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NATIONAL MISSILE DEFENSE (NMD) -- HAS ITS TIME COME?

BY

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National Missile Defense (NMD) -- Has Its Time Come?

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The issue over deploying national missile defense (NMD) to counter strategic ballistic missiles has been ongoing since the 1950's. During the Cold War, the debate shifted from considering the viability of deploying territorial defense to counter the Soviet threat to one of agreement by both superpowers to limit missile defenses for fear they would undermine strategic stability and increase the chances for nuclear war. Without missile defenses, it was understood that the populations of both countries would be subject to mutual assured destruction (MAD) should a nuclear war ever break out between the sides.

With the Cold War over, the debate has shifted once again. The issue is whether or not the threat posed by the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction (WMD) and their delivery systems warrants a reevaluation of Cold War arguments against NMD and MAD. Contrary to the views of the current administration, the author outlines that NMD deployment is needed now more than ever for the United States to effectively operate in the 21st Century and to ensure the American population is never again threatened by direct attack.
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The President’s tone was soft, sad almost, as he addressed the Deputy Secretary of State. “What is the population of Libya?” “Two million, sir, give or take a hundred thousand . . . .” The President turned down the table toward the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs. “Harry, how many people would we lose if a three megaton device went off in New York?” . . . The Chairman reflected a moment. “Between four and five million, sir.”

The Fifth Horseman

Henry Kissinger stated in 1977 that “foreign policy must start with security. A nation’s survival is its first and ultimate responsibility; it cannot be compromised or put to risk.” With the end of the Cold War, U.S. foreign policy has shifted from the relative stability of a bipolar world to one of instability where tribal, ethnic, religious and cultural differences form the foundation for a wider number of potential crisis situations. In addition, “technology has grabbed America by the lapels and pulled her into the crowded elevator of nations. Enemies halfway around the world could now visit destruction on the United States thanks to new weapons such as ballistic missiles carrying nuclear, biological, or chemical (NBC) warheads.”

To address the post-Cold War era, U.S. national security strategy has shifted from a focus on East-West conflict with the Soviet Union to one of “Engagement and Enlargement.” Under this strategy, the Clinton administration believes that the United States “... can only address this era’s dangers and opportunities if we remain actively engaged in global affairs.” To pursue such a strategy, strategic concepts used to deal with the Cold War threat may no longer be viable in a multipolar world of the 21st Century. But unfortunately, “like the Energizer Bunny, some debates just go on and on.
Many of the military strategies developed in the long bipolar competition . . . are now obsolete, but they are still debated . . . as if they were relevant.\textsuperscript{5}

One of those key debates focuses on whether or not the United States should break with the bipolar deterrent concept of mutual assured destruction (MAD) and begin the process of fielding a national missile defense (NMD) designed to stop strategic ballistic missiles and cruise missiles.

The following paper examines why now, more than ever, the United States should institute a national policy that directs deployment of NMD. Contrary to current administration policy, the need for NMD in the post-Cold War era is more important now than it was during the height of the Cold War. "As we look around the globe, our potential adversaries are ones whose militaries are inferior to ours. Hence, it would seem they would only provoke a conflict with us if they miscalculate our reaction, or believe their total means will prevail over our limited means."\textsuperscript{6}

Since this paper focuses on the policy debate, it will not get into the question of the technological feasibility of NMD or the issue of costs associated with deploying NMD. However, the author believes that technology is available at this time to deploy an effective NMD system. Spin-offs from President Reagan's Strategic Defense Initiative (SDI) that are being used to develop theater missile defenses (TMD) will, in turn, lay the foundation for NMD. As to the issue of cost, NMD will be expensive especially in a period of budget constraints. However, the costs for deploying NMD will be much less than the
material and non-material costs associated with a direct attack on a U.S. city by a ballistic or cruise missile carrying weapons of mass destruction (WMD).

The ability of the United States to undertake effective decision-making and foreign policy options in the 21st Century will be impacted by three events -- 1) the direct threat to U.S. national security interests posed by the proliferation of WMD and their delivery systems in the hands of third world states; 2) the realization that the threat of nuclear retaliation which maintained stability during the Cold War may no longer provide a viable deterrent against rogue states armed with WMD; and 3) the failure to modify Cold War arms control agreements to account for changes in the post-Cold War environment; specifically, the 1972 Anti-Ballistic Missile (ABM) Treaty. The impact of these three events will become more pronounced as the United States focuses on domestic issues, downsizes its military due to budget constraints, moves away from overseas basing to a continental based force and fails to adequately fund force modernization.

If the United States is to be successful in the 21st Century, it must be able to deter adversaries possessing or planning to possess WMD. If not, threats of WMD use by adversaries will prevent and/or deter the United States and its allies from influencing the course of international events. A third world country need not use WMD, but only threaten its use to be a viable deterrent to U.S. policy. While such threats were rare during the Cold War, they may become the rule, rather than the exception in the future.
It is likely that within the next decade, WMD will be used on a regional battlefield despite the best efforts of the United States to prevent such use. It is also likely the United States itself, will face a valid and real WMD threat to its homeland. Therefore, the question boils down to whether or not circumstances have changed enough to warrant a commitment to deploy NMD now?

The short answer to the question is ‘yes.’ However, the current administration believes the answer is ‘no’ under the premise that it has enacted an all encompassing policy to deal with the WMD threat. Recently, the Secretary of Defense reaffirmed administration policy noting that in order “to defend our nation against this insidious threat, we have established three lines of defense. The first . . . prevent or reduce the proliferation threat. The second, if prevention fails . . . deter the threat. And the third, if deterrence fails, . . . defend against the threat.”  

After three years of working interagency policy issues for the Joint Staff on the ABM Treaty and ballistic missile nonproliferation, the author believes the administration leaves open a very large gap in its’ WMD strategy by focusing only on deploying TMD instead of also pursuing NMD deployment. Even though the administration argues that no post-Cold War threat exists to warrant a NMD deployment decision now, justification has been based on continuing long standing Cold War arguments against effective missile defenses -- no viable technological solution to counter offensive missiles; building defensive systems are not cost effective; stability and deterrence with Russia will be undermined, resulting in a new arms race.
The administration has failed to temper these Cold War arguments against the realities of the evolving 21st Century WMD threat. During the Cold War, it was established U.S. policy that the American population would remain open to direct attack by strategic ballistic missiles. In the post-Cold War era, the same policy exists even though in a series of focus groups and opinion polls, the Coalition to Defend America found that “most Americans are unaware their government has chosen, for over two decades, to leave the nation unequipped to intercept ballistic missiles.”

A unique opportunity exists to walk back and correct past Cold War deficiencies in missile defense and pursue options that will prevent a situation whereby a rogue state could blackmail or threaten the United States directly with WMD.

Background

The debate over missile defenses has been around since Nazi Germany first developed and used V-2 rockets against England during World War II. This revolution in military affairs (RMA) destroyed the myth that countries once considered geographically immune from direct attack were no longer safe from unmanned weapons of terror delivered over great distances. After World War II, U.S. and Soviet leaders utilized the capability of V-2 technology to develop a tremendous offensive arsenal of intercontinental range ballistic missiles as instruments of policy during the Cold War.

As the risk of nuclear war increased, the superpowers began the process of walking back the “hair trigger” of the nuclear arms race. As early as 1964,
U.S. and Soviet leaders explored options to limit the arms race through arms control agreements. By 1972, the sides reached initial agreement to cap offensive weapons under the Strategic Arms Limitation Talks (SALT) and agreed, under the ABM Treaty, to limit the development and fielding of defensive systems designed to stop strategic ballistic missiles.

While these and other arms control agreements instilled some degree of stability in the Cold War relationship, they failed to prevent the massive arms race and the reliance on mutual assured destruction of each others’ homeland as the basis for deterrence and defense against offensive ballistic missiles.

There have, and continue to be, three distinct schools of thought on the value of missile defenses: First, are the arms control advocates who conclude that no direct threat exists to the United States to warrant building NMD now or in the future. For them, stability was maintained by not building NMD to counter the Soviet threat during the Cold War, therefore, building NMD now or changing the ABM Treaty risks instability and will result in another arms race. Second, those in the middle who believe that NMD is not necessary until such time as a specific threat arises to warrant a deployment decision. Third, those who believe the threat is here and growing. For them, failure to develop NMD now is irresponsible since it is the government’s responsibility to protect its citizens from possible attack.

The Clinton Administration falls into the second school of thought. When the administration arrived in the White House in January 1993, one of their first actions was to undertake a review of ballistic missile defenses and the
future of the ABM Treaty. This review examined President Bush's dialogue with Mikhail Gorbachev and then with Boris Yeltsin, over the possibility of pursuing joint development of a scaled down version of President Reagan's SDI program for global missile defenses.12

The review also examined Iraqi use of scud missiles during the Gulf War and the growing WMD proliferation threat that led President Bush and a Democratic controlled Congress to pass the Missile Defense Act of 1991.13 This legislation recognized a changing post-Cold War environment and a need to pursue both theater and national missile defenses. It also recognized a need to modify the ABM Treaty to develop any revised missile defense programs.

Under pressure from anti-missile defense advocates, President Clinton decided in 1993 to reject the missile defense views of previous administrations.14 He reaffirmed the validity of the ABM Treaty in its current form as the basis for strategic stability with Russia and set forth his missile defense priorities: "1) assigned first priority to theater missile defenses [TMD] and regional threats; 2) downgraded the priority for NMD, changing the focus from an acquisition program to a technology demonstration/readiness program; and 3) give third priority to an advanced technologies program, designed to develop and demonstrate high payoff technologies for TMD and NMD."15

The administration justified the move away from NMD based on the view that no direct threat existed to the United States to warrant NMD deployment. This view was later reinforced in a classified November 1995 National
Intelligence Estimate (NIE) which concluded that “no country, other than the major declared nuclear powers, will develop or otherwise acquire a ballistic missile in the next 15 years that will threaten the contiguous 48 states or Canada.”

Missile defense advocates in Congress were outraged and claimed the NIE was politicized to justify the administration’s unwillingness to pursue provisions of the 1991 Missile Defense Act and to foil other missile defense efforts in Congress. Administration critics argued that the NIE failed to address threats posed to Alaska and Hawaii by North Korean long range missiles or that a country might covertly purchase a mobile ballistic missile without having to develop an indigenous missile program from scratch.

To counter the administration’s missile defense priorities, the Republican Party in the run-up to the 1994 midterm Congressional elections, outlined its “Contract with America” identifying key issues that would receive emphasis during the first 100 days of a Republican controlled House of Representatives. The top national security issue was the “defend America” pledge which stated: “I recognize that the world-wide proliferation of mass destruction weapons . . . represents a current and growing danger to the United States, our military forces overseas and our allies. I recognize the fact that today we cannot protect the United States, our troops overseas and our allies against even one ballistic missile armed with a nuclear, chemical or biological weapon. If elected, I will support a vigorous U.S. effort to develop and deploy effective defenses . . . as an immediate national priority.”
After the Republican victory in Congress, an aggressive agenda to legislate NMD began. The FY 95 Defense Authorization Bill forwarded to the President contained language legislating NMD deployment and negotiations with Russia to modify the ABM Treaty as needed. President Clinton vetoed the bill on 28 December 1995. After shutting down the Federal Government, Congress eventually agreed to strip out NMD provisions that resulted in the Presidential veto. In 1996, the Republicans again undertook efforts to pass legislation requiring NMD deployment. They also attempted to use NMD as a decisive campaign issue in the Presidential election, but with little success. However, several members of Congress were successful in filing suit in Federal Court claiming the administration was in violation of the law by failing to follow missile defense provisions the President signed into law in the final FY 95 Authorization Bill. Action is still pending in the courts.

**Proliferation of WMD**

The administration's first line of defense in dealing with WMD is to reduce or prevent proliferation. On November 12, 1996, President Clinton notified Congress that: “On November 14, 1994 by Executive Order No 12938, I declared a national emergency with respect to the unusual and extraordinary threat to the national security, foreign policy, and economy of the United States posed by the proliferation of nuclear, biological, and chemical weapons ("weapons of mass destruction") and the means of delivering such weapons. Because the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and the means of delivering them continues to pose an unusual and extraordinary threat . . . the
national emergency declared on November 14, 1994, and extended on
November 14, 1995, must continue in effect beyond November 14, 1996.”

While no one knows the exact numbers, the current trend in WMD
proliferation and their delivery systems is increasing rather than decreasing
among the third world. While sources may differ, there is general agreement
that on average 20-25 nations have ballistic or space launch missiles in their
inventories; 20-30 nations have nuclear weapons or research and development
programs examining the feasibility for acquiring such weapons; up to 30
nations may have chemical weapons; and up to 10 nations may have biological
weapons.22

In response to the WMD threat, the Clinton administration put into place
policy initiatives designed to continue efforts of previous administrations to
stem WMD proliferation. Through arms control agreements, participation in
international nonproliferation regimes, pursuit of tighter export controls and
enactment of legal sanctions, the United States led the way on the international
stage to address the growing WMD threat. However, these actions have had
only limited success in stopping WMD programs in rogue states such as Iran,
Iraq, North Korea and others. It is likely the proliferation problem will get
worse as these states achieve full WMD status and become future proliferators
to other state and non-state entities.

As the Joint Staff expert on the Missile Technology Control Regime (MTCR),
the author participated directly in administration efforts to stem the
proliferation of ballistic missile systems that could deliver WMD. From 1993-
1996, the administration was successful in getting South Africa, Hungary, Argentina and Brazil to terminate ballistic missile programs in exchange for MTCR membership. The administration was also successful in bringing Russia into the regime, however, the jury is still out on whether or not Russia will become a responsible MTCR partner given its current economic difficulties and thriving organized crime. Other attempts were made to bring China, North Korea, Ukraine and South Korea into the regime as well. Currently, negotiations with these countries continue.

The ability of the MTCR to effectively counter the proliferation problem over the long run is hampered because it is a non-binding regime of 27 like-minded states and is not an international treaty. Therefore, it lacks enforcement mechanisms necessary to ensure compliance among regime members. Despite proposals from the United States to tighten up the MTCR guidelines, few nations have shown a willingness to do so for fear it will undermine the ability of a nation's companies to effectively conduct international trade.

Over the last three years, numerous newspaper articles have appeared on the growing illegal and covert transfer of WMD technology and their delivery systems from China, Russia, North Korea, Ukraine and others to rogue states. As the world becomes more intertwined economically, the ability to control this proliferation will become even more difficult. In recent Congressional testimony, the Director of the CIA stated that "the chilling reality is that nuclear materials and technologies are more accessible now than at any other time in history . . . . This problem is exacerbated by the increasing diffusion of
modern technology through the growth of the world market, making it harder to detect illicit diversions of materials and technologies relevant to a nuclear weapons program.\textsuperscript{23} The same is true for chemical and biological weapons programs, which are easier and less expensive to develop than a nuclear program.

The administration’s track record for cracking down and imposing sanctions on key proliferators is not very good. There has been a willingness to crack down on the so called “rogue states” of North Korea, Iran, Libya and Iraq. However, when it comes to proliferators such as Russia and China, the administration has gone out of its way to play down the issue in order not to undermine political and trade relations with those countries. By doing so, the administration has, in effect, given a green light that trade and other issues are more important than stopping proliferation. Unless the United States is willing to take a hard stand with Russia and China, WMD proliferation will not end.

The proliferation problem will always be difficult to solve because “there is no single motive that explains the proliferation decisions of every country. Likewise, no single policy prescription will address every motive.”\textsuperscript{24} For example, a remarkable description of how committed and successful a rogue state can be in pursuing and acquiring WMD technology can be found by examining what United Nations inspectors found in Iraq after the Gulf War. David A. Kay, a chief inspector on three early UN inspections of Iraq’s nuclear program, stated that “the failed efforts of both the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) safeguards inspectors and national intelligence authorities to
detect prior to the Persian Gulf War a nuclear weapons program of the magnitude and advanced character of Iraq's, should stand as a monument to the fallibility of on-site inspections and national intelligence when faced by a determined opponent. Even after 5 years with the world's most intrusive inspection regime in place, there is still no full accounting of Iraq's WMD program and whether or not it was permanently destroyed or is hidden away for future use. If Iraq can remain this deceptive, does anyone really believe a full accounting or control over proliferating WMD programs can be made in other closed societies such as Iran, Libya and North Korea?

While the United States will have some success in slowing down WMD proliferation, the reality is that WMD technology and their delivery systems will continue to expand at a rapid rate. Therefore, it would seem the administration's first line of defense -- prevent and reduce the proliferation threat -- will not be successful over the long run.

**Deterrence**

If WMD proliferation cannot be stopped, the administration will turn to its second line of defense -- deter the threat. Keith Payne, an expert on deterrence theory, stated that "... the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction (WMD) and advanced missile systems is causing us to take increasing notice of regional powers ... the question of how to deter 'rogues' armed with WMD will require our attention whatever our nonproliferation efforts and successes: some countries will see great value in WMD and their means of delivery and persevere until they have acquired them. ... how to deter such countries may
only pique our interest now but it will become paramount in the future.”26 In April 1996, the Secretary of Defense stated: “the bad news is that in this era the simple threat of retaliation that worked during the Cold War may not be enough to deter terrorists or aggressive regimes from using nuclear, biological, and chemical weapons.”27

The deterrent value of nuclear weapons and effective threats of retaliation are usually based on the belief that one is dealing with a rational adversary who understands and realizes the consequences of his actions, especially when it comes to WMD use.28 During the Cold War, U.S. and Soviet leaders fully understood the consequences of a conflict between two superpowers -- whether it be conventional or nuclear. Now that the list of potential adversaries is growing, it is unlikely the United States will always face a rational leader in a regional crisis.

Therefore, the effectiveness of the United States nuclear arsenal as a deterrent in the future may become questionable for a variety of reasons: “First, enemy leaders might believe the US and its allies lack the will to win a regional conflict if confronted with the possibility of horrific losses from WMD attack. . . . Second, adversary leaders might misread the degree of political support or political courage possessed by the US president . . . Third, adversary leaders might operate in a world of their own, surrounded by yes-men and cut off from realistic intelligence about the US, its allies, and their intentions. . . . Fourth, some adversary leaders might have such a different worldview or set of
values that they would not be deterrable . . . Finally, deterrence assumes that state leaders can control their subordinates. . . .”

If Desert Shield/Desert Storm proved nothing else, it left a lasting impression on other third world countries that you cannot engage the United States in a conventional ground war and win. It was reported after the Gulf War that India’s Army Chief of Staff was quoted as saying “never fight the US without nuclear weapons.” This may help support why so many third world states are seeking WMD and their delivery systems as a counter balance to U.S. conventional superiority. It may only take the threatened use of WMD to deter the United States and its allies from entering into a future regional conflict. While the United States was successful in deterring Iraq from using its WMD arsenal during the Gulf War, there is no consensus on exactly how or why Iraq was deterred. But what is clear, is the failure of the United States to deter Iraq from invading Kuwait in the first place. It would seem the administration’s second line of defense -- deter the threat -- may not prove successful in all cases.

The ABM Treaty

The administration’s third line of defense -- defend against the threat -- is dependent on the ability to pursue adequate active and passive defenses. However, the ability to pursue active defenses is impacted by the 1972 ABM Treaty between the United States and the former Soviet Union.

The premise of the treaty was “that defensive systems are inherently destabilizing: if a country deploys effective defenses against ballistic missiles,
it could launch a first strike with impunity because whatever retaliatory enemy forces survived the attack would be no match for the attacker's defensive systems. By limiting defensive systems, the ABM Treaty thus reduced the imperative for rapid growth in offensive systems necessary to overwhelm missile defenses. The belief under this premise was that by reaching a state of strategic stability, the sides would then be able to move towards efforts to limit and reduce levels of offensive nuclear weapons. In reality, the ABM Treaty failed to stop the arms race. Even though offensive arms levels increased rapidly after the ABM Treaty's signing, the treaty did form the foundation for follow on arms control agreements (INF, START, CTBT Extension, etc.) that started the process of reducing strategic arms.

With the end of the Cold War; the demise of the Soviet Union; the death of 28 U.S. soldiers by an Iraqi scud missile during the Gulf War; and WMD proliferation, the debate resurfaced over the continuing value of the ABM Treaty in the post-Cold War environment. This was especially true since key provisions of the treaty prevented the deployment of certain types of missile defenses. For example: Article I prevents each party from deploying ABM systems for territorial defense or the basis for such a defense. Article II, as amended by the 1974 Protocol, limits deployment of an ABM system to 100 ABM launchers at one site designated by each party (Moscow for USSR/Grand Forks ICBM field for the United States). Article V prohibits air-, sea-, space- or mobile land-based ABM systems. Finally, Article VI (a) prohibits giving
systems other than ABM systems capability to counter strategic ballistic missiles or to test them in an ABM mode.33

"The future of the ABM Treaty must be considered in the broader context of long-term U.S. national security planning. . . . the way ahead for the United States . . . could have far reaching implications for U.S.-Russian relations, and more specifically, for U.S.-Russian weapons' disarmament and nuclear restructuring. But, contending assessments of where the greater danger lies -- in rogue actors acquiring an ICBM capability or in a remilitarized Russia . . . "34 is key to resolving the NMD debate and the determination over whether or not the ABM Treaty should be abrogated, maintained or amended.

a. Abrogating the ABM Treaty. This view is supported by many members of the Republican controlled Congress who have placed a high priority on developing missile defenses. Representative Floyd Spence best summarizes the Republican position: "As for the stated concern that deploying a defense against ballistic missiles could threaten the ABM Treaty, it would seem that the administration is more concerned with preserving antiquated Cold War arms control agreements than with ensuring the security of the American people against post-Cold War threats. In fact, the ABM Treaty was signed 24 years ago with a country that no longer exists under political and military conditions that no longer apply . . . The notion of consciously remaining vulnerable to ballistic missile attack as a matter of national security is as inconsistent with U.S. security interests in the post-Cold War world as it was more than two decades ago."35
b. **Maintaining the ABM Treaty in its current form.** This view is supported by arms control advocates who see the treaty as the cornerstone of strategic stability. Without the treaty, "... the large-scale deployment of anti-ballistic missile systems would undermine efforts to shrink strategic arsenals and could even provoke the United States and Russia to increase strategic offensive forces to overcome any perceived threat to their retaliatory capability. A freeze or reversal of the strategic nuclear arms reduction process would, in turn, have a highly negative impact on the attitude of non-nuclear-weapon states toward international nuclear non-proliferation efforts."\(^{36}\)

c. **Amending the ABM Treaty.** While the Clinton Administration supports the treaty as the cornerstone of strategic stability with Russia, it has shown a willingness to clarify the treaty when it comes to the development of theater missile defenses. Despite criticism from the other two schools of thought, the administration has been negotiating with Russia since November 1993 to clarify aspects of the ABM Treaty in order to develop and field highly capable TMD to counter third world WMD threats. However, when it comes to Congressional NMD efforts, senior administration officials have stated: "... the ABM Treaty needs to be updated to take account of changes in the international security situation, particularly with regard to theater missile defense. ... we do not ... see any requirement to amend or modify it to permit a national missile defense that otherwise would not be possible."\(^{37}\)
Therefore, it would seem the administration’s third line of defense -- defend against the threat -- will be impacted unless the ABM Treaty is modified to allow for deployment of a NMD system.

**Why NMD?**

Deploying NMD is like having car insurance.\(^{38}\) It would be nice if you didn't have to buy car insurance until the night before you were going to have an accident. It would also be nice to know with exact certainty when a specific WMD threat would arise so that NMD could be deployed in time to meet that threat. Unfortunately, things don’t work out that way. We have to buy car insurance because we don’t know exactly when or if we will be involved in an accident. The same is true when it comes to WMD.

Senator Charles S. Robb stated that “history has shown repeatedly that the next major threat can be difficult to predict. Preparation for modern conflict involves major new weapon systems that can take more than a decade to develop and produce -- but the United States has seldom identified potential adversaries in time to permit orderly planning and preparation for war.”\(^{39}\)

The administration’s active defense policy of “3+3” does not provide adequate insurance against the WMD threat. Under this policy, the “plan is to develop elements of this system over the next three years. Then, at that point, if we were to see a rogue threat emerging, we could construct this system and have it on site in another three years -- that is, by the year 2003. If, as we expect, we see no such threat emerging, we will continue developing and improving the technologies, all the while retaining the capability to have the
system up and running within three years of a decision to deploy. That way, we will be ready and able to field the most advanced system possible to counter missile threats to our nation as fast as they emerge.  

The problem with this policy is that it assumes: 1) a WMD threat can be identified in time to make the right deployment decision; 2) the acquisition process will be able to move NMD from R&D to deployment within three years; 3) the R&D process will be able to make a technological breakthrough over the next several years that will make the current approach to missile defense (i.e. missile against missile) obsolete; and 4) negotiations with the Russians are possible and will be successful in modifying the ABM Treaty or other arms control agreements to accommodate NMD deployment requirements.

In reality, it will be extremely difficult to satisfy all these conditions in order to implement the “3+3” NMD approach. First, if rogue states are already undertaking actions to build covert WMD programs, it is very unlikely the timeline for such programs can be assured with any degree of accuracy to make a timely deployment decision. Therefore, it will be difficult to gain intelligence community and interagency consensus on whether an evolving WMD threat is of such a magnitude to warrant a NMD deployment decision. Second, despite efforts by the administration to streamline the acquisition process, it is unlikely it will be reformed in a manner that will substantially reduce the trend that it takes decades to adequately field a major new weapons system. Third, it is unlikely that a major technological breakthrough will take place that will alter the current approach to missile defenses. Planned TMD
systems are being developed based on "hit to kill" technology and other SDI technology of the 1980's. In turn, TMD technology will form the foundation for NMD options. Therefore, no significant technology breakthrough is expected any time soon. It is often forgotten that "one of the complicating factors in Defense budgetary planning is that the time horizons are so distant. It is useful to recall that the systems that performed so well in the Persian Gulf largely represented the technology of the 1960's, the development of the 1970's, and the production of the 1980's - all utilized by the people of the 1990's."41

Lastly, it is unlikely to assume that efforts to modify arms control agreements with Russia can be accomplished quickly. Historically, negotiations between the United States and the Former Soviet Union have been very complicated and taken years to complete. For example, the current ABM/TMD demarcation negotiations with the Russians to clarify fielding of TMD systems under the ABM Treaty have been on going since November 1993 with no accord in sight. If a new NMD agreement is needed, it will have to be completed and ratified before the process of fielding NMD can take place. If the negotiation process is not started well in advance of a NMD deployment decision or until a WMD threat arises, the only option available to the United States would be to withdraw from various arms control agreements with Russia.

Recommendations

"Active defenses stand to play a central and vital role in U.S. defense planning well into the next century... these systems will have a significant impact on our ability to send forces abroad in defense of our national interests,
and may even be called upon to defend the United States itself from missile attacks . . . "42

To effectively counter the WMD threat, the administration must revise its policy and take the initiative and opportunity to move the United States away from a policy that leaves the American people open to direct attack by WMD to one that ensures security. First, the United States should execute its right under the ABM Treaty to deploy a limited land-based missile defense system at Grand Forks, North Dakota just as the Russians have done around Moscow.43 Second, the administration should open immediate negotiations with Russia to modify the ABM Treaty to allow for the deployment of a multi-site NMD using land, sea, air or space-based options as necessary. Third, to ensure stability in the bilateral relationship, the United States may want to restart efforts to work jointly with Russia on NMD programs such as the Global Protection System (GPS) and Global Protection Against Limited Strikes (GPALS) proposals of the 1980’s. Fourth, if the Russians are unwilling to negotiate changes to the ABM Treaty or participate in joint NMD development, the United States should execute its right to withdraw from the ABM Treaty in order to deploy NMD.

Even under the worse case of withdrawing from the ABM Treaty, the fear of a new arms race and instability with Russia should be minimal. Even though the Russians will complain a lot, once they realize that the United States is serious about NMD deployment, they will want to participate in the process in order not to be left behind. Both countries have already experienced the devastating consequences of an arms race. It is unlikely a new one will start.
Instead, NMD will be linked to other issues such as START III, NATO expansion and changes in the Conventional Forces Treaty (CFE). Solutions in these areas will allow both sides to address each other's security concerns with NMD. These efforts will eventually help the sides transition from a reliance on offensive weapons to one of defensive systems, thereby, moving the sides away from mutual assured destruction to mutual assured safety.

Since such a process will be time consuming, the United States must not lose focus on the threat from rogue states and their WMD. The scale and pace of any process to appease and negotiate with the Russians must be dependent on the pace of the evolving threat. Regardless of how or when the final decision on NMD is made, preparations for deployment must, as a minimum begin now. The United States cannot wait until the threat arrives before it begins to lay the groundwork for NMD deployment.

**Conclusion**

If the United States is going to pursue a national security strategy of “Engagement and Enlargement,” decision-makers must accept that WMD proliferation will impact the ability of United States to operate and influence events in many regions of the world. “Unlike classical force planning against a hostile nation with conventional forces, coping with weapons of mass destruction is a complex issue, and the tools we have at our disposal are imperfect. Motivations... to develop an arsenal of weapons of mass destruction differ from region to region and from country to country.” Therefore, the clean, quick victory of Desert Shield/Desert Storm is part of the
past and is not necessarily a road map for success in the 21st Century. The proliferation of high technology for WMD development and their delivery systems along with the reduction in the size and capability of U.S. military forces will result in some rogue states believing they can effectively challenge and deter U.S. involvement in a regional conflict.

While the Clinton administration has instituted a three part line of defense to deal with WMD proliferation, it doesn't go far enough. Even the Secretary of Defense has admitted problems with the current policy stating that “... preventive measures have reduced the threat from proliferation, but proliferation threats, like cancer, can sometimes elude preventive measures. So we need a second line of defense and that ... is deterrence. ... but the reality is that the simple threat of retaliation may not be enough to deter some rogue nations ... from using these weapons. Thus, we cannot always rely on deterrence: we must be prepared to defend ourselves.”

Decision-makers must reevaluate the WMD threat, the value and role of U.S. deterrent capability to deal with limited threats and the continuing value of Cold War arms control agreements that are not flexible enough to address a changing world environment. “Other nations must not be led to doubt either our strength or our resolution. For how others see us determines the risks they are prepared to run and the degree to which they are willing to place confidence in our policies. If adversaries consider us weak or irresolute, testing and crises are inevitable.”
Pursuing "ballistic missile defense is a critical component of the broad U.S. strategy to meet ballistic missile threats to U.S. forces and allies in a theater and to the United States. . . . Effective missile defense systems reduce the incentives for proliferants to develop, acquire, or use ballistic missiles and WMD by reducing the chances that an attack would inflict serious damage on U.S. or allied targets."49

Yes, the time has come to put into place an insurance policy that allows for NMD deployment now to ensure that when the WMD threat arises, the United States will have in place some form of national defense for its home territory. If we wait until the threat arises, it will be too late. History has shown repeatedly that the United States generally underestimates its opponents and is usually taken by surprise by an adversary's initiative and determination, regardless of the costs. When it comes to WMD, the United States cannot afford to be taken by surprise. When it comes to NMD deployment, we must remember that "... the decisions we make today will to a considerable extent determine the casualties we will suffer in carrying out our national security objectives in the next century. This is a very great responsibility that must be borne by all of us who have fiduciary responsibilities for national security."50
ENDNOTES


28Payne, Deterrence in the Second Nuclear Age, 45-49.


31Payne, Deterrence in the Second Nuclear Age, 81-87.


42Institute for Foreign Policy Analysis, Inc., viii.


48Kissinger, American Foreign Policy, 347.


50Augustine, 22.
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