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ANALYSIS OF THE BOTTOM-UP REVIEW (BUR) AND RECOMMENDATIONS TO THE QUADRENNIAL DEFENSE REVIEW (QDR) PANEL

BY

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ABSTRACT

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In light of the significant changes in the international security environment resulting from the dissolution of the Soviet Union and declining resources available for defense needs, the Department of Defense (DoD) has examined U.S. defense strategy, force levels, and budgetary requirements for the post-Cold War era. In 1991, President Bush presented a defense plan reflecting a shift in U.S. strategy from preparing for a global war in Europe against the Soviet Union to preparing for major regional conflicts against uncertain adversaries. The structure from this defensive plan became known as the base force until the Clinton Administration took over in 1993. Once again the DoD reviewed the nation's defense strategy, force structure, modernization, infrastructure, foundations, and resources needed for the post-Cold War era. Their efforts produced a document called the Bottom-Up Review (BUR) which continued to focus on regional threats; however, it de-emphasized the possibility of a reemerging Soviet threat. In its place, the BUR came up with a two major regional contingency (MRC) strategy. This paper analyzes the BUR with particular focus on its shortfalls. The paper further outlines several recommendations the Quadrennial Defense Review (QDR) panel should consider which will produce the appropriate changes that reflect the world of today, not yesterday.
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"In other respects, the Unites States at the end of the Cold War looked frustratingly as it had at the end of WWII. The WWII Army had been on the same kinds of ideas about structure and decision making that the great industrialists had used to build American industry. Over the intervening years, it had become more and more layered with expensive, time consuming bureaucracy that had added enormous cost, slowed down innovation, and made it harder and harder to respond effectively to change. Our ideas about structure and process were very fixed. The Army was good—very good—at gradual change, but it was poorly prepared to handle the avalanche of change thrust upon it as the Cold War came to a close."

I. INTRODUCTION

The most significant transformation is that the United States, and all of the nations of the world, are no longer threatened by fear of a world conflagration, possibly ignited by a small spark in some seemingly obscure location. The collapse of the Soviet Union and fall of Communism have, however, resulted in strife and turmoil in many parts of the world. Fortunately, there is no resultant entity capable of replacing the former Soviet Union as a formidable military power with an ideology advocating world dominance with coercion and military force as its primary instrument for exerting its will.

In light of the significant changes in the international security environment resulting from the dissolution of the Soviet Union and declining resources available for defense needs, the Department of Defense (DoD) has examined U.S. defense strategy, force levels, and budgetary requirements for the post-Cold War era. In 1991, President Bush presented a defense plan reflecting a shift in U.S. strategy from preparing for a global war in Europe against the Soviet Union to preparing for major regional conflicts against uncertain adversaries. This volatile
geopolitical situation resulted in a plan which proposed a significant reduction in force structure (a decline in "real spending of 35% from its Reagan-era peak of FY85 and a reduction in active duty personnel from 2.1 million to approximately 1.6 million"), or *base force*, but retained sufficient forces to counter a possible reemergence of the Soviet threat. A major problem the Bush Administration had in the post-Cold War, after four plus decades of containing the Soviet Union, was explaining to the American people and Congress the actual threat to the United States. As General Colin Powell put it, "We no longer have the luxury of having a threat to plan for... I'm running out of demons."\(^3\)

After the Clinton Administration took over in 1993, the new Secretary of Defense (Les Aspin) reassessed U.S. defense requirements in an effort referred to as DoD's Bottom-Up Review (BUR). This review examined the nation's defense strategy, force structure, modernization, infrastructure, foundations, and resources needed for the post-Cold War era. As a result of the BUR, DoD continued to focus U.S. strategy on regional threats; however, it de-emphasized the possibility of a reemerging Soviet threat and reduced U.S. forces to levels smaller than the *base force*. Currently, the Pentagon’s Quadrennial Defense Review (QDR) is under way with a completion date of May 1997. Its purpose is to provide a comprehensive examination of the Active, Guard, and Reserve Components; force modernization plans; infrastructure; readiness; and other elements of the Clinton administration’s defense program.

The author will analyze the BUR and identify some of the key advantages as well as point out some of its shortfalls. One of the biggest shortfalls contained in the document is its two major regional contingency (MRC) strategy, to include some of the assumptions it made to make it a viable concept. Since the two-MRC strategy is the most controversial concept of the BUR, I
will spend some time analyzing this strategy. Finally, I will translate these shortfalls into recommendations that the QDR panel should consider which will produce the appropriate changes that reflect the world of today, not yesterday. The new strategic conditions and threats, combined with the sharp decline in resources available to defense, require changes in military forces to ensure they are not hollowed out nor ineffective when next called upon.

Since the QDR is ongoing and new information continues to surface, some comments or recommendations in this paper may contradict the latest information generated from the QDR panel.

II. Bottom-Up Review (BUR) Analysis

The National Security Strategy (NSS) 1996 established three viable objectives. The National Military Strategy (NMS) 1995 in turn developed two feasible objectives to support the NSS. The BUR clearly states,

"...the United States must field forces capable, in concert with its allies, of fighting and winning two major regional conflicts that occur nearly simultaneously...so long as we implement a series of critical force enhancements to improve our strategic mobility and strengthen our early-arriving antiarmor capability and take other steps to ensure our ability to halt regional aggression quickly."

The central feature of the BUR, around which all else revolved, was the determination that American military forces needed to be sized, structured, organized, and equipped to fight and win two MRCs that occur nearly simultaneously. If one has to grade the BUR, the major lesson learned was that the original BUR force has worked. True, it has not been called upon to fight
and win two MRCs, and there is still considerable debate as to whether it is sized and equipped to do so. Its ability to respond to the challenge faced by the first Clinton Administration, including Korea and the Persian Gulf, the two-MRC approach has worked in three somewhat subtle ways:

a. Sizing the current military force to the two-MRC scenario not only saved the taxpayers billions of dollars compared to President Bush’s Base Force, but it retained a wide range of options in responding to international events.7

b. International troublemakers must measure their movements carefully as America has remained able to respond in new locations even if significantly engaged somewhere else. Should war erupt in one theater, potential aggressors in another cannot assume they have a greater freedom of action because the United States is already fully committed; thus, it enhances strategic stability. A military force of this size is essential to maintaining the credibility of our foreign policy. Capable and ready military forces, combined with the credible threat of their use when necessary to defend our national security interests, serve to deter conflict. Without both a credible foreign policy and a strong military force, the ability of the U.S. to shape the future course of world events will be severely hampered.

c. This capability facilitates decisive action when circumstances demand it. Committing forces to fight a MRC such as Desert Storm would be enormously more difficult if the President and Congress had to worry that those forces would be left vulnerable should circumstances then demand a major response elsewhere.

On the negative side, despite what many state, the BUR is not a strategy. The nation has a security strategy known as “Engagement and Enlargement,” and in support of that it has a NMS. Regrettably, the two-MRC requirement has so fully captured the attention of many, including planners within DoD, that we run the risk of designing and equipping forces that may be less capable of dealing with the day-to-day demands of today’s global security environment.

The BUR document substantiates the two-MRC strategy on a fixed scenario using the Persian Gulf (requiring heavy armor and mechanized units) and the Korean (dealing with lighter forces) conflicts. It is also clear that once a single MRC capability is fully engaged, the United
States does not want another potential aggressor in a different region to take advantage of the situation. This rationale ensures that the United States will have sufficient military capabilities to defend against a coalition of hostile powers or a larger, more capable adversary than is foreseen today. Plus, it ensures a positive credible posture when dealing with our allies. This is a very cautious outlook to base a strategy on but this “worst case” scenario has a very low probability of occurring. Some people would question the two MRC strategy on the basis of our history; the last time the United States had to face such a challenge was World War II which consisted of a “win (defeat Germany) hold (occupy Japan until Germany falls) win (then defeat Japan) strategy. The argument then becomes the validity of the MRC planning assumption; are we developing a force structure built on a possibility, a low one at best?

This brings us to the first big, if not the main, shortfall in the BUR and that is the question of—What is the threat? While there has been an understandable focus on Northeast and Southwest Asia in recent years, “the military, as always, continues to prepare to fight the last war.” This thought process causes a disconnect between the NMS and the security threats outlined in the BUR that face the United States. The potential threats to our national security today differ from those of the Cold War, they are less easily deterred by traditional means and often less easily defeated. The U.S. must deal with a wide range of “lesser” threats throughout the world, while recognizing that larger threats that are impossible to anticipate with any degree of certainty will eventually emerge. The ten “new dangers” in the post Cold War era, as outlined by then secretary of Defense Les Aspin, were:

“a collapse of order and reform in the former Soviet Union; threats to democratic and civil order in the developing world; a weak domestic economy; lack of international competitiveness; a lack of environmental security; proliferation of weapons of mass destruction from Moscow’s central control to the newly independent states or to a terrorist abroad;
proliferation of such weapons to other countries; state-sponsored terrorism; ethnic, religious and internal conflict; and large scale aggression or intimidation, like Iraq’s invasion of Kuwait."9

In reality, the BUR’s massive force level designs are coping with only one (probably the least realistic) item on the list; two simultaneous Iraq style wars of aggression requiring U. S. troops in two different regions of the world. Unfortunately, planning to fight another Gulf War scenario assumes America’s foes learned nothing at all from Sadam Hussein’s failed strategy. “Massed tank armies are not the way to take over small countries that happen to be American allies—far better to launch ambiguous takeovers behind smoke screens of liberation movements or uncontrolled dissident groups or native putsch-makers.”10

Opponents of the current two-MRC strategy would say our next adversaries will be cognizant of Iraq’s mistakes by: making sure they intermingle their forces with civilians to render American bombing politically unattractive, playing on American sensitivity to causalities, possessing a better equipped and trained enemy forces (to include using weapons of mass destruction to scare off America’s allies), and possibly using more ambiguous forms of aggression. All this leads one to ask are the military planners making a rule out of an exception when it comes to the two MRC strategy. Looking at the last four years, the military has engaged in domestic disaster support (e.g. fire fighting, hurricane recovery), peace operations, humanitarian intervention, and anti-drug operations. For example, the United States has sent forces: to feed the hungry in Somalia and in the former Soviet Union, to intercept drug smugglers and Haitian refugees in the Caribbean, to enforce air embargoes over Iraq and Bosnia, and to patrol the border of Macedonia and the waters of the Persian Gulf. Army planners report “the United States has deployed 16-22,000 soldiers a day on such operations in
up to 75 countries in the past year.” Reversals in Somalia and Haiti produced sobering affects on the administration with respect to the usefulness of such activities, but clearly, if the past is any guide to sizing, planning and staffing forces for our future conflict, then I say we are likely to waste significant resources in preparing the wrong kind of military for the wrong kind of missions. In a recent article, Senator John McCain said, “...change the strategy, accepting a higher level of risk. We need to redefine the mission of the armed forces...to maintain capability for dealing with the crisis around the world.” Senator McCain went on to say a single MRC was a lot more probable than the current two-MRC strategy.

In summary, three threats seem to pose the biggest near-term concern to the U.S. The first one, and probably the most serious, is proliferation of weapons of mass destruction (WMD), and the means to deliver them. Despite a great deal of attention devoted to strengthening non-proliferation regimes and export controls, many nations have succeeded in acquiring nuclear, biological, and chemical weapons capabilities, or are well down the path of doing so. About 30 countries have ballistic missiles, and more then half are located in the Middle East, North Africa, and Asia. Armed with a nuclear, biological or chemical warhead, even the most primitive and inaccurate missile can be a severely destabilizing weapon. The second near-term threat is the increasing capability of individuals and nations to attack us through our dependence on high technology. Information warfare is a good example. Disrupting military or dual-use communication systems could severely hamper operations, but a disruption of civilian communication systems could have much wider and more devastating consequences for the world’s economy. The final near-term threat is terrorism which is a direct danger to American citizens. The bombing of the Oklahoma City federal building, the earlier attack on the World
Trade Center in New York and the possibility that TWA Flight 800 was destroyed by a terrorist
demonstrates America’s vulnerability to terrorism.

Long term threats are less predictable but I do not think there is a major future challenge
to U.S. power. Some would say the re-emergence of Russia as an unstable or rival state, or
China as a military superpower could be our next superpower adversary, but both of these
candidates would take 15-20 years to come to pass.

The next shortfall of the BUR is “our forces must be sized and structured to preserve the
flexibility and the capability to act unilaterally, should we choose to do so.”14 This requirement
is both unrealistic and dangerous. The BUR develops a strong argument for building a coalition
of democracies as central to the national strategy, but then abandons any reliance on allies for
force planning purposes. Moreover, the potential regional adversaries pose a threat, not to the
United States but to our allies, by definition our military forces will not act alone.

The first faltered assumption the BUR made was its reliance on enhancements, such as
improving strategic mobility and lethality of U.S. firepower as key to the projected force's ability
to fight and win two nearly simultaneous contingencies. Under the DoD budget the then
Secretary of Defense William Perry said, "...weapons modernization was chosen to serve as the
bill payer for readiness."15 This decision jeopardized the NMS’s military capabilities
requirement for a smaller force, in which one “...must become pound for pound more capable
through enhancements and selected modernization. Our ability to execute this strategy of
flexible and selective engagement will be put at risk without these required force upgrades.”16
This shortfall, along with the inevitable requirement to replace the current fleet of equipment
when their life cycle runs out, will ensure a ruinously expensive collision path for acquisitions in
ten years. This becomes a risk to our conventional forces to be able to fight and win the next war. Currently, DoD is still fighting the force structure versus modernization dilemma as it pertains to the budget.

Another shortfall in the BUR assumptions listed the potential aggressor’s military forces as “2-4,000 tanks, 3-5,000 armored fighting vehicles, and 2-4,000 artillery pieces.” These seemed to be the same assumptions that guided our planning against the Soviet threat in central Europe. Projecting these capabilities and intentions on regional powers was rationalizing our concept of the Cold War, not the post-Cold War. This type of analysis puts the DoD planners in the same “paradigm” as before, fighting the last war versus reevaluating the world situation. Paradoxically, integration and fragmentation both govern our world and will continue to govern it. No longer is the world divided in “East and West” or “North and South” but it divides into the “have and the have not” lines; those with optimistic futures and those who are hopeless.

The next questionable assumption was the ability of the Army National Guard enhanced combat brigades to deploy within the specified time frame to supplement active combat units. Currently, the National Guard is experiencing difficulty in meeting peacetime training requirements to ensure their ability to deploy quickly in wartime. The key problems appear to be the inability of DoD to assign specific missions (e.g. provide flank security or movement to contact or deliberate attack) to the enhanced brigades and not reviewing the enhancements required to make the brigade compatible with the gaining active unit. This type of planning will almost guarantee disaster when it is time to execute the concept.

Finally, the last faltered assumptions in the BUR were the amount of forces required to execute the two-MRC concept along with the idea of redeploying forces from other operations,
such as peacekeeping or another MRC, to the upcoming MRC. Using our last war (Desert Storm) as a comparison, we sent eight divisions (two-MRC strategy outlined four to five divisions) and “the Air Force used two-thirds of its precision guided bombs and missiles plus committed well over 50 per cent of its airlift and aerial-refueling aircraft in supporting the deployment and sustaining the force. In addition, there are not many water-purification units or stevedore outfits or munitions-assembly organizations in either the active or reserve forces, and without them you cannot fight a war.”

The BUR assumed that after a “quick” victory in one part of the world, the military can put their forces on board airplanes (if available) and their equipment on ships (if available) and go off and fight another major conflict. It’s a high risk (causalities) concept to stretch your forces this thin even if you pause to refit, retrain or rest them. Another concern one must look at if the U.S. removes forces from MOOTW deployments to support a MRC, is the loss of credibility with our allies and/or alliances.

In summary, even with the BUR’s advantages, the critical shortfalls it possesses along with the questionable assumptions, provides a faulty defensive framework in which to build a realistic strategy to meet the post-Cold War threats. The only way to correct this is to avoid the same mistakes in the QDR. The QDR must depict a strategy that confronts a viable threat (not yesterday’s foe) for the present and future environment. Also, this QDR should not express their resources with some specific number of contingencies. The key is to develop a capability-based requirement that everyone can find feasible and not be constrained by a budget. The bottom line is to ensure the U.S. has a strategy, which is supported by flexible forces, based on a sound framework that will produce a decisive victory with minimal causalities.
III. Quadrennial Defense Review (QDR) Recommendations

As General (Ret) Sullivan clearly stated in his quote at the beginning of this paper, in order to deal with the changing realities of the post-Cold War era, the United States must continue to reassess U.S. military force structure and the national security strategy that it supports. Follow-up reviews are currently underway both inside and outside the Pentagon. Despite these efforts, we have not yet succeeded in fully adapting to the challenge created by the collapse of the Soviet Union and the Warsaw Pact. We have yet to define adequately the role of the United States in a world of shifting alliances and relationships. Once we have determined our course, we must reshape our strategy, tactics, and force plans to meet the requirements of a new security environment.

After analyzing the BUR, the author would make the following recommendations to the QDR panel. The first one critically handicaps the whole process of developing a viable National Security Strategy (NSS) and that is the current Administration’s failure thus far to enunciate a clear policy that defines the American military’s role in the post-Cold War era. The second recommendation requires the QDR panel to consider a different and much stronger role of the Reserve and Guard Components in the national plan. The third recommendation is a complete review of our revolution of military affairs (RMA) to ensure that it will keep America as the sole superpower. Finally, and more importantly, is the shift in logic in how the United States links national security strategy and military force structure. This one is no easy accomplishment for any bureaucracy, let alone one as complex as the set of institutions that comprise our national security apparatus. The international strategic environment has changed and, correspondingly,
so must the logic linking national security strategy and military force structure. Unless there is a change in logic ("paradigm shift") for the QDR, Cold War thinking will dominate its outcome, just as it did during the DoD’s BUR. The potential result may be a smaller, highly lethal, but less useful and possibly irrelevant U.S. armed forces.

A Clear National Security Strategy (NSS)

Indeed, the Clinton Administration has yet to define with any clarity, American’s role in the newly emerging international system. Does the administration see the United States in the role of World Policeman, maintaining global stability by deterring or, if need be, waging regional wars while engaging in an array of so-called peace operations? Or will the United States be the World’s Fireman, appearing on the scene only when things get so out of hand that American security is directly threatened? Or will U.S. forces support an American security posture as the World’s Good Samaritan, engaging principally in peace operations and eschewing involvement in regional wars that could involve states possessing weapons of mass destruction? Or will America adopt a neo-isolationist posture that makes it, in effect, the World’s Recluse?19

Clearly, each role requires a substantially different defense posture, and corresponding level of expenditures.

What challenges (or dangers) should claim top priority? At present, DoD appears to be placing the greatest emphasis on meeting the two-MRC contingency requirements at the risk of force modernization. Considering the geopolitical and military revolutions now under way, the author recommends the QDR panel give stronger emphasis than was evident in the BUR to the following elements:
a. The DoD should consider how its program might contribute to forestalling the danger of a resurrection of the great rivalry that has characterized the modern historical epoch. This would involve giving higher priority to preserving the long term military potential of U.S. forces, as opposed to near term capabilities. This implies placing greater emphasis on those things like R&D, operational and organizational experimentation and innovation, and selective modernization, that will best preserve U.S. military potential. It also implies giving relatively less priority to preserving force structure.

b. Another candidate as high priority would be shaping the U.S. defense budget and forces to respond to the threat of WMD proliferation and advance military technology diffusion. Greater emphasis on identifying ways to dissuade, discourage, deter, or defend against hostile regimes or organizations that intend to acquire, or who do acquire, WMD or advance conventional systems. A major component of this effort will involve encouraging innovation and experimentation among the military services and within the DoD as a whole.

c. The most likely challenges to U.S. security could be accorded higher priority. The DoD needs to resolve the competition between the requirements of a two-MRC and peace operations. As seen by recent events in places like Somalia and Bosnia, so-called peace operations require significantly different kinds of strategy, doctrine, force structure, equipment and training then do the major regional contingencies. The BUR admitted it could not provide forces for sizable peace enforcement or intervention operations and also meet its two-MRC requirement. In cases where priorities compete, the Administration must decide which will take precedence.

d. Consideration should also be given to restructuring the defense budget’s organization to reflect contemporary needs. Today the DoD budget remains oriented primarily around those forces and missions that were instituted over thirty years ago. New missions areas, such as counterproliferation, have no specific budget lines. While some adjustments were made over time, it would seem that a major review of the budget structure itself is in order.

If the United States’ defense program is to be focused on meeting the greatest and most likely challenges to its security, something will have to give. Some additional risks to national security will have to be accepted in certain areas to offset potentially far greater risk in other areas; this is nothing new. Establishing a defense posture with limited resources has always involved accepting some risk. A good starting point would be to publish a new NSS for 1997 that
more closely resembles the world of today. Similarly, the military needs a NMS (the last one is 1995) that clearly depicts how military forces will support this new NSS.

Unless DoD can make a better case for the BUR defense program, it may be prudent for the QDR to adopt a one-MRC “plus” posture, while also reviewing U.S. forward presence requirements.

**Stronger Reserve Role in National Defense Plan**

A national defense strategy that relies much more heavily on reservist could help the nation balance the budget, fund domestic programs, and maintain its presence as a worldwide power. The Army Guard provides 51 percent of the Army’s combat power and 35 percent of its combat support units. In the Air Force, the Air Guard provides 30 percent of the fighters, 33 percent of the air refueling capability, and 40 percent of the theater airlift.\(^{20}\)

A lesson learned, or more properly relearned, in the Gulf War was the critical importance of the Reserve Components. This operation required the largest mobilization and deployment of Reserve Component forces since the Korean Conflict.\(^{21}\) The comparison with the Korean War was apt, for that war would have been lost without the Reserves. The same was true of the war in the Persian Gulf; active duty military units simply would have been overwhelmed. For example, much of the U.S. airlift capability was provided by Air National Guard and Air Reserve units, and a large proportion of the Army’s logistics units came from the Reserve Components.

Their mobilization was a validation of the “Total Force” concept that grew out of the Vietnam War experience. Although there was a token partial mobilization during the Vietnam War, for the first time in American military history, the Reserve and Guard Components did not
play a major part. This failure to mobilize the Reserves along with the inability to win the
support of the American people were the major factors in America’s nonsuccess in achieving its
strategic objectives. In the Gulf War, not only were the physical contributions of the Reserves
validated but more so were its psychological dimensions. “By activating 798 Army, Air Force,
Marine Corps and Coast Guard Reserve Component units from over two thousand towns and
cities in every state across the country, public support for the war was almost guaranteed.”

History has clearly shown the requirement for the Reserve and Guard Components and
the QDR should strongly consider missions that are more suitable for these units. They should
be tasked primarily with those mission areas which support rapid power projection but require
little training prior to deployment. Combat arms units in the Guard and Reserve that cannot be
mobilized within a very short period of time cannot play a decisive role in conflict resolution.
By restricting the Guard and Reserves to those areas where proficiency can be maintained with
minimal unit training time, we can minimize reliance on forces that might not be prepared to
respond rapidly in a crisis.

The missions most appropriate to the Guard and Reserves, commonly referred to as
combat service support, are those directly related to a civilian occupation. Other appropriate
assignments for the Guard and Reserve are combat support missions such as artillery or air
defense for which proficiency can be maintained during the weekend training exercises. Some
combat roles, such as aviation also have civilian occupational equivalents which allow personnel
in these billets to maintain proficiency without requiring as much time to train directly for
military missions.
There are, however, certain military missions which should not be assigned to the Reserves and Guard Components. These missions, such as heavy armor and infantry combat, require constant physical conditioning and the ability to synchronize combined arms operations. They are best left to the active forces which can be maintained in a ready state for rapid deployment.

The leaders and planners of the QDR must look at the Guard and Reserve forces with a sense of reality and not with a political “slant”. Recent history (e.g. Desert Storm) has clearly shown the Reserve and Guard units have significant contributions they bring to the table but they possess limitations as well. It is time for the leaders to realize these limitations and understand that more money for training and increased modernization in these units will not change the results. The “parochial” pride of the Reserve and Guard forces needs to be checked at the door and the end result must be what’s best for the national security of America. This “paradigm shift” will be tough to achieve but as the world changes so must the strategy.

**The Revolution of Military Affairs (RMA)**

It is the conventional wisdom that the United States is on the verge of a military revolution. The question “How much is enough?” was made popular by Alain Enthoven and Wayne Smith around the mid-point of the Cold War. At that time the geopolitical environment was relatively stable. The United States military faced a formidable threat in the Soviet Union, but had the advantage of being able to plan against a relatively well-known adversary whose military capability was evolving in a fairly predictable manner. The BUR authors did not enjoy this luxury. Thanks to the geopolitical revolution that began with the
collapse of Soviet power, they do not have a clear threat against which to plan. Nor do they
know when the United States will encounter the next major challenge to its security.
Furthermore, there are significant indications that a so-called military revolution may be under
way that will fundamentally change the ways in which conflicts are waged and the way military
effectiveness is measured. This one could put the already pre- eminent United States vastly
ahead of enemies and allies alike, and thus change the world again.

This latest revolution is based on the application of information technology to weapons.
It involves gathering huge amounts of data; processing them so relevant information is displayed
on a screen; and then destroying targets, at much greater distances and with much greater
accuracy than was previously possible. These changes favor attack rather than defense and all
this is bad news for America’s foes. Russia, a once and perhaps future rival, has neither the
money nor the know-how to imitate the latest American advances. Other countries with more
cash to spare may aspire to master enough of the new technology to challenge American power
locally. China, for instances, is plainly flexing its muscles in Asia. Iran wants to develop cruise
missiles to allow it to keep other countries’ ships away from the Gulf. But the Americans’
mastery of the new warfare will make it increasingly foolish to take them on in a high-intensity
shooting war, as Saddam Hussein did. So if anyone wants to have a go at the U.S., he/she will
probably do so by other methods, such as ballistic missiles, biological weapons or terrorism.

The RMA also has implications for America’s friends. By increasing American might, it
may encourage the country’s unilateralist element to think it can win wars without having to
work with troublesome partners. In any event, working with allies will probably become more
bothersome; their low-tech armies may be incapable of plugging into American information
networks. No one can be certain where this revolution will end, but a few questions that it raises can be posed. How will it affect the way armies fight and are organized? Will it make much difference to “low-intensity” conflicts such as guerrilla warfare? How easily could the new techniques be countered, and, will the revolution make America unchallenged?

Over the next several decades, the military systems and operations and in some respects, the organization and force structures that dominated the major military establishments during the Cold War era will be superseded by these new systems. This emerging RMA will not be unique; the world has experienced several military revolutions over the past two centuries. But it promises to exert a profound influence on the character of conflict and the determinants of military effectiveness.

By radically changing the nature of the military competition in peace and war, military revolutions have often devalued formally dominant elements of military power, to include weaponry, platforms, and doctrines. One recalls the rapid rise of the carrier and submarine and relatively sharp decline of the battleship in the early part of this century, and the concomitant rise of an entirely new military system and operation, the long-range bomber and strategic aerial bombardment. Military revolutions also are often witness to the unexpected, and seemingly rapid decline of dominant military organizations that could not adapt in a rapidly changing competitive environment. Perhaps the classic example of this century is the French Army, which although victorious in WWI was unable to cope with the rapid transformation in land warfare made possible by dramatic advances in mechanization that led to the blitzkrieg.

History shows that those nations emerging from these revolutionary periods with dominant or competitive military capabilities are those whose military organizations accept the
need for change and innovation, and which are flexible and adaptive enough to make it happen. In short, the intellectual breakthroughs that lead to new doctrines and organizations are as important as the technological advances in periods of revolution of military affairs.

Thus, for the reasons outlined above, I feel Operation Desert Storm was more of a precursor of things to come. First, military organizations are only beginning to exploit the potential of the major emerging areas of technological progression. Second, they have not yet identified those military systems that can best exploit technologies and developed a strategy for managing their introduction into the force structure. Third, there exists no clear doctrine, or operational concept, to exploit these new systems.

Preserving U.S. military potential during a period of military revolution, and preparing for possible future conflicts instead of focusing on the last war, can be accomplished despite the prospect of low budgets. The Pentagon’s budget authority measured in constant 1997 dollars has decreased by 40 percent from 1985 to 1997 ($405 billion down to $243 billion). In the process of downsizing, the defense department also cut its military active duty strength from 2.2 million to 1.5 million in that 12-year period. Further, the dollars spent to modernize military equipment have shrunk even more; from $134 billion in FY85 to $39 billion in FY97. Concurrently, research and development funds fell from $44 billion to $34 billion. The U.S. military developed the foundation for carrier air operations and strategic aerial bombardment during the 1920s and 1930s, a period of very lean military budgets. Compared to that time and to other military organizations today, the U.S. military’s competitive position is now very favorable.
An early and even dominant lead, however, is no guarantee of success. Even if the world's military technological leaders remain allied or friendly with each other, they are likely, over time, to adopt new military systems and techniques to maximize their advantage over third parties from whom they perceive threats. This effort does not imply a need for radical near-term changes in defense programs. It does require a commitment to preserving U.S. military potential in the "out years". Currently, the Army has the smallest budget for research and development and procurement to modernize weapons of the all services which I feel is directly due to their commitment in supporting the two-MRC concept. The Army's budget requests for military personnel was increased slightly from last year's appropriations. The operations and maintenance request, however, has dropped from last year's allotment. The bottom line is the Army, despite their rhetorical premium put on equipment modernization, continues to budget for a 495,000 force structure at the sacrifice of modernization. The natural result of these reductions in R & D and procurement has been a dramatic shrinkage of the industrial base that laid off nearly 1.5 million workers so far, with another million expected to go in the next few years—but that was before the rash of mergers had begun, so the industrial base is undoubtedly much smaller today. This trend will eventual cause a vacuum in the Army's future capability to maintain a formidable force.

Other countries are working hard to create their own RMA, at a time when American support for basic research is dangerously low. Current thinking assumes that America's advantages in information processing, computers, and communications will drive this next revolution. Yet competitors will surely try to defeat that approach through less costly, but still dangerous revolutions, such as biological warfare or computer virus technology. There is a
window of opportunity. The international security environment is relatively stable and peaceful; no major war looms on the horizon. However, history cautions us that circumstances will change. In all likelihood, the military instrument of national power will again be called upon as the ultimate guarantor of American national security.

What this implies is that unless a proactive investment program is soon adopted, the military will not be able to keep pace with weapon technology advances and will continue to fight with systems developed in the 1970s and 1980s—all while potential enemies surpass the United States. Force planners must understand that every military revolution creates a new dialectic. America’s striking margin of victory in defeating Iraq guarantees that competitors are striving for their own RMA to overcome inferiority and avoid defeat. It is incumbent on today’s national security leadership to ensure that time and resources are wisely used. Innovation and creativity must be encouraged along with adequately funding scientific and technological areas. If the United States maintains this focus, when a future time of national stress occurs, it will prevail because it holds the high ground of the next revolution of military affairs.

The bottom line is America’s future military readiness hinges on our ability to retain technological superiority over any potential adversary. The continuing failure to invest sufficient resources in military modernization programs has put our future readiness at risk. The Armed Forces must reverse the practice of postponing essential weapons modernization programs. They must ensure that the U.S. military remains the most technologically advanced force in the world, highly automated, and capable of being swiftly projected into any potential theater of operations. Current U.S. strategy and force planning are too focused on maintaining the force structure that proved effective in winning the last war, while paying too little attention to the uncertain nature
of future conflicts. Decisions made or not made will profoundly affect how the U.S. deals with adversaries five, ten and fifteen years down the road.

Paradigm Shift

The BUR reduced the size of the U.S. forces to the level deemed necessary to ensure defeat of the remaining communist threat (e.g. North Korea and Iraq). Defense planners removed Soviet forces and the global war scenario from their models and inserted those of the two-MRC’s then derived the size and composition of the force necessary to win in the Korean and SWA scenarios. In reality, however, the two-MRC strategy was no strategy; it was merely a sizing function based on the budget and uncertain times. Bottom line, the BUR was a continuation of a threat based, Cold War logic.

The post-Cold War period is already a decade old and it has been most revealing. For example, the majority of armed forces deployments were for peace enforcement, peacekeeping and humanitarian operations along with domestic (e.g. natural disaster) type operations. In fact, during the time when our military force structure and budget have decreased by almost 40 percent, the use of military forces have increased by 300 percent. What one should conclude from this past decade is the following: paradox, asymmetry, and uncertainty characterize the international environment now and into the foreseeable future.

When strategists view the world, the focus is usually on symmetrical threats (e.g. identifying potential adversaries against whom the U.S. would have to employ its conventional sea, air and land forces. Such a view is necessary because these threats do exist, but this view is insufficient. The asymmetry of our world is much more perplexing.
Military planners have learned over nearly a decade of post-Cold War activities that our armed forces will be ordered to succeed in a variety of geographic, climatic, coalition, political, and threat circumstances. The military planners have congealed around four concepts: prevent threats from emerging; deter threats that do emerge; if prevention and deterrence fail, defeat the threat; and support domestic authorities at home in enforcing laws or recovering from natural disasters. Unlike during the BUR process, the nation now has a sufficiently formed strategy from which to derive the proper post-Cold War military force structure. The defense planners no longer need a sizing function upon which to base the size and structure of the military. They can now divorce themselves from the threat-based logic of the Cold War and ask a more specific question: What set of capabilities must American military forces have to execute the full spectrum of requirements dictated by our NSS? This question is much different then the one presently dominating the military force structure debate; that being, “What size and type of force is necessary to fight and win in a one or two-MRC scenario?” The difference illustrates the following two conceptual challenges for the defense planners:

a. War game models will be less useful and require more complex capabilities when computing and comparing fleets, aircraft’s, divisions, and missiles.

b. Force structures will be based on required capabilities. Terms like “other then war” are too narrow and do not fit reality. Wars have been, are being and will be conducted not only by states but also corporations, religious groups, terrorist organizations, tribes, guerrilla bands, drug cartels, and clan leaders.

If defense planners were to derive the size and composition of America’s armed forces only from that necessity to fight and win two-MRC’s against a conventional enemy, that force would be inadequate to execute the full range of national security requirements. Moreover, in the realm conventional combat, offsetting quantity with technology still applies, but only to a point.
America can bring to bear significant technological advantage to its conventional forces. Joint forces can be connected via information technologies. This connectivity allows the massing of effects from platforms of each of the services in a way not possible in the arena of conventional combat, for massing forces physically is no longer needed to achieve the same effect on the enemy. But the offset principle has important limitations. Physical massing on the ground still counts in operations like those in Bosnia, Macedonia, Haiti, and Somalia-operations aimed at preventing wars from starting, spreading, or escalating. Finally, physical mass counts in civil disturbance operations as well as in reacting to natural disasters. Remote controlled, sterile, bloodless, video-game warfare is a figment of someone’s imagination. Technology is still very useful and often vital, but it cannot offset the physical presence of troops on the ground, even in conventional combat.

Further, the most likely use of military forces in the next five to fifteen years will be in the “non-traditional” category or “unconventional combat” under strict rules of engagement. This analysis along with an opponent who will pose an asymmetrical threat to offset America’s conventional strength, leads inexorably to this conclusion—during the QDR, the planners must take care not to optimize America’s armed forces for only one, narrow band of strategic requirements.

The paradigm (logic) governing post-Cold War force structure is different from that which applied in the Cold War and during the interim period of the BUR. Paradox, asymmetry and uncertainty all argue for a flexible military force, not an optimized one. Utility with respect to the full spectrum of national security objectives should be the governing principle in determining the structure of America’s armed forces,
Shifting from one paradigm to a new one is not easy. If the civilian and military planners involved in the QDR merely extend the paradigm of the Cold War and the BUR, they will have fallen victim to fighting the “last war.” To create the military required for today and the future, planners must change this current paradigm governing the structure of American armed forces.

IV. Conclusion

The most important strategic issues we face on the edge of the 21st Century are not Asia, the Former Soviet Union, the Gulf, terrorism, proliferation or any of the usual adversaries. They are rather United States’ willingness to face up to the real nature of the world we live in, the depth of its problems, and its uncertainty.

America must be prepared to react as new threats inevitably begin to materialize. We must have the wisdom to know what we cannot change; must accept the fact that there will often be little or no moral difference between today’s “friends” and the “enemies”, and that only a few allied states will ever fully share our American values. As a result, the best possible strategy, plans, and analysis will never be a substitute for flexible forces. Also they will never be a substitute for the capability to react to unforeseen contingencies and the ability to improvise will often be far more important than the best possible intelligence analysis and contingency-related force planning.
There is no organizational or technological magic that will allow America to remain a superpower on the "cheap". The QDR needs to reshape our strategy, force plans, RMA concept, role of the Reserves and Guard, and defense spending in ways that show far more concern with "right-sizing" versus "down-sizing".

The QDR must void themselves of the parochial views that everyone brings to the table and focus on the realities of the world situation. When faced with such a task, Thomas Kuhn reminds us in *The Structure of Scientific Revolution*: "The tendency is to devise numerous articulations and ad hoc modifications to (the present) theory in order to eliminate any apparent conflict. If the civilian and military strategist involved in the QDR merely extended the logic of the Cold War and the BUR, they will have fallen prey to this very tendency."31

Military leadership must determine their own destiny versus an outside panel. Looking at history, the Goldwater-Nichols Act came about due to the inability of the Armed Forces to come to resolution on key issues in a ever changing world, allowing Congress to take charge of the situation. As stated above, unless the QDR panel breaks the "paradigm" thought process of the Cold War, we will end up with a smaller, more highly lethal, but less useful and possibly irrelevant U.S. armed forces.
END NOTES

4 William J. Clinton, *A National Security of Engagement and Enlargement* (hereafter referred to as NSS96), (Washington DC: GPO, 1996), 11-12. The primary objectives that President Clinton are enhancing our security; promoting prosperity at home; and promoting democracy.
11 Borosage, 12.
12 Atkeson, 12.
13 McCain, 9.
14 Aspin, 15.
16 NMS95, 17.
17 Aspin, 13.
18 Elliot A. Cohen, “Beyond Bottom Up,” *National Review* Vol:45, Issue: 22 (Nov 15, 1993): 40. For your information, the field artillery had over 90% of its MRLS rockets/missiles plus 100% of its precision guided (copperhead) munitions in the theater.
22 Ibid., 133.
28 Davis, 43.
30 Ibid., 43-44.
31 Ibid., 44.
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