Operational Logistics in MOOTW: What Your CINC Needs To Know

by

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Operational Logistics in MOOTW: What Your CINC Needs To Know (Unclassified)

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As the role of the military shifts from traditional full scale combat to operations other than war, the military logistics must adjust her focus to address the full spectrum of war. This paper focuses on the importance of operational logistics in military operations other than war. Furthermore, it addresses how a senior logistician on a regional CINC's staff should plan for future operations other than war based on lessons learned from the past. Specifically, I suggest planning factors for NGOs, integrated training with Reserve Component logistical units and Active Component units, the heightened need for logistical intelligence and coordination with other federal officials.
"On 5 April 1991, President Bush announced the beginning of a relief operation in the area of northern Iraq. The US responded immediately. By 7 April, US aircraft from Europe dropped relief supplies over the Iraqi border. More than 6,000 soldiers from units which had just participated in Operation Desert Storm eventually redeployed to Turkey and northern Iraq in support of Operation Provide Comfort. During the next four months, Army forces demonstrated agility, versatility, and deployability during operations other than war. Missions included providing supplies to refugee camps, construction, medical assistance, refugee control, PSYOP, and CA. Operation Provide Comfort was a joint and combined operation executed with no formal agreements between participating agencies and countries. It exhibited the unity of effort essential to operations of this nature."

SCENARIO:
17 May 1999
Colonel Beth Cabe, the J4 for JTF 13, has just arrived in Tropwen, a city in Africa. The mission of the JTF is to help alleviate the devastating hunger that is the result of a 10 year drought. The African country of which Tropwen is the capital won its independence from France in 1970. Thus, its infrastructure is that of the late sixties. No modernization efforts have occurred here since independence. Although she planned on using structures in the capital city for operations, the buildings have all been deemed unsafe. As a result, the J4 section is setting up shop in an old barn without running water or electricity. Nothing has gone right in this deployment. Because she was unaware that the lake in the country is a salt water one, the water purification unit brought urtilator equipment rather than the reverse osmosis water purification equipment. The reserve medical unit alerted for this mission was unaware of the command’s SOP which calls for medical units to coordinate which medical supplies should be brought with the local medical authorities. Not only was the medical unit understaffed and lacking critical supplies, but the chief medical officer just reported that the local population was in the initial stages of an outbreak of cholera. To add insult to injury, the city has been inundated with personnel from US federal agencies and worldwide non-governmental organizations and private organizations expecting US forces to provide food, water and security. As Colonel Cabe prepares her situation report for the daily briefing to the CJTF and the CINC, she wonders where she went wrong and how she could have possible anticipated these problems. To make matters worse, she feels a little feverish. She hopes it is not cholera.

1 Operations, FM 100-5, Department of the Army, June 1993, p. 13-3.
INTRODUCTION

Much has been made of the changing role of the military since the threat from communism has all but been eliminated with the fall of the Soviet Union. In fact, without an “evil empire” to provide a focus for our military plans the military has been forced to redefine itself in the wake of these startling changes. We must do more with less, downsize our forces, shift many logistical assets to the reserve components to save money, reduce our forward presence while at the same time maintaining capabilities to fight two major regional contingencies and to conduct military operations other than war (MOOTW).

MOOTW have become increasingly predominant in the roles and missions of our armed forces. Since the fall of the iron curtain United States armed forces have been involved in Operation Provide Comfort to feed the Kurds in Northern Iraq, Operation Restore Hope to feed the starving masses in Somalia, Operation Uphold Democracy to restore a democratic government in Haiti, Joint Task Force Los Angeles during the riots in California and Operation Support Hope to “stop the dying”² in Rwanda. These military operations demonstrate a gradual shift in the use of military forces from simply winning our nation’s wars to providing the tools to feed the hungry, provide water to the thirsty and uphold foreign government elections all in support of our national interests.

An interesting question, then, is what is the role of the logistician in all of this? Has the logistician’s role changed? This paper will analyze and explore the issues logistics must address when planning for MOOTW. Specifically, I will look at how a senior logistics officer on a regional CINC’s staff should plan for future MOOTW based on lessons learned from the past. The issues addressed are not revolutionary or earth shattering. They are common sense items that, if integrated into a logistician’s future plans, can make supporting non-traditional operations more effective.

Before addressing specific issues it is useful to review the kinds of MOOTW a logistician may come across. According to the Doctrine for Joint Operations, Joint Publication 3-0, military operations other than war “encompass a wide range of activities where the military instrument of national power is used for purposes other than the large-scale combat operations usually associated with war.”

US Army Field Manual 100-5 breaks down states of the environment as either war, conflict or peacetime.

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4 FM 100-5, p. 2-1
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MOOTW occur during conflict and peacetime. It might be said that the examples associated with conflict and peacetime can be further divided by degree of difficulty. For example, of all military operations other than war, strikes and raids, support to insurgency and counter-terrorism are the easiest to support since they, though not a traditional use of military force, use skills exportable and not in conflict with the traditional military mission. Counterdrug, disaster relief, civil support and nation assistance are a little more difficult. Again, these activities are not traditional but can be used effectively here because of the absence of a threatening presence. The most difficult of all MOOTW are the peacekeeping, peace enforcement, NEO and peace building activities. Here the opportunity for disaster is greatest due to the ambiguity of the situation. US forces could easily be put in harms way when dealing with two hostile entities while prepared only to enforce or keep the peace. In fact, joint publication 3-07 breaks MOOTW into
those situations involving the use or threat of force and those that do not. These distinctions are important to logisticians too because they determine the conditions under which support can be provided which affects the quality and quantity of support.

**OPERATIONAL LOGISTICS AND MOOTW**

Logistical operations were defined by Rear Admiral Henry E. Eccles, USN (Ret), in 1953 as the functions that create and sustain support of weapon systems and forces to be tactically employed to attain strategic objectives. In other words, it is the procurement, distribution and replacement of personnel and materiel as well as the supplies, services and maintenance to sustain them. Joint publication 4-0 defines logistics as “the science of planning and carrying out the movement and maintenance of forces. In its most comprehensive sense, those aspects of a military operation which deal with (a) design and development, acquisition, storage, movement, distribution, maintenance, evacuation, and disposition of materiel; (b) movement, evacuation and hospitalization of personnel; (c) acquisition or construction, maintenance operation, and disposition of facilities; and, (d) acquisition or furnishing of services”\(^6\) and key elements of logistical operations.

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\(^6\) *Doctrine for Logistics Support of Joint Operations*, Joint Publication, 4-0, p. GL-6.
Accordingly, operational logistics is the process of acquiring, maintaining and sustaining manpower and materiel in order to support the operational commander’s operational design or scheme of a major operation or campaign. Joint publication 3-07 and Army FM 100-5 agree that in MOOTW logistics may be the main effort of the operation. Logistical efforts may include building bridges and roads, providing medical services, and delivering food and water.\(^7\) As a logistician on a regional CINCs staff, there are some considerations that must be given to MOOTW that do not always apply in traditional conflicts or may have more of an impact during MOOTW than in traditional military activities. These considerations include the following: increased contact with non-governmental organizations, integrated training with Reserve Component logistical units and Active Component units, more capable C4I assets for logisticians, and increased contact with Federal government officials and agencies. Again, these issues apply to both traditional warfare and MOOTW, but in the case of MOOTW they become more significant.

**NON-GOVERNMENTAL ORGANIZATIONS (NGOs)**

NGOs are involved in almost all military operations in one way or another. Whether it is the Red Cross delivering messages from family members or a humanitarian relief organization providing food and shelter to refugees, NGOs have an impact. That impact is magnified several times over when it comes to

\(^7\) FM 100-5, p. 12-7.
MOOTW. Even logisticians at the operational level are oftentimes unaware of the work of NGOs in traditional warfare. In MOOTW a logistician must not only be aware of NGOs, but integrate NGO services into logistical plans.

NGOs can be a detraction from the logisticians mission. Oftentimes the military must provide transportation assets to NGO personnel as well as facilities to assist them in distributing food and services. Obviously this diverts critical transportation assets. Another issue involved is security, not only of the NGO personnel but the US forces and equipment too. NGOs entering a hostile and unstable environment are at the mercy of the military forces for providing a secure environment in which to work. Similarly, US forces must set up a system to identify the NGO personnel in order to reduce risk to US forces and property. In particular during military operations in Somalia due to the need to limit access to key areas such as ports and food distribution centers, identification cards were issued to NGO workers.\(^8\) Again, it took time and effort to research and verify relief workers' credentials. Despite the distractions, though, NGOs provide some advantages to military logisticians. For example, NGO relief workers can be a source of manpower in distributing goods and services to the target population. It is less manpower intensive to merely provide transportation to NGOs than providing personnel for the to distribution effort as well. Another advantage is that NGOs have the same mission the military forces have. That is not to say

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that both organizations work on the same time line or have the same priorities; but, in general, they want to achieve the same objective.

Coordinating with NGOs before a crisis arises is the best way to ensure there will be a clear understanding of who does what. Coordination is critical to smooth functioning of the military operation. This applies not only to the J3 and J5, but it is essential that the logistician, too, coordinate with NGOs to understand what support they can provide and what they need for logistical support. This understanding will facilitate unity of effort and discourage duplication of effort. A good example is that the medical unit in a joint task force must know what support the organization Doctors Without Borders will provide so as to complement their activities and streamline the support the unit provides. As stated in FM 100-5 in reference to supporting operations other than war, "Army efforts must be integrated with host nation or local resources and activities" so as not to overwhelm local authorities and cause them to become totally dependent on US resources.⁹

**INTEGRATED TRAINING WITH RESERVE COMPONENT LOGISTICAL UNITS AND ACTIVE COMPONENT UNITS**

Much has been written in joint publication 3-07 in regard to integrated training between the services. It is a well recognized fact that the Army, Navy, Air Force, Marines and Coast Guard must train together in order to be successful

⁹FM 100-5, p. 12-7.
in military operations. The joint publications also make much of the need to train with other nations in order to facilitate combined multinational operations. What the publication fails to mention is that integrated training with Reserve Component and Active Component units is also essential to effect smooth operations. This is especially true in MOOTW scenarios. The Army in particular has about fifty percent of its logistical support in the Reserve Component. Civil Affairs units, Psychological Operations units, Engineering units, not to mention medical and water purification units are all in the Reserve Component. The individuals in the reserve units are well trained in their specialties but may take time adjusting to the requirements of a unit in a MOOTW environment. Although most of these professionals train as a unit once a month and two weeks a year, there is no substitute for integrating their training with the active duty units to which they may be assigned during times of crisis.

MOOTW reflect the importance of certain personnel with special skills. These individuals such as logisticians, medical specialists, engineers and port transportation organizers, must be identified early and deployed as soon as possible.\(^{10}\) Because of our reliance on the Reserve Component for MOOTW and the limitations of the Presidential call-up coupled with the restrictions of the War Powers Act, it may make more sense to put some of this logistical structure into the active force. As Steven Metz stated, "Active Component combat support and combat service support forces are very limited. In wartime, the Reserve

\(^{10}\) Allard, p. 40-41.
Component makes up this shortfall. In operations other than war such as humanitarian relief, the Army is forced to choose between overtaxing already strained Active Component forces or seeking mobilization of reserve units which also has long-term costs in terms of retainability and recruitment."11

COMMAND AND CONTROL, COMMUNICATION, COMPUTERS AND INTELLIGENCE (C4I)

C4I is paramount to any military operation. Command and control, communications, computers and intelligence must be designed for and dedicated to logistics. Based on recent history in MOOTW there exists the greatest chance of being engaged in an immature theater. Not only does this place more demands on logistical assets and personnel, it also puts logistical intelligence at a premium.

Logistical intelligence is the gathering, processing and analyzing of information the logistician needs to support a mission. Logistical intelligence includes information on the quality of local food and water sources, condition of ports and airfields, the sophistication of economy and commerce (for use of military contracts), status of medical facilities, health of local population (disease control), assessment of infrastructure, as well as the impact of climate and temperature on the operation. As the US becomes involved in areas of the world other than those involved in the Cold War, this information becomes more

important. Obviously the US has dossiers on every country and region in the world in the form of State Department Country Studies, but the logistician's needs are more specific than temperature, climate and rainfall. In Operation Restore Hope not only did military units have to build ports from which to receive supplies, but the commander on the ground in Somalia decreed that military personnel could consume only US supplies due to the poor quality of the water and the few food sources available. Similarly, construction equipment used to build roads in Somalia released tuberculosis spores dormant in the ground into the air causing problems for the overtaxed US medical facilities.¹² As Kenneth Allard points out, a database of available medical facilities and their capabilities would have ensured that the US brought the appropriate medical assets to the area instead of evacuating US personnel to Kenya.

Again, an appropriate emphasis on logistical intelligence can seek to alleviate these problems in the future. The CINC's senior logistician should press for this information and update it annually so as to have a clear picture of what is needed in an area of operations. In times of austerity, we cannot afford to bring more than is necessary. Conversely, political pressure warrants that these operations are completed as soon as possible. A logistician does not have the luxury of getting on the ground and then assessing needs and determining requirements.

¹² Allard, p. 84.
COORDINATION WITH FEDERAL OFFICIALS

Coordination with outside agencies does not apply only to NGOs and PVOs. The information and resources available from our own government agencies are enormous. Obviously the CINC has representatives from the Department of State, the Embassy, the CIA, and others advising him. The logistician, though, can tap into the resources other federal agencies bring to the table. The interagency process notwithstanding, logisticians can coordinate with these agencies to know what they will bring to a MOOTW situation. This knowledge allows logisticians to bring exactly what is needed -- neither too much nor too little. I am not so naive as to think these agencies will "share" resources, but the logistician with a working knowledge of what the US Department of Agriculture provides during humanitarian relief of a hurricane or earthquake in the US is better equipped to complement instead of duplicate those efforts. It may be surprising to realize that the USDA can provide transportation, communications, public works and engineering, information and planning, mass care and resources, health services and hazardous material support as well as firefighting and food in emergency and humanitarian relief efforts.\textsuperscript{13}

\textsuperscript{13} Interagency Coordination During Joint Operations, Joint Publication 3-08,
CONCLUSION

"The future is not 'son of Desert Storm,' but 'stepchild of Somalia and Chechnya.'"—Marine Corps General Charles Krulak

Again, the role of logistics in MOOTW is of paramount importance. The issues addressed in this paper are not revolutionary concepts, but they do focus on the criticality of logistics in MOOTW and how to make logistics more effective for the operational level logistician and thus the operational level commander. There will always be a need for conventional military forces with the mission to win our nation's wars. But I believe, as many of our military leaders do, that MOOTW will dominate military operations in the foreseeable future. Logisticians must plan accordingly. It is recognized that MOOTW "place special demands on the logistic system." As logisticians we must acknowledge this fact and address these pertinent issues. Traditionally warfighting drives military operations, but as Major James Currie stated, it may be necessary to implement "the subordination of logistics to warfighting, whereby warfighting capability support (sic) logistics." It is our duty as logisticians to educate our CINCs,

15 FM 100-5, p. 12-7.
employ the initiatives discussed in this paper, and make our ability to accomplish MOOTW missions better than ever.

SCENARIO:
17 May 1999
As Colonel Beth Cabe the J4 for JTF 13 boards the C141 destined for Tropwen, she mentally runs through her checklist. She feels good about this humanitarian mission in Africa. The J4 is prepared for almost anything.
The unit completed a MOOTW logistical field training exercise with several reserve component logistical units last December. So the reserve units know how the JTF operates. The J2 provided the J4 with detailed logistical intelligence. As a result, the reserve water purification units were deployed with reverse osmosis equipment instead of the traditional ertilator equipment. A converted five ton truck with a shelter will serve as the operations cell for the J4 since the buildings in Tropwen are considered hazardous.
Colonel Cabe has coordinated with federal agencies and NGOs and PVOs. Each agency is aware of their contribution to the effort decreasing the amount of duplication of effort. And because of close coordination with the Red Cross and Doctors Without Borders US forces were aware of a cholera epidemic. Thus, the US forces were inoculated with a vaccine for cholera and were deploying with medicine to treat the disease. No MOOTW scenario is perfect, but with the accurate information acquired and the timely training her unit has executed, JTF 13 is destined for success.
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