UNDERSTANDING THE APPLICATION OF THE ARMY'S LOGISTICS CIVIL AUGMENTATION PROGRAM (LOGCAP)

BY

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Understanding the Application of the Army's Logistics Civil Augmentation Program (LOGCAP)

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COL David W. Russell

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ABSTRACT

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The U.S. Army has commercially contracted for logistics and engineering support almost since its existence. LOGCAP is the Army's current method of out-sourcing for selected combat support and combat service support (CS and CSS) to meet the needs of warfighting commanders. The major difference between LOGCAP and previous commercial contract support is that LOGCAP uses an umbrella concept to obtain a wide range of support under one contract. For the first time in Army history, this type of support is centralized at the Army level for management and execution. LOGCAP is another tool available to the warfighting commander to fill requirements that can not be supported by available forces or wartime host nation support (WHNS). Since the first LOGCAP umbrella contract was awarded in 1992, it has been executed on numerous Army operations, ranging from Somalia to Bosnia. During each operation, success only came after commanders in the theater tackled a steep learning curve by completing on-the-job-training. How can we get the most out of this program without experiencing the same problems each time the program is executed? This paper will explore existing LOGCAP issues for the purpose of getting a better understanding of the program and future actions that are necessary to increase efficiency.
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Although the 21st Century is approximately three years away, in many respects the U.S. Army started the new century shortly after Operation Desert Storm. Up to this point the Army has been successful in its mission of fighting and winning America’s wars, to include the Cold War. Since the free world is no longer being faced with a significant single military threat, the Army has been able to charter a course of downsizing from 18 to 10 active combat divisions. At the same time a new phenomenon has occurred which expands the Army single focus of warfighting to include a complex function called military operations other than war (MOOTW).

One of the unique aspects of MOOTW has been of the previous emphases given to combat forces are now being shifted to combat support and combat service support units. These units are in great demand due to their capability to provide the support needed during MOOTW. Earlier it was stated that the Army had downsized the number of active combat divisions. As for the combat support and combat service support force structure, downsizing started shortly after the Vietnam Conflict. More than seventy-five percent of this force structure has been moved to the Army Reserves and National Guards. As a result, the current combat support and combat service support force structure can not adequately support all the real world requirements for wartime and MOOTW.

Two assumptions are made with a certain degree of assurance— the Army’s force structure will not grow larger to accommodate the force structure shortfall and combat forces will not sacrifice warfighting capabilities to increase support capabilities. One of the solutions to help reduces the impact of combat support and combat service support shortfall has been the use of the Logistics Civilian Augmentation Program (LOGCAP). LOGCAP is a capstone program that includes all pre-planned logistics and engineering contingency contracts that are awarded as peacetime contracts with contingency clauses.¹ This simply means civilian contractors will be
used to assist in providing logistical support during military operations. This assistance will be pre-planned just as any other contingency plans waiting on the shelf for execution.

Although LOGCAP was not used during Operations Desert Storm, it has been used in six subsequent operations ranging from Operation Restore Hope in Somalia to Operation Joint Endeavor in Hungary, Croatia, and Bosnia. The diversity and success of these operations proved LOGCAP to be a viable supplementary option. As will be discussed later in the research, outsourcing selected logistical operations is not something new to the Army; however, the newness comes in the method in which LOGCAP is executed.

The purpose of this paper is to look at the use of LOGCAP as an additional facet in Army logistical operations and the need for Army leadership at various levels to understand the LOGCAP concept for efficient implementation. After reviewing several Army operations that used LOGCAP, we will address several issues to include problem areas and possible corrective actions. Additionally we will look at the LOGCAP management transition from the US Army Corps of Engineers to the US Army Materiel Command. This review will include the future direction for LOGCAP.

Background

The concept of contracting for logistical and engineering support is not new to the American Army. In fact the concept goes as far back as the American Revolutionary War. From that time through World War II civilian contracted support was a given element of the military that was used both in peacetime and wartime. Support was acquired at whatever location the military force was positioned. This type of logistical operation proved to be adequate because most available manpower could be dedicated to training and executing warfighting, and less
manpower dedicated to providing support. As it can be determined from this point, it was each individual unit’s responsibility to augment its depot issued basic stocks with local procurements.

The Vietnam Conflict was the first significant change in nearly 200 years in contracting for support. Very early on during the conflict it was known that the logistical and engineering force structure to execute successful support operations did not exist in the active military; however, the necessary force structure did exist in the Army Reserves. The political decision was made by the president that reserve units would not be called-up to participate in the conflict Because South Vietnam and U.S. allies participating in the conflict were unable to assist the American forces with support, contracting for support was the only alternative to bridge the existing shortfall. Although contractors were not able to completely fill the shortfall, they able to provide a substantial amount of engineering support at the various port facilities and to provide some logistical support such as transportation, maintenance, and supply.²

During the 45 years to follow World War II, with the exception of the Vietnam Conflict, the U.S. military strategy evolved using forward-basing. In forward-basing, units are permanently deployed in a given theater where they are expected to fight during hostilities. As a result, Army combat forces have the prescribed level of combat support and combat service support (CS/CSS) units deployed forward as well. During hostilities, augmenting continental United States (CONUS) forces receives a large amount of its logistical and engineering support from pre-positioned equipment and stocks, and wartime host nation support (WHNS). Heavy emphasis is given to developing WHNS because these civilian resources are already in theater and can be acquired rapidly. As the military strategy has evolved from forward-basing to
forward-presence, some of the in-theater resources, such as CS/CSS units, are no longer available. Wherever possible, the U.S. tries to replace lost resources with more WHNS.

Until 1985, local commanders had the authority and were expected to coordinate for commercial support whenever a shortfall existed between requirements and provisions made by available higher commands. In 1985, the Army formalized the concept called Logistics Civil Augmentation Program (LOGCAP). The initial concept gave each Army component of the regional unified commands the authority and resources to contract for supply and service requirements that could not be met through the normal Army channels. The authority no longer resided with each local commander. The Army published AR 700-137, LOGCAP, as the guide for Army Service Component Commanders (ASCC) to follow.3

In 1988, the Third U.S. Army (TUSA) requested the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers (USACE), Transatlantic Division, serve as the contracting agent for a Southwest Asia project. TUSA wanted USACE to develop a LOGCAP management plan for a civilian contractor to construct and maintain two petroleum pipelines (Inland Petroleum Distribution System) which could be used both in peacetime and wartime. The plan was developed, but not executed during Operations Desert Shield/Storm. This became USACE first tasking as the LOGCAP contracting activity and program manager.4

**LOGCAP**

A significant change in the management of LOGCAP occurred in 1992. The program was no longer decentralized with each Army service component commander functioning as the Army proponent as well as the program manager. At this point it was clear to the entire Army that the Department of the Army Deputy Chief of Staff for Logistics (DA DCSLOG) was and
continues to be the Army proponent for LOGCAP. USACE was the single contracting activity and program manager for LOGCAP planning and execution. In essence, LOGCAP has moved from being decentralized to being centralized.  

A true test for the new centralized LOGCAP concept occurred the same year. USACE was directed to award an “Umbrella Support Contract” which would be an advanced acquisition plan that could executed for war as well as MOOTW. An “Umbrella Support Contract” is a Department of the Army (DA) level contract that is aimed at peacetime contingency planning for logistical and engineering services to augment other capabilities in support of the combatant commander’s requirement. The centralized funding only paid for the contractor’s planning effort; if the contract was executed for a contingency mission, the appropriate Army service component commander would be responsible for funding.  

The first contract under this concept was awarded to the Brown & Root Services Corporation (BRSC) of Houston, Texas. The contract was unique in many respects because of its broad approach. Major requirements for the contractor are provided below:  

--develop a worldwide management plan which had the capability to be executed anywhere in the world in support of the prescribe force  

--develop 13 country specific plans using specific planning data provided by the regional commanders  

--world wide and regional plans to be updated annually  

--develop a worldwide database of potential support sources  

--participate in at least two exercises annually  

--execute plan upon alert notification
The scope of the above planning provided the following base camp equipment and supporting services for a force up to 20,000 soldiers:

--deploy advance party (contractor) within 72 hours of notification and first base camp operational on Day-16

--construct five base camps (completely operational on Day-31)

- one rear support area
- one sea port of debarkation (SPOD)
- two air port of debarkation (APOD)(1-primary, 1-secondary)
- four forward support areas

Each of these operations are turn-key facilities. The contractor is completely responsible for the operation of these facilities. The contractor provides billeting, showers, meals, laundry, utilities, potable water, sanitation, maintenance, and other support.

**LOGCAP Requirement**

Since LOGCAP has been centralized and a contract awarded, is there a real requirement that will the sustain the program? Is LOGCAP a short-term fix to a logistical problem? The world in changing more rapidly today than it ever has in history. Most of these changes have occurred as a result of the vast amount of information that is available. Yet there are laws of nature that keep selected elements about the same. In the area of warfighting there has been so many progressions; yet one law remain constant, an army can not fight any further or longer than it has the ability to logistically sustain itself. During Operations Desert Shield/Storm most world leaders and military were impressed with the U.S. weaponry, but they were most amazed at the
U.S. ability to project power and sustain the force. In many respects logistical operations can be seen as a center of gravity.

Army doctrine supports the claim of importance for logistics, but the active logistical force structure is limited with approximately one-fourth of the CS/CSS force structure in the active component and three-fourth being in the Army Reserves and National Guard⁹. The Reserves and National Guard provide most of the corps and theater level logistical units. The earliest that most of these units are available is between Day-30 to Day-60, but may be as late as Day-120.

There are no indications that the CS/CSS force structure will improve in regards to its ratio of active units to reserves units. This points to the need for support outside of the U.S. military. As previously stated, the U.S. Army is heavily relying on wartime host nation support (WHNS) in providing the necessary logistical and engineering support that is not available from any other sources. WHNS can not replace or substitute for force structure, but simply augment the Army’s capability to prosecute war. Yet in reality when closely looking at the U.S. Army in Germany, Japan, and Korea, CS/CSS force structure has been reduced and combat force structure increased because of the availability of WHNS. This has both advantages and disadvantages for the warfighting Commander in Chiefs (CINCs) to conduct war. Just in a broad sense the CINC's have more flexibility and combat firepower, but they are more dependent on host nations to support their combat forces. This new level of dependency may make it more difficult to sustain initial operations without the logistical assistance of host nations. Regardless, strategically the U.S. has accepted the risk and relies on WHNS whenever available or more economical.
The CINC's responsible for aforementioned regions are not been involved in warfighting in those countries, but instead conducting MOOTW in their regions where WHNS is not available. Their requests for CS/CSS units are partially honored because requested units were unable to arrive within the time needed or just were not available to support the mission. The next available option was the use of LOGCAP or contingency contracting. Contingency contracting or civil augmentation, although heavily used during Operations Desert Shield/Storm, is decentralized and in the future may prove to be an alternative to LOGCAP. For now LOGCAP will be the standard for contract support. Up-coming discussions will reveal that LOGCAP is a viable option to consider when other alternatives are not available or limited in the capability to provide results.

Operations in Somalia

Within two years after the U.S. and coalition forces were successful in defeating the enemy in Operation Desert Storm, the post-Cold War era ushered in the growing need for peace operations. Prior to this time, such operations were infrequent because for the most part the world was divided into two camps, a democratic society and a socialist society. Generally, each camp was responsible for resolving differences within its sphere. In the post-Cold War era, Somalia was a unique country because previously both camps had courted her because of its strategic location in relationship to the Horn of Africa. The changing world toward the end of the Cold War saw Somalia lose most of its importance to the combatant countries. At this point the entire country declined into a chaotic state ran by warring factions.
When the U.S. introduced military forces into Somalia, it was the result of pressure to arrest the growing deaths attributed to famine, warring factions, and the lack of a central government. By the conclusion of Somalia operations, there were three distinct phases:

- **Operation Provide Relief**: An airlift mission solely dedicated to providing humanitarian assistance.
- **Operation Restore Hope**: A two-part mission designed to provide humanitarian assistance and military operations to improve security for relief efforts.
- **Operation USFORSOM**: Efforts specifically aimed toward peace enforcement and nation-building.

The remainder of this section will look at Operation Restore Hope because Army forces were in-country and required logistical support throughout the phase.

Once the political decision was made to put American forces in Somalia, military planners determined there was no infrastructure in-country to support military operations. Additionally there was no possibility for host nation support because no central government existed in order to conduct negotiations. Nor was there any support agreement with any of neighboring countries. As a result the only other alternative in augmenting CS/CSS units, was the employment of LOGCAP. Brown & Root Service Corporation (BRSC) and USACE had negotiated a LOGCAP contract just four months earlier. In accordance with the LOGCAP contract, BRSC developed a support plan for Somalia. Operation Restore Hope appeared to be a good opportunity to execute for the first time the concept of LOGCAP because it was labeled as a humanitarian operation. Once the decision was made to execute the LOGCAP support plan developed by BRSC, the contractor was able to employ a team within the 72-hour requirement.
The implementation of LOGCAP for this operation was a trip into uncharted territory. However, because BRSC is a global company, it had resources in more than thirty countries. This meant even in an austere environment the company had more flexibility to obtain logistic and engineering support or sub-contracts than most any one country could attempt to obtain.

At the conclusion of Operation Restore Hope (Phase II, U.S. JTF) and Operation USFORSOM (Phase III, UN operation), Brown & Root Service Corporation had been successful in providing logistical and engineering support to the U.S. and UN forces. At the end of the mission, contract support completely replaced the U.S. Logistics Support Command. In keeping with the contract, BRSC provided the following support at a cost of $106M ($63M--U.S., $43M-UN)\textsuperscript{12}:

- base camp construction and maintenance
- food supply and services
- laundry/field showers/latrines
- power production and generator repair
- water production/storage/distribution
- sewage and solid waste removal
- receive/store/issue bulk fuel
- local and line haul for passengers and cargo
- linguist support

Somalia was the first military operation to execute LOGCAP and as a result, along with all the successes, there were problem areas. Initially most military parties agreed that LOGCAP was the most efficient means to augment CS/CSS units in supporting the mission.
Notwithstanding, resources were not specifically identified to be used for LOGCAP. The concept identified the regional Army service component command as being responsible for funding the program when executed. In this case the command was expected to use its existing resources to finance the contract. Because the Army was slow in providing the funding up front, the contractor was not able to fully execute the plan as earlier briefed to the Army. This meant the contractor had to reduce the level of support that could be made available.\textsuperscript{13}

Another important problem for the contractor was the length of the operation. The contractor did not have a specific time-table for the operation. The operation could last from a few months to several years. Such a wide span of time made it difficult for the contractor to determine the level of investment that needed to be made in building an infrastructure as well as the size of the local workforce that would be needed to support the plan. Additionally it made it difficult in determining the amount of supplies and materiel that were needed in theater to meet the demands without having high levels of excess.\textsuperscript{14}

There are other issues identified during the operation, but the most important fact to result from these operations was that LOGCAP is an option that can be exercised to augment existing support capabilities. Problems experienced in Somalia were lessons learned that could be applied to corrective action for future employment of LOGCAP.

\textbf{Operations in Hungary, Croatia, and Bosnia}

Before the validation of LOGCAP in Somalia, there were those that questioned the future of the program, and whether or not the Army could afford the expense associated with using contractors. The answer to both comments is yes. Brown & Root has deployed the LOGCAP cadre on five other operations since the mission in Somalia:

- Operation Support Hope in Rwanda, FY 94
Operation Uphold Democracy in Haiti, FY 94
Operation Vigilant Warrior in Southwest Asia, FY95
Operation Deny Flight in Italy, FY96
Operation Joint Endeavor in Bosnia, Croatia, and Hungary, FY95

Each of the operations provided valuable building blocks for improving LOGCAP. Several of the operations were single focus such as producing potable water in Rwanda or operating and maintaining base camps in Italy. These operations were key in building toward Operation Joint Endeavor because of their orientation to support light infantry and airborne forces. For the first the program would be tailored to support heavy forces, mechanized infantry and armored.¹⁵

Operation Joint Endeavor (OJE) is a direct result of the 1995 Dayton Peace Accord. The U.S. Army, Europe was identified to provide the bulk of the forces required for this peacekeeping mission. Although the plan called for troops to be stationed in several countries, the majority of combat forces would be deployed to Bosnia with a task of maintaining a predetermind buffer zone between warring factions. The troop ceiling for the command was 25,000 for ground forces. This was approximately sixty-five percent of the requested troop strength. The actual troop level made a small increase to approximately 27,000--19,000 in Bosnia, 2,000 in Croatia, 5,000 in Hungary, and 1,000 in Italy. Within this ceiling the president authorized the call-up 4,300 reservists (3,888 Army reservists). Regardless to the troop ceiling, a minimum of 20,000 combat soldiers were needed to maintain the 1,200 mile buffer zone between warring factions.¹⁶

The combat troop level is important because it dictates all the varying support requirements. Also the limitations in using the Reserves reduce their role in the operation and the availability of the more than seventy percent of CS/CSS force structure. A third issue that
impact on the operation is host nation support (HNS). Prior to the peace accord, no HNS agreement existed between the U.S. and any of the involved countries because of their recent history of being members of the Soviet bloc. Considering all these issues, LOGCAP was the most viable option in augmenting the CS/CSS force structure.

During the planning phase, planners agreed with the contractor that 12 base camps would be established to support operations, but later the command increased the number of base camps from 12 to 33—7 camps for intermediate support base (Hungary), 2 camps for staging area (Croatia), and 24 camps for field operations (Bosnia).\textsuperscript{17} The increase in camps were attributable to terrain conditions, road network supporting the camps, and the need to distribute U.S. forces in each of the former warring factions sectors.\textsuperscript{18} Support in these camps are very similar to the support provided in Somalia:\textsuperscript{19}

- Facilities (construct, upgrade, operate, and maintain base camps)
- Supplies (fuel, water, non-tactical equipment, and construction materiel)
- Services (food, laundry, showers, and sanitation services)
- Maintenance (non-military vehicles and equipment)
- Transportation (administrative transport of personnel, cargo, and mail)

Additionally the contractor had the responsibility for railhead and seaport operations that included container handling support.

This broad brush of the LOGCAP contractor's responsibilities may appear to be simple and straightforward, but there are many moving parts that any one of them could be damaging to the overall mission. At the peak of operations, the LOGCAP contractor personnel strength was
approximately 6,766--1,288 U.S. nationals and 5,478 local nationals. These numbers do not include personnel strengths of sub-contractors that provided support.\textsuperscript{20}

The support being provided by LOGCAP for OJE is the most extensive since the conception of LOGCAP. All previous operations had significant number of lessons learned, and where possible, were implemented during OJE. However, because of the magnitude of the operation, the experiences gained and correction of shortfalls will elevate LOGCAP to being a more efficient and effective program.

As with any operation, especially MOOTW, cost estimates as well as the actual cost are important factors that have an important role in the decision-making process. The initial estimate for OJE LOGCAP operation was $350M to operate 14 base camps for one year. The actual cost after one year was approximately $500M. The increase in cost is the result of the change to the scope of work and the increase in requirements. In addition to the increase in camps, several of the sites selected for camps required more preparation than initially planned. Several of the initial camps erected by the military engineers were repaired or rebuilt due to terrain changes caused by changes in the weather conditions. Although there was a significant increase in work as requirements for more construction materiel, the contractor was directed to adhere to the original time schedule for completing camp construction. This increased the cost because construction materiel was be transported to theater by air rather than by surface as originally planned. Second, Hungary did not recognize the contractor as part of the military and as a result not considered to be a part of the status of forces’ agreement. This meant the contractor had to pay tariffs on all goods bought into the country and levied value-added taxes on all goods and services produced in the country. Again all these costs were past on to the Army.\textsuperscript{21}
There are studies and analyses concerning logistical operations for OJE and most reach similar conclusions on the strengths and weaknesses. Some of the observations made are provided below:\textsuperscript{22}

- USAREUR executed its own planning process to determine whether or not to use LOGCAP in augmenting shortfalls in CS/CSS requirements due to force capacity constraints, overall shortfall in the CS/CSS force structure, and the call-up for the reserve component.

- LOGCAP was used; however, during the initial phases the command was slow in integrating the contractor into the planning process or the daily operational updates. This may be attributable to a lack of understanding the role of the contractor and the need to be integrated in the overall operation.

- The military officers that interfaced with LOGCAP did not have guides or references to assist them in accomplishing their tasks.

- The standard of living rapidly elevated to tier 3, tents with hard floors and pre-fabricated building with climate controls capability. Without this quality of life issue being known in the initial planning, the contractor had to expedite shipments of materiel to the theater by air rather than by surface as previously planned. This increased the cost of some materiel by 400 percent.

- The LOGCAP contractor was delayed while waiting for materiel and supplies to arrive in theater. It is the contractor’s responsibility to deploy his equipment, materiel, and supplies into theater. This may pose a problem because the contractor is competing with the military for the same APOD(s) and SPOD(s).
Conclusion

During the last five years, the Army has undergone several significant changes that have made the institution more efficient and effective in accomplishing the mission of winning America's wars. LOGCAP is one such change validated during six different operations over the past five years. LOGCAP is not the panacea to the Army's shortfall in meeting logistical requirements, but instead as another logistical capability for the warfighting CINC. LOGCAP as a concept may not always exist as an option; however, we can accurately assume that some form of civilian augmentation in the theater of operation during wartime or peacetime will be an option that CINCs include in most of their deliberate planning. The challenge the Army has is to adequately prepare its leaders in the application of LOGCAP or contract support. DA ODCSLOG and USAMC are leaning forward to correct identified shortcomings in the program, but much of the knowledge to be gained must be available to those that are expected to execute the plan.

When should the decision be made to use LOGCAP? Although the concept itself is DA centralized, there has not been a published official process to apply in assisting in the decision-making process. Since the deployment in support of OJE, DA ODCSLOG has developed a decision-making process to be used in assisting the CINC or ASCC staff in using force structure, host nation support, civil augmentation program, or a combination of any of the three. This process should be widely disseminated to ensure that all parties are using the same reference point. More important the process is formalized to provide the necessary guide. The processes ask basic questions that provide direction as well identify where problem areas are located. The decision process is as follows:
Once a logistical requirement is identified in support of a military operation, staff planners can consider selected factors.

Are the type forces required in the structure? Are these forces available?

Is there a troop ceiling that may reduce the size of the necessary support force?

What is the level of risk to deploying personnel?

Will there be adequate strategic lift to move the support force?

Will this mission be a doctrinal employment (combat operation)?

Will the quality of life standard be higher than support units can maintain?

What is the estimated cost of the support operation?

If the decision is made that military forces are not the optimal choice or only part of the optimal choice, the next major factor is to consider host nation support (HNS).

Is there an agreement in place for the involved country to provide host nation support?

Does the host nation have the resources to provide the required support?

Does the host nation have the means to execute the support?

If the decision is made that HNS is not the optimal choice or only part of the optimal choice, the next factor to consider is LOGCAP or some other form of contracting.

Once the process is complete, the solution may be a hybrid of one, two, or three of the choices.

If the choice is made to use HNS or some type of civilian augmentation, some type of CS/CSS force must also be in the area of operations and the Army is required to provide protection for civilian.
Another shortcoming that exists in the application of LOGCAP is the failure to provide overall training to officers that are expected to execute the program or possibly another civil augmentation program. There are several areas that are being reviewed for possible changes; however, additional factors need to be considered. During all six LOGCAP operations, officers that had direct interface with the contractor learned how to conduct business through on-the-job-training. In most instances the officers did not have any knowledge or limited knowledge in executing the program. The learning curve in these situations was almost vertical and must be accomplished in a short period of time. Additionally while the on-the-job-training is occurring, a commander may make inappropriate decisions that may be costly, but provide no added benefit to the operation. The contractor will make every attempt to meet a new timeline, but the additional costs that are incurred by the contractor are past on to the Army.

Regardless to whether it is LOGCAP or another civil augmentation program, contracting for support can be expensive. Often the contractor can provide support more economically than Army units; however, the company is still in business to make a profit. In the case of LOGCAP, the contractor is awarded a firm fixed price contract for planning and a cost reimbursement plus award fee contract during execution. The award fee can be as high as 10 percent, depending on the evaluation of the quality of support provided. Below are the costs associated with LOGCAP operations:

<table>
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<th>Country</th>
<th>Amount</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Somalia</td>
<td>$62.8M</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rwanda</td>
<td>$6.3M</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Haiti</td>
<td>$133M</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Saudi Arabia</td>
<td>$5.1M</td>
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</table>
Italy $6.3M
Bosnia $500M (as of Jan 97)
Total $713.5M

Future LOGCAP operations will be executed somewhat different in that USAMC regional Logistics Support Element (LSE) commander will function as the central focal point for the program in the contingency area of operation. The LSE commander will serve as the interface between the contractor and the responsible command. This is an important change that will improve the program execution, but the fact remains that all officers and senior noncommissioned officers should have a working knowledge and understanding of LOGCAP and contracting support. There may be a situation that a command may opt not to go with LOGCAP, but instead use another civil augmentation in which LSE is not involved. During an interview with the previous LOGCAP program manager, Mr. Robert Gruber, revealed that one of the most important problem that continues to occur is the failure of military officers to understand the difference between contract support and military support, the contractor’s capabilities, and the role of the contracting officer’s representative (COR). The contractor and the COR are often not included in the planning or daily updates, but expected to provide support without having input.

TRADOC is correcting the problem by introducing instruction at various schools such as the different senior service colleges and intermediate level schools. However, LOGCAP and decentralized contract support need to be introduced as early as the basic and advanced officer courses, and the basic and advanced noncommissioned officer courses. This is an important step because these soldiers will experience some form of civil augmentation throughout their careers.
Army leaders must be equipped with adequate doctrinal knowledge on how to efficiently choose, employ, and maintain a LOGCAP operation. Additionally some form of organized training should be provided to the LOGCAP contractor in order to assist in having a better understanding of the Army in which he is being contracted to support. A publication should be developed for contractors that have received a decentralized contract for augmentation support. Although the current published doctrine is outdated, DA ODCSLOG, USAMC, and the Combined Arms Support Command (CASCOM) are in the process of updating all applicable publications.

Operation Joint Endeavor has been and continues to be an excellent vehicle to refine the LOGCAP concept, and DA ODCSLOG and USAMC are incorporating lesson learned to make further improvements. The newly created role of the LSE commander will aid the regional commander in the use of the program as well as assist in development of a quality statement of work that can become part of the deliberate planning. LOGCAP will continue to improve.

LOGCAP or some other form civil augmentation will be forever a part of the Army’s alternatives in providing logistical or engineering support. The program has proven to be a success. Yet it must never be forgotten that a civil augmentation program is a force multiplier, not a force replacement. Augmentation is key in defining the program’s capability. Less than 25 percent of the CS/CSS force structure is part of the active component, with the remaining being in the reserves or guards. The active component CS/CSS is mostly dedicated to active combat divisions and a small portion dedicated to corps and theater levels. These are the logistical units that are most available to deploy in support of a contingency mission and provide the initial support needed to flow into theater the combat forces. During the first 30 days of an operation, any civil augmentation has very limited capability to support the force. The augmentation
capability starts to mature between Day-30 and Day-60. Also the contractor is relying on sub-contractors to assist in accomplishing the contract. If a sub-contractor falters, the contractor can be delayed even further.

The active component CS/CSS force structure is critical for the first 30 days of an operation. Presently, there is no alternative to force structure during this period. Reserves are not available until approximately 30 days into the operation, approximately the same time a contractor is operational. Host nation support can not execute until some part of the CS/CSS force structure is available to oversee and direct the support. Regardless to the augmentation, it is essential for an element of the CS/CSS units to be in the theater.

LOGCAP is an alternative that must be applied when appropriate. It is not a panacea nor can it support all missions. It can provide flexibility in accomplishing many of the logistical tasks and be the most economical and efficient means. The program can be used to reduce the requirements to activate the National Guards and the Army Reserves for MOOTW. At the same time, the civil augmentation can invigorate a host nation economy by creating jobs. Furthermore, it can mitigate negative reaction from the local nationals by minimizing the U.S. Army presence. There is ample justifications to maintain LOGCAP; however, the Army must be trained on its proper applicable in order to ensure the programs provide the most efficient and effective service at the most economical cost.
ENDNOTES


4 Ibid.

5 Ibid., 3.


8 Ibid.


11 Clow, 12.

12 Jones, chart 7.

13 Clow, 14.

14 Ibid., 16.


17 Logistics Management Institute, 15-16.
18 General Accounting Office, 17.
19 Logistics Management Institute, 15.
20 Ibid., 15.
21 Ibid., 21.
23 Jones, chart 10.
24 BDM, 2-1, 2-6.
25 Logistics Management Institute, 8.
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