The Battle of Cedar Mountain: A Battlefield Terrain Study

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Tactical studies of Civil War battlefields have long been used by modern soldiers as a method of enhancing their understanding of the profession of arms. In this study, using records and reports written by commanders and participants actually involved in the battle, the authors examine a minor Civil War battle fought near Cedar Mountain, Virginia in the late summer of 1862. Confederate forces led by then Major General Thomas "Stonewall" Jackson engage a Union force in a minor, but bloody skirmish that results in a temporary delay of a planned Confederate invasion of Maryland. Command decisions and leadership styles of the key participants are a prominent feature of the study. Should the reader decide to visit the battlefield and walk the ground, the study includes directions to the battlefield and to various points of interest on the field.
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OVERVIEW
STRATEGIC OVERVIEW

During the early part of June 1862, Confederate forces under General Robert E. Lee, commanding the Army of Northern Virginia, and Major General Thomas J. "Stonewall" Jackson, commanding the Valley District, had placed the Union armies in the Shenandoah Valley and in the vicinity of Richmond on the defensive. In the Shenandoah, Jackson had routed the corps commanded by Major General Nathaniel P. Banks after an engagement at Winchester, Va., with considerable loss of men and material. Likewise, he defeated the corps under Major General John C. Fremont when it attempted to block Jackson’s march to Richmond. At about the same time, Lee had forced Major General Irvin McDowell to abandon his corps’ movement towards Richmond and to withdraw to Fredericksburg. While these activities were in progress, Lee’s army had met the Army of the Potomac under Major General George B. McClellan in a series of battles which later led to McClellan’s retreat from Richmond.

In the face of the failure of operations in the vicinity of Washington, D. C., President Lincoln called Major General John Pope from command of the Army of the Mississippi to Washington. He ordered him to form and command the Army of Virginia as of June 26, 1862. This new army consisted of three formerly independent corps and two cavalry brigades. The First Corps under Major General Fremont had a strength of 11,500 soldiers. Major General Banks’ Second Corps had a reported strength of 14,500 men, but actual strength was closer to 8,000. The Third Corps under Major General McDowell had approximately 18,500 men. Ironically, all of the corps commanders were more senior in rank than their newly appointed commander—a situation which disgusted Fremont and caused his prompt resignation. In Fremont’s place, Major General Franz Sigel assumed command of the First Corps. The addition of two cavalry brigades under the commands of Brigadier Generals George D. Bayard and John Buford, brought the total strength of Pope’s army to approximately 38,000 men.

Fearful of the Army of the Potomac’s impending defeat and withdrawal from Richmond, President Lincoln gave Pope the threefold mission to protect the nation’s capital in the event of attacks launched from Richmond, to make such dispositions as were necessary to assure the safety of the Shenandoah Valley, and at the same time to operate against the South’s lines of communication in the direction of
Gordonsville and Charlottesville, Va. Moreover, Pope was to assist McClellan's operation against the Army of Northern Virginia by diverting, if possible, a considerable portion of the Confederate forces away from Richmond.

In order to accomplish this mission, Pope concentrated his army, as much as possible, at locations where Confederate attempts to enter the Shenandoah from Richmond could be cut off and the southern approaches to Washington, D.C. could be protected. At Pope's direction, Sigel moved his corps from the Shenandoah to Sperryville, Va. on the eastern side of the Blue Ridge Mountains. Likewise, Banks crossed the Blue Ridge and took up a position to the east of Sigel at Little Washington. Similarly, McDowell moved one of his divisions under Brigadier General James B. Ricketts from Manassas to Waterloo Bridge. McDowell's second division was left at Fredericksburg to assist with McClellan's withdrawal and to block Confederate advances towards Washington. These movements, completed by July 17, 1862, brought the Army of Virginia on a line extending from Luray Gap eastward through Sperryville and Little Washington to Warrington. Later orders from Pope would find the army converging on Culpeper, Va. in early August.

In the meantime, General Lee had been monitoring the reorganization of Pope's army and had anticipated its southward movement. With the immediate threat to Richmond from McClellan having subsided, he dispatched Jackson with two divisions to meet the Union advance, secure the approaches to Gordonsville, Charlottesville, and Richmond, and attack if the opportunity arose. Accordingly, Jackson proceeded towards Gordonsville on July 13, 1862 with his own division now commanded by Major General Charles S. Winder and a second division under Major General Richard S. Ewell.

Upon arriving in Gordonsville on July 19, General Jackson requested reinforcements from Lee after ascertaining the large size of the Army of Virginia. In response, Lee sent forward the Light Division under Major General Ambrose P. Hill and a cavalry brigade under Brigadier General Beverly Robertson. The total strength of Jackson's army now numbered roughly 18,000 men—nearly 5,000 in Ewell's division, 7,000 under Hill, more than 5,000 under Winder, and approximately 1,200 cavalrymen.

Jackson's arrival at Gordonsville on July 19, thwarted Pope's intention to seize that town and proceed south to Charlottesville. Finding it no longer practical to occupy Gordonsville immediately, Pope alternatively instructed his three corps to converge on Culpeper by August 8, preparatory to operations against Jackson. An advance brigade under Brigadier General Samuel S. Crawford from Banks' corps reached Culpeper on July 24. Hindered by extremely hot weather, the remainder of Banks' corps and Ricketts' division marched into Culpeper on August 8 and took up positions
between the town and Cedar Mountain along the Orange-Culpeper road. Here, they joined Crawford who had been supporting Bayard's cavalry against elements of Jackson's cavalry. Inexplicably confused on the proper march route from Sperryville, General Sigel did not arrive at Culpeper until the evening of August 9—too late to engage in the battle.

Meanwhile, General Lee, having nothing more to fear from McClellan at Richmond and having received reports of Pope's movements, ordered Jackson to strike the Army of Virginia before it could be reinforced from outside the theater of operations. Knowing that only part of Pope's army had reached Culpeper, Jackson resolved to attack those forces before the approach of the preponderance of the Northern army. Preceded by cavalry reconnaissance, General Jackson moved his army northwards along the Orange-Culpeper road from Gordonsville, crossed the Rapidan River on August 8, and advanced towards Culpeper on the morning of Saturday, August 9—Bayard's cavalry falling back before them. Shortly before noontime, arriving within eight miles of Culpeper in the vicinity of Cedar Mountain, Jackson's army encountered Banks' corps which had already deployed just north of the mountain.
TACTICAL OVERVIEW

Arriving within eight miles of Culpeper at 11 A.M. on August 9, 1862, Major General Thomas J. Jackson, commander of the Confederate forces, contacted the advance elements of Major General John Pope's Army of Virginia near Cedar Run, a short distance northwest of Cedar Mountain. Shortly thereafter, Confederate artillery commenced firing on Brigadier General George D. Bayard's cavalry brigade, which was exposed on a ridge to the Confederate front. In response, the federal artillery returned the fire. Although it would only last a few hours, the battle of Cedar Run had begun.

General Pope had previously directed Brigadier General Samuel S. Crawford's brigade of Major General Nathaniel P. Banks' Second Corps, southward from its encampment at Culpeper to support Bayard and resist the enemy's advance. At about noon, Brigadier General Alpheus S. Williams, commanding Banks' First Division, followed Crawford's brigade to the vicinity of Cedar Mountain, accompanied by one of his brigades under Brigadier General George A. Gordon. There, he posted his other brigade under Crawford to the west of the Orange-Culpeper Road and placed Gordon to the right of Crawford. Trailing Williams, General Banks arrived on the field between one and two o'clock. His Second Division under Brigadier General Christopher C. Augur, followed and deployed into battle positions. This division which had three brigades commanded by Brigadier Generals John W. Geary, Henry Prince, and George S. Greene, took position to the east of the Orange-Culpeper Road—Geary next to the road, Prince in the center, and Green on the left flank. In all, Banks' corps mustered about 8,000 men on the day of the battle, divided into five infantry brigades in two divisions. Much later in the day, a division under Brigadier General James B. Ricketts from Major General Irvin McDowell's corps, reached the battlefield—too late to effectively stem the Confederate success, but soon enough to assist with Banks' withdrawal.

While this was transpiring, General Jackson was equally active in bringing up his artillery, maneuvering his cavalry, and placing his infantry divisions into position. His force consisted of approximately 18,000 men divided among 12 infantry brigades, formed into three divisions. Major General Richard S. Ewell maneuvered his division consisting of two brigades commanded by Brigadier Generals Jubal A.
Early and Isaac R. Trimble and a third brigade under Colonel Henry Forno, from the Orange-Culpeper Road eastward to the northwestern slope of Cedar Mountain, where he confronted Augur's division. Ewell established himself, along with Trimble's and Forno's brigades, on the slope of the mountain. Early, however, took a position halfway between the mountain and the road. Later in the afternoon, Brigadier General Edward L. Thomas, commanding a brigade under Major General Ambrose P. Hill, reinforced Ewell, taking a position on Early's right. In between these Confederate and Union forces, the country was open and broken for some distance, with a corn field adjacent to the road, northwest of Cedar Mountain.

While Ewell was preparing the right flank, Jackson's second division with its three brigades under Major General Charles S. Winder, deployed at the edge of a thick woods on both sides of the Orange-Culpeper Road. The brigade under Lieutenant Colonel Thomas S. Garnett, took a position next to the west side of the road; the brigade under Colonel Charles A. Ronald deployed to Garnett's left; and finally, the brigade under Brigadier General William B. Taliaferro fell in on the east side of the road, between Early and Garnett. To the left front of Winder's division was a wheat field, which stretched from three to five hundred yards across. Here, the three Confederate brigades faced Williams' division, located at the field's northern edge. On Winder's right front, Taliaferro faced Geary across the corn field. Jackson's reserve division under General Hill, was still south of Cedar Mountain, moving north on the Orange-Culpeper Road to support Ewell and Winder.

For several hours, the battle raged with rapid and continuous artillery fire and occasional skirmishing. Both sides suffered considerable losses. During this exchange, an artillery shell struck General Winder shortly before his infantry engaged the enemy. As Winder lay dying, General Taliaferro assumed command of the division and his own brigade fell to the command of Colonel Alexander G. Taliaferro for the remainder of the action.

At about five o'clock in the afternoon, General Augur ordered Geary and Prince to attack across the corn field, where they met the three brigades under Early, Thomas, and Taliaferro in a series of vigorous, hard-fought engagements. General Geary was wounded early in the battle, having an arm shattered. He remained with his command, however, until its withdrawal at about 7:30 P.M. About the same hour, General Prince's brigade retreated after a violent engagement against heavy odds. As the general rode through the field of tall corn attempting to rally his forces, he was seized and taken prisoner by Taliaferro's infantry. A half hour before the retreat, Augur was also wounded. Realizing that Geary, who was next in the succession to command, had been wounded previously, the division commander sent a messenger to
General Prince ordering him to assume command of the division. Before the courier reached the newly named commander, however, General Prince already had been captured. After this turn of events, General Greene, the only general officer remaining out of four in the Second Division, assumed command and presided over the division’s retreat.

In conjunction with Augur’s attack at five o’clock on the right side of the Confederate line, General Crawford advanced his brigade to a wooded area at the northern edge of the wheat field, preparatory to an attack on the left side of the Jackson’s forces. Then, crossing the wheat field at a double-quick pace with only three of his four regiments, Crawford fell upon Garnett’s brigade and poured destructive fire into its left flank and rear. With Garnett retreating in disorder, Crawford continued to push forward and caused portions of both Taliaferro’s and Early’s brigade to fall back temporarily. At this critical moment when Union victory appeared imminent on the Confederate left, General Jackson personally intervened at the scene of the engagement. He ordered a counterattack on Crawford’s brigade by Ronald’s infantry and by a brigade under Brigadier General L. O’B. Branch from A. P. Hill’s division, which by now had arrived at the battle front. Hopelessly outnumbered, Crawford began his withdrawal. The overwhelming Confederate forces, bolstered by two more of A. P. Hill’s brigades, under Brigadier Generals James J. Archer and William D. Pender, drove Crawford back across the wheat field into the opposite woods from where he had emerged, inflicting terrible losses on the retreating troops. As they pursued Crawford, the four Confederate brigades met General Gordon’s brigade and Crawford’s remaining uncommitted regiment, which were belatedly advancing to the wheat field. Near sunset, following a bloody engagement at the northern edge of the field, these newly committed Federal forces also retreated to their original positions, while the victorious Confederate brigades remained in the vicinity of the wheat field.

As Banks’ shattered command withdrew on both sides of the road, leaving its dead and wounded on the battlefield, a battalion of Bayard’s cavalry commanded by Major Richard I. Falls, made a gallant, but futile charge southward on the Orange-Culpepper Road in support of the fleeing infantry. The cavalry galloped into a hail of frontal and flanking fire from both Taliaferro’s and Branch’s brigades. Repulsed by the devastating Confederate firepower, Falls turned right and retreated through the same bloody wheat field.

Though the hour was now well past sunset, General Jackson still sought to reach Culpeper before the next morning. Accordingly, he ordered Hill’s division to advance cautiously in that direction. In the meantime, General Pope arrived on the field at 7 P.M. at the head of Ricketts’ division. As a result of Rickett’s considerable infantry and artillery support, Hill’s advance stalled. In the face of
the stiff Union resistance, Jackson ordered a halt for the night, believing it imprudent to move further forward during the darkness.

The battle was over. On the following morning, August 10, General Jackson, received information that Banks' corps had been reinforced during the night by the greater part of Pope's army and concluded that further attempts to secure Culpeper with his outnumbered forces was unwise. Instead, Jackson now preferred to maintain his hard-won position. Pope, for his part, spent the day consolidating his forces around Culpeper. Both armies took advantage of this break in the action to bury the dead, tend to the wounded, and collect arms from the battlefield.

On the 11th under a flag of truce, Pope requested permission until 2 P.M. to bury the dead that were not already interred. Jackson granted the truce, which was subsequently extended until 5 P.M. at the request of the Union army. That evening, Jackson evacuated his position south of Culpeper and returned to Gordonsville in order avoid a confrontation with the now greatly superior Army of Virginia. Inexplicably choosing not to pursue, Pope retired northward across the Rappahannock River a few days later.
REPORT OF MAJOR GENERAL THOMAS J. JACKSON

Major General Thomas J. Jackson, who commanded the Valley District of the Army of Northern Virginia, described the events at the battle of Cedar Mountain.

...Having received information that only part of General Pope’s army was at Culpeper Court-House, and hoping...to be able to defeat it before re-enforcements should arrive there, Ewell’s, Hill’s, and Jackson’s divisions were moved on the 7th in the direction of the enemy from their respective encampments near Gordonsville....

On the 9th, as we arrived within 8 miles of Culpeper Court-House, we found the enemy in our front, near Cedar Run, and a short distance west and north of Slaughter Mountain [Cedar Mountain]. When first seen his cavalry in large force occupied a ridge to the right of the road. A battery...opened upon the cavalry, which soon forced it to retire. Our fire was responded to by some guns beyond the ridge from which the Federal advance had just been driven....

General Early was ordered forward, keeping near the Culpeper road, while General Ewell, with his two remaining brigades [Trimble’s and Forno’s]...diverged from the road to the right, advancing along the western slope of Slaughter [Cedar] Mountain. General Early, forming his brigade in line of battle, moved into the open field, and passing a short
distance to the right of the road, but parallel to it, pushed forward, driving the Federal cavalry before him to the crest of a hill which overlooked the ground between his troops and the opposite hill, along which the enemy's batteries were posted. In his front the country was for some distance open and broken. A corn field, and to the left of it a wheat field, upon which the shocks were yet standing, extended to the opposite hill, which was covered with timber. So soon as Early reached the eminence described the Federal batteries were opened upon him. Large bodies of cavalry were seen in the wheat field to the left. General Early having retired his troops under the protection of the hill, Captain Brown, with one piece, and Captain Dement, with three pieces of artillery planted their guns in advance of his right and opened a rapid and well-directed fire upon the Federal batteries. By this time General Winder, with Jackson's division, had arrived, and after having disposed Campbell's brigade, Lieutenant Colonel Garnett commanding, to the left, under cover of the wood, in the rear of the batteries of Foague, Carpenter, and Caskie, then being placed near the road, under the direction of Major Andrews, chief of artillery of the division, and Winder's brigade, Colonel Ronald commanding, as a reserve, he was proceeding to direct...the movements of these batteries, when he was struck by a shell, from which he expired in a few hours....

The command of Jackson's division now devolved upon Brig. Gen. William B. Taliaferro, whose brigade during the remainder of the action was commanded by Col. A. G.
Taliaferro.

In the meantime General Ewell, with the brigades of Trimble and Hays [Forno], reached the northwest termination of Slaughter [Cedar] Mountain, and upon an elevated spot, about 200 feet above the valley below, had planted Latimer's guns, which opened with marked effect upon the enemy's batteries. For some two hours a rapid and continuous fire of artillery was kept up on both sides. Our batteries were well served and damaged the enemy seriously....

About 5 o'clock the enemy threw forward his skirmishers through the corn field and advanced his infantry [Geary and Prince], until then concealed in the woods, to the rear and left of the batteries. Another body of infantry, apparently debouching from one of those valleys hid from the view by the undulating character of the country, moved upon Early's right, which rested near a clump of cedars [near the present site of the Inskeep farm house], where the guns of Brown and Dement were posted. The infantry fight soon extended to the left and center. Early became warmly engaged with the enemy on his right and front. He had previously called for re-enforcements. As General Hill arrived with his division, one of his brigades [Thomas's] was sent to Early, and joined him in time to render efficient service. While the attack upon Early was in progress the main body [Crawford] of the Federal infantry moved down from the wood through the corn and wheat fields, and fell with great vigor upon our extreme left, and by the force of superior numbers, bearing down all
opposition, turned it and poured a destructive fire into its rear. Campbell's [Garnett's] brigade fell back in disorder. The enemy pushing forward, and the left flank of Taliaferro's brigade being by these movements exposed to a flank fire, fell back, as did also the left of Early's line, the remainder of his command holding its position with great firmness. During the advance of the enemy the rear of the guns of Jackson's [Winder's] division becoming exposed, they were withdrawn. At this critical moment Branch's brigade of Hill's division, with Winder's [Ronald's] brigade, farther to the left, met the Federal forces, flushed with their temporary triumph, and drove them back with terrible slaughter through the wood. The fight was still maintained with obstinacy between the enemy and the two brigades just named, when Archer and Pender coming up, a general charge was made, which drove the enemy across the [wheat] field into the opposite wood, strewing the narrow valley with their dead. In this charge Archer's brigade was subjected to a heavy fire. At this time the Federal [Falls'] cavalry charged upon Taliaferro's brigade with impetuous valor, but were met with such determined resistance by Taliaferro's brigade in its front, and by so galling a fire from Branch's brigade in flank, that it was forced rapidly from the field with loss and in disorder.

In the meantime General Ewell, on the right, found himself kept back from advancing by the incessant fire from our batteries in the valley. This difficulty no longer existing, he moved with his two brigades...and pressed
forward under a heavy fire from the enemy’s artillery.

Thus repulsed from our left and center, and now pressed by our right, center, and left, the Federal forces fell back at every point of their line and commenced retreating, leaving their dead and wounded on the field of battle.

Though late, I was so desirous of reaching Culpeper Court-House before morning as to induce me to pursue. The advance was accordingly ordered, General Hill, with his division, leading; but owing to the darkness of the night it was necessary to move cautiously.

...Believing it imprudent to move forward during the darkness, I ordered a halt for the night.

On the following morning (10th), having reason to believe that the Federal army had been so largely re-enforced as to render it imprudent for me to attempt to advance further, directions were given for sending the wounded to the rear, for burying the dead, and collecting arms from the battle-field....the heavy forces concentrated in front rendered it unwise on my part to renew the action....

On the 11th a flag of truce was received from the enemy, who requested permission until 2 o’clock to remove and bury his dead not already interred by our troops....

We captured some 400 prisoners, and among them Brigadier-General Prince; 5,302 small-arms; one 12-pounder Napoleon and its caisson, with 2 other caissons and a limber, and 3 colors by Winder’s brigade....

The official reports of the casualties of my command in
this battle show a loss of 19 officers killed and 114
wounded, of non-commissioned officers and privates 204 killed
and 946 wounded, with 31 missing, making 223 killed and 1,060
wounded; total loss of killed, wounded, and missing, 1,314.
This loss was probably about one-half that sustained by the
enemy.

I remained in position until the night of the 11th, when
I returned to the vicinity of Gordonsville, in order to avoid
being attacked by the vastly superior force in front of me,
and with the hope that by thus falling back General Pope
would be induced to follow me until I should be re-
enforced.... 1
REPORT OF MAJOR GENERAL JOHN POPE

Major General John pope, who commanded the Army of Virginia, described the events at the battle of Cedar Mountain.

On Thursday morning [August 7] the enemy crossed the Rapidan at Barnett's Ford in heavy force, and advanced strong on the road to Culpeper....Early on Friday it became apparent that...the main attack of the enemy would be at Culpeper, to which place I had thrown forward part of Banks' and McDowell's corps.

Brigadier-General Bayard...who was in advance near the Rapidan, fell slowly back, delaying and embarrassing the enemy's advance as far as possible and capturing some of his men.

The forces of Banks and Sigel and one of the divisions [Ricketts'] of McDowell's corps were rapidly concentrated at Culpeper during Friday and Friday night, Banks' corps being pressed forward 5 miles south of Culpeper, with Ricketts' division of McDowell's corps 3 miles in his rear.

The corps of Sigel, which had marched all night, was halted in Culpeper to rest for a few hours. On Saturday the enemy advanced rapidly to Cedar Mountain, the sides of which they occupied in heavy force.

General Banks was instructed to take up his position on
the ground occupied by Crawford's brigade, of his command, which had been thrown out the previous day to observe the enemy's movements. He was directed not to advance beyond that point, and if attacked by the enemy to defend his position and send back timely notice. It was my desire to have time to give the corps of Sigel all the rest possible after their forced march and to bring forward all the forces at my disposal. The artillery of the enemy was opened early in the afternoon, but he made no advance until nearly 5 o'clock, at which time a few skirmishers were thrown forward on each side under cover of the heavy woods in which his force was concealed. The enemy pushed forward in strong force...and General Banks' advanced to the attack. The engagement did not fairly open until after 6 o'clock, but for one and a half hours was furious and unceasing. Throughout the cannonading, which at first was desultory and directed mainly against the cavalry, I had continued to receive reports from General Banks that no attack was apprehended, and that no considerable infantry force of the enemy had come forward; yet toward evening the increase in the artillery fire having satisfied me an engagement might be at hand, though the lateness of the hour rendered it unlikely, I ordered McDowell to advance Ricketts' division to support Banks....I arrived personally on the field at 7 p.m. and found action raging furiously. The infantry fire was incessant and severe. I found Banks holding the position he took up early in the morning. His losses were heavy. Ricketts' division was immediately pushed forward and
occupied the right of Banks....The artillery fire at night by Ricketts' division...was most destructive....

...At daylight the next morning the enemy fell back 2 miles from our front and still higher up the mountain....The fatigue of the troops from long marches and excessive heat made it impossible for either side to resume the action on Sunday. The men were allowed to rest and recruit the whole day....Monday was spent in burying the dead and in getting off the wounded. The slaughter was severe on both sides, most of the fighting being hand-to-hand. The dead bodies of both armies were found mingled together in masses over the whole ground of the conflict. The burying of the dead was not completed until dark on Monday, the heat being so terrible that severe work was impossible. On Monday night the enemy fled from the field, leaving many of his dead unburied, and his wounded on the ground and along the road to Orange Court-House....²
START--CULPEPER, VIRGINIA

* From the Econo Lodge motel at the intersection of *
  highway 15 and 29, south of Culpeper, Va., proceed *
  south on highway 15 for 0.6 miles to the intersection of *
  highway 15 and route 692. Turn right and proceed on *
  route 692 (Old Orange Road). *

Route 692 follows the original trace of the old Orange-
Culpeper road. This is the route along which the Federal *
forces advanced during their march from Culpeper to the Cedar *
Mountain battlefield.

After travelling 1.3 miles along route 692, you will *
approach a wooded area on the left of the road and the *
intersection of route 603 on the right. The former site of *
Colvin’s Tavern, this is the area where Brig. Gen. Ricketts *
positioned his forces while the battle was taking place *
further south. Cedar Mountain is visible ahead.

Further along, the Orange-Culpeper road again *
intersects highway 15 at 0.4 miles ahead. Just before the *
intersection, you can see a farm house approximately 0.5 *
miles to your right. This was the location of the Nalle *
house, where Maj. Gen. Pope established his headquarters at 7 *
p.m. as the battle neared its conclusion. The Nalle house *
was also used as a hospital by the Federal forces.

Continue along route 692 across highway 15, where the *
road becomes gravel covered. The divisions under Brig. Gen. *
Williams and Brig. Gen. Augur marched along this road before *
deploying into battle positions further south.

After travelling 0.8 miles past the highway 15-route 692 *
intersection, you will come upon route 617 on the left. This *
location marks the approximate position of the Confederate *
forces’ furthest advance northward as they pursued the *
retreating Federal forces.
REPORT OF BRIGADIER GENERAL JAMES B. RICKETTS

Brigadier General James B. Ricketts, who commanded a division in McDowell's corps, described his division's role in support of Banks' corps at the battle of Cedar Mountain.

....On Friday, the 8th instant, the division was ordered from camp north of Culpeper, and took position on the Orange road, near its junction with the road leading to Stevensburg, and remained there until ordered forward about 5 p.m. on the 9th, reaching the field about 7 o'clock. The division was immediately directed to relieve the right of General Banks' corps [William's division], which was done by forming line of battle....

This arrangement was being rapidly completed when the enemy advanced a battery near a point of woods to our left in close range and opened a brisk fire, followed by discharges of infantry. Hall's battery had formed, Thompson's came into action while receiving the enemy's fire, and both replied with such good effect as to cause the withdrawal of the enemy, leaving us in undisturbed possession of the field for the night....
STOP #1--CEDAR RUN BAPTIST CHURCH

******************************************************************************
* After passing route 617, proceed southward on *
* route 692 for another 0.3 miles. On the right is the *
* Cedar Run Baptist Church, built in 1830. Turn right *
* and park in the church’s parking lot. *
*
* The distance between the start and stop #1 *
* is 3.4 miles. *
******************************************************************************

On the left side of the entrance to the parking area is a barbed wire fence. Approach the fence. From this position, observe the low ground to the immediate front. This low ground traces the route of the north fork of Cedar Run. The Federal forces established their original battle positions along Cedar Run to the right and left of the Orange-Culpeper road. They placed their artillery along the ridge beyond Cedar Run.

Brig. Gen. Williams deployed his division to the right of the Orange-Culpeper road. He placed Crawford’s brigade between the road and what is now highway 15 to the right. Further right beyond highway 15, he deployed Gordon’s brigade. Brig. Gen. Gordon established his headquarters at the Brown house located on the high ground to the right. The Brown house later served as a hospital for Federal soldiers.

Turning now to the left side of the Orange-Culpeper road, Brig. Gen. Augur deployed his division, extending from the road for three fourths of a mile along Cedar Run. His brigades under Generals Geary, Prince and Greene, crossed from the northern to the southern bank of Cedar Run and took positions along the low ground.

While at the Cedar Run Baptist Church, you may wish to view the grave of J. J. Freeman, a Confederate soldier in the Virginia cavalry.
REPORT OF BRIGADIER GENERAL ALPHEUS S. WILLIAMS

Brigadier General Alpheus S. Williams, who commanded Major General Banks' First Division, described his forces' actions across the wheat field against the Confederate forces.

...With Gordon's brigade I reached Culpeper about midnight on the 8th instant, and on the following morning received orders to move to the front without trains, and unite my division in the position taken up by General Crawford the previous evening. I arrived on the ground about 12 m., at the moment that the enemy opened with his artillery, which was speedily silenced...From this time to 3 o'clock p.m. there was very little demonstration on the part of the enemy, except some cavalry movements...and an occasional interchange of shots with the cavalry under Brigadier-General Bayard.

In the meantime Gordon's brigade had...taken a strong, elevated position on our extreme right, from which, through the open field, any movement of the enemy in that direction could be observed and checked. The Major-General [Banks] commanding the corps also came up and assumed command...General Augur's division, taking up position on the left of the main road...

...my division occupied nearly a continuous line along the bottom-land of Cedar Run, running from the road to the
elevated ground spoken of as the position of Gordon's brigade, a distance of from 800 to 1,000 yards. A densely wooded ridge in front masked the whole line from observation, and the entire division lay almost without loss during the heavy cannonade which preceded the attack....

About 5 o'clock, by direction of the major-general commanding the corps, I ordered Crawford's brigade to occupy the woods in front, preparatory to a movement which it was thought might relieve the left wing, severely pressed by the enemy, especially by a heavy cross-fire of artillery....Five companies of Third Wisconsin, deployed as skirmishers, were...attached to General Crawford's command for this advance. Gordon's brigade was held in the original position to observe the right flank...as well as to be in readiness to re-inforce Crawford's brigade in case of necessity....

At this time this brigade [Crawford's] occupied the interior line of the strip of woods in front of its original position. A field, varying from 250 to 500 yards in width, partly wheat stubble and partly scrub-oak underbrush, lay between it and the next strip of woods. In moving across this field [Crawford's forces] were received by a terrific fire of musketry both from the underbrush, from the wheat field, and from the woods. The Third Wisconsin especially fell under a partial flank fire from the underbrush and woods, which swept its right companies with great destruction....The enemy was driven out of the open field...and some distance into the woods, where, being
strongly re-inforced, their fire became overwhelming....A combat more persistent or heroic can scarcely be found in the history of the war; but men of even this unequaled heroism could not withstand the overwhelming numbers of the enemy, especially when left without the encouragement and direction of officers.

While the regiments were thus engaged, the Tenth Maine [Crawford's remaining uncommitted regiment], had advanced across the fields nearer the road, and engaged the enemy with great vigor....Anticipating the necessity of using Gordon's brigade in support of Crawford's, and yet reluctant to move it from its strong and most important position until the necessity was apparent, I had arranged with General Gordon a signal for his advance....

This signal was given....General Gordon put his brigade in movement at double-quick as soon as the order was communicated....

As Gordon's brigade reached the interior edge of the first wood it was received by a tremendous fire of the enemy from the opposite woods and from the undergrowth to the right and front. It was evident that the enemy had been strongly re-inforced, and greatly outnumbered us. The brigade, however, firmly maintained its position and checked the farther advance of the enemy, with a terrible loss, however, in officers and men....Satisfied that it would be impossible to hold, especially after dark, our advanced position, which was exposed to be outflanked by the greatly superior numbers of the enemy....I ordered the brigades to withdraw.
It was already dusk. General Gordon brought off the remnant of his brigade, and took up his original position, which he held until relieved by General Ricketts' division. General Crawford's brigade, having lost in three regiments every company officer, necessarily withdrew in broken ranks....

I enclose herewith a list of casualties in the division...showing a loss of 78 officers and 1,144 enlisted men, nearly one-third of the number engaged....

Upon reoccupying the field of battle it was found necessary from the intense heat to hurry the burials, and most of the dead were interred by details of men who did not know or could not recognize them....
LETTER OF BRIGADIER GENERAL ALPHEUS S. WILLIAMS

In this letter to his daughter, Brigadier general Alpheus S. Williams provides a more personal perspective of the battle of Cedar Mountain and criticizes the Union leadership.

Culpeper, Aug. 17, 1862.

My Darling Daughter:

....We came up here from Washington Court House in a two days' march, dusty and hot in the extreme. Being in the rear, I did not reach this place till after midnight on the night of the 8th (day before the battle) and as I was obliged to see my divisions in camp, it was after 2 o'clock before I got to sleep in a small room of a small toll-house outside of town. There were a dozen or so of us jammed into one room.

At 10 o'clock the next morning news came that the enemy was advancing in force upon one of my brigades [Crawford's] which had moved the night before six miles or so to the front. We left everything standing and moved off to their support. We found the brigade just beyond a little stream called Cedar Run and within a mile of a mountain [Cedar] whose northern side slopes gradually up into a considerable elevation. The country was much wooded, with intervening strips of cultivated land. The position was a bad one and I immediately wrote back to Gen. Banks to that effect. He came up, however, soon afterwards, about the time my second
brigade (Goodwin's) [Gordon's], which I had gone ahead of, arrived. The enemy had opened with his cannon the moment I arrived, but was soon silenced by ours. From this to 3 o'clock, there was no firing. After my brigades were put in position, our cook got us up a good lunch of coffee, ham, etc., and I invited many field officers of my old brigade [Crawford's] to join me. After lunching, we all lay down under a shade [tree] and talked over the events of the ten months we had been together, and everybody seemed as unconcerned and careless as if he was on the lawn of a watering place instead of the front of a vastly superior enemy. Col. Donnelly of the 28th New York, a great joker and full of humor, was in excellent spirits and cracked his jokes as joyously as ever.

Sorrow and misfortune seemed far away and yet of all the field officers of these three regiments (mine) not one, five hours afterwards, was unhurt. Everyone was either killed or wounded....

The 10th Maine, a new regiment in this brigade [Crawford's], was almost as badly cut up. In Goodwin's [Crawford's] brigade the loss was not so great, but in the 2nd Massachusetts, a regiment whose officers are of the Boston elite, four captains were killed outright, all of them young men of great fortunes and of the highest standing. The major was also wounded. Lt. Col. Crane of the 3rd Wisconsin was killed. He was a most excellent man and very popular. Out of the 3,400 infantry of my division at least 1000 were
killed, wounded, or missing, but few missing. This does not include the slightly wounded who returned to duty.

The battle was opened by artillery about 3 o’clock. At 5, I had placed my brigade [Crawford’s] in the woods and orders were sent to push through and if possible take a battery which was doing great mischief to our left (Augur’s division). It was in this effort to pass the open ground [wheat field], which was successfully accomplished, and in the woods beyond where they had concealed their reserves [Hill’s division], that we suffered so severely. For two hours the volleys of infantry were incessant and the roar of artillery seemed hushed in the din of small arms. By the aid of the 2nd (Gordon’s) Brigade we held on till dark, though it was every moment apparent that we were greatly outnumbered and exposed to flank movements. We then slowly withdrew to our old position, wondering what had become of the 12 or 15,000 of our troops (Rickett’s and part of Sigel’s corps) which we had passed in the morning on our way out, not over four miles from the battlefield. If they had arrived an hour before sundown we should have thrashed Jackson badly and taken a host of his artillery. As it was, they came up sometime after dark and took up a position that greatly relieved us.

We had, however, several instances of tremendous cannonading and the Rebels tried once seriously to force our lines. I came very near being caught in it....a spirited fire of infantry was opened upon us. Fortunately we were in a small hollow and the balls passed over us. There was,
however, a great stampede of officers and dragoons. Just behind us Gens. Pope and Banks were sitting dismounted with a good many staff officers and escorts. This was a hurry ing time with them and altogether the skedaddle became laughable in spite of its danger.....

....The Rebels almost immediately opened with a heavy fire of artillery to which two of our batteries (twelve pieces) on the flank promptly responded. It was a grand sight, especially as our batteries were well served and knocked the Rebels to pieces rapidly. Finding the Rebel shells passed far over me, I stood on a little knoll and enjoyed the sight vastly. It was a flaming pyrotechnic display....They didn't stay long after our guns got the range and quiet reigned the rest of the night.

It was a glorious moonlight, too, but what with fatigue and excitement and extreme thirst I can't say I was in the best frame [of mind] to enjoy it.....So after riding with Gen. Banks to the river after water, I picked up a bundle of wheat or rye straw, took my horse to a fence near the front, unbridled him, tied the halter about my arm, and went to sleep while he munched straw.

After an hour or so I woke up.... I was assured by Gen. Pope it [the battle] would be [renewed] by sunrise. I wish he had kept his promise, for I feel confident we should have punished them badly. I found, too, that my troops had gone to the rear and that all the other troops had been massed in column of brigades. I had heard the rumbling of vehicles,
which I dreamed or imagined to be ambulances with wounded, but which was the moving of artillery. Everything was solemnly still except this rumbling and an occasional suppressed tone of command.

....Gen. Banks was run against by a horse in the skedaddle and on the following day turned over the command to me and went into town. I have since been incessantly at work until after midnight....The applications I receive from all sources for everything, for telegraph, transportation, protection, etc., and the thousand reports and returns, the looking after the broken troops of two divisions, the numberless papers to be endorsed and forwarded, the hundreds of matters to be examined and approved, you cannot imagine.

We have a new general [Pope], too, who has new rules, with a new staff from the bureau that make all the trouble and vexation possible. I pray for Gen. Banks to get well....

I was ordered into town on Wednesday last, and have command of all the troops here and about. How long we shall stay here I can't guess. A good many troops are in advance, but not as many, I fear, as the Rebels can bring up from Richmond. I hope to see the day we shall meet them with at least equal numbers, and on fair grounds. But our generals seem more ambitious of personal glory [than] of their country’s gain, at least some of them....

As ever, Your Affectionate Father,

A.S.W. 5
REPORT OF BRIGADIER GENERAL CHRISTOPHER C. AUGUR

Brigadier General Christopher C. Augur, who commanded Major General Banks' Second Division, described his forces' actions in the vicinity of the corn field.

....My division consisted of Generals Geary's, Prince's, and Greene's brigades....The number of enlisted men of the division actually on the field was therefore about 3,013.

As my division came upon the field I was directed to place it on the left of Crawford's brigade and toward Cedar Mountain. Subsequently Crawford's brigade joined his division on the right of the line, and I was directed to move my command to place it in two lines, with its right resting on the road leading to Orange Court-House and its left extending in the direction of Cedar Mountain....The ground from this position to the front was open, with an occasional corn field and clumps of underbrush, and gradually rising for nearly a mile. On the right of the Orange road was a forest, extending perhaps for a quarter of a mile along the road, and behind which was massed the infantry of the enemy's left. On the left was Cedar Mountain, so that in advancing my division would pass between the two.

While the infantry of Williams' division on our right advanced and became engaged I was ordered to cause my batteries in front to cease firing and to advance my
infantry....I caused Geary's brigade to advance, which it did steadily and quickly, and when within range opened a regular and well-directed fire upon the enemy. I then caused Prince's brigade to advance in like manner upon the left, which it did under its gallant leader handsomely and in good order, and when in position opened its fire.

Meantime the enemy had gotten a battery and a body of infantry in position on our left...and were in a position to annoy us extremely....As our front lines became weakened by their losses I caused the second lines to advance, which they did in good order.

....my horse was shot, and a moment after I was wounded myself and rendered unable to keep the field.
REPORT OF CAPTAIN JOSEPH M. Knap

Captain Joseph M. Knap, who commanded a battery of artillery in Augur's division, provides a glimpse of the artillery's role at the battle of Cedar Mountain.

On Friday, 8th instant, I was ordered by General Crawford, commanding brigade at Culpeper, to move at 4 p.m. in advance of his brigade with four guns. We took a position on an eminence to the left of the Orange road, some 400 yards beyond Cedar Run, and remained there all night, nothing occurring until 12 m. on Saturday, the 9th instant.

At the time above mentioned the enemy opened upon our advance cavalry with two batteries....A few shots from my battery...soon silenced the enemy's guns....

At 1.30 p.m. General Geary's brigade arrived and took position on my left....

At 2.30 p.m. the enemy opened with two batteries, about a mile distant, upon our position, and in less than twenty minutes four additional batteries were unmasked, all apparently concentrating their fire on our artillery. The enemy's line of batteries extended in a crescent shape for about 2. miles on elevated ground, and at distances from our batteries varying from 1,500 to 2,500 yards. A continual fire from both sides was kept up, the enemy occasionally changing the position of their batteries, until 5.30 p.m.,
when our infantry [Crawford] moved forward on the right, charging upon and silencing the two batteries on the enemy’s left, which had produced the most effect upon our artillery. We were then ordered to devote our attention to the enemy’s right flank, and fire on their infantry whenever it was practicable.

The enemy’s artillery ceased firing about dusk, when I was ordered...to fall back and take another position, my ammunition, with the exception of cannister, having been expended....Owing to the nature of the ground I was unable to shift my position materially during the entire engagement. I was forced to leave two caissons on the field, empty and disabled, one of which has been recovered.

One gun was disabled late in the action by a cannon shot, but was brought off the field. No ammunition fell into the enemy’s hands.

....The amount of shell expended by my battery (six 10-pounder Parrots) was 980....
STOP #2—CORN FIELD

*************************************************
* Return to route 692 and proceed southward for 0.5 *
* miles to route 649. This is the location where Brig. *
* Gen. Banks established his corps headquarters. At the *
* time of the battle, the old Orange-Culpepper road *
* continued southward from this point. *
* *
* Turn left on route 649 and continue for 0.2 miles, *
* where a dirt farm road is located on the right. Turn *
* onto the side of the farm road and stop. *
* *
* The distance from stop #1 to stop #2 is 0.7 miles. *
*************************************************

Immediately to the front is the Inskeep farm house. Most of the land in this area is owned by the Inskeepers. The fields which extend to the front and right are the site of the corn field which existed at the time of the battle.

From his headquarters which you just passed, Gen. Banks exerted very limited control over his forces. He could not even observe Williams' division on the right and could only partially observe Augur's brigades to his left.

Federal forces under Gen. Augur, advanced southward from their positions at Cedar Run, crossed the road to the immediate rear (route 649), and engaged the Confederate forces under Brig. Gen. Thomas, Brig. Gen. Early, and Col. Taliaferro, in the area of the corn field. These Confederate forces were initially deployed along the ridge to your front and then, along a branch of the southern fork of Cedar Run, which is located along the low ground to the left of the Inskeep farm house.

To the left front is Cedar Mountain, where Maj. Gen. Ewell with the brigades of Col. Forney and Brig. Gen. Trimble, was located approximately 200 feet up the northwestern slope of the mountain. From this point, Ewell placed artillery fire on the advancing Federal forces and then pursued Augur's division as it retreated.

The other scene of major action, the wheat field, is located in the vicinity of the wooded area approximately three fourths of a mile to the right and front. That field is not visible from this position.
REPORT OF BRIGADIER GENERAL JOHN W. GEARY

Brigadier General John W. Geary, who commanded a brigade in Augur's division, described his brigade's role in the battle of Cedar Mountain, particularly with respect to the action at the corn field.

...At about 8 a.m. August 9 the brigade took up the line of march from camp...taking the road toward Orange Court-House. The extreme heat of the day caused many cases of sunstroke, after a march of 5 or 6 miles the road to each side was full of men, who had been compelled to fall out from sheer exhaustion, and many cases of sunstroke terminated fatally.

...the brigade...proceeded on a distance of about 2 miles, where we found the advance troops taking position in line of battle near and beyond Cedar Creek. I immediately put my brigade in line....This position was taken about 2 p.m.

Firing was commenced in a very short time by the rebel batteries and answered immediately....We remained in this position until about 3.30 p.m., when we changed position by the right flank to support the right center battery....We remained in this position about one hour, when we received orders to advance. We moved forward about 200 yards and were ordered to halt and await further orders. While here...we were
exposed to a terrible cross-fire from the enemy’s batteries and lost several men killed and wounded. We remained in this position about one hour, and were ordered forward to support a line of skirmishers...who were falling back under a galling fire of the enemy, then advancing in force. We were soon in range of their infantry and became hotly engaged. The Seventh and Sixty-sixth Ohio, under the destructive fire of at least five times their number, were being terribly cut up, but retained their ground, closing up their decimated ranks, and still progressing toward the enemy....At this period a ball struck me on the ankle, and almost at the same instant a ball passed through my left arm. I was compelled to leave the field....
REPORT OF BRIGADIER GENERAL HENRY PRINCE

Brigadier General Henry Prince, who commanded a brigade in Augur's division, described his brigade's role in the battle of Cedar Mountain, particularly with respect to the action at the corn field.

....My command was the Second Brigade of the Second Division, Second Army Corps, Army of Virginia....

We marched from Culpeper Court-House before noon of the date referred to [August 9th] in the division column, following the First Brigade and taking the main road southward....it was the warmest day of the season. Six miles from Culpeper a strip of woodland, stretching across the road and reaching some distance from it on either side, furnished a shade, in which the troops rested and obtained water. During the halt for these purposes they were informed that the brigade was about to leave the road for the purpose of meeting the enemy....After passing through the wood and filing to the left we followed down a small run [Cedar Run] three-fourths of a mile, crossed it, and halted in its hollow to wait for orders.

....In a few minutes I received from division headquarters the following orders nearly simultaneously: To detach the battalion of the Eight and Twelfth Infantry...to relieve the battery on the hill near by; to form
the...brigade with two lines, and place it on the left of Geary's brigade....for several hours they faced the cannonade which ensued with but few casualties....

At the time of the partial suspension of the cannonade, seeing Geary's brigade advancing, I began a cautious advance of my first line...and soon after receiving the order from division headquarters to "Move forward," we straightened up and marched in line at the ordinary pace directly for the enemy. In advancing we passed over a small ridge, a ditch, fences, a road [route 649] lying parallel to our position, and then a field of very high corn, beyond which the ground was open and ascending. While descending the slope of the ridge the line received the fire of the enemy without any disconcertion....Continuing to advance amidst the whistle of a storm of bullets, the alignment was of course interrupted in crossing the fences....In the corn field, though, but few men could see each other....On the whole, the advance was as good as it would have been over the same ground on drill.

The line, having reached the outer edge of the corn field was halted....The fire of the enemy at the time of halting converged from full thirty degrees to our left, where it was nearest to us along the front. While crossing the corn field the order was communicated to me from division headquarters to move forward my whole force. I now brought up the second line....[The first line] hearing the volley in its rear [from the second line] supposed itself fired into, and retired in consequence in disorder, passing the right of the second line.....
The second line uniformly held its own. Bearing myself generally toward its left to look for any change in the position of the enemy until I discovered that daylight was fading I then went to the right, observing as I went the perfect order and enthusiasm of our troops, who were loading and firing deliberately amidst the unabated heat of the enemy's fire. On approaching the right I perceived that the firing in the other brigades had ceased, which forcibly impressed upon me the necessity of learning immediately something of the day.... I determined to go back to the ridge, where I might see the field or communicate with others .... While walking my horse in the dense corn, where the ground was heavy, my bridle was seized [by Taliaferro's infantry], and I perceived that I was in the midst of enemies before otherwise discovering any person to be there. The time was about 7.45—about the time that the battery ceased firing. The fact is, the right of my advanced second line was already turned by [Taliaferro's] troops that were noiselessly occupying the corn field, they being held in check by my first line, which had rallied in the road....

The conduct of the brigade, considering its advanced position and severe combat, was highly creditable to it. This will be fully appreciated by the table of casualties ... showing a loss of 33 per cent. of the number for duty....
STOP #3--WHEAT FIELD, NORTH SIDE

*******************************************************************************
* Now return to highway 15, exiting the Inskeep farm *
* road and turning left onto route 649 for 0.5 miles. *
* Turn left on highway 15 and proceed 0.4 miles to *
* route 642 (gravel covered road). Turn right on route *
* 642, proceed for 0.3 miles, and stop at the right side *
* when reaching a pond to the left of the road. *
* *
* Shortly after turning on to route 642, you will *
* pass a wooded road cut. This is a portion of the *
* of the remains of the old Orange-Culpeper road that *
* existed at the time of the battle. It was along this *
* section of the old road that Major Falls led his valiant *
* cavalry charge before retreating through the wheat field.* *
* *
* The distance from stop #2 to stop #3 is 1.2 miles. *
*******************************************************************************

Face the pond, which is adjacent to the left side of the road. The fence to the immediate front existed at the time of the battle; the road was constructed after the battle. Beyond the pond is the Wiseman farm house. Wiseman owns most of the land in this area of the battlefield.

To the front and right (the open area) is the location of the wheat field, where Brig. Gen. Williams' division advanced and engaged the brigades under Maj. Gen. Winder. The original woods to the front and right still remain as when the battle took place; however, the woods to the rear have been severely thinned.

Here, Brig. Gen. Crawford attacked Lt. Col. Garnett. With his right flank along the ridge to the right, he advanced from the edge of the woods at the rear of the road and crossed the wheat field to where Garnett was located to the left of the Wiseman farm house. From this position, Crawford was completely separated from the action at the corn field, was unaware of the enemy's strength beyond the ridge ahead of him, and was unable to maintain contact with his division commander. Afterwards, Brig. Gen. Gordon's advance was also stopped by the Confederate forces at the edge of these same woods. The Tenth Maine Regiment, operating independently, advanced partially through the wheat field before being repulsed by Winder's Confederate forces. A monument dedicated to the Tenth Maine Regiment has been erected approximately 100 yards to the left rear (north of
route 642) at the edge of a farmers field and a wooded area.
REPORT OF BRIGADIER GENERAL SAMUEL W. CRAWFORD

Brigadier General Samuel W. Crawford, who commanded a brigade in William's division, described his brigade's role in the battle of Cedar Mountain, particularly with respect to the action at the wheat field.

...At noon on Friday, the 8th instant, while encamped with my command at Culpeper Court-House, I received an order from the major-general [Pope] commanding the Army of Virginia to immediately proceed to the support of Brigadier-General Bayard, whose small force was retiring before the enemy....

My brigade was soon under arms and on the march, and passing through Culpeper took the road leading toward Orange Court-House. By 4 o'clock in the afternoon I came up with General Bayard's force between Colvin's Tavern and a small stream, known as Cedar Run, and which crosses the road in advance of a belt of woods running east and west. Passing to the front I discovered the enemy's pickets, and beyond...a portion of his cavalry.

...I brought up my artillery, drawing up the infantry regiments in close supporting distance on the low ground of the run, completely concealed from the view of the enemy....The cavalry were ordered to the front and flank to watch the enemy. Strong pickets were thrown out within a short distance of those of the enemy, and the command...
bivouacked for the night.

Early nexty morning General Bayard reported to me that the enemy were advancing. The command were immediately under arms....

At 11 o'clock the enemy, being established upon the slope of Cedar Mountain at the skirt of the timber near the base on our left, opened fire upon our cavalry....I directed Captain Knapp [an artillery battery commander] to reply, which he did so effectually, that at the third shell from his guns the enemy's battery ceased to fire....

An order now reached me from the major-general commanding the Army of Virginia directing me to resist the advance of the enemy, and that General Banks was advancing to my support....The artillery fire was kept up occasionally at long range for some time, when at 12 o'clock...General Williams arrived on the field with Gordon's brigade.

...Between 1 and 2 o'clock Major-General Banks arrived upon the field with the division of Augur and assumed command.

I reported to General Williams my position, and soon after received an order to move my entire brigade upon the right of the road, that position having been assigned to Williams' division. The brigade of Brigadier-General Gordon was directed to occupy my right....

The enemy at this moment opened with all his batteries, one of which he had established in an open field on our left....Just at this period I received an order from the major-general commanding the corps to advance my brigade through the woods and prepare to move upon the left flank of
the enemy, and that the movement would be supported by the brigade under Brigadier-General Gordon.

...I formed my regiments into line of battle directly opposite the enemy's left. A thick belt of woods skirted an open wheat stubble field on three sides; a road running across formed the fourth. To the right a thick undergrowth of scrub oak and bushes covered the space. In front of the line the field sloped downward toward the woods directly opposite, the point of which terminated at the road.

...The assistant adjutant-general of the general commanding the division, came up and urged the movement at once as the decisive one of the day. An order was given by him also to Colonel Ruger, commanding the Third Wisconsin Regiment, to join his command to mine and move with it upon the enemy.

My regiments were immediately formed....The Tenth Maine was advanced through the woods on my extreme left, under the immediate direction of a staff officer of the major-general commanding the corps, and was some distance from the other regiments. I then gave the order to advance to the edge of the woods, to fix bayonets, and to charge upon the enemy's position. Steadily in line my command advanced, crossed the fence which skirted the woods, and with one loud cheer charged across the open space in the face of a fatal and murderous fire from the masses of the enemy's infantry, who lay concealed in the bushes and woods on our front and flank. Onward these regiments charged, driving the enemy's infantry back and through the woods beyond...and engaged in a hand-to-
hand fight with vastly superior numbers of the enemy...but the reserves of the enemy were at once brought up and thrown upon their broken ranks. Their field officers [from Crawford's attacking regiments] had all been killed, wounded, or taken prisoners, the support I looked for [from Gordon's brigade] did not arrive, and my gallant men, broken, decimated by that fearful fire, that unequal contest, fell back again across the space, leaving most of their number upon the field.

The slaughter was fearful. The field officers of the regiments which had driven the enemy back were killed, wounded, or prisoners. Most of the company officers had fallen by the side of their men, and the color guards had been shot down in detail as they attempted to sustain and carry forward the colors of their regiment. The Wisconsin regiment which advanced on my right, unable to sustain the terrible fire from the bushes and woods, retired to the woods in rear, where it was reformed some distance beyond and brought again into action. The Tenth Maine Regiment of my brigade, acting under direct orders from the commanding general, through one of his staff, advanced to the middle of the open space, and sustained a most severe and galling fire from the concealed enemy beyond.

....Out of 88 officers and 1,679 men taken by me into action 56 officers and 811 men are killed, wounded, and prisoners....

I remained upon the battle-field until dark, directing
the removal of the wounded, when I returned and reported to
the general commanding, who directed me to move with the
remnant of my command to the rear of the woods on Cedar Run,
at the center of our position....I then reformed my regiments
in the neighborhood of Colvin's Tavern, north of the battle-
field.... 10
MEMOIRS OF BRIGADIER GENERAL GEORGE A. GORDON

Brigadier General George A. Gordon, who commanded a brigade in William's division, described his brigade's role in the battle of Cedar Mountain, particularly with respect to the action at the wheat field.

...It was about half-past five o'clock in the afternoon, when General Williams, my division commander, sent me an order to observe him, and when he made a signal by waving his handkerchief, to throw forward my whole command to support Crawford....

It was now a little before six o'clock....A thick smoke curling through the tree-tops, as it rose in clouds from corn and wheat fields, marked the place to which we were ordered, --the place where the narrow valley was strewn with dead. "Double-quick!" I gave the order, and my brigade responded. Down the slope from Brown's house (the little cottage) at a run, through the marshy land at its base, over Cedar Creek to the steep hill and up its sides into the woods, I pressed my troops....At the edge of the woods I rallied and gathered up...part of the broken fragment of Crawford's brigade, a second time to be baptized in the fiery flood of Cedar Mountain. So we went until we had penetrated the woods, and stood in line of battle on the very edge of the wheat field. We had come at the topmost speed to support Crawford, but his
whole line had melted away. We had come to sustain, but we remained alone to bear the brunt of the fight, ourselves unsupported....

When I gained the timber I looked for Crawford's regiments, but so broken had they been by their repulse that I could find, of all, only what remained of the six Wisconsin companies....The slaughter had indeed been fearful....

My line of battle was quickly formed....From the edge of the wood we looked across the wheat-field, not over four hundred yards, at the long lines of the enemy, who, having now advanced into clear ground, opened upon us a heavy fire....

In the woods which Jackson now directed his attack, nothing but three small regiments was left to confront not less than five entire brigades of the enemy....

This was the situation, as we alone of all Banks' corps, when the light was growing dim on that fatal August night, opened fire on the long lines of Archer's brigade, as his troops, disdaining cover, stood boldly out amid the wheat stacks in front of the timber. As may be imagined, our position was an exposed one....

Now, in front and on flank, full and fierce the storm tore through and around us. The crash was terrific; it was indescribable....I am speaking of that terrible, that dreadful and remorseless fire, that came like a whirlwind, and licked up with its fiery blast more lives than were lost to...my brigade in any battle of the war. I recall the name of one who in the midst of all this carnage, in the very face
and front of the enemy's fire, and almost within the reach of his guns, himself wounded, placed his own body and his own frail life between his friend and the enemy....

Flesh and blood could stand no longer; the last attack had been made, and now we, too, were driven the last from the field....

It was half-past six o'clock in the evening when, in company of from thirty to fifty men...whom I had rallied, I found myself out of the timber on its edge, at the foot of the hill up which we had scrambled, and not three hundred yards from the fatal field....I directed my shattered and broken command towards the point from whence, scarce an hour before, we had started. There we arrived after dark, to sink down exhausted upon the ground.

But what a change since our departure! The cottage, the yard, the grounds around were filled with our dead and dying....
REPORT OF MAJOR RICHARD I. FALLS

Major Richard I. Falls, who commanded the First Battalion, First Pennsylvania Cavalry, described his ill-fated cavalry charge on the Confederate forces.

...At about 5 o'clock p.m. I was directed by Brigadier-General Bayard to charge through the enemy's lines at a point where they were supposed to be forming for a charge on our batteries....

After getting in front of the point designated, and being in column of fours, I immediately formed squadron, my command being already under fire. I moved forward at a rapid gait until within fifty yards of the enemy's lines,...when I gave the command, "Charge," when, with loud and terrific cheering, my command charged through the enemy's lines, cutting and running down and scattering them in every direction, causing sad havoc and discomfiture in their ranks....After charging back and reforming, I found my command reduced from 164...to that of 71, the remainder having been killed, wounded, or otherwise placed [out of combat] by their horses falling over other killed or wounded, our little band thus proving themselves true sons of the old Keystone State.
STOP #4--WHEAT FIELD, SOUTH SIDE

**************************************************************************************************************************************************************************
* Once again, return to highway 15 by turning *
* around at the nearest suitable location. Upon reaching *
* highway 15, turn right and proceed 0.3 miles to route *
* 657 (gravel covered road). Turn right on route 657 and *
* after travelling 0.2 miles, park on the right side of *
* the road and proceed to the Cedar Mountain Memorial. *
* *
* The distance from stop #3 to stop #4 is 0.8 miles. *
**************************************************************************************************************************************************************************

After viewing the Cedar Mountain memorial, which marks the site where Maj. Gen. Winder was mortally wounded, note the farmhouse to the right front. This is the Wiseman farm house, which is located on the south side of the wheat field where Brig. Gen. Crawford engaged Maj. Gen. Winder's division. This is also the location where Maj. Gen. Jackson established his headquarters.

The road to the left that heads in a southerly direction is the continuation of the old Orange-Culpeper road (route 657). At the time of the battle, this road also continued northward. Confederate forces advanced northward along the road on their march from Gordonsville. Upon reaching this position, Winder's division deployed to the left along the edge of the wheat field, where it confronted Brig. Gen. Williams' division on the other side of the field. Following Winder, Maj. Gen. Ewell's division deployed to the right towards the base of Cedar Mountain, where it faced Brig. Gen. Augur's division. Lastly, Maj. Gen. Hill deployed his division on both sides of the road to reinforce both Winder and Ewell.
REPORT OF BRIGADIER GENERAL WILLIAM B. TALIAFERRO

Brigadier General William B. Taliaferro, who initially commanded a brigade in Winder's division and later commanded the division after Winder was mortally wounded, described the division's role in the battle of Cedar Mountain, particularly with respect to the action at the wheat field and the corn field.

...This division was ordered to attack the enemy's right, while the division of General Ewell was ordered to attack him upon the left. On my riding to the front I perceived the enemy's cavalry drawn up on the range of hills near Cedar Run, with a line of vedettes in front, while the fall of the hills in rear and the woods beyond evidently concealed their batteries and infantry. A corn field in front of this position also concealed the movements of the enemy and the undulations of the country made reconnaissances very difficult.

The field batteries of General Ewell were now shelling the enemy, when General Winder ordered the division forward along the turnpike to a point at which the woods on the right of the road terminated. Beyond this point the woods on the left extended to a wheat field, beyond which a dense wood again appeared. On the right of the road from the point of termination of the wood an extensive bare field stretched to the left to a considerable distance and to the front to a
corn field. A brigade under General Early, protected by the fall of the hills, occupied the right of this field in line of battle, directly fronting the general line of the enemy, as far as we could make it out.

General Winder now ordered the Second Brigade [Garnett’s]...to move forward to the left under cover of the woods to the wheat field, and to extend back to the left along the skirt of the woods. He then ordered some pieces of artillery...to the point where the bare field commenced, and ordered the Third Brigade, under my command, to move along up parallel to the road in rear of the Second Brigade. The brigade was then faced to the road. The First Brigade [Ronald’s]...was ordered, as I was informed, to move up as a reserve. While these dispositions were being made the troops were subjected to a heavy discharge of shell and shot from the enemy’s artillery, thrown mostly at random into the woods. The effect of our batteries from the point of woods and from a position subsequently taken in the open field to the right was very great, to a great extent silencing the enemy’s guns. After the pieces had been placed in battery at the corner of the woods, and had opened some fifteen minutes on the enemy, I returned to my brigade, a short distance back in the woods and out of sight of the enemy, to await General Winder’s orders. I...was informed a short time afterward that he had been struck by a shell and mortally wounded.

I now assumed command of this division....I at once rode to the front to acquaint myself with the position of the
Second Brigade, and reconnoitered the enemy's position from the wheat field....I could discover no evidences of the enemy in front, but could discover them in force on the right of that position in the corn field, somewhat concealed from the view of our troops by the undulations of the country.

I now returned to the position occupied by our batteries, when I was overtaken by an officer, who reported that the enemy were showing themselves in front of the position I had just left and were advancing. I at once ordered the Tenth Virginia Regiment to be detached...and sent forward to re-enforce the First Virginia Battalion, and sent an order to Colonel Ronald to move his brigade...rapidly to support the Second Brigade. I now perceived the enemy advancing through the corn field, and directed Colonel Garnett to throw his right forward and drive them back, and ordered Colonel Taliaferro to move his brigade into the open field to the right and attack and drive back the enemy in the front....The Third Brigade advanced in fine style and the enemy gave way before the severity of its fire. At this moment I discovered that...the enemy had attacked the left wing of the Second Brigade and turned it, and that it was falling back in some disorder. This movement exposed also the left flank of the Third Brigade and caused it to fall back, but it was soon afterward brought back to its original position. At this critical moment the First Brigade, moved up and, with General Branch's brigade, of General Hill's division, encountered the enemy, confused by their severe
conflict with the Second Brigade, and drove them back with terrible slaughter. The Third Brigade now advanced to the brow of the hill overlooking the corn field and the Second Brigade to the edge of the woods, and drove the enemy in front of them from their positions in confusion. To cover his retreat the enemy's [Falls'] cavalry charged the Third Brigade, but they were met by such a storm of missiles that the whole column was turned, wheeled to the right, and before it could be wheeled off to the rear was forced to run the gauntlet of the other brigades and scattered in every direction with heavy loss. This was the last effort of the enemy to make a stand. They retreated and our troops pursued them, capturing a number of prisoners. This division crossed the corn field diagonally toward the woods on the road toward the railroad. Brigadier-General Prince, US Army, was made a prisoner, and surrendered to me as we were clearing this field, and his command...fled upon our approach with scarcely any opposition. We continued to push forward until we had driven the enemy some 3 miles and until the darkness rendered it impossible to distinguish our troops from those of the enemy...."
Lieutenant Colonel Thomas S. Garnett, who commanded a brigade in Winder's division, described his brigade's role in the battle of Cedar Mountain, particularly with respect to the action at the wheat field.

...By order of General Winder, commanding First Division, the Second Brigade was ordered about 3.30 p.m. to march to the front...to rest its right near a school-house in the vicinity of the battle-field. Remaining in this position until General Early's brigade had driven in the cavalry pickets, I received orders to move rapidly forward along the main road toward the enemy's position...the brigade was filed to the left in the woods, and proceeded along the slope of a hill parallel to the road until it had marched to a point where the road emerges from the woods into a field directly in front of the enemy's batteries. Here General Winder ordered me to file to the left along a by-road in the woods, and to follow it as far as I could under cover of the woods. On reaching this last position I was to place the brigade in line of battle and charge the nearest battery by a flank movement while our artillery engaged it in front. On reconnoitering the position of the battery a heavy body of infantry was discovered in its rear, and a long line of cavalry behind a fence covered with brush, on the left of the
battery, commanding perfectly the field the Second Brigade would necessarily cross in reaching its destination. I reported these facts immediately to General Winder...and received orders on his return to remain where I was for a few moments. This was the last order I received from General Winder....

General Taliaferro, now assuming command, ordered such a disposition of the Second Brigade as would afford some protection to the batteries on our right and some 400 yards to the rear....

At this juncture General Jackson and staff arrived, and I received orders from the general to look well to my left flank and to report at once to General Taliaferro for re-enforcements....the enemy had advanced rapidly, already engaging our right. With coolness and determination the regiments on the right delivered their fire, keeping a superior number of the enemy at bay. Firing now commenced on the left, and hastening to the position occupied by the First Virginia Battalion I discovered the enemy [Crawford's brigade] in heavy force rapidly advancing, not more than 50 yards from our front, bearing down upon us also from the left, delivering as they came a most galling fire. Unable to withstand this fire from the front and flank, the First Virginia Battalion gave way in confusion, and rendered abortive every effort of its corps of gallant officers to reform it. Finding our left turned, I...ordered a change of front to meet the enemy in this new direction; but...the movement could not be accomplished before the enemy had
commenced a fire in their rear, producing some confusion and disorder. The other regiments, all the while engaged in front, were also attacked in rear, now that the left flank was turned, producing much disorder in their ranks....Re-enforcements coming up, portions of different regiments were formed, and assisted in driving the enemy discomfited from the field.

The terrible loss in this brigade resulted from its left flank being turned, thereby subjecting it to a double fire....

It would be improper to close this report without calling the attention of the general to the acts of savage brutality perpetrated by the enemy upon our officers and men who fell into their hands temporarily as prisoners. Such fiendish barbarity is not to be found in the history of warfare among civilized nations....

14
REPORT OF COLONEL CHARLES A. RONALD

Colonel Charles A. Ronald, who commanded a brigade in Winder's division, described his brigade's role in the battle of Cedar Mountain, particularly with respect to the action at the wheat field.

....A little after 1 p.m. I was ordered to put the brigade in line of battle perpendicular to the road and move forward....I moved forward through the woods, but in a few minutes I was ordered to put the brigade in column of regiments, which order was executed promptly; but before advancing the column I was ordered to deploy the column and advance in line of battle, letting the right rest about 100 yards from the road...I moved forward through the woods under a heavy fire of spherical case and canister shot from the enemy's guns. Arriving at a fence that partly inclosed an open field I halted the brigade [temporarily]....I put the brigade in motion [again] and rode some 200 yards in advance in order to gain the top of the hill....Arriving at the top of the hill I observed the enemy [Crawford's brigade] about 300 yards distant advancing in line of battle, when I immediately rode back to the brigade, which had advanced to within 400 yards of the enemy and in view of each other. This brigade then opened fire upon the enemy, and having discharged several volleys, which seemed to confuse him, I
immediately ordered the brigade to charge, which order was promptly executed and with fine effect, the enemy falling back in great confusion, leaving many of his dead and wounded upon the field. Arriving at the woods in his retreat the enemy attempted to reform his line, which I determined to prevent by following him up; but at this point I was informed that the enemy had turned the left of the Second [Garnett's] Brigade...whereupon I immediately directed a change of front...which enabled me to engage this flank movement of the enemy; but General Branch's brigade coming up at this moment...General Branch opened a vigorous fire upon the enemy, which soon succeeded in driving him from his position. He was here compelled to pass through a large grain field in his retreat, which exposed his broken columns to a deadly cross-fire from Branch's and this brigade.

About sundown General Pender's...brigade appeared on the extreme left of the open field I first entered. He continued his march by the flank until his right reached the northeast corner of the field, when I sent Captain Fulton to inform him that the enemy were in the woods to his right. He then continued this march for some distance, and then put his brigade in the line of battle, his right resting on the left of the First Brigade, and then the whole line advanced in the direction of the main road. Very shortly after this connection was formed a short but very vigorous contest ensued, which succeeded in completely routing the enemy. It is proper here to state that the enemy engaged in the woods at this point is the same column whose reformation of line I
attempted to prevent when informed that the left flank of the Second Brigade had been turned. Here the enemy's loss was very heavy. This brigade pursued the now retreating foe until after dark, when I was ordered to halt and rest for the night. 15
REPORT OF BRIGADIER GENERAL L. O'B. BRANCH

Brigadier General L. O'B. Branch, who commanded a brigade in Hill's division, described his brigade's role in the battle of Cedar Mountain, particularly with respect to the action at the wheat field while supporting Winder's division.

....General Jackson was present in person to command our side. Ewell was ordered to take possession of a mountain [Cedar Mountain] on our right. General Jackson's own division, commanded by General Winder, was on the left. General Hill's division was placed behind General Jackson's to support it. The battle commenced and raged for a short time, when General Jackson came to me and told me his left [Garnett's brigade] was beaten and broken, and the enemy was turning him and he wished me to advance. I was already in line of battle and instantly gave the order "Forward, march." I had not gone 100 yards through the woods before we met the celebrated Stonewall Brigade [actually Garnett's brigade] utterly routed and fleeing as fast as they could run. After proceeding a short distance farther we met the enemy [Crawford's brigade] pursuing. My brigade opened upon them and quickly drove the enemy back from the woods into a large field [wheat field]. Following up to the edge of the field, I came in view of large bodies of the enemy, and having a very fine position, I opened upon them with great effect. The enemy's cavalry [Fall's cavalry] attempted to charge us
in two columns, but the fire soon broke them and sent them fleeing across the field in every direction. The infantry then retreated also. Advancing into the field, I halted near the middle of it, in doubt which direction to take. Just at that moment General Jackson came riding up from my rear alone. I reported my brigade as being solid and asked for orders. My men recognized him and raised a terrific shout as he rode along the line with his hat off. He evidently knew how to appreciate a brigade that had gone through a battle and was then following the retreating enemy without having broken its line of battle, and remained with me directing my movements until the pursuit ceased. We returned and slept on the battlefield among the dead and wounded....
Brigadier General William D. Pender, who commanded a brigade in Hill's division, described his brigade's role in the battle of Cedar Mountain, particularly with respect to the action at the wheat field while supporting Winder's division.

....I have the honor to state that...I formed my brigade on the left of General Archer's, on the left of the road going from Cedar Run to Culpeper, in the battle on the 9th instant. As he had moved forward before my line was complete, and as I had to move through thick woods, I found myself some distance to his left on coming into a field [wheat field], and consequently flanked to the right; but on receiving a request to go to the support of troops [Garnett's brigade] in front, which were being flanked on the left [by Crawford's brigade], faced about and moved to the left until I had reached the wood on the extreme left of our position, and then I moved to the front. This maneuvering placed my line obliquely to that of General Archer, and as we moved forward came together again, and from this we co-operated. However, before we had joined our troops, I met the enemy [Crawford's brigade], repulsing him with heavy loss in almost the first round. He made but slight resistance again during the evening....General Archer and myself advanced well to the front, and halted until we could feel our way with skirmishers in the wood on the opposite side of the Run. At this time we had gotten to the right of the wood. Here we received orders to halt, and remained until late, when we
were ordered to the road to follow in pursuit...
REPORT OF COLONEL S. CRUTCHFIELD

Colonel S. Crutchfield, who was the Chief of Artillery of the Confederate forces, describes the part taken by the artillery of his army corps in the battle of Cedar Mountain.

...The road [Orange-Culpeper road] on which we advanced debouched from a piece of woods [stop #4] upon the immediate battle-field, which was open and somewhat broken, a brook [south fork of Cedar Run] running across it and the prolongation of the road, and making a small angle with our general line of battle. The advance of our troops was the division of Brig. Gen. C. S. Winder, and its artillery became first engaged. The enemy's batteries occupied rising ground to the right and beyond the mouth of the road, while his infantry extended from these batteries toward our left. About 2 p.m. a gun placed at the mouth of the road by Maj. R. S. Andrews, commanding the artillery of General Winder's division, opened on the enemy (his cavalry skirmishers and outposts had been previously driven in by Brigadier-General Early's brigade, which was just to the right of this point). The reply was immediate, and from this time the enemy kept up a sharp fire at this point as one near which our troops and batteries must pass in taking position. I found that to the right and front some 250 yards were rises in the ground favorable for positions for artillery. I therefore directed
Major Andrews to move forward his rifled guns to these points. He moved out four rifled and one 12-pounder Napoleon....Their fire was directed against the enemy's batteries in order to protect the deployment of our infantry....

Meanwhile the battery of Captain Latimer, which had moved with Major-General Ewell's division, had opened on the enemy from a position at the base of Slaughter [Cedar] Mountain far to our right, while the batteries of Captains Brown and Dement (the two comprising six guns) had position between the battery of Captain Latimer and those of Major Andrews. These two batteries were capably served, and evidently damaged the enemy severely. Thus far the fight had been between the opposing artillery exclusively. At this time the enemy's infantry advanced in line of battle—that is, a regiment of them—through a corn field just beyond the brook and in front of Major Andrews' guns....Just then Major Andrews turned his guns upon them...and opening with cannister soon broke them. At this time Lieut. Col. R. L. Walker coming up with the artillery of Maj. Gen. A. P. Hill's division, I directed him to place four rifled guns on the rising ground to Major Andrew's right. He placed them by sections....These guns were now formed en echelon...giving an oblique fire across their front. At this moment the enemy's infantry advanced again in the general line across the corn field, and Lieutenant Colonel Walker's guns were turned on them exclusively. In a short time our infantry on the left
of the road was apparently thrown into confusion and gave way....At the same time the enemy made a feeble effort to advance through and from the corn field, but a well-directed fire of cannister...checked them, though their skirmishers got quite near under cover of the accidents of the ground. The temporary confusion on the left was soon overcome, and in a short time the enemy gave way, and our whole line advancing, the artillery moved along the road, unable to cross the brook [south fork of Cedar Run] in front through the fields. The pursuit continued until, having crossed the second brook [north fork of Cedar Run], we came upon a large body of woods....After a short time Captain Pegram's battery was ordered forward with an infantry brigade through these woods about a quarter of a mile. It took position just beyond and opened upon what was thought and proved to be the enemy's camp. A battery was soon opened in reply, and a heavy cannonade was the consequence for some time, causing Captain Pegram severe loss. His battery, however, retained its position until next morning, when it was withdrawn. We lost no pieces or caissons, but had two guns dismounted by the enemy's fire. We captured one 12-pounder Napoleon (spiked) and carriage and caisson, with two other caissons and a limber, all of which were brought off....
STOP #5--SOUTHERN EDGE OF BATTLEFIELD

**************************************************
* Now return to highway 15 by the same route. Upon *
* reaching the highway, turn right and stop in the *
* parking area near the Carousel Antiques shop. This is *
* the final stop of the battlefield terrain study. *
* *
* The distance from stop #4 to stop #5 is 0.3 miles. *
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Directly across highway 15 is a sign that marks the southern edge of the battlefield. Walk across highway 15 and proceed northward a short distance to the road sign marking route 657.

From here, Brig. Gen. Thomas and Brig. Gen. Early deployed their brigades along the farm road to the right. The Confederate line extended to the Crittenden farm house, whose ruins can be seen approximately one half mile distant. Beyond these forces, Maj. Gen. Ewell, with Trimble's and Forno's brigades, was located approximately 200 feet up the slope of Cedar Mountain. Taliaferro's brigade was located to the left across highway 15 and extended to the vicinity of the Cedar Mountain memorial.

The high ground ahead and to the right, along which Confederate infantry and artillery later deployed, is the same ridge that was visible from stop #2. Beyond this ridge is the Inskeep farm house and the general vicinity of the corn field. Federal forces advanced from their initial positions (stop #1) to the corn field where they engaged the Confederate forces. The Federal brigades under Brig. Gen. Geary and Brig. Gen. Prince approached the high ground to the right front before being repulsed by the Confederate forces.

With the Inskeep's permission, the Crittenden ruins (a burned out farm house and an old barn) may be viewed by driving on the farm road to the right in the direction of Cedar Mountain until reaching the end of the road. Then walk a short distance to the ruins.
REPORT OF BRIGADIER GENERAL JUBAL A. EARLY

Brigadier General Jubal A. Early, who commanded a brigade in Ewell's division, described his brigade's role in the battle of Cedar Mountain, particularly with respect to the action at the corn field.

...After some time spent in observing the enemy's cavalry in our front my brigade...was advanced on the road toward Culpeper Court-House...and was placed in the woods by the side of the road....After...less than an hour, Capt. A. S. Pendleton, of General Jackson's staff, came to me and informed me that General Jackson had ordered an advance; that General Trimble would advance on the right over the side of the mountain (Slaughter) [Cedar], supported by the Louisiana Brigade [Forno's], of General Ewell's division, and that I would advance from the position I then occupied, and be supported by General Winder with three brigades...and he directed me to advance as soon as I received a message from General Winder that he was in position to support me. While waiting for the message from General Winder I reconnoitered the ground in front, and the position of the enemy's cavalry, which was in the fields of Mrs. Crittenden's farm....My command was concealed from this cavalry, and I determined to advance upon it, if possible....On riding back...I found a courier from General Winder with the information that he was
ready. I then commenced my movement, being about 2 p.m.
...until I reached the place where I proposed to form my line
of battle.

...the brigade was formed in a meadow on the north of a
branch of Cedar creek [south branch], in an oblique direction
to the Culpeper road and to the left of it....As soon as the
line was formed I directed the skirmishers to advance, taking
care to bear to the right, so as to cross the road, and come
into the fields beyond...and ordered the brigade forward...by
flank to form behind a ridge, beyond which was the enemy’s
cavalry....About this time...skirmishers commenced firing
...and the cavalry scampered off. The brigade continued to
move forward, swinging around the corner of the woods and
coming out into the open field in line of battle. It had by
this time got to the right of the Culpeper road and moved in
pursuit of the enemy’s cavalry through the fields in a
direction parallel to the road until it came to a farm road
running from Mrs. Crittenden’s house, on the right,
perpendicularly to the Culpeper road. Here it was halted for
a few minutes behind a fence running along the farm road....
The fence was then pulled down and the brigade moved forward
in line to the crest of a hill which commanded a view in
front of what afterward proved to be the battle-field. As
soon as the brigade reached the crest of this hill three
batteries opened on it, and a large body of cavalry was
discovered in a wheat field in front to the left....The hill
sloped down in front, and farther on was a corn field running
back to the crest of the next hill, along and behind which
were posted the enemy's batteries, and it was evident that there was a depression behind this hill [north branch of Cedar Run] in which large bodies of infantry might be concealed. There was woods also on a hill in the rear of the wheat field, in and behind which infantry might be placed under cover, and to the left was a woods through which my flank might be turned. The opening of the batteries and the halting of the cavalry in its flight convinced me that the enemy intended to make a stand here and that he was in force. The hill upon which I was being a commanding one, from which the enemy's movements might be observed...I determined to hold it, and sent my aide...back to General Winder for re-enforcements....My left at this time rested on the Culpeper road where it runs between the field in which I was and the woods to the left....A short time after [Early asked] that some pieces of artillery should be sent up.....[Four pieces of artillery] were posted...a little in advance of my right near a clump of cedars....They very soon opened fire upon the enemy, and were followed in a short time by some pieces from the corner of the field where the road from Mrs. Crittenden's crosses the Culpeper road.

About this time the pieces with...[Trimble's and Forno's] Brigades opened fire from the mountain, and a very brisk cannonading was kept up for some time--perhaps for two hours or more. The shells from the enemy's pieces burst over and around my men constantly, doing some damage occasionally, but not a great deal. I observed that the fire from our guns
was having considerable effect....a short time afterward movements were observed in front that induced the belief that the enemy was sending infantry [Crawford's brigade] to our left, and notice was sent to General Winder...but just before my aide reached the place where General Winder was this gallant officer received a mortal wound from a shell....Not long afterward a line of skirmishers from the enemy [Geary's brigade] was seen advancing across the corn field in front and several regiments in rear supporting them. A body of infantry [Prince's brigade] also commenced moving up toward my right....I sent to General Jackson for a brigade to support my right....The enemy's skirmishers had halted in the edge of the corn field nearest us, as had the regiments which had supported them, and before the brigade promised me came up...several of our pieces from the left dashed down the slope of the hill in front of my left to within close range of the enemy's skirmishers, which they had not seen. The enemy's skirmishers and the infantry in their rear commenced moving and firing on them immediately, and seeing their danger, I at once ordered my brigade forward at double quick, which order was complied with, the men rushing down with a shout and reaching the pieces just in time to save them. At the same time a fire was opened from the woods to the left by some troops of General Winder's command, and the infantry fight thus began. The enemy's front regiments began to give way, and other regiments were seen advancing through the wheat field to the left and additional regiments through the corn field in my front....I observed a brigade passing from
the rear to my right, which proved to be one of Major-General Hill's brigades, commanded by Colonel Thomas. I immediately proceeded to post this brigade to the right...where it also had a strong position. After getting this brigade in position...I rode toward the left, and found that...the regiments of my brigade and all the troops [Taliaferro's brigade] to their left as far as I could see had fallen back, and the enemy were advancing up the slope of the hill. I saw at once the critical position in which we were placed....I could not...go to rally those of my regiments which were retiring, but dispatched...my assistant adjutant-general, to do so, and I immediately rode to the right to urge the troops there to hold their position. After doing this I rode again toward the left and discovered the enemy retiring before some of our troops which were again advancing. These I discovered to be a portion of my own brigade, which had been rallied, and a part of General Taliaferro's brigade. I rode up to them, and while I was here the enemy attempted to retrieve the fortune of the day by a cavalry charge [Fall's cavalry] along the Culpeper road, which was, however, successfully repulsed by...General Taliaferro's brigade--and a number of parties from other brigades.

This was after sunset, and the troops which had rallied and driven the enemy back advanced into the corn field.... The ammunition of my own regiments being nearly exhausted, as was that of Colonel Thomas' brigade, I directed them to maintain their ground at all hazards and use the bayonet if
necessary, and they did not waiver for a moment....

A little before dusk the last of the enemy's regiments left the ground on the advance of our troops to the left into the corn field, and we were left masters of the battle-field. In a short time I was informed by Major-General Hill...that General Jackson's order was to advance in pursuit of the enemy on the Culpeper road and that his division was advancing. I informed him of the fact that the whole of my ammunition was exhausted, and that my brigade was much fatigued and in some confusion; but...I collected the brigade and did advance until I was met by General Ewell...and was by him ordered to wait until the other two brigades of the division came upon the road from the right and follow them, which I did, and was shortly after halted and ordered to bivouac for the night....19
ORDER OF BATTLE
Order of Battle
Union Forces
Cedar Mountain, Virginia
August 9, 1862

Army of Virginia

Second Army Corps
Brig. Gen. Nathaniel P. Banks

First Division
Brig. Gen. Alpheus S. Williams

First Brigade
Brig. Gen. Samuel W. Crawford
5th Connecticut
10th Maine
28th New York
46th Pennsylvania

Third Brigade
Brig. Gen. George A. Gordon
2d Massachusetts
Zouaves d’Afrique
(Collins’ Company)
27th Indiana
3d Wisconsin

Artillery
16th Indiana Battery
1st New York Light Artillery, Battery M
2d New York Light Artillery, Battery L
4th U. S. Artillery, Battery F

Second Division
Brig. Gen. Christopher C. Augur (wounded)
Brig. Gen. Henry Prince (captured)
Brig. Gen. George S. Greene

First Brigade
Brig. Gen. John W. Geary
(wounded)
Col. Charles Candy

Second Brigade
Brig. Gen. Henry Prince
Col. David P. De Witt

5th Ohio
7th Ohio
29th Ohio
66th Ohio

3d Maryland
102d New York
109th Pennsylvania
111th Pennsylvania
8th and 12th U. S.
Infantry Battalion

Third Brigade
Brig. Gen. George S. Greene
1st District of Columbia
78th New York

Artillery
Maine Light Artillery,
4th Battery
6th Battery
Pennsylvania Light Artillery,
Battery E
Third Army Corps
Maj. Gen. Irvin McDowell

Second Division
Brig. Gen. James B. Ricketts

First Brigade
Brig. Gen. Abram Duryea

97th New York
104th New York
105th New York
107th New York

Second Brigade
Brig. Gen. Zealous B. Tower

26th New York
94th New York
88th Pennsylvania
90th Pennsylvania

Third Brigade
Brig. Gen. George L. Harstuff

12th Massachusetts
13th Massachusetts
83d New York
11th Pennsylvania

Fourth Brigade
Col. Samuel S. Carroll

7th Indiana
84th Pennsylvania
110th Pennsylvania
1st Virginia (Union)

Artillery

Maine Light Artillery,
2d Battery (B)
5th Battery (E)
1st Pennsylvania Light Artillery,
Battery F
Pennsylvania Light Artillery,
Battery C20

Cavalry Brigade
Brig. Gen. George D. Bayard

1st Maine
1st New Jersey
1st Pennsylvania
1st Rhode Island
Order of Battle
Confederate Forces
Cedar Mountain, Virginia
August 9, 1862

Valley District
Maj. Gen. Thomas J. Jackson, C. S. Army

Jackson's Division
Maj. Gen. Charles S. Winder (killed)
Brig. Gen. William B. Taliaferro

Stonewall's Brigade
Col. Charles A. Ronald
2d Virginia
4th Virginia
5th Virginia
27th Virginia
33d Virginia

Campbell's Brigade
Lt. Col. Thomas S. Garnett
21st Virginia
42d Virginia
48th Virginia
1st Virginia Battalion

Taliaferro's Brigade
Brig. Gen. Wm. B. Taliaferro
Col. Alexander G. Taliaferro
10th Virginia
23d Virginia
37th Virginia
47th Alabama
48th Alabama

Artillery
Poague's Battery
Carpenter's Battery
Caskie's Battery

Ewell's Division
Maj. Gen. Richard S. Ewell

Early's Brigade
Brig. Gen. Jubal A. Early
13th Virginia
25th Virginia
31st Virginia
52d Virginia
58th Virginia
12th Georgia

Trimble's Brigade
Brig. Gen. Isaac R. Trimble
21st Georgia
21st North Carolina
15th Alabama

Hays' Brigade
Col. Henry Forno
5th Louisiana
6th Louisiana
7th Louisiana
8th Louisiana

Artillery
Brown's Battery
Dement's Battery
D'Aquin's Battery
Latimer's Battery
Johnson's Battery
A. P. Hill's Division  
Maj. Gen. Ambrose P. Hill

Branch's Brigade  
Brig. Gen. L. O'B. Branch

7th North Carolina  
18th North Carolina  
28th North Carolina  
33d North Carolina  
37th North Carolina

Archers Brigade  
Brig. Gen. James J. Archer

1st Tennessee  
7th Tennessee  
14th Tennessee  
5th Alabama Battalion  
19th Georgia

Thomas' Brigade  
Brig. Gen. Edward L. Thomas

10th Georgia  
14th Georgia  
35th Georgia  
45th Georgia  
49th Georgia

Fields' Brigade  
Brig. Gen. Charles W. Field

40th Virginia  
55th Virginia  
2d (22d) Virginia Battalion

Pender's Brigade  
Brig. Gen. William D. Pender

16th North Carolina  
22d North Carolina  
34th North Carolina  
38th North Carolina

Starke's Brigade  
Col. Leroy A. Stafford

2d Louisiana  
9th Louisiana  
10th Louisiana  
14th Louisiana  
15th Louisiana

Artillery

Braxton's Battery  
Latham's Battery  
Davidson's Battery  
Pegram's Battery  
Fleet's Battery

Robertson's Cavalry Brigade  
Brig. Gen. Beverly Robertson

7th Virginia  
21
Effective Forces  
Battle of Cedar Mountain  
August 9, 1862

Union Army

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Artillery ................. 66 Guns *

Confederate Army

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<td>4,892</td>
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<td>Robertson's Cavalry</td>
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<td>31</td>
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Artillery ................. 40 Guns(approx.) **

* Includes 42 guns in Banks' corps and 24 guns in Rickett's division.
** Accounts vary from 30 to 42 guns.
REFLECTIONS

The contest which took place between the Federal and Confederate forces near Cedar Mountain was small in comparison to a number of battles that had preceded it and to many that would follow. Essentially, the two opponents met on a fairly restricted battlefield and fought a short and bloody, though largely inconclusive, action for control of a town along a major north-south road. By defeating Banks’ corps, Jackson achieved a tactical victory, which stung the enemy, but did not cause lasting damage. On the other hand, the Federal forces could claim the more important strategic victory, which prevented the Confederate forces from advancing northward—even if only temporarily.

The battlefield just south of Culpeper remains much the same today as when General Jackson met General Banks in early August, 1862. The terrain features are for the most part untouched except for the thinning of the woods at the northern edge of the wheat field, the construction of a modern road, and the addition or elimination of several structures. Moreover, the old Orange-Culpeper road, which is still very nearly in its original form, clearly traces the route along which the fighting raged. Yet as one walks the terrain, the limited size of the battlefield is perhaps the most striking feature of the engagement. Although nearly all of the action occurred within one square mile of ground, the most violent confrontations were in the two smaller locations—the corn field and the wheat field—of that area.

The leadership styles exhibited by the commanders of each side is another interesting aspect of this battle. The apparent strengths and weaknesses of the leaders at Cedar Mountain were not unique to this encounter. Similar traits would surface again repeatedly in other leaders throughout the remainder of the war.

The first leadership characteristic focuses on the physical position of the commanders during the battle. Jackson located his headquarters close to the front lines with his troops. He deployed his forces along ground where he could control their movement and thereby quickly influence the action at the critical time. On the other hand, Banks located his headquarters where he could only partially observe the left side of his line. As a consequence, he was probably unaware of much that was happening on his right at the wheat field. Although Banks’ position was somewhat
isolated from the action, he could have easily overcome this deficiency by simply riding along his lines, checking on his units, and making appropriate well-timed decisions. His failure to provide professionally sound leadership was a significant factor in the Union's defeat that day. At a higher level of responsibility, General Pope, who must have realized that a major battle was imminent near Culpeper, did not arrive on the scene to take personal charge until 7 p.m.—about the time the battle ended and too late to exert any meaningful influence.

The second notable leadership trait relates to the tactical skills of the leaders. Jackson deployed his force along a mutually supportive, continuous front with a strong reserve that was ready to lend support where needed. When the left side of the Confederate line was in danger of defeat, he quickly introduced his reserve brigades to stem the Federal advance and rout the now outnumbered Union infantry. Later, Jackson skillfully used his remaining fresh reserves to pursue the retreating enemy. In contrast to Jackson's tactical brilliance, Banks was dull and unimaginative. He erringly split his corps between two separate areas, the wheat field and the corn field, where it was impossible for the two divisions to effectively support each other. In addition, he failed to decisively commit his reserve force. In this respect, he did not exploit General Crawford's initially successful attack with the timely introduction of General Gordon's still idle brigade. Of even more importance, Banks did not seek support from General Ricketts' division, which sat through the battle only three miles to rear of the fighting. Moreover, General Sigel's tardy arrival at Culpepper was inexcusable. Although Pope had ordered him from Sperryville to Culpepper in sufficient time to join the battle, Sigel procrastinated, claiming uncertainty as to the appropriate march route. Pope's acceptance and tolerance of such recalcitrance places great doubt on his ability to command an army. The greater tactical error on Pope's part, however, has to do with his permitting the unopposed withdrawal of Jackson's army from Culpepper to Gordonsville. The Confederate commander wisely withdrew after realizing that he faced the entire Federal army; but, Pope blundered by not vigorously pursuing the now numerically inferior enemy. Had General Pope been able to better coordinate the movement of his three corps or even if Banks had been more skillful in the employment of his forces, the outcome of the battle may have been entirely different.

A third aspect of the leaders' competence can be seen in the events surrounding the initiation of the battle. For his part, Jackson had achieved more than a twofold superiority over Banks' force. Accordingly, he could expect a successful outcome in assuming the offense if victory could be attained before the arrival of Federal reinforcements. On the other hand, it is difficult to understand why Banks, with a force of less than half that of the enemy, would even contemplate
offensive action without waiting for Pope's arrival with the entire massed army. Banks later claimed that Pope had ordered him to block the Confederate forces and attack them as they approached Culpeper. Pope, however, argued that his intent was to have Banks avoid a decisive engagement while delaying the enemy and gaining information on its size. In any event and for whatever reason, the lack of clarity in the Federal attack order and Banks' misguided offensive spirit were instrumental in the Federal disaster.

Finally, the chivalrous, but futile cavalry charge by Major Falls in support of his retreating comrades, is one more example of flawed top-level leadership. When the battle was all but lost for the Federal forces, Falls received an order to charge against a strong, well-placed enemy infantry force. The result was inevitable. After being subjected to a hail of frontal and flanking fire from two Confederate brigades, Falls' decimated command retreated with the loss of more than half his men.

Interestingly, neither the Confederate nor Union commander had very good knowledge of each others forces. Although Jackson was certainly aware of the overall size and general location of Banks' corps, and indeed chose to engage the enemy before the arrival of the remainder of Pope's army, he was surprised by Crawford's unexpected attack across the wheat field. This tactical surprise nearly caused the collapse of Jackson's left flank. Likewise, Banks assumed that Jackson's reserve division was located far to the rear where it could not react rapidly to the ill-advised attack against the Confederate forward divisions. In fact, the Confederate reserve brigades were perfectly positioned to blunt and reverse the initial Federal penetration. Then as now, the importance of timely, accurate information relative to the enemy is critical to success in battle.

As a final thought, the role of artillery in this battle, and indeed throughout the war, differs markedly from the modern-day employment of artillery. At Cedar Mountain, the batteries of both sides were placed in prominent, exposed positions that offered a direct line of sight and fire to the enemy. This procedure rendered the artillery vulnerable to return fire from both the enemy's artillery and infantry. Accordingly, it was necessary for friendly infantry to support and protect the forward-positioned artillery. Today, because of the vast improvements in weaponry and targeting procedures, artillery can be placed in protected positions to the rear of the front lines. Now, unlike the past, artillery supports the maneuvering infantry.
ENDNOTES


2. Ibid., pp. 133-135.

3. Ibid., pp. 170-171.

4. Ibid., pp. 145-149.


7. Ibid., pp. 161-162.

8. Ibid., pp. 160-161.


10. Ibid., pp. 149-153.


13. Ibid., pp. 188-191.


15. Ibid., pp. 191-193.

16. Ibid., pp. 221-222.

17. Ibid., p. 225.

19. Ibid., pp. 228-233.

20. Ibid., pp. 136-139.


SELECTED BIBLIOGRAPHY


