THESIS

NATO OPERATIONS IN THE FORMER YUGOSLAVIA: PROTOTYPING THE COMBINED JOINT TASK FORCE

by

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December, 1996

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PROTOTYPING THE COMBINED JOINT TASK FORCE

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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

The end of the Cold War called into question NATO’s relevance to the new global security environment. The Alliance’s aspirations for a broader future security role are packaged in a structural initiative: the Combined Joint Task Force (CJTF). CJTF is designed to provide a mechanism for crisis response and peacekeeping operations conducted beyond Allied borders by variable coalitions of NATO members and associates. Also, CJTF is intended to facilitate better resource-sharing between the U.S. and the European Allies, permitting the Europeans to undertake some missions without direct U.S. involvement. Such arrangements are intended to promote a distinct European Security and Defense Identity (ESDI) within the Alliance, as well as to help satisfy the American desire to share more of the global security burden with Europe. Finally, CJTF is designed to promote good relations between NATO and the nations of the former Soviet bloc -- and, implicitly, to facilitate NATO expansion -- by providing a framework for operational military cooperation between the Allies and their post-Communist neighbors.

Approved in principle by the Allied Heads of State and Government at their January 1994 summit in Brussels, the adoption of a final CJTF format has been delayed by intra-Allied political disagreements. As presently envisioned, the concept is centered around several permanent nucleus staffs, to which forces can be added in building-block fashion to respond to a given contingency. Nuclei, along with likely component forces, are widely envisioned as maintaining a peacetime regime of training, exercising, and planning, so that NATO as a whole as well as specific national units are prepared to respond to a broad variety of scenarios at short notice. To accommodate the wide range of potential participants, CJTF employs a
“variable geometry,” which encompasses four possible CJTF configurations: a NATO-led operation, a WEU-led operation, and coalitions in which members of NATO or the WEU are joined by other members of the UN or OSCE.

A pure NATO configuration is the most likely. A task force would not necessarily have to include contingents from every Ally to be classed as a NATO CJTF; any collection of Alliance members conducting an operation under NATO auspices would retain access to all of the Alliance’s collective infrastructure, even if some allies chose not to participate. Such “NATO-minus” groupings may, in fact, be the rule for smaller non-Article 5 contingencies. The second CJTF configuration, WEU-led, might be described as an extreme case of NATO-minus: a coalition in which the U.S. and other non-WEU Allies decline to participate. While this configuration has generated the most political attention due to its implications for an ESDI, it seems unlikely that the U.S. will remain uninvolved in any major security crisis in Europe, in view of (for example) the continuing American commitment in Bosnia. The final CJTF configurations, NATO- or WEU-plus, involve the addition to a NATO or WEU CJTF of other nations who are members of the UN or the OSCE, particularly those participating in the Alliance’s Partnership for Peace program.

While all of the Allies have agreed to these concepts in theory, the process of implementation has raised political issues which have effectively stalled the initiative. In its role as a process of building military coalitions, there has been little controversy over the nature of the CJTF. The proper placement of the CJTF, regardless of composition, within the Alliance’s decision-making structure has been more difficult to determine. NATO’s Atlantic pillar sees CJTF as an extension of the present integrated military structure, an effective
infrastructure built up at great cost over the past 45 years, the majority of the European Allies tend to agree with this perspective. On the other hand, some elements within the European pillar, particularly those nations who do not participate in the integrated military structure, view Article 5 and non-Article 5 missions as fundamentally incompatible, requiring distinct political-military control structures. At the June 1996 NAC Ministerial in Berlin, the Allies agreed to use the integrated military structure for both Article 5 and non-Article 5 missions, provided that the structure was “renovated” to provide for an increased European command presence and more thorough political oversight for out of area missions. The exact details of this “renovation” have yet to be agreed upon, and still have the potential to derail or at least delay significantly the implementation of the CJTF concept.

Events in the former Yugoslavia have provided impetus for the Alliance’s evolution, as well as creating a proving ground for its new initiatives. Indeed, IFOR represents NATO’s first out-of-area deployment, its first employment as a peacekeeping force on the ground, and its first involvement in a coalition with non-members. In the absence of a final agreement on CJTF, the Implementation Force (IFOR) in Bosnia is serving as a prototype. NATO leaders, relying on the experience gained over the past three years of involvement in the former Yugoslavia, have adapted existing NATO doctrine and command structures to fit the requirements of the Bosnia scenario. Despite the “ad-hockery” involved in their implementation, these arrangements appear to have been satisfactory, although their temporary nature has left Allied military leaders eager to create permanent command arrangements for contingency operations. Perhaps the most important lesson learned in Bosnia, as far as CJTF is concerned, is that IFOR and its NATO predecessor operations have
demonstrated the inherent robustness and flexibility of the Alliance’s integrated military structure, and its viability to serve as the foundation for the CJTF concept.

This thesis begins with an examination of the Alliance’s strategic culture and the oft-divergent goals of its principal members. Innovative as it is, CJTF still reflects the long-standing trans-Atlantic compromises that make up NATO’s collective strategic vision. Once this context is established (Chapter II), the thesis lays out CJTF’s fundamental tenets (Chapter III), followed by a survey of the current state of the debate surrounding CJTF’s implementation (Chapter IV). These sections pay particular attention to areas of intra-Allied contention, as these sticking points reveal the hidden national fears and agendas that lie beneath the surface of the CJTF deliberations. After the central issues and implications raised by the CJTF initiative are thoroughly scrutinized, the thesis shifts its attention to Bosnia. An examination and critique of the principal NATO operations in the former Yugoslavia (Chapters V and VI) should prove instructive for those seeking to institutionalize the CJTF framework within the Alliance, because in many respects, practice has been driving theory (rather than the reverse) as NATO has adapted itself to the new strategic environment of the post-Cold War world.
I. INTRODUCTION

Operation JOINT ENDEAVOUR, the deployment of a NATO-led multinational Implementation Force (IFOR) to war-ravaged Bosnia, represents a seminal point in the Alliance’s post-Cold War development. Politically, JOINT ENDEAVOUR has “attest[ed] to NATO’s capacity to fulfill its new missions of crisis management and peacekeeping,”\(^1\) missions designed to enhance the Alliance’s relevance to the world’s changing security order. NATO’s aspirations for a broader future role are packaged in a structure: the Combined Joint Task Force (CJTF). Although the definitive format for CJTF has not yet crystallized at the political or military level as of this writing, the concept’s intent is to provide a mechanism for crisis response and peacekeeping operations conducted in or out of area by coalitions of Allied and non-Allied nations supported by NATO military structures and collective assets. The initiative’s title speaks to this purpose: “a ‘task force’ is a military body brought together and structured for a particular operational purpose, ‘combined’ denotes participation by two or more nations, and ‘joint’ entails the involvement of elements from two or more services.”\(^2\)

First approved by the Allied Heads of State and Government at their Brussels meeting in January 1994, the adoption of a final CJTF format has been delayed by intra-Allied political disagreements. After a two and a half year deadlock, CJTF began to move again at the Berlin

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\(^1\)Statement on Bosnia-Hercegovina issued by the Allied Foreign and Defense Ministers, meeting in joint session at Brussels, 5 December 1995, p. 1.

Ministerial Meeting of the North Atlantic Council (NAC) in June 1996. At Berlin, the Allies agreed that, irrespective of its military details, CJTF must:

- give NATO’s command structures sufficient flexibility to allow the Allies to respond effectively to new missions beyond the defense of Allied nations from direct attack
- facilitate the dual use of NATO forces and command structures for Western European Union (WEU) operations in the context of an emerging European Security and Defense Identity
- permit non-NATO partners to join NATO countries in operations, exercises and training, as envisioned in the “Partnership for Peace.”

With these political concepts as a base, NATO military planners began to hammer out the details of a CJTF scheme, which was expected to be complete by December 1996, almost three years after the concept’s endorsement at Brussels. Former Supreme Allied Commander, Atlantic (SACLANT) Adm. Paul David Miller, USN, characterizes a CJTF as: “both a process and a structure: as a process, it enables us to assemble and groom the forces and capabilities to operate together; as a structure, it provides the command and control architecture to direct and employ a coalition operation.” The concept is centered around several permanent “nucleus” staffs, to which forces can be added in building-block fashion.

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4Political disagreements within the Alliance, especially between France and the United States, over the details of the CJTF format continue to delay the initiative’s implementation. As of this writing, it appears that no final agreement on CJTF can be expected prior to the summer 1997 NATO summit.

to respond to a given contingency. Staffs, along with likely component forces, are widely envisioned as maintaining a peacetime regime of "training, exercising, command, control, communications and planning in advance, so that individual units can be prepared to work together in whatever configurations are required."6

Events in the former Yugoslavia have provided impetus for the Alliance’s evolution, as well as creating a proving ground for its new initiatives. "In many ways," notes NATO Secretary General Javier Solana, "the CJTF concept is having a trial run in Bosnia."7 Indeed, IFOR represents NATO’s first out-of-area deployment, its first employment as a peacekeeping force on the ground, and its first involvement in a coalition with non-members.

The situation in the former Yugoslavia has made for a rude transition from Cold War operations and doctrine within NATO, particularly for sectors like the Southern Region (AFSOUTH) which have traditionally held secondary status (during the Cold War, the Central Region (AFCENT) received the lion’s share of Allied resources and attention due to the concentration of Soviet forces in East Germany). Thrust into the limelight, AFSOUTH’s once-sleepy Neapolitan headquarters has evolved command structures "on an ad hoc basis and in response to requirements posed to NATO from outside [rather] than as the result of carefully coordinated planning."8 In the absence of a functional blueprint for organizing a

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CJTF, IFOR has served as a prototype: NATO leaders, relying on the experience gained over the past three years of involvement in the former Yugoslavia, have adapted existing NATO doctrine and command structures to fit the requirements of the Bosnia scenario. Despite the "ad-hockery" involved in their implementation, these arrangements appear to have been satisfactory. IFOR's successes notwithstanding, "winging it" is not the preferred method of operation for any military organization; CJTF is designed to ensure that "instead of having to improvise a force when a crisis develops, there will in future be a command element in [NATO's] structure whose task will be to prepare for rapid and effective assembly of a multinational peacekeeping force."9

As "any discussion of NATO's military future should begin with the theme of continuity, since that is the foundation for NATO adaptation,"10 this thesis begins with an examination of the Alliance's strategic evolution, customs, and the oft-divergent goals of its principal members. Innovative as it is, CJTF still reflects the long-standing trans-atlantic compromises that make up NATO's collective strategic vision. Once this context is established, the thesis lays out CJTF's fundamental tenets, followed by a survey of the current state of the debate surrounding CJTF's implementation. These sections pay particular attention to areas of intra-Allied contention, as these sticking points reveal the hidden national fears and agendas that lie beneath the surface of the CJTF deliberations. After the central issues and implications raised by the CJTF initiative are thoroughly scrutinized, the thesis

9Javier Solana, Speech to the Dutch Atlantic Commission, the Hague, 21 October 1996.
shifts its attention to Bosnia. An examination and critique of the principal NATO operations in the former Yugoslavia should prove instructive for those seeking to institutionalize the CJTF framework within the Alliance, because in many respects, “it’s not the theory that is going to drive the practice, but the practice that will drive the theory.”

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II. HISTORICAL PRECEDENT: THE TRANS-ATLANTIC DISCOURSE

The book of Ecclesiastes observes that there is nothing new under the sun; this maxim holds true when one examines NATO’s strategic development. Although the specific features of Alliance strategy and force structure have varied in response to geo-political and technological developments, the fundamental strategic positions of the Alliance’s “twin pillars” -- the Atlantic and the European -- have not altered significantly since the signing of the Washington Treaty in April 1949. Each of the Alliance’s major strategic initiatives since then, successful or not, has reflected a discourse between the deep-seated beliefs, goals and fears of both pillars. Because the underlying priorities of the two sides are often divergent, NATO strategy always reflects some degree of accommodation; this give-and-take, based upon shared interests and a consequent determination to reach mutually acceptable solutions, constitutes the glue of the Alliance. These same dynamics lie beneath the CJTF initiative, which is the post-1989 manifestation of the long-standing trans-Atlantic strategic exchange.

To understand the significance and nuances of the CJTF debate, one needs to examine the root issues involved. This chapter lays out the general strategic perspectives of the U.S. and Europe and provides examples from NATO history to illustrate how trans-Atlantic differences have been resolved -- or left unresolved -- in the formulation of past Atlantic strategies.
A. THE AMERICAN PERSPECTIVE

1. Reluctant Involvement

America has been traditionally reluctant to involve itself in European wars, and has observed the past two centuries of European carnage with a mixture of fear and moral distaste. One of the principal factors contributing to the American Revolution was a colonial populace tired of being forced to spend blood and treasure on the imperial ambitions of a distant and seemingly ungrateful mother country. In this context, it is not surprising that as the foreign policy of the fledgling Republic coalesced, its fundamental tenet was isolation. In his farewell address, George Washington reminded his countrymen that “Europe has a set of primary interests, which to us have none, or a very remote relation,” and observed that “our detached and distant situation invites and enables us to pursue a different course.” A few years later, Thomas Jefferson would cement these ideas in a formal policy of non-intervention as Europe engaged in its largest-scale slaughter yet.

As a third-rate power on a distant shore, America could afford such policies and Europe was content, by and large, to let her alone. Unfortunately for American preferences, the technical and economic innovations of the 19th century inexorably narrowed the geographic buffers that permitted and encouraged policies of isolation. At the same time, Europe was experiencing a growing bifurcation between authoritarianism and liberal democracy. Whereas America had traditionally viewed the objectives and methods of the various European monarchies with more or less equal distaste, the period following the
American Civil War brought a slow realization among U.S. leaders that political systems were emerging in Europe that were particularly at odds with cherished American ideals.

World War I accelerated America’s international coming of age. By the time the U.S. entered the war, the average American -- however reluctant -- had been made to understand the danger posed by the potential domination of Europe, and hence the world, by a political system inimical to liberal democracy. Thus animated, America went to war with determination, but only as an “associate” of the European democracies rather than a full ally. The American mind was not prepared to accept a permanent military engagement in Europe; to all but the most far-sighted, “victory in battle was all that was necessary.”\(^{12}\) Wilsonian idealism notwithstanding, U.S. policy in the immediate aftermath of World War I was heavily conditioned by the two primordial elements of the American view of Europe: fear of entanglement in European conflicts and a sense of moral superiority. The Versailles conference and the Allied occupation of the Rhineland constituted America’s first peacetime involvement in European security affairs, and America’s performance in these two engagements reflected the tug of war between her venerable political traditions and her newfound status as a great power.

For a short while after the armistice, Americans had “loyally accepted their unexpected responsibilities around the globe.”\(^{13}\) The public viewed participation in the Rhenish occupation as a necessary adjunct to the war; Americans “were on the Rhine simply


\(^{13}\) Ibid, p. 79.
to remind themselves and the Germans that the Allies had won the war . . . they had no ulterior motives . . . they had no desire to change things.”  

Soon, however, these arrangements began to unravel. President Wilson defended the League of Nations to the public as an alternative to Old World balance of power policies, but the enduring presence of American troops on the Rhine and elsewhere seemed at odds with Wilson’s promises. Extreme isolationists in Congress, termed “the Irreconcilables,” tended “with mounting frequency to construe the maintenance of any troops abroad as creating a precedent for the League.”  

Senator Hiram Johnson of California, a leading Irreconcilable, neatly captured America’s instinctive fear of entanglement in Europe:

This morning’s news visualized the League of Nations for all . . . American boys fighting an undisclosed war in Siberia; American boys sent to Silesia; American boys alleged to have been cruelly treated in Dalmatia; American boys to remain on the Rhine for fifteen years . . . the logic of events demonstrates what the League of Nations is for — to have America underwrite the peace treaty in which are interwoven the secret treaties disposing of the world among the allies.

Johnson’s bluster also highlights the deep American distrust of European motives and feelings of moral revulsion towards Bismarckian power politics. The relish with which the European Allies carved up the German Empire and their calls for massive reparations did not sit well with America. Relatively untouched by the war physically and economically, Americans had difficulty understanding Europe’s economic and security needs. The Rhenish

14Nelson, p. 25.

15Ibid, p. 129.

16Quoted in Nelson, p. 130.
occupation soon became synonymous in the American mind with European money-grubbing and expansionism, particularly on the part of the French. Pierpont Noyes, the first American commissioner on the Rhine, soon came to believe that the occupation had “become a cover for French activities aimed at separating the left bank of the Rhine or at seizing the Ruhr;”¹⁷ and French economic activity in the occupied zone prompted an outcry from the Irreconcilables to the effect that “under no circumstances should the U.S. Army serve as a debt collector for any other nation, particularly France.”¹⁸ American leaders were careful to keep a high moral tone throughout the occupation and consistently resisted French attempts to exert undue economic and political control in the Rhineland, so much so that they were accused at times of being pro-German. Ultimately, the French invasion of the Ruhr appeared to vindicate American suspicions and provided a final pretext for U.S. withdrawal in late 1922. In spite of this deterioration of trans-Atlantic relations, astute Americans discerned that the presence of U.S. troops in Europe had “helped reduce tension in an area of the world peculiarly important to America.”¹⁹ In spite of an isolationism deeply entrenched in the public mind and soon to be reinforced by a global depression, America’s brief involvement in post-World War I Europe set the stage for the present era of American engagement.

¹⁸Ibid, p. 186.
¹⁹Ibid, p. 229.
2. Full Engagement

The U.S. entered the Second World War in much the same frame of mind as it had the First. Faced with the interwar return of hostile political systems overseas capped by the Axis perfidy of December 1941, the U.S. stepped once more into the breach on behalf of the world’s free nations. As the war drew to a close, a tired America clamored for demobilization and withdrawal from global commitments. Initially, the conditions seemed ideal for retrenchment. The Soviet Union, while clearly not our natural ally, had not yet revealed itself as our dedicated adversary, and the nuclear monopoly provided America with “the ultimate Jeffersonian weapon . . . the means by which America could remain remote and secure from Europe, as well as the arbiter of its fate.”20 The unmasking of Soviet hostility and expansionism and the subsequent loss of the nuclear monopoly resulted in a new dynamic in the American view of Europe. Suddenly, America needed a healthy Europe as a counterweight to Soviet power, the results included the Marshall Plan for economic reconstruction and the Washington Treaty establishing the Atlantic Alliance.

The Cold War magnification of Europe’s value to America gave rise to “a permanent anxiety about the credibility of the American guarantee to defend [Europe] and fear that the Europeans would ‘go neutral’ or worse, if they perceived a weak United States.”21 This new worry found expression in the 1950 policy paper NSC 68, which helped commit the U.S. to


21 Ibid, pp. 280-281.
the containment of Soviet power. The authors of NSC 68, led by Paul Nitze, sought to "prevent a European sellout, which would leave the U.S. isolated in the world . . . the essence of the NSC 68 program, in other words, was the propitiation of Europe."\textsuperscript{22} Set against traditional American fears of entanglement and distrust of European political morality, Europe's newfound importance during the Truman administration triggered a considerable backlash within certain sectors of the American public. As a result, the need to "propitiate the Europeans was now at war with the necessity to prod them to do the things that would counteract anger and cynicism toward Europe in the United States."\textsuperscript{23} The necessary corollary to an American presence in Europe has been the demand that Europeans help shoulder the economic, political and military burdens of engagement. From the beginning of the U.S. peacetime presence in Western Europe, the underlying rationale in the view of many, if not most, Americans has been to assist Europe in re-creating its military and economic strength so that the U.S. could safely withdraw; in other words, "let us restore responsibility for Europe to the Europeans."\textsuperscript{24}

American policy within NATO has always reflected a dynamic tension between the conflicting demands of propitiation and burden-sharing. The U.S. has, moreover, pursued two strikingly different methods of reconciling the two imperatives: European integration and Atlantic coordination. From the beginning of American involvement in postwar Europe, two

\textsuperscript{22}Harper, p. 293.

\textsuperscript{23}Ibid, p. 306.

\textsuperscript{24}Ibid, p. 201.
factions, the "Europeanists" and the "Atlanticists," have struggled for control of U.S. policy towards Europe. The Europeanist view, which sought to create a federally integrated Europe as a counterweight to Soviet power, predominated through the mid 1960's. America's initial overtures to Europe were heavily influenced by burden-sharing considerations and isolationist reflexes. As the U.S. transitioned back to a peacetime economy, its attitude towards Europe was "show us what you are prepared to do for yourselves and each other and then we will see what we can do." Early European efforts to pool resources, especially the 1948 Brussels Treaty and the 1950 European Coal and Steel Community (ECSC), seemed to reveal "an unexpected degree of European political vitality" which made the costs of assistance more palatable to Americans.

Buoyed by these early European initiatives, American Europeanists began to lobby for a "supranational Europe with a greater degree of economic, political and military unity [which] defined a framework that would not only strengthen Europe economically and politically, but would also ensure a greater European contribution to the common defense." In addition to appeasing advocates of burden-sharing, early U.S. support for multilateral projects like the proposed European Defense Community (EDC) of the early 1950's was also conditioned by the traditionally contemptuous American view of European politics, which

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26Nelson, p. 297.

blamed petty nationalism on the continent as the root of both World Wars. In this context, “one of the main reasons for U.S. support for European integration had been the desire to prevent the specter of nationalism from re-emerging.”

American enthusiasm for European integration centered around expectations of increased military and political strength; when the Europeans began to emphasize economic cooperation over other forms, American support began to wane. As Europe’s economy recovered from its wartime devastation and America continued to pay for the stationing of U.S. troops on the continent, the balance of payments began to swing in favor of Europe. Moreover, the Europeans had shown a marked lack of enthusiasm for multilateral solutions to basic strategic problems. By the end of the Kennedy Administration, “increased economic competition between the U.S. and the European Economic Community (EEC), as well as a European tendency to criticize or oppose certain American political or military initiatives, did much to usher in an eclipse of the support by the U.S. for European integration.” The return of De Gaulle in 1958 did much to sour American enthusiasm for a united Europe. De Gaulle’s enthusiasm for a Europe based on the nation-state and led by an independently-minded France was not what even the most ardent American Europeanist had in mind. Rather than dampen European nationalism, De Gaulle’s vision of a united Europe threatened to revive it by demonstrating that “supranationalism and Europeanism could also serve

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28Winand, p. 246.

nationalist interests . . . ‘in the name of Europe’.

Furthermore, a Europe built upon these terms would be more likely to become a “third force, holding place with the U.S. and Russia in the determination of world policy . . . and leaning towards a middle-ground or neutralist position.”

Most grievously, a united Europe threatened America’s freedom to act as unchallenged leader of the free world; this could not be borne. After all, “speaking of burden-sharing and partnership was one thing; renouncing or sharing leadership was another.” This stance was not purely chauvinistic, but reflected a realistic, if somewhat jaded, assessment of Europe’s past record of wielding power.

Enter the Atlanticists, who advocated “Atlantic partnership with a view towards monitoring the development of the new Europe by keeping it solidly anchored to the U.S.”

Preferring multinational cooperation rather than multilateral integration, the Atlanticists have sought to maintain “multiple centers of decision” within Europe and to encase European political and military initiatives within the larger framework of the Alliance and American leadership in order to “ensure that European resources would be channeled towards meeting the ‘common tasks’ of the ‘free world.’” The Atlantic perspective, which has dominated


31 Former U.S. Secretary of State Christian Herter, quoted in Winand, p. 158.

32 Winand, p. 192.

33 Ibid, p. 255.

34 Ibid, p. 252.
American policy towards Europe since the mid-1960's, balances the desire to share burdens and maintain American leadership against the need to propitiate an increasingly assertive Europe. This balance has not been easy to keep; in the absence of a common and compelling threat, it is likely to become even more difficult.

B. THE EUROPEAN PERSPECTIVE

European strategic preferences are more difficult to express, as Europe is still not a single unit with a coherent foreign and security policy. Each of the major players in Europe has a distinct view of what “Europe” means: for the Germans, integration and open markets, for the French, independence and leadership, and for the British, particularism and selective engagement. Nonetheless, common perspectives exist and it is possible to generalize about European beliefs. Europe’s traditional view of the U.S. has been that of the colonial master, observing with bemused contempt their former subjects’s naive and supercilious attempts at establishing themselves as a force on the world stage. At the same time, the Europeans have recognized America’s raw power and vitality as a force badly needed to replace their own fading glory. Perhaps the most important factor coloring the European perspective has been geography: “differences in location mean different degrees of vulnerability, which in turn shape perceptions about the nature, magnitude and immediacy of the threat.”

threat translated into an enduring dependence on American security resources as the only available defense against Soviet power.

As early as World War I, the European "public . . . image of the doughboy tended to confirm a belief in America's power and impartiality."36 Europe's economic prostration and military exhaustion after World War II compounded its reliance on the U.S. At the same time, the rapidity of American demobilization gave rise to a European fear of abandonment, which has remained a constant in Euro-Atlantic relations. Europe greeted the early U.S. decision to maintain a sizeable peacetime military presence on the continent with a sigh of relief; American troops have become "the most visible symbol of the U.S. commitment to European security . . . such expectations make it difficult for the U.S. to reduce its forces on the continent without triggering allied remonstrances."37 While American security guarantees have been reassuring to Europe, their convenience and relative stability have served to dissuade Europe from pursuing more difficult and costly solutions to its security dilemma. This situation has been somewhat paradoxical: "in progressively extending the political-military 'umbrella' without which -- the Europeans were the first to insist -- an integrated Europe would never emerge, the U.S. also fostered a situation in which the incentives for collective European self-reliance and autonomy were reduced."38 As a result, throughout the first two decades of the Alliance's history, Europe concentrated primarily upon strengthening

36Nelson, p. 171.

37Duffield, p. 74.

38Harper, p. 280.
itself economically rather than facing the more difficult tasks of political and military integration.

Awareness of their dependent status has produced a profound desire, at least in some European circles, to assert European interests in relations with the U.S.. Because Europeans “did not like the feeling of being wards of the U.S.,” they set about creating leverage for themselves. For the first two decades of the Alliance especially, Europe favored multinational rather than multilateral strategies, with each state maintaining an independent, though coordinated, link to their Atlantic partner. Distracted by unrest in the remnants of their empires, the major European states were unwilling to fully integrate their armies in defense of Europe under the auspices of the French-proposed and U.S.-backed EDC; to have done so would have dramatically reduced national forces available for colonial duty, forcing an accelerated forfeiture of Europe’s remaining colonies. While Jean Monnet’s integrationist vision may have borne early fruit in the economic arena, “when it came to security matters, Europe was not yet ready for Europe.” To the suspicious De Gaulle, the U.S.-backed integrationists “favored the creation of a politically amorphous Europe, which the U.S. would only be too happy to provide with the political guidance that it lacked.” In other words, security integration would weaken rather than strengthen Europe, at least in the short-term. Instead, the wily old general conceived a “European order subject to French hegemony and

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40 Winand, p. 253.
based on the preeminence of the nation-state. France's costly development of an independent nuclear deterrent and 1966 withdrawal from NATO's Integrated Military Structure (IMS) were the penultimate expressions of De Gaulle's hopes for a Europe able to "look the U.S. in the face," but these were the maneuvers of a solitary nation rather than the joint efforts of a united Europe.

Ironically, as American enthusiasm for multilateral European security solutions waned, the Europeans began to see the benefits of acting with a united voice. By the mid-1960s, U.S. economic friction with Europe caused America to cast a jaundiced eye on the prospects of a truly integrated Europe. At the same time, Europeans began to see that a "Europe able to act as an effective entity would deserve and could exercise comparable influence on [NATO] common policy and action . . . disposing resources much nearer to those of the U.S.; such a Europe could join in the genuine partnership of equals." Modern advocates of European union do not intend to use Europe's pooled resources to tear themselves away from their partnership with the U.S.; instead, the intent is to redress the existing "excessive concentration of power in the hands of the senior partner." In the last two decades of the Cold War, however, Europe's desire for a greater voice in Alliance security policy has been fundamentally at odds with its dependence on U.S. resources and the attendant fear of

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41 Winand, p. 219.
abandonment. With the recent demise of the obvious and compelling threat, the European drive towards integration has accelerated, though not to the point of consummation.

C. PATTERNS OF INTERACTION

Though both the U.S. and Europe viewed the Soviets as a dire threat, the underlying fears and motives of the two pillars have been fundamentally at odds throughout the Alliance’s history. The U.S. has tried to maintain a strong enough presence in Europe to reassure its allies and maintain the leading role in the Alliance, while at the same time attempting to shift as much of the security burden as possible onto European backs. Europe, on the other hand, has sought to attain as much independence as possible from U.S. political control while at the same time preserving access to American military resources. As the conflicting strategic preferences of America and Europe have played themselves out within the context of the development of Alliance strategy and force structure, several clear patterns have emerged. As these patterns have remained relatively constant throughout Alliance history, one can reasonably expect them to manifest themselves again as NATO struggles to re-shape itself in the post-Cold War environment, even in the absence of such a tangible threat as the Soviet Union.

1. The Superiority of Political over Military Considerations

The first and most important pattern in Alliance strategic planning is the superiority of political over military considerations. Each new initiative, in the words of former SACEUR Gen. Andrew Goodpaster, has to meet “the dual criteria of credibility: that is, military
effectiveness of our weapons and political acceptability of our plans for their use in war." Of the two criteria, the political is clearly dominant. As an example, the genesis of the EDC in 1950-51 lay in the need to make an unpalatable military requirement, the armament of Federal Germany, politically acceptable to a wary Europe by integrating West German troops at the regimental level (and later at the division level) into a supranational European army. Europeanists on both sides of the Atlantic soon came to view the EDC as the logical next step towards a united Europe as well as an amicable means of assimilating the still-feared Germans. From the American viewpoint, a pooling of resources would enable Europe to shoulder a greater portion of the conventional defense burden. The idea met with much less enthusiasm from military leaders, who were aghast at the difficulty of integrating troops with incompatible languages, doctrine and equipment.

Military objections were swept aside by the idea’s political attractiveness. Jean Monnet observed pointedly that “the crux of the [EDC] was not so much military effectiveness as political soundness . . . the critical issue was not the size of the divisions or other technicalities, but the creation of a common European outlook.” The EDC’s ultimate failure in 1954 was less a result of its manifest military unsoundness than a question of fundamental incompatibilities in its political implications for the Alliance’s two pillars. While the Americans “saw the EDC as the most effective means to facilitate a rapid military exodus

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45Winand, p. 28.
from Europe, the Europeans who favored the scheme saw it as a way of guaranteeing a long-term American presence by demonstrating Europe’s shared commitment to the defense of the West.⁴⁶ More skeptical Europeans deplored the implied loss of sovereignty and resented American interference in matters pertaining to European integration. Similar issues bracketed the U.S. proposal in the late 1950’s and early 1960’s to integrate NATO’s nuclear deterrent in a Multilateral Force (MLF). In spite of misgivings in the Pentagon, the MLF was designed to “meet not only European desires for greater participation in their own defense but also American concerns for control over the development of European production of nuclear weapons and American hopes for increasing the financial contribution of their allies to nuclear defense.”⁴⁷ Like the EDC, the MLF founndered over issues of European sovereignty and resentment of U.S. oversight rather than over the initiative’s military merits or lack thereof.

Even less ideologically ambitious proposals have revolved around political imperatives. When the U.S. first began to consider the modernization and concurrent reduction of NATO’s nuclear stockpile in the early 1970’s, it found that the Europeans prized the stockpile more for its symbolic importance than its military value. From the military perspective, a significant portion of these warheads were dangerously obsolete, and the expense of storage took money away from other projects. Politically, however, the reasoning was quite different; the fact that “the stockpile had reached 7,000 [warheads] was irrelevant

⁴⁶Large, p. 126.
⁴⁷Winand, p. 218.
in itself. What mattered was that this number had become symbolic of the American commitment. Lower the number and the Europeans would see a lowered commitment.²⁴⁸

For this reason, the modernization initiative, which eventually resulted in the Long Range Theater Nuclear Forces (LRTNF) deployment of the early 80’s, met with much greater enthusiasm in some European expert circles when first proposed than the attendant proposals for stockpile reduction and consolidation. Throughout the 1970’s, Alliance consensus dictated that “while the composition of the NATO nuclear stockpile might be subject to change, the negative political repercussions of any significant reduction in size were believed to outweigh any conceivable military benefits.”²⁴⁹ Although the advent of the nuclear disarmament movement ultimately mired the LRTNF deployment in controversy and made stockpile reduction more attractive politically, that reduction was only accomplished after the new LRTNF “Euromissiles” had reaffirmed the validity and utility of U.S. nuclear guarantees. Though LRTNF deployment was driven primarily by the larger geostrategic implications of the global nuclear balance, it also illustrated an axiom that has held true throughout the Alliance’s history: it is far easier from the political standpoint to make qualitative modifications to NATO force structure than significant quantitative changes.

In the case of the 1970’s nuclear stockpile, qualitative improvements were intended to substitute for quantitative reductions. For NATO’s conventional force posture over the last 25 years, the reverse has typically been true: qualitative improvements have been implemented

²⁴²Lawrence Freedman, quoted in Daalder, p. 153.
²⁴⁹Daalder, p. 141.
when quantitative increases have proven politically and economically unfeasible. Such was the case in the aftermath of the 1961 Berlin crisis, which highlighted serious conventional deficiencies in Allied force structure. Arguing for a politically unpopular expenditure on conventional forces, the U.S. advanced the belief that “much of the necessary increase in strength could be obtained simply by correcting deficiencies in existing allied forces”\textsuperscript{50} rather than dramatically expanding troop levels.

A similar dynamic played itself out following NATO’s adoption of Flexible Response in 1967, a strategy which, in principle, required further improvements to conventional forces. On both sides, however, the domestic political climate precluded numerical additions to troop levels and induced pressure for force reductions. From the European point of view, U.S. requests for increased conventional force contributions seemed unfair: “by implying that the Europeans should devote the bulk of their resources to fielding the necessary conventional forces while the U.S. alone would provide NATO’s nuclear backing, the U.S. proposals... raised the specter of an unequal division of labor.”\textsuperscript{51} At the same time, the U.S. government found no constituency, other than the Joint Chiefs of Staff, for the maintenance of existing troop levels, let alone any increase; American priorities, especially for Congress, were to “reduce the U.S. balance of payments deficit... and to free trained manpower for use in Vietnam.”\textsuperscript{52}

\textsuperscript{50}Duffield, p. 169.

\textsuperscript{51}Ibid, pp. 165-166.

\textsuperscript{52}Ibid, p. 188.
The solution to the impasse between the dictates of military requirements and political acceptability was to make qualitative improvements to the Alliance's conventional capabilities. In the mid-1970s, both pillars hoped to improve the efficiency of NATO's conventional forces without significant expenditures through a dedicated process of Rationalization, Standardization and Interoperability (RSI) to eliminate waste and duplication of effort. Though the RSI programs bore some fruit, the allies soon recognized that "rationalization alone would not reverse the adverse trends in the NATO-Warsaw Pact military balance."\textsuperscript{53} NATO then agreed upon a Long-Term Defense Plan (LTDP) in 1978, which sought to effect a significant strengthening of the Alliance's conventional defense through the 1980's. While the LTDP involved significant outlays, much of which failed to materialize, it was "most notable [for] what it did not try to do, which was to increase the size of NATO's conventional force structure . . . instead, its emphasis was almost entirely upon force modernization and other qualitative improvements."\textsuperscript{54} The Alliance's Conventional Defense Improvement (CDI) initiative of the mid-1980's followed the same logic.

Finally, in demonstrating the superiority of political considerations within the process of Alliance strategy and force structure formulation, one must consider the degree to which each ally uses NATO strategy to justify national programs and priorities. This tendency has been pronounced throughout Alliance history, as "member states actively seek to shape

\textsuperscript{53}Duffield, p. 215.

\textsuperscript{54}Ibid, p. 219.
strategy in ways that help justify the forces they are willing to provide.”\textsuperscript{55} As an example, in the mid-1950's, the faltering British economy led that nation to consider major cutbacks in its forces assigned to NATO. Realizing that a unilateral withdrawal based upon national imperatives would undercut allied cohesion, British policymakers determined that “a military rationale would be needed to justify the desired withdrawals . . . and the most direct way to devise such a rationale was to revise NATO strategy.”\textsuperscript{56} Nations have also sought to influence allied strategy in order to justify national procurement programs. America has been among the worst offenders in this regard: MC 48 helped promote the U.S. Army’s introduction of the “Pentomic” division and the massive buildup of the U.S. Air Force’s Strategic Air Command. Likewise, the MLF initiative was intended in part to boost the fortunes of the Polaris program and its follow-ons, and the push for the LRTNF deployment was partly fueled by the U.S. military’s interest in cruise missile development.

2. The Dictates of Consensus

In both the nuclear and conventional realms, allied planning has traditionally obeyed the dictum that states: “the details of NATO’s force structure are less important than the preservation of alliance cohesion.”\textsuperscript{57} In practice, this has meant that NATO has been slow to deviate from the status quo, and that major changes are arrived at only after prolonged negotiation. While the Alliance made a succession of rapid strategic adjustments in its early

\textsuperscript{55}Duffield, p. 235.

\textsuperscript{56}Ibid, p. 121.

\textsuperscript{57}Ibid, p. 255.
years, NATO strategy has become "increasingly stable over time . . . until the upheavals that ended the Cold War, NATO’s formal strategic concept had not changed in more than two decades." Force structure, both nuclear and conventional, remained remarkably stable as well throughout the last two decades of the Cold War. As with any organization requiring consensus among disparate perspectives, any satisfactory agreement becomes something of an institutional norm; the existence of a norm creates powerful incentives to adhere and renders attempts at deviation both conspicuous and traumatic. Strategically, "perpetuation of the status quo [has] represented a more acceptable compromise among the divergent views within the Atlantic Alliance than would the implementation of any of the alternatives." Accordingly, Flexible Response (ca. 1967 ff.) remained the Alliance’s strategy throughout the latter part of the Cold War, in spite of American doubts about the willingness of the Europeans to shoulder an appropriate share of the defense burden and European misgivings about the reliability of American nuclear guarantees.

Pressures to maintain institutional norms have been even more pronounced in the Alliance’s force structure, where "the highest norm was that . . . states should seek to provide previously agreed force levels or at least to preserve the status quo." The last NATO formulation of conventional force requirements (in division-equivalents) occurred in 1961. Although total Allied force levels never quite reached the target of 29 2/3 divisions, they

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58 Duffield, p. 233.
59 Daalder, p. 156.
60 Duffield, p. 251.
remained remarkably stable until the end of the Cold War, never fluctuating by more than 1 ½ divisions (of an average of 26). Each of the Alliance’s pillars had a distinct motive for adherence. The Europeans “tended to maintain their forces at established levels largely to ensure that no U.S. forces were withdrawn from the continent . . . the benefits to be derived from unilateral reductions would not outweigh the resulting costs in diminished security if U.S. force levels were also reduced.” On the U.S. side, “American leaders feared that U.S. troop withdrawals would precipitate corresponding allied force reductions, rather than compensatory allied increases.” Whether the motivation was fear of American abandonment or of European defection, the end result was the same: the perpetuation of the status quo.

This laudable strategic stability has come at the price of vagueness. In order to accommodate and reconcile the generally opposing strategic views of the Atlantic and European pillars, NATO strategy has been “presented in such a way that each country could plausibly interpret the document as satisfying its minimal strategic requirements, which typically necessitated couching the strategy in vague language.” The ambiguity of NATO strategy explains a good deal of its longevity: “as the strategic concept became more indeterminate, its modification became increasingly unnecessary because it could

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61 Duffield, from Table 7.1 on p. 235.
63 Ibid.
64 Ibid, p. 245.
accommodate an expanding range of interpretations.” As an example, the development of NATO Selective Employment Plans (SEP) for nuclear forces in the 1970's was conditioned by the need to accommodate conflicting European and American views on the proper employment of nuclear weapons. The SEPs, which presented NATO leaders with a variety of nuclear use options that encompassed the range of Allied employment preferences, “represented a classic political compromise among divergent strategic perspectives . . . as a result, the Alliance was able to avoid a continual debate about when, how, where and for what purpose NATO should employ nuclear weapons.” Of course, deliberate ambiguity is no substitute for true consensus; such measures simply “kick the can down the road” for future generations to take up.

3. The Acceleration Effects of Crisis

Much of the Alliance’s cohesion during the Cold War was due to the series of global crises provoked by the Soviets and their satellites, which served to remind the oft-fractious allies of the reality and immediacy of the threat. The divergent strategic perspectives of NATO’s two pillars created a built-in entropy within the Alliance; in order to “counteract the tendency towards [Allied] fragmentation . . . the West needed catalysts to focus the common political will of the [member] nations.” Interestingly, these catalysts, which typically came in the form of crises, seldom triggered new responses; rather, they served to accelerate

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65 Duffield, p. 241.
66 Daalder, p. 104.
67 Winand, p. 166.
initiatives already begun but mired in intra-Alliance dispute. The first such crisis was the Korean War, which provided a shocking demonstration in June 1950 of the Soviet Union’s malevolence and willingness to take action against the West. The results of the Korean War were a dramatically expanded U.S. military presence in Europe and the call for Federal German armament. What is less commonly known is the fact that “initiatives to put Germans back on the front, albeit of an informal nature, had been launched well before the Korean War began . . . the strategic reassessment of which German rearmament was a part was well advanced by the time the North Koreans attacked.”68 Moreover, the Americans had already been considering greater security involvement on the continent, though these ideas had been sidelined by their political unpopularity. The outbreak of war added impetus to these moribund proposals by elevating fear of the Soviets over prior political objections. Admittedly, residual intra-Allied resentments and political maneuvering delayed West Germany’s admission to NATO and the founding of the West German armed forces until 1955, but the strategic implications of the Korean War provided the incentive for compromise that made the eventual agreements possible.

Similarly, the 1956 Soviet invasion of Hungary accelerated NATO’s shift away from a defense centered primarily around nuclear weapons. This crisis “cast doubt on the argument that the danger of thermonuclear war had significantly dampened the willingness of the Soviet Union to use force . . . to the contrary, some Europeans concluded that the risk of aggression,

68 Large, p. 62.
including the possibility of a limited war, had increased. The result was that initiatives to improve the Alliance’s conventional capabilities were revived and enshrined in a new strategy, MC 14/2, which gave increased weight to conventional forces. A few years after the Hungarian crisis, however, Allied fears waned, and conventional force improvements were stalled in budgetary gridlock. The Berlin Crisis of 1961 broke the Allies out of their reverie and reinforced “their initial interest in obtaining stronger non-nuclear forces.” This same pattern repeated itself in the latter part of the decade, when the 1968 Soviet invasion of Czechoslovakia accelerated the implementation of the 1967 revision of NATO strategy, MC 14/3. In spite of the new strategy, which placed still greater emphasis on conventional forces, the allies in late 1967 were contemplating force reductions to relieve economic burdens and, in the case of the U.S., to release manpower for use in Vietnam. Images of Soviet tanks rolling through downtown Prague, “by raising new doubts about Soviet intentions, served to arrest the cascade of force reductions that . . . threatened to weaken NATO’s military posture significantly.” On the nuclear side, the 1979 Soviet invasion of Afghanistan provided much-needed political cover for the controversial LRTNF deployment, which had been informally agreed upon by the Allies some months prior.

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69 Duffield, p. 125.  
70 Ibid, p. 152.  
71 Ibid, p. 190.
D. IMPLICATIONS FOR CJTF

In the immediate aftermath of the demise of the Soviet Union, the Alliance’s twin pillars seemed to be reverting to more traditional patterns of behavior as Cold War fears of abandonment and defection lost sway. Political pressures for a U.S. withdrawal from Europe began to mount as the American public sought to realize its eagerly awaited “peace dividend.” Some Europeans lost no time in attempting to “throw off the American yoke” by strengthening European institutions at NATO’s expense. Fortunately for the Alliance, outside events once again conspired to create internal pressure for compromise. Following the old pattern of the effect of crisis on Allied consensus, the violent dissolution of Yugoslavia helped convince reluctant Allied publics and governments that threats to Euro-Atlantic security exist in the absence of the Soviet Union and that NATO requires a capability to intervene out-of-area as crises arise. While the military genesis of the CJTF lay in the success of multinational military cooperation during the 1990-91 Gulf War, the eruption in the Balkans brought the initiative to the forefront of Alliance deliberations and helped overcome the unrealistic euphoria that accompanied the end of the Cold War.

Overall, the long-standing NATO pattern of political imperatives outweighing military concerns seems to be repeating itself once again in the case of CJTF. CJTF’s eventual form will therefore reflect a compromise between the oft-competing political demands of the Alliance’s two pillars, even to the possible detriment of pure military efficiency. Though some claim that CJTF represents a revolutionary change in the Alliance’s orientation and capabilities, it is in fact grounded in the status quo and the need to maintain Alliance cohesion.
At its core, CJTF is about preserving existing NATO institutions, notably the integrated military structure, in the face of a changing strategic environment. Though CJTF will result in the modification of the Alliance's core structures, these will be evolutionary changes rather than a revolutionary overthrow of the Alliance's hard-won consensus. The essence of the CJTF initiative is an improvement to NATO's ability to respond to contingencies with existing conventional means. By adapting currently available forces and headquarters, the Allies hope to use CJTF to enhance the quality and utility of NATO's conventional forces without requiring quantitative increases in personnel or defense expenditures.

There will undoubtedly remain a degree of vagueness in CJTF arrangements to allow room for the various strategic and political preferences of the Alliance's diverse membership. On the other hand, the economic and social realities of the post-Cold War order are pressing the Alliance towards more efficient and specific solutions. In the recent past, NATO has enjoyed a relative abundance of military capacity, which has permitted some "slop" in military arrangements in order to accommodate political compromises. As budgets tighten and resources grow scarcer, this flexibility will diminish, forcing the Alliance to make harder choices. The next two chapters lay out the details of these choices as they pertain to CJTF and highlight the hidden political and strategic agendas that undergird the initiative.
III. FUNDAMENTAL ELEMENTS OF THE CJTF CONCEPT

Among the many pronouncements of the NATO Heads of State and Government at the January 1994 Brussels Summit, their endorsement of the CJTF concept may have the most significant strategic and operational impact upon the next century. If properly realized, this initiative also has the potential to address several of the Alliance’s most pressing political challenges. Two principal goals underpin the project: a desire to “strengthen the European pillar of the Alliance and allow it to make a more coherent contribution to the security of all of the Allies,”72 and an anticipated need “to undertake missions in addition to the traditional and fundamental task of collective defense,” which may include “peacekeeping and other operations under the authority of the UN . . . or CSCE.”73 CJTF is also intended to foster NATO cooperation with the nations of Central and Eastern Europe by providing for their participation in selected contingencies. This chapter examines these three goals in detail.

A. STRENGTHENING THE ALLIANCE’S EUROPEAN PILLAR: “SEPARABLE BUT NOT SEPARATE”

The Alliance’s commitment to strengthen its European pillar reflects deep-seated goals on both sides of the Atlantic. Officially, “the U.S. supports the development of a greater European security identity and defense role as a means of strengthening the integrity and


73 Ibid, para. 7.
effectiveness of NATO."74 The late strategic planner and diplomat Col. S. Nelson Drew, USAF, observed pointedly that "such a position is a logical outgrowth of the long-standing American desire for revised ‘burden sharing’ . . . a desire to see the European Allies shoulder a greater share of the roles, risks, and responsibilities of their own defense."75 Thus, American support for CJTF is not based upon an altruistic desire to see Europe united for its own sake; rather, the U.S. view reflects traditional American economic concerns and desires for limited liability in Europe, as discussed in the previous chapter. U.S. military and political leaders are facing a new political and economic reality: it will not always be feasible for the U.S. to intervene globally on a unilateral basis, even when such intervention is desired. In an era of fiscal constraint and military retrenchment, "the U.S. will need allies, coalition partners, to enable us to insert troops and maintain those troops and accomplish our missions in distant places . . . in almost any scenario involving the use of American military power."76

In Europe, two interrelated objectives are addressed. Ideologically, strengthening the European pillar promotes the process of European political union by prompting a collective "judgement of the role the European Union (EU) wishes to play in the world and the contribution it wishes to make to security in its immediate neighborhood and in the wider


75Drew, "A View from the U.S. . . .," p. 4.

world."\textsuperscript{77} More practically, it provides for greater European autonomy, when desired, from American influence in defense decision making. The first major NATO commitment to a greater role for Europe within the alliance was expressed by the Ministers of Foreign Affairs in mid-1991 at Copenhagen. The Heads of State reaffirmed this position at Rome later in the year by recognizing the desirability of "the development of a European security identity and defense role."\textsuperscript{78} This statement was subsequently refined into its current form, delivered at Brussels in 1994: "We give our full support to the development of a European Security and Defense Identity (ESDI) which . . . might in time lead to a common defense compatible with the Atlantic Alliance."\textsuperscript{79} Although there are several potential venues for an ESDI, only one, the Western European Union (WEU), stands out as being sufficiently developed to express it. Jose Cutliero, then WEU Secretary-General, noted with pride in 1995 that the "WEU is well-placed to continue as the focus for the further development of the European Security and Defense Identity,"\textsuperscript{80} and he was correct, given the unique links the WEU has to both NATO and the EU.

On the part of the EU, the 1992 Treaty on European Union characterized the WEU as "an integral part of the development of the Union" and requested that the WEU "elaborate

\textsuperscript{77}Preliminary Conclusions on the Formulation of a Common European Defense Policy, report to the Western European Union Council of Ministers by the Permanent Council, 14 November 1994, p. 4.

\textsuperscript{78}Rome Declaration on Peace and Cooperation, Issued by the Heads of State and Government Participating in the Meeting of the North Atlantic Council in Rome on 7th-8th November 1991, para. 3.

\textsuperscript{79}Brussels Declaration, para. 4.

\textsuperscript{80}Ambassador Jose Cutliero, "WEU's Operational Development and its Relationship to NATO," NATO Review, Vol. 43, No. 5 (September 1995), p. 11.
and implement decisions and actions of the Union which have defense implications.”\(^{81}\) While this statement stopped short of a formal linkage between WEU and the EU, in practical terms, the WEU serves as the EU’s security appendage. There is, however, little drive to consummate the EU-WEU relationship, as “Europeans have no consensus as to [WEU’s] role . . . Germany sees it absorbed by the EU as the defense agency of the EU, but the UK does not like this, and keeps alive the WEU to prevent the EU from taking responsibility in foreign and security affairs . . . even France sees the WEU as neither efficient nor capable.”\(^{82}\)

The German view is driven by their ardor for European integration as well as an interest in efficiency. By folding the WEU into the EU, Germans argue, the EU would be strengthened and a potentially redundant structure would be eliminated. The British, on the other hand, are most reluctant to surrender their tradition of unfettered sovereignty in foreign and security affairs to a supranational body and wish to keep European security matters within an inter-governmental framework in which they would maintain strong veto rights. Viewing the EU as primarily an economic instrument rather than a true government of Europe, the British feel that “encumbering the Union with military responsibility would do nothing to enhance the unique contribution that the EU can make to greater regional security through the political and economic instruments available to it.”\(^{83}\)

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\(^{81}\) Treaty on European Union, February 1992, Title V, Article J.4.2.

\(^{82}\) Gen. Klaus Naumann, GEA, Chairman of the NATO Military Committee, remarks upon his visit to the National Defense University, Washington, D.C., May 7, 1996.

Perhaps surprisingly, the French have the most balanced vision for the WEU: the French see the WEU as having the potential to become a viable European institution in its own right, believing that "the WEU, as the natural tool for the development of the European defense identity needs to be able to become, in political terms, the consultative framework for European cooperation on defense matters, both as the defense component of the Union and as the European pillar of the Alliance."\textsuperscript{84}

At Brussels in January 1994, NATO adopted this line of reasoning by formalizing its support for "strengthening the European pillar of the Alliance through the Western European Union, which is being developed as the defense component of the European Union."\textsuperscript{85} This "dual vocation" -- as NATO's European pillar and the EU's semi-official defense arm -- places the WEU in the unique position of potentially bridging the political-military gap between the EU and NATO: "WEU has become an unavoidable point in the decision-making process . . . it has grown into a European bloc within the Alliance Structure."\textsuperscript{86} This solution appears satisfactory to all: "France can claim that Europe's visibility within the Alliance has grown, Germany can point to progress towards European integration, and the UK can point to a pragmatic, useful outcome that reduces the perceived need for EU involvement in matters


\textsuperscript{85}Brussels Declaration, para. 5.

of security and defense."\textsuperscript{87} Such arrangements, however amicable, are not without their hazards. A powerful European security organization could potentially become a rival to NATO for political authority and ever-scarce defense resources. This prospect is especially worrisome for the U.S., and in the recent past, "the tension between a European desire for greater independence and the American desire to avoid creation of a competitor for NATO became a source of considerable frustration among Allies."\textsuperscript{88}

European officials are quick to dismiss fears of a competitive relationship between NATO and the WEU, yet on paper at least, the possibility for overlap exists. Article V of the Modified Brussels Treaty outlines collective defense responsibilities for WEU members markedly similar to, and in some respects exceeding, those contained in Article 5 of the Washington Treaty.\textsuperscript{89} At their 1992 meeting at Petersberg, the WEU Council of Ministers defined additional missions that might be carried out by WEU-directed forces: humanitarian relief, search and rescue, peacekeeping, and crisis management (including limited peacemaking). In 1994 at Noordwijk, the same body noted that the stage had been set for the WEU’s "development as an effective defense organization with full operational capacities to carry out the Petersberg tasks."\textsuperscript{90} Indeed, declares Jean-Marie Guehenno, France’s

\textsuperscript{87}NATO, CJTF’ s and IFOR,” IISS Strategic Comments, Vol. 2, No. 5 (June 1996), p. 2.


\textsuperscript{89}See Preliminary Conclusions . . . , p. 4.

\textsuperscript{90}Declaration of the WEU Council of Ministers meeting at Noordwijk, 14 November 1994, para. 4.
Permanent Representative to the WEU, "WEU cannot content itself with being a subsidiary body of NATO."\(^{91}\)

In practical terms, however, the WEU is far from being a threat to NATO. Lacking NATO’s highly-developed military infrastructure and integrated chain of command, the WEU has thus far relied almost wholly on the willingness of its members to find and provide national military assets not already earmarked for NATO use, an uncertain task in an era of numerically declining armed forces. Likewise, the WEU lacks a major military staff and permanent commanders, forcing it to rely on national officers and headquarters offered to WEU on a case-by-case basis. As far as concrete measures go, “little has been done to prepare the WEU for its place in the spotlight as the Union’s security arm . . . one official at the WEU says money is so tight that one even has to fight for paper clips.”\(^{92}\) For the foreseeable future, therefore, the WEU “has no choice but to look to NATO”\(^{93}\) to ensure its operational effectiveness and the efficacy of an ESDI.

At the January 1994 Brussels Summit, NATO recognized the implications of the current and future paucity of defense resources for the emerging ESDI. By agreeing “to make collective assets available . . . for WEU operations undertaken by the European Allies


\(^{93}\)Foster, p. 27.
in pursuit of their Common Foreign and Security Policy,"\footnote{Brussels Declaration, para. 6.} both pillars of the Alliance underwrote ESDI and, at the same time, prevented wasteful competition. As Secretary General Solana notes, this is a matter of fairness and efficiency: "The European Allies have no separable operational capability of their own, even though they invest heavily in NATO infrastructure. At a time when resources are so constrained, it makes no sense for European assets to lie dormant within NATO’s structure . . . these assets should not be separate from NATO, but they should be realized and exploited."\footnote{Javier Solana, “NATO: Shaping Up for the Future,” speech by the Secretary General at the IISS, London, September 19, 1996.} CJTF is the mechanism by which these forces, “separable but not separate”\footnote{Brussels Declaration, para. 6.} from NATO, are to be provided. So closely linked were ESDI and CJTF at the Brussels Summit that “for a time, it looked as if the CJTF concept would itself largely define the parameters of the ESDI . . . for each is objectively interrelated with the other."\footnote{Rafael Estrella, rapporteur, Structure and Functions: European Security and Defense Identity and Combined Joint Task Forces, draft report to the Defense and Security Committee of the North Atlantic Assembly, October 1995, p. 3.} At the same time, it must be recalled that strengthening the European pillar is only one of CJTF’s goals, not its exclusive rationale. As Drew emphasized, the CJTF concept “does not need the ESDI as a justification, but rather permits the Alliance to adapt to its own requirements in a manner that is supportive of -- rather than in competition with -- ESDI.”\footnote{Drew, The Evolution of NATO . . . , p. 22.}
B. MOVING NATO OUT OF AREA: "COALITIONS OF THE WILLING"

1. NATO's Peacekeeping Mission

European political considerations notwithstanding, the CJTF's most fundamental role is to provide a framework within which NATO can support missions for which the Alliance's traditional structure was not designed. The origins of NATO's willingness to participate in peacekeeping operations coincide, chronologically, with the breakup of Yugoslavia in 1991, but they are not rooted in that crisis; rather, they stem from the unexpected collapse of the Communist bloc, a trauma whose grand scale drowned out the first rumblings in the Balkans. The experiences of Allied nations participating in the 1990-1991 Gulf War coalition contributed to the awareness that the end of the Cold War had left the Alliance poorly prepared -- politically even more than militarily -- to confront any threat to peace and stability besides the Soviet one. NATO's New Strategic Concept, adopted by the Heads of State and Government at the Rome meeting of the North Atlantic Council (NAC) in November 1991, "reflected Alliance realization that significant changes were required in the way in which NATO would have to perform if it was to remain relevant to the security interests of its members in the post-Cold War environment."99

While the New Strategic Concept explicitly reaffirmed collective defense as the Alliance's essential purpose, it also acknowledged that the profound changes in the world order meant that:

Risks to Allied Security are less likely to result from calculated aggression against the territory of the Allies, but rather from the adverse consequences of instabilities that may arise from the serious economic, social and political difficulties, including ethnic rivalries and territorial disputes, which . . . could lead to crises inimical to European Stability and even to armed conflicts, which could involve outside powers or spill over into NATO countries, having a direct effect on the security of the Alliance.\textsuperscript{100}

This prescient statement anticipated Allied involvement in the Balkans, but at that point, direct intervention was not foreseen. Instead, the New Strategic Concept and the accompanying Rome Declaration on Peace and Cooperation advocated “a broad approach to security . . . reflected in three mutually reinforcing elements of Allied security policy: dialogue, cooperation and the maintenance of a collective defense capability.”\textsuperscript{101} This relatively pacific ideal was based upon a more vigorous exercise of economic and diplomatic consultations, as called for in Articles 2 and 4 of the Washington Treaty, through the mechanism of “a framework of interlocking institutions tying together the countries of Europe and North America.”\textsuperscript{102}

As events in Bosnia progressed, it became increasingly obvious that for the foreseeable future, Europe’s institutional security framework would be too weak and uncoordinated to address outright conflict. Europe’s economic giant, the European Community -- which became the European Union in November 1993 -- was a self-professed

\textsuperscript{100}The Alliance’s New Strategic Concept, Agreed by the Heads of State and Government Participating in the Meeting of the North Atlantic Council in Rome on 7-8 November 1991, para. 10.

\textsuperscript{101}New Strategic Concept, para. 25. Also, see The Rome Declaration, para. 4.

\textsuperscript{102}Ibid, para 3.
military dependant of NATO and the WEU, and its ability to make far-reaching political-military decisions was -- and still is -- subordinated to the task of Europe's economic integration. The Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe (CSCE) had too limited a mandate and too many members to make operational military decisions. Also, CSCE lacked the political interest among its members necessary to even call itself a full-fledged regional security organization, although that too would change. The WEU had perhaps the most potential to accept a role in peacekeeping, as its adoption of the Petersburg Tasks demonstrated. Unfortunately, the WEU's organizational deficiencies and chronic lack of resources hindered it from taking a leading role; at one point, "the WEU had drafted plans for an interpositional force [in the former Yugoslavia], which its members shied from inserting."\(^{103}\) Only NATO possessed adequate diplomatic and military means, and it soon became "difficult to envision a means by which NATO . . . could make good on [its] commitment to stability and peace throughout the trans-Atlantic community without consideration of an Alliance role in peacekeeping activities."\(^{104}\) Such consideration would be contentious.

Some Allies, France among them, "rejected an Alliance role altogether, preferring to see an expanded CSCE role in this field, perhaps in concert with the new European mechanisms for a common foreign and security policy as called for in Maastricht."\(^{105}\) Others,

\(^{103}\)Foster, p. 11.


\(^{105}\)Ibid.
the United States in particular, were not keen on peacekeeping to begin with or, like Germany, had constitutional restrictions on out-of-area military endeavors. The first step was, typically, a compromise. At the ministerial meeting of the NAC at Oslo in June 1992, the Allies agreed to support “on a case-by-case basis in accordance with our own procedures, peacekeeping activities under the responsibility of the CSCE, including by making available Alliance resources and expertise.” Deference to the CSCE satisfied the “Eurocentrics,” while the agreement to “make available resources and expertise” was non-committal enough to soothe the wary. Ironically, this half-measure proved sufficient to draw the Alliance into active participation in the former Yugoslavia. Shortly after the NAC meeting at Oslo, the UN called upon the CSCE to provide assistance in Bosnia, and the CSCE, lacking the structure and resources to comply, passed the UN request to NATO.

After heated debate, the NAC agreed in July 1992 to provide naval forces to help monitor the UN arms embargo against all republics of the former Yugoslavia, and in October 1992 to provide airborne monitoring of the UN-mandated no-fly zone over Bosnia. In December 1992, NATO legitimized its new link with the UN at the NAC Ministerial in Brussels by confirming “the preparedness of our Alliance to support, on a case-by-case basis and in accordance with our own procedures, peacekeeping operations under the authority of the UN Security Council . . . we are ready to respond positively to initiatives that the UN

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106 Final Communique of the Ministerial Meeting of the North Atlantic Council in Oslo, 4 June 1992, para. 11.

107 NATO’s Role in Peacekeeping in the Former Yugoslavia, Basic Fact Sheet No. 4 (Brussels: NATO Office of Information, January 1996), pp. 2-3.
Secretary General might take to seek Alliance assistance in the implementation of UN Security Council Resolutions.\textsuperscript{108} Within six months, the UN would broaden the mandate of NATO’s air and maritime monitoring operations to include embargo and no-fly zone enforcement, although direct NATO peacekeeping on the ground remained out of reach for two more years.

The January 1994 Brussels Summit moved the Alliance even closer to a full role in peacekeeping. On the one hand, the Brussels Declaration soft-pedaled the issue by reiterating the hedging language of Oslo (case-by-case basis, under the authority of the UN or CSCE, etc.) and by adding reassurances that “participation in any such operation or mission will remain subject to decisions of member states.”\textsuperscript{109} At the same time, however, the Heads of State and Government sought “to conduct more efficiently and flexibly the Alliance’s missions, including peacekeeping.”\textsuperscript{110} Somewhere in between Oslo in June 1992 and Brussels in January 1994, peacekeeping had become a NATO mission. The seeds of this development were sown at the NAC Ministerial in December 1992, when the Alliance pledged to “share experiences in peacekeeping with our Cooperation Partners and other CSCE participating states.”\textsuperscript{111} The chosen vehicle for the evolution of a NATO peacekeeping capability was not a long-established alliance body; rather, the task was given to the year-old North Atlantic

\textsuperscript{108}\textit{Final Communiqué of the Ministerial Meeting of the North Atlantic Council in Brussels}, 17 December 1992, para. 4.

\textsuperscript{109}\textit{Brussels Declaration}, para. 8.

\textsuperscript{110}\textit{Ibid}, para. 9.

\textsuperscript{111}\textit{Final Communiqué}, 17 December 1992, para. 3.
Cooperation Council (NACC), which was formed primarily to coordinate NATO political initiatives in Central and Eastern Europe. Use of the NACC in this capacity was politically shrewd for a divided Alliance. It provided a meaty issue for the cooperation partners to help chew on which was within their modest political and military means, while at the same time pushing the peacekeeping issue out of the Alliance’s core, into a forum where decisions would not be binding.

The NACC set to work fairly briskly. As tasked, the NACC dutifully chartered an Ad-Hoc Group on Co-operation in Peacekeeping to “develop a common understanding on the political principles of and the tools for peacekeeping, and to share experience and thereby develop common practical approaches.”112 By June 1993, the Ad-Hoc Group had formulated a conceptual approach to peacekeeping that included definitions, general principles and operational guidelines. The only problematic feature in this document was its reliance on the UN or CSCE “to define in each case the arrangements for the conduct of a peacekeeping operation, including command relationships.”113 This statement notwithstanding, the NACC report was good enough to have many of its features, including its definitions, absorbed by the NATO Military Committee into MC 327, *NATO Military Planning for Peace Support Operations* (5 August 1993).114 While disagreements in the NAC blocked official NATO


113Ibid, p.4.

114Foster, p. 6.
adoption of the NACC-formulated peacekeeping principles, the NACC’s work served to keep consideration of peacekeeping active in Allied councils until the subject was finally brought into public view at the January 1994 Brussels Summit.

2. CJTF’s Links to PfP and NATO Enlargement

Not only did the 1994 Brussels Summit institutionalize peacekeeping as a NATO mission, it also strengthened the emphasis on European cooperation in peacekeeping through the newly created Partnership for Peace. Multilateral cooperation in peacekeeping has been one of the Alliance’s principal means of establishing and maintaining a meaningful security dialogue with the post-Communist states of Central and Eastern Europe. NATO’s New Strategic Concept, adopted in November 1991, committed that body to a “broad approach to security . . . [with] three mutually reinforcing elements”115: dialogue, cooperation and collective defense. In conjunction with the first two of these goals, the Alliance created the NACC to facilitate consultation between the Allies and their non-NATO European neighbors, particularly those of the former Communist bloc. As previously discussed, the NACC at its first ministerial meeting agreed to “cooperate in preparation for UN or CSCE [-mandated] peacekeeping operations and to share experience in peacekeeping and related matters.”116

The Partnership for Peace (PfP), unveiled at the January 1994 Brussels Summit, accelerated the rapprochement between the Allies and their former foes. While commonly

115The New Strategic Concept, para. 25.

viewed as a compromise measure to forestall a more permanent solution to the question of NATO enlargement, the Partnership is also a reaffirmation of NATO’s desire to broaden overall European participation in peacekeeping. Initially conceived as a “Partnership for Peacekeeping,”117 PfP in its final form encompasses a wider variety of diplomatic and military functions related to the stabilization of the European security environment and the democratization of the post-Communist states to the east. Peacekeeping remains a major cooperative mechanism within the Partnership, however. Two of PfP’s five primary objectives involve strengthening the willingness and ability of Partners to participate in peacekeeping operations in conjunction with the Allies. Within nine months of the Partnership invitation, 23 nations had tendered their Partnership Framework Documents and major military exercises had been held involving Allied and Partner ground forces in a simulated peacekeeping environment. In 1995, additional exercises strengthened the ability of Partner staffs to coordinate with NATO’s integrated military structure. The speed with which these developments proceeded revealed both the Partners’ eagerness to solidify ties with NATO as well as the Alliance’s growing awareness that its vision for European security cooperation would soon face the acid test: ground involvement in Bosnia.

3. CJTF’s “Variable Geometry”

Non-Article 5 operations -- which encompass a range of missions including peacekeeping, peacemaking and humanitarian aid -- carry with them important conceptual

implications. Such contingencies are generally assumed to take place “out of area,” that is, beyond the borders of the Allied nations, and require a concomitant “recasting [of] the Alliance as a structure adapted to force projection.”118 Such measures are fraught with political peril, as there is “a tremendous difference between the ability to generate consensus to respond to an Article 5 attack . . . and the ability to generate and sustain consensus to deploy NATO forces to engage in . . . operations outside of the territory of member states.”119 Since the Alliance operates on a consensus basis, the political complications of out of area deployments could potentially have paralyzing effects on NATO’s decision-making apparatus. Allied unanimity stems from the concept of equal sharing of risk, enshrined in Article 5, whereby each member is obligated to participate in the common defense. Since out of area contingencies are not necessarily matters of common defense, “it is not practical to hope to enforce this Article 5 principle for non-Article 5 missions; certain allies may not have the [appropriate] military resources . . . others may have unavoidable political or historical reservations.”120

From the outset, the Alliance recognized the impracticability of insisting on unanimous participation in out of area missions. While unanimous consent is still required for NATO to initiate or participate in such operations, it was specifically stated at Brussels that “participation in any such operation . . . will remain subject to decisions of member states in

118Foster, p. 37.


120Foster, p. 38.
accordance with national constitutions."\textsuperscript{121} The CJTF concept expressly allows for a "variable geometry" of participants for each operation, allowing some Allies to opt out while preserving the availability of collective resources to those who choose to participate. To help flesh out these "coalitions of the willing," the CJTF also provides an avenue for participation by "nations outside the Alliance,"\textsuperscript{122} particularly those participating in NATO's Partnership for Peace. These arrangements, while flexible, carry with them significant danger, as they "sanctify a fundamental and inevitable shift away from the basic rule of every coalition: the more or less equal sharing of risk."\textsuperscript{123} Additionally, since non-Article 5 missions are to be carried out in support of the UN or OSCE, there is the problem of relations between the Alliance and these bodies: "the dialogue between the UN and national military command has always been difficult, but it is even more complicated once the UN delegates the conduct of military operations, not to a country, but to an international organization."\textsuperscript{124} Preserving Alliance autonomy becomes a priority; as former NATO Secretary-General Willy Claes reminds us, NATO "supports the UN, but we are not its sub-contractor."\textsuperscript{125}

\textsuperscript{121} \textit{Brussels Declaration}, para. 7.

\textsuperscript{122}Ibid, para. 9.

\textsuperscript{123}Foster, p. 45.


The language of the January 1994 Brussels Declaration implies four possible CJTF configurations: a NATO-led operation, a WEU-led operation, and coalitions in which members of NATO or the WEU are joined by other members of the UN or OSCE. A pure NATO configuration is the most likely, and is the "first and most important use of the CJTF concept." A task force would not necessarily have to include contingents from every Ally to be classed as a NATO CJTF; any collection of Alliance members conducting an operation under NATO auspices would retain access to all of the Alliance's collective infrastructure, even if some allies chose not to participate. Such "NATO-minus" groupings may, in fact, be the rule for smaller non-Article 5 contingencies. NATO task forces potentially have access to a wide variety of national and multinational formations. By 1995, Alliance forces will be grouped into three categories, first articulated in the 1991 New Strategic Concept: Main Defense Forces, the bulk of NATO's conventional deterrent; Reaction Forces, capable of rapid deployment to trouble spots; and Augmenting Forces, available to reinforce the other two. All three types possess crisis-response capability via mobile and detachable units, which may be drawn upon to form and support a NATO CJTF.

All three force categories are composed of formations increasingly multinational in character at the corps level. Currently, four main defense corps are bi-national, and the

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128 One Danish-German, one German-Dutch, one German-US and one US-German.
ACE Rapid Reaction Corps (ARRC), the “likely first instrument of [Allied] response,” is multinational down to the divisional level. Additionally, the five-nation Eurocorps is available for NATO use as a Main Defense Force or as a “Rapid Reaction Force, ACE-wide.” The proliferation of multinational formations may be beneficial for Allied solidarity and interoperability, but poses a potential problem in a NATO-minus situation. Nations choosing not to participate in a “coalition of the willing” may inadvertently gut multinational forces and staffs available to a CJTF by withdrawing critical units. This issue will be particularly critical for the CJTF nucleus staffs, which may need to seek “national approval to allow all assigned personnel to deploy -- irrespective of a nation’s decision to contribute forces -- to avoid degrading command and staff functions on the brink of deployment.”

The second CJTF configuration, WEU-led, might be described as an extreme case of NATO-minus: a coalition in which the U.S. and other non-WEU Allies decline to participate. While this configuration has generated the most political attention due to its implications for ESDI, “from a practical point of view, the scenarios where we will have a WEU force going out with the U.S. standing aside are not likely to arise.” On the other hand, in the words of U.S. diplomat Eric Newsome, “if we determine that there are few or no U.S. national

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130 Foster, p. 25.


interests at stake [in a given contingency], the degree of our participation will be much different than if there are important interests at stake."\textsuperscript{133} The January 1994 Brussels Declaration indicates that NATO military capabilities will be available to the Alliance's European pillar, implying that, with the NAC's consent, staff and other collective resources will be provided to the WEU where appropriate.

In anticipation of such contingencies, the WEU is now seeking to define Forces Answerable to the WEU (FAWEU) which may be drawn upon to form a WEU-led CJTF. Heading this list is the Eurocorps, which, though obligated to NATO as an MDF for Article 5 purposes, was initially designed to provide a European crisis-response capability. Joining Eurocorps as potential FAWEU are the Multinational Airborne Division (Central), the UK/Netherlands Amphibious Force, the newly established 4-nation EUROFOR and EUROMARFOR, and, potentially, the 1st German/Netherlands Army Corps.\textsuperscript{134} These European multinational formations suffer from the same vulnerability to selective non-participation as their NATO counterparts, and require "unanimity among their burgeoning masters to deploy."\textsuperscript{135} Additionally, many of the formations comprising these forces are "dual-hatted," being primarily obligated to NATO; the availability of such forces to the WEU is therefore contingent on their release from NATO duties. As the WEU members themselves

\textsuperscript{133}Newsome, p. 14.

\textsuperscript{134}See European Security: a Common Concept of the 27 WEU Countries, report to the WEU Council of Ministers at Madrid, 14 November 1995, p. 56.

\textsuperscript{135}Foster, p. 31.
acknowledge, "the readiness of the Alliance to make collective assets and capabilities available for WEU operations is fundamental to ensuring that WEU has access to a sufficiently wide range of capabilities."\textsuperscript{136}

The final CJTF configurations, NATO- or WEU-plus, involve the participation of other nations who are members of the UN or the OSCE. The broad language of the January 1994 Brussels Declaration includes the possibility of coalition with Western-oriented nations, such as Australia or Japan, as well as with other regional powers, notably Russia. However, the NATO-plus configuration is most commonly envisioned as a function of the Partnership for Peace initiative, whose objectives for partners include "the development of cooperative military relations with NATO . . . in order to strengthen their ability to undertake missions in the fields of peacekeeping, search and rescue, humanitarian operations, and others as may subsequently be agreed."\textsuperscript{137} For Partner nations, integration into NATO military operations represents "a hedge against instability and external threats."\textsuperscript{138} This goal, while laudable and politically desirable, is bound to carry with it inconvenient and expensive interoperability issues, which should not be set aside lightly. In spite of the inconvenience, former CINCSOUTH Adm. Leighton Smith believes that "an ever-increasing and genuine possibility of ad hoc coalitions requires a more inclusive approach to interoperability,"\textsuperscript{139} which is being

\textsuperscript{136}European Security: a Common Concept . . . , p. 57.

\textsuperscript{137}Partnership for Peace: Framework Document, Brussels, 11 January 1994, para. 3(d).

\textsuperscript{138}Drew, The Evolution of NATO . . . , p. 23.

pursued as a principal objective of PfP. Neither this nor any of the other obstacles yet discussed are insurmountable, and all 16 Allies are firmly committed to overcoming them. At the same time, unresolved issues remain. The next chapter examines these sticking points in the CJTF debate and the larger political and strategic efforts from which they stem.
IV. THE FORMAT DEBATE: CJTF’S UNCERTAIN SHAPE

As NATO’s flagship initiative for the post-Cold War order, CJTF raises several political and military issues with the potential to seriously affect Allied cohesion and the balance of influence between the Alliance’s two pillars. In its role as a process of building military coalitions, there has been little controversy over the nature of the CJTF. The proper placement of the CJTF, regardless of composition, within the Alliance’s decision-making structure has been more difficult to determine. The Atlantic pillar sees CJTF as an extension of the present integrated military structure, an effective infrastructure built up at great cost over the past 45 years; the majority of the European Allies tend to agree with this perspective. On the other hand, some elements within the European pillar, particularly those nations who do not participate in the integrated military structure, view Article 5 and non-Article 5 missions as fundamentally incompatible and requiring distinct political-military control structures. For a time, there seemed to be “a grave danger of splitting NATO into an article 5 organization and a non-Article 5 organization, the former without, the latter with French participation, thus overloading the whole structure by constant redundancy and overlap.”140 Though this contentious debate was resolved in general terms at the June 1996 NAC Ministerial at Berlin, the details of CJTF’s place in the Alliance’s political-military structure

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are not yet fixed and remain the subject of much controversy. This chapter surveys the current state of the debate, laying out the substance of the major disagreements and identifying likely areas of compromise.

A. FROM BRUSSELS TO BERLIN: A STALLED INITIATIVE

Though the Alliance collectively approved CJTF at Brussels in January 1994 as the Alliance’s way ahead, the spirit of consensus which prevailed at that historic meeting broke down rapidly as the Allies struggled to work out the details. For a short while, military planners made sound progress until they found that, in spite of the general support for the concept expressed at Brussels, there were very real disagreements over how the concept was to be implemented. Both the U.S. and the Europeans had hidden agendas: “France’s priority was to enhance the visibility and potential effectiveness of the ESDI . . . the U.S., however, was more interested in preserving both Washington’s leading role in the Alliance, and NATO’s unity of command.”\textsuperscript{141} The next two-plus years passed in stalemate as “the debate on CJTF became increasingly intricate, complex, and lost the attention of the political leaders.”\textsuperscript{142}

1. The Mainstream View

The “mainstream” view, championed by the U.S. and supported by the majority of the Allies, has been that all CJTF development and employment must take place under the

\textsuperscript{141}\textit{IISS, NATO, CJTFs and IFOR}, p. 1.

\textsuperscript{142}Gilles Andreani, former Deputy Permanent Representative of France to the North Atlantic Council, quoted in “France and NATO” (U.S.-CREST), p. 4.
auspices of NATO's integrated military structure. The paramount concern for the mainstream nations prior to Berlin was that the integrated military structure, long a mainstay of Alliance solidarity and productivity, not be weakened by a competing structure. From the standpoint of efficiency, "the well proven integrated military structure would be made irrelevant for the new tasks of crisis management, conflict prevention and peace support operations, where the inherent flexibility of the structure, its adaptability, expertise and communality of operating procedures are needed most,"143 if CJTFs were to be subordinated to a new command authority. Additionally, there has been "a prevailing view in NATO circles that [non-Article 5] operations could assume Article 5 proportions,"144 leading to rival command structures contending for operational control of forces. From the standpoint of Euro-Atlantic relations, former U.S. Military Representative to NATO Lt. Gen. Daniel Christman, USA, points out that "we simply cannot afford two alliances . . . bifurcation in the approach to Article 5 and non-Article 5 missions is a certain way to disengage this hemisphere from the European continent,"145 an undesirable outcome for both sides.

While the desire to preserve the authority of the integrated military structure is shared more or less equally by the Allies that participate in it, the U.S. has additional reservations regarding the employment of CJTFs outside of the Alliance. When U.S. assets are among those provided by NATO for a WEU-led CJTF, which would be the case for almost every

143Genschel, from Transatlantic Relations and International Security, p. 9.
145Christman, p. 79.
imaginable contingency, the U.S. wishes to preserve a measure of control over their use. In particular, “the U.S. wants NATO to be able to control the assets before an operation, allot them in accordance with NATO priorities and monitor their use throughout any operation.”\textsuperscript{146}

Rejecting French proposals for a prearranged turnover of NATO assets to the WEU for European CJTF operations, the U.S. government made it clear that “there is no way we are going to hand over our assets lock, stock and barrel to the WEU without some form of oversight.”\textsuperscript{147} As the U.S. is widely represented in the integrated military structure, maintaining some oversight of American assets provided by NATO to the WEU through that structure seems an adequate substitute for direct U.S. national supervision. To this end, the U.S. has pressed for the designation of one of the Major NATO Commanders (MNC) as “the ‘supporting CINC’ to the WEU operational commander for the provision of NATO resources as well as for . . . U.S. assets.”\textsuperscript{148} The designated MNC would monitor the employment of Allied forces by the WEU to ensure that they are used in a manner consistent with NATO and, implicitly, U.S. policies. Conveniently, both MNCs are American officers. Some Europeans see this as an unacceptable U.S. veto on European operational autonomy; for the

\textsuperscript{146}Frederick Bonnart, “Balancing Act: Integrating a European Component Into NATO,” \textit{The International Herald Tribune} (May 28, 1996).


\textsuperscript{148}Barry, “NATO’s Bold New Concept,” p. 52.
U.S., however, such an arrangement represents insurance against “being drawn into a military commitment, in which it had no influence from the beginning, through the back door.”

2. The Minority View

Feelings have been equally strong on the other side of the debate. The minority view, developed primarily by France, seeks to create maximum maneuvering room for the ESDI within CJTF. Firstly, the minority view sees “a fundamental difference between common defense . . . and the management of post-Cold War crises, for in the latter case, a priority for the Europeans may not be a priority for our North American allies.” For this reason, the French argue, the maintenance of a structural separation between the two tasks is the best means of preserving Europe’s ability to decisively and autonomously intervene in localized security problems. In particular, the minority view holds that political control mechanisms within the integrated military structure are not sufficient for peacekeeping and other non-Article 5 tasks, which require an elevated degree of political oversight. In the minority’s eyes, the integrated military structure is a creature of the Cold War, when “the immediacy of the threat called for predelegation of authority to a single identifiable commander, who had to be American.”

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150 Guéhenno, p. 11.

151 Andreani, p. 13.
Non-Article 5 missions, on the other hand, are more subtle, calling for a civilian “hand on the throttle” capable of making continuous adjustments in a fluid environment. V. Adm. Jean Betermier, French Navy, of the Centre des Hautes Etudes de l’Armement, Ecole Militaire, Paris, makes the interesting observation that “the U.S. experience in Vietnam has made them more willing to push the policy side out of the chain of command,”\textsuperscript{152} an uncomfortable situation for the French, who have come to insist upon unusually tight political control over military activities. The French view of the proper place for the military in the national and European security establishments has been heavily conditioned by a series of difficulties in civil-military relations dating back to 1940.

The French, like the U.S., have additional national reservations about CJTF arrangements. Within the French government especially, the integrated military structure “is still widely perceived . . . as being incompatible with independence in political-military affairs.”\textsuperscript{153} For many Frenchmen, the prospect of NATO/US assets provided to a WEU-led CJTF being administered through the integrated military structure smacks of subordination and an involuntary return to the structure they deliberately abandoned in 1966. For this reason, the French have pressed for NATO assets provided to the WEU to be administered by the NAC, a body in which they participate, rather than the integrated military structure. Particularly under Mitterrand, “Paris preferred that the NAC determine the political goals for

\textsuperscript{152}V. Adm. Jean Betermier, French Navy, remarks given at the Naval Postgraduate School, Monterey, 16 May 1996.

and continually monitor CJTF operations, wanting to de-emphasize the role of NATO’s military decision-making bodies.”¹⁵⁴ From a French perspective, the heavy U.S. presence in the integrated military structure makes the problem worse: “if it is agreed that the supporting officer [that is, the U.S. officer serving as a Major NATO Commander] should have the right to control or inspect both the aim and execution of the European-led operation through the assets that he is supposed to provide, the ESDI would still be dependent on the United States,”¹⁵⁵ an unacceptable situation for France.

To preserve the ESDI from American influence, France has sought to build structural firewalls between European-led CJTF arrangements and those for full NATO participation. In particular, Paris has pressed for “assets preallotted and available for a European commander, with a staff to make contingency plans for possible European-only operations . . . in particular, France sees such operations, although nominally within the Alliance framework, taking place independently under WEU political control without any interference from NATO.”¹⁵⁶ These demands have been consistently rejected by the Americans as an irresponsible “blank check” and a wasteful duplication of structures. While a cynic might argue that “for Paris, the problem is how to secure access to NATO/US resources without subjecting the Europeans to US political control,”¹⁵⁷ the minority view must be respected.

¹⁵⁴Sloan, NATO Adapts . . . , p. 4.


¹⁵⁶Bonnart.

¹⁵⁷Foster, p. 40.
For the French, "American insistence on using the command relationships of the [integrated military structure], where France is not a player, seems designed to deliberately marginalize the French role."\(^{158}\) That role is not inconsiderable. The French have "the potential to be the most important European contributor to CJTF operations,"\(^ {159}\) and it would be unwise to alienate or exclude them.

B. RESOLVING THE IMPASSE

1. The Franco-Allied Rapprochement

On December 5, 1995, the ice began to thaw. On that day, addressing the NAC Ministerial Session in Brussels, M. De Charette, the French Foreign Minister, announced that henceforth:

- the French Defense Minister would participate regularly in the work of the Alliance
- France would take its place in the Military Committee and also in the bodies coming under it
- France would participate in the NATO Defense College, the Oberammergau College and the Alliance’s Situation Centre
- France would bring about a process likely to improve its working relations with SHAPE.\(^ {160}\)

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These decisions reflect a dramatic change in France’s policy and attitude towards NATO, though they have been generally misinterpreted by the press. France’s decisions do not represent a “French return to NATO” -- as the French never left NATO in the first place, only its integrated military structure -- and they stop short of re-integrating France into that structure. What these overtures represent, in the words of political analyst Stanley Sloan, is “an invitation to bargain.” More officially put, the French announcements are “a unilateral gesture ... we have not set any conditions ... our aim is to give a new impetus to the Alliance reform process decided at the January 1994 Summit.” This gesture was achieved at considerable political cost for President Jacques Chirac, who has “felt pressure from the right, for ‘selling out France,’ and from the left, for ‘selling out Europe.’” The fact that Chirac is a Gaullist made his decisions all the more ground-breaking, proving once again the adage that “only Nixon could go to China.”

France’s overtures were not purely altruistic. The fact that the announcements were made as NATO was finalizing plans for JOINT ENDEAVOUR was no coincidence. As one of the three main participants in IFOR, France had a reasonable desire to be represented in the political-military bodies that would be overseeing the employment of over 10,000 French troops. France also realized that an increased French presence in Allied councils would translate into increased leverage for French positions on the CJTF debate and other important

issues. By taking a more active role in certain key NATO institutions France hoped to “make a better contribution to these thoughts [on the renewal of the Alliance] and to enable her partners to share her convictions in favor of strengthening political control and the European identity within NATO.”  

More subtly, France has tried to seize the moral high ground in the CJTF debate, saying, in effect, “France has taken the first step, but henceforth, we must walk together.”  

As discussions on CJTF resumed, the implication seemed to be that it was America’s turn to make some concessions.

2. The Berlin Ministerial

Meeting at the level of Foreign Ministers in Berlin in early June 1996, the NAC crafted a carefully-worded set of compromises designed to satisfy both the majority and minority views on CJTF. Shortly before the Ministerial, the NATO Military Committee (NMC), with French participation, agreed upon six military principles for CJTF development; these principles undergird the Berlin accord. Under the NMC guidelines, CJTF must:

- preserve the integrated military structure
- provide for separable but not separate forces in support of ESDI
- maintain a single command structure for Article 5 and non-Article 5 missions
- retain the role of the Military Committee in advising the NAC and in transmitting strategic guidance from the NAC to NATO Military Authorities

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165 Beternier.
• avoid ad hoc participation in NATO bodies
• preserve the ability of Major NATO Commands to do timely contingency planning.\textsuperscript{166}

At Berlin, the Alliance's civilian leaders gave these principles the political legitimacy needed to make CJTF palatable to each of NATO's sixteen member nations; as usual with the Alliance, "there was a great deal of ritual and theology to the adaptations."\textsuperscript{167} In brief, the minority conceded that NATO must retain a single military structure, and in turn, the majority committed itself more concretely to the development of an effective ESDI. Reduced to a single statement, the Berlin compromise ensured that rather than the WEU, the EU, or the OSCE, NATO would remain "the essential forum for consultation among its members and the venue for agreement on policies bearing on the security and defense commitments of the Allies."\textsuperscript{168}

\textit{a. Concessions to the Majority View}

The principal concessions to the majority view at Berlin were the commitment to a single military structure and the agreement on NATO oversight over forces provided to the WEU. By affirming that NATO will continue to be built upon "a single multinational

\footnote{\textsuperscript{166}}{\textsuperscript{166}}\textsuperscript{Christman, p. 79.}

\footnote{\textsuperscript{167}}{\textsuperscript{167}}\textsuperscript{Steven Erlanger, "NATO Plans Component That Will Be All-European," \textit{The New York Times} (June 4, 1996), p. A5.}

\footnote{\textsuperscript{168}}{\textsuperscript{168}}\textsuperscript{Final Communiqué, Ministerial Meeting of the North Atlantic Council in Berlin, 3 June 1996, para. 7.}
command structure . . . able to undertake all missions,”169 the NAC ended any threat of a rival structure competing with the integrated military structure for funding and staff resources. While acknowledging that the integrated military structure will have to be “renovated” in order to better undertake the Alliance’s new missions, the Berlin decisions ensured that the integrated military structure will be the forum for “the ability to mount NATO non-Article 5 operations, guided by the concept of one system capable of performing multiple functions.”170 The integrated military structure is also to be the structure through which European-led CJTFs are to be planned for and organized; the Berlin accord provides for the “elaboration of appropriate multinational European command arrangements within NATO [emphasis added] . . . able to prepare, support, command and conduct the WEU-led operations.”171 The primacy of the integrated military structure, even for WEU-led operations, means that “Washington can rest assured that it will maintain an effective veto over European use of NATO assets for missions of which it does not approve.”172 Furthermore, there will be no “blank check” guarantees for the automatic provision of NATO assets and forces to the WEU; rather, “the NAC will approve the release of NATO assets and capabilities for WEU

169Berlin Communique, para. 7.
170Ibid.
171Ibid.
operations,"\textsuperscript{173} providing all NATO members with the opportunity to veto the provision of Allied support for a WEU operation.

\textit{b. Concessions to the Minority View}

From the minority viewpoint, the Berlin agreements give the ESDI teeth by permitting "the creation of militarily coherent and effective forces capable of operating under the political control and strategic direction of the WEU."\textsuperscript{174} In spite of the subordination of WEU-led operations to the integrated military structure, the Berlin arrangements permit "all European Allies to play a larger role in NATO's military and command structures" and ensure that "such European command arrangements should be identifiable and the arrangements should be sufficiently well articulated to permit the rapid constitution"\textsuperscript{175} of a WEU-led CJTF. While the provision of NATO assets to the WEU is subject to the judgement of the NAC, the NATO military authorities are effectively shut out of the approval and monitoring process, being limited to giving "advice" on such matters. The Berlin decisions also assuage minority concerns about the level of political oversight for non-Article 5 missions by establishing a new forum, the Policy Coordination Group (PCG), which is intended to "meet the need, especially in NATO's new missions, for closer coordination of political and military viewpoints."\textsuperscript{176}

\textsuperscript{173}Berlin Communiqué, para. 7.

\textsuperscript{174}Ibid.

\textsuperscript{175}Ibid.

\textsuperscript{176}Ibid.
C. UNRESOLVED ISSUES: "RENOVATING" NATO'S MILITARY STRUCTURE

As critical is it has been towards progress in CJTF, in some respects, the June 1996 Berlin Ministerial "kicked the can down the road" on a number of issues. The most critical of these is the nature of the "renovated" integrated military structure. The term "renovation" satisfied both sides politically. For the majority, it means that the integrated military structure will be modified rather than superseded, while the minority sees it as guaranteeing that fundamental changes will occur in the way that the Alliance does business. Unfortunately, at Berlin, the NAC was -- deliberately -- not explicit about what "renovation" will entail. NATO Secretary General Javier Solana believes that a renovated or "new" military structure must be:

- equally able to defend NATO interests out of area, as well as protect territory within it, including after NATO enlarges

- capable of including all existing members and new members

- reflective of a growing and visible European responsibility in defense and security.\(^{177}\)

The third of these goals will be the most difficult to implement. While the U.S. is generally supportive of ESDI, American leaders, particularly in the military, "want a structure that recognizes the U.S. commitment and contribution to European security."\(^{178}\)

\(^{177}\) Solana, IISS speech.

bluntly, the U.S. will resist any revision that significantly diminishes its leading role in Allied military affairs, particularly where the oversight of U.S. assets is concerned. As the format for CJTF has coalesced, several issues relating to the renovation of the integrated military structure have emerged as potential sticking points.

1. The Long Term Study

Shortly after the Brussels meeting in January 1994, the NATO Chiefs of Defense Staffs (CHODS) determined that fundamental reorganization and streamlining were needed within the integrated military structure, both to prepare it for potential new roles and to make it more militarily and fiscally efficient. To that end, the CHODS commissioned the NMC to undertake a Long-Term Study (LTS) on the adaptation of NATO structures. The LTS has been driven by "across-the-board consensus that the existing command structure is top-heavy, too expensive and incapable of accommodating a possible NATO enlargement."\(^{179}\) As it stands, the current integrated military structure has 65 headquarters, including the two Major NATO Commands (MNC), 8 Major Subordinate Commands (MSC), 23 Principal Subordinate Commands (PSC) and 32 sub-PSCs. Many of these headquarters, particularly sub-PSCs, are the result of a "pork barrel" mentality, whereby each NATO member has attempted to get as many NATO headquarters as possible within its borders.

While the details of the LTS remain classified, current plans apparently envision a sweeping rationalization of this structure, including the reduction in power of many of the

\(^{179}\)Blaauw, para. xxxviii.
smaller, more nationally oriented headquarters. The MNCs will likely be renamed Strategic Commanders (SC), reflecting their role in military planning and resources oversight. Likewise, MSCs will be redesignated as Regional Commanders (RC), in recognition of their role in directing military operations within preset geographic areas of responsibility. The exact number of RCs under each SC has not yet been determined, but it will most likely be fewer than the current eight. Each RC will retain its functional component commanders, e.g., AFSOUTH will still have LANDSOUTH, AIRSOUTH, NAWSOUTH, etc., as well as smaller joint subordinate commands that will be responsible for areas of special interest, such as the Baltic Approaches, the Iberian Atlantic area, and Asia Minor.

2. Location of CJTF Nuclei

While the LTS is in many respects “an appearance game, some changes have substance.” Technically separate from CJTF issues, the results of the still-unfinished LTS will nonetheless have a significant impact upon the final format for CJTFs, particularly with regard to the location of CJTF “nucleus” staffs. Shortly after the NATO Foreign Ministers met in Berlin in June 1996, the NATO Defense Ministers met as the NAC for the first time in almost 30 years. At that session, the Defense Ministers directed that “the NAC in permanent session, with the advice of the NATO Military Authorities to take forward the implementation of the CJTF concept . . . including in particular the location, size, number and

180 These basic elements of the LTS were described by Mr. Slocombe at the Bergen press briefing (p. 2 of the transcript).

structure of CJTF headquarters elements and their operating procedures.”182 Immediately following the CJTF initiative’s adoption at Brussels in January 1994, Allied military planners began to sketch out a rough design for the shape of a CJTF. The resulting tri-MNC study on CJTF headquarters concepts, which has been the starting point for CJTF format discussions ever since, is based upon the establishment of permanent “nuclei” which would “represent the minimum necessary frameworks around which a complete headquarters could quickly be constructed once a decision had been taken to form and employ a CJTF.”183 In peacetime, the nuclei would reside within specific “core headquarters,” and would be responsible for “informing their ‘core’ headquarters commander on CJTF matters, assist in generic planning, coordinate training of the entire nucleus staff and convey updated information on personnel and resources”184 to higher CJTF political-military planning bodies. When activated, each nucleus would form a framework staff that could be augmented by “modules” from the core or other NATO, WEU and national staffs.

While the Allies are in agreement over these basic principles, the issues of how many nuclei to stand up and to which “cores” they should belong has been contentious. The French, in particular, have been insistent that national headquarters of WEU members be granted nuclei in addition to NATO headquarters so that WEU has the option of “requesting the use


183Cragg, p. 8.

184Blauw, para. lv.
of a CJTF headquarters [from NATO] . . . or, in some circumstances, WEU operations could also be conducted with . . . a nucleus from headquarters answerable to the WEU.”  

The basis for the French argument is that since the WEU would only undertake modest missions based upon the relatively circumscribed Petersburg Tasks, it makes sense to have “little nuclei” to complement the “big nuclei” at various NATO headquarters that would handle IFOR-sized missions. Some observers speculate, perhaps uncharitably, that hidden behind this official rationale is a French desire to have a nucleus or two at headquarters dominated by Frenchmen, obviating the need for France to rejoin the integrated military structure in order to participate fully in CJTF staff planning and execution. The U.S. opposes the French proposal on grounds of inefficiency and unnecessary duplication; the U.S.-proposed modular concept would permit the WEU to “flesh out” a NATO-provided nucleus with WEU staff elements, rather than having the WEU maintain independent nuclei of its own. Placing nuclei outside of the Alliance, in the U.S. view, would complicate CJTF planning and allow the French to circumvent and undermine the authority of the integrated military structure.

Uncertainty also exists over the proper location for the first set of CJTF nuclei. Rather than attempting to plant nuclei at every MSC simultaneously, there is a general consensus that one or two nuclei should be formed on a trial basis. In ACLANT, the choice is simple: a sea-based nucleus could be formed around the Striking Fleet, Atlantic (STRIKEFLTLANT), which, in its other “hat” as the U.S. Second Fleet, has already served as a JTF off of Haiti.
The choices in ACE are harder. Of the ACE MSCs, the Central and Southern regions have the most extensively supported headquarters and the widest ranges of forces available; of the two, AFCENT is the largest, while AFSOUTH has become the busiest and most experienced. Some planners feel that AFSOUTH’s experience in directing JOINT ENDEAVOUR and its predecessors make it the logical choice to shepherd the nucleus concept to maturity. On the other hand, AFSOUTH’s exposure to the unique conditions in Bosnia may have prejudiced the staff to the degree that they might not be the best choice to develop a concept that must meet a wide range of contingencies, some bearing little or no relation to events in Bosnia. In this regard, AFCENT may be more of a “sterile petri dish in which to implement a prototype CJTF.”\(^{186}\) The fact that CINCCENT is European while CINCSOUTH is American may make CINCCENT a more inviting choice, particularly for the French.

3. “Europeanizing” the Integrated Military Structure

At Berlin, the NAC agreed to pursue the “elaboration of appropriate multinational European command arrangements within NATO.”\(^{187}\) How this will be accomplished remains to be determined. The crux of the matter is that for the U.S., the “Europeanization” of the integrated military structure simply means making provisions for European-led operations in extraordinary situations, while the Europeans, particularly France, believe that “the ‘Europeanization’ of the Alliance has to be effective not only when an operation is actually mounted, but also in time of peace . . . it must be able to take effect not only within the

\(^{186}\)Interview, Washington D.C., 28 August 1996.

\(^{187}\)Berlin Communiqué, para. 7.
framework of the actual military operation but also in the planning and preparatory stages, and in the politico-military decision process.”¹⁸⁸ Three alternative plans have been suggested to facilitate this “peacetime Europeanization”:

- a WEU general officer would work in tandem with SACEUR (probably coordinating through the Deputy SACEUR (DSACEUR)) on CJTF matters; this WEU officer would command a WEU-led operation

- the Deputy MNCs (DSACLANT and DSACEUR) would be made permanent European billets; these officers would be “dual hatted” with the WEU for WEU CJTF planning and operations

- a European would be placed in command of the “core” MSC for the first CJTF nucleus; this officer would be “dual hatted,” serving also as the WEU CJTF commander.¹⁸⁹

Of these options, the second is the preferred solution for the Europeans; the U.S. has serious reservations about all three. As far as U.S. planners are concerned, the first option is the least desirable, as it could result in precisely the duplication of structures that CJTF is intended to avoid.

The second option is colloquially known as the “deputies proposal” and was proposed jointly by the British and the French at the beginning of 1996. In French terms, the Deputy MNCs, particularly DSACEUR, would probably be less of a deputy and more of a “petit SACEUR,” having an independent role in coordinating European CJTF planning and

¹⁸⁸Millon, p. 16.

¹⁸⁹Command alternatives adapted from IISS, “NATO, CJTFs and IFOR,” p. 1.
execution efforts. In advancing this proposal, the Europeans point to the Berlin agreement, which expressly provided for "double-hatting appropriate personnel within the NATO command structure to perform these functions." U.S. policymakers, especially on the military side, have been highly critical of the deputies proposal, being concerned that "the principle of unity of command would be jeopardized by having a DSACEUR report both to the NAC and the WEU council." More to the point, SACEUR is concerned about the erosion of his authority and the command structure disarray that could occur if his supposed deputy possessed independent powers to plan for and organize operations which SACEUR would have to provide forces for.

At first glance, the third option seems like the ideal compromise. A "dual-hatted" European at the MSC level would pose no threat to SACEUR's authority, while at the same time retaining enough stature to satisfy the Europeans. The problem with this option stems from the fact that the U.S. is insistent upon retaining American commanders in certain MSC billets for national reasons. The most obvious such case is CINCSOUTH. The U.S. believes, in the words of Secretary of Defense William Perry, that "it is essential that NATO's AFSOUTH, which includes the U.S. Sixth Fleet and other forces in the Mediterranean, remain under U.S. command... we have a preponderant military force in the AFSOUTH area, and

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190 Interview, Washington D.C., 28 August 1996.

191 Berlin Communique, para. 7.


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it really makes supreme sense for an American commander to be in charge."193 Practically, the
U.S. uses CINCSOUTH in his American "hat" to monitor potential threats to U.S. national
strategic interests in the Mediterranean and to support U.S. efforts in the Middle East. Placing
AFSOUTH under the authority of a senior multinational European commander might disrupt
these American arrangements considerably. Moreover, only the U.S. has the economic,
political, and military clout and reputation as an "honest broker" to deal effectively with the
Greeks and the Turks.

The French have made matters all the more complex by insisting that CINCSOUTH
become a European position. Faced with this challenge, the U.S. has reluctantly agreed to
support the deputies proposal, with the tacit understanding that, in return, the French will
desist from their push for a European CINCSOUTH. At Bergen in September 1996, both
Secretary of Defense William Perry and his Under Secretary for Policy, Walter Slocombe,
acknowledged that "within the European command, very much within the European structure,
there will be an additional role for the DSACEUR, who is and will continue to be a European
officer."194 To the extreme consternation of American leaders, the French have since renewed
their calls for a European CINCSOUTH in addition to the deputies proposal. Matters are
currently at an impasse. As of this writing, it looks as if the disagreement over this issue will

193 Secretary of Defense William Perry, Transcript of the Press Conference held at the Informal

194 Slocombe, p. 2.
delay approval of the LTS, which might otherwise have been approved at the December 1996 NAC Ministerial in Brussels, until the next NATO summit in June 1997.195

For the French, it is a matter of national pride as well as the domestic political need to assuage the Gaullists, who want their President to take a harder line towards NATO and the U.S.. On France’s part, there are “no hard feelings... we understand that the U.S. has its reasons to be particularly concerned about the Sixth Fleet, but we would have a political problem if we gave in now.”196 French resistance notwithstanding, the Americans look likely to win this argument, as most of the European Allies believe that “the French have overplayed their hand... [other Europeans] won’t say so publicly, but they’re sitting on the fence, and if the United States insists on keeping the southern region, they will go along with Washington.”197

4. Political-Military Coordination

To accommodate French requests for closer political supervision of CJTF operations, the NAC agreed in June 1996 at Berlin to create a Policy Co-ordination Group (PCG). While the terms of reference for this body have not yet been released, in general terms, the PCG will be a NAC subsidiary “composed of Allied political and military representatives to facilitate


197Unnamed European official, quoted in Whitney, “Paris Blames U.S. . . . .”
coordination of the political goals of a mission and its military implementation."  

Subsequently, the NAC, meeting at the level of defense ministers, initiated the development of two additional CJTF planning and oversight bodies: the Capabilities Co-ordination Cell (CCC) and the Combined Joint Planning Staff (CJPS). The CCC is to "provide staff support to the Military Committee on contingency related matters and assist the Military Committee in providing planning guidance to the Major NATO commanders." Similarly, the CJPS, operating at the MNC level, would "perform centralized CJTF headquarters planning functions and co-ordination with all relevant headquarters, as well as with forces that might serve under a CJTF headquarters, and as appropriate with the WEU Planning Cell." While the CCC and the CJPS are more military than political in nature, their intent is to permit NATO Military Authorities to provide better CJTF planning coordination and advice to the NAC, both in peacetime and during an operation.

Considerable disagreement exists over which of these bodies will be primarily responsible for providing the political-military link to the WEU, both for planning and operational purposes. As each of these new organs corresponds to an existing level of the NATO structure, the real question is: at which level -- the NAC, the NMC, or the MNCs -- will NATO coordinate with the WEU on CJTF matters. The U.S. feels that the CJPS, as the most military of the three new bodies, would be the most efficient mechanism for coordinating

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198 Sloan, NATO Adapts..., p. 3.

199 Defense Ministers Communiqué, para. 6.

200 Ibid.
military planning with the WEU. The fact that the CJPS would operate under MNC -- hence, American -- cognizance also makes it attractive to the U.S. Predictably, the French have rejected this notion: “it will never be acceptable to the French that a chain of command would go from the WEU council to SACEUR thence back to the CJTF commander . . . for France, it must be a direct line.”\textsuperscript{201} The French would prefer that the CCC be the primary NATO-WEU coordinating body, which would push the level of contact up to the Military Committee. Because the Military Committee is an organ in which they now participate fully, the French want to strengthen the role of that body in Allied military planning, declaring that “the Military Committee needs to serve as a General Staff for the whole of our Alliance, with a mandate to prepare the scenarios for the detailed military planning undertaken by the various commands.”\textsuperscript{202} Such an increase in the scope of Military Committee responsibility could only come at the expense of the MNCs, an outcome that will probably be bitterly contested by the U.S..

5. French Participation in the Integrated Military Structure

Following the changes to France’s NATO policy in December 1995, the French have maintained that they “are not excluding accepting positions within the Integrated military structure if the Integrated military structure is modified to permit a greater European role.”\textsuperscript{203} Regrettably, no one within France or the rest of NATO seems to know what degree of

\textsuperscript{201}Naumann, NDU remarks.

\textsuperscript{202}Millon, p. 15.

\textsuperscript{203}Betermier, NPS remarks.
"renovation" will be necessary in order to accomplish this. Much of the impetus for CJTF, the LTS and other structural modifications stems from the need to "make it possible for the French to sell [NATO] to their public . . . nothing is as hard for French politicians than trying to revise a decision taken by de Gaulle earlier . . . it must be a sound sales presentation, i.e., where NATO did something new based on a French initiative."\textsuperscript{204} Unfortunately, the French seem to have run out of new initiatives. Upon assuming his duties as Chairman of the Military Committee, Gen. Klaus Naumann, German Army, "asked all CHODS about ESDI and how to make it more visible . . . they all fell silent . . . then I addressed the French -- no ideas here either."\textsuperscript{205} The problem is made worse by ignorance; even French officials will admit to "how little key French decision makers know about this [integrated military] structure in NATO."\textsuperscript{206} A French return to the integrated military structure would be a desirable outcome for the U.S. -- and the Alliance as a whole -- in many respects. By ending the practice of NATO "a la carte," all NATO members would be on an equal footing, eliminating the need for inefficient special arrangements for France as a participant in CJTF planning. On the other hand, the U.S. would have to be prepared to accept a greater French role in NATO military decision making. The end result will likely be another compromise; in the post-Cold War NATO, no one, not even France or the U.S., can afford to insist on having his cake and eating it too.

\textsuperscript{204}Naumann, NDU remarks.

\textsuperscript{205}Ibid.

\textsuperscript{206}Andreani, p. 10.
V. THE FORMER YUGOSLAVIA: “THE TEST CASE FROM HELL”

Although structural disagreements are prolonging the formalization of the CJTF concept, NATO operations in and around the former Yugoslavia offer a useful model with which to judge the viability of some of the CJTF’s central tenets. For three years, NATO, working in conjunction with the WEU and the UN, enforced economic sanctions and no-fly zones in the former Yugoslavia. At the January 1994 Brussels Summit, the Alliance stepped closer to full involvement by “reaffirming [NATO’s] determination to contribute to the implementation of a viable settlement reached in good faith.”207 Unfortunately, that determination would be tested before the military parameters of the CJTF initiative and the political parameters of Allied peacekeeping doctrine could be settled. As of this writing, almost twelve months into JOINT ENDEAVOUR, NATO still has no binding guidance for the organization of a CJTF or the conduct of peacekeeping operations. As a result, the Alliance, “which for years had enjoyed the luxury of long-range detailed planning for potential allied military operations [has been] reduced to ‘making it up as it [goes] along’ on the road to the first actual use of force in Alliance history.”208 For this reason, Col. Drew characterized events in the former Yugoslavia as “the test case from hell”209, this sobriquet was made

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207Brussels Declaration, para. 24.


especially apt and tragic when Bosnia numbered Col. Drew among its victims. This chapter shows how in fact, if not in name, the Allied responses to this vexing test case constitute a “prototype” CJTF.


In describing the shape of the NATO Combined Joint Task Force initiative as it slowly evolved in Brussels, Lt. Col. Charles L. Barry, USA, astutely noted in 1994 that “the final CJTF concept may, in fact, reflect much of what is being learned daily by AFSSOUTH in DENY FLIGHT and SHARP GUARD.” 210 These operations, NATO’s first formal out of area involvement, proved quite effective, despite the unwieldy diplomatic arrangements used to coordinate the use of force in the region. Although NATO efforts in the former Yugoslavia were conducted piecemeal, with largely independent air and maritime components under the aegis of CINCSOUTH, in toto, they formed an unofficial -- and very loosely interpreted -- CJTF. CINCSOUTH, under SACEUR’s cognizance, coordinated two non-Article 5 tasks in 1992-95 in support of United Nations resolutions: a maritime embargo in the Adriatic, SHARP GUARD, and multi-mission air operations over Bosnia, DENY FLIGHT. A third operation, PROVIDE PROMISE, which supported humanitarian relief efforts, was not technically a NATO effort, but was functionally incorporated into CINCSOUTH’s command structure. Each of these three operations was conducted by a multinational force composed of NATO contingents plus elements drawn from national or

WEU formations. Allied participation was the outgrowth of the NAC’s July and September 1992 decisions to make NATO forces -- maritime and air, respectively -- available to support UN missions in the former Yugoslavia, a policy shift prompted by the deteriorating situation. From the outset, however, NATO was not content to act simply as the UN’s pack mule, and actively pursued its own operational vision. The late Adm. Mike Boorda, USN, former CINCSOUTH, depicted the relationship between the two as one in which:

NATO has been a partner supporting the United Nations rather than operating directly under its flag. Furthermore, this relationship has been an interactive one wherein the United Nations established the operational requirement for the mission and NATO provided the capability to meet that requirement. It is in this relationship that we have seen a new form of support and a possible pattern of future NATO/UN cooperation and, as well, a test of the Alliance’s new strategy.

1. Operation DENY FLIGHT

Operation DENY FLIGHT began as a rather modest air monitoring operation, but quickly matured into a full air campaign with several distinct missions. Acceding to a UN request to help monitor the then-toothless ban on military flights over Bosnia, the NAC initiated Operation SKY MONITOR in October 1992 using collective Alliance assets: the multinational NATO Airborne Early Warning Force (NAEWF). In April 1993, after NAEWF had fruitlessly reported over 500 violations of the no-fly zone, the UN authorized

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NATO to actively enforce the ban. The NAC quickly agreed to provide combat forces to augment the monitoring effort, and the operation’s name was changed to DENY FLIGHT to reflect its revised mission. Following another request from the UN Security Council, the NATO Foreign Ministers, meeting in council in June 1993, agreed to further expand DENY FLIGHT to include Close Air Support (CAS) for the oft-beleaguered UN Protection Force (UNPROFOR) in Bosnia. Following the June 1993 decisions, DENY FLIGHT was tasked:

- To conduct aerial monitoring and enforce compliance with the “No-Fly Zone” over Bosnia-Herzegovina.

- To provide close air support for UN ground troops at the request of, and controlled by, UN forces.

- To conduct, after request by and in coordination with the UN, air strikes against designated targets threatening the security of the UN-declared “safe areas.”\(^{214}\)

Each of these three missions required a separate cooperative arrangement with the UN, none of which was particularly efficient or well regarded by NATO forces and commanders. Enforcing the No-Fly Zone was the most straightforward, as criteria for violations were well-defined. Nonetheless, a complex set of rules of engagement requiring unambiguous identification of violators and multiple warnings constrained NATO aircrews; over DENY FLIGHT’s duration, only one aerial violation was met with force.\(^{215}\) For use of

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\(^{215}\) In February 1994, four NATO fighters shot down four of six hostile aircraft conducting ground attacks in Bosnia.
force authorization, the CAS and air strike missions each employed a variation on a basic theme: the notorious “dual key.” Until mid-1995, this system was, in effect, a triple-key, as approval was needed from both the civilian envoy from the UN Secretary-General and the UNPROFOR Commander before NATO forces, subject to CINCSOUTH permission, could carry out CAS or air strikes. 216 After a somewhat acrimonious debate between NATO and UN officials, a true dual-key system was initiated in July 1995, with the UN civilians removed from the scheme. Although the UN officially initiated all requests for air strikes, NATO often had to lobby that recalcitrant body to take action. For instance, in April 1994, the NAC forced the UN’s hand by declaring its intent to authorize force to protect NATO-declared “military exclusion zones” superimposed over UN Safe Areas. 217

Similarly, the August 1995 DELIBERATE FORCE bombing campaign, an offshoot of DENY FLIGHT, originated with CINCSOUTH, and was heartily endorsed by SACEUR and the NAC. Meeting at London in July 1995 to discuss issues pertaining to the former Yugoslavia, the NATO Foreign Ministers drew a “line in the sand,” declaring that “an attack on [UN Safe Area] Gorazde will be met by substantial and decisive airpower.” 218 Later that month, the NAC specified that any further Bosnian Serb offensive action against safe areas would be met with force. All of these decisions were taken independently of the UN and


217AFSOUTH Fact Sheet: Operation DENY FLIGHT, p. 4.

irrespective of UN policies on the use of force. NATO was tired of being a spectator. On 28 August 1995, a Bosnian Serb mortar barrage caught a Sarajevo marketplace, killing 38 citizens and wounding 85. Adm. Smith, who, as CINCSOUTH, possessed predelegated authority from the NAC to launch retaliatory airstrikes, immediately pressed the UN authorities for concurrence on a bombing campaign intended both to punish the Serbs and to prevent further attacks. The resulting air strikes, directed against 48 target complexes, were conducted on eleven days during the period 29 August - 14 September 1995. The campaign was broken by a 50 hour pause initiated by the UN, which felt that the Serbs had “gotten the message” after the first few days. After a heated exchange between Brussels and New York, the Alliance emerged very much in the driver’s seat; from that point on in Bosnia, “the United Nations would follow NATO’s lead in dictating new strictures to the Serbs.”

The forces that comprised DENY FLIGHT originated from a variety of sources. Most were drawn from NATO-dedicated forces throughout Europe, augmented by additional national forces, both land- and carrier-based. Both the French and the Spanish chose to participate fully in this operation, and quietly placed their aircraft under NATO’s operational control, establishing national liaisons at the Fifth Allied Tactical Air Force (5 ATAF) Combined Air Operations Center (CAOC) at Vicenza. This deliberately ill-publicized arrangement was a quiet reversal of long-standing French and Spanish policy, the first concrete indication of a thaw in their relations with the NATO military structure. Command

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and control arrangements were relatively straightforward, “drawn directly from the integrated military structure], with modifications as required to permit interface with the UN.” These modifications were few: NATO and the UN exchanged representatives between 5 ATAF and UN headquarters in Zagreb and Sarajevo. In spite of the difficulties “associated with being a peace-enforcing NATO operation working in support of a peacekeeping UN operation,” DENY FLIGHT convincingly demonstrated the Alliance’s ability to operate in a non-Article 5 environment, while the DELIBERATE FORCE campaign “validated force as an effective handmaiden to diplomacy . . . and infused NATO with a new sense of strength and vibrancy.”

2. Operation SHARP GUARD

Like DENY FLIGHT, Operation SHARP GUARD began as a monitoring mission. This time, NATO was responding to two stimuli: a request from the UN to help monitor compliance with UN sanctions imposed on the former Yugoslav republics, and a competing effort initiated a month earlier by the WEU. While the Alliance would likely have responded to the UN request in any case, “WEU’s decision, at French bidding, to implement [a] naval embargo off the Montenegrin coast in June 1992 [while] militarily superfluous, had the effect


221AFSOUTH Fact Sheet: Operation DENY FLIGHT, p. 1.


of spurring NATO to parallel action."224 By July 1992, both operations were running in tandem, with MARITIME MONITOR (NATO) and SHARP VIGILANCE (WEU) alternating weekly between the Montenegrin coast and the Straits of Otranto. In November 1992, the mandate of both operations was expanded to include embargo enforcement, and they were renamed MARITIME GUARD and SHARP FENCE, respectively. MARITIME GUARD was directed by COMNAVSOUTH, CINCSOUTH's naval component commander, using the multinational NATO Standing Naval Forces, Atlantic and Mediterranean (STANAVFORLANT and STANAVFORMED), and NATO-dedicated maritime patrol aircraft. SHARP FENCE, on the other hand, was conducted by the Commander-in-Chief of the Italian Navy (CINCNAV), acting as an agent of the WEU Council, using French, Italian and Spanish ships hastily assembled into a WEU Contingency Maritime Force (WEUCONMARFOR).225

These two headquarters were not co-located, making high-level coordination difficult. Although effective informal agreements were made between the forces at sea, the overall situation represented "exactly the sort of competition and wasteful duplication of effort about which the U.S. had always been concerned"226 regarding NATO-WEU relations. Finally, in conjunction with strengthened UN sanctions, the WEU and NATO met in joint Council in

224Foster, p. 22.


June 1993 and approved a combined operation: SHARP GUARD. The new arrangement, “with unity of military command maintained through the NATO chain, but responding to joint political decisions of the NATO and WEU Councils, was somewhat artificial,” but not unmanageable. The revised command structure, called Combined Task Force 440 (CTF 440), was headed by COMNAVSOUTH, responsible to CINCSOUTH. An Italian Rear Admiral, representing the WEU, served as deputy task force commander. CTF 440 was staffed by the operations, logistics and intelligence elements of the NAVSOUTH staff, augmented by an add-on WEU “cell” headed by a French Rear Admiral.

In practice, the operation was “nearly seamless . . . [WEU and NATO forces] used standard NATO procedures and communications.” CTF 440’s task was doubtless made easier by the fact that SHARP GUARD requires no interface with the UN. The relevant UN Security Council resolutions establishing the embargo contained a mandate for their enforcement, and all necessary control, including decisions on the use of force, was delegated to NATO and the WEU. The operation actually enforced a twin embargo: one intended to prevent all arms from entering any part of former Yugoslavia, and the other designed to prevent all unauthorized shipping from entering the territorial waters of Serbia and

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Montenegro. Each embargo had an associated operating area: one in the Straits of Otranto and the other off of the Montenegrin coast, respectively.

The three operational commanders, COMSTANAVFORLANT, COMSTANAVFORMED and COMWEUCONMARFOR, rotated on a monthly basis between the two operating areas, with the third cycle being an off-period. To accommodate the varying ship maintenance and rotational requirements, the three squadrons were combined into a single functional pool of ships; thus, it was not uncommon to have one of the NATO Commanders exercising tactical command of a WEU ship, and vice versa. The task groups were supported by national oilers, who provided service to WEU, NATO and national assets alike. Additionally, the U.S. Sixth Fleet provided SHARP GUARD with a cruiser to deconflict CTF 440 and DENY FLIGHT air operations; this ship was placed under the operational control of the Montenegro task group commander, regardless of whether that individual was a NATO or a WEU officer. Supporting maritime patrol aircraft from eight nations, representing both NATO and the WEU, operated together as Combined Task Force 431, also subordinate to COMNAVSOUTH. While politically unwieldy, CTF 440 proved the feasibility of NATO-WEU operational cooperation, though the necessity for WEU involvement was doubtful in this case as the U.S. was a full participant in the operation.

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230Ibid, p. 4.
3. Operation PROVIDE PROMISE

Operation PROVIDE PROMISE was somewhat of an anomaly. Ostensibly a catch-all Joint Task Force for U.S. national support of UN humanitarian efforts, it encompassed a hospital in Croatia plus air-delivered food and medical shipments to Bosnia, and was run by the Commander-in-Chief, U.S. Naval Forces Europe (CINCUSNAVEUR). In February of 1993, the operation was transferred to CINCSOUTH – CINCUSNAVEUR’s NATO “hat” -- as a multi-national effort to air-deliver foodstuffs to Sarajevo and isolated Bosnian towns.\(^{231}\) The precise character of the operation was ambiguous; officially, the U.S., U.K., French, German and Spanish cargo planes were not under NATO’s operational control. Regardless of their exact status, however, PROVIDE PROMISE flights flew from NATO bases and were tactically controlled by the 5 ATAF CAOC, which ensured that they were integrated into the overall air effort.

B. A MATURING PROTOTYPE: IFOR 1995-1996

On 1 December 1995, the NAC authorized SACEUR to commence Operation JOINT ENDEAVOUR, NATO’s military support for the Peace Agreement signed in Dayton on 21 November 1995. As NATO’s first non-Article 5 ground operation, IFOR is “tangible proof that, in addition to carrying out the core functions of defense of the Alliance, its military forces have the flexibility to be used outside the NATO area.”\(^{232}\) A truly joint-service organization, with coordinated ground, maritime and air elements, the JOINT ENDEAVOUR

\(^{231}\)AFSOUTH Fact Sheet: Selection of Events ..., p. 3.

Implementation Force (IFOR) supersedes previous NATO, WEU and UN operations in, around and over Bosnia. Unlike the quasi-independent activities that preceded it, JOINT ENDEAVOUR meets the technical definition for a CJTF: a multinational, multiple service force under unified command with a specific operational mandate. While lacking CJTF’s still-developing political control and military planning structures, IFOR “nonetheless bears many of its characteristics and the lessons to be learned from the management of such a complex operation will be invaluable for the development of the concept.”

1. IFOR’s Command Structure

JOINT ENDEAVOUR is being conducted under the auspices of the Dayton Accords and complementary UN Security Council Resolutions which authorize NATO to take over the enforcement of the settlement’s military provisions. The operation itself, however, has no direct connection to the UN; instead, IFOR gets its political guidance from the NAC. SACEUR, as the closest MNC and the principal force provider, has overall military responsibility for JOINT ENDEAVOUR. SACEUR has chosen to delegate command of IFOR to CINCSOUTH as a separate “hat”: COMIFOR. Deputy COMIFOR is not a “dual hat” of Deputy CINCSOUTH, who is traditionally an Italian General. Rather, SACEUR has delegated the IFOR Deputy billet to France, in recognition of France’s past experience in Bosnia as well as the size of the French troop contribution. Likewise, the selection of

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233Cragg, p. 8.

234Information for the following paragraphs on IFOR command arrangements was taken from the IFOR Fact Sheet.
COMIFOR’s service component commanders has not followed strict conformity with existing AFSOUTH structures. For the ground component, COMLANDSOUTH, another Italian general, was passed over in favor of the Commander, ACE Rapid Reaction Corps (COMARRC), a British General who commands NATO’s only readily deployable major ground headquarters. This choice, while perhaps frustrating to the Italians, reflects the large British troop contribution as well as the mobility and unique training of the ARRC staff as opposed to the more static Article-5 oriented LANDSOUTH.

COMAIRSOUTH, an American, was chosen to command the IFOR air component. This was a logical choice, as the AIRSOUTH staff and its subordinate elements had been running DENY FLIGHT for the past three years; also, the U.S. has supplied almost 2/3 of the air assets for IFOR support. Most unusually, command of the IFOR maritime component has been split between two commanders. COMNAVSOUTH, an Italian Admiral, has maintained control of SHARP GUARD as a quasi-independent operation, as well as providing minesweeping and escort support to troop convoys in the Adriatic. The Commander, Striking Forces Southern Europe (COMSTRIKEFORSOUTH), the NATO “hat” for the commander of the U.S. Sixth Fleet, has been given authority for all IFOR carrier battle group (CVBG) and amphibious ready group (ARG) support. This is a logical choice, given the fact that the U.S. possesses the preponderance of these assets in the Mediterranean and has been traditionally uncomfortable with the idea of placing these forces under foreign commanders. As with any NATO headquarters, COMIFOR HQ has a multinational staff with a chief of staff and assistants for logistics, operations, intelligence, etc. Many of the flag and general
officers filling these billets have come from Alliance headquarters other than AFSOUTH, both for political reasons and to avoid stripping AFSOUTH of all of its senior leaders. Most of the lower-level IFOR HQ staff members have been furnished by AFSOUTH, augmented as necessary by personnel from other NATO staffs.

2. IFOR Ground

On 2 December 1995, IFOR "Enabling Forces" began to move into positions in Bosnia, Croatia and Hungary to "facilitate the smooth flow of the IFOR deployment... they consisted primarily of headquarters, communications, and logistic elements involving around 2,600 NATO personnel." By 20 December 1995, the designated date of Transfer of Authority (TOA) between the UN and NATO, the ARRC headquarters was mostly in place and began to coordinate IFOR ground operations. In managing the transition, COMARRC's job was made considerably easier by the fact that many of the forces that would comprise the IFOR ground element were already in theater as part of the United Nations Protection Force (UNPROFOR). These forces, predominantly British and French, were smoothly folded in to Allied operations; thus, at TOA, COMARRC had over 17,000 troops available in Bosnia. More were soon to follow as NATO embarked on a massive trooplift which would bring 43,000 more troops into theater by 18 February 1996, when the IFOR ground deployment was declared complete. IFOR ground forces have been grouped into three multinational divisions:

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235 IFOR Fact Sheet, p. 7.

236 ibid, p. 3.
• Multinational Division (South West), commanded by the British and composed of British, Canadian, Dutch and Czech components

• Multinational Division (South East), commanded by the French and composed of French, Spanish, Italian, Portuguese, Ukrainian and Egyptian troops

• Multinational Division (North), commanded by the Americans and composed of U.S., Turkish and Russian troops, plus a multinational Nordic Brigade composed of Norwegians, Danes, Swedes, Finns, and Poles.

Additional specialist troops, including medical, civil affairs, engineers, and military police, operate independently under direct control of the IFOR Ground Component Commander.

3. IFOR Air

The transition from DENY FLIGHT to IFOR air operations was much simpler. The headquarters, aircraft, procedures and tasks of the former were absorbed by the latter with little but a name change to mark the transfer. The IFOR air component has been primarily concerned with the provision of surveillance and close air support to NATO ground troops. Although IFOR has used several small punitive air strikes to destroy weapons in restricted areas, these weapons have not been defended. NATO has not flown an opposed combat mission since the TOA.

4. IFOR Maritime

Given its unique status as a joint NATO/WEU operation with a mandate distinct from IFOR's, SHARP GUARD continued to run after the TOA as an independent operation. COMNAVSOUTH continued to direct the embargo, reporting to Adm. Smith in his CINCSOUTH "hat" rather than as COMIFOR. In March of 1996, the general economic
sanctions and the embargo on small arms and munitions were lifted in accordance with the Dayton Peace Agreement. Accordingly, SHARP GUARD eliminated the Montenegro task group and released STANAVFORLANT back to SACLANT control. STANAVFORMED and WEUCONMARFOR continued to enforce the prohibition on heavy weapons until June 1996, when this measure was suspended by the UN Security Council. Though SHARP GUARD operations were complete, the two remaining squadrons were "ready to resume, at short notice, full implementation of sanctions if the conditions set by the UNSC resolutions were not met."\textsuperscript{237} Not until 1 October 1996, were sanctions permanently lifted; SHARP GUARD was officially terminated the next day.\textsuperscript{238}

The IFOR maritime component commanded by COMSTRIKEFORSOUTH encompassed the various national carrier and amphibious task groups which had been operating off-and-on in the Adriatic for over three years. At various times, the U.S., U.K., France and Spain had deployed carrier groups near the former Yugoslavia to protect national troop components and participate in DENY FLIGHT; though under national control in the pre-IFOR period, these groups coordinated operating schedules on an informal basis and used NATO standard procedures. Activating them as the IFOR maritime component was simply a matter of formalizing these arrangements. In addition to the capital ships under COMSTRIKEFORSOUTH, smaller ships have been deployed to the Adriatic under COMNAVSOUTH control for support purposes. These ships have primarily been provided

\textsuperscript{237}AFSOUTH Fact Sheet: Operation SHARP GUARD, p. 2.

\textsuperscript{238}Ibid, p. 1.
by smaller Allied navies in the Mediterranean, particularly Italy, Greece, and Turkey. Minesweeping and protection of Allied shipping are their stated tasks, though these functions have not often been called for. This arrangement reflects political imperatives; it provides COMNAVSOUTH, an Italian four-star officer, with a role in the operation, and thus compensates the Italians for their exclusion from the other principal IFOR billets. The maritime support forces also allow non-carrier Allied navies to play a role, however minor, in IFOR.

5. **IFOR's Composition: NATO-Plus**

Although several Partners had been contributing individually to the UN Protection Force (UNPROFOR) in the former Yugoslavia, the PfP concept was not formally tested until December 1995, when the Allies invited 13 Partners, Russia included, to join IFOR. All 13 responded affirmatively, although some have caveated their contributions. As well as being a demonstration of Allied resolve, IFOR is, in the words of NATO Secretary General Javier Solana, a chance to “strengthen further the patterns of cooperation already in place between NATO and its Partners . . . indeed, PfP would seem to have been tailor-made for the Bosnia operation.”239 Partner and other non-NATO forces number 10,000 troops, over 15% of IFOR’s total,240 and are integrated into the NATO chain of command (with the exception of Russia). Although the drama in the former Yugoslavia has unfolded at a time when the nations of Central and Eastern Europe are still in the painful process of shedding their

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239 Solana, “NATO’s Role in Bosnia . . .”, p. 4.

240 IFOR Fact Sheet, p. 3.
Communist political, military and economic baggage, these states have been eager to take part. IFOR represents a golden opportunity for each participating Partner to convince the Allies that it is politically and militarily mature enough to be admitted to NATO as a full member. Even if NATO expansion is not immediately forthcoming, most of the Partners consider "closer integration in NATO activities as a hedge against instability and external threats."\textsuperscript{241} For Partner militaries, the opportunity to work side-by-side in IFOR with mainline NATO forces, including headquarters staffs, is enabling them "to demonstrate their tactical readiness to make the grade"\textsuperscript{242} as well as providing on-the-job training in NATO military procedures.

C. LESSONS LEARNED IN THE FORMER YUGOSLAVIA

1. NATO-UN Command Relations

Overall, the greatest operational handicap faced by NATO in the former Yugoslavia prior to IFOR was the disastrous command relationship with the UN. The problem was based partly on conflicting goals and missions, and partly in the two bodies's radically different strategic cultures. While serving as CINCSOUTH, Adm. Smith observed pointedly that "the United Nations mandates are for peacekeeping . . . on the other hand, NATO mandates are for enforcement . . . so it's very difficult to draw these two together so that you have a

\textsuperscript{241}Drew, \textit{The Evolution of NATO . . .}, p. 23.

confluence of expectations.”243 The “dual-key” system of approval for air strikes was emblematic of the frictions between the two bodies: “the dual-key was designed to prevent NATO military commanders from acting without the approval of the UN civilian command. And so it is no key at all; it is really the opposite of a key: it is a stronger and fancier lock.”244 Disagreements between the two bodies over the use of force became more frustrating when NATO and UN contingents from the same nations were forced to operate under drastically different ROE. The addition of non-NATO nations to UNPROFOR created an additional layer of mistrust. For instance, in spite of exchanged liaison officers between 5 ATAF and UNPROFOR, the “exchange of information was not completely open. NATO officers at AIRSOUTH expressed concern about security arrangements inside UNPROFOR, and particularly UN military personnel from non-NATO countries.”245 Whatever the reason or combination of reasons for the impasse between NATO and the UN, the result was often paralysis.

The pre-IFOR operation that suffered the least from UN restrictions was SHARP GUARD. As there was no direct support of UN forces by the NATO/WEU ships, there were no locks and no keys other than the rules laid out by CINCSOUTH to his own commanders. This is the desired pattern for the future, a situation where the UN “remains the source of an international legal framework; if the leading powers in the Security Council can agree on a


role for NATO, let them grant an enabling ‘fig-leaf’ mechanism that permits NATO headquarters the margin to set their own precise guidelines on the use of force.”

Regardless of the exact circumstances, Adm. Smith’s warning remains valid: “don’t ever have another dual key . . . I would not make that mistake again.”

2. Integration of WEU and National Elements

Another persistent problem has been the mix-and-match nature of the staffs and operating forces, which has had the potential to dilute the cohesiveness and efficiency of NATO units. Rather than exclusively using pre-existing NATO formations, Balkan operations in 1992-95 became a patchwork of national and multinational units which, though using common procedures, had not necessarily trained together. Much of the reason for this was political; the inclusion of France and Spain (which were non-participants in NATO’s integrated military structure) in UNPROFOR and the WEU participation in SHARP GUARD propitiated many of the voices proclaiming that the age of Europe had arrived. Still, a common operational heritage served to bridge gaps, and “NATO personnel were able to fashion a command-and-control architecture which provided a degree of order among a potentially confusing mix of international and national operations in the Balkans.”

Many of the working arrangements succeeded because of the “dual-hatting” of key commanders and staffs. For example, NATO “did not directly command the [PROVIDE PROMISE] airlift and

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246 Foster, p. 65.
air-drop operations. Western air operations over Bosnia, however, have become ‘seamless,’ with NATO combat air patrols positioned to protect aid flights . . . this type of coordination took place because the PROVIDE PROMISE [Air Component Commander] was ‘dual-hatted,’ being also the director of the 5 ATAF CAOC.”

In the future, however, such happy coincidences should not be taken for granted, and NATO commanders should “not be forced to patch together their own working arrangements to make up for the fact that their political leaders are acting separately.”

IFOR’s advent improved this situation considerably. Under IFOR, France and Spain, as well as non-Allied participants have been compelled to use standard NATO procedures, including ROE. While the newcomers have had to learn many of NATO’s procedures in the field, they have absorbed them rapidly and applied them to good effect. Equipment interoperability -- or the lack thereof -- has been the source of considerable frustration, particularly for non-NATO contingents. Unfortunately, a ready solution for this problem is not at hand, as these nations lack the economic resources to completely re-equip their units on-the-spot with NATO-standard equipment. The chain of command has been unified for all participants, save Russia, which operates under a unique arrangement. Refusing to place their forces under NATO operational control (OPCON), the Russians have specified that they will only place their forces under American tactical control (TACCON). A Russian General has been installed at SACEUR headquarters as the “Deputy IFOR Supreme Commander for


Russian Forces in Bosnia.” This officer, Col.-Gen. Leonty Shevtsov, “provides advice to SACEUR on all matters which relate to Russian participation in IFOR . . . [and] fully participates in the situation-assessment and staff-planning process, being fully integrated into the IFOR decision-making mechanism on matters related to Russian participation.”251

The chain of command for Russian forces thus bypasses both COMIFOR and the IFOR ground component commander. SACEUR coordinates with Gen. Shevtsov, who exercises operational command over the Russian brigade commander, who is also under the tactical control of the American general officer in command of the Multinational Division (North). As Lt. Gen. Christman remarked, “one will not find this command arrangement in any field manual, but it works . . . further, the Russian troops, operating in a particularly delicate and difficult area of Bosnia, have shown great professionalism and serious commitment to the mission.”252 In the final analysis, General Christman’s latter point is the most important. Regardless of the awkward arrangements, IFOR is demonstrating the validity of a key concept behind CJTF and PfP: that non-NATO nations, including the Russians, can effectively operate in conjunction with Allied forces, for mutual benefit in a common mission.

3. The Resource Drain

The duration of the crisis in the former Yugoslavia has also caused problems. When NATO operations commenced in 1992, its military structure responded with commendable


252 Christman, p. 78.
speed in providing forces and resources to CINCSOUTH. Most of NATO’s rapidly-deployable maritime and air forces, including the two standing maritime immediate reaction forces, were involved in operations from the beginning. Their continued involvement, however, has come at the detriment of their worldwide mobility and availability for use elsewhere. Although individual ships and air squadrons have been rotated regularly, staffs and structures— as well as the bulk of IFOR ground forces— have become frozen in place, raising the inevitable question of how the Alliance could respond to a new crisis while still heavily involved in the Balkans. Peacetime training routines have suffered as well. The Alliance’s new force structure, when fully implemented, will include Augmenting Forces to replace Reaction Forces after their initial deployment; one must ask the question, however, of where these forces will come from, given the shrinking militaries of NATO members. Shortages have been and will continue to be particularly evident in specialized units and equipment: special forces, command and control, electronic warfare, and airborne early warning.

After IFOR’s major military milestones had been passed in April 1996, SACEUR received authority from the NAC to coordinate a limited restructuring of IFOR. While troop levels stayed the same, some heavy forces were rotated out and replaced with lighter formations better suited for civil-military relations tasks. While this rotation provided some relief to the ground forces, a significant number of units have been in place throughout the operation. NATO has also been forced to consider the effect of four years of prolonged operations on the AFSOUTH staff, particularly those seconded to the IFOR HQ in Sarajevo. While the AFSOUTH staff has performed commendably, its regular functions of planning and
exercising for other regional contingencies and general war have atrophied. The ARRC staff has also suffered in this manner, though not for as long a time. In order to provide some relief to these staffs, the NAC announced in September 1996 that it had “agreed to new command arrangements for IFOR, to allow for the phased withdrawal of HQ ARRC and HQ AFSOUTH from Bosnia and their replacement by a headquarters based on Allied Land Forces Central Europe (LANDCENT).”\textsuperscript{253} Accordingly, Gen. William Crouch, USA, (COMLANDCENT) relieved Adm. Joseph Lopez, USN (CINCSOUTH) as COMIFOR on 7 November 1996; on 20 November 1996, Gen. Crouch also relieved Lt. Gen. Sir Michael Walker, British Army (COMARRC) as the IFOR Ground Component Commander.\textsuperscript{254} By substituting one new headquarters for both the main IFOR staff and its co-located ground component staff, the Alliance hopes to lower JOINT ENDEAVOUR’s overhead while conserving staff resources for other NATO uses.

4. **NATO’s Inherent Reliance on U.S. Resources**

Finally, operations in the former Yugoslavia have highlighted NATO’s -- and, by proxy, the WEU’s -- dependence on U.S. resources. Even when Americans were not involved on the ground, the U.S. military provided the bulk of the transport and combat aircraft in theater, a greater number of ships than any other single contributor, plus virtually all of the

\textsuperscript{253}IFOR Fact Sheet, p. 4.

\textsuperscript{254}Information gleaned from the NATO World Wide Web site (www.nato.int). For further details, see Transcript of the Transfer of Authority Ceremony held at Sarajevo on 7 November 1996 (http://www.nato.int/ifor/afsouth/961107a.htm) and Transcript of the Transfer of Authority Ceremony held at Sarajevo on 20 November 1996 (http://www.nato.int/ifor/afsouth/961120b.htm).
satellite-based communications and intelligence. DELIBERATE FORCE, in particular, "illustrated that a sustained NATO combat expedition is impossible without U.S. muscle: satellite intelligence, [electronic warfare] and other technological contributions were virtually all American, and the U.S. flew two-thirds of all aircraft sorties." This situation bodes ill for a realistic and truly independent ESDI: "unless and until Europeans build up their own force projection, logistics and intelligence capabilities, they will remain dependent, not just on NATO, but on the U.S. as well." Though France and others have initiated viable programs of their own in the critical fields of communications and intelligence, "current levels of defense spending . . . mitigate against the quick replacement of these [U.S.] capabilities." As a result, "the need for U.S. support will likely give the United States decisive influence over the choice of missions" for a European-led CJTF in the foreseeable future.

\footnote{Atkinson, "With Deliberate Force . . .," p. 6.}
\footnote{IISS, "NATO, CJTFs and IFOR," p. 2.}
\footnote{Barry, "NATO's Bold New Concept . . .," p. 53.}
\footnote{Sloan, CJTF and New Missions for NATO, p. 4.}
VI. IFOR’S POLITICAL DIMENSIONS

Ironically, while the political underpinnings of NATO’s future are more concrete than the details of its projected military structure, JOINT ENDEAVOUR thus far has posed more political problems than operational ones. Achieving IFOR’s various goals without straying beyond the bounds of Alliance consensus has undoubtedly been difficult and often frustrating for the Alliance’s military leadership. After all, “people in battle dress have to convert the subtle language of pinstriped politicians and diplomats into something doable.”259 NATO’s transition from making piecemeal air and maritime contributions to the larger international effort in the former Yugoslavia to becoming the chief agent of that effort is a high-stakes cast of the die. Political failure, even in the face of military success -- the specter of Vietnam -- would likely have dramatic repercussions for the Alliance. While failure in Bosnia need not compromise NATO’s effectiveness as a defensive organ, it would cause widespread doubt as to the validity of the Alliance’s intention, expressed at the January 1994 Brussels Summit, to “undertake missions in addition to the traditional and fundamental task of collective defense.”260 The political debates and rhetoric surrounding IFOR’s mission and the manner in which it is being carried out comprise potential stumblingblocks that future CJTFs will undoubtedly face, regardless of how they are structured militarily.


260Brussels Declaration, para. 7.
A. IFOR'S MISSION: PEACE IMPLEMENTATION

The official characterization of the Alliance's role in Bosnia is that "NATO will not be imposing a settlement, but will take the necessary action to ensure compliance" with the Peace Agreement. As its name suggests, IFOR is in the "peace implementation" business; unfortunately, this function is not defined in MC 327 or the 1993 Athens Report of the NACC Ad Hoc Group on Peacekeeping -- the closest things NATO has to official peacekeeping doctrine -- nor is it a UN-standard term. According to MC 327, peacekeeping

narrowly defined, is the containment, moderation and/or termination of hostilities between or within states, through the medium of an impartial third party intervention, organized and directed internationally; using military forces and civilians to complement the political process of conflict resolution and to restore and maintain peace. Peacekeeping operations based on Chapter VI of the UN Charter have traditionally involved the deployment of a peacekeeping force in the field, with consent of the parties, including supervising demarcation lines, monitoring cease-fires and controlling buffer zones, disarming and demobilizing warring factions and supervising borders.262

By these standards, JOINT ENDEAVOUR would appear to have a peacekeeping mission, as IFOR fulfils all of the above criteria. Strangely, however, neither the Dayton Peace Agreement nor UN Security Council Resolution 1031, which jointly authorize NATO to form and deploy IFOR, contain any reference to peacekeeping. Both documents give IFOR authority to "ensure compliance" with the settlement and to take "enforcement action" if needed. The use of the word "enforcement" is deliberate, calling to mind the mission of peace enforcement, defined by MC 327 as "using military means to restore peace in an area of


262MC 327, quoted in Foster, pp. 6-7.
conflict under Chapter VII of the UN Charter."\(^{263}\) Gen. George Joulwan, USA, the current SACEUR, characterizes JOINT ENDEAVOUR as "NATO proving it can respond robustly and quickly to its new mission of *peace enforcement* [emphasis added]."\(^{264}\) Gen. Joulwan has also stated flatly that "IFOR will be a Chapter VII versus a Chapter VI operation,"\(^{265}\) referring to the sections of the UN Charter which govern, respectively, Action with Respect to Threats to the Peace, Breaches of the Peace, and Acts of Aggression (referenced in the MC 327 definition of *peace enforcement*) and the Pacific Settlement of Disputes (referenced in the MC 327 definition of *peacekeeping*). In fact, UNSCR 1031 specifically invokes Chapter VII in authorizing NATO to deploy IFOR, as the Allied force is manifestly a military means of influencing the situation in Bosnia.

In the past few years, the lines of distinction between peacekeeping and peace enforcement have grown blurry. David Lightburn, a staff member in the Alliance’s Division of Defense Planning and Policy, notes insightfully that “NATO’s interest in and contributions to international peacekeeping occur . . . at a time when the fundamental nature of peacekeeping is changing.”\(^{266}\) Rather than the relatively tidy inter-state peacekeeping of the past, such as Cyprus or the Sinai, with well-defined borders and the consent -- however

\(^{263}\) MC 327, quoted in Foster, p. 7.


grudging -- of both sides, peace operations are increasingly being conducted in “security conditions that are complex, unpredictable and dangerous, combined with a serious humanitarian situation.”\(^{267}\) In view of the increasingly complicated environment for peace operations, Shashi Tharoor, Special Assistant to the UN Under Secretary General for Peacekeeping Operations, has proffered the term “multifunctional peacekeeping” for non-traditional cases. Recognizing the utility of the new UN term, the NACC Ad-Hoc Group took note of it in a follow-on to their original report.\(^{268}\) The military tasks in “multifunctional peacekeeping” go beyond “traditional peacekeeping functions such as separation of forces, observation, disarmament and de-mining” into the realm of “military support for a range of political and humanitarian operations; and, if required, application of coercive military measures including a measured and appropriate use of force.”\(^{269}\) In addition to encompassing a wider variety of tasks, “multifunctional peacekeeping may be undertaken in a hostile environment, sometimes within a state where factions or irregular forces not controlled by the government may be operating.”\(^{270}\) The concept of “multifunctional peacekeeping” straddles aspects of both peacekeeping and peace enforcement; it also neatly encapsulates IFOR’s mission.

\(^{267}\) Lightburn, p. 11.


\(^{269}\) Lightburn, p. 13.

\(^{270}\) Follow-On to the 1993 Athens Report, para. 4.
Regrettably, neither the term "multifunctional peacekeeping" nor its Dayton equivalent, peace implementation, has been formalized by NATO; this discrepancy forces Alliance policymakers to choose between the two most applicable conventional definitions, peacekeeping and peace enforcement, when attempting to categorize IFOR. NATO officials, particularly on the military side, prefer to speak in terms of peace enforcement -- the less applicable of the two in IFOR's case -- apparently because peacekeeping has negative connotations. The current sense of peacekeeping-as-a-dirty-word is largely due to the egregious failure of the UN effort in Bosnia, widely -- though somewhat inaccurately -- seen as a traditional peacekeeping operation. Although the Somalia disaster has contributed to a distinctly negative impression of the UN, particularly in the U.S., the misadventures of the UN Protection Force (UNPROFOR) in Bosnia have been the most glaring example of the UN's difficulties in adapting to post-Cold War conditions. So great were UNPROFOR's inadequacies and so obvious were its failures in the world's eyes that "Bosnia [became] for the United Nations what the Vietnam war was to the United States."271

The UN's attempts to graft the accoutrements of traditional peacekeeping -- a small, lightly armed force with mainly monitoring functions -- onto a situation which had deteriorated beyond such measures resulted in what might be termed culpable inefficacy. The lesson learned by many observers was, unfortunately, the wrong one: "peacekeeping ... is

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probably morally bankrupt and certainly an idea whose time has passed.” It is unfair to malign the concept of peacekeeping simply because it was applied to the wrong situation. In the first place, the belligerents had not agreed to a settlement. Antonio Pedauye, a former UNPROFOR Head of Mission, believes that “it was very wrong to call UNPROFOR a peacekeeping operation since there was no peace to keep, nor even a cease fire to monitor until 12 October 1995.” Also, UNPROFOR’s mandate was contradictory. The force was initially introduced into Bosnia in 1992 with the consent of the warring parties to guard and ensure delivery of foodstuffs and medicine to isolated areas. In 1993, however, the U.N. added a completely different mission: the protection of six widely separated “safe areas.”

At this point, UNPROFOR’s mandate became “inherently unenforceable . . . asking the same force to distribute aid one day and fight a defensive battle the next meant that neither task was done well.” The force’s size, armament and rules of engagement (ROE) were never substantially upgraded to compensate for its enormous expansion of responsibility. In essence, a small peacekeeping force was supposed to accomplish a limited form of peace enforcement. Any hopes of success at protecting the safe areas were dashed by the UN’s restrictive ROE and the fact that UNPROFOR “never had enough troops available to sustain any consistent policy other than to supply food and medicine to the civilian population,” and

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272Rieff, p. 19.


the humanitarian mission was “compromised by the fact that it was being undertaken in the middle of a war.”\textsuperscript{275} The result was impotence so widespread that the UN was forced to call on NATO to provide deterrent airpower. Even air strikes did not have much of an effect, as they were “emasculated by UN officials to the point that they became mere pinpricks of no deterrent value . . . they emboldened, rather than constrained, the aggressors.”\textsuperscript{276}

B. IFOR’S MILITARY TASKS AND POWERS

To assuage the fears of publics and politicians worried about the dangers of UNPROFOR-style “peacekeeping,” the Alliance created a far larger and more heavily armed force for Bosnia. While emphasizing the fact that “IFOR is not in Bosnia to fight a war or impose a settlement,”\textsuperscript{277} NATO leaders highlighted the differences between IFOR and UNPROFOR. JOINT ENDEAVOR’s director of plans, Maj. Gen. J.B. Burns, characterized IFOR as having “robust force, ROE and resolve; the ‘three Rs’ so to speak.”\textsuperscript{278} On the ground, IFOR employs over 60,000 troops, mostly in heavy formations: mechanized infantry and armored brigades. Backing up the ground force is an all-weather air surveillance and close air support capability. As opposed to the UN, NATO “clearly plans to rely on their

\textsuperscript{275}Freedman, pp. 21, 23.


\textsuperscript{278}Transcript of the IFOR Press Briefing held on 17 February 1996 at the Sarajevo Coalition Press Center, p. 3.
weapons to motivate compliance."\textsuperscript{279} Furthermore, the ROE permit IFOR to use them. The Dayton Peace Agreement clearly authorizes IFOR "to take such action as required, including the use of necessary force to ensure compliance with this [agreement], and to ensure its own protection."\textsuperscript{280} While the exact terms of the ROE are classified, they "allow troops to defend themselves whenever they feel threatened -- including firing first if necessary."\textsuperscript{281} Moreover, there is no UN-style civilian control of ROE, as all authority is delegated to the IFOR Commander (COMIFOR) "without interference or permission of any party."\textsuperscript{282} The last "R," resolve, is more difficult to quantify, though judging from the amount of bluster and swagger that many officials, particularly in the U.S., exhibited as the force stood up, IFOR's resolve must be high indeed.

The most important difference between IFOR and UNPROFOR, however, is the former's clear mandate. When asked at a press conference what made him believe that IFOR could accomplish in 12 months what the United Nations could not do in four years, IFOR's then-commander, Adm. Leighton Smith, unhesitatingly replied: "because the United Nations


\textsuperscript{282}Bosnia Peace Agreement, Annex A, Art. VI, para 5.
did not have a signed peace agreement and we do."\textsuperscript{283} The essence of IFOR's role in implementing this settlement, in Secretary General Solana's eyes, is to "interpose themselves between the various parties and provide the safe environment and climate of confidence which are needed for peace to take root in Bosnia."\textsuperscript{284} IFOR is directly responsible for monitoring and enforcing the military aspects of the peace settlement, which are centered on the following primary tasks:

- to monitor and help ensure compliance with the cease-fire
- to ensure the withdrawal of forces from the agreed cease-fire zone of separation, and to ensure the separation of forces
- to assist in the safe, orderly withdrawal of UN forces not transferred to IFOR
- to control the airspace over Bosnia-Hercegovina.\textsuperscript{285}

The cease fire and withdrawal of forces followed specific time tables. The first deadline, the withdrawal of military forces from Sarajevo, occurred seven days after the transfer of authority from UNPROFOR to IFOR (D+7). By D+30, all parties were to have their forces withdrawn from the Zone of Separation (ZOS) along the cease fire line, and areas to be transferred from one faction to another had to be demilitarized by D+45. Finally, by D+120,
all heavy weapons had to be withdrawn into designated cantonments for counting and monitoring.

To accomplish the above tasks, COMIFOR has been given two primary tools: IFOR’s weapons and his personal input into the UN Security Council’s lifting or imposition of economic sanctions on the belligerents. The emphasis given to COMIFOR’s judgement is significant. As the “final authority in theater regarding interpretation of . . . the military aspects of the peace settlement,” COMIFOR may declare any party in violation and choose to report or punish the offense at his discretion. Specific military violations that are obvious and intentional are typically dealt with on the spot, especially if they are judged to pose a threat to IFOR. For example, on 21 February 1996, an IFOR patrol found an occupied Bosnian Serb Army (VRS) bunker in the Zone of Separation; the VRS soldiers’ weapons were confiscated immediately and the bunker was destroyed.  

Not all violations are as clear cut; many can be “attributed mainly to ignorance and lack of leadership rather than deliberate non-compliance.” For these cases, the Peace Agreement provides for resolution through mediating bodies known as Joint Military Commissions (JMC), composed at the theater level of COMIFOR, representatives from the various non-governmental organizations involved with the settlement, and the army commanders of the three Former Warring Factions (FWF). This body was put to the test

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286Bosnia Peace Agreement, Annex A, Art. XII.

28722 February 1996 IFOR Transcript, p. 10.

288IFOR Fact Sheet, p. 3.
within the first two days of IFOR’s deployment, when some VRS air defense radars came on
in violation of the settlement. COMIFOR assessed that the violations were the result of poor
communications between VRS headquarters and outlying units; the matter was “addressed
through the JMC . . . the [Serbs] took immediate action, and we have had no violation
subsequent to that.”289 This structure is mirrored at the brigade and battalion level, so that
local violations and disputes may be resolved and upper level JMC decisions passed on to
sector authorities.

Apart from dealing with specific cases, COMIFOR is responsible for assessing the
general state of compliance and reporting at regular intervals to the UN. He may also submit
a special report of non-compliance at any time.290 A judgement of non-compliance can result
in the UN Security Council refusing to lift or re-imposing economic sanctions, as well as
blocking access to IMF reconstruction grants. Thus far, COMIFOR has only resorted to this
method once, recommending on 21 February 1996 that the UN delay the scheduled D+60
suspension of sanctions against the Bosnian Serbs, primarily because the Bosnian Serbs were
refusing to attend JMC sessions. Within five days, the Bosnian Serbs were back at the table
and the sanctions were lifted as scheduled.

At the time of this writing, the last major military milestones in the peace agreement
have been reached. The zones to be transferred between factions were demilitarized almost
immediately and remained so until the transfer was complete at D+90. All heavy weapons

28920 December 1995 COMIFOR Transcript, p.7.
were withdrawn into cantonments by D+120; this may have been the most difficult provision for the FWFs to achieve, not necessarily due to a lack of cooperation, but rather to the physical difficulty of accounting for and moving the detritus of five years of fighting. Nonetheless, it would appear that the main opportunities for direct military confrontation between IFOR and the FWFs have passed. Lt. Gen. Sir Michael Rose, BA, the most controversial of UNPROFOR’s commanders, resisted confrontation with the warring parties because “there is a limit to peacekeeping in terms of how much enforcement can be used without losing the essential element of consent.”

Yet IFOR has decisively crossed the enforcement threshold without major problems, forcibly destroying or confiscating several heavy weapons in the ZOS, including AA guns and tanks.

C. **“MISSION CREEP”: IFOR’S NON-MILITARY ROLES**

Even though the settlement’s military milestones have passed without difficulty, many analysts worry that the civil tasks still have the potential to derail the peace train. IFOR, though not responsible for carrying out nation-building efforts, unavoidably shares the burden of their attainment, for “NATO can pull out and declare victory only if there’s success across the board, and that includes on the civilian side.”

The inextricable linkage between civil and military tasks has manifested itself in an unavoidable graying of the boundaries of IFOR’s role in Bosnia. The lack of an official NATO peacekeeping doctrine and the Alliance’s overall

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inexperience in peace operations have been keenly felt in the “mission creep” debate. Regrettably, NATO’s military leadership, heavily influenced by the experiences of Allied nations participating in UN operations in Bosnia and Somalia, may be resisting “mission creep” too strenuously. Turning the blind eye to blatant misconduct on the grounds that “it isn’t in our mandate” threatens to put IFOR into the same (a-)moral league as UNPROFOR.

The issue of IFOR support for the various non-governmental organizations (NGOs) struggling to implement the civil aspects of the Peace Agreement has been a contentious one. The fortunes of the operation’s military and civil sides are largely indivisible; one NATO official has pointed out that “it will be no good saying the military side was a success if the overall operation has failed.” Gen. Joulwan likewise acknowledges that “the key to success in Bosnia will be the effectiveness of civilian organizations, not military forces.” Unfortunately, the various NGO efforts in Bosnia were slow to come on line and are still not adequately funded, manned or organized. This “increasingly obvious disparity between the well-organized military and a largely civilian democracy-building effort” has military leaders worried; they fear “their troops could get sucked into an unwanted ‘nation-building’ role if the civilian organizations do not do their job.” Conditioned by their unhappy peacekeeping experience in Somalia, U.S. military leaders have been especially reluctant to let IFOR be

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294 Joulwan, p. 9.


drawn into non-military roles. The U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff, in an attempt to get a handle on the problem of "mission creep," drafted a mission statement specifying "among other things, jobs that IFOR will not do: oversee security during elections, conduct humanitarian missions, help civilians move about or act as a local police force." 297

This statement does not square with the provisions of the Peace Agreement, which specifies the following supporting tasks for IFOR, to be fulfilled "within the limits of its assigned principal tasks and available resources, and on request" 298:

- to help create secure conditions for the conduct by others of non-military tasks associated with the peace settlement, including free and fair elections
- to assist in the movement of organizations in the accomplishment of humanitarian missions
- to observe and prevent interference with the movement of civilian populations, refugees and displaced persons, and to respond appropriately to deliberate violence to life and person
- to monitor the clearing of minefields and obstacles.

Some analysts and policymakers consider the language of these tasks a "deliberate fudge" 299 designed to create a back door through which the military's status as impartial referees may be compromised and NATO troops pulled into open conflict with the FWFs. Others are less disturbed by the prospects of "mission creep," in their view, given the linkage

297Newman, p. 49.

298Bosnia Peace Agrement, Annex A, Article VI, para. 2(d).

299Hackworth, p. 36.
between the military and civil success, it may be in the best interests of the military to insure the success of the other aspects of the settlement. In this vein, Walter Clarke, former U.S. Deputy Chief of Mission at the embassy in Somalia, believes that “responses to urgent requests by relief agencies for logistical support cannot be cited as evidence of ‘mission creep’ especially when such requests are predictable and probably intrinsic to mission success.”

IFOR’s military leaders, however, have been slow to awaken to this reality, particularly on the issues of war crimes investigations and the exercise of police functions.

Officially, IFOR is cooperating with the International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia (ICTY) by agreeing to “detain and transfer to the ICTY persons indicted for war crimes . . . when it comes into contact with such persons in carrying out [IFOR’s] duties” as well as by “providing logistical support to the ICTY case by case.” NATO is making it clear, however, that “we are not engaged in identifying them, searching for them or tracking them down . . . we’re not conducting a house to house, car to car search for these individuals.” On the face of it, this seems a reasonable policy; IFOR is too busy to conduct extensive searches which would probably do little more than antagonize the populace. Critics, however, charge that the policy is being used to camouflage the fact that “IFOR

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301 IFOR Assistance to the International Tribunal, NATO Press Release (96)26, 14 February 1996.

302 Transcript of the IFOR Press Briefing Given on 12 February 1996 at the Sarajevo Coalition Press Center, p. 2.
seems to look the other way when war criminals pass by.” 303 When pressed by journalists after reports that the two most prominent alleged war criminals, the Bosnian Serb President Radovan Karadzic and VRS Gen. Ratko Mladic, had passed through IFOR checkpoints, NATO officers admitted somewhat sheepishly in February 1996 that no photos or descriptions of any indicted war criminals had been handed out to IFOR troops manning checkpoints. Only after the embarrassed U.S. State Department “insisted that the photographs be distributed to the lowest levels” 304 did IFOR agree to do so.

IFOR is understandably hesitant to do anything that would disrupt the general flow of the peace process or incite the anger of one of the factions against the force; the arrest of the Bosnian Serb leader by NATO troops would certainly have these effects. Indeed, when NATO transported to the ICTY in February 1996 two indicted Bosnian Serbs held by the Federation government, the Bosnian Serbs refused to attend the JMC meetings in Sarajevo for over a week. IFOR hastily distanced itself from the event: “these are requests from the ICTY, the events . . . were entirely under the control of the ICTY, they made all the arrangements, they were controlling at all times.” 305

An even thornier war crimes issue loomed as the FWFs vacated zones to be turned over to other parties. In the process, they deliberately destroyed as much evidence as possible.

304 Transcript of the IFOR Press Briefing Given on 13 February 1996 at the Sarajevo Coalition Press Center, p. 5.
at war crimes sites. Official IFOR guidance is that the force "will not be in the position of guarding sites . . . that is a proper task for civilian authorities and police."\textsuperscript{306} Outcry in the press and from war crimes investigators, however, prompted a policy modification; NATO promised to guarantee their safety as the snow began to melt in the spring of 1996 and sites became more accessible.

IFOR has been drawn increasingly into police functions such as riot control and refugee movement. As the crowded Sarajevo suburbs were transferred from Bosnian Serb to Federation control in February and March 1996, looting and arson appeared as an unofficial "scorched earth" policy on the part of angry Bosnian Serbs. The initial NATO stance was that the prevention of "criminal looting is the responsibility of the proper civil authorities"\textsuperscript{307} and that "IFOR is not a police force and cannot assume responsibility for law and order in places like Sarajevo."\textsuperscript{308} The scale of the destruction and the small size of the Federation police force prompted a reluctant IFOR to act more vigorously as the situation deteriorated. Media pressure was especially heavy at this point; headlines like "NATO Forces Watch as Sarajevo Area Burns"\textsuperscript{309} did nothing to contribute to IFOR's popularity with the publics of the participating nations. Starting on 6 March 1996, IFOR troops were assigned

\textsuperscript{306} Transcript of the Joint Press Conference with Secretary General and SACEUR at Brussels, 19 Jan 1996, p. 9.

\textsuperscript{307} 27 February 1996 IFOR Transcript, p. 3.

\textsuperscript{308} Solana, quoted in the transcript of the Joint Press Conference of the Secretary General and SACEUR at Brussels, March 18, 1996, p. 2.

\textsuperscript{309} Taken from The New York Times, March 18, 1996.
to guard warehouses containing UN relief supplies, and some participated in reinforced foot patrols in the affected districts. These developments, and the inevitable escalation of IFOR’s overall civil role, created a profound sense of unease on the part of military leaders, prompting a formal “re-thinking” of the mission. In March 1996, SACEUR formally requested NAC “assistance to enable IFOR to continue to support the missions of the civilian agencies under the Dayton Agreement,” to include clearer political guidance on the undertaking of non-military tasks. Following this request, NATO declared that “in view of the importance of the civilian aspects of the Peace Agreement, IFOR is providing increased support for civilian tasks within the limits of its existing mandate and available resources.”

The current parameters for IFOR employment amount to official sanction for “mission creep,” reflecting the ascendancy of civil over military considerations in Bosnia. In addition to providing the “secure environment” that civil agencies need to operate, IFOR has been providing transportation, supply and medical assistance to the various NGOs in theater. IFOR has also become heavily involved in nation-building in its own right. IFOR’s Civilian-Military Coordination Organization (CIMIC), headed by a U.S. Army Brig. General, has members presently “integrated with, and in many cases seconded to, the Office of the High Representative (OHR),” the civilian commissioner charged with coordinating the nation-

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310 Transcript of the IFOR Press Briefing Given on 05 March 1996 at the Sarajevo Coalition Press Center, p. 1.

311 Basic Fact Sheet No. 11, p. 7.

building efforts for the various civilian organizations represented in Bosnia. CIMIC soldiers
“are working with the OSCE on election preparations and human rights monitoring,” at
every level, to the extent that “NATO officers planned and carried out the September 14
[1996] national vote after acknowledgment by the OSCE, whose job it was to organize the
elections, that it could not complete the task.” Additionally, IFOR’s engineering battalions
have embarked on an extensive program of public works rebuilding with funding provided by
the World Bank and the NATO Security Investment Programme.

More than anything else, IFOR’s mission debates illustrate the underlying tension
between a conservative military Alliance unused to the vagaries of peacekeeping, and a
diplomatic community desperate to “attempt to salvage honor from a peace settlement that
amounts to a partition.” Much of the friction between IFOR and civilian agencies can be
traced to the fact that “the two cultures -- that of the civilian agencies and the military -- have
fundamentally different ways of looking at crisis situations . . . the civilian agencies often think
that they understand and can deal with the situation better than the military.” In Bosnia, the

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314John Pomfret, "U.S. Army Leads Rebuilding of Bosnia," The San Francisco Chronicle (November
1, 1996).


316Kenneth Hamburger, "Historical and Cultural Aspects of Coalition Peacekeeping Operations,"
delivered at the Headquarters, U.S. Army Europe Conference on Problems and Solutions in Future Coalition

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reverse has more often been the case: "NATO officers and their troops seem to think more creatively and push harder to reach solutions than their civilian counterparts."  

The general success of IFOR's nation-building efforts seems to have vindicated those who have pushed for "mission creep." Unfortunately, "mission creep" is a difficult game for NATO to win, as it is hard to gauge the amount of "creep" sufficient to assume the mantle of moral authority without overextending the Alliance. If IFOR fails to actively pursue its humanitarian responsibilities, it will be castigated -- rightly -- for the same kind of deliberate blindness to evil that characterized UNPROFOR. On the other hand, if IFOR allows itself some "mission creep" and encounters trouble, particularly in the form of rising casualties, its critics will have a field day. The same principles apply to IFOR's projected successor, which the Alliance agreed in November 1996 to establish.

D. UNANSWERED QUESTIONS IN BOSNIA

As vexing as the "mission creep" debate has been, Bosnia holds more serious threats to the Alliance's reputation and future. Some analysts believe that "the greatest threat to NATO's cohesion today is the possibility of failure in Bosnia... no other issue has such a potential to tear NATO apart -- not the debate over enlargement or disagreements about how to handle the Russians."  

On the surface, all seems well. Thus far, the operation has been a smashing success, with no battle casualties and all parties in general compliance with the

317 Pomfret.

Dayton Accords. In spite of the appearance of Allied solidarity, however, “Americans and Europeans have been pursuing different agendas, and Clinton’s primary theater of operations has been at home.” Several key provisions in the Dayton Agreement, especially IFOR’s initial 12-month mandate and the regional arms control ratios, were formulated as much to appease American domestic unilateralist sentiments as they were to promote a lasting peace. Indeed, some commentators have remarked that Dayton was really “two peace agreements . . . one among the warring parties in Bosnia and another between Bill Clinton and the Republicans in Congress.” The 12 month deadline and the exit strategy debate that revolved around it, as well as the question of arming the Bosniaks, had the potential to sour all the Allied goodwill that has coalesced around the peace process.

1. Finding an Exit Strategy

The given reason for a fixed 12-month IFOR mandate was to prevent the force from “becoming a permanent structure in the region, or indeed an alibi for the parties in Bosnia not to commence the urgently required process of national reconciliation.” In theory, a year long break in fighting would give the parties a chance to rebuild civil structures and become truly self-governing. From a practical viewpoint, most of IFOR’s major tasks were completed in the first three months; Adm. Smith claimed from the outset that “we’re going

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319 Foster, p. 16.
320 Watson and Barry, p. 40.
321 Solana, “NATO’s Role in Bosnia . . . ,” p. 3.
to know in about 90 days whether or not we’ve got a viable agreement.” 322 Many diplomats
and senior military officers, especially in Europe, doubted that this was a realistic exit
strategy, based as it was on time and short-term milestones rather than lasting
accomplishment. Drawing on his experience in Somalia, diplomat Clarke observed that this
schedule did not address “the humanitarian needs on the ground, whose pace of resolution
cannot be controlled by Washington, New York or Brussels” although it “might buy some
short-term domestic political support.” 323

Indeed, the question of domestic support for troops abroad in an American election
year was at the heart of the 12 month mandate. Sending in troops so close to an election was
a courageous move on President Clinton’s part, though it can be argued that pressure from
the international community to honor his previous promises left him no choice. Having
displayed this courage, he “wanted American troops headed homeward before next
November’s election,” 324 which meant that they would have had to begin their withdrawal at
least two months before the expiration of the IFOR mandate.

This prospect infuriated the European Allies, who were already irritated by the
American domestic preoccupation. French Foreign Minister Herve de Charette is on record
as stating that “the troops of different countries will arrive together and leave together . . . it
is out of the question for the U.S. to take its troops home, for example, on the eve of an

322 20 December 1995 COMIFOR Transcript, p. 5.
323 Clarke and Herbst, p. 81.
American presidential election and leave the Europeans to finish the job. 325 Fortunately for the sake of Allied harmony, the Bosnian theater remained quiet in the months preceding the U.S. Presidential election. With public pressure for an early withdrawal slackened, the U.S. has officially confirmed that IFOR troop withdrawals, called "redeployments" to avoid the negative connotations of a "withdrawal," will be "beginning in [late] November [1996], but [NATO will] still have a fully capable IFOR force on December 20 (D+365), . . . with a rapid acceleration in the redeployment after the 20th of December [1996]." 326

Unfortunately, the publicity given to the one-year deadline means that "the time horizon has been stressed to the point where it may be difficult to alter, whether or not the mission is essentially complete at the end of the period." 327 UN Security Council Resolution 1031 provides for an extension of IFOR's mandate, subject to the recommendations of the participating nations and a Security Council vote. The Europeans's urge to remain in place and protect their security investment is strong. While American resistance is equally strong, the U.S. has relented enough to permit "NATO military authorities to assess the prospects for stability in Bosnia over the next year and develop a range of security options . . . [which] include withdrawing on schedule, but which also include options for providing stabilization in Bosnia next year." 328 Three broad courses of action emerged for consideration:


328 Perry, Bergen press conference transcript, p. 2.
• withdraw IFOR as planned, leaving the parties to maintain peace under the pressure of public scrutiny and international economic and political leverage (carrots and sticks)

• extend IFOR’s deployment

• opt to enforce peace beyond IFOR by leaving a residual force or follow-on force -- an IFOR II operation -- with the intent of putting more time between the recent war and an unchaperoned peace.329

The middle of the two options was the least likely; the U.S. government had staked too much domestic and international credibility to make an about-face at this point, although the recent election somewhat reduced the President’s need to appease the public. The first option -- “carrot-and-stick” -- would have probably resulted in the creation of a NATO aerial deterrent force in the Southern Region capable of instantly retaliating against violations of the peace, essentially a return to NATO’s pre-IFOR role. This approach was unlikely to be adopted. Even in the U.S., there was widespread recognition that the Bosnian peace is too fragile to be left “unchaperoned,” and U.S. military planners were reluctantly coming to the conclusion that firepower alone would probably be insufficient to keep the FWFs in line.

European support has always been strongest for the third option, a follow-on force. Significantly, early European stay-behind planning was done by the WEU, providing the Alliance with a golden opportunity to strengthen its institutional bonds to that body; after all, the use of NATO assets by the WEU is one of the CJTF concept’s raisons d’être. From the

European viewpoint, a successful handover between NATO and the WEU "would [have been] an inaugural implementation of the Berlin agreement, and a return from global to regional management." Such an arrangement would have constituted an even more thorough "road test" for the CJTF concept than IFOR has been. If the U.S. were at least to contribute intelligence and command-and-control assets, if not airpower, to a WEU CJTF, both sides could potentially have gained something: the Americans could have walked away from Bosnia after a year with a clean conscience, and the Europeans could have demonstrated that an ESDI exists outside of documents. On the American side, the problem with this proposal was that it would have left U.S. assets under the control of "foreign" commanders, a "hot-button" issue for certain members of Congress. Moreover, the WEU was not ready to undertake such a large responsibility, even with U.S. resource support. Gen. Naumann put it bluntly: "the Europeans cannot do a post IFOR operation by themselves." European military shortcomings aside, this proposal was too much of a risk for Europe to assume at this point. If matters were to go sour, the cause of ESDI and CFSP would be set back considerably, support for economic and political integration in Europe would be significantly reduced as well.

The most likely outcome was the one approved by NATO in November 1996: a NATO-led operation (a CJTF in fact, but not in name) in Bosnia, with the U.S. providing the preponderance of air and support assets and the Europeans supplying the bulk of the ground

330IIS, "NATO, CJTFs and IFOR," p. 2.
331Naumann, NDU remarks.
forces. In June 1996, Secretary Perry acknowledged that "it is a separate consideration [from the decision to 'redeploy' IFOR] as to whether NATO will fill a requirement to provide any additional security to Bosnia on into next year, and the U.S. would fully participate in any decision made by NATO."  

The European Allies had some anxious moments in their effort to convince U.S. policymakers to approve an IFOR follow-on. On 5 November 1996, Military Committee discussions of post-IFOR proposals were abruptly brought to a halt by U.S. objections, principally because the Europeans pressed for U.S. troops on the ground. Lamented a European diplomat, "we were supposed to begin reviewing [options] today and could not because of the Americans . . . we don't know if it is for political reasons, to create some distance from the election, or if there is a real stiffening in the American position."  

If a smooth transition is to be effected between IFOR and its successor, a decision had to be made promptly.

In the wake of President Clinton's re-election, the U.S. underwent a not-unexpected sea-change. On 16 November 1996, President Clinton declared that "I have carefully reviewed its options, and I have decided to . . . inform our allies that in principle, the United States will take part in a follow-on force in Bosnia." The European Allies wasted no time

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332 Perry, quoted in Rick Atkinson, "NATO is Expecting Longer Bosnia Stay," The International Herald Tribune (June 11, 1996).


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in moving forward with post-IFOR planning. On 18 November 1996, the NAC instructed the Military Committee to draw up plans for a follow-on force, to be called the Stabilization Force (SFOR). As its name implies, SFOR will be charged with maintaining a stable environment within which the nation-building process can proceed without coercion. While the details of SFOR’s charter have not been finalized as of this writing, on 4 December 1996, NATO Secretary General Solana informed participants at the Peace Implementation Conference in London that

SFOR will be a smaller force, roughly half the size of IFOR, and its mission will necessarily be more limited. We are planning for an 18-month mission, to be reviewed at 6 and 12 months, with a view to progressively reducing the force’s presence to a deterrent posture and eventual withdrawal. In preparing SFOR, we have been consulting closely with the 17 non-NATO nations who have contributed to IFOR . . . all 17 wish to contribute to SFOR, and two more of our [PfP] Partners -- Bulgaria and Slovenia -- have also signaled a willingness to contribute. As was the case for IFOR, SFOR will require a clear Chapter VII mandate from the UN Security Council. Also, like IFOR, we expect the new force to operate with the consent of the parties to the Peace Agreement.335

Significantly, the force will include 8,500 American ground troops.336 While this represents a reduction in the percentage of U.S. ground troops from roughly 33% to 25%, it is still a significant contribution and reflects a distinct reversal of American policy statements over the past year. For this reason, U.S. officials, including the President, have been careful to point out to Congress and the American public that “the prolongation of U.S.


troops in Bosnia [is] not a sign that the initial military mission had failed, but [is] a consequence of a lagging economic and political reconstruction effort." As anticipated, the President's announcement has been followed by some political backlash, particularly from the opposition; nevertheless, there appears to be a grudging bipartisan consensus in Congress for continued U.S. participation in Bosnia. The U.S. decision to support a continued NATO presence in Bosnia with its political and military clout is an encouraging signal to the European Allies that America intends to remain fully engaged in Europe.

2. Arming the Bosniaks

The issue of arming and training the Bosniaks under a broad regime of regional arms limitations has likewise been a bone of contention between America and its European allies. Other than the 12 month drop-dead date, the U.S. exit strategy "almost certainly depends on another device as well . . . an unwritten agreement with the Bosnian government to arm and train the Bosnian army." Equipping the Bosniaks is not mandated under the Peace Agreement or the associated UN resolutions; neither is it prohibited. UN Security Council Resolution 1021 currently governs the arms embargo against all warring parties, which has been lifted incrementally. Small and light arms and munitions may be brought into the country beginning at D+90. Heavy weapons remained prohibited until D+180, when the UN Secretary General assessed as satisfactory FWF compliance with the Peace Agreement's


Annex 1B, the Agreement on Regional Stabilization.\textsuperscript{339} Annex 1B is a CFE treaty in miniature, using the same guidelines and formulae to establish maximum limits on armed forces in the former Yugoslavia. Under the Annex, the Bosnian Serbs must give up over half of their heavy equipment, while the Bosniaks are permitted to double theirs.\textsuperscript{340} Paradoxically, permission for the Bosniaks to build up to their new limit is tied to Bosnian Serb cooperation in building down to theirs unless subsequent resolutions separate the two issues.

Achieving arms parity between the traditionally outgunned Bosniaks and their antagonists is a longstanding goal of the U.S. Congress, which pushed for the lifting of the arms embargo for three years. Buried within the desire to see the Bosniaks better able to defend themselves is the notion that this measure might have forestalled the need for U.S. ground intervention by “Bosnianizing” the war. The advent of IFOR rendered this (temporarily, at least) a moot point, but the feeling that a well-armed Bosnian army is the best way to maintain the peace still permeates political circles in Washington, including -- for the moment -- the White House. Both the U.S. military and the European Allies vigorously oppose this notion, believing that such an effort, even if undertaken by only a single nation, would constitute “the ultimate sin for peacekeepers . . . it’s an impossible task [to] keep a peace that not everyone wants and at the same time [to be] training one of the combatants.”\textsuperscript{341}


\textsuperscript{340}Morgenthau and Barry, p. 30.

\textsuperscript{341}Hackworth, p. 34.
For this reason, UK Armed Forces Minister Nicholas Soames, voicing a common sentiment in Europe, has bluntly stated that "neither NATO nor any contingent in IFOR will arm and train the Bosnians."\(^{342}\) Likewise, Adm. Smith was adamant that IFOR "does not have an equip, arm and train mission . . . we are not involved in it -- period."\(^{343}\)

Faced with such stiff opposition, including that of the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, Congress and the Clinton administration have backed off somewhat. While agreeing that U.S. forces -- and, one presumes, the forces of all other IFOR participants -- will not be involved in training or equipping the Bosniaks, Secretary of State Warren Christopher has promised that the U.S. will coordinate an international effort to arm the Bosniaks. Presumably, this will involve a non-IFOR sponsor nation or private contractor that can channel U.S. equipment -- perhaps funded with Arab dollars -- to the Bosniaks. Many in Europe see blatant American preference for the Bosniaks as a destabilizing influence on the settlement, possibly leading to a drive for Bosnian Serb and Croat rearmament. Just as disturbing to the European Allies is the American willingness to break ranks with the Alliance when it suits domestic purposes. To be fair, most of NATO's members have indulged in such practices in the past, but "the consequence for NATO of an open and deepening rift is certain

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\(^{342}\)Quoted in "Over 30,000 IFOR members in place by D+30," *Jane's Defense Weekly* (January 24, 1996), p. 3.

\(^{343}\)Transcript of CNN Interview with Adm. Leighton Smith, 21 December 1995, p. 4.
to be far more damaging for the Alliance now that it has assumed a leading role in the operation and is no longer in a position to shift blame to the UN."³⁴⁴

³⁴⁴ A Comprehensive Peace For Bosnia and Hercegovina?", IISS Strategic Comments No. 10 (13 December 1995), p. 3.
1996 has been a year of significant progress in reshaping the Alliance. CJTF and the LTS are close to fruition, and expansion seems likely in the near future. More than anything else, however, 1996 has been "the year of Bosnia, which will continue to intrude on other issues in the alliance . . . but it may intrude in ways that are instructive for the reform process."

Without the catalyst of Bosnia, NATO might have ended up in history’s dustbin, the victim of a not-so-amicable divorce between the Atlantic and European pillars. Some commentators believe that it was a mistake on the part of NATO to have made Bosnia a test case for its future relevance and its new structures. Adam Garfinkle, writing in *The National Interest*, believes that the Alliance’s commitment in the former Yugoslavia foolishly raises "the specter of abject failure on a comparatively minor issue at the outset of a new era, and before the astonished eyes of the entire world."

For NATO to have done nothing would have amounted to the same thing, however. Bosnia was an unavoidable issue for the Alliance. It has highlighted the Alliance’s ability, unique among the world’s security organizations, to match carefully reasoned political consensus with effective military force. Bosnia has also reminded both Alliance pillars of the importance of the transatlantic relationship. Finally, it has underscored the need for the

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Alliance to continue the process of political and military adaptation, to ensure that NATO will be able to respond to future crises more promptly and with less disarray.

A. VALIDATING THE MAINSTREAM CONCEPT FOR CJTFS

Overall, IFOR and its predecessor operations have demonstrated the inherent robustness and flexibility of NATO’s integrated military structure, and its viability to serve as the foundation for the CJTF concept. In Bosnia, NATO did not have to create a new structure; rather the Alliance “used an existing structure, but invented procedures to use it in a way which was more or less consonant with the operation at hand . . . and that it heresy, if you will . . . it taught us that the current structure could be made to be used for some purposes which had nothing to do with its original mission.”347 Throughout NATO’s involvement in the former Yugoslavia, “existing structures and processes proved to have capability for growth as well as for reduction while retaining basic cohesion and commonality of purpose.”348 Contrary to the fears of some nations, the integrated military structure has facilitated, rather than hindered, the flow of political guidance to the IFOR military commanders. A series of complicated but manageable working arrangements has permitted France and Spain -- as well as non-NATO nations -- to participate fully, setting a precedent for future operations. The principal complaint about operations in the former Yugoslavia from both the political and military sides is that the level of “ad hocery” has been too high; the diplomats feel that important decisions have been rushed, while NATO military leaders have


348 Genschel, Transatlantic Relations and International Security, p. 5.
chafed under the necessity of waiting for the political authorities to pass down policy, especially during the years prior to the establishment of IFOR. The critical task for the Alliance in the next few years will be to modify its structure in a way that makes it easier to achieve Allied consensus and political-military coordination. A true CJTF, as envisioned, would be simpler to deploy than IFOR, with preset arrangements for command and extra-Allied participation; the idea is "to have such deployments prepared for and practiced well in advance, with clear lines of military and political control, rather than putting them together in an ad hoc manner."

B. NATO'S RENAISSANCE AND THE REASSERTION OF THE TRANSATLANTIC LINK

In examining NATO's post-Cold War odyssey, "we will find that practice outpaces theory." Lacking a formal peacekeeping doctrine or a finalized agreement on CJTF, the Alliance has nonetheless been able to unite its often fractious members and build a coalition of over 30 nations to implement the Bosnia Peace Agreement. NATO's military success in the former Yugoslavia in the absence of a definitive CJTF format demonstrates that the Alliance's real effectiveness is not so much a function of its


350Solana, "NATO's Role in Bosnia . . .", p. 4.
structures and assets, but [of] the common political will and coordinated policy to commit such assets . . . indeed, in the absence of political will to act and the ability to agree among the Allies, new organizational structures will not be of much use. NATO’s problem in Bosnia from 1991-95 was less that it lacked proper command structures than that it could not agree how to act, and its success since 1995 results from political agreement and will rather than new structures.\textsuperscript{351}

The Allied consensus of November-December 1995 to support with military means the Bosnian Peace Agreement stands out as a watershed in NATO history: the point at which the Atlantic Alliance rediscovered itself and “responded to the out-of-area or out-of-business challenge to its existence with a determined reply that it will stay in business.”\textsuperscript{352} Once NATO awoke to its own capabilities and importance to regional, if not global, stability, it wasted no time in “jumping into the driver’s seat” in Bosnia. As Chapters V and VI of this thesis illustrate, NATO has displaced the UN in Bosnia not only militarily, but politically as well; the UN, however, still provides broad legitimization for the NAC’s political decisions and the NATO Military Authorities’s evaluations and recommendations.

The Alliance’s “robust health is particularly striking for an organization that had seemed, at the end of the cold war, to be in danger of becoming redundant.”\textsuperscript{353} The key factor in this transformation has been the realization, on both sides of the Atlantic, that NATO is the organization best-suited to serve as the linchpin of European security. At the January 1994 NATO summit in Brussels, the Allies confirmed “the enduring validity and indispensability

\textsuperscript{351}IiSS, “NATO, CJTFs and IFOR,” p. 2.

\textsuperscript{352}Barry, “NATO’s Bold New Concept . . .,” p. 46.

\textsuperscript{353}“The Future of NATO: A New Kind of Alliance?” The Economist (June 1, 1996), p. 19.
of our Alliance . . . based on a strong transatlantic link, the expression of a shared destiny . . . [and] designed to contribute to lasting peace, stability, and well-being in the whole of Europe," but at that point, neither Europe nor America was prepared to make concrete steps to reassert the transatlantic link with regard to out-of-area challenges. Not until the situation in Bosnia began to seriously deteriorate in mid-1995 did both pillars begin to move towards one another. On the part of the Europeans, this meant "truly accepting the U.S. as a permanent European power, not just a temporary protector during the Cold War." The U.S. came to the same conclusion, recognizing that "Europe may no longer play the central role it used to in U.S. defense planning as an endangered continent, but it has become more important as an ally and a partner."

NATO unanimity in supporting the Dayton Accords signaled a renewal of Alliance cohesion and a reaffirmation of the leading role of the United States after a period of apparent American disinterest. American initiative -- and arm twisting -- in Dayton was indisputably the glue that held the peace process together. Moreover, it reminded the U.S. and the other Allies that "America succeeded because only America could . . . America remains not just a member of NATO, but its cornerstone." In turn, America’s newly restored confidence in

\[354\] Brussels Declaration, para. 1.


\[356\] Ibid.

its role in Europe reinvigorated the Alliance, emboldening it to make its historic commitment to peacekeeping operations beyond the territory of the member states. Some Allies were less pleased than others by America’s re-awakening. France in particular smarted at the evident demonstration of the failure of European solutions. In one sense, Dayton “demoted the French; the largest contributor to the UN peacekeeping force became a junior partner in IFOR.” 358 Fortunately, the U.S. handled the issue with greater diplomatic skill than usual and generally succeeded in making the French comfortable. IFOR arrangements deliberately preserved much of France’s military role in Bosnia, while shifting much of the responsibility -- and potential for blame -- onto the U.S.; they also gave JOINT ENDEAVOUR the flavor of a Great Power arrangement, an irresistible temptation for the French. IFOR has had the welcome side effect of making the French more comfortable with NATO, as well as demonstrating to them that the Alliance, and not some other body, would be the focus of European security efforts in the near future; it was “no coincidence that the French announcement [of their decision to participate as a full member in the Military Committee] came on the day NATO authorized the deployment of IFOR.” 359

All of the effects of America’s efforts at Dayton appear positive, yet America may not be ready to write a blank-check renewal of its interest in Europe. Secretary General Solana emphasizes the fact that “of all of the implications of IFOR, one stands out: the centrality of


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the transatlantic link.” Nonetheless, the American end of that bridge may have shaky foundations. The dark side of America’s vigorous leadership in the peace process has been its tendency to ride roughshod over the opinions of the other Allies, either prodding them farther than they want to go or stopping them short of their objectives. America must realize that just as France is realizing the drawbacks of “NATO à la carte,” so the U.S. cannot have “Europe à la carte” without penalty. On the other hand, as President Kennedy archly noted, Europe “really cannot have both [American] military presence and our diplomatic absence.”

The solution, as is typical for NATO, will be a compromise: “the Alliance must reflect a transatlantic partnership based on the understanding that the U.S. remains committed to Europe’s security but takes advantage of organized European solidarity.” From the American side, this means encouraging, even to the point of helping underwrite, a viable ESDI. In return, the Europeans -- France in particular -- must ensure that an ESDI evolves in a manner that complements, rather than competes with, U.S. security strategy. While this basic compromise was struck at Berlin, it has not yet been implemented. As CJTF is finalized, there are several questions which, if not addressed satisfactorily, have the potential to derail what analyst Stanley Sloan calls “the new transatlantic bargain.”

360 Solana, “NATO’s Role in Bosnia . . .,” p. 6.

361 Kennedy, quoted in Winand, p. 241.

362 Röhe, p. 5.
C. FUTURE QUESTIONS FOR THE ALLIANCE

1. How Far Out of Area?

While the Alliance’s commitment to operating out of area is strong, there has been very little open discussion of just how far out of area NATO is prepared to go. The Washington Treaty does not explicitly establish NATO as a regional security organization under Chapter VIII of the UN Charter, but the preamble implicitly confines the Alliance to the "North Atlantic area" (Article 6 of the Washington Treaty contains a more precise geographic definition for the purposes of Article 5’s collective defense commitments). In the global age, however, the security of the North Atlantic area is inextricably linked with the rest of the world. Perhaps the clearest example of this principle was the 1991 Gulf War, which "awakened Europe to the risk of resource and trade interruptions originating ‘out of area’... since virtually all of the European countries depend heavily upon seaborne trade and large-scale deliveries of oil and other raw materials, they will be unable to ignore the possibility of future crises in the Middle East and elsewhere."\(^\text{363}\) Likewise, the U.S. and Canada have significant interests in Asia. Following the 1973 oil embargo and continuing into the 1980s, the Alliance considered the prospect of intervening out of area in order to protect vital strategic resources but never found a consensus. Most Allies thought that such planning might divert NATO resources from the Soviet threat, and preferred to rely upon the U.S., France, and the UK for the maintenance of security beyond the North Atlantic area.

For the first few years following the breakup of the Soviet Union and the end of the Cold War, there was "a tendency to divide responsibilities . . . [for example] for the [U.S.] to say 'let Europe take care of Bosnia' and for the Europeans to say 'we can do it on our own'"\textsuperscript{364} during the breakup of Yugoslavia in 1991-92. Similarly, the 1990-91 Gulf War was viewed by many in Europe as an American problem, despite Europe's reliance on energy imports from the Middle East. While the U.S. accepted the bulk of the responsibility for the Gulf War, the strain upon American resources was evident. In the future, the other Allies will probably not be able to "free ride" on the U.S. in respect to extra-European threats any more than the U.S. can expect a "free ride" on Europe for the solution of problems on the continent. For a true transatlantic partnership to exist, "it has to be confirmed politically in the Alliance that we need to share responsibilities even if tasks are divided."\textsuperscript{365} Both pillars of NATO should consider a definition of "out of area" that includes not only Central Europe and the Mediterranean, but the Middle East and possibly Asia as well. The Alliance also needs to consider which MNCs and MSCs (or SCs and RCs if the LTS terminology is adopted) will have responsibility for monitoring these areas and planning for operations in them.

2. **How to Flesh Out a "Renovated" Integrated Military Structure?**

Particularly for the Europeans, out of area operations call for forces that are raised, trained, and equipped differently than forces optimized for static defense. As the Europeans found in the Gulf War, the current legal and moral ramifications of sending conscripts to fight

\textsuperscript{364}\textsuperscript{Sloan, "France and NATO,” p. 8.}

\textsuperscript{365}\textsuperscript{Ibid.}
in foreign wars greatly complicated meaningful European participation. The principal exceptions were the British Armed Forces and certain French units, notably the Foreign Legion, composed of volunteer professionals. With the demise of the Soviet threat and the rise in out of area missions, most of the Europeans are having to profoundly re-think their armed forces. France "is the first of our major European partners to recognize the need to fundamentally restructure their forces to make them deployable and sustainable in sufficient numbers." In February 1996, France announced its switch to an all-volunteer force and a shift towards mobile formations. The necessary trade-offs, of course, are much reduced manpower (from over 500,000 to fewer than 350,000) and transition costs that have effectively halted the procurement of major new systems.

Most of the other European militaries are following suit, including Germany, which is now permitted to participate in multinational "out of area" operations, based upon a 1994 constitutional re-interpretation. The result of these national force structure changes has been a net drop in forces available to NATO, though the forces offered are of increased value for expeditionary warfare. As the individual Allies revise their force structures, NATO needs to "ensure that we do not lose our core combat competencies and structures as we embrace new missions." Of the European Allies, only Germany seems to be paying great attention to NATO's continuing requirement for collective defense: "Germany will be maintaining substantial main defense forces . . . the Bundeswehr, with its capacity to mobilize to a wartime

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366 Christman, p. 77.
367 Ibid, p. 77.
strength of about 700,000 troops, will remain the cornerstone of NATO's collective defense.\textsuperscript{368} If NATO is to successfully re-orient its forces towards out of area operations while simultaneously maintaining a robust collective defense, the Allies -- including the United States -- will have to stem their post-Cold War decline in defense spending. This is not likely to be popular or even possible for the European Allies in the face of the general economic down-turn which has occurred in Europe over the past few years, which means that Europe will continue to be dependent upon the U.S. military for the foreseeable future.

3. How to Improve European Military Capacity?

One might argue that rather than reducing European dependence upon U.S. defense resources, the CJTF initiative is designed to take advantage of it. Nevertheless, it is a stated European goal to eventually become less dependent on the U.S. in defense matters. This objective will not be attained anytime soon; IFOR has convincingly demonstrated Europe's present reliance on the U.S. for a broad range of special capabilities. As long as key NATO assets in transportation, communication and intelligence are provided almost solely by the U.S., the Americans will maintain a de facto veto over NATO operations. In the past, collectively-funded NATO assets have been a means of ensuring that a single nation cannot paralyze the Alliance by withholding critical equipment; the best examples of this are the NATO AWACS (NAEWF) and the command and control systems which link the major Allied headquarters. These aircraft and electronics systems are paid for collectively and are

\textsuperscript{368}Rühe, p. 5.
dedicated solely to NATO missions. One way for Europe to reduce its dependence upon the U.S. would be to increase the amount of common-funded assets. At the June 1996 meeting of the Defense Planning Group, the Allies generated force goals in which "particular attention was given to enhancements to the Alliance’s ability to move its forces within and between theaters and to sustain them once deployed."  

While there is no formal plan to collectivize NATO logistics, Gen. Naumann believes that NATO "must rethink the principle of logistics as a national responsibility . . . we must slaughter one of NATO’s sacred cows." Presumably, this could involve the acquisition of common cargo aircraft and rolling stock. Similarly, there has been some talk of forming a NATO ground surveillance force by collectively purchasing U.S.-built J-STARS aircraft. While a good idea in theory, the U.S., as the largest potential contributor, may not want to spend its already overstretched defense dollars in order to buy capabilities for NATO that the U.S. already provides, just so the Europeans can feel more assured about their control of such assets.  

More practically, the Europeans should consider funding these items without U.S. help, perhaps under the WEU banner. The WEU Satellite Center in Torrejon, Spain is just such a project. European collective assets could then be provided to NATO in much the same manner as the EuroCorps presently is. If Europe "is really serious about the development of

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370 Naumann, NDU remarks.
its security and defense identity, even within NATO, it should start to develop and acquire its own assets . . . the agreement [being] reached on CJTF provides them with an interim period to put their house in order.\textsuperscript{371} The real question is whether Europe is really willing to pay the price of a truly viable ESDI, or whether that identity will remain a pipe-dream.

\textsuperscript{371}Blauw, paras. liii-liv.
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