NAVAL WAR COLLEGE
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MAJOR GENERAL T.J. JACKSON'S
SHENANDOAH VALLEY CAMPAIGN:
An Operational Art Analysis

by

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A paper submitted to the Faculty of the Naval War College in partial satisfaction of
the requirements of the Department of Joint Military Operations.

The contents of this paper reflect my own personal views and are not necessarily
endorsed by the Naval War College or the Department of the Navy.

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ABSTRACT

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CHAPTER ONE

INTRODUCTION

"War means fighting... The business of the soldier is to fight... to find the enemy and strike him; to invade his country, and do him all possible damage in the shortest possible time."¹

-- Stonewall Jackson

A close review of this quote speaks volumes about its author. Thomas Jonathan Jackson, one of the most successful yet enigmatic Confederate leaders of the Civil War, engineered a major military operation during the early months of 1862 that was instantly recognized as being a masterpiece. An advocate of relentless, aggressive warfare, the nickname “Stonewall” could not have been less descriptive of his methodology.

“Movement and risk pervaded his operations.”² The so-called Shenandoah Valley Campaign³ is the product of Jackson’s skillful application of what today, is called operational art.

Not a campaign, in the current sense, Jackson’s Valley Campaign is nevertheless filled with practical examples of sound operational concepts. Jackson used operational art to link together a series of sequentially conducted tactical actions (battles and engagements) in order to achieve the operational objectives of diverting Federal forces to the Shenandoah, as well as retaining Confederate use of this vital region. Professor Milan Vego emphasizes that “[s]trategy should always dominate operational art and tactics.”⁴ Jackson understood this concept, and possessed the vision to see how his small army could contribute to the higher strategic needs of his country. By representing a threat to the Federal capital, Jackson in effect created a diversion that had strategic implications on the war in the east.
The genesis of the Valley Campaign was a result of the exigent situation created by Federal pressure on the Confederate capital in 1862. Operating independently with only general mission-type orders to guide his actions, Jackson sequenced a series of battles that indirectly served the Confederate higher strategic purpose. For three months, he put on a maneuver warfare clinic—completely outmaneuvering and destroying major elements of three separate Federal forces sent to deal with him.

"With a force that never had exceeded . . . 17,000 men of all arms, he had cleared the enemy from the greater part of the Shenandoah. What was far more important, he had used this small force so effectively that he had forced President Lincoln to change the entire plan for the capture of Richmond. At a time when the junction of McDowell with McClellan would have rendered the defense of the Confederate capital almost hopeless, Jackson temporarily had paralyzed the advance of close to 40,000 Federal troops. Rarely in war had so few infantry achieved such dazzling strategic results."\(^5\)

The benefits of studying history are derived from the future application of its lessons learned. This paper analyzes the Valley Campaign from an operational art perspective with particular emphasis on operational factors as they applied to Jackson’s efforts. "The art of warfare at all levels is to obtain and maintain freedom of action. At the operational and strategic levels this is primarily achieved by properly balancing operational factors of space, time, and forces."\(^6\) Given today’s complex, fast moving, joint battlefield, the Shenandoah Valley Campaign provides a clear illustration of the importance of operational factors in the planning of future campaigns/major operations.
FIGURE 1

VIRGINIA AND MARYLAND THEATER OF WAR 1861-1863

CHAPTER TWO

STRATEGIC SETTING

"We ought to invade their country now, and not wait for them to make the necessary preparations to invade ours ... and making unrelenting war amidst their homes, force the people of the North to understand what it will cost them to hold the South in the Union at the bayonet's point."7

--T. J. Jackson: After First Bull Run, 1861

The early success enjoyed by the Confederacy in 1861 at Fort Sumter and First Bull Run quickly bogged down as General Joseph E. Johnston waited for the Union to make the next move. After an initial attempt to press Southern President Jefferson Davis for an immediate strike into the North, the senior Confederate generals backed down, and “[o]nly Stonewall Jackson . . . made an independent proposal [on four separate occasions] for a Northern offensive.”8 General George B. McClellan (now serving as general in chief of all Union armies) moved deliberately in building up the Army of the Potomac, thereby incurring the distrust of both Lincoln and Secretary of War, Edwin M. Stanton. This suspicion resulted in his removal from command of all but the Army of the Potomac, and was to plague McClellan for the rest of the war.

In the meantime, “the war actually took shape in the West.”9 A series of Southern defeats had resulted in the loss of much of Tennessee, Arkansas, northern Mississippi, northern Alabama, and all of Missouri and Kentucky.10 These devastating losses were of lasting consequence in the war, but because of the proximity of the two capitals, the focus of attention was always on the action in Virginia.

Under pressure from Lincoln, McClellan developed plans to invade Virginia with nearly 210,000 troops. With MajGen John C. Fremont (30,000) aiming toward the important railroad junction at Staunton, and MajGen Nathaniel P. Banks (30,000) poised
to cross the Potomac into the lower Shenandoah Valley, the Union commander intended to invest Richmond with 150,000 men. Coupled with MajGen Ambrose Burnside’s (13,000) success in North Carolina, McClellan was certain that Richmond could be cut off and strangled. Throughout the region, the Confederates had a mere 60,000 to 70,000 troops to counter this threat.11 Already stretched to the breaking point in an attempt to preserve key ports along an expansive coastline, there were simply no reserves to allocate to the impending crisis in Virginia.

Johnston’s decision to quit his defensive position around Manassas and fall back to the south bank of the Rappahannock River, caused McClellan to change his planned turning movement from a landing at Urbanna “to Fortress Monroe at the tip of the Peninsula and make his way up the sixty-odd miles to Richmond.”12 Lincoln was opposed to this course of action and grudgingly assented to McClellan’s plan with the constraint “that he retain an adequate defense for the protection of the Federal capital.”13

At the strategic level, the Confederate Army was the obvious center of gravity for the South, yet McClellan appeared to focus solely on the capture of Richmond. A cursory analysis would appear to highlight a mismatch, when in fact Richmond was an operational decisive point. McClellan knew that Richmond was a strategic strength for the South, both diplomatically and politically as a symbol of national legitimacy, as well as for its critical transportation and economic value. He correctly surmised that the Confederates would concentrate their Army to defend it, allowing him to indirectly attack the Southern center of gravity.14

General Robert E. Lee, acting in his capacity as military advisor to President Davis, was able to step back and see the strategic situation in a way that Johnston could
not. Lee’s view was that of “disaster looming ready-made.” Johnston had allowed his force to be shoved into a box. McClellan was at the portal of Richmond, and the only maneuver space was to the north. Lee recognized that Lincoln (who was now directing all Federal forces) was the Union center of gravity. Besides being the man who directly controlled one of the North’s critical strengths (its Army), Lincoln, the politician, was sensitive to the will of the Northern people to fight should the capital be overrun. This was the strategic critical vulnerability Lee intended to exploit. Jackson biographer Col G.F.R. Henderson wrote of Lee:

“Few would have seen the opportunity . . . but it was not McClellan and McDowell whom Lee was fighting, not the enormous hosts which they commanded, nor the vast resources of the North. The power which gave life and motion to the mighty mechanism of the attack lay not within the camps that could be seen from the housetops of Richmond . . . [but] far to the north . . . at Washington . . . [was] the power which controlled them . . . the Northern President. It was at Lincoln that Lee was about to strike, at Lincoln and the Northern people, and an effective blow at the point which people and President deemed vital might arrest the progress of their armies as surely as if the Confederates had been reinforced by a hundred thousand men.”

Lee’s dilemma was how to relieve the pressure on Richmond and avoid potentially having to defend the city on two fronts by freezing MajGen Irwin McDowell to the north, in the vicinity of Fredericksburg. Lee felt that “[i]f the two largest southern commands, under Jackson and Ewell, could be combined, they might be able to hit one of the three opposing forces [McDowell, Banks, or Fremont] hard enough to alarm the Union high command into delaying the advance of all the rest. . . . Lee would stop McDowell not by striking him—he was too strong—but by striking Banks or Fremont, who would call on him for help.” Thus began “an intuitive collaboration” between Jackson and Lee, as the latter wrote to Jackson: “Whatever movement you make against Banks, do it speedily,
and if successful drive him back towards the Potomac, and create the impression, as far as possible, that you design threatening that line. In this simple mission-type order, Lee conveyed his intent to his subordinate without being prescriptive regarding the methods to be used. Jackson had his marching orders—the Valley Campaign was set in motion.

CHAPTER THREE
SHENANDOAH VALLEY CAMPAIGN OVERVIEW

"With God's blessing, let us make thorough work of it."

--Stonewall Jackson: At the outset of the Valley Campaign, 1862

In order to fully appreciate the operational-strategic impact of Jackson’s Valley Campaign, it is necessary to first outline the significant events that transpired during early 1862. The tactical details of the Campaign’s various engagements are fascinating to study, but the operational factors of time and space preclude a full discourse on Jackson’s brilliant execution.

“Stonewall” Jackson was given command of the newly established Valley District after Federal forces moved into the area and threatened Winchester in the fall of 1861. His winter operations were relatively unremarkable in terms of results. The next spring, Banks’s forces moved up the Valley and occupied Winchester, forcing Jackson to pull out on 11 March 1862. Banks placed BrigGen James Shields’s Division (9,000) in Strasburg, BrigGen Alpheus S. Williams’s Division (7,000) in Winchester, and BrigGen John Sedgwick’s Division (7,000) at Harpers Ferry. At this point, Banks began moving his forces to the east in order to link up with McClellan for the Peninsula Campaign.
Source: George F.R. Henderson, Stonewall Jackson and the American Civil War (London: Longmans, Green and Co. 1904).
Given his implied mission to fix Banks in the Valley and thereby prevent him from reinforcing McClellan, Jackson quickly set out and attacked a greatly superior force under Shields at Kernstown on the 23rd. Although suffering a tactical defeat, he achieved Lee’s desired operational-strategic objective by influencing the Union decision-makers’ thinking. Not only was Banks withheld, but an additional division was taken from McClellan to counter Jackson. Additionally, McDowell’s 40,000 man 1st Corps was tethered to Washington D.C. in order to ensure the capital’s safety, thus preventing the scheduled link up with McClellan’s right flank.22

Under pressure from Banks, Jackson withdrew up the Valley and established himself at Swift Run Gap in a position to flank any further attempt by Banks to move up the Valley Pike. Aware that Fremont was moving toward Staunton from West Virginia, Jackson recognized the danger of allowing him to combine forces with Banks (potential force of 45,000 to 60,000 men). Arranging for MajGen Dick S. Ewell’s division (8,000) to move from Gordonsville and join him at Swift Run Gap, Jackson simply directed him to stop Banks from making any further moves up the Valley. Then Jackson and his force disappeared, mystifying not only Banks, but his own staff as well. Marching south to Port Republic then crossing the mountains, he rendezvoused with trains at Mechum’s River Station and traveled by rail to Staunton, where he marched to join BrigGen Edward Johnson’s division (2,500). Now with nearly 17,000 men in his command (including Ewell), Jackson aimed to move into the Allegheny Mountains in search of Fremont. The Battle of McDowell occurred on 8 May 1862, and resulted in Union forces under BrigGen Robert H. Milroy being defeated and pursued back to Franklin. After returning to
McDowell, Jackson departed for Harrisonburg on 14 May obviously aiming for Banks’s main body.\textsuperscript{23}

While Jackson was focused on Fremont, Banks had been directed to send Shields’s division to join McDowell’s corps. This left Banks alone in the Valley with only Williams’s division at Strasburg.\textsuperscript{24} Using his cavalry, under (soon to be) BrigGen Turner Ashby, to screen his movement and intentions, Jackson set off down the Valley signaling an attack directly on Strasburg. Without warning, he suddenly turned at New Market and made his way across the Massanuttons where he linked up with Ewell at Luray. On 23 May, with a combined force of roughly 16,000, Jackson swept down and virtually destroyed a Union blocking force of 1,000 under Colonel John Kenly at Front Royal. Having turned Banks’s flank once again, Jackson correctly deduced that the Federal force would withdraw down the Valley and he therefore attempted to cut them off at Middletown.\textsuperscript{25}

Over the next couple of days, Jackson’s cavalry performed poorly. Ashby failed to provide Jackson with adequate intelligence regarding Banks’s dispositions, and the Federal force managed to narrowly evade the trap. Fighting a stubborn rear guard action, a brigade from Williams’s division allowed Banks to safely reach Winchester late on the 24\textsuperscript{th}. A desultory Confederate pursuit ensued, with critical time lost as rebel forces looted the defenseless Union supply train that was left behind. Jackson continued to push his worn-out troops hard as they marched through the night. Intent on denying Banks the luxury of occupying prepared positions on the key terrain south of Winchester, Jackson positioned himself for an attack at dawn.\textsuperscript{26} The Battle of Winchester resulted in a thorough rout of Banks’s army. He retreated through Martinsburg, and on the 26\textsuperscript{th},
crossed the Potomac into Williamsport. Once again, the exhausted Confederates failed to consolidate their victory. The infantry were physically incapable of further action, Ashby could not be located, and Ewell’s cavalry commander, BrigGen George N. Steuart refused to pursue unless he received the order directly from Ewell himself. Jackson rested his troops, then moved on Harpers Ferry, arriving on 29 May.27

At this point, the Confederate commander wanted to remain deep in the Valley to threaten the Federal capital, and buy time to gather and transport to the rear the spoils of his recent efforts. The next day, Jackson’s intelligence network alerted him to the danger of a closing trap, planned by Lincoln. Both Fremont and McDowell’s forces were converging on Strasburg, and Banks was in a position to pressure him from the north, so Jackson began to withdraw immediately.28 En route, Jackson calmly accepted the news that the enemy had captured Front Royal, placing both Shields and Fremont closer to Strasburg than he was. With the Stonewall Brigade fighting a rear guard action, Ashby’s cavalry rose to the occasion and contested every step of Fremont’s advance, while the infantry prevented Shields’s force from pushing out beyond Front Royal. At midday on 1 June, Jackson’s entire force cleared Strasburg just ahead of the Union cavalry.29

Now pursued by three separate Union forces, Jackson detached cavalry to destroy key bridges along the South Fork of the Shenandoah River. Shields moved up the South Fork in order to cut Jackson’s communications with Johnston, while Fremont followed the Confederates up the North Fork. The Union cavalry destroyed Jackson’s rear guard on 2 June, and only a legendary effort by Ashby to reorganize the delaying effort prevented a rout. Ashby went on to personally supervise the burning of a bridge across the North Fork that cut off the Union pursuit until early on 5 June.30
Jackson used the respite to position his main body at Port Republic, and to place Ewell’s division (6,500) at Cross Keys. The Federal forces regained contact on the 6th, and Ashby was killed in an engagement in the vicinity of Harrisonburg. Seemingly caught between the two Union columns, Jackson decide to give battle once more rather than withdraw through Brown’s Gap. Wanting to first defeat Fremont (13,000) and then turn on Shields, Jackson attempted to draw the former into attacking on 7 June to no avail. The next morning, Jackson was surprised at Port Republic and almost captured by Shields’s cavalry. Fremont finally attacked Ewell at the Battle of Cross Keys, and was driven back soundly. Using a brigade to hold Fremont in place, Jackson ordered the rest of Ewell’s force to join in the 9 June attack on two of Shields’s advance brigades (3,000). The Battle of Port Republic ended in a resounding Confederate victory. The Union forces were withdrawn and Jackson, having accomplished everything possible in the Valley, concentrated at Brown’s Gap until ordered to Richmond on 17 June to participate in the Seven Days’ Battles.

CHAPTER FOUR
ANALYSIS OF OPERATIONAL FACTORS

"I have only to say this — that if this valley is lost Virginia is lost."

—T. J. Jackson: 3 March 1862

Stonewall Jackson’s operational success was a function of his mastery of the fundamentals of operational art. Operating within the broad boundaries outlined by Lee in the form of a solid mission-type order with a clearly articulated commander’s intent, Jackson’s estimate process routinely took into account the operational factors of space,
time, forces, and their various combinations. He used these factors to gain and maintain complete freedom of action, or "initiative in such a fashion as to strip his adversary of alternatives." Once this was accomplished, Jackson was able to "impose his will on his adversary." The following paragraphs illustrate specific examples of operational factors in the Valley Campaign.

**Space**

As seen in Chapter Two, Johnston had effectively allowed himself to lose so much space that he could not maneuver operationally. Lee's recognition of this fact caused him to look elsewhere for options to regain the initiative. Armed with his orders and "roughly five thousand square miles in the Shenandoah Valley from the Potomac to Staunton," Jackson was the only hope the Confederates had to divert Union forces from the juggernaut poised to crush Richmond. Jackson was to capitalize on every advantage offered by his area of responsibility. "Long and painful hours spent committing its geography to memory with the assistance of mileage charts, listing the distance between any two points in the region, had enabled him to quote from the map as readily as he could quote from Scripture, sight unseen."

The Shenandoah Valley is a fertile corridor in western Virginia that is oriented in a southwestward direction from the Potomac River to the James River. It is flanked on the west by the Allegheny Mountains and on the east by the Blue Ridge Mountains. The significant terrain features in the Valley are: 1) the Massanutten Mountain range that splits the Valley for nearly 50 miles, 2) the Shenandoah River and its north and south forks that run down both sides of the Massanuttons and merge at Front Royal, and 3) the various gaps that allow movement through the Valley's contiguous mountain ranges.
The military value of the Valley exceeded its importance as the source of provisions that maintained Richmond. For the South, the Valley was a natural invasion route toward the North’s key cities. Since the Valley led away from Richmond, it did not provide the Union with similar advantages. Jackson recognized that by threatening Washington through this corridor, he could attract Lincoln’s attention and achieve his operational commander’s intent.

Jackson was determined to offset his lack of strength, in terms of numbers, by operating from interior lines. The New Market Gap, which neatly crossed the Massanuttons in the middle “was where Jackson fixed his eye, and the harder he looked the more he saw in the way of opportunities.”

By controlling this key decisive point, he could effectively strike at the enemy’s rear or flank (as he did in the attack on Front Royal), while protecting the vital escape routes through the Blue Ridge gaps. Control would also require the enemy to march completely around the Mountain to regain contact. Jackson coupled this with restricting access to the various bridges over the Shenandoah River to separate Fremont’s and Shields’s forces during the final stages of the Campaign.

While Jackson gained and lost space based on his design and degree of freedom of action, for the most part this factor was fixed. Time, on the other hand, is dynamic by definition. “[S]pace and time [together] form the basis of all calculations of the operational commander. They form a framework within which he directs the movement of his forces.”

Time

Unlike space, once time is lost it cannot be recovered. In this sense, time is arguably the most important of the factors. In order to gain and maintain freedom of
action, one must use time to greater advantage than your adversary—both Lee and Jackson were adept at implementing this concept.

At the operational-strategic level, the South was running out of time. Johnston could no longer trade space for time, and the massing of irresistible Federal force around Richmond was imminent. As the defender, Johnston was forced to make a stand with McClellan just six miles from the city, in order to gain enough time for Jackson’s strategic diversion to take effect. The longer Johnston could delay, the more time would work toward the advantage of the South.

Jackson found himself in exactly the opposite situation regarding time. He had to go on the offensive immediately, so that he was seen as a credible threat by the Union’s leadership. The decision to attack at Kernstown was undertaken at a moments notice, when Jackson was informed that Banks was sending forces to eastern Virginia. The rapid forced march and aggressive attack resulted in the Union decision-makers convincing themselves that Jackson had been reinforced in preparation for an assault into the North.

Jackson’s forte was conducting rapid operations that were based on getting inside his opponent’s decision making cycle. He would attempt to shatter his enemy’s cohesion by using maneuver to attack from a position of strength or advantage. By conducting rapid marches over great distances in relatively short periods of time, he was able to generate tempo – speed over time. Jackson parlayed this speed into maintaining the initiative and causing the Federal forces to react to him. In addition to providing operational security for his force, speed was an essential factor in achieving surprise.

The attack on Front Royal best illustrates the factor of time and its potential. Exploiting his cavalry screen to shift his line of advance by a grueling march through New
Market Gap, Jackson was able to concentrate his force by linking up with Ewell at Luray, and achieve complete surprise the next morning against a fraction of Banks's force. The total surprise and rapidity of action so completely dislocated Banks's decision making capability that he refused to believe what had actually happened for several hours.

Jackson's "sixth sense" regarding the relationship between time and space proved decisive, as he demonstrated an uncanny ability to accurately plan for the transit, reinforcement, and logistical sustainment of his force over great distances. This was best demonstrated during his retrograde up the Valley from Harpers Ferry just in time to evade Lincoln's trap at Strasburg.

**Forces**

The forces situation facing the South in mid-March "was bleak indeed. Federal combinations totaling well over 200,000 men were threatening less than 70,000 Confederates strung out along an arc whose chord extended northwest-southeast through Richmond." Lee knew that "McClellan's large main body could slide anywhere along that arc... then bull straight through for Richmond, outnumbering three-to-one -- or for that matter ten-to-one, depending on where it struck -- any force that stood in its path."\(^{42}\) Until McClellan showed his hand by landing at Fortress Monroe, the Southern leaders were paralyzed. McClellan maintained the initiative at the operational level.

Jackson employed two operational rules throughout the Valley Campaign in the handling of his forces:

"Always mystify, mislead, and surprise the enemy, if possible. And when you strike and overcome him, never let up in the pursuit so long as your men have strength to follow; for an army routed, if hotly pursued, becomes panic-stricken, and can then be destroyed by half their number. The other rule is, never fight against heavy odds if by any possible maneuvering you can hurl your own force on
only a part, and that the weakest part, of your enemy and crush it. Such tactics will win every time, and a small army may thus destroy a large one in detail, and repeated victory will make it invincible.\textsuperscript{43}

Although he believed that his soldiers were better fighters than those of the Union, he recognized that he was badly out-gunned in terms of combat power when pitted directly against the enemy. Since his object was always to “employ superior force,”\textsuperscript{44} Jackson relied on concentration or mass at the decisive time and place to develop superior combat power.

With two exceptions, Jackson utilized warfare by maneuver to outnumber his opponent on the field of battle. He attacked Shields’s Division at Kernstown based on faulty intelligence that led him to believe that he was fighting against a rearguard. At Cross Keys, Ewell’s superior defensive position thwarted Fremont’s force even though he was outnumbered 12,750 to 8,000. Jackson enjoyed superior combat ratios that ranged from a low of two-to-one up to sixteen-to-one in every other engagement.\textsuperscript{45} Jackson’s apparent numerical inferiority at the outset of the Campaign was ultimately offset by several intangible factors that stemmed directly from his superior leadership, grasp of operational concepts, and the discipline/mobility of his forces.

CHAPTER FIVE

CONCLUSION

"Never take counsel of your fears."\textsuperscript{46}

--T. J. Jackson: At the conclusion of the Valley Campaign, 18 June 1862

During the course of the Shenandoah Valley Campaign, MajGen T.J. Jackson demonstrated, nearly without fault, virtually every facet of the components of operational
art. Application of these principles "enabled Stonewall, with 17,000 troops, to frustrate the plans of 60,000 Federals whose generals were assigned the exclusive task of accomplishing his destruction. Four pitched battles he had fought, six formal skirmishes, and any number of minor actions. . . . Mostly this had been done by rapid marching. Since March 22, the eve of Kernstown, his troops had covered 646 miles of road in forty-eight marching days. The rewards had been enormous: 3,500 prisoners, 10,000 badly needed muskets, nine rifled guns and quartermaster stores of incalculable value. . . . An even larger reward was the knowledge that he had played on the hopes and fears of Lincoln with such effect that 38,000 men . . . were kept from joining McClellan in front of Richmond."47

Jackson's maneuver warfare methodology required a commander with the vision to see how the accomplishment of his assigned mission fit into the operational and strategic scheme. Operating independently within the intent of his superior, Jackson boldly accepted a significant degree of risk on numerous occasions while designing and executing operations that capitalized on the Union failure to achieve anything remotely resembling unity of command. In these cases, he unfailingly balanced the operational factors of space, time, and forces to achieve and maintain freedom of action so that he could divide and conquer his enemy at the decisive time and place with overwhelming force.
NOTES

1 Thomas J. Jackson, quoted in Robert D. Heinl, Jr., *Dictionary of Military and Naval Quotations* (Annapolis, MD: United States Naval Institute 1966), 115.


3 For the purposes of this paper, the Shenandoah Valley Campaign refers to operations conducted by Stonewall Jackson during 1862. Also referred to throughout this paper as the Valley Campaign.


11 Henderson, 404.


13 Ibid.

14 Ibid., 9.


16 Ibid., 419.

17 Henderson, 306.

18 Foote, 419.

20 Henderson, 306.

21 Heinl, 87.

22 Alexander, 45-46.


24 Freeman, 360.

25 Cooke, 140-144.

26 Alexander, 67-68.

27 Freeman, 395-406.

28 Ibid., 411-414.

29 Ibid., 416-422.

30 Alexander, 83-84.

31 Cooke, 170.

32 Ibid., 178-179.

33 Ibid., 181-184.

34 Ibid., 186-191.

35 Ibid., 205.

36 Ibid., 103.

37 Freeman, 484-485.

38 Casdorph, 220.

39 Foote, 425.

40 Ibid.


42 Foote, 396-397.

43 Ibid., 464.

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