THE CIVIL AFFAIRS FORCE
STRUCTURE: IS IT SUFFICIENT TO
SUPPORT DIVISIONS AND CORPS IN
CONTINGENCY OPERATIONS?

A MONOGRAPH
BY
Major Murray J. Duff
Field Artillery

School of Advanced Military Studies
United States Army Command and General Staff
College
Fort Leavenworth, Kansas

First Term AY 96-97

Approved for Public Release Distribution is Unlimited
**Report Title:** The Civil-affairs Force Structure: Is It Sufficient to Support Divisions and Corps in Contingency Operations?

**Author:** Maj Murray J. Duff

**Performing Organization:**
- School of Advanced Military Studies
- Command and General Staff College
- Fort Leavenworth, Kansas 66027

**Sponsoring/monitoring Agency:**
- Command and General Staff College
- Fort Leavenworth, Kansas 66027

**Abstract:**
- See attached

**Subject Terms:**
- Civil Affairs
- Force Structure

**Security Classification:**
- Report: Unclassified
- Page: Unclassified
- Abstract: Unclassified

**Pages:** 47
ABSTRACT

THE CIVIL AFFAIRS FORCE STRUCTURE: IS IT SUFFICIENT TO SUPPORT DIVISIONS AND CORPS IN CONTINGENCY OPERATIONS? by MAJ Murray J. Duff, USA, 47 pages.

This monograph discusses the ability of the current civil affairs force structure to adequately support divisions and corps when they are deployed in contingency operations. Over 95 percent of all civil affairs units are found in the reserves. The active force is composed of only one battalion. Therefore, when a division or corps is deployed in a contingency operation, there is typically inadequate support available until a reserve unit can be mobilized.

The monograph outlines the current force structure in terms of its capabilities, strengths, and weaknesses. Then it examines the effectiveness of the support it provided during Operation URGENT FURY, Operation JUST CAUSE, and Operation RESTORE DEMOCRACY.

Finally, it contrasts various considerations and concerns involved with force structure capability shortcomings and examines a possible remedy for those shortcomings.
SCHOOL OF ADVANCED MILITARY STUDIES
MONOGRAPH APPROVAL

Major Murray J. Duff

Title of Monograph: The Civil Affairs Force Structure: Is It Sufficient to Support Divisions and Corps in Contingency Operations?

Approved by:

Edward J. Menard
COL Edward J. Menard, AM

Danny M. Davis, MA, MMAS

Philip J. Brookes, Ph.D.

Monograph Director
Director, School of Advanced Military Studies
Director, Graduate Degree Program

Accepted this 13th Day of December 1996
ABSTRACT

THE CIVIL AFFAIRS FORCE STRUCTURE: IS IT SUFFICIENT TO SUPPORT DIVISIONS AND CORPS IN CONTINGENCY OPERATIONS? by MAJ Murray J. Duff, USA, 47 pages.

This monograph discusses the ability of the current civil affairs force structure to adequately support divisions and corps when they are deployed in contingency operations. Over 95 percent of all civil affairs units are found in the reserves. The active force is composed of only one battalion. Therefore, when a division or corps is deployed in a contingency operation, there is typically inadequate support available until a reserve unit can be mobilized.

The monograph outlines the current force structure in terms of its capabilities, strengths, and weaknesses. Then it examines the effectiveness of the support it provided during Operation URGENT FURY, Operation JUST CAUSE, and Operation RESTORE DEMOCRACY.

Finally, it contrasts various considerations and concerns involved with force structure capability shortcomings and examines a possible remedy for those shortcomings.
INTRODUCTION

Since the demise of the Soviet Union and the conclusion of the Cold War, the United States and particularly its Army has struggled to develop a coherent and viable national security posture. As the international and domestic environment vacillates through various stages of development, the Army is faced with new and diversified missions which seem to change on a constant basis. The issue is complicated by the fact that the Army is not ideally structured to deal with many of the new missions that it has inherited. While the current force structure is oriented towards success in a force on force heavy environment, many believe that the most likely threat the Army must be prepared to deal with will come in the form of an unconventional conflict or Military Operations Other Than War (MOOTW). The specter of a major conflict involving massive commitments of conventional forces in a high intensity environment is for the time being at least, less likely than it has been in the past. As a consequence, the Army's divisions and corps have been called upon to execute MOOTW missions such as peace operations, humanitarian assistance, domestic disaster relief, counterdrug operations and peace enforcement. Many of these missions are executed in conjunction with or under the control of other nations or multinational organizations. Most are executed on foreign soil and involve extensive interaction with other governments and their populations, non-governmental organizations or international organizations.
In order to effectively deal with these new and difficult missions, commanders have levied increased support requirements upon the civil affairs community. The magnitude and frequency of these new requirements have at times found civil affairs (CA) forces unable to respond in a timely and adequate manner. This is especially true with regards to short notice contingency operations. Currently, the active Army has only one civil affairs battalion which is located at Fort Bragg, NC. Because the vast preponderance of civil affairs forces are found in the reserves and all the specialty skills (such as, public administration, public health, property control, legal, and economics) are found there, the statutory restrictions which control the activation of reserve units severely restrict the timely ability of the civil affairs community to adequately support divisions and corps in the conduct of MOOTW contingencies. Therefore, an examination of current force structure with regards to support of active forces is warranted. The Army must address the question of whether or not the civil affairs force structure as it is now constituted, is adequate to support the Army’s divisions and corps when they execute contingency operations.

Whether in domestic disaster assistance, peace operations, conflict, or war, military operations are more effective when they incorporate civil affairs support. Although conditions differ throughout the operational continuum and vary from mission to mission, civil affairs forces are designed to create, maintain, direct, or exploit relations between Army forces and civil authorities and the local populace in order to facilitate military operations. Because civil affairs units offer
unique skills, present commanders with abilities that can’t be duplicated by other units, and provide support that is critical to the success of most missions, their ability to support major conventional units becomes critical.

It is not certain that Army civil affairs forces are sufficient in number, nor is it certain that the current force structure is adequate to support active divisions and corps when they are committed to contingency missions. If the Army is to maximize its mission effectiveness, it must be adept at civil affairs operations. In order to determine the effectiveness of the current civil affairs force structure, it is prudent to examine recent contingencies. Operation URGENT FURY, Operation JUST CAUSE, and Operation RESTORE HOPE offer the best and most appropriate opportunity to examine the current force structure relative to civil affairs support afforded to conventional divisions and corps. If after considered examination the civil affairs force structure is found to be insufficient in some manner, than the Army should consider potential changes which would enable the civil affairs community to provide more effective support.
In order to assess the effectiveness of the support rendered by civil affairs forces, one must have an understanding of the roles and missions that they are designed to fulfill when divisions and corps conduct operations. When considering the roles and missions of civil affairs forces several assumptions based on recent military operations and foreseeable U. S. foreign policy, must be made in order to properly frame the context of the examination: Operations Other Than War missions and tempo will increase. Accompanying these missions will come requirements to conduct civil-military operations (CMO) with civilian populations and organizations. Civil-military operations will force commanders at all levels, but particularly at division and corps level to understand and exploit local population cultural and infrastructure peculiarities. Information operations will require U. S. forces to be especially sensitive to actions that would allow the national and international media to portray American forces in a negative light. Maximum use of host nation support (HNS) or target country capabilities to facilitate or resource combat or civil-military operations will be critical to success. Combined and coalition operations will increase in frequency. Humanitarian assistance and peacekeeping operations will increase in frequency.\(^2\)

Given these assumptions, it is clear that a thorough understanding of the capabilities of civil affairs units is essential to mission success. In an effort to
clearly delineate this role, the Secretary of Defense issued Department of Defense Directive 2000.13 (Civil Affairs) which outlines the Department of Defense policy concerning civil affairs roles and missions. It defines civil affairs as "The activities of a commander that establish, maintain, influence, or exploit relations between military forces and civil authorities, both governmental and nongovernmental, and the civilian population in a friendly, neutral, or hostile area of operations in order to facilitate military operations and consolidate operational objectives." Additionally, civil affairs may include activities and functions normally the purview and responsibility of local government. These civil affairs activities may occur before, during, or subsequent to other military actions.

Perhaps the most important aspect of the Department of Defense Directive is that it officially reiterates the fact that the conduct of civil-military operations is a function of command. U. S. Army Field Manual (FM) 101-5, Staff Organization and Operations, stipulates that, "Command includes the authority and responsibility for effectively using available resources and for planning the employment of, organizing, directing, coordinating and controlling military forces to accomplish assigned missions". Additionally, the law of land warfare as well as international law, specify the commander's ethical obligation in military operations for the local population found within his assigned area of operation. Command and control is the process through which the activities of military forces are directed, coordinated and controlled to accomplish the mission.
Inherent in the command and control system is the requirement to execute obscure missions under high stress conditions. The command and control organization is the mechanism that allows the commander to accomplish his mission. If the staff is not organized properly with the appropriate mix of expertise and manpower, than the commander's ability to successfully execute the mission is proportionally negatively effected. It follows that if the commander does not have the necessary civil affairs expertise or personnel on his staff, than his ability to fulfill his moral and legal obligations under the law of land warfare and international law, as well as accomplish his mission, will be negatively affected.

As a normal procedure, commanders plan for fire support, mobility/countermobility, air defense and other functions of the battlefield operating systems. Planning for military contact with the local population, host nation officials, contracting requirements and host nation support acquisitions should also be routine for divisions and corps. Commanders must learn to anticipate and plan for the affects of noncombatants on the battlefield. Often when units do not receive civil affairs staff augmentation, or no member of the staff is given direct responsibility for civil affairs functions, noncombatants are given little consideration. It is the responsibility of civil affairs forces to ensure that commanders are supported properly with sound advice and staff expertise in order to ensure that these considerations do not negatively impact upon the success of the mission.
Civil affairs forces fulfill a command support role in all operational environments and across the operational continuum. By definition, civil affairs operations encompass the relationship between military forces, civil authorities, and people in a friendly or occupied area. Their role is to support national policy and implement national objectives by coordinating with, influencing, or controlling local infrastructures in the operational area of supported units.\(^4\) The degree of civil affairs action or control should be in accordance with United States and international law as well as any binding agreements or treaties to which the United States is party. Support of the commander’s political/military mission may involve civil affairs forces participating or coordinating with allied or international military agencies or civil organizations.

The focus of civil-military operations is to support military objectives. Regardless of the level of application, the doctrine, tactics and techniques that are used are basically the same. Five mission activities characterize civil-military operations: Foreign Nation Support, Populace and Resource Control, Humanitarian Assistance, Military Civic Action, and Civil Defense.

Foreign nation support includes both host nation support and third country support. Depending on mission requirements, civil affairs units identify locally available resources as well as resources which can be obtained from friendly nations and assist in their procurement on an ad hoc basis. They also activate preplanned requests for foreign nation support.
Civil affairs units assist in the planning and execution of populace and resources control activities such as, the imposition of curfews, resettlement of dislocated civilians, movement restrictions, licensing, inspection of facilities, and rations control. Dislocated civilian (DC) operations and noncombatant evacuation operations (NEO) are specialized forms of populace resources control.

Humanitarian assistance (HA) is a group of programs that authorize the use of Department of Defense and United States Government resources to conduct military acts and operations of a humanitarian nature. Civil affairs forces are structured to coordinate the execution of HA missions. Authority to conduct humanitarian assistance is given to commanders by Chapter 20 of Title 10 of the United States Code. Humanitarian Assistance includes, but is not limited to, Humanitarian/Civic Assistance (H/CA), foreign disaster relief, and support to foreign displaced civilians. H/CA is the most common form of humanitarian assistance and often takes the form of medical, dental, or veterinary care, construction of transportation networks, construction of basic sanitation systems, or construction and repair of public facilities.

Military civic actions (MCA) projects are designed to bolster public support for host nation governmental programs. They are normally targeted to directly enhance the legitimacy, effectiveness or image of the government or the military. They are not designed to bring attention to American forces or the United States Government and our soldiers purposely remain in the background
in order to allow the local government to benefit. Military civic actions programs can be extended to support military and paramilitary forces.

Civil defense missions deal with immediate emergency conditions created by an attack from another nation or natural or manmade disasters. These missions have increased in frequency during recent years. During these manmade or natural disasters, civil affairs are capable of supporting the commander in planning for and coordinating with government, industry, public utilities, and public health agencies.⁵
THE CURRENT FORCE STRUCTURE

Civil Affairs forces comprise one of the five elements of the United States Army Special Operations Command (USASOC). These forces are trained and organized in order to provide commanders with rapidly deployable assessment, tactical and specialized capabilities. As outlined in Title 10, United States Code, all civil affairs assets are designated special operations forces and USASOC is the proponent command. When directed, USASOC provides CA units to the regional CINCs for employment in theater. The U.S. Army Civil Affairs and Psychological Operations Command (USACAPOC) is the major subordinate command of USASOC which commands all active and reserve CA forces. USACAPOC is responsible for alerting units for missions and for validating reserve units for mission capability.

The Active Force

The majority of civil affairs forces are found in the reserves. These units are subject to all the normal restrictions on activation, deployment and resourcing that are inherent in any reserve organization. In order to meet a perceived requirement for increased versatility and deployability in the civil affairs community, the Army created an active component battalion (the 96th Civil Affairs Battalion) and stationed it at Fort Bragg, NC. In accordance with the
Joint Strategic Capabilities Plan (JSCP), Annex L. each unified commander is apportioned, for planning purposes, one reserve component (RC) regionally affiliated civil affairs command (or Brigade of equivalent capabilities). Each active Component (AC) company from the 96th CA Bn operates under tasking authority of the regionally aligned commands.

The companies of the 96th serve as theater assets. They are available for rapid deployment missions and contingencies involving special operations forces as well as conventional units. While the reserve units are primarily designed to provide "specialists" with unique skills and expertise which are designed to work up to the unified and governmental level, the active force is composed of "generalists" who provide tactical civil affairs support to commanders through joint task force level. These personnel are fully qualified but they normally lack specific expertise in the functional CA specialties such as, public administration, food and agriculture, economics and commerce, and property control. Civil affairs generalists are capable of supporting the maneuver commander's immediate needs. They are capable of supervising or conducting civil-military operations that support a tactical mission. Civil affairs generalists prepare area assessments which allow civil affairs specialists to complete detailed planning for CMO that follow on or supporting forces will conduct.

When the 96th CA Bn allocates assets to support conventional commanders at the corps or division level, they provide Civil Affairs Tactical
Support Teams (CATSTs). These four-man teams are composed of a Functional Area 39C (Civil Affairs) trained captain, a sergeant 1st class (SFC) 18F (Special Forces operations and intelligence course graduate), a staff sergeant (SSG) 18C (Special Forces engineer sergeant) and a SSG 18D (Special Forces medical sergeant). Each team is designated to a specified theater of operations, is trained in a language found in that theater, and is qualified in civil affairs and civil-military operations. Commanders should not expect a large number of personnel to augment their staff. However, these teams are capable of assisting in the planning and conduct of in-depth operational area analysis. They can educate the deploying force concerning the area of deployment and the religious and cultural characteristics of the local population. CATSTs are also capable of conducting ground assessments to determine host nation military and civilian support capabilities, providing linguistic, cultural and regional expertise to support friendly forces, and determining what civil administration and infrastructure capabilities exist.

Unfortunately, the increasing level of requirements levied against the active civil affairs forces, coupled with decreasing resources and the inability of the reserve force to mobilize quickly, has necessitated the employment of 96th CA units to execute missions normally performed by reserve units. Doctrinal employment of sufficient active civil affairs forces in sufficient numbers to support the conventional force is problematic.
Reserve Forces

Reserve forces provide the vast majority of the civil affairs capability. The current force structure places all reserve CA forces under the command of the U. S. Army Civil Affairs and Psychological Operations Command (USACAPOC) at Fort Bragg. There are three civil affairs commands and two civil affairs brigades in USACAPOC. A civil affairs command is normally aligned with a theater Army and the commander is the senior civil affairs commander in theater. It is designed to plan, manage, and conduct CA operations in support of the theater commander's mission. CA commands may also be required to augment subunified commands, component service headquarters, and functional commands. The CA command is organized into teams which afford it specialists, skilled in all of the 20 civil affairs functional specialties. These teams are: Public Facilities, Special Functions, Language, Plans, Programs, and Policy, Government, and Economics. These civil affairs teams are designed to operate at the strategic and operational level. They provide interface between national civil authorities and the U.S. military and establish procedures and processes designed to minimize civilian interference with military operations. A civil affairs command provides command and control for subordinate CA units, advises on agreements with host nations, and recommends theater policy for civic action, civil assistance and civil administration missions.
Civil affairs brigades plan, manage and conduct CA operations in support of corps or joint task forces. A CA brigade is not equipped to perform the functions of a CA command, however it may receive attached support teams to facilitate command of subordinate CA units and provide staff support to other component services and joint staffs as required. Its primary function is to advise and assist the commander concerning his legal obligations and moral considerations in a particular area of operation. It is also structured to provide interface between local civil authorities and U.S. military forces.

A civil affairs battalion (General Purpose) is normally the type of unit that is used to support a deployed division. It is the lowest echelon of command in the civil affairs force structure. A general purpose battalion provides the supported unit with capabilities in public administration, displaced civilian operations, civilian supply, public communications, public health, civil defense, public works and utilities, and language assistance. Its primary mission focuses on the movement, control, and coordination of humanitarian support for displaced civilians using local resources to lessen the commitment of U.S. military resources. It also works to minimize the impact of the local population on military operations. The general purpose battalion is also normally charged with augmenting the division G5 section in order to facilitate combat operations.
Civil-Military Operations Staff

In the current doctrine outlined by FM 100-15 Corps Operations (1993), FM 71-100 Division Operations, and FM 101-5 Staff Organization and Operations, the Assistant Chief of Staff, G5 is the principal staff assistant to the commander in all matters concerning the political, social, cultural, and economic aspects of military operations. At the division and corps level, he is principally responsible to act as a liaison between the military forces, civil authorities, and the indigenous people in the area of operation. He is responsible to plan and orchestrate activities that support the commander's intent. Like the operations and intelligence officers, he focuses outward to support the commander in the operational area, but like the personnel and logistics officers he focuses inward on combat support and combat service support issues associated with sustaining the force and the conduct of displaced civilian operations.

The G5, like other staff officers, is authorized personnel in accordance with a table of organization and equipment. However, current division and corps authorization tables do not provide the G5 with sufficient personnel assets to adequately perform all assigned functions. Consequently, augmentation from regionally aligned reserve civil affairs units has become normal operating procedure. This fact creates many problems for contingency operations. Units can not count on receiving the proper number of augmentees in a timely fashion, they can not count on being augmented by soldiers with whom they have
trained, and normally augmentees come as individuals based on availability not on requisite skills or knowledge of unit procedures.

When properly augmented, the G5 organizes his staff section to support operations at the division/corps main and rear operation centers. Additionally, he may establish a Civil-Military Operations Center (CMOC). At the main, the CMO section provides representatives to the plans, current operations, intelligence and CSS cells to monitor the civil-military effects on current and developing operations. The CMO section must maintain a 24-hour capability and therefore normally consists of a minimum of five personnel per shift. The G5 should remain where he can best coordinate all CMO and be appropriately responsive to the commander’s requirements and facilitate staff integration. Normally, this is at the main command post.

At the rear, the G5 provides a CMO cell to monitor the main battle and rear area activities. If available, a CA unit may be tasked to man and operate the CMO cell. The CMO cell requires 24-hour capability whether it is task-organized from G5 assets or from a supporting CA unit. It plans for and coordinates host nation support as well as dislocated civilian operations. Additionally, the CMO cell conducts all coordination and integration of CA activities with the corps or division staff for combat-support and combat-service support operations.

When a CMOC is established, the G5 section forms the nucleus for the operations center that gives the commander the capability to process requests
for assistance from participating or coordinating U. S. Government, international, nongovernmental and private volunteer organizations. Although the term CMOC has been unofficially promulgated in Army doctrine for many years and used to describe different staff and unit organizations at different times, its function has remained relatively constant. The role of a CMOC is to assist the G5 in anticipating, coordinating and orchestrating functions pertaining to the civil population, government and economy in areas where armed forces are employed.\textsuperscript{8}

The CMOC is neither a unit nor an organization. It allows nonmilitary organizations to seek help from and coordinate with the military force. It is an extension of the CMO cell, found in the rear operations center, that exchanges and provides civil affairs related information with nonmilitary agencies operating away from the corps or division headquarters.

Experience has demonstrated that the major functions of a CMOC center around: Providing government organizations (GO), international organizations (IO), nongovernmental organizations (NGO), private volunteer organizations (PVO), and other agencies with a focal point for activities relating to the civil population. It serves as a coordination center for processing requests, acts as a de facto clearing house for coordinating supply distribution, identifying problems, and developing synergy using the combined assets of the relief agencies. It coordinates relief efforts with U. S. and allied commands as well as provides interface with the U. S. Information Service (USIS), U. S. Agency for
International Development (USAID), and the American Embassy. It also assists in the transfer of authority and handoff of operations from military forces to the host nation and other agencies.⁹

Although techniques and procedures for a CMOC and for civil-military operations staff support at the corps and division have evolved over the years, one thing is certain, the commander's requirement to consider CA operations will not change.
CIVIL AFFAIRS FORCES IN GRENADA

In order to assess the capability of the civil affairs force structure to support divisions and corps in contingency operations, one must examine the operations in which CA forces have been employed. The first time CA forces were employed using modern doctrine and force structure to support a contingency operation was in Operation URGENT FURY.

In the early morning of October 25, 1983, the combined United States-Caribbean security force, composed of units from the United States, Barbados, Jamaica, and four member states of the Organization of Eastern Caribbean States, assaulted the island nation of Grenada. U. S. Marines landed on the beaches south of Pearls Airport and Army Special Operations Forces as well as elements of the 82nd Airborne Division parachuted into Point Salines Airport. American airlift, sea and heavier forces quickly provided follow-on support. Despite some command and control and interoperability issues which are beyond the scope of this study, the various combat objectives throughout the island were quickly achieved.

Almost immediately, because of the nature of the lightly equipped contingency forces used to make the assault and the nature of the mission, the requirement for interaction with the host nation became evident. Immediate problems arose in terms of property control, dislocated civilians, critical labor-force requirements, food distribution, non-combatant evacuation operations and
coordination and interaction with United States and Grenadan government agencies. All of these issues are classic civil affairs missions; however the first civil affairs soldiers did not arrive in Grenada until October 28th (D+3). Elements of the advanced party for the 96th Civil Affairs battalion, the only active civil affairs unit in the Army, landed and by 30 October, the civil-military operations center had established contact with the United States Agency for International Development, the United States Information Service and local host nation officials.

Largely because civil affairs forces were not included in the planning phases of the operation, the 96th was quickly overwhelmed by the magnitude of the mission. It is important to note that the 96th has a world wide support requirement and that only one company is structured to support civil affairs missions in each theater of operations. Despite the total commitment of the Battalion, it was unable to fulfill the requirements of the JTF, XVIII Airborne Corps, the 82nd Airborne Division, Army special operations forces and other governmental agencies. In the initial stages of the operation, civil affairs forces were tasked to establish a local labor force for use by XVIII Airborne Corps headquarters and other units on the ground, establish print plant facilities, find an adequate potable water source for the Richmond Hill Hospital, repair the water system supplying Point Salines, coordinate the reopening of civilian airports on the island, establish civilian mail delivery, repatriate all Cuban nationals on the island, close the Cuban embassy and establish a crop spraying
program to help salvage the food production system. Because it consists of only
generalists, and is limited in terms of personnel, the 96th CA battalion was not
capable of executing the required missions.

Support from the reserve civil affairs support structure was requested by
the Commander in Chief, Atlantic Command (CINCLANT), on 28 October but
reserve assets from the 358th CA Brigade, Norristown, Pennsylvania did not
report for duty until 11 November (D+17).

There was no presidential reserve call-up for Operation URGENT FURY
so all reserve forces committed to the island were volunteers. Because of this
fact, the 358th was forced to create ad hoc teams from among its volunteers.
The teams consisted of soldiers who, although they were members of the same
brigade, had not generally trained together and were usually not functioning in
their normally assigned jobs. Consequently, efficiency and expertise were
sacrificed in order to field the appropriate type of civil affairs teams.

When the operation shifted into the post-combat phase civil affairs forces
were continuing to flow into country. The in-flow of reserve forces coincided with
the out-flow of combat troops and continued throughout November and
December, two months after D-day. As a consequence, vital types of civil affairs
support were not adequately afforded to the combat units on the ground, simply
because there were not enough CA personnel available and the reserve
component could not mobilize fast enough to support the requirement in country.
As a direct result of the lack of CA support, significant difficulties developed with
the improper requisition of private property. The airborne forces used in the invasion quickly found that organic assets and the logistical tail were unable to meet all requirements and therefore, attempted to fulfill their requirements locally. Because they were not supported properly, abuses resulted. Because of improper requisition, civilian distrust developed, private property was misused and claims resolution was exacerbated.\textsuperscript{12}

The conduct of Operation URGENT FURY revealed several important points concerning the adequacy of CA support. The first is that civil affairs planning must start prior to deployment and must include civil affairs planners in order to assure proper guidelines and procedures are developed. Contingency planning must provide for the identification and deployment of U. S. Army reserve civil affairs assets to the area of operation. The planning cycle for URGENT FURY did not adequately incorporate CA assets, and as a consequence, the conventional contingency force suffered. The CA force structure at the time of URGENT FURY was clearly structured for governmental support and nation building rather than command support. If CA planners had been involved in the planning cycle from the beginning, they might have been able to at least reduce the negative effects of the force structure deficiencies.

Civil affairs units and individual augmentees must arrive in country with the combat units they support. Commanders must balance the need for additional combat power with the combat multiplier of civil affairs support. The proper mix of CA forces is essential to an operation like URGENT FURY. The
lack of CA support among combat units forced commanders to address problems with dislocated civilians and food shortages using assets which detracted from combat power and effectiveness. The proper balance expedites the removal of civilians from combat areas and facilitates care and control of those who have been temporarily displaced. It enables units to search out public utility workers capable of re-establishing vital public services such as water, power etc. It also would have allowed combat forces in Grenada to execute special requirements which were unique, such as restricting foreign nationals to embassies and assembling U. S. citizens for departure in non-combatant evacuation operations.\textsuperscript{13}

Operations in Grenada demonstrated the necessity to provide a mechanism to selectively mobilize U. S. Army reserve assets. During Operation URGENT FURY, the civil affairs community was essentially unable to augment the 96th Civil Affairs Battalion because there was no procedure for placing reservists on active duty in a timely fashion. Even when CA assets were identified, deployment did not take place for two weeks after the initial determination of need.\textsuperscript{14}

By most accounts, Operation URGENT FURY was successful but it revealed many deficiencies in the Army's ability to conduct contingency operations. The civil affairs support to the operation should be viewed in the same manner. The mission was an overall success; however, major deficiencies in the CA force structure and consequently its capabilities were revealed.
OPERATION JUST CAUSE

United States Army activities in Panama during Operation JUST CAUSE involved a variety of units including mechanized, light, airborne and special operation forces. It successfully demonstrated the United States' ability to actively pursue its national interests anywhere in the world with rapid and decisive military action. The objectives of Operation JUST CAUSE were many; however, in terms of facilitating long-term stability in Panamanian society and establishing a new functional Panamanian government, none of these forces were more important than Army civil affairs units.

During the 18 months prior to the night of December 20, 1989, relations between the United States and the Panamanian government of Manuel Noriega deteriorated. Although the status of the Panama Canal had been determined by treaty in 1977 by the Torrijos government, the Noriega regime continued to provoke the United States. It held power through a combination of brute force, violent intimidation and election fraud. In 1988, Noriega was indicted by a grand jury in Miami for drug trafficking.

In May 1989, Noriega lost overwhelmingly in national elections but refused to relinquish power. By summer, Admiral William J. Crowe, Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, ordered General Maxwell Thurman, Commander-in-Chief of U. S. Southern Command (SOUTHCOM) to prepare for the invasion of Panama and the destruction of the Noriega government.¹⁵
When the Noriega regime murdered an American Marine officer, beat a Navy Lieutenant and threatened to rape his wife, its time ran out. On December 17th, President Bush ordered that Operation JUST CAUSE be executed.

Civil affairs involvement in JUST CAUSE preceded the execution order by more than a year. The CA planning cycle began in March 1988 when two members of the Civil Affairs Branch of the Strategy, Policy and Plans Directorate (SCJ5) were directed to develop the CA portion of a recently JCS approved plan titled ELABORATE MAZE. These planners were quickly augmented by reservists from the 361st CA Bde, the SOUTHCOM CAPSTONE unit. Once the team was organized, they quickly drafted a plan based on three major assumptions. The first was that the CMO plan was to be capable of being executed independently of any other plan, concurrently with another plan, or following the execution of the combat plan. The second assumption was that the CINC would be in charge of civil-military operations after the combat operations against the Panamanian Defense Force (PDF) were completed for no longer than 30 days. The third major assumption was that the executors of the CMO plan would be the U. S. Army Reserve CA units CAPSTONE to SOUTHCOM with any required augmentation arriving in the form of individual volunteers. This assumption was the most dangerous, because it dealt with domestic political concerns largely out of the control of the Defense Department. It was probably made because the plan was developed by reservists from that unit. In retrospect, it was a great mistake.
After the first planning team finished its temporary tour on active duty with a draft plan in place, the follow on teams began to refine the effort. KRYSTAL BALL, as the plan was named, quickly developed into something much larger and more cumbersome than was originally intended. Largely because the CA planners were inexperienced, were not a normal part of the SOUTHCOM staff and integrated their parochial reserve interests into the CA plan, KRYSTAL BALL called for the influx of four civil affairs brigades. It is important to note that, because of security concerns, the authors of this massive civil-military operation did not even have access to the combat portion of the invasion plan.\textsuperscript{17}

The need to develop two plans, one at the CINC level, and one at the execution level, soon became apparent. Planners realized that the size of the operation coupled with the timeliness of a reserve forces call up might necessitate the requirement that non-CA trained personnel might have to execute the plan in its early stages. In order to facilitate this fact, KRYSTAL BALL was written in the form of annexes designed to provide sufficient instruction to whomever would execute it to start them on the correct azimuth. Additionally, the annexes provided packets directing a method of implementation and provided sufficient flexibility to make the plan useful in a variety of situations and under differing conditions.

In October 1989, the CMO plan now titled BLIND LOGIC was pulled off the shelf and updated. The tactical plan for the invasion, titled BLUE SPOON and BLIND LOGIC should have been inextricably connected; however, JTF
South (XVIII Airborne Corps) OPLAN specifically ignored BLIND LOGIC’s requirements and SOUTHCOM did not alert XVIII Airborne Corps planners to that fact. A major breakdown in tactical and operational civil affairs planning occurred between the SOUTHCOM staff and the Corps planners. The inexperienced reserve planners from SOUTHCOM sought out members of the Corps planning staff and conducted an informal coordination session which they misinterpreted as a commitment to incorporate BLIND LOGIC into the conditions for execution of the tactical plan.

From SOUTHCOM’s perspective, the JTF would be required to coordinate the in country flow of activating reserve forces in a timely manner and other issues such as the required support to civil-military operations by military police, engineers, medical personnel, and the 96th Civil Affairs battalion. The relationship between these CMO forces and the JTF needed to be clearly identified. Additionally, the mission to restore law in order and reestablish government services, needed to be delineated. Equally important was the establishment of the point when these forces would be transferred from the control of the JTF to the control of the Civil-Military Operations Task Force (CMOTF).¹⁸

The perceived agreements with the XVIII Airborne Corps planners were incorporated into BLIND LOGIC. The SOUTHCOM planners expected that the Corps planners would conduct parallel planning and incorporate their agreements into the OPLAN. This was not the case. The Corps did not include
the results of their discussions concerning the CMO mission in BLUE SPOON. In fact, they shifted the focus of the operation from the center of Panama City to the outskirts, which opened much of the city to the breakdown of law and order. Additionally, they did not provide any forces to maintain or restore order within the city. Therefore, at this point the CMO plan had two major faults. The first was that it inappropriately counted on a reserve forces call up and the second was that it was disconnected and out of synchronization with the JTF combat plan.

The difficulties with CMO planning were soon overcome by events. On December 17th the order to execute the BLUE SPOON as JUST CAUSE was given by the President. Guillermo Endara and his two Vice Presidents were sworn in by a justice of the peace on Fort Clayton. By 0100 hours, December 20th offensive operations against the Noriega regime and the PDF were in full swing.

The combat operation went off without any major difficulties. Thousands of American paratroopers including elements of the 96th CA Battalion descended on targets throughout Panama. However, because the JCS and the President declined to initiate a reserve call up, there were no reserve civil affairs forces present. The XVIII Airborne Corps, the 82nd Airborne Division and the 7th Infantry Division (Light) had no attached civil affairs support. Furthermore, they were essentially unprepared to execute any type of civil-military operations,
either concurrent with combat operations or after the combat phase was completed.

Elements of the 96th CA Battalion were attached to support the 75th Ranger Regiment and they were very successful considering the fact that the CA planning cycle was incomplete and the CA mission statement was sketchy at best. The commander of A company, 96th CA Bn did his best to outline what he perceived his mission to be during the operation, "Our mission was to help the Panamanians get their country running again." This type of generalized "make it happen" attitude characterized the impressive efforts of the 96th throughout the initial stages of the operation. With extremely limited manpower, these generalists were successful at establishing collection points for PDF soldiers and civilians, reestablishing operations at the Tocumen Airport, evacuating more than 5,000 civilians from the country, and reestablishing health clinics for the local population in order to relieve pressure on the military medical system.

As soon as the Rangers transitioned out of country, the 82nd Airborne Division realized the deficiency in CMO planning. They quickly grabbed the 96th for support. Again the 96th was very successful. It coordinated the selection and hiring of 154 local civilian workers and established a wage structure for the area. Additionally, they played catch-up in familiarizing combat troops with the area of operation and the proper procedures required to successfully execute their post-combat operations missions.
It is evident that the problems created by improper planning and coordination were exacerbated by the dependence of the civil affairs force structure on reservists. When the National Command Authority decided against a reserve unit call up, the Army had to fall back on individual volunteers. Notwithstanding the valiant efforts at Fort Bragg to process these reservists on to active duty for a 139 day period, it was not until December 26 that the first troops arrived. Despite the 361st CA Brigade’s knowledge of the plan and upcoming operation, only 25 soldiers arrived with the initial group of reservists. It was not until January that 80 more individual volunteers arrived in country.\textsuperscript{20}

In retrospect, several issues from Operation JUST CAUSE are apparent. Planners must not count on the Presidential call-up of reserve units. The political sensitivity of this action normally will preclude it from being a viable option in developing a viable civil affairs organization in contingency operations. Whenever possible, individual volunteers should be from the same unit and the unit headquarters should be sent, even if the commander does not volunteer. This would preclude the difficulties experienced when individuals had not trained together and did not have standard operating procedures. It also would eliminate difficulties associated with ordering supplies and equipment, funding unit activities, and problems with personnel actions such as orders.

It is clear that in this operation, more tactical civil affairs assets were needed. The battalions were the ideal place for CA to do its job of preventing problems before they occur. Most of the preventable damage was done during
the invasion by units that did not have CA support available when they needed it most.

Civil affairs support during the invasion of Panama showed the capabilities of the 96th CA Battalion and demonstrated the flexibility of the American soldier. It was by no means a model of success for CMO planning and coordination between conventional forces and the civil affairs community.
In September 1994, the last minute negotiations of former President Jimmy Carter, retired General Collin Powell, and Senator Sam Nunn, allowed the unopposed entry of U.S. Army forces onto the Port-au-Prince International Airport and the execution of Operation UPHOLD DEMOCRACY. With the initiation of this operation, the President of the United States intended to ensure the Haitian armed forces and police comply with the Carter-Cedras accords and that U.S. citizens and interests were protected. Additional objectives included the restoration of civil order, assistance in the reorganization of the Haitian armed forces and police, assistance in the transition from the current dictatorial rule to a democratic government, and assurance that President Jean Bertrand Aristide was returned to power no later than 15 October 1994.\textsuperscript{21}

In many ways, Operation UPHOLD DEMOCRACY was the most “joint” major operation the American military has executed to date. It was the first time a Navy aircraft carrier was stripped of its planes and Army helicopters placed on board instead. It was the first time that a Navy command and control ship (U.S.S Mount Whitney) was specifically manned and configured to act as a command and control platform for joint operations ashore. It was also the first time that large scale Army conventional forces actively sought to integrate civil affairs units into the force structure, the operations plan and the execution of operations on the ground.
UPHOLD DEMOCRACY afforded the ideal opportunity for the civil affairs community to demonstrate its effectiveness in supporting committed conventional Army forces. Because of sufficient planning time and as a result of lessons from previous operations, this operation saw reserve component and active component civil affairs units fully integrated before the execution order was given. Civil affairs units from both components were loaded aboard aircraft preparing to conduct the airborne assault into Haiti. This fact demonstrates how closely civil affairs units were integrated into the operations planning and how much value was placed on their unique skills. This development is significant because it reflects a maturation of the planning process and it represents a departure from the norm of active units conducting an area assessment that drives the deployment of later arriving reserve forces which conduct detailed assessments and civil-military operations.

Initial planning for RESTORE DEMOCRACY did not provide the type of mission analysis or organizational structure that is normally expected from a higher headquarters order and is required for civil affairs mission execution. The operations order from U.S. Atlantic Command (USACOM) did not include a civil affairs annex. Despite this deficiency, it did not take long for XVIII Airborne Corps (JTF 180) and its subordinate Army divisions, the 82nd Airborne Division, and the 10th Mountain Division (JTF190), to recognize that “restoring democracy” in Haiti was going to involve more than simply removing the current military regime. The mission clearly involved conducting nation assistance
operations. Civil affairs units are specifically tailored to operate in this type of environment and their specialized skills were quickly integrated into the support plan.

Under current deployment procedures, when a division from a contingency corps, like the 82nd Airborne Division deploys, initial support comes exclusively from the 96th CA battalion. Using the model established by the 96th CA battalion, the civil affairs component in Haiti was quickly organized into 21 direct support (DS) two-man teams with no general support (GS), without the supply and administrative support elements.  

The mission of the civil affairs units deployed to Haiti was to conduct civil-military operations in support of the Joint Task Force. Civil affairs personnel were integrated into the mission at all levels of the JTF. They assisted in the protection of U.S. citizens and interests by coordinating activities with the Department of State, the multinational police force, the United Nations Multinational Force and other U.S. and international agencies. These actions were necessitated by the mission requirements for preserving order, maintaining a stable and secure environment, supporting the professionalism of the public security forces of Haiti, and the transition to a multinational force. The initial civil affairs force consisted of fifty-two officers and thirty-four enlisted soldiers. They manned and operated civil-military operations centers at all levels of command and provided special assessment teams to meet all mission requirements.
It is important to note that during the planning cycle for JTF 180 and JTF 190 the mission analysis and comparisons of end states indicated a need to curtail the amount of military civic action and direct involvement in humanitarian assistance. The criteria for the conduct of either type of operation centered around three questions, “Will it gain support for the legitimate government?”, “Will it benefit a cross section of the people and not just the elite?”, and “Can the system U.S. forces leave in place sustain it?” Every effort was made to ensure that military support was conducted through other governmental and nongovernmental organizations. The intent was to avoid creating popular expectations that were beyond the scope of the mission statement and the military or governmental sustainment capabilities.

Within the framework of these limitations, support for the Joint Task Force came in the specific form of civil affairs elements providing coordination to procure food and medical supplies for the operation. Civil affairs elements were instrumental in restoring electricity to the major sites throughout the country. Public facilities teams were involved in road repair, assessments to enable immediate temporary fixes to the water and waste treatment systems and aided in the reopening of Port au Prince International Airport. Public Health teams were able to facilitate medical relief in the form of medical assistance projects at various sites on the island.

In terms of civil-military operations and the civil affairs force structure, Operation UPHOLD DEMOCRACY was not without error. Problems arose when
the regionally aligned CA units deployed instead of the normal training unit associated with the deploying division. However, despite troubles such as this, operations in Haiti should be viewed as the most successful example of civil affairs integration into conventional operations to date.
CONCLUSION

The roles, capabilities and expertise of civil affairs units and civil affairs personnel in the active and reserve component have grown immensely since the first time they were committed in support of conventional forces during a contingency operation. There should be no question that the civil affairs community has learned from these operations. CA doctrine, techniques, and procedures reflect many of the lessons learned through experience. Army civil affair units have collectively captured the institutional knowledge which makes them a critical part of both the conventional and the unconventional force.

The civil affairs community learned several critical points from Operation URGENT FURY in Grenada. The first is that CA planners must be incorporated into the planning cycle from the very beginning of the mission analysis phase. Failure to ensure this CA planning can result in a force structure which is insufficient to accomplish the mission. Additionally, the reserve component units which could be involved, require significantly more time to prepare for operations than active units. Without sufficient CA planning time, the likelihood of these units being properly prepared is lessened.

A Presidential call up of reserve forces is critical to success in virtually all contingency CMO missions. Relying upon volunteers and individual replacements is an unacceptable way of conducting business. While the enthusiasm and desire of these volunteers is commendable, they are not trained
as units, they are available for limited tours of duty, and they do not present the commander with the requisite specialty skills necessary to execute all aspects of the mission. The 96th CA Battalion is insufficient in terms of capabilities and personnel strength to compensate, except in very small and short term operations, for the lack of reserve unit augmentation.

Operations in Grenada also demonstrated that CA units must be available to deploy with combat units when combat operations begin. Flowing in as a follow-on force at some later date is usually a recipe for creating or exacerbating difficulties on the ground. There cannot be a delay between when combat forces are inserted and when civil-military operations begin. Therefore, CA units must be structured to deploy quickly and in sufficient numbers to support all likely contingencies. This requirement is probably only within the capabilities of an active unit or a reserve unit under Presidential call up.

Operation JUST CAUSE saw some improvement over URGENT FURY, but not much. Once again the planning capabilities of the CA force structure demonstrated a need for significant improvement. Immense difficulties resulted from the fact that SOUTHCOM did not have a regular CA planning cell on its staff. Instead, it relied on temporary duty reservists who could not provide continuity and did not have the professional experience or knowledge to properly plan and coordinate a major contingency civil-military operation. They made unwise and incorrect planning assumptions, they lost institutional knowledge of the plan every time a rotation occurred, and they failed to properly coordinate
their plan with the JTF that would execute it. Failure to coordinate the plan with
the subordinate units was primarily caused by an improper fixation by planners,
with strategic versus tactical or operational civil affairs support. This error was
committed largely because the reserve unit from which the planners came is
primarily focused at the strategic level. It was compounded by the fact that the
plan did not call for CA units to support the JTF or its subordinate divisions.

With the exception of the 96th CA Battalion supporting the Rangers, CA
units were not integrated into deploying units. As a result, critical time was lost
and tactical actions were taken without the advice of CA staff officers, which
could have minimized negative consequences to the follow-on CMO mission.
These negative consequences were compounded by the fact that once again
reserve forces were slow to arrive in theater because there was no Presidential
call up.

In stark contrast to Operation JUST CAUSE, Operation UPHOLD
DEMOCRACY is characterized by a string of successful civil affairs actions.
Because of the long planning cycle and the nature of the mission, there was
sufficient time to properly integrate civil-military operations into the operation.
Although USACOM did not prepare a civil affairs annex for its order, XVIII
Airborne Corps and its subordinate divisions learned from their negative
experiences in Panama. They quickly incorporated CA planners into their staffs
and pushed CA personnel down to the tactical level to facilitate immediate CA
support.
These actions were made possible by the enactment of a selective Presidential reserve call up. The inclusion of reserve forces as units were critical to the overall success of the civil affairs effort in Haiti. However, this fact did create a problem in the sense that combat units anticipated support from their CAPSTONE aligned CA unit. When a regionally aligned unit was assigned, there were some temporary difficulties while standard procedures and methods of attachment and support were worked out.

Although the success of civil affairs operations in Haiti demonstrates an overall trend towards improved support for conventional divisions and corps in the conduct of contingency operations, it is clear that deficiencies in the civil affairs force structure exist. These deficiencies center around the conduct of tactical level operations where generalists, not specialists are required. Because of the deployability limitations of reserve forces, the answer is likely to be found in the active force.

LTC James F. Powers Jr., the former commander of the 96th CA Battalion, advocates a possible solution that would solve many of the problems associated with the CA force structure. Currently the 96th is organized to provide Civil Affairs Tactical Support Teams (CATSTs) worldwide. Collecting these teams into one unit is the most efficient way to train and qualify personnel, but it prevents most tactical units from gaining access to the CA expertise that is available in the active force. It may be more advantageous and more operationally feasible to assign CATSTs to maneuver units on a full-time basis.
Assigning tactical CA elements to maneuver units challenges current special operations employment conventions. However, it is not unprecedented. Special Operations Coordination Elements are now assigned at corps level and fulfill a vital role in the synchronization of all battlefield operating systems.

Although additional active civil affairs force structure is the optimal option, it is not likely to be a feasible one. The Army’s ability to field CATSTs is limited by current personnel end strengths and the capacity of the training base to produce qualified soldiers. However, based on a 10-division Army, there are sufficient active component CATSTs currently available to equip each brigade-level major subordinate unit with one support team. In order to field these CATSTs, two primary options are available; either break up the 96th CA Battalion or modify the existing divisional tables of organization and equipment. These CATSTs could be an integral part of the brigade staff and handle various other CA related tasks within the brigade or division. If required, the CATSTs could be reallocated by the commander to support subordinate units and develop habitual relationships for reserve CA forces within the unit.

This is not the only solution to solving the capabilities gap in the current force structure. It entails several disadvantages, such as a lessened capability for CINCs to rapidly employ tactical CA assets and the time required to conduct the reorganization may make it unfeasible. However, it is clear that there exists a capabilities gap within the CA force structure, in terms of support to conventional forces when they are called upon to execute a contingency.
operations. It must be addressed or we will continue to experience the limitations to execution that we have struggled with in the past.


Ibid., 3-2.

Ibid., 5-4.


Ibid.

Civil Affairs Department School of International Studies, *Civil Affairs: Lessons Learned-Grenada* (Fort Bragg: Special Warfare Center, 1986), 1.


Civil Affairs Department School of International Studies, *Civil Affairs: Lessons Learned-Grenada* (Fort Bragg: Special Warfare Center, 1986), 10.

Ibid., 8.


Ibid.
15 Ibid., 20.


20 Ibid., 30.

21 Center for Army Lessons Learned, Operation UPHOLD DEMOCRACY: Initial Impressions D-20 to D+40 (Fort Leavenworth, 1994), i.

22 Ibid., vi.


24 Ibid.

25 Center for Army Lessons Learned, Operation UPHOLD DEMOCRACY, 191.

26 Center for Army Lessons Learned, Operation UPHOLD DEMOCRACY: Initial Impressions D-20 to D+150 (Fort Leavenworth, 1995), 155.


28 Ibid., 67.
BIBLIOGRAPHY

U.S. Government Documents, Manuals and Reports

Center for Army Lessons Learned, U S Army Training and Doctrine Command, "Operation Uphold Democracy: Initial Impressions D-20 to D+40." Fort Leavenworth, K S (December 1994).


Civil Affairs Department, School of International Studies, Special Warfare Center, "Civil Affairs Lessons Learned - Grenada." Fort Bragg, N C (November 1983).


Books and Monographs


Articles and Papers


