Strategic Assessment 1997
Flashpoints and Force Structure
NATIONAL DEFENSE UNIVERSITY
INSTITUTE FOR NATIONAL STRATEGIC STUDIES
Preface

By LIEUTENANT GENERAL ERVIN J. ROKKE, USAF
President, National Defense University

In light of the ever more complex challenges the world presents and in a time of tight budgetary resources, the U.S. military needs to carefully examine the strategic environment it faces and to assess its force structure in this light.

The Strategic Assessment applies the research expertise of the National Defense University, under the leadership of its interdisciplinary research arm, the Institute for National Strategic Studies, with the generous assistance of analysts from elsewhere in the U.S. government and from the private sector. Offering such analyses, in both general and more specialized areas of interest to the national security community, is one part of NDU’s educational mission. That mission, as defined by the Joint Chiefs of Staff, is to educate senior military and government officials on issues related to national strategy, security policy, resources management, and warfare in the information age.

We hope the report can be useful to all those with an interest in security policy as a survey of the threats facing the United States in the next decade. In addition, we have designed the discussion of force structure issues to explore new ideas and sometimes to stir controversy with out-of-the-box thinking. We emphasize that this report is by no means a statement of U.S. government policy nor of the views of the Defense Department or the Joint Chiefs of Staff. Rather than to state policy, our role is, by our work, to stimulate further thinking, discussion, and research among both policymakers and policy analysts.

We wish to thank all those who contributed to the success of this project, particularly the many analysts both inside and outside the military who reviewed drafts of the Assessment.
Strategic Assessment 1997 is neither a statement nor a critique of U.S. government policy. Opinions, conclusions, and recommendations, expressed or implied, are those of the authors. They do not necessarily reflect the views of the National Defense University, the Department of Defense, or any other U.S. government agency.

Strategic Assessment 1997 was written in mid-1996 and revised to include developments through November 6, 1996.
Foreword

By Hans Binnendijk, Editor-in-Chief

In 1995, INSS inaugurated its Strategic Assessment with a survey of the world strategic environment from the perspectives of U.S. interests. In 1996, we looked at the instruments by which the U.S. government can influence the behavior of other governments. This year, we examine the flashpoints which may erupt into conflict in the next decade and, on the basis of the analysis of threat environment, some ways to structure U.S. forces within the constraints imposed by resource availabilities and bearing in mind the capabilities that the U.S. military would like to maintain.

Structure

The Strategic Assessment is aimed at policymakers, analysts, and informed members of the public who want a serious summary of the threats facing the United States in the next decade. The analysis of the flashpoints does not provide novel interpretations or detailed specialized research. Specialists on one flashpoint are unlikely to find much new material on that issue here, although we hope they will find a succinct statement of the problems involved for the United States and the scenarios that could lead to conflict.

Our aim was to establish what the threats facing the United States will be over the next decade. We decided, therefore, to stretch the term flashpoints to include two related phenomena:

- We analyze problems like proliferation, terrorism, and international crime, as well as geographic hotspots like the Persian Gulf. These problems could break out almost anywhere; the negative side of easier international travel and communication is that malefactors can move across borders more easily. For instance, Middle East terrorists have blown up buildings in Buenos Aires and London as well as Jerusalem and Riyadh. And the approach to solving these problems is often global, e.g., international agreements against the spread of nuclear, biological, and chemical weapons technology and material. It is therefore useful to examine these problems on a global scale, as well as in the context of particular geographic areas. For example, Iraqi WMD efforts are a global proliferation issue as well as an Iraq issue.

- We analyze stresses and strains among the United States’ neighbors and major allies. There are few prospects of clashes in North America or NATO; even a tense relationship like that of Turkey and Greece will hopefully not lead to violent conflict. Yet the importance to the United States of its North American neighbors, the European Union, and Japan mean that Washington has to be attentive to strains in the relationships.

The last chapter in Strategic Assessment 1997 looks at some options for structuring U.S. forces to meet the threats we describe. For each of the options, we concentrate on describing principles and pointing to some general characteristics of force structure. For each option, we have tested the underlying ideas against numerous military analysts, have thought about how specific force numbers might accomplish the required missions, and have done some modeling of the costs. However, we have only done rough estimates, so we do not offer any specific numbers in this section. It is not our role, nor do we have the resources, to game out in detail what specific forces would be needed to meet threat scenarios, nor to prepare detailed estimates of the costs of various force options.
Although *Strategic Assessment* 1997 strives to analyze how policies now and in the future characterize the U.S. approaches towards each flashpoint, as well to set out different models of force structure, its primary intent is not to advocate particular policies or approaches to policy. It is neither a statement nor a critique of U.S. government policy. The views expressed in this document are those of the editors and do not represent the official policy or position of the National Defense University, the Department of Defense, or the U.S. Government.

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Executive Summary

Thumbnail Sketch

The United States faces a new threat environment of unprecedented complexity and unpredictability. In addition to considering regional contingencies and operations other than war, defense planners will also have to meet the new challenge posed by the rise of potential theater-peer competitors, such as China and possibly Russia.

This broader set of threats challenges the U.S. military to accomplish a broader set of tasks, including:

- Establishing how best to incorporate RMA technology and concepts, especially to thwart military ambitions of a theater peer.
- Maintaining the capability to defeat overwhelmingly a rogue regime in a major regional conflict, while successfully deterring and preparing to defeat a second such regime.
- Providing a sufficient "on call" capability for peace operations.

Three heuristic force-structure models for the next decade:

- The Recapitalization Force Model emphasizes continuity of the already excellent force but with some reductions in force structure to finance the recapitalization of equipment as it becomes obsolete.
- The Accelerated Revolution in Military Affairs (RMA) Force Model quickly integrates system-of-systems technologies and radically changes the force structure to take full advantage of the new capabilities.
- The Full Spectrum Force Model responds most directly to the emerging strategic environment by retaining most of the current force while experimenting with RMA technologies and creating an "on call" capability to deal with operations other than war, requiring a higher budget than the other two forces.

Assumptions

U.S. foreign policy will continue to emphasize promoting stability, pluralistic political systems, and market-oriented economic institutions.

Three revolutions have transformed the very nature of the global security environment:

- The Geostrategic Revolution. Relations among the major powers reflect asymmetrical multipolarity. The U.S. pole is much the strongest. Ideology is no longer a divisive force. Even nationalism is tempered by the desire to build market economies.
- The Information Technology Revolution. New technologies continue to provide previously unimagined access to an ever-expanding array of information. This access has supported the trend toward more open societies.
- The Governmental Revolution. Reversing the pattern of more than four decades, the sphere of state control is steadily shrinking. In most developed countries, power is devolving to regional and local governments, and to the private sector. This too has reinforced the trend towards pluralist societies.

The Strategic Environment

Owing to these three revolutions, the present security environment is far more complex than in earlier eras. It is no longer possible to identify one specific canonical threat. Defense planners now, therefore, confront a broad array of threats that arise from a wide variety of different sources.
- Threats from potential theater-peer competitors, who cannot challenge U.S. interests globally but are potentially capable of military challenges in areas close to their borders (hence the term, "theater peer").
- Threats of major regional conflict. While the main rogue regimes—North Korea, Iraq, and Iran—all face internal difficulties, each remains capable of challenging U.S. interests.
- Threats emanating from troubled states and transnational problems such as terrorism.

The Major Powers

The short period of great-power cooperation may be coming to an end. While ties among the United States, Europe, and Japan are growing stronger, despite some strains, the other great powers, Russia and China, are increasingly suspicious of longer-term U.S. intentions. They also feel they are not being treated as great powers, and both are concerned about their peripheries:
- Russia—about the near abroad, populated by 25 million ethnic Russians.
- China—about areas it regards as part of its sovereign territory: Taiwan, Hong Kong, and the Spratly Archipelago in the South China Sea.

Both are well aware of residual military deficiencies; both are focused on domestic priorities; both wish to avoid conflict for fear of jeopardizing economic development. Therefore, rather than opposing the United States directly during the next decade, China and Russia are more likely to mount a low-intensity strategic competition with the United States designed to reduce or offset U.S. influence in the regions they regard as their special spheres of influence.

Each, however, has growing nationalist movements, so the possibility of conflict, however unlikely, cannot be discounted. If conflict erupts, it is likely to involve specific issues related to sovereignty and to be limited in scope, scale, and duration.

For the next decade at least, neither China nor Russia will be a global-peer competitor of the United States capable of mounting broad strategic challenges. However, either one could become a theater peer with the U.S., possibly presenting graver problems than could a regional power. Both China and Russia are: nuclear powers with ICBMs, space powers with access to overhead imagery and global communications, nations of enormous size with considerable strategic depth, and important leaders of international institutions, well positioned to block UN actions against their interests.

The challenge for Washington, which has become the stabilizer of relations among the major powers, is to:
- **Persuade** Russia and China that following a policy of cooperative participation in the international community is the course that best serves their interests, and that the United States does not present a challenge to their fundamental interests or sovereignty.
- **Dissuade** China and Russia from settling disputes by force by maintaining a U.S. military capability that will discourage them from investing the resources to become future opponents, a force that is at once highly capable but not threatening.

**Significant Regional Contingencies**

Although the United States would be vitally concerned about a new Arab/Israeli conflict or a nuclear war between India and
Pakistan, the regional conflicts most likely to involve the U.S. military directly remain those in Korea and the Persian Gulf. The threats:

- North Korea might invade South Korea out of desperation.
- Iran and Iraq continue to harbor aggressive designs. The Persian Gulf states cannot defend themselves against an Iraqi attack, nor could they defeat an Iranian sea-denial attack against the Straits of Hormuz.
- In any conflict, it is likely that U.S. forces would face the risk of nuclear, biological, and chemical attack. Iran, Iraq, and North Korea all might view such weapons of mass destruction (WMD) as their first choice rather than as weapons of last resort.

Nonetheless, the “two nearly simultaneous Major Regional Contingencies” concept is a less useful primary planning scenario in 1997 than it was in 1993. The scope and scale of the threat is diminishing:

- On the Korean peninsula, North Korea appears near economic collapse. Although it can wreak great destruction, Pyongyang’s weapons are obsolete and a lack of training degrades the capabilities of its forces.
- In the Middle East, Desert Storm and the embargo have taken their toll on Iraq. Although Iran’s WMD capabilities and sea-denial capabilities are growing, its economic difficulties and diplomatic isolation hinder its acquisition of weapons for ground attack.

To deter simultaneous conflict the U.S. could:

- When and where possible, engage North Korea, Iran, and Iraq diplomatically from a position of strategic/military strength.
- Maintain deterrence by substantial regional deployments and by demonstrating the ability and willingness to reinforce them.
- Prepare to use a broad mix of strategic assets and information warfare.
- Change war aims to include ending the tenure of certain regimes if they should attack.
- Develop cooperation with regional friends and allies and draw on their military strength.

**Troubled States**

Certain states are unable to manage the challenge of ethnic, tribal, and religious competition. The result is internal unrest and human rights violations, ranging from the breakdown of law and order to refugee flows and genocide. Many more such conflicts can be expected during the next decade.

Even though few such situations pose direct threats to vital U.S. interests, the fact that they violate fundamental U.S. values means that U.S. forces will be expected to intervene in a variety of conflict and near-conflict scenarios to make or keep the peace and to provide relief.

Such operations can be carried out with capabilities developed for other purposes once minor modifications are made, though at some cost to overall combat readiness. The issues for the United States are to determine how to respond most effectively and how much of its overall force can be safely allocated to such activities.

**Transnational Problems**

Security threats associated with terrorism, massive refugee flows, the environment, drugs, and international crime are likely to increase owing to porous international borders and the inability of governments to deal with such problems.

Although international civilian cooperation is the principal approach to dealing with such transnational problems as drugs and crime, the military has a major role to play in combating terrorism. Terrorist attacks on U.S. military forces may increase, particularly in the Middle East.

**Military Missions**

_The need for flexibility_. The U.S. military must plan for a broad array of missions rather than for one major mission. Some lower-priority missions may have to be scrubbed because of limited resources.

_The need for agility_. Agility does not mean that each element of the force can perform all missions, through many units would have multiple missions. In some cases, agility may require a higher degree
of specialization, so that the overall force has maximum agility. Agility will require organizational and cultural changes rather than equipment changes.

First: Dealing with Theater Peers

Conflict with a theater peer would differ significantly from conflict with a rogue state such as Iran, Iraq, or North Korea. The theater peer would possess a nuclear option for use against U.S. territory; it could also cause great harm by either nuclear or conventional means to U.S. allies and friends near its borders. Its power, location, and large territory would make it difficult to totally defeat. To deal militarily with a theater peer, the U.S. would have to thwart its ambition by deterrence, both nuclear and conventional—that is, by maintaining an adequate forward presence in concert with regional allies.

The U.S. would also have to prepare to conduct limited operations on the periphery of the theater peer. Those operations would be:

- Designed to raise the political and economic costs of military operations to an unacceptably high level, not to achieve total victory.
- Carefully controlled to avoid escalation to nuclear warfare.
- Managed to maintain of superiority in information warfare capabilities.

The key is to prepare for such an eventuality without creating a self-fulfilling prophecy. This will require skillful diplomacy as well as a degree of strategic restraint.

Second: Responding to Regional Contingencies

The United States must be prepared to defend and liberate territory by using heavy ground-maneuver units under risk of nuclear, biological, and chemical weapons attack. It must also be prepared to operate in concert with ad hoc coalitions, in which some participants are there more for political effect while others bring substantial military assets.

The U.S. must also be prepared to enforce sanctions and embargoes.

Third: Dealing with Troubled States and Transnational Problems

While the main U.S. role in peace operations will be to provide support forces, the U.S. should maintain an on-call ground force capability—that is, be able to deploy forces upon short notice without additional training.

The U.S. military will be called upon to work with law enforcement. In troubled states, it may have to augment local law enforcement temporarily and help rebuild it. In the United States, it will be called upon to assist civilian authorities in countering terrorism and drug trafficking, as well as in managing mass migrant flows.

Force Structure Options

Three models of forces capable of conducting the military missions of the next decade are presented below as heuristic devices, not as prescriptions or recommendations.
The Recapitalization Force Model

This model emphasizes continuity, on the grounds that today's force is very good and that changing its character is difficult. At the same time, the military will face a serious resource problem: as existing systems wear out, large sums will be needed for new weapons. The focus of the Recapitalization Force Model is on recapitalizing, that is, modernizing at a moderate rate. On the assumption that the defense budget will not rise significantly, generating the resources for recapitalization may necessitate some reduction in force size and some sacrifice of readiness.

Advantages

+ Minimizes the disruption of change.
+ Provides the margin to fund recapitalization while remaining within likely resource constraints.

Disadvantages

− Potential opponents know its strengths and weaknesses and may try to counter it with asymmetrical responses.
− Reduced readiness for high intensity conflict.
− U.S. may miss the opportunity provided by the present lack of of a global peer to experiment with information-age technologies.

The Accelerated RMA Force Model

This model assumes a concerted effort to accelerate the integration of system-of-systems technologies into a force structure altered to take full advantage of those technologies. Such a force would fight differently than today's, using concurrent—as opposed to sequential—operations and nodal—rather than attrition or maneuver—warfare.

The Accelerated RMA Model is consistent with large force reductions. The purpose is not to save money but rather to speed the transition to a force organized and operated differently from today's. The force would be smaller and many of the required changes would involve structure and doctrine rather than equipment. Overall, it could cost less than the Recapitalization Force.

Advantages

+ Great potency for future combat.
+ Small footprint makes it well-suited to an environment with WMD, precision-guided missiles, and terrorists.
+ Less expensive.

Disadvantages

− Systems integration is a high-risk approach, especially if a major crisis erupts.
− Reserve components would have to provide foot soldiers for most operations other than war.
− Radically different approach to forward presence might confuse allies and mislead potential adversaries.

The Full Spectrum Force Model

This model calls for maintaining nearly all the present robust force while simultaneously pursuing a modest RMA option. The aim is to slowly integrate system-of-systems technologies as they prove viable but to avoid the risks associated with rapid organizational change. The Full Spectrum Model assumes that adequate budgetary resources would be made available for both purposes.

Advantages

+ Provides a broad range of capabilities in the short run and advanced capabilities in the longer run.
- Best design for conducting operations other than war while simultaneously introducing new technology to deal with a theater peer later on.
- Most consistent with the challenges of the emerging strategic environment.

**Disadvantages**

- Modernizes more slowly than the Accelerated RMA Force.
- Relatively greater cost than other options.

**Conclusion**

In light of the broad array of potential flashpoints, the United States will need to maintain a broad array of military capabilities in the decade ahead. Regardless of the force model adopted, U.S. armed forces will need simultaneously to pursue the prospects of a revolution in military affairs, maintain the fighting strength needed to defeat regional foes, and conduct numerous peace operations.
Our analysis is based on several assumptions about the context in which U.S. force structure planning will be done. The key assumptions are about the character of the emerging world system, the goals the U.S. will pursue, the resources the U.S. will commit to international affairs and defense, and the state of the U.S. military today.

The Emerging World System

As detailed in the introductory chapters to the 1995 and 1996 editions of Strategic Assessment, the world is changing quickly. It is undergoing three changes so sweeping that they may deserve to be called revolutions. A common characteristic of all three revolutions is that they make the world a more diverse place.

Geostategic revolution. Most apparent to analysts of international affairs are the geostategic changes, which are explored in detail in the chapters on flashpoints. With regard to relations among the major powers—which have historically been the main element in world politics—the long superpower confrontation during the Cold War is being replaced by a world of asymmetrical multipolarity in which one power (the U.S.) is much the strongest. The other major powers are, nevertheless, important actors, with considerable influence in their own regions. The world has not become unipolar, as some imagined in the first moments after the Cold War. Now, relations among some major powers are cooler, and differences of perspective are becoming more pronounced. The hopes for a new strategic partnership between the U.S. and Russia have faded. Russia feels isolated and bitter about what it sees as others taking advantage of its temporary difficulties; the West needs to avoid creating a Versailles syndrome in Moscow. China is feeling more powerful because of its spectacular economic growth; sometimes it acts like a normal player in international affairs and sometimes it acts like the stereotype of the Middle Kingdom—not well informed about other states and assuming that it has a natural right to what it wants.

Another aspect of the global geostategic scene has been the triumph of the idea of market democracy. While not always practiced, it is regarded nearly everywhere outside China as the best way to run society.
From this perspective, the world can be divided into three categories of states:

- states successful at implementing the goal of market democracy
- states in transition from authoritarianism toward market democracy, but at risk of becoming frozen with politicized economies and partially free political systems
- troubled states that are falling further behind the rest of the world while in many cases struggling with ethnic and religious extremism, if not secessionist crises

Some troubled or transitional states may be tempted to assert their interests, or to divert attention from domestic problems, by external aggression aimed at increasing regional influence. The proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, particularly nuclear weapons, could make especially dangerous major regional conflicts with such rogue regimes. At the same time, conflicts within troubled states are likely to be more frequent, and in some cases, those states will fail—their governments will cease to function effectively, and civil society will degenerate into near chaos.

Perhaps the most novel feature of the geostrategic scene has been growing transnational problems, that is, those which do not stem from the action of governments. International crime, terrorism, violent ethnic slaughter, sudden mass migrations, and environmental threats are not susceptible to the traditional tools of statecraft designed for relations among sovereign governments.

**Information revolution.** Information technology has been improving at the rate of a factor of ten every four to seven years, an unprecedented rate of change. Computers, faxes, fiber optic cables, and satellites speed the flow of information across frontiers, reinforcing the political trend toward increasingly open societies. No one can foretell all the ways in which information technologies will change traditional venues of national power, but certain themes are beginning to emerge. One is that access to information technology has become a prerequisite for economic growth, at least in developed countries. Another is that the ubiquity of global communication is creating new avenues for the interests, cultures, and values of the United States to travel overseas, and vice versa. A third is that the greater availability of information from many alternative channels undermines the ability of totalitarian governments to control what people hear and provides avenues for dissidents to make their voices heard. Yet a fourth is that the extension of rapid communication and computer technological advances to the battlefield may make information-based warfare possible within a decade or two.

*Revolution in government.* After decades of increasing state involvement in many areas of society in most countries, central governments have been on the retreat recently. Their power is weakening or devolving: whether in Russia, the United States, the European Union or China, central governments are ceding more authority to regional and local governments. Central governments are becoming more susceptible to pressure from a better informed public. They are also shedding functions, partly to reduce expenditures and contain budget deficits. Governments are also privatizing state enterprises, in the expectation that this will boost growth.

The power of international business has increased relative to that of governments. However, this shift may not diminish the ability of governments to mobilize resources to support perceived vital national interests, for instance, during wartime.

A phenomenon related to the decline of central governments has been less concern about domestic issues, especially the economy. In many countries, the argument is heard that only a strong economic base can provide the foundation for an active international role.
We devote much of this report to analyzing the implications of this world situation for the challenges and missions facing the U.S. military. We use as the basis for our analysis the framework set forth in our last two reports. We argue that this international situation dictates that the military should prepare for the following tasks:

- **Hedging against the emergence of a peer competitor** equipped with the new information technologies. This requires investing in the future, through research and development and procurement. The percentage of the defense budget dedicated to this investment fell from 45 percent in FY 1986 to 29 percent in FY 1996. Reversing this trend will not be cheap.

- **Preparing for major regional conflict** (MRC). The risk of an MRC in either the Persian Gulf or the Korean peninsula remains acute, although the adversaries in both areas are weakening. A high degree of readiness, force enhancements, strong overseas presence (both to deter and to serve as forward staging areas), and increased preparation for coalition warfare have made the U.S. position stronger. In this environment, a strategy of preparing for two nearly simultaneous MRCs is less important than in the past.

- **Countering proliferation.** Despite positive developments (such as inspections in Iraq and the North Korea agreement), at least twenty countries—many hostile to the U.S.—are still seeking to produce nuclear, biological, or chemical weapons and the means to deliver them.

- **Developing cost-effective responses to transnational threats,** that is, undertaking constabulary operations that back up local police forces, and addressing environmental problems without diverting military assets from their primary missions.

- **Engaging selectively in peace operations** for failed states. The selectivity should be both geographic and topical. Geographically, the U.S. will engage more readily in areas of vital national interest or of historic commitment. Topically, the U.S. will concentrate on humanitarian relief and conflict containment, rather than nation building or seeking to end age-old ethnic tensions.

We would add that **overseas presence** can be an important means to shape the strategic environment. The overseas presence of combat-credible forces enhances deterrence, which is as important a function of the military as the capability to fight and win. Presence also facilitates peacetime engagement with other nations’ military forces, which can be important for promoting democratic ideals abroad, improving relations with former adversaries, and reducing tensions with potential adversaries.

**Limited Resources for Foreign Affairs and Defense**

In FY 1987–96, there was a sharp decline in national defense funding, that is, in the 050 account in the federal budget, which includes nearly all the DOD budget as well as defense-related expenditures by other agencies, mostly the Department of Energy. In FY 1997 dollars, the 050 account budget authority declined from $386 billion in 1987 to $254 billion in 1996, a 34 percent reduction. The largest reduction ($65 billion out of the total reduction of $145 billion) was in procurement, which fell by 60 percent. At present, the services are operating with the large equipment stock built during the 1980s buildup. In FY 1996, the Army bought no new tanks and the Navy bought only four ships. Obviously, this is not a sustainable long-term procurement level, if current forces levels are to be sustained. As discussed in the chapter below on force structure, the five-year plans include an eventual upturn in procurement, which will place further pressure on the budget.
The FY 1996 national defense budget shrunk in real terms by 3 percent, contrary to the widespread impression that it grew because of the $7 billion added by Congress to the Clinton administration request. For FY 1997, the Clinton administration proposed a further four percent cut. However, Congress added $11 billion, which made the FY 1997 national defense budget essentially the same in real terms as in FY 1996.

The international affairs budget also dropped sharply in FY 1987-96. In real terms, the international affairs budget (the 150 account) fell 34 percent, the same percentage as the reduction in the national defense budget. In constant FY 1997 dollars, the reduction was from $25 billion to $16 billion over that time. However, the reduction was heavily concentrated in aid and foreign information, especially in military aid. In FY 1997 dollars, the budget for the conduct of foreign affairs (account 153, which is a component of account 150), which is essentially the State Department operating expenses, went from $3.5 billion in FY 1987 to $4.2 billion in FY 1996. But the burden of work grew as the number of countries rose and as the world became a more complex place. For FY 1997, the Clinton administration proposed a slight increase in international affairs spending, but the funding Congress approved meant a slight decrease.

The congressional concurrent resolution on the FY 1997 budget and the FY 1997 Clinton administration budget both forecast spending through FY 2002. Both plans call for national defense budget authority to be marginally reduced in real terms by FY 2001 from the FY 1997 level. The Clinton administration budget provides detailed breakdown of its spending plans by category. Under those plans, further reductions in research and development ($7 billion), personnel ($5 billion) and operations and maintenance ($4 billion) are programmed in order to pay for increased procurement ($14 billion). Despite the increase, procurement will remain significantly below the steady-state replacement rate, that is, the average age of major systems will continue to increase. In other words, it may be difficult to sustain the planned force levels with the resources programmed for defense.

For international affairs, the FY 1997 Clinton administration budget programs a five-year reduction of 6 percent in real terms. The congressional concurrent resolution on the FY 1997 budget calls for a much more substantial cut, primarily because of a greater reduction in aid accounts. However, neither Congress nor the administration are proposing cuts as steep as they had envisioned in 1996, when the five-year program called for cuts of at least 40 percent. Nevertheless, any of these plans for reduction will be a challenge to absorb. The risk is that funding will cover only the most pressing needs, while short-changing preventive diplomacy that can have high returns in the mid- and long-run. It will be difficult to maintain much of a foreign aid program, especially if contributions to multilateral institutions and aid to Israel and Egypt are sustained at anything like current levels. It is likely that the
U.S. will remain in arrears to the UN throughout the rest of this decade. At the same time, the reduced international affairs spending will not have much effect on the overall deficit. Spending on international affairs is one percent of the overall government budget.

The five-year spending programs would continue the reduction in the share of national income spent on national defense and international affairs. From FY 1987 to FY 1996, defense and foreign affairs spending fell from 6.9 percent of GDP to 3.7 percent. The administration proposal would reduce that to 3.0 percent in FY 2002. Of that, defense spending would be 2.8 percent of GDP—its lowest level since the 1930s.

Both the Clinton and congressional plans would mean tight resource constraints for national security. And the situation could get worse, because of the pressure for balancing the budget. Both political parties want the budget balanced. The Republicans want a large tax cut. The Democrats want to protect spending on programs like health, education and the environment. In 1996, the economic climate looked good for achieving that combination of goals, with low interest rates holding down the cost of servicing the national debts, while rapid economic growth raised revenue and kept low the cost of programs like unemployment insurance and welfare. As a result, the FY 1996 budget deficit was only 1.5 percent of GDP, or $109 billion.

However, it will be difficult to shrink the deficit further for several reasons. Economists anticipate that the U.S. economy will grow more slowly over the long run than it did in 1993-9, which will limit revenue growth and create pressures for more spending. Pressures could build for more tax reduction or for higher spending on social programs. And the cost of entitlement programs such as Medicare and Social Security will increase as the baby boom generation begins to retire. Perhaps savings will be made, e.g., through changes in the way benefits are increased as the consumer price index rises. Besides the entitlement programs, defense spending is one of the few large items available to cut. Therefore, it could well be reduced below the current agreed level. A prudent national security planner would include among his scenarios one in which budgets are reduced appreciably more than presently planned small cuts. The fact that, during the FY 1997 budget debate, the president and Congress agreed relatively easily on a forecast level of defense spending for 2002 does not by any means assure that those resources will actually be made available when 2002 arrives.

### Ambitious Goals Require Creative Use of U.S. Power

At the most general level, there is little disagreement about the aims for U.S. government policy. The Constitution describes its purpose as being to provide for the common defense, promote the general welfare, and secure the blessings of liberty and establish justice, as well as to form a more perfect union and ensure domestic tranquility. In more modern language, those first objectives might be phrased as:

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**DOD National Defense Budget**
(billions of FY 97 dollars)

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*Note: In 1990, "Other" was negative by $38.5 billion, due to contributions to pay for Desert Shield/Storm. For all years, chart excludes a small portion of DOD's budget which is categorized as not being for National Defense.*
One way to reconcile the limited resources and the ambitious goals would be to concentrate on only a few areas of the world. For instance, the U.S. could adopt a policy of concentrating on the Western Hemisphere, a direction which some believed inherent in the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA). Or the U.S. could emphasize its historic alliance in the North Atlantic region, to which the U.S. is tied through a myriad of institutions such as NATO, the OECD, and the G7. Or an argument could be made that the U.S. should concentrate on the fast-growing economies of East Asia. These proposals may sound attractive to a geostrategist, but none is acceptable to the American people. As part of the desire to be number one on a global scale, Americans insist that their government remain active nearly everywhere in the globe—certainly in the Western Hemisphere, in the North Atlantic, in East Asia, and in the Middle East.

Another way to reconcile the limited resources with these ambitious goals would be to work through multilateral institutions more than at present. Again, this is not acceptable to the American people. To be sure, the immediate aftermath of the Cold War saw a burst of enthusiasm for the United Nations and other international institutions. But these hopes were soon tempered by the realization that international organizations are often poorly run, and that many states, including the U.S., are reluctant to provide them the clout and the resources to implement the lofty goals they proclaimed. Based on the experiences in Somalia and the former Yugoslavia, the perception in the U.S. is that the UN is often not an effective security organization. Indeed, the perception is that the NATO alliance works well only when there is a strong U.S. leadership role.

In short, the American people remain committed to a global presence and to U.S. leadership, while insisting that the ambitious U.S. goals be accomplished with only limited resources. Implicitly, the U.S. public believes the world situation is benign. In other words, because there is no enemy, the U.S. need not spend much on defense and even less on civilian activities abroad. It is true that the U.S. no longer faces a
peer competitor who challenges its very existence. (Russia and China have nuclear weapons that could inflict unacceptable damage on the U.S., but neither has sufficient national power to be a peer to the U.S. nor to challenge the U.S. in every theater around the globe.) Nearly all major nations have cut back on their militaries; despite the defense drawdown, the U.S. spends as much on its military as the next ten highest spending countries combined.

Nevertheless, we disagree with the contention that the world situation is benign. We argue instead that, compared to the Cold War, the threats are not as high but they are broader. Moreover, they require a greater degree of understanding and more creative diplomacy than when the threat was simpler. To paraphrase ex-CIA director James Woolsey, the Cold War dragon has been slain, but now we are in a forest teeming with poisonous snakes. Furthermore, we are concerned that major threats far surpassing those from an Iraq or North Korea could develop in ten or twenty years, especially if other major powers conclude that reduced resources will make the U.S. unable to defend its interests against the challenge they could mount in their region.

If our view of the world situation is correct, there will be tensions between the ambitious U.S. goals and the limited resources devoted to defense and foreign affairs. That tension creates the risk that by trying to do too much, the U.S. may accomplished less than if its efforts were more focused. We find that a higher degree of risk exists than we are comfortable with, but that is what we will have to live with unless the U.S. political climate changes in a way that we do not expect.

The best response to the tension between goals and resources is to focus on ways to improve efficiency, that is, to do more with the same resources. It is incumbent on the defense and foreign policy community to reinvent how to do business to take advantage of new opportunities and to phase down or out that which has become less important or less effective. A variety of means to diversify and leverage the instruments of U.S. power were analyzed in the 1996 Strategic Assessment, including:


Since the birth of the Nation our military strategy has been anchored to the same core purpose: to protect our Nation and its interests, while maintaining fundamental American values intact.

In addressing current dangers, we have translated these purposes as two complementary objectives:

- Promote Stability. A primary thrust of our strategy must be to promote a long-term stability that is advantageous to the United States. There is ample precedent in this century that regional instability in military, economic, and political terms can escalate into global conflict. Our strategy further promotes stability in order to establish the conditions under which democracy can take hold and expand around the world.

- Thwart Aggression. Because the United States has important national interests throughout the world, we must avoid any situation in which a hostile power in one region might be tempted to take advantage when U.S. forces are heavily committed elsewhere. Consequently, we must have forces of sufficient size and capabilities, in concert with regional allies, to defeat potential enemies in major conflicts that may occur nearly simultaneously in two different regions.

- New ways of applying instruments. An important example is the Partnership for Peace (PFP), part of the reorientation of NATO away from defending Germany against Soviet attack toward being a vehicle for enhancing stability in eastern Europe. Another example was the enhanced use of the Exchange Stabilization Fund to lend $20 billion to Mexico when that country experienced a financial crisis in early 1995. A third example is greater use in international relations of some U.S. agencies which in the past were only peripherally involved in foreign affairs, such as the FBI, especially for response to transnational problems.

- Phasing down use of some instruments that were central during the Cold War. For instance, with the end of the ideological struggle with the Soviets, the U.S. does not need to place as much importance on the battle for hearts and minds,
so it can reduce its spending on activities like direct radio broadcasting. Another example is that the U.S. is reducing stockpiles of nuclear weapons and eliminating chemical weapons.

- **Working with the private sector.** As U.S. firms operate more on a world scale and as the private sector grows in previously state-dominated societies, the U.S. government has increasing opportunities to make its influence felt through the private sector. For instance, non-governmental organizations (NGOs) provide much of the support for the humanitarian side of peace operations in Haiti and Bosnia, relieving the military of a responsibility for which it is ill suited and which required much attention in the past, e.g., in Vietnam. The pervasiveness of American popular culture and the strength of American high-technology industries add to U.S. power. However, they cannot be the basis for U.S. global leadership on vital security issues such as the proliferation of nuclear weapons.

- **Mobilizing assistance from others.** The U.S. has become more active than ever at getting others to share responsibilities. A prominent example is the Korean Peninsula Energy Development Organization (KEDO). The U.S. provided the leadership for reaching the agreement under which North Korea is dismantling its dangerous nuclear program in return for a nuclear power station, but nearly all the financing is coming from other countries. Another case is the closer coordination with international financial institutions, such as the consultation with the International Monetary Fund (IMF) on assembling a $51 billion package for Mexico after its early 1995 financial crisis; the U.S. contributed $20 billion, the IMF $18 billion, and central banks and commercial banks $13 billion.

- **Coordinating among instruments.** The need for coordination has become more acute because, in the post-Cold War era, there is less clarity about which goals are central and which are peripheral. For instance, considerable effort has been needed to develop and implement a government-wide approach toward strengthening security cooperation with Japan at the same time as vigorously pushing Japan to be forthcoming on trade issues.

In sum, the U.S. government has so far been successful in adapting the ways it does business so as to protect vital national security interests, despite tight resource constraints. At the same time, it has been a challenge to stretch resources to cover important, though not vital, interests, as well as to promote humanitarian values.

**U.S. Forces Strong Today, Despite Drawdown**

U.S. forces have been reduced by one-third or more since the Cold War, but they remain stronger by far than any other country's. The drawdown has been largely a reorientation away from those capabilities needed to meet the Soviet threat.

**Land forces.** Throughout the Cold War era, the large ground forces provided by the United States and its allies were at the heart of the strategy to contain the expansion of the Soviet Union in Europe. The big land forces procurement programs of the 1970s and 1980s strengthened the capabilities to fight a high-intensity war against large, heavily armored units.

With the dissolution of the Soviet Union, the requirement to fight two nearly simultaneous major regional contingencies has become the planning standard that de-
Contributors in the Total Military Force

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terminates the requirements for ground forces. The result has been a shift to mobility and rapid response capabilities.

Overall, the Army’s active component is 40 percent smaller in 1997 than it was a decade earlier, as the result of budget pressures and the changing strategic environment. The reserve component has been reduced by a smaller amount. Although the absolute size of the Marine Corps has not declined as much as that of the Army, the Marines were a relatively small force to begin with, and they never focused primarily on the defense of the central region of Europe against Soviet aggression. They have maintained their traditional role as an expeditionary force, and the active structure of three divisions and three Marine aircraft air wings is being maintained with this point in mind.

**Aerospace Forces.** During the Cold War, U.S. aviation force planning was largely focused on the Soviet Union, which possessed a large, capable tactical- and nuclear-strike air force. The Air Force and Navy responded by assigning priority to air superiority, which was essential for defense or counterattack on the ground. Without air superiority, damage suffered from Soviet air strikes on NATO’s rear area could have been crippling. In the 1970s and 1980s, considerable investment went into ensuring U.S. air superiority, with the procurement of large numbers of F-14, F-15 and F-16 aircraft, among others.

In the post-Cold War world, no opposing air force currently possesses a capability in terms of absolute numbers or technological sophistication in any way comparable to U.S. air power. As a result, U.S. aviation forces are able to focus more of their effort on bringing firepower to bear on the ground quickly and accurately. At the same time, the largest modernization program pursued by the Air Force is the F-22 stealth fighter, which will replace the F-15 air-superiority fighter.

In 1997, the Air Force is about half the size it was in 1987. Naval air forces have been reduced less and the Marine Corps air hardly at all.

**Maritime Forces.** During the Cold War, the Navy focused on control of the high seas to safeguard the U.S.’s ability to reinforce NATO and Pacific allies by sea. By the late 1970s, the Navy concluded that dealing with the Soviet threat required a strong offensive strategy, rather than waiting for the Soviets to attack. It developed the Maritime Strategy, which emphasized carrying the battle to the source of the Soviets’ combat power, including attacking heavily defended targets.

In the late-1990s, no nation can mount a sizable naval threat to U.S. forces far from its own shores, thereby easing the task of self-protection and defending merchant shipping on the high seas. This has allowed U.S. maritime forces to work on bringing a more massive and more precise firepower to bear on the battle ashore. The Navy and Marine Corps have developed a strategic concept in which the focus is on the littoral, or coastal areas, of the globe. Littoral operations, which were only a secondary concern during the Cold War, involve different challenges than operations on the open ocean. As maritime forces approach the shore, they come into range of attack from land (for instance, from land-based cruise missiles). Mines are more of a threat in shallow, geographically restricted waters.
The Navy faces the challenge of transforming a force optimized to defeat a peer superpower on the open ocean into one that aims primarily at supporting regional littoral operations typical of the post-Cold War environment. The inventory of ships will change slowly: aircraft carriers have a useful life of up to fifty years; major surface combatants and submarines, some thirty-plus years. Many of the ships are flexible and adaptable. As a result, much of the adjustment of maritime forces to the demands of the post-Cold War world will be a matter of doctrine and training.

U.S. maritime forces are much smaller in 1997 than in 1987. The biggest reduction has come in the number of attack submarines and convoy-escort surface combatants. This reduction reflects the diminished threat to battle groups and merchant shipping in the open ocean. The number of carriers and large-deck amphibious ships that can bring aircraft and forces to a conflict theater has decreased only marginally. Mine-warfare capabilities also are being improved.

In 1996, almost one-third of all U.S. maritime forces were continuously deployed overseas, even though the U.S. was at peace. A carrier battle group with supporting ships and a Marine expeditionary unit, the core of the Seventh Fleet, are permanently stationed in Japan. The Fifth Fleet, established in 1995, patrols the Persian Gulf region. The Sixth Fleet, with its home port in Italy, provides a continuous presence in the Mediterranean Sea.
Flashpoints

The flashpoints considered here illustrate the diverse circumstances that could lead to conflict. More important than the particular flashpoints is the analytical framework we propose for thinking about the problems with which the U.S. military will be tasked to respond in the next three to ten years. The analysis demonstrates that the world's flashpoints can be divided into four types of problems, which are, in order of the military challenge presented:

- Major powers, that is, the countries with sufficient weight to be major players in several aspects of world affairs. Only the U.S. is a major player simultaneously in political, economic, and military affairs. Russia is not among the world's top ten economies, yet it qualifies as a major power because of its military might and the heritage of its days as the core of the Soviet superpower. Japan has little capacity to project military power and it is often quiet on the global political scene, but it clearly ranks among the major powers because it has the world's second largest economy. Europe is not a country at all, but the European Union functions more and more like one major power, with Germany at its heart. In the coming decades, several other countries such as India may become major powers; however, none of these countries are likely to achieve major power status in the ten year time frame considered in this report.

- Significant regional contingencies. In the next decade, the highest prospect for an intense military confrontation is the outbreak of a conflict among regional powers. While there are many states in the world with poor relations with a neighbor that could lead to conflict, in most cases the forces involved are relatively small. There are really only four situations in the world where large-scale forces are massed on borders of historic enemies, ready to spring into action: the Korean Peninsula, South Asia, the Persian Gulf, and the Levant. Given the animosities and the disposition of forces, conflict could erupt in any of these theaters with little notice. Indeed, the maintenance of a balance of forces—especially the U.S. commitment to one side in three cases (South Asia being the exception)—is the most important reason why conflicts in these regions may be avoided. In each of these regions, the United States has a strong interest in preventing the use or threat of use of weapons of mass destruction (WMD).

- Troubled states. There is a growing propensity by people in many countries to turn away from the state toward ethnic, tribal, religious or other forms of separatism. Governments, in turn, have lost power and are much more vulnerable to separatist or other special interests. State power is being eroded by globalization—much freer international communication and the increased power of international organizations and corporations. Since the end of the Cold War, the number of states undergoing serious, internal unrest involving violent disorder and large-scale humanitarian or human rights problems has increased substantially. In several instances, internal unrest has generated high tension with neighboring states, while the flood of refugees has created serious internal problems for these states. These problems are of concern to U.S. interests in world stability and in advancement of human rights, as well as on occasion to U.S. interests in regions of present or future strategic importance.

- Transnational problems. A significant and increasing threat to U.S. security comes from a wide range of transnational problems, including those caused by malefactors (drug traffickers and terrorists), impersonal forces (pollution, resource shortages, population growth), and humanitarian disasters. The unifying elements in this broad range of issues are that all move across increasingly porous borders and none are due primarily to the actions of governments.
The U.S. approach to Russia in the 1990s has been aimed at building a better U.S.-Russian security relationship. To achieve this end, the two countries have focused on reforming the Russian political and economic systems and reducing the chance that nuclear weapons from the former Soviet Union's arsenal might fall into the wrong hands. Despite successes, the U.S. and its allies still hedge against the potential that Russia will become a military threat that, in the theater of the Russian periphery, is a peer with Western forces.

Such caution is well founded. Russia's security position has been deteriorating on its southern flank. At the same time, Moscow is concerned about the impact of NATO expansion. These issues are likely to dominate Russia's security concerns through the beginning of the twenty-first century.

Background and Trends

Political Backlash without Economic Conversion

The future of political reform in Russia remains in question. Although President Boris Yeltsin won the 1996 presidential elections as a "reform" candidate, the history of his presidency has been a mixture of democracy and authoritarianism. Additionally, since the election, he has adopted many of the statist ideas of his anti-reform opponents and brought many of those opponents into his government.

Moreover, many Russian pro-reform observers are concerned that President Yeltsin could die or become disabled in office, throwing Russia into a succession crisis. Under law, Viktor Chernomyrdin, as Prime Minister, would become president, but would have to hold new presidential elections in 3 months. If this happens, an anti-reform or slow-reform candidate could win the election since a large percentage of the general Russian population still supports strong state involvement in
the social and economic aspects of daily life. Public support of state involvement is attested to by, among other things, the fact that the Communist Party candidate for president, Gennadii Zyuganov, received 40 percent of the vote.

Chernomyrdin could also postpone another presidential election by declaring a state of emergency—which might be fully justified under the circumstances—and remaining president for an indefinite time. Moreover, Chernomyrdin, himself, is a “go-slow reformer” who would probably drag out the process of privatizing industries presently owned by the Russian government. Either way—with Yeltsin or Chernomyrdin as president, or someone from the major opposition parties—political (and economic) reform in Russia is likely to proceed at a much slower pace than advocated by the West just a few years ago.

Russian President Boris Yeltsin has proclaimed on more than one occasion that, during the 1996 election campaign, he became fully aware of the price the Russian people have had to pay as a result of his economic policies of the previous five years. While he has repeatedly stated that he will continue economic reform, he has promised to ensure that future hardships caused by reform measures are offset by government welfare and employment programs. Prime Minister Viktor Chernomyrdin indicated he was prepared to cover the promises—including many to pay salary backlogs—by raising taxes.

President Yeltsin and Prime Minister Chernomyrdin have both indicated that they intend to maintain—and increase if necessary—the government’s role in the Russian economy. In essence, they have pledged to pursue a “market economy—Russian style.” Western analysts often refer to this as the “muddling-through scenario,” designed more to prevent social upheaval than to enact systemic economic change. If in fact the government’s role is increased, such a move would be counter to the approach the International Monetary Fund (IMF) has tried to get the Russian government to pursue for five years.

Even though increased government control may be the worst approach economically—except for an outright return to central planning—it is likely to be the route Russia follows in the foreseeable future. It is also not dissimilar to the approach Russia took in the early to mid-1990s. Since 1992, privatization—a primary pillar of the IMF’s program for Russia—has proceeded very slowly. As a consequence, the government remains the paymaster for a large percentage of the Russian population. Moreover, basic issues of property ownership have not been resolved because much of the Russian population still fears the results of a decreased government role in everyday life.

But the biggest problem with these slow and inconsistent Russian economic policies is that they have allowed corruption to become an even greater aspect of
Chinese-Russian Relations

Chinese-Russian relations have grown warmer during 1995-1996, punctuated in 1996 by President Yeltsin's visit to Beijing and by new security and economic agreements. During the summit, each country supported the nationalistic claims of the other. It remains unclear whether these developments portend a Chinese-Russian relationship that could negatively affect U.S. and allied interests.

China and Russia share several interests and have few areas of potential discord. Both consider themselves divided nations and make irredentist claims. China recently reinforced its claims to Taiwan and the South China Sea, while Russia seeks to protect 25 million ethnic Russians living outside the Federation. Russia's main source of foreign policy concern is to its east with NATO enlargement, while China's main source of foreign policy concern is to its south with Taiwanese independence. Most of the China-Russia border problems have been settled, and in Central Asia they share a common goal of maintaining the status quo. Worldwide, Russia wants to sell arms, and China seeks to buy them. And finally, the 1960s ideological rivalry is gone.

There are limits to the development of stronger Chinese-Russian relations. Russia would resist economic junior partner status and fears the imbalanced demographics of north China and Siberia. China believes Russia has little to offer economically. But if the NATO enlargement and Taiwan issues are both mishandled by the West, then it is quite possible that these two major powers could align themselves in ways that would be harmful to U.S. interests.

CIS Resistance to Russian "Great Power"

One of Russia's key national-defense interests is preventing foreign-power influence in the security issues of the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS). This concern was reflected in the 1996 presidential message on Russia's security concept that was sent to the upper chamber of the Russian parliament. For example, regarding Central Asia, it asserted: "The situation in the region is characterized by a fierce struggle for dominance and influence between China, Turkey, Iran, Pakistan, (and even Afghanistan), Saudi Arabia, the United States, and the NATO countries (particularly Germany)." As a consequence, Russia has been trying since 1992 to establish security relations with the other countries of the CIS region to bind them to Moscow.

Those who advocate the restoration of Russia as a great power have suggested various approaches based on the idea of reinstituting a union, possibly the Soviet Union itself. Their methods range from persuading the other countries of the CIS to hold (and pass) referenda that would reestablish the USSR to using force to bring the countries back into a union. None of the proposals is reasonable. In fact, talk of such proposals during the Russian presidential campaign of 1996 alarmed most countries of the CIS and hurt the cause of great-power restorationists outside of Russia.

Since the dissolution of the Soviet Union in December 1991, Russia has struggled to maintain exclusive influence over security matters in the CIS region. Policymakers in Moscow have considered several approaches: trying to gain exclusive influence over the security decisions of other CIS states but not involving themselves in any other aspect of the countries' political dominion; assuming command of military forces but permitting political autonomy; and taking control of all aspects of the neighbors' political life—as advocated by the most extreme great-power restorationists. No single approach has been decided upon. Moreover, all of the proposals have drawbacks for Russia and face resistance in most of the CIS countries.
Indeed, most of the countries of the CIS do not want to return to life under Moscow’s political control. They accept, for the most part, that they must maintain economic—or even some security—ties with Russia, but they are determined to maintain sufficient say over their own affairs to be considered sovereign by the international community. Ukraine has been the most adamant on this matter, consistently pursuing a plan in which it would have no permanent security commitments to either the West or the East, but would move from one to the other as required to shift the balance of power. The commitment not to surrender sovereignty can also be seen in bilateral agreements signed with Russia, such as the Russian-Armenian and Russian-Georgian treaties. Even in those treaties that permit Russian forces to be based in another CIS country, indigenous personnel are allowed to join the Russian forces; in some cases, such as on the Tajikistan-Afghanistan border, indigenous personnel (Tajiks) are reported to form the majority of the Russian forces.

The determination of CIS countries to remain free of total Russian domination can be seen best in the CIS security treaties that have (and have not) been signed. Such security treaties lack substance and have been signed by a limited number of CIS partners. Ukraine, for example, has refused to sign the two most significant CIS defense documents: the CIS Security Agreement and the Joint Air Defense Agreement.

Since the founding of the CIS in December 1991, Russia’s co-founders have been leery of the commonwealth’s becoming a military control mechanism similar to the Warsaw Treaty Organization. Individual CIS decisions have allowed Russia to establish a military presence in some CIS countries (such as Tajikistan and Georgia), but the decisions have also limited Russia’s charters (border security and peacekeeping) and have allowed other CIS countries to determine their own degree of participation.

The other CIS countries reaffirmed their opposition to Russian great power during the Russian presidential campaign, when they signed a document at a meeting of the CIS heads of state that opposed candidate Gennadii Zyuganov. Most political leaders of the CIS have been careful not to comment on the internal politics of others, but in this instance they went out of their way to go on record as opposing the Russian presidential candidate most closely associated with the idea of reestablishing the old Soviet Union.

**Maintenance of Good Relations with All World Powers**

Since the dissolution of the USSR, Russia has sought to prevent any rift between itself and the major world powers. It will likely pursue this goal into the foreseeable future, despite an increased emphasis on the belief that Russia must reestablish itself as a “great power.” The two ideas are not mutually exclusive, but their coexistence depends upon Russian diplomacy and Western agreement that a regionally strong Russia is important to Eurasian stability—and not evidence of Moscow’s return to the confrontational philosophy of the Soviet years.

Russian foreign policy (under Andrei Kozyrev) embraced the premise that the country’s future security depended on Russia’s full acceptance into the international security and economic systems established by the West. During the mid-1990s, however, a change in Moscow’s outlook made Russia’s leaders less willing to comply with Western demands but still determined to enter the international order dominated by the major Western powers. At that time, Moscow acknowledged that Russia must accept full responsibility for its future development and must not become exclusively aligned with any single center of global power.

Consequently, Russia is pursuing good relations with all the centers of world power—including its immediate neighbor, China—through multilateral and bilateral agreements. Russia is signing multiple commercial and defense agreements with China, including a series of agreements to clear up the border disagreements that have plagued Russian-Chinese relations for a hundred years. At the same time, it is seeking membership in exclusively Western organizations, such as the Group of Seven and the European Union.
This approach would seem to indicate Moscow recognizes that Russia will not regain the status of a superpower in the near future, and that it was unrealistic for Kozyrev to expect the West to reserve Russia’s place at the table of world powers while the country was transforming itself into a modern political and economic state. Further, Russian leaders anticipate an increase in China’s international power and role that not only could threaten Russia’s sovereignty over its eastern regions, but could replace the importance of Russia in Western foreign policy considerations. Russia is simply hedging its bets during a time of world transition.

Russia’s approach—branded “equal-distance” by some security officials—does not mean that Moscow considers all major powers to be equally important. It considers the United States to be the premier power in the immediate post-Cold War period, having unmatched global influence. Correspondingly, the United States is also the target of most of Moscow’s suspicions that foreign powers are attempting to diminish further Russia’s global influence, especially within the area of the former Soviet Union.

China, which is considered to be an important rising power for the next century, is also viewed as a direct threat to Moscow’s sphere of control—within Russia itself. Security specialists in Moscow anticipate that China could economically—and politically—dominate the Russian Far East as waves of Chinese migrate into the area and large numbers of ethnic Russians leave. Unlike its suspicion of U.S. actions, however, Moscow’s dire assessment of Chinese migration is that it is an inevitable process. Consequently, Russia’s ongoing negotiations with the Chinese to settle historic disputes are, in large part, an effort to establish mutual trust and open channels of communication in anticipation of the time when events in the Far East pit one country’s interests against the other’s.

Germany is the third major power of concern to Moscow. It is not only viewed as a major economic power in its own right but as the key to the economic center of Western Europe. Moscow does not seem to believe that Germany will present a separate military challenge to Russia in the foreseeable future, but that assessment is based on the assumption that the United States will retain military forces on the European continent. Moscow, however, does view Germany as one of the two major forces behind NATO enlargement (the U.S. being the other). As a result, many Russian security specialists believe that, given its own reins, Germany would turn Western Europe into a military force against which Russia would have to prepare to fight. While this scenario probably will not play

### Ethnic Russians Outside Russia

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Russian presence outside Russia</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>10% - 25%</td>
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<tr>
<td>25% - 40%</td>
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<tr>
<td>40% or more</td>
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<table>
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<tr>
<th>Russian presence in European capitals</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>500,000 or less</td>
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<td>500,000 - 1,000,000</td>
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<tr>
<td>1,000,000 - 1,500,000</td>
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<td>1,500,000 or more</td>
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<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Region</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Russia</td>
<td>149,300</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Belarus</td>
<td>78,000</td>
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<tr>
<td>Ukraine</td>
<td>73,000</td>
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<tr>
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<td>65,000</td>
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<tr>
<td>Armenia</td>
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<tr>
<td>Azerbaijan</td>
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<tr>
<td>Estonia</td>
<td>60,000</td>
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<tr>
<td>Latvia</td>
<td>52,000</td>
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Note: Based on 1993 World Factbook.
out in the near future, it reflects Moscow’s ability to make sober security assessments even when it depends on a particular country for substantial economic assistance. Owing to Germany’s strength, Moscow believes that the U.S. influence in Europe is essential, and that Russia must establish its economic importance and reestablish its military prowess.

In all, over the next ten to fifteen years, Russia can be expected to attempt to increase bilateral and multilateral economic and defense ties with all the major world powers, but in such a manner that Russian ties with any one power will not upset relations with the others. With the exception of the former Soviet states, Russian leaders probably consider it against their country’s interests to enter into defense alliances that might be interpreted by others as forming a new military bloc.

Deterioration of the Armed Forces

Since the late 1980s, the Russian (and formerly Soviet) conventional armed forces have been steadily deteriorating. Numerous troop redeployments, constant changes in command structure, promotion of incompetent senior officers, large-scale and forcewide corruption, infrequent training, excessive equipment downtime, draft evasion, ghost employees, and nonpayment of wages have caused a large number of Russian conventional units to be unprepared for combat, incapable of functioning as units even at the tactical level.

The debacle during the first use of forces in the Russian republic of Chechnya is the best-known manifestation of the Russian military’s ineptness. However, there have been many other cases, such as the initial deployment of Russian forces into South Ossetia, when the General Staff had to scrounge sub-units from throughout the Russian forces simply to put together a task force able to carry out its assignment. Furthermore, only a few large tactical units (battalion and regimental size) of the Russian Army are capable of performing as a unified force.

Although multiple factors have contributed to force deterioration, as noted above, the military leadership must take some of the blame for the poor state of the Russian armed forces. For example, military leaders opposed every effort to downsize the Army inherited from the Soviet Union to a force whose size is appropriate for the missions it is likely to execute during the late 1990s. The military leadership is trying to maintain a conventional force reported by some to be approximately ninety maneuver divisions when Russia’s GDP is only 35 percent of the former Soviet Union’s. That is far beyond the size Russia requires in its new role as a regional power.

The Russian military leadership has steadfastly ignored the security need for a military reform program that downizes the conventional force structure and upgrades training. As a consequence, the funding authorized for conventional forces during the mid-1990s has been spread among too many requirements, supporting none of them in a satisfactory manner.

Reports of problems in the conventional forces typically have included such observations as:

- No more than 20 percent of the military’s manpower perform combat-related jobs.
- In the Ground Forces, only eight maneuver divisions are judged mission-capable—and four of these are under the peacetime command; 70–75 percent of tanks are in need of replacement; modern tanks account for only 2–5 percent of the force inventory—with estimates that the proportion will rise to only 30 percent by 2005; and only fifty Infantry Fighting Vehicles were bought in the last two years, despite the ongoing war in Chechnya.
- Only 60 percent of Air Assault units are judged to be combat ready; and estimates predict that by 2000, the units will have only 10 percent of their airlift requirement.
- In the Air Forces, actual forcewide flight time is less than 30 percent of scheduled flight time; only 30–50 percent of the fuel requirements are met—causing fuel to be distributed only to those squads with experienced pilots, leaving younger pilots (the future of the pilot corps) to forgo ad-
advanced training; only one hundred airfields with artificial covering exist—and they accommodate three times the number of aircraft for which they were designed; 20 percent of these airfields are beyond repair.

In the Naval Forces, between 1990 and 1995, personnel was cut by 50 percent (fleet aviation personnel by 60 percent), ships by 50 percent, and fleet aircraft by 66 percent. It has been estimated that the Navy loses thirteen to fifteen ships each month and that by 2000, the reduction in Russia’s shipbuilding capacity will be irreversible.

In particular, the military leadership has opposed any imposition of glasnost on the force-development process. It has exerted great control over defense law-making in the Russian legislature, limiting the legislature’s attempts at oversight. Budgets submitted to the legislature have consisted of summary entries for the major categories, and no effort has been made to justify requested funds based on threat and risk assessments. (Even General Aleksandr Lebed’s startling call to reduce Russia’s maneuver forces to fifteen active duty and fifteen reserve divisions was reportedly made without a threat and risk assessment.) Instead, the General Staff has listed all possible threats that could arise (regardless of probability) and sought funding that is clearly disproportionate to what the Russian economy can afford—the initial request for 1996 amounted to 30-50 percent of the anticipated government expenditures.

The tight-lipped approach of the military hurts its efforts to obtain the budget it wants. Because the Ministry of Defense’s budget request is so general and is not tied to prioritized threats and capability assessments, the Russian government and the Duma have cut the request, arguing that it sought a percent of the GDP that threatened Russia’s economic programs. Discussions on security needs have been avoided, however, and ironically, the Ministry of Defense has been free to spend as it chooses whatever funds come its way. Corruption is reportedly widespread within the ministry, and Russian security has suffered greatly.

It is possible that, in the future, the Ministry of Defense under General Rodionov will submit more detailed line-item budget requests based on prioritized threat assessments. But if those assessments inflate threats to justify a conventional army the size of that inherited from the Soviet Union, it is likely that the ministry will still not receive the funding it seeks. Stories about soldiers starving to death or serving in combat without proper winter clothing, and of soldier labor and equipment being sold off, will continue to make news, while force readiness deteriorates.

The situation is different when it comes to the Russian Strategic Defense Forces. It appears that these forces have continued to receive close to full funding since the fall of the Soviet Union. In light of the deterioration of the conventional forces, some Russian security specialists
seem to believe that the strategic nuclear force is the only arm of the military left for deterrence. While such “nuclearization” of Russian thinking should concern the West, there is cause for some optimism because Russia’s executive branch appears to be pursuing the provisions of the START I arms-control agreement. The success of (still ongoing) U.S. efforts to transfer nuclear weapons to Russia from Ukraine, Kazakhstan, and Belarus is another bright spot in U.S.-Russian security relations.

Potential Flashpoints

The regions on Russia’s borders that have the most potential to become locations for military conflicts with Russia are listed below in the order of their importance to the United States.

Baltics

There are several issues that could lead to conflict in the Baltic states: historical animosities; border disputes—especially between Estonia and Russia; perceived injustices to ethnic minorities—most notably Russian; disagreements over the disposition of troops; and disagreements over military transit rights. Additionally, because Russia considers the region to be of importance to its security, Moscow would probably react militarily if foreign military forces perceived hostile to Russia were stationed in the region.

The Baltic problem having the most potential for developing into a conflict is the treatment of the Russian minority—especially in Estonia and Latvia. Thirty percent of Estonia’s population is ethnic Russian and generally concentrated in the eastern part of the state. Thirty-four percent of Latvia’s population is ethnic Russian and concentrated in the country’s largest cities. Both states are concerned that they would lose their cultural identity if their citizenship laws were relaxed, allowing the resident ethnic Russians to have full political rights.

Consequently, tension exists in the two states as Estonia and Latvia resist extending rights and benefits to their Russian minorities; and the ethnic Russians, calling Tallinn and Riga’s policies “apartheid” seek political support from Moscow. It is possible that future strife between the Russian minorities and either the Estonian or Latvian government could result in street fighting or even civil war. In such an event, Moscow could be expected to intervene on the side of the Russian minority, providing either military support or Russian forces.

Another issue that could develop into conflict is that of Russian access to Kaliningrad. Kaliningrad is Russian territory, but has no land routes connecting it to the rest of Russia. Short-term agreements have allowed Russia to transit Belarus and Lithuania to Kaliningrad; and Russia will need to have such agreements in the future. However, since much of the Russian material crossing this route is military, Lithuania has raised objections to a treaty extension. Lithuania has also attempted to tie further agreements to its efforts to enter NATO—an explosive issue in itself for Moscow. The ultra-nationalistic nature of politics in Kaliningrad makes an already strained situation regarding future transit rights even worse. A military confrontation over the issue, therefore, is entirely possible.

The explosive potential of the Baltic states is also in large measure due to Russia’s apparently conditional acceptance of their sovereignty. Russia supports the independence of the three Baltic states for two reasons: diplomatically, the states are important to the West, and Russia’s opposition to the states’ independence would set back Moscow’s relations with the West; and militarily, Moscow probably believes it can re-conquer the states with little preparation. The states in themselves do not threaten Russia’s security. However, their independence does substantially reduce the naval facilities available to Russia in case of war. The ports in the St. Petersburg area are limited and could easily be blockaded by an enemy power, such as NATO. Kaliningrad is also isolated and possibly not supportable in wartime from Russia proper, and it is also subject to an enemy blockade. Therefore, Kaliningrad is not seen by the Russian military as significantly adding to Russia’s naval correlation of forces in the Baltic Sea.
Ethnic Russians and Ukrainians in Ukraine

Russia would need the Baltic ports in wartime—if for no other reason than to deny their use to an enemy power. Consequently, it can be assumed that the Russian General Staff would plan on gaining them back through military actions at the start of any conflict with the West—even during a crisis period preceding the outbreak of large-scale war.

A western foreign military force in the Baltics during peacetime would be considered by the Russian military to be a threat to Russia. It would be seen as an aggressive strategic deployment of forces in peacetime that has only one purpose—to support future land and naval offensive operations against Russia.

Ukraine

Though problems in Ukraine could bring about a major conflict with Russia, such problems appear to be much more controllable those those in the Caucasus and Central Asia. Tensions would most likely arise in eastern Ukraine, in the Crimea, and over the issue of control and support facility arrangements for the Ukrainian and Russian Black Sea-based fleets.

Speculation about problems centers on the local ethnic Russian population in the eastern Ukraine and Crimea. Some people fear that ethnic Russians’ discontent with economic deprivations and perceived (or real) discrimination could lead them to rebel against the central government in Kiev, turning to Moscow for help. At that point, it is speculated, Moscow might respond with force against the only other country of the former Soviet Union that has a major military force of its own.

The political and economic situation in Ukraine certainly makes such scenarios seem plausible. Kiev was slow to lay out economic reform programs and quick to sidetrack them when faced with social unrest. Eastern Ukraine—where the most ethnic Russians reside—has suffered most by the breakup of the Soviet command economy and prospered little under economic reform. There are sound economic reasons for the economic hardships in eastern Ukraine (industrial obsolescence and economically inviable mining). Political factions who oppose an independent Ukraine have used the economic deprivations of the east to promote political unrest and strong support for reunification with Russia.

Similarly, on the surface, the situation in the Crimea might lead one to conclude that Russia would become militarily involved in what is legally an Ukrainian internal matter. The majority of the peninsula’s population is ethnically Russian. Further, the Russian population believes it rightfully should be a part of Russia and that the government in Kiev does not act in the interests of the majority Russian population in the Crimea. Local suspicions of Kiev’s bad faith are further fueled by the fact that the government in Kiev is the only entity of the former Soviet Union to support resettlement of Crimean Tatars in northern Crimea. Further, the new Ukrainian Constitution, adopted in June 1996 despite the fact that wording of key sections was still in dispute, is unlikely to resolve
differences since it requires Kiev’s approval of Crimea’s constitution. As a consequence, it is likely that the ethnic Russian population’s distrust of the central government will continue to fuel social unrest.

The problem with such scenarios is that they assume the government in Moscow places more value on gaining control over the two economically depressed regions than it does with maintaining good relations with Kiev. Just the opposite is likely to be true. It is unlikely that Moscow would seek to gain control over the area of eastern Ukraine which would present Moscow with even more economic and ethnic problems with which it would have to deal. In fact, in past incidences in which residents of the two regions sought Moscow’s support, while the Russian legislature supported the ethnic Russians, the leaders in the Kremlin ignored their pleas.

Likewise, cooperation between Kiev and Moscow can be expected to continue to defuse crises that occur in the protracted and bitter negotiations over the former Soviet Black Sea Fleet. Acrimonious relations over—and within—the fleet itself have been primarily fostered by naval leaders and nationalistic politicians within the legislative branches of the two governments. For their part, the presidents of the two countries have shown no interest in entering a conflict over the division of the fleet’s assets.

Most importantly, the main difference between the issues in Ukraine and the CIS regions to the east is that both Kiev and Moscow want to avoid the escalation of problems—a situation that is likely to persist unless an ultra-nationalist like Zhironovsky were to come to power in Russia. There are several military reasons alone why both countries would want to prevent problems escalating to the point of conflict. For its part, Moscow cannot be sure that it could achieve a clear-cut military victory in a conflict with Ukraine. Russia has a larger conventional force structure, but many of its forces are at cadre strength; and, in the conflict in Chechnya—which has involved the largest contingency of Russian forces in combat since Afghanistan—the Russian forces have not performed well against an enemy that has much less combat potential than does the Ukrainian military. Although Ukraine’s military suffers from most of the same problems that plague the Russian military, Kiev does have a force of modern Soviet equipment that is larger than any other country in Europe except Russia itself. Moreover, Moscow cannot be sure that the West would not back Kiev in some way in a Russian-Ukrainian conflict.

The bottom line is that the presidents of both countries are aware that a military conflict—of any scale—between the two countries is not in their immediate or long-term interests. Consequently, they could be expected to work together to defuse an internal Ukrainian rebellion or seek a solution that would be recognized by international law.

The Caucasus

In contrast to Mikhail Gorbachev’s approach of limiting Soviet military actions in the Caucasus, the Russian approach since early 1992 has been one of steady involvement. Though its force deployments are never overwhelming, Moscow has employed Russian forces and provided military hardware in several parts of the region. Russian troops have been sent as peacekeepers to South Ossetia and Abkhazia in Georgia; Russian equipment was reportedly supplied to the Abkhazians at the beginning of their war for independence against Georgia; and the Russian decision to turn over Soviet military equipment to Armenia and Azerbaijan has been portrayed by Baku as an attempt to influence the tide of the war over Nagorno-Karabakh. In addition, Russia has deployed troops along the CIS’s external borders in the southern part of the Caucasus and signed agreements to keep Russian military units in Georgia (a move that may benefit Tbilisi more than Moscow). Moreover, Russian troops have been employed in the Caucasus regions in southern Russia—most notably in Chechnya, but also in North Ossetia and Ingushetia.

This military involvement, however, has not brought the stability to the region that Moscow desires. The greater Caucasus region is, in fact, extremely unstable and has the potential to become even more so. That is due primarily to three factors: increased interest in the region from coun-
tries outside the borders of the former Soviet Union, such as Turkey and Iran; the potential profits from controlling the transport of Caspian Sea oil across the region; and Russia's military weakness, as demonstrated in the Chechen war.

In fact, the greater Caucasus region—because of developments in the Chechen war—is the major "hot spot" with which Moscow must deal. Many in Moscow believe that support for the Chechen rebels has come from Muslim countries (though not necessarily from Muslim governments), including Turkey, Iran, Pakistan, Saudi Arabia, Libya, and Jordan. Additionally, the rebels’ base of support has reportedly expanded into the southern regions of Russia itself, where the rebels are said to receive medical care and enjoy rest and relaxation facilities. In its effort to stop the Chechen forces, Russia has conducted cross-border operations into Azerbaijan and Georgia, attacking supply lines that lead to southern Russian provinces, such as Dagestan and Kabardino-Balkar. Moreover, the war has spread to Russia itself, which has suffered the seizure of a hospital in Budennovsk in 1995 and several aircraft hijackings.

Instability in the Caucasus is heightened by contention between Russia and its southern neighbors over how Caspian Sea oil will be transported to market. In October 1995, one of the consortiums (Azerbaijan International Operating Company) took a major step toward resolving the issue when it announced preliminary plans to exploit the Azeri oil fields by sending oil through two different pipelines in the lands of the former Soviet Union. The decision included the following provisions: By the end of 1996, oil is to be pumped through an existing pipeline that crosses Russian territory and runs from Azerbaijan to the Russian city of Novorossiisk on the Black Sea. This pipeline, which runs underground through the Chechen capital city of Grozny, is being upgraded. At a later date, oil will be pumped through a second pipeline that crosses Azerbaijan and Georgia, arriving at the Georgian port of Batumi. An old pipeline along this route is to be rehabilitated or rebuilt.

The consortium’s decision gives Russia the major role in transporting Caspian Sea oil for the immediate future. During that time, Russia will most likely try to make the construction of a second pipeline look unattractive. Conversely, the Caucasus states will have an incentive to keep Moscow occupied with wars within Russia’s borders (like that in Chechnya) to ensure that Moscow does not have the resources to cause trouble in their states, and to detract from the desirability of the Russian route.

Lastly, the aforementioned deterioration in the Russian military force raises the possibility that Muslim countries might be able to make inroads into the area of the former Soviet Union, even into Russia itself, through the Caucasus.

Central Asia

Radical Muslim dominance of Central Asia would be seen as a major security threat by Moscow and would lead to a renewed emphasis on rebuilding the Russian military and associated economic infrastructure. The spread of radical Muslim regimes would raise the specter of Russian borders being pushed back not just in kilometers, but in centuries, through southern Kazakhstan and into the southern regions of Russia itself, west to the Black Sea.

While most of the regimes in Central Asia are secular in nature, contact with Muslim countries such as Turkey, Iran (particularly by Turkmenistan and Uzbekistan), and others is increasing. Moves such as the 1996 completion of a railway linking Turkmenistan and Iran are unsettling to Russian leaders.

Further, militant factions in Afghanistan have been supporting the Muslim opposition forces in Tajikistan against a weakening and unpopular government. The civil war in Tajikistan could easily turn against the government, bringing to power a regime that would have ties to Muslim radicals outside the CIS. Moscow's support of the Tajik government has been limited both militarily and diplomatically. While Russia has supplied some of the troops defending the Tajik-Afghan border, it has remained essentially neutral toward the internal political struggle. Nevertheless, the establishment of an Afghan-supported Muslim government in
Dushanbe would be seen by Moscow as a major step toward replacing Russian influence throughout the Central Asian region with that of a hostile religious force.

U.S. Interests and Approach

Net Assessment

Moscow will be preoccupied with its internal economical and political turmoil and, to a lesser extent, with maintaining its domination of the former Soviet Union. This will be made more difficult by the deterioration of the Russian armed forces since 1991 and steadfast resistance from the new states in the Commonwealth of Independent States. The ongoing fighting between Russian forces and the Chechen rebels has shown Russia's military weakness and will likely encourage Muslim extremists to support more military actions against Russia throughout the Caucasus (including on Russian territory) and in Central Asia.

Difficulties between Russia and the Baltic states present a particular problem for the West. All the countries involved are important to the West. Moreover, both the Baltic states and Russia tend to view the West's position on the various issues that could result in conflict as indicators of western long-term intentions regarding their countries. On the other hand, the potential for flashpoints developing within Ukraine that could pit Moscow and Kiev against each other are low since the Russian and Ukrainian leadership appear determined not to be pushed into conflicts.

Although the prospects do not appear to be high, the possibility that the Russian government will become ultranationalistic cannot be dismissed. If this happens, Moscow will be more inclined to rely on
military means to protect what it perceives as its security interests in the Near Abroad. If the leadership placed top priority on the task and if the economy supported such an effort, the Russian conventional forces might be revitalized within as little as five years, and they could be modernized within ten to fifteen years. At the same time, even compliance with START II will leave Russia with a strategic nuclear force that could threaten the United States.

Moreover, political turmoil will continue in parts of the former Soviet Union over the next decade. That increases the prospects for U.S. military involvement. It is conceivable that the U.S. military may become involved in some former Soviet republics as part of an international peace operations effort. On the other hand, if Russia is under the control of ultranationalists, the U.S. might provide assistance to those opposing Russian forces and could possibly be involved in armed conflict with Russian forces along Russia's periphery. While such a scenario is unlikely for the next decade, it would be prudent for U.S. military planners to begin to consider the prospect of limited conflict with Russia as a potential theater peer.

U.S. Interests

Reducing the Military Threat to the United States or Its Allies

For the foreseeable future, Russia will retain the capability to inflict unacceptable damage on the U.S. through use of its nuclear arsenal. Reducing the threat from this nuclear arsenal will remain the principal U.S. interest vis-a-vis Russia. This threat is a function both of Russia's capabilities and its intentions.

A Russia hostile to the West and possessing a powerful conventional military would force the United States and its allies to again devote excessive defense resources and diplomatic attention to Moscow, limiting the West's ability to focus on other important international problems.

On a related point, the U.S. has an interest in ensuring that no government hostile to the U.S.—such as Iran, which has a major interest in the Caucasus—gains sig-

ificant influence in the region. If this were to happen, instability would increase and take on a distinctly anti-American nature.

Peace and Stability in the Former Soviet Union

The boundaries of the CIS touch a large number of countries that are important to the United States and that have important and historical interests in the region. Regional instability increases the chances of friction between these border countries and CIS countries—and among the CIS countries themselves. Conflicts of any type within the CIS or along its borders will adversely affect United States' economic and security interests in the region and create a diplomatic quagmire involving allies and other countries of major concern. It is important that Russia acts in concert with the other former Soviet Republics to ensure the region's stability.

Market Access

The U.S. has an interest in ensuring that American businesses have fair access to the markets of those regions, especially the oil reserves. The oil reserves of the Caspian Sea alone are estimated to rival those of the Middle East. If American businesses do not have access to the region's reserves, the United States' security will suffer—as will its ability to influence the political and economic developments in the region.

Long-term Democratic Reform

In the long term, the success of democratic reforms—particularly in Russia and Ukraine—will enhance U.S. security. In turn, the establishment of democratic values will profoundly reduce the chances of conflict. Democratic reforms offer the best long-term answer to the aggressive nationalism and ethnic hatreds unleashed at the end of the Cold War.

U.S. Approach

Since the demise of the Soviet Union, Washington has assumed that Russia would remain the major actor in that region and a strategic nuclear power comparable to the United States. Consequently, the U.S. has encouraged Russia to pursue the stabilizing aspects of a modern soci-
ety—a democratic government, a market economy, demilitarization of the economy, reduction of conventional and nuclear forces to a level sufficient for defense, and enhancement of the security surrounding nuclear weapons and materials.

The United States, along with the major states of the Western world, has encouraged democratic reform in Russia and supported Russia’s attempt to establish a market economy through bilateral and international loans and technical-assistance programs. It established the Nunn-Lugar program, which has successfully stopped nuclear proliferation and will significantly decrease nuclear accidents, as well as other government-to-government and privately financed programs intended to assist Russia in its transformation. The United States has also been a major supporter of IMF loan programs for Russia.

The U.S. has advocated the reduction and re-orientation of NATO’s defense planning away from the scenario of countering the old-style Soviet attack on Western Europe. U.S. sponsorship of the Partnership for Peace (PFP) program has been aimed at expanding the security enjoyed by NATO members into the countries and regions formerly under the domination of the Soviet Union. Russia’s participation in the PFP program has been considered important to Europe’s security as a whole and to Russia itself. Consequently, the United States has steadfastly encouraged and welcomed Russian participation in the program.

Similarly, the United States has encouraged Moscow to build a new, cooperative relationship with the rest of Europe through a special relationship with NATO and participation in the peace process in Bosnia. The U.S. and its NATO allies have reduced troop levels, established new alliance goals, and reorganized the NATO command structure, in large part to show the West’s good will towards Russia. And the U.S. has bilaterally, and as part of the NATO alliance, routinely consulted with Moscow to ensure that European security will be enhanced at every turn.

These measures have all been intended to enhance the security of the United States, its European allies, and the former members of the Warsaw Treaty Organization, including Russia itself. They have not explicitly addressed the security threat that has started to arise in the southern region of the former Soviet Union, although they have implicitly assumed that Russia would remain a military power capable of dominating the security affairs in the region of the former Soviet Union (except in Ukraine). However, Russia’s inability in the mid-1990s to develop, train, and maintain its conventional forces—best shown by its inept military performance in Chechnya—has resulted in force deterioration to the point that regional security may be endangered because Russia no longer dominates the area of the former Soviet Union. A regional security vacuum may be developing at the same time that the oil resources of the Caspian Sea appear to be exploitable by states other than Russia. That, in turn, confronts the United States and other major world powers with the need to consider options for maintaining stability in the most volatile regions of the former Soviet Union—Central Asia, and, more important, the Caucasus.

It will be difficult for the West to persuade Russian security specialists that NATO expansion presents no military threat to Russia. Over the longer term, the challenge will be to persuade Russia to cooperate with NATO. That could present the West with an opportunity to achieve some of its goals regarding Russia that appear to be slipping beyond reach. However, such cooperation will be difficult unless the Russian government establishes comprehensive and effective civilian control over its armed forces, as well as a rational force-development program that sizes the Russian military according to the most likely threat and in a cost-effective manner.
In 1996, Europe was still in the process of adjusting to the revolutionary changes of the previous decade. In terms of war and peace, Bosnia had been the only site of military conflict (not counting the serious fighting in the former Soviet Union, especially in the Caucasus region). NATO military action against the Bosnian-Serbs stopped the fighting and paved the way for the Dayton Accords, a plan for peace and stability effected by a 60,000-strong NATO Implementation Force (IFOR). IFOR encountered relative success and some frustrations, especially with the Serbs, but in the minds of most Europeans the relevance of NATO in the post-Cold War period was now without question. Moreover, U.S. engagement and leadership were fundamental to this outcome and Washington continues to be heavily involved in NATO’s continuing reform and engagement with countries which were formerly neutrals or Warsaw Pact adversaries.

In political terms, questions of enlarging NATO and the European Union (EU), and of revamping their internal structures, were at the top of the European agenda. The EU is also preoccupied with establishing a full monetary union and creating a single currency. All these projects raised major issues of finance and of maintaining effective decision-making processes. NATO enlargement faces the further risk of damaging relations with Russia, thus requiring a high degree of political and diplomatic skill on NATO’s part. The European Council, the Union’s highest decision-making body faces the task of marrying enlargement (“widening”) with the updating of the Maastricht treaty’s political and institutional innovations (“deepening”), all of which are being discussed at the “Intergovernmental Conference” (IGC) which is in continuous session in 1996. In many ways, NATO enlargement and EU enlargement are connected and overlapping problems. Indeed, U.S. policy (such as the Atlantic Initiative) seeks to underscore this linkage. NATO and EU enlargements are seen by both Europeans and Americans as parallel tasks, developing on parallel tracks albeit with different timetables.
Background and Trends

Economic Problems Reverberate Through Society and Defense Industries

Economies Performing Below Par

The economy is the dominant domestic issue in 1996 and European nations face hard choices in:

- Reducing unacceptable levels of unemployment and growing public debt
- Stimulating economic growth and prosperity
- Maintaining social services and pensions without adding to the tax burden

European governments east and west are in agreement that the economy is their biggest political problem and social constraint. But there is wide disagreement about policy. Both politicians and the public prefer to blame difficulties on outside forces—such as their country’s Maastricht obligations, the Bundesbank, or the International Monetary Fund (IMF)—rather than fault their own past actions and expectations. As a result, Europe will close out the century with economic problems severely constraining its ability to update defense assets and build new structures to fill the post-Cold War security environment.

In Western Europe, gross domestic product (GDP) levels are registering at best modest growth in the big countries; the German economy, still dealing with the costs of German unification, has fallen into a technical recession. German unemployment has risen to 11 percent, rivaling the 12 percent rate in France. The big EU governments are striving to meet the “convergence criteria” that the Maastricht Treaty sets for admission to the single European currency union to be decided in early 1998. The new Italian government under Romano Prodi is trying to cut budgets and reduce deficits at least to resemble its German and French partners.

Most of the former Warsaw Pact countries show equally disappointing economic results, with certain exceptions for Poland, the Czech Republic and Hungary. GDP patterns have moved irregularly, as central eastern European countries have introduced market reforms at different paces with varying rates of success. Like certain EU governments, some of the central eastern European countries have tended to undertake short-term policies and cutbacks in budgets and programs, modified in response to public opinion, labor aggressiveness, demonstrations, or elections.

Defense Industry Competition in Declining Markets

The end of the Cold War resulted in significant cuts in military equipment spending throughout Europe, with the marginal exceptions of Greece and Turkey. Some governments have tried to encourage industries to convert from defense material to capital or consumer goods; other
governments have tried to find new export markets, particularly in the Middle East and Asia. These attempts have had mixed success, but a common result has been increased competition among various national industries, often pitting NATO allies against each other.

**Weak Governments Struggle With Social Problems**

In a number of European countries, weak governments have been unable to effectively deal with the general economic downturn and ailing defense industries. Germany and France since the presidential elections reflect stable political majorities in power but face some of the worst economic indicators and increasingly intransigent publics. On Europe’s rim, from Spain to England and Turkey to Italy, there are mostly coalition-based, newly elected governments from polarized electorates or, in London, a highly unpopular government that faces a major reorientation after elections scheduled for mid-1997, at the latest. Public approval ratings in these countries are uniformly low while expectations for continued support for social services remain extremely high. In addition, the new freedom to travel across the old Cold War boundaries has resulted in unexpected and unwanted movements of people. Countries that earlier emphasized the rights of asylum seekers during the Cold War are now pulling up the gangplanks because the scale of immigration and the costs of social integration have become too great.

Moreover, uncontrolled or unchecked immigration invariably impacts on crime. For example, the relatively small illegal immigration base in Switzerland produces over 50 percent of the country’s violent crime. The end of a number of former police states has brought a new level and sophistication of criminal activity to many parts of Europe. Relatively open borders invite smuggling that is often controlled by ethnic or national groups of criminals, which local police seem powerless to stop. Criminal activity, now linked in the minds of many Europeans with terrorism, further drains government coffers. European security concerns, which formerly emphasized external threats and a military response, now focus in the mid-1990s on domestic problems that require strengthened police forces. The “third pillar” of the Maastricht treaty with police and judicial matters is slowly taking shape to deal with these problems on an EU-wide basis.

**European Integration Progressing Slowly**

**European Unification Still on Track but Contested**

The EC’s Maastricht Treaty in 1991 created the European Union and projected a full monetary union (EMU) at a very propitious time: Domestic climates were good, there was genuine optimism over peace dividends and relations with Russia, and Bosnia was not yet a European tragedy of major proportions. Now the state of the economy, inter-European competition, declining defense expenditures, immigration problems, and crime are currently shaping the debate over integration.

The IGC opened in March 1996 in Turin, Italy, to begin a large-scale review of Maastricht and the new Europe with special focus on decision-making, especially for common foreign and defense policies and on establishing conditions for new EU membership. The interests of key states differ. A main goal of the IGC is to prevent a
Europe’s Tough Targets

European Union nations seeking to meet the Maastricht Criteria for Joining a Single Currency.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>MAASTRICHT TARGET</th>
<th>Inflation</th>
<th>Public Deficit As a % of GDP</th>
<th>Public Deficit As a % of GDP</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>3.2</td>
<td>3.0</td>
<td>60.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Germany</td>
<td>1.7%</td>
<td>3.0%</td>
<td>61.9%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>France</td>
<td>1.6%</td>
<td>3.0%</td>
<td>57.3%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Italy</td>
<td>3.0%</td>
<td>5.5%</td>
<td>127.8%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>U.K.</td>
<td>2.4%</td>
<td>3.3%</td>
<td>50.8%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Belgium</td>
<td>2.0%</td>
<td>3.0%</td>
<td>129.6%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Denmark</td>
<td>1.9%</td>
<td>1.0%</td>
<td>69.5%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Greece</td>
<td>3.0%</td>
<td>6.0%</td>
<td>106.2%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ireland</td>
<td>2.5%</td>
<td>2.3%</td>
<td>76.3%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Luxembourg</td>
<td>2.0%</td>
<td>0.0%</td>
<td>6.8%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Netherlands</td>
<td>2.9%</td>
<td>3.5%</td>
<td>77.3%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Portugal</td>
<td>3.0%</td>
<td>3.8%</td>
<td>70.7%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Spain</td>
<td>3.1%</td>
<td>3.8%</td>
<td>67.1%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Australia</td>
<td>1.9%</td>
<td>3.0%</td>
<td>73.8%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Finland</td>
<td>2.0%</td>
<td>1.8%</td>
<td>61.8%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sweden</td>
<td>2.3%</td>
<td>3.0%</td>
<td>78.5%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: International Monetary Fund, World Economic Outlook, October 1996.

The outlook is that Europe, preoccupied with unemployment and slow economic growth, lacking politically strong governments and strong leadership, and lately distracted by a poorly handled agricultural crisis in Britain will not do much more than fine-tune the original Maastricht I treaty. A successful launch of the Single European Currency process even with relaxed criteria would be a very significant EU success. A revised treaty, scheduled to be completed by July 1997, will have to be flexible enough to allow for a successful ratification process by all fifteen EU members, several of which approved the more general Maastricht I by only a narrow margin. The new treaty will probably include stronger machinery to address common problems and achieve joint agreement on issues like crime and immigration. The IGC will probably avoid the reform of agricultural problems because the likelihood of any compromise is remote. At the same time as the EU is deepening, the reasons for expansion into Central Europe seem sufficient to ensure a broader EU albeit with a delayed timetable.

The Western European Union Finding Its Place with NATO

The WEU will serve as the structure for organizing European-only missions out of the NATO area using “separable but not separate” logistics, communications, and intelligence assets from NATO along with U.S. unique capabilities. The key agreement is that NATO’s North Atlantic Council (NAC) will decide such missions, meaning that the American government will have, in principle, a veto right and, at the least, a continuing large role in all European security decision-making. Thus Chirac’s new orientation of French policy and the decisions in Berlin define NATO’s role in European-only security operations, how NATO and the WEU will operate, and what the future American role is expected to be.
For the time being, it is unclear whether the WEU should remain a separate organization or merge with the Union. Belgium, one of the more committed integrationists in Europe, took over the WEU presidency for six months in July 1996 and can be expected to further develop the WEU’s operational capabilities as budgetary support allows. Probable steps include:

- Strengthening the WEU crisis-and-planning center at its Brussels headquarters.
- Expansion of satellite intelligence capabilities using the Franco-German Helios project as a core instrument if budget appropriations permit its implementation.
- Closer operational links to Europe’s evolving multinational force structures, such as the EUROCORPS, EUFOR, or EUROMARFOR.

The WEU will play a prominent role in the European and Defense Identity (ESDI). At the June 1996 North Atlantic Council (NAC) Ministerial, it was decided that ESDI would be built within the NATO alliance. The decision to build ESDI within rather than outside NATO was made possible by President Chirac’s radical steps to downsize and reconfigure French military forces, to open the door for the French to return to NATO’s central military command institutions, and to welcome American leadership in European security issues where only the Americans could lead. As of late 1996, French officials were indicating that France could be headed for a total return to the NATO integrated command structure, assuming suitable reforms of NATO internal workings.

The Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe: Restructured and More Active

Unlike the WEU, the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE) derives both its legitimacy and weakness from its single class of membership. The fifty-three participating states cover the northern hemisphere of Europe and North America. From 1975 to 1990, the OSCE, then known as the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe, served as an important channel of East-West communication and was instrumental in providing confidence-building measures, resolving humanitarian issues and establishing codes of conduct relating to international law and human rights. Because the OSCE was recognized as a regional organization under the UN Charter, every country could join it, every country had a veto, and no country could be expelled from it. All parties therefore remained at the conference table, and the organization functioned using moral pressure and consensus. In recent years, the OSCE has undertaken a number of steps to transform itself from a Cold War consultative forum to an operational European security organization relevant to post-Cold War developments.

Beginning with the 1990 Paris Summit, the OSCE restructured itself and established a revamped organization with an annual council meeting of foreign ministers, a standing committee of senior officials, and three institutional centers: an Office for Democratic Institutions and Human Rights in Warsaw, a Conflict Prevention Center in Vienna, and a secretariat in Prague. It took on a mandate to undertake peacekeeping operations with the option to call on NATO, the EU, the WEU, or even the UN Security Council for assistance if the situation warranted. In spite of NATO Allies’ differing views on the closeness and form of the NATO-OSCE relationship and on whether the OSCE’s principal focus should be human rights or security, the OSCE now plays an active role in arms control, the enforcement of sanctions and several ongoing crises:
- Attempting to mediate among belligerents in Chechnya.
- Sending observers to Albania for the 1996 election to the People’s Assembly, where they provided critical and highly regarded reports of undemocratic behavior.
- Becoming a key player in the Bosnian conflict with oversight responsibilities for the preparation and conduct of the September 14, 1996 general elections.

But while the OSCE can be a legitimizing structure in fact-finding missions, constructive dialogue, and conflict prevention, the organization cannot stop civil wars or international aggression. Its lack of resources, limited crisis response capabilities, requirement for consensus, and various centers of operation reduce its effectiveness.

Bosnia and the Response by European Security Organizations

Bosnia is discussed at greater length in the chapter on the Balkans. For the purpose of this chapter, two key questions arise with the final outcome in Bosnia still so uncertain. First, are conflicts such as the one in Bosnia the rule or the exception for the future? Second, what chance is there that the Bosnian conflict may still spread? There is some agreement that such a conflict will not be repeated in other regions in Europe outside the former Soviet Union because Bosnia’s historical, religious, and multiethnic complexity make it so unique. It also seems likely that at least in the short term, the conflict will be contained although developments in Kosovo bear close watching. But, more important, the events in Bosnia and the response by Americans and Europeans have established several important trends. The conflict in the former Yugoslavia tested the relevance of European security organizations and their new doctrines on such issues as peacekeeping, crisis management, and the projection of stability with the following results:

- The Implementation Force (IFOR) demonstrated NATO’s military planning and operational capabilities and proved that NATO is still necessary and still works after the Cold War.

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A Growing Network of Institutions

**LEGEND**
- ■ = member
- ◆ = associate member
- ▲ = associate partner
- ◆ = observer

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>OSCE Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe (1973)</th>
<th>United States</th>
<th>Canada</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>NACC North Atlantic Cooperation Council (1991)</td>
<td>Belgium</td>
<td>France</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PFP Partnership for Peace (1994)</td>
<td>Germany</td>
<td>Italy</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NATO North Atlantic Treaty Organization (1949)</td>
<td>Luxembourg</td>
<td>Portugal</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>EU European Union, formerly the European Community (1957)</td>
<td>Spain</td>
<td>United Kingdom</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>WEU Western European Union (1954)</td>
<td>Greece</td>
<td>Denmark</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CIS Commonwealth of Independent States (1991)</td>
<td>Iceland</td>
<td>Norway</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Turkey</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

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* NATO members and states that signed a PFP Framework Agreement but not necessarily an Individual Partnership Program.

1 Includes Cyprus, the Holy See, Liechtenstein, Monaco, and San Marino.

2 "Yugoslavia" has been suspended.

3 Austria and Sweden are not members but, together with Finland (which has observer status), participate in the NACC Ad Hoc Group on Cooperation in Peacekeeping.
In responding to the Bosnian conflict with a naval blockade in Operations Sharp Guard and Maritime Guard, airspace denial in Operation Deny Flight, and the introduction of large-scale ground forces in Operation Joint Endeavor, NATO showed cohesion even in the absence of a common threat like that of the Cold War.

- The WEU, the EU, and the OSCE added to their roles even while demonstrating significant limitations and operational constraints. By joining the naval blockade in the Adriatic and enforcing on their own an embargo on the Danube, the WEU showed it can operate smaller multinational engagements out of area utilizing NATO assets and procedures.

- The OSCE has become a moral and legitimizing yardstick for the democratic process and human rights.

- The EU is most effective in economics, monetary coordination and development.

- Only NATO can undertake large multinational deployments, and NATO standards of command and control are required for success.

Smaller but More Professional Militaries

The European Defense Industry Downsized and Multinational

France, Germany, and the United Kingdom are downsizing and restructuring their military industrial base with an emphasis on multinational consolidation, which will reduce inter-European rivalries and ultimately lead to increased competition with U.S. defense contractors. European countries are likely to make significant new investments only in military equipment directly associated with NATO membership requirements or needed to replace obsolete lines of hardware. Finance was a significant factor in France’s 1996 major reform of defense and military structures, including the turn back to NATO ordered by President Chirac. Among those countries aspiring to be NATO members, there will undoubtedly be special requests for assistance to finance major equipment purchases.

| Ireland | Austria | Finland | Sweden | Switzerland | Czech Republic | Hungary | Poland | Slovakia | Bulgaria | Romania | Albania | Estonia | Latvia | Lithuania | Russia | Ukraine | Moldova | Uzbekistan | Kyrgyzstan | Tajikistan | Kazakhstan | Turkmenistan | Armenia | Belarus | Georgia | Bosnia-Herzegovina | Croatia | FYR Macedonia | Slovenia | Others | Malta |
|---------|---------|---------|--------|-----------|---------------|---------|-------|---------|---------|---------|---------|---------|-------|--------|--------|---------|---------|---------|---------|-----------|------------|------------|------------|------------|---------|--------|---------|-----------------|----------|-------------|---------|--------|------|
| 3       | 3       | 4       |        |           |               |         |       |         |         |         |         |         |       |        |        |         |         |         |           |            |            |            |          |         |        |                  |          |              |         |        |      |
|         |         |         |        |           |               |         |       |         |         |         |         |         |       |        |        |         |         |         |           |            |            |            |          |         |        |                  |          |              |         |        |      |
|         |         |         |        |           |               |         |       |         |         |         |         |         |       |        |        |         |         |         |           |            |            |            |          |         |        |                  |          |              |         |        |      |
| 5       | 5       | 5       | 5      | 5         | 5             | 5       | 5     | 5       | 6       | 5       | 5       | 6       | 6     | 6      | 6      | 6       | 6       | 7       | 11/94    | 3          |           |            |          |         |        |                  |          |              |         |        |      |

* Has decided to apply.
* Signed Partnership and Cooperation Agreements.
* Signed Europe Agreements.
* In Negotiations on Partnership and Cooperation Agreements.
Western European governments are increasingly cooperating in multinational joint ventures to spread out budget and research costs, allow for greater sharing of industrial benefits, and guarantee markets. There are over 100 French-German cooperative efforts. One of the largest involves building the Tiger attack helicopter which has finally reached the production and delivery stage. The major European allies are also planning a Future Large Aircraft (FLA) to replace their own manufactured C-160 and the U.S.-made C-130 heavy transport aircraft although Chirac’s military downsizing and German budgetary cutbacks could threaten this project. For the Navy, there is a long-standing consortium to produce a new frigate, but unresolved conflicts over design specifications have led to serious delays. Similarly, the plans to develop a new armored vehicle involving the United Kingdom, France, and Germany are still in the discussion phase. Long standing industrial defense rivalries, shifting military budgets, and differing national defense requirements limit multinational cooperation despite official intentions.

In general, the NATO allies are:
- Significantly reducing standing armies
- Introducing greater military professionalism
- Emphasizing highly mobile forces with high-technology weaponry prepared to deploy rapidly in a joint, multinational, out-of-area environment

The Struggle of Resources versus Requirements

A dominant security issue in Europe in 1996 was how to match the decline in resources devoted to security and defense affairs with the burgeoning and new requirements tasked to the military establishment. In most of the central and eastern European countries, military budgets have declined to little more than 1 percent of GDP even as new democratic governments have ordered defense ministries and command staffs to adjust as quickly as possible to NATO standards. Moreover, certain central and eastern European countries are experiencing strong political pressure, sometimes with subtle industry support, for major investments in one or more lines of Western military equipment, whether or not defense doctrine justifies the investment.

Economic pressures and expectations of a peace dividend have resulted in similar reductions in NATO Allies’ expenditures, although overall levels remain much higher proportionally. Peacekeeping in Bosnia requires mixes of support logistics, mobility, intelligence, and communications that are costly and not a part of Cold War military structures. Legislators, facing domestic pressure, are often hesitant to fund changes and start new procurement programs. Meanwhile, entrenched bureaucracies and industries defend expensive defense items that are often less relevant in the new environment.

Country by country, NATO allies and other western European countries have cut their military budgets:
- **Britain.** Successive white papers have forced major reductions in all three military services; Britain deploys forces in the demanding areas of northern Ireland, Africa, the Middle East, and Bosnia.
- **France.** Total defense expenditures are in percentage of GDP second only to those of the U.S. However, President Chirac and the government led by Alain Juppe, plans by 2002 to phase out conscription and shrink the Army by one-third, and the Air Force and Navy by 25 percent.
- **Germany.** In 1996, the German Armed Forces reached their reduced peacetime strength of 340,000 which means a total reduction of forces (East and West Germany) since reunification of over 40 percent.
- **Switzerland.** The defense minister has proposed reshaping Switzerland’s militia army after centuries of service into a military force which is composed of professionals.
The Draft Across Europe

Comparing Selected Countries

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Country</th>
<th>Service time</th>
<th>Number of Conscripts</th>
<th>Total armed forces</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Britain</td>
<td>No Draft</td>
<td>254,000</td>
<td>409,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>France</td>
<td>10 Months</td>
<td>205,000</td>
<td>367,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Germany</td>
<td>12 Months</td>
<td>154,000</td>
<td>322,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Italy</td>
<td>9 Months</td>
<td>197,100</td>
<td>322,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Spain</td>
<td>9 Months</td>
<td>133,200</td>
<td>206,500</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Greece</td>
<td>19-23 Months</td>
<td>122,300</td>
<td>150,300</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Netherlands</td>
<td>9 Months</td>
<td>43,200</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>ends this year</td>
<td>27,700</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: International Institute for Strategic Studies, German Defense Ministry.

- Belgium and the Netherlands. The two countries plan to merge services over national boundaries. This trend is expected to continue along with the further development of multinational units such as the EUROCORPS and EUROMAR.

The March Toward Professionalism

Britain was the first NATO ally to move to a fully professional army in the 1960s and now most western European nations plan to reduce or end conscription. Belgium ended the draft in 1995, and the Netherlands is scheduled to do so at the end of 1996.

NATO countries that retain the draft have reduced the required time in uniform to as little as nine months, making meaningful training and specialization almost impossible. Despite significant reductions in the military budget since the Berlin Wall came down, conscription in Germany will continue as a tool for integration of the five new eastern provinces and as part of the post-World War II tradition to maintain a citizen army. Conscription time has been reduced, however, to as little as ten months.

Potential Flashpoints

The Southern Rim

The southern rim region—the region from North Africa through the Middle East—is viewed as potentially the most troublesome for NATO as a result of such factors as:

- Rising Islamic radical movements which might lead to military intervention to bring stability, evacuate civilians, or protect citizens.
- Continued maverick and renegade regimes in Iran, Iraq, Libya, and Sudan.
- Mounting demographic and economic pressures that could send a flood of immigrants and refugees into southern Europe in the late 1990s.
- Demands for water that result in beggar-thy-neighbor policies.
- Fears that internal conflicts in southern rim countries will generate terrorist attacks in Western Europe.

The geographic proximity of all the countries around the Mediterranean feeds these fears and increases the likelihood that political leaders will see the need to militarily intervene to effect an outcome, protect cities and citizens, or prevent the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction. In particular, Libyan efforts to acquire surface-to-surface missiles of extended range and reports of Libyan interest in developing its chemical weapons arsenal are sources of profound concern to defense planners in NATO headquarters and to NATO Mediterranean capitals.

The current struggle between Islamic extremists and the Algerian government has aroused especially intense worry in France. Five years of domestic violence have caused tens of thousands of casualties with no end in sight. A radical Islamic victory now seems less likely than before but still remains a possibility. It would have enormous repercussions in Algeria and might also threaten and possibly transform the political landscape of neighboring Morocco and Tunisia. In its wake, hundreds of thousands of Western-oriented Arabs and Berbers would flee to southern Europe, where substantial unem-
ployment, illegal immigration, and attendant social problems already exist. Efforts by France and other European countries to enter into a dialogue with southern-rim countries on economic and security problems were launched at Barcelona in November 1995 but yielded only limited results by late 1996. NATO has also undertaken conversations with moderate governments in northern Africa to explain new NATO activities and concerns.

Turkey and Greece

Of all the NATO allies, Turkey is currently the most vulnerable for both domestic and external reasons. There is an ongoing war with elements of the Kurdistan Workers’ Party (PKK) which is largely confined to Turkey’s southeastern provinces but could have major repercussions. As it is, terrorism has been a constant threat in many parts of the country resulting from the PKK campaign using indiscriminate bombings to establish a breakaway state. Expanded cooperation between Israel and Turkey could have problematic results if the Arab-Israeli peace process breaks down. Turkey is the linchpin of NATO’s southern strategy by virtue of its geographic position near the new southern states that border Russia. Until this year it has been a moderate and secular Muslim state in contrast to the religious extremist pressures in the region, which might otherwise force themselves into Europe’s backyard.

Unfortunately, the formation of its latest government, led for the first time by a member of Turkey’s Islamic political party, brings further uncertainties. Necmettin Erbakan, the leader of the pro-Islamist Rafeh party, won a slight plurality in the 1995 parliamentary elections with 21.4 percent of the vote in a crowded field. In late June 1996, he took over the government as Prime Minister in a coalition with the conservative secularist and former Prime Minister Tansu Ciller. Erbakan’s success was more a result of squabbling and ineptitude on the part of Turkey’s other secular politi-
cion or Ciller's fear of corruption charges than of widespread popular support. Neverthe-
less, an Erbakan-led government makes it difficult to maintain that Turkey
continues to be a solid NATO ally with sec-
ular and pro-Western policies. Erbakan's
first foreign trip abroad to Iran where he
signed a $23 billion long-term natural gas
agreement on August 12, 1996, may help
satisfy Turkish industrial requirements but
only reinforces skeptics that Erbakan is any-
thing but an Islamic conservative who will
reorient Turkish foreign policy.

This new direction in domestic politics
comes at a time when Turkey's young and
growing population base means that over
600,000 males annually reach military age, a
number second in the alliance only to that
in the United States. By maintaining the size
of its Armed Forces relative to the declining
force levels of other NATO states, Turkey
has been allocated one of the more senior
military positions in the reorganization of
Allied Command Europe. The vulnerability
of Turkey contrasted with its increasing im-
portance underscores the challenge of solv-
ing outstanding issues with its erstwhile
NATO ally and neighbor Greece.

Throughout the twentieth century, the
relationship between Greece and Turkey
has ranged from open warfare to a state of
continual but noncombative hostility. In
1996, armed warplanes, ships, and troops
faced each other across disputed lines in
numerous contested locations. Several
lives were lost along the border in Cyprus
in confrontations between civilians and
military forces. The tiny, uninhabited is-
land of Imia or Kardak in the Aegean was
the focal point of another military flare-up.
The possibility of incidents remains so
high that friends of both states concerned
with maintaining regional peace and sta-
bility must constantly engage in defusing
minor crises and confrontations in order to
avoid real and deadly conflict. The mem-
bership of both states in NATO has de-
creased chances of war, but the ongoing
Greek-Turkish disputes have caused the
alliance itself serious harm.

- The disputes have adversely af-
fected the planning and operation of
NATO's engagement in Bosnia and the
Partnership for Peace Program.
- A number of major communica-
tions, intelligence, and surveillance proj-
ects worth hundreds of millions of dollars
have been placed on hold, leading to some
disarray in NATO's budget.
- Most southern region restructuring
projects are blocked, and numerous Mili-
itary Committee documents delayed.
- The dispute prevents the establish-
ment of a fully integrated NATO principal
subordinate command structure in the
southern region.

Greek-Turkish relations worsened be-
cause the collapse of the Soviet Union and
dissolution of the Warsaw Pact removed a
common threat, leaving the two countries
relatively free to pursue their national ob-
jectives within NATO regardless of the
damage to the alliance. In addition, inter-
nal political instabilities have led Greece
and Turkey to use the disputes for domes-
tic political advantage and have made the
two governments less flexible. The dispu-
tes that affect NATO primarily revolve
around the Aegean Sea:
- NATO command and control structures
- The Athens Flight Information Region
- Territorial airspace claims
- Territorial seas
The challenge for the NATO Allies is finding nonconfrontational resolutions to these issues. Cyprus will clearly form part of the solution. A multilateral approach may be preferable to unilateral action. Ideally, any initiatives within the context of the new NATO should be accompanied or paralleled by activities in the framework of the EU and its widening integration. The worst scenario is to let the situation continue as it stands in 1996.

Preventing Resentment by the Uninvited

Enlargement of European institutions may create economic and security problems for those nations who are not invited to join the early in the enlargement process.

The expansion of consultative institutions such as the Council of Europe are relatively unproblematic. But the various Central and East European candidate countries cannot all be absorbed at once into NATO and the EU. Nor are NATO and the EU prepared to cast aside political, military and economic standards in gestures of solidarity. Differentiation among candidate countries is thus unavoidable. A first group is likely to be admitted to NATO before the year 2000. The result could be misperceived as a drawing of new lines in Europe, feelings of exclusion, what some east Europeans are already calling a "new Yalta." The U.S. and the current members of NATO wish to avoid any such misperception.

For both NATO and the EU, enlargement is not a contest. New memberships will be a rolling process with no arbitrary cap. Not-yet-admitted states must eschew both resentment of new member countries and blame of NATO. NATO and the EU must, simultaneously, keep control of enlargement. Distinct negotiations with each candidate are required, rather than creating a list of criteria whose fulfillment would amount to automatic admission. The Baltic states present a particular problem. They might meet a list of criteria for NATO membership. Yet for historic reasons, their NATO candidacies could provoke a uniquely hostile Russian policy. Baltic admission to the EU (with its indirect security guarantees), is one possible compromise.

Altogether, NATO (and EU) enlargement and a new special NATO/EU/Russian relationship are likely to go hand-in-hand. More intense development of Partnership for Peace (PFP) structures—including development of a new Atlantic Partnership Council proposed by the U.S.—plus elaboration of the EU’s structure of Association agreements are ways to show that NATO and EU enlargement are processes, not contests, whose goals are stability and prosperity, not the drawing of new dividing lines in Europe.
U.S. Interests and Approach

Net Assessment

The demise of the Soviet Union and the end of divided Europe in 1989–1991 posed the question whether the NATO Alliance, having prevailed, would continue. Half a decade later, after American leadership of the Bosnia military intervention with NATO-led forces, and after French President Chirac’s call for a permanent U.S. role in European security and French agreement to build a European Security and Defense Identity within rather than outside of NATO, the question seems answered. Every non-NATO European country seeks entry into or association with NATO.

The most virulent European flashpoint remains Bosnia. Beyond this, the main potential danger is some large crisis involving Russia and Europe. Boris Yeltsin’s convincing July 1966 electoral victory against an atavistic communist opponent provided some assurance that, while the people of Russia are suffering, there seems to be little desire to divert attention from their problems with a re-nationalized, aggressive regime.

Finally, serious debate is growing about EU political economies: whether, among the EU countries planning to join the Single European Currency in the first round, the budget and deficit-cutting involved in meeting the five Maastricht “convergence criteria” for EMU are not creating unacceptably high unemployment and artificially low economic growth. This is now the cutting edge of the economic and welfare-state problems discussed at the beginning of this chapter.

U.S. Interests

During the Cold War, the paramount U.S. security interest in Europe was deterring and defending against Soviet attack. That security interest protected an Atlantic political, economic and cultural community of shared values. Even without the Soviet threat, Europe is a region second to none in America’s interests.

Sustaining Deep Historic Ties

Europe and the U.S. are deeply bound by the ties of common values, alliances of long history, shared popular and high culture, and common ancestry—more so, still today, than with any other world region. In security matters, America’s oldest, most reliable partners are European countries. NATO can be understood as an outgrowth of this community of values and interest. It is first of all a political alliance for democracy and open markets, and a military alliance second. Sustaining this alliance remains among America’s deepest interests.

Avoiding Redivision of Europe into Hostile Blocs

At stake in the debate about NATO enlargement is how to guarantee the stability of Central and Eastern Europe—to discourage adventurism there without provoking Russia into new hostility to the U.S. In such a case Moscow might coerce or rally its neighbors into a new anti-Western bloc. The U.S. interest is to promote enlargement while avoiding any redivision of Europe into blocs, one in the West and one based on Russia. Any such new drawing of lines—sometimes referred to as a “new Yalta”—would mean resumption of a cold war on a lower scale.

Sharing with Europe the Burdens of World Responsibility

The Atlantic alliance offers the U.S. important leverage in shaping the post-Cold War system of international economic and political relations. In financial terms, the East-West Cold War cost the U.S. on the order of six trillion dollars. Though the U.S. is the world’s remaining superpower, it cannot bear alone the various costs of protection of international stability, peacekeeping and humanitarian assistance, and the promotion of sustainable economic development. In addition, the continued presence of American military forces in Europe both anchors European security and provides a useful staging area for response to crisis in other regions, especially the Middle East. France and Britain, with long experience in Africa, are well-placed to contribute to sometimes urgent peacekeeping and relief operations. Economically, coordi-
nation between European governments, the European Union and the U.S. is essential to common vital interests of stable exchange rates, a sound international financial system and low inflation.

Guaranteeing Access to European Markets

Europe is one of the U.S.'s largest markets, where the success of American exporters produces a trade surplus. Guaranteed access to the European market is clearly a vital American interest, and American policy-makers would be seriously concerned by any Fortress Europe tendency which would discriminate against American firms. Despite conflicts from time to time, fair trade and open capital markets have been the norm.

U.S. Approach

The U.S. approach to promoting stability in Europe centers on:

- Ensuring collective action on the part of NATO allies
- Restructuring NATO and further internationalizing its leadership
- Managing the enlargement and engagement of NATO

Collective Action Requires Time and U.S. Leadership

NATO's decision-making process in the political headquarters in Brussels works too slowly to permit the type of rapid response required in crisis management, if there is no U.S. leadership, consensus is almost impossible to achieve. Permanent representatives are limited in the amount of intelligence they receive and dependent on instructions often received with considerable delay. Consensus requires unanimity and few things are now more important than confronting potential crises with earlier agreed positions and the right mix of military resources. Declining budgets have made resources a major issue and weak economies have promoted competition in upgrading material assets instead of cooperation. Europeans feel threatened by the much bigger U.S. military industrial giants which seemingly dominate certain European markets and shut out competition in the United States.

Current U.S. Defense Department steps to seek out European suppliers for specific military contracts should reassure European Allies. The United States has also taken the lead in one symbolic multinational cooperative effort, the Medium Extended Air Defense System (MEADS). A successful MEADS would demonstrate that both sides of the Atlantic could compromise on an important industrial venture that links key components of the electronic and space industries. However, Chirac's first round of defense cuts will end France's participation in MEADS, removing 20 percent of the development costs and sending the program back to the blueprint stage.

A Restructured and Internationalized NATO

Although NATO detractors argued in the early 1990s that the organization had outlived its purpose, the fall of the Berlin Wall did not end the requirement for suit-
Changes at the SHAPE Headquarters

In Allied Command Europe (ACE), headquartered in Mons, Belgium, the Supreme Headquarters Allied Powers Europe (SHAPE) has allocated new national positions based in part on the force levels dedicated to NATO in the field:

- For the first time, a European (German) serves as SHAPE Chief of Staff. Germans also serve as Chairman of the Military Committee, the most senior military job at NATO headquarters in Brussels, and as the Assistant Chief of Staff for Resources at SHAPE.
- The SHAPE leadership at the four-star level is composed of U.S., British, and German generals.
- A senior Dutch officer heads the ACE Reaction Force Planning Staff (ARFPS) and a Dutch two-star officer is responsible for intelligence at SHAPE.
- A Turkish officer joined the command staff as Assistant Chief of Staff for Communications and Information Systems.
- The new Secretary General is from Spain, NATO's newest member.
- Italy provides NATO's Deputy Secretary General and has taken a very active role in the Bosnia operations.
- France led the UN Protection Force (UNPROFOR), is involved in the ongoing changes at SHAPE headquarters, is represented in the ARFPS, and participates in NATO's outreach and engagement in central and eastern Europe, the Partnership for Peace Program (PFP).

Configuring SHAPE for Bosnia operations and new mission requirements necessitated several new structural entities:

- The ARFPS, which was activated under Norwegian and then Dutch command even while SHAPE was downsizing.
- A Crisis Response Center (CRC), activated in late 1994, to monitor developments in Bosnia.
- A Crisis Management Organization (CMO), which coordinated SHAPE's overall direction of Operation Joint Endeavor.
- The ACE Mobility Coordination Center (AMCC), which synchronized national deployment plans with SHAPE and the in-theater commander to maximize the use of limited ship, rail, air, and road facilities and minimize the clogging of any transportation routes. The AMCC used a special software program to track and control the movement of troops and equipment.
- The IFOR Control Center (ICC), staffed with representatives from all IFOR participants once Joint Endeavor got under way.

This smaller, more international and streamlined SHAPE staff successfully brought NATO into all its missions relating to Bosnia: at sea with Albanian and Sharp Guard maritime embargoes, deny flight in Bosnian airspace, and the IFOR deployment on the ground beginning December 20, 1995. IFOR resulted from several years of planning and more than twenty drafted iterations. The final deployment document, more extensive than that which choreographed the 1944 Normandy Invasion, specified a unified, joint, and multinational command directing a single mission. In the end IFOR successfully involved:

- 52,000 troops drawn from all Alliance members and seventeen other countries.
- 2,500 transport flights, 50 ships, and 380 trains to move them and the accompanying 200,000 tons of cargo.
- A deployment area bigger than the state of Tennessee that contains some of the most rugged terrain in Europe and an inhospitable climate.

ably robust and multinational military forces to confront threats to the peace and security of the Euro-Atlantic community. Moreover, it is misleading to consider NATO solely a Cold War creation. The 1949 Washington Treaty establishing NATO signifies common principles of democracy, liberty, and the rule of law. Neither the ideological threat of communism nor the Soviet Union are mentioned. The concept of Europe is not defined in the Treaty as West or East. NATO's success during its first forty years should be judged as much on what it helped create—a prosperous West Europe, whole and free—as what it stopped: an expansionist and hostile ideology. Whatever steps NATO now takes throughout the rest of Europe to promote wider peace and security are in consonance with the original Treaty.

In the new, restructured NATO:

- The headquarters staff is smaller and reflects a significantly enhanced European presence.
- Rapid reaction forces under joint multinational commands have replaced larger, standing national units.
- The three former major NATO commands were reduced to two and headquarters staffs by 33 percent.

NATO has a more multinational command structure with sufficient flexibility to rapidly develop and staff new organizations to run new operation. In this first phase of change, the Alliance has demonstrated unity of purpose.

The Larger Role of PFP and NATO Enlargement

PFP is not, as critics say, a substitute for NATO enlargement or a mere mechanism to breathe new life into NATO. It can better be described as the most ambitious military cooperation effort ever undertaken by any alliance in history and, ironically, involving mostly former adversaries. Its successes have been achieved during a period of significantly reduced resources and just at the time when NATO deployed at sea, in the air and on land in Bosnia. PFP has resulted in new structures and forms of activity based on the values in the Washington Treaty which are now a permanent part of the security landscape of a Europe undivided and free. The true gene-
Hungarians Beyond Hungary’s Borders

Hungary’s own population of 10.5 million is 94 percent ethnic Hungarian (the other 6 percent are primarily German and Serb). Conquered during World War I and having fought with the Axis powers during World War II, Hungary lost territory and one-third of its population in the 1920 Treaty of Trianon and did not regain it after 1945. Hence, the ethnic problems of Hungarian minorities stem from neighboring states that contain ethnic Hungarians notably Romania (2.1 million), Slovakia (600,000), and Yugoslavia (400,000). In September 1996, Hungary signed a good-neighbor treaty with Romania but the process has not yet started with Serbia. A treaty between Hungary and Slovakia which had been initialed a year earlier was put into effect in 1997 but with differing interpretations. Slovakia has in the meantime blocked the nomination of a well-qualified Hungarian to lead the OSCE.

The crisis of PFP is not NATO enlargement but NATO engagement. Partnership for Peace was a natural extension of the first post-Cold War NATO Heads of State meeting in 1990, which directed NATO military commands to begin cooperating with former Warsaw Pact nations as a confidence-building measure. Subsequent to PFP’s formal launching at the Brussels Summit in 1994, the Partnership Coordination Cell (PCC) at SHAPE headquarters was established to manage joint training and exercises. Since France was not represented in the SHAPE integrated military command but was involved with PFP, a compromise was reached to have the PCC at SHAPE but not in SHAPE. Terminus the Partnership organization a cell rather than a center satisfied those in the alliance who preferred a slower-paced NATO outreach.

The response from central and eastern Europe was overwhelmingly positive. PFP allows each partner government to set its own pace and range of cooperation with NATO. The first training exercises demonstrated to new Partners how much they had to do to achieve a minimum level of compatibility with NATO forces. In addition, by assigning military liaison officers to deal directly with NATO officers at SHAPE under a political framework document signed by foreign ministries, PFP established new working relationships between military and diplomats in the field and ministries of foreign affairs and defense in partner capitals. This relationship, a necessary part of NATO’s requirement for an appropriate balance of civilian-military affairs in a democratic context, never existed in Warsaw Pact countries.

During 1995–96, PFP has become a permanent security structure linking the NATO Allies with all countries in the Euro-Atlantic community north of the thirty-sixth parallel. These 26 PFP members include all the former Warsaw Pact signatories and Soviet republics. The only exceptions are Ireland, Switzerland, Tajikistan, and the warring states in the Bosnia conflict.

The PCC is both the nucleus of an expanded NATO and a headquarters for Partner countries to develop interoperability. With the participation of France, NATO staffed the PCC with officers responsible for coordinating training in search and rescue activities, humanitarian missions, peacekeeping operations, and other missions as agreed by the North Atlantic Council. Under the direction of a Danish two-star officer, the PCC has become a driving force in military cooperation.

Against the background of a vital and robust PFP, NATO enlargement takes on a different perspective. Under PFP, NATO has engaged its former adversaries with a web of political and security relations and activities not possible in the early 1990s:

- Partners sign a framework document committing them to fundamental NATO ideals.
- Partners submit a presentation document cataloging the steps they will take to fulfill this commitment. Almost all of the 26 PFP members had completed this step by early 1996.
- A negotiated Individual Partnership Program (IPP) develops an agenda of activities between NATO and the partner state. All but the most recent members have agreed IPP’s including Russia.
- Status of Forces Agreements (SOFA) have been signed with half of the PFP membership thereby covering NATO forces on TDY training and exercise missions.
- The Planning and Review Process (PARP) utilized by some 14 Partners which closely parallels NATO’s own defense planning system and permits the closest possible harmonization of security goals and objectives balanced against resource requirements.
The formerly neutral countries of Austria, Finland and Sweden have rapidly become active and enthusiastic players in the partnership process and their contributions are as important politically as they are militarily. The very accession of Finland and Sweden to the Partnership for Peace framework document, accompanied by declarations that neither intended to formally apply for NATO membership, was a useful spur to Russia in its own deliberations whether or not to join PFP. Moreover, Sweden and Finland had already divided up certain peacekeeping training functions between themselves and their other Nordic partners Denmark and Norway, and all this was now made available to new PFP Partners. Austria makes a special contribution to PFP resulting from the country’s geostrategic location and long-standing participation in numerous UN peacekeeping missions. Although Switzerland has not yet joined PFP, it has closely followed PFP developments and seems prepared to sign an unprecedented logistics agreement with NATO which promotes compatibility, a major PFP goal.

Former Warsaw Pact Partners have found that the planning process under PFP involves totally new functions for a military never before concerned with writing its own job descriptions, establishing its own priorities, drafting its own operational doctrines, and budgeting for them. The first PCC military liaison officers had to learn when, how, and why to report to their respective embassies in Brussels, which represented them at NATO’s political headquarters. The rapid development and robust activities of the PCC often require political coordination, approval, and counterpart action in Brussels. But responsibilities for PFP are split between several divisions in NATO’s international staff which remains basically organized under the same staffing patterns existing during the Cold War. At the military level, the Partner countries have learned to operate effectively in the PCC at SHAPE but continue to face a sometimes bewildering bureaucracy in NATO Brussels.

Operation Joint Endeavor has diverted resources and attention from PFP while, at the same time, it has underscored PFP’s importance. Twelve of the seventeen non-NATO countries deployed under IFOR are Partner countries. All but Russia have used their PCC liaison officers as the liaison to IFOR. The training and exercise schedule of PFP resulted in better prepared troops subsequently deployed under IFOR.

As NATO begins the process of admitting new members, the continuation of a robust PFP program will be absolutely necessary to maintain the pace of engagement with those countries still aspiring to mem-

### A Comparison of Defense Expenditures: NATO Countries 1995

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Country</th>
<th>Defense Expenditures as a Percentage of GDP (Market price)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Greece</td>
<td>4.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>U.S.</td>
<td>3.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Turkey</td>
<td>3.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>U.K.</td>
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<tr>
<td>France</td>
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<tr>
<td>Norway</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>Denmark</td>
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<tr>
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<td>Canada</td>
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<tr>
<td>Spain</td>
<td>0.9</td>
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### Total Defense Expenditures (US $M)

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<tr>
<th>Country</th>
<th>US Total</th>
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<td>Germany</td>
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<td>U.K.</td>
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<td>2,819</td>
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<tr>
<td>Luxembourg</td>
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</tr>
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</table>

bership or those who wish to remain good Partners. An active PFP minimizes the possibility that new dividing lines will be drawn in Europe. It remains an ideal mechanism to strengthen NATO’s relationship to Russia although Russian military forces have not yet participated with any frequency in PFP exercises. Ultimately, for those countries who utilize PFP to the maximum extent possible, the issue of full NATO membership may become less meaningful.

NATO’s engagement with its Partners under PFP is so extensive and the desire for membership of some Partners is so compelling that NATO’s formal enlargement is a foregone conclusion. But the timing and conditions are yet to be fully resolved and questions remain concerning:

- extent of democratic reforms and civilian/military relationship
- compatibility of military forces and level of military spending
- state of relationship with neighboring states
- steps to be taken toward those states not initially named for full membership
The emergence of China as a great power and its large influence on the affairs of the Asia Pacific region are due to its size, location, and potential. If the economy continues to grow and the leadership deals successfully with pressing political and economic issues, China’s scope of influence will extend throughout the globe. Dealing with China as a rising power is the most compelling of all of the many complex challenges facing the United States and its regional allies. Their stance and their actions and those of the other regional powers will be crucial elements of China’s foreign and national security policy calculus.

Background and Trends

Economic Issues Predominate

China’s leaders place priority on economic growth. However, they might deliberately risk or even sacrifice economic development if:

- They felt Chinese sovereignty to be at stake
- Taiwan were to declare its independence
- They had to choose between internal stability and continued economic development

Beijing’s primary objective is to see China take what it considers its rightful place as a major regional and global power: to set the regional political agenda and determine rather than react to major political and economic currents. To be a global superpower requires a world-class economy.

Economic development is also extremely important in the short term for social stability and the tenure of the leadership. Since 1992, the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) has staked its continued rule on the proposition that rising living standards will offset growing popular dissatisfaction with many of the negative phenomena, such as corruption, that have emerged as a corollary of rapid economic development. According to the official logic, the Chinese people will accept and embrace Beijing’s ideology, Socialism with Chinese Characteristics, if they see that the system can guarantee a constantly improving livelihood and simultaneously enhance China’s international position.
### World's Largest Economies

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Area</th>
<th>Economy Ranking</th>
<th>Purchasing Power Party (PPP) Exchange Rate GNP</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>U.S.</td>
<td>1</td>
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<tr>
<td>China</td>
<td>2</td>
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<td>Japan</td>
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<td>Australia</td>
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<tr>
<td>Netherlands</td>
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<td>289</td>
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### Market Exchange Rate GNP

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Area</th>
<th>Economy Ranking</th>
<th>Market Exchange Rate GNP</th>
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<tr>
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Whether China’s drive toward development will propel it into the ranks of the most successful global economies remains an open question. The era of undisciplined economic growth may be coming to an end. Beijing has begun to control real growth in gross domestic product, which amounted to 9.8 percent in the first three quarters of 1995, the lowest rate in years. Similarly but tentatively, inflation decreased to about 13 percent in 1995 from about 25 percent in 1994. These figures suggest that the government has developed a fairly wide range of new, more effective economic control mechanisms, the lack of which had produced difficulties in the past.

Chinese economists continue to be concerned about the slow progress in developing a legal and judicial infrastructure to match and support the still-embryonic financial and physical infrastructures necessary to unify economic activity on a national scale. Without such infrastructures, growth could slow and eventually undermine further the already weak loyalty of China’s population.

Another issue that will assume greater importance is energy shortfalls. Although China possesses abundant resources of coal, it lacks the capability to mine it, transport it to the places that need it, and locate and tap requisite new reserves of petroleum. In 1993 China became a net importer of energy. The only short-term recourse is to find reliable new sources of foreign supply. This means that in the future, Beijing will begin to compete with the United States, Japan, and other industrial nations to purchase oil on the world market, a development that risks producing price rises and all that implies for the relevant domestic economies, balance of trade problems, and global trade discipline. The need to cultivate reliable sources of energy supply also helps to explain Beijing’s growing interest in establishing closer ties with Iran and Iraq, as well as China’s continuing focus on the potentially petroleum-rich South China Sea.

The Chinese economy will probably continue its present upward trajectory into 2000, although growth rates will not match the levels of the 1990s. The leadership will continue its effort to develop and perfect
crucial economic control mechanisms but is likely to make only a minimal effort to solve the problems related to the lack of legal and judicial infrastructures. In the longer term, Beijing can expect to encounter a series of economic peaks and troughs, and the leadership will have to adjust some of its foreign policy and military modernization priorities to account for fluctuations in the availability of crucial financial resources.

Leadership focus on domestic politics

Among the challenges for China into the twenty-first century will be to:
- Consolidate a post-Deng Xiaoping leadership
- Redefine relations between Beijing and China's various regions
- Reform the state sector of the economy
- Restore the failing legitimacy of the CCP leadership

Although the central issue will be succession politics, the outcome will depend upon how well the various candidates deal with the latter three concerns. Until all four issues are resolved, the Chinese government will continue to find it difficult to compromise or to adopt bold policies in the foreign policy arena.

Succession. Since Deng Xiaoping selected him as the core of the third generation in 1989, China's president and party secretary, Jiang Zemin, has done much to consolidate his position. He now occupies every important formal leadership position in the party, state, and military systems. More important, as his relations with the People's Liberation Army (PLA) illustrate, he is using his position to make the personnel and policy decisions that enable him to develop his own base of political power. The Fifteenth National Congress of the Chinese Communist Party scheduled for the fall of 1997 will probably witness the emplacement of a cadre of civilian and military officials who, formally at least, will owe their positions to Jiang. In this sense, it can be argued that the succession is complete, or nearly so.

However, despite his gains and the top echelon's commitment to avoiding a potentially destabilizing open battle for primacy, Jiang's long-term prospects are far from settled. Opponents regard him as unable to lead or to manage the many problems now facing China. After Deng's final passage from the scene, competition will intensify, and different contenders will maneuver for advantage for two to three years. During this period, the government will remain commensurately weak and therefore unable to undertake bold initiatives in either the domestic or the foreign policy spheres. Caution will prevail in both areas.

Regional Pressures. The victor in the succession struggle will be the individual who makes progress on the other issues confronting the CCP leadership. For example, Shanghai and Guangzhou continue to enjoy record-setting levels of economic growth and desire a commensurate degree of political autonomy. In contrast, other areas in the interior continue to press Beijing for special consideration in the allocation of development funds, and all areas want to retain a larger share of revenues for local application. Similarly, Tibet and the non-Han areas of western China seek more latitude for cultural expression, if not outright political autonomy. The result is more pressure on Beijing to strike a new bargain between the center and China's various regions. Yet concerns about releasing potentially uncontrollable divisive pressures make Beijing afraid to create such a bargain rapidly.

Privatization. Privatizing the debt-ridden state-owned sector of the economy is risky. Although they comprise a bare 15 percent of the total, all state-owned enterprises are centered in raw materials, transportation, and basic industries. The reform of China's financial system and restructuring and privatization of its state-owned enterprises are inextricably linked. Without the latter, the commercialization of China's financial sector, critical to the efficient deployment of the nation's investment resources and sustained growth, will be postponed indefinitely. Stated more simply, the economy cannot afford the burden of maintaining these inefficient industries and enterprises.
Reforming the state sector is more than an economic problem, however. A significant proportion of the CCP cadres, upon whom the government relies for support, work in the state economic sector. For this group to lose their positions would threaten the continued tenure of the CCP. More important, the loss of the safety net of the housing, education, medical care, and retirement income provided by the state-owned enterprises would further reduce the already low public confidence in the government and intensify the criticism of the CCP leadership that began in earnest in 1992, when the new economic policies were instituted. For the next few years or so, the leadership will probably continue to pay the economic costs involved and move only at a snail’s pace in this critical policy area.

Legitimacy. The CCP leadership must restore its legitimacy in the minds of the Chinese people. It has been undermined by:
- Unmet demands for greater regional autonomy
- The uneven pace of economic reform
- Widespread disparities in income
- Continuing anxiety about the negative effects of economic reform on individual lifestyles
- Resentment of China’s widespread and apparently growing corruption

Foreign Policy Constrained

Each domestic issue is bound up with the larger question of political succession and affects the course of China’s external relations. This pattern will persist at least until 1999. Until then, or until the issue of succession is resolved, China’s leaders will not be inclined to compromise on what they regard as the core issues of foreign and national security policy.

Nationalism as a Basis of Foreign Policy

Chinese foreign policy since 1980 shows no evidence of even the slightest commitment to revolutionary Marxism or an effort to spread Socialism. Instead of offering an alternative, China’s leaders have opted for nationalism. As a result, the fragile legitimacy of the CCP leadership depends on the ability of Jiang and his colleagues to link China’s domestic and particularly its foreign policies with the larger strategic objective of building the rich country and strong army that will deconstruct the perceived abuses of the past and form a basis for constructing a new image of China as a global power.

Into the twenty-first century Beijing will continue to:
- Adhere to its essentially statist approach to international relations and relatively narrow definition of national interest
- Emphasize the hard as opposed to the soft elements of national power
- View the world in balance-of-power, zero-sum terms
- Make tactical adjustments to multilateral initiatives in the regional security arena

Nationalism vs. the Need for Compromise

The cultivation of nationalism will make it difficult for Beijing to compromise on many important foreign policy issues. For example, abundant evidence supports the view that the Chinese people widely supported Beijing’s March 1996 exercises and missile tests in the Taiwan Strait, despite the palpable negative impact on Beijing’s status within the region and on its relations with the United States. Overall, Jiang and the CCP gained much domestic political credit by what was billed as resolute action in defense of China’s sovereignty and national integrity. This imperative applies in other areas as well. For example, owing to succession politics and domestic political challenges that threaten the Jiang leadership’s legitimacy, the CCP cannot afford to appear to compromise on core issues that involve sovereignty or national prerogative, such as relations with Taiwan and Hong Kong or the status of China’s territorial claims in the South China Sea. However, this will not be so in other, non-core areas. For example, although domestic political considerations will encourage the government to respond to requests for changes in its policies on human rights or nuclear proliferation with highly nationalistic statements about intrusions into China’s internal affairs, the obvious benefits to China’s de-
development plans will undoubtedly encourage the leadership to find some ground for compromise.

**Increased Pragmatism and Encouragement of Multipolarity**

Overall, the last years of the 1990s will see the continuation of Beijing’s present pragmatic foreign policies. Because of the importance of short- and long-term economic development, China’s most important foreign policy priorities will be to maintain regional peace and stability and develop the broad network of economic ties that support them. The Jiang leadership will concentrate on diplomatic and economic means to maintain the present stable regional environment.

The Chinese also reason that, if they are forced to deal with a larger number of relatively more independent power centers, the United States will be less able to determine the flow of global and regional events. The development of multipolarity is therefore in China’s strategic interest. Signs of this trend in Chinese strategic thinking are:

- Efforts to establish China’s influence on the Korean peninsula, discredit the U.S.-Japan security relationship, and reduce ASEAN reliance on the U.S. military presence.
- The strategic accord signed in April 1996 among China, Russia, Kazakhstan, Tajikistan, and Kyrgyzstan.
- New and expanding economic ties with France, Germany, and the European Union.
- Continued improvements in relations with Iran in the Middle East and Africa.

**Discrediting the U.S.-Japan Security Alliance**

China fears that Tokyo will translate its economic power into political and military power that will block or challenge China’s great power ambitions and threaten its security. Bilateral relations worsened in 1996 as a result of Beijing’s refusal (in Japanese eyes) to respond to Tokyo’s concerns about China’s nuclear testing program, continuing difficulties over disputed ownership of the Senkaku Islands, and PLA exercises and missile tests in the Taiwan Strait. Another factor was Chinese fear that the new generation of Japanese political leaders is less sensitive about the legacy of Japan’s imperial past than its elders and will seek a more active international role for Tokyo at China’s expense.

China’s goal will be to prevent Japan from rearming or adopting an explicitly anti-Chinese stance and, if that fails, to dilute the effectiveness of the effort or neutralize it. However, because China has little leverage over Japan and because, in Beijing’s view, the U.S.-Japan alliance helps restrain Japan, in the late 1990s Beijing will continue to play on regional fears about the possible recrudescence of Japanese militarism in an effort to limit Tokyo’s ability to expand its activities and influence within the region. It will continue to play the so-called “history card.”

Of direct concern to the United States will be Beijing’s effort to interpret the redefinition of the U.S.-Japan security alliance as an attempt to establish joint hegemony throughout the Asia Pacific region. China will oppose virtually every aspect of U.S. security relations with Japan, from the redefinition of the Defense Cooperation Guidelines, to FSX production, to discussions about Theater Missile Defense (TMD), on the grounds that they are all intended to cement the leading position of the regional superpowers at the expense of the remainder of the region. It will also insist that the U.S. alliance with Japan is designed solely to contain China and that, by upgrading and expanding the scope of the alliance, the U.S. and Japan are drawing lines among the regional powers in ways that threaten regional stability.

**Military Capabilities Improving Slowly**

**Developing an Effective Nuclear Option**

China’s strategic nuclear forces provide a credible deterrent. The People’s Liberation Army (PLA) possesses the world’s third-largest nuclear weapons arsenal, including more than 80 intermediate-range ballistic missiles and more than 20 inter-
Slowly Improving Conventional Capabilities

The PLA can inflict great damage in limited campaigns against any of its immediate neighbors but is years away from being able to project sustained military force at any distance from China’s borders. China lacks the capability either to produce or to purchase new systems in the quantities necessary, and the PLA in 1996 was probably two decades away from challenging or holding its own against a modern military force.

Since the early 1980s, Beijing’s military modernization program has produced a self-sustaining cadre of highly professional officers. The effort to procure and field modern weapons is proceeding relatively slowly. The PLA is also slowly developing the doctrinal concepts required for high-technology warfare and has identified a number of key mission areas and weapons systems for future development:

- Developing antisubmarine warfare, ship-borne air defense, sustained naval operations, and amphibious warfare capabilities.
- Developing strategic airlift, aerial refueling, ground-attack capabilities, and a new generation of air-superiority fighters.
- Improving ground force mobility and logistical support, air defense, all-weather operations, and command-and-control capabilities.

As a result, most of China’s 24 Group Armies now have designated rapid-deployment units comprising some 18 to 20 divisions. There is also a force of some 5,000 Marines. These formations are equipped with the PLA’s most modern ground weapons and are at the leading edge of training reform. While such crack units would be effective in operations in the South China Sea, their small size, their dispersal throughout China, and a lack of lift limit their effectiveness for large-scale operations such as an invasion of Taiwan.

To address the problems of strategic lift, the Air Force acquired ten Ilyushin heavy-transport aircraft from Russia and in 1995 began to integrate long-range transport operations into the training cycle.

continental ballistic missiles (ICBMs). The Air Force has 180 nuclear-capable bombers, and the Navy deploys one nuclear submarine armed with 12 ballistic missiles. By the end of the century, China might be deploying accurate, mobile, solid-fuel ICBMs. Beijing is also expected to field ICBMs with multiple independently targeted warheads by 2010.

Despite these achievements, China’s strategic nuclear arsenal does not begin to match those of the United States and Russia and will not do so through the first decade of the next century, even if the rumors about Russian transfers of SA-18-associated technologies to China prove true. Although Beijing is clearly committed to modernizing and perfecting its strategic nuclear forces, China’s long-term thinking about the use of nuclear weapons and constraints on scarce resources will limit Beijing to a second-strike, counter-value nuclear doctrine.
However, the small number of suitable aircraft will make it difficult to conduct training on a scale large enough to make a difference. The Air Force has also acquired one squadron of Su–27 fighter aircraft and in 1995 signed an agreement with Russia for an additional squadron and production rights. Although the Su–27 provides a clear qualitative gain, limitations on pilot skills and the lack of aerial refueling capability will deny the PLA their full benefit.

The PLA Navy is replacing or improving its old surface combatants and its submarines and has acquired two of the four Kilo Class submarines contracted for with Russia. However, these improvements will not address the Navy’s fundamental problem: its inability to mount sustained, coordinated operations and to protect itself while doing so.

Critical indicators for the future include:
- Navy: The number of ships and their associated air defense and anti-submarine warfare systems, new construction of supply and amphibious ships, and development of a carrier-capable aircraft.
- Air Force: Increases in the numbers of lift and ground-attack aircraft, proficiency in aerial refueling, and the deployment of an air-superiority fighter.
- Ground Forces: An increase in the number of rapid reaction units.
- Doctrine and Training: Indicators pointing beyond the upgrading of Navy and Air Force roles and missions in support of ground forces toward superiority and denial missions at some distance from Chinese territorial seas.

Potential Flashpoints

Taiwan

Taiwan-China relations will alternate between periods of stability and potential crisis. The tension in cross-strait relations appeared to have moderated in late 1996 as each side waited for the other to make a move. Although Taiwan president Lee Teng-hui asserted in his May 20, 1996, inaugural address that independence for Taiwan is “impossible and unnecessary” and mentioned his willingness to travel to China, both statements were carefully hedged and grounded on Taipei’s past positions, diluting their value in Beijing’s eyes. Nor did Lee provide any other indication of future conciliatory moves by his government, which is in place until 2001. In a restrained public reaction to the speech, authoritative Chinese media reported the statements of “the leader of the Taiwan authorities,” noted that they contained nothing new, and reaffirmed the necessity for an end to Taipei’s “splittist” behavior. Neither side is likely to undertake any major initiative until well into 1997.

Taiwan’s quest for identity and international status will continue to vex Beijing-Taipei and Beijing-U.S. relations. Continuing political evolution and economic necessity will increase the pressure on Taipei to participate more visibly in international organizations, and China will not compromise on the issue of eventual reunification. Succession politics will make even a compromise that stops short of independence difficult to achieve. Because nationalism is involved, evolution in China toward a more open political system will not cause pressure from the mainland to abate. At most, a more open Chinese regime will only help reduce Taiwan resistance. A final resolution is decades away.

During a period of stress, China may use military instruments against Taiwan. Although China and Taiwan will wish to avoid conflict, China’s ultimate concern is that, if allowed to progress beyond certain, unspecified limits, Taiwan’s sense of separateness will evolve into an unsurmountable obstacle to reunification. Beijing’s March 1996 exercises and missile tests in the Taiwan Strait aimed to limit Taiwan’s behavior, not to attack Taiwan or any of the islands under its control.

At a minimum, the PLA would repeat the military posturing of March 1996. Other scenarios to consider are.

Full-Scale Invasion. The PLA cannot yet transport a credible invasion force to Taiwan. Invasion is unlikely for the following reasons:
Taipei would have significant warning time if Beijing were to prepare for an invasion.

Taiwan can deter an attack by maintaining its qualitative advantage against a numerically superior PLA via the deliveries of F-16 (150) and Mirage 2000 (60) fighter aircraft, which began in late 1996, the deployment of new frigates, an improved air defense system, and earlier improvements in ground force capabilities.

Naval Blockade. Although the PLA Navy cannot coordinate the air, surface, and submarine dimensions of a naval blockade, the reaction to the PLA's March 1996 exercises and missile tests suggests that even a partly effective blockade can unsettle Taiwan's economic life.

Air Operations. Possibly in concert with a naval blockade, amphibious operations, missile strikes against Taiwan-held islands, or missile strikes against Taiwan itself, air operations provide a third option. Taipei's qualitative advantage would help offset the PLA's numerical superiority, but air operations would cause great damage, eventually enable China to achieve air superiority, and could force Taipei into a political settlement on China's terms unless Taiwan were to receive external assistance.

China's military posturing during 1995 and 1996 demonstrates that any use of the PLA will provoke both internal and regional demands for a U.S. response. The U.S. deployment of two aircraft carrier battle groups to the Taiwan Strait area in March 1996 set a precedent that will be impossible to ignore in the future. Moreover, the Taiwan Relations Act requires that "the United States make available to Taiwan such defense articles and defense services in such quantity as may be necessary to enable Taiwan to maintain a sufficient self-defense capability."

Chances are better than even that the United States will have to determine whether to become involved in a Taiwan-China conflict. Washington will also be required to choose an appropriate mix of military and political means. Although a force-on-force confrontation is not likely, the United States will at least be called on to provide a wide range of logistical and combat support to the armed forces of Taiwan. If it were to do so, relations with China would suffer accordingly.

Southeast Asia and the South China Sea

China has conflicting territorial claims in the Spratly Archipelago with Brunei, Malaysia, the Philippines, and Vietnam. In addition, Chinese governments have historically defined the entire subregion as an area of special interest for Chinese security.

Conflict in the South China Sea will occur only if one or more of the Southeast Asian disputants attempts to alter the status quo. As with Taiwan, Beijing will probably not opt for military instruments to
settle its ownership claims by 2001. In military terms, although it can deter any similarly unlikely effort by Brunei, Malaysia, the Philippines, or Vietnam to challenge Chinese claims, the PLA cannot yet seize and hold territories in the South China Sea. At some point during operations in the Spratlys, its forces would become vulnerable to significant air and sea counterattack by regional forces. Nonetheless, Beijing will probably continue to test the will of the other claimants, particularly Vietnam, by continuing to refuse to discuss the issue of sovereignty and at times reinforcing its claims by improving existing facilities and, in a replication of actions on Mischief Reef, by constructing new ones.

A conflict in the South China Sea would directly affect all members of the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) and threaten Japan's and the Republic of Korea’s vital sea lines of communication. The United States has declared that it takes no position on the issue of ownership but has also reaffirmed its commitment to maintaining freedom of navigation in the South China Sea. If conflict were to occur, the United States would become involved in limited operations designed to keep the sea lanes open.

ASEAN and the ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF) on security issues accept the need to maintain a U.S. military presence within the subregion. Beijing is concerned, accordingly, that anti-China sentiment not lead to the consolidation of ASEAN unity and will wish to thwart any U.S. attempt to enhance its position there at China’s expense.

Beijing’s effort to accomplish its goals will be qualified by two important factors:

- With the possible exceptions of Thailand and Myanmar, ASEAN nations are suspicious of China’s long-range strategic goals. These fears are intensified by Chinese policies which alternate between periods of assertion and conciliation.
- Deficiencies in China’s overall level of economic development constrain Beijing’s ability to expand its economic ties with ASEAN members. They produce many of the products that China has to offer, limiting the potential for expanded trade relations.

In these circumstances, the Chinese will:

- Avoid facing a unified ASEAN position on any of the Spratly issues.
- Continue to define the dialogue in terms of a series of bilateral problems between itself and the individual nations concerned.
- Continue to alternate periods of assertiveness with periods of conciliation.
- Try to undermine ASEAN confidence in U.S. staying power and in the durability of its commitment.
- Attempt to portray the United States as an opportunistic outsider whose major interest is to use ASEAN and the ARF as a means of containing China.
The Korean Peninsula

Beijing will try to improve its position on the Korean peninsula to reduce U.S. influence when the crisis there ends. As long as a credible North Korean military threat exists, the U.S. troop presence on the Korean peninsula serves Chinese interests:

● During 1960-89, the period of Sino-Soviet estrangement, the presence of U.S. forces complicated Soviet efforts to expand Moscow’s influence there at the potential expense of Chinese interests.

● The Washington-led effort to freeze Pyongyang’s nuclear program was consonant with larger Chinese objectives: a nuclear-armed North Korea threatens China’s strategic interests.

● By deterring a potential North Korean attack, U.S. forces on the peninsula help to maintain stability in an area directly adjacent to China’s strategically important northeastern provinces (Manchuria).

China shares the view that the balance of power on the peninsula will shift permanently towards Seoul and, as a result, the likelihood of conflict on the Korean peninsula will soon begin to diminish. Suspicious as it is of perceived U.S. containment intentions, China is likely to see decreasing benefit in a continued U.S. military presence on the peninsula after the threat from the North finally recedes. The long-term goals will be to reduce U.S. influence and eventually replace U.S. influence with its own.

Since 1993, Beijing has systematically developed a broad network of economic ties with South Korea, the most visible example in the political sphere being Jiang Zemin’s visit to Seoul in November 1995. Although contacts thus far emphasize trade and economic ties, credible evidence supports the assertion that both sides are actively building a substantial dialogue on security-related issues as well. Ties between Beijing and Seoul will continue to develop in the late 1990s and almost certainly will include contacts between the two military establishments. The most important elements of Beijing’s effort will be attempts to:

● Encourage nationalism to reduce the basis of Korean support for the U.S. military presence and make it difficult to station U.S. forces after the threat of conflict is gone.

● Turn anti-Japanese sentiment in Korea to its advantage by interpreting the redefined security relationship between Washington and Tokyo as an example of the U.S. emphasis on ties with Japan over those with the Republic of Korea.

● Present closer ties with China as compensation for rising Japanese power and diminishing U.S. concern with Korea.

U.S. Interests and Approach

Net Assessment

For China’s leaders, to conduct relations with the United States is to confront a paradox. Development imperatives dictate broad and close interaction, while perceived longer-term strategic imperatives produce suspicion and incipient competition. Beijing’s present policies clearly indicate that its leaders are guided in the main by the imperatives of development. Despite frictions over trade, intellectual property, proliferation, human rights, and even Taiwan, Beijing shows no evidence of any willingness to allow its ties with Washington to collapse or evolve towards military conflict. Nor, with the exception of U.S. support for Taiwan independence, is it likely to find a reason to do so at any time during the next decade or so.

On the other hand, continuing suspicion will mean that the present cyclical pattern of bilateral ties will continue. Issues such as accession to the World Trade Organization (WTO), the sale of nuclear materials to Pakistan, and intellectual property rights and safeguards, if they are resolved, will be replaced by other problems of a similarly vexing nature. Also, convinced as it is of Washington’s intention to maintain leverage over China, in the form of the redefined alliance with Japan, a continuing presence on the Korean peninsula, and strong ties with ASEAN—that is, convinced as it is that Washington will practice “Soft Contain-
ment " or "Engagement with Elements of Containment"—Beijing will, in the next few years, become increasingly willing to manifest its concerns about the longer term. In the absence of any strategic accord with Washington, it can and it will begin to try to better position itself within the region as a hedge against an uncertain future. Indeed, its actions with respect to Japan, the two Koreas, and Southeast Asia indicate that it has already begun to do so.

The next few years will see a new element in Beijing's relations with the United States. While Beijing will continue to seek the benefit of economic and other ties, the Chinese will also try to thwart U.S. efforts to consolidate what Beijing perceives to be its modified containment strategy. Because China is at present strategically and materially disadvantaged relative to the United States, direct competition, much less military confrontation will be carefully avoided. Rather, the Chinese will mount a low-intensity effort to compete strategically with the United States, an effort that is carefully controlled to avoid escalation to crisis. As noted, this effort will focus on the Asia Pacific region, but it will also at times extend to Western Europe and the Middle East as well.

Within the decade, China could become a power that is a peer to the U.S. in the East Asian theater. Moreover, as its comprehensive national strength continues to develop over the decade, Beijing might play the role of theater peer with more assurance than is presently the case. A more capable and confident China may prove to be more obdurate in its pursuit of issues that touch upon sovereignty and national reunification, such as Taiwan or the South China Sea. In these circumstances, a miscalculation by Beijing of either Taipei's or Washington's intentions could produce a conflict into which the United States might be drawn. Prudence would dictate that such an eventuality be considered by U.S. force planners.

U.S. Interests

Unhindered Access to Asian Markets

Unhindered access to the markets of a stable and prosperous Asia is essential to the continuing prosperity of the United States. The tenor of U.S. relations with China affects regional stability and, therefore, economic prosperity. Adversarial, estranged, hostile, or even highly competitive relations create or intensify fault lines within the Asia Pacific as the other regional powers struggle to adjust to the pressures produced by Washington and Beijing.

Dissuading Ambitions to be a Military Superpower

If the U.S. is to maintain its position within the Asia Pacific region, then there is also an interest in ensuring that China's growing comprehensive national strength is not directed against the United States in the future. It is in the American interest to dissuade China from engaging in military/strategic competition with the United States or from directly challenging the U.S. regional position.

Human Rights inside China

Whereas the U.S. has at times placed high priority on the state of human rights inside China, a broad consensus seems to have developed in U.S. government circles that human rights can best be advanced in the context of promoting economic development and general good relations.

U.S. Approach

The United States and China will probably not enter into conflict by 2006 or even 2016. But, without a long-term focus, the United States will not dissuade China from directing its growing comprehensive national strength into strategic competition, and Washington will not be able to maintain its position within the Asia Pacific region.

A successful approach will establish a strategic framework that will guide and discipline bilateral ties. Such a framework would strike a balance between flexibility and the need to safeguard vital national interests. If the United States views and
treats China as a hostile or potentially hostile power, Beijing is likely to act in that way in the future. On the other hand, an effective approach will include realistic expectations for Chinese behavior and appropriate benchmarks for judging Beijing's policies, based on an ordered sense of national interests and strategic priorities.

U.S. policy towards China combines aspects of three approaches to dissuasion—approaches which are not always mutually compatible:

- Engage Beijing on a broad range of issues, including an active security dialogue. The goal is to establish a broad network of mutually beneficial strategic, economic, and political ties that will provide Beijing with an incentive to participate responsibly in the affairs of the region. Ideally, engagement is also directed toward developing the bilateral and multilateral consultative mechanisms necessary to resolve perceived differences between the interests of China and the United States and between China and the other regional powers and, when differences in interests cannot be accommodated, to manage frictions and prevent conflict. The present strategy places a high premium on process and, at its core, is economic, political, and strategic.

- Establish a strategic basis for conducting and managing relations. Another approach is a variation on the mainstream focus on engagement. According to this position, the policies of the 1990s place excessive emphasis on process rather than on result. If the two sides can agree on a framework for relations, they will have an incentive to overcome differences on specific issues. The key to this approach is the requirement to infuse engagement with new content that reflects the strategic interests and priorities of the two sides.

- Reject engagement in favor of containment. This approach advocates more focus on China's transgressions in human rights, proliferation activities, and trade practices. In this view, Beijing's record in these areas reflects a difference in values that no amount of contact can overcome, and, because Beijing will eventually challenge the United States, it is better to prevent China from developing the capability to make that challenge effective.

Elements of the first approach clearly predominate in the present U.S. policy mix. This has the potential to produce significant short-term improvement. But the recent history of U.S./China relations suggests that the utility of this approach for dissuasion over the longer term remains open to question. It may be possible to deal with present irritants, and this might build some confidence for the future. But the potential for continuing alternations between positive and negative poles will remain.

The second approach supports the first, and, with its emphasis on building a strategic framework based on shared or complementary interests, it appears to offer some potential for stabilizing bilateral ties. The third approach will not dissuade China at all. Rather, it will merely postpone Beijing's issuing of the challenge.

It is worth noting that all three approaches assume a continuing U.S. military presence within the region as well as strong security relations with its alliance partners and friends. The first two acknowledge Beijing's sensitivities on this point, but they do not suggest that U.S. forward deployments are in any sense negotiable. Rather, they affirm the centrality of such deployments to American vital interests and would develop interactions between the two military establishments as a means of dealing with Chinese concerns. A robust military force and an active dialogue on security issues and concerns are viewed as key elements in any strategy of dissuasion.
There has been more ferment in the U.S.-Japanese bilateral security relationship in the mid-1990s than at any time since the reversion of Okinawa in 1972. Some observers reckon that only the revision of the Security Treaty in 1960 matches events in the mid-1990s for intensity and significance. The U.S.-Japan security relationship is enmeshed in a process of generational political change across the region and a fluid, turbulent Northeast Asian strategic environment. Japanese views of the alliance are shaped by the uneasy emergence of China as an military and economic power and fears of instability on the Korean peninsula. Whatever the historical comparison, the alliance is passing through a post-Cold War catharsis that will determine its future pertinence, value, and longevity.

**Background and Trends**

The U.S.-Japanese relationship has endured continuous challenges and fluctuations since its new beginnings after World War II. This relationship is comprised of three broad pillars—economics, politics, and security. During most of the Cold War, the security dimension carried disproportionate weight in the relationship. In the 1990s, however, the economic component has loomed larger as the three pillars have combined to create a tense, uncertain alliance. Nor has the most significant change in international relations—the end of the Cold War—left Japan untouched. Japan’s interpretation of and response to international security threats remain based on a calculus of a credible U.S. nuclear/security umbrella, but in a markedly different security environment.

Japan, reliant upon the United States for security since the end of World War II, is in the process of redefining itself in the international arena. Japan has begun to develop security goals for itself, as Tokyo and its Asian neighbors search for a new security equilibrium in the region which will reflect Japan’s economic stature and accommodate the strategic concerns of Japan and others in the region. The late 1990s will be a critical point in the redefinition of Japan as a global power and in the redefinition of the U.S.-Japanese alliance on all fronts.
Domestic Political and Economic Changes

Although Japan has recovered through industrial and trade successes a great deal of the power and pride lost during the Pacific war, most Japanese still remain uncertain about what their country’s regional and global roles should be.

Since the late 1980s, the U.S.-Japanese security relationship has been challenged by the emergence of Japan as a major global economic and financial power, which even prior to the end of the Cold War, moved economics into a more prominent position in the bilateral relationship. This more important role for economics was further accentuated by the end of the Cold War, the collapse of the Soviet Union, and the emotional hurdles of the fiftieth anniversaries of the attack on Pearl Harbor and the end of World War II in the Pacific. Heated confrontation, such as that over the question of technology sharing in the F5-X debacle, and a seemingly endless stream of contentious trade negotiations moved such issues to centerstage.

In the early 1990s, a tilt towards East Asia—driven by deepening intra-Asian economic integration—in both Japanese economic policy and foreign policy became increasingly evident, replete with the reorganization of the Foreign Ministry and bitter trade disputes with the U.S. In intellectual exercises, and often in practice, Japan placed increased emphasis on multilateral and UN solutions to security problems. In the early 1990s, it appeared that, for the first time, Japan might be searching for an alternative to the bilateral system led by the United States.

Japanese divergence, driven by uncertainty fostered by American indecision and inconsistency as much as by Tokyo’s own Asian aspirations, probably peaked in 1994 with the Higuchi Commission’s recommendations on the future of Japan’s security goals. It recommended increased dependence and emphasis on multilateralism and the United Nations, with reliance on the United States third in order of priority.

By 1995–96, burgeoning Japanese self-confidence had been trimmed significantly by serious and prolonged recession, endemic political scandal, and political gridlock. Assumptions regarding the decline of the United States began to appear overblown, especially in light of American leadership that resolved the Korean crisis, made possible progress in the Middle East peace process, and would lead to NATO action in Bosnia. At the same time, growing regional concern about Chinese military assertiveness, particularly in the South China Sea, became a focus of attention in the region.

Reflecting modest political ferment, the Liberal Democratic Party (LDP) lost power for the first time in four decades in 1993. Although in 1995 the LDP regained power in a coalition with its traditional nemesis the Social Democratic Party, Japan’s political system remains in flux. Issues such as the peace constitution hold the potential to play a significant role in reshaping Japanese political alignments. The LDP strengthened its position in the October 1996 elections, the first under a new electoral system in which 60 percent of the Japanese Diet was elected in single-member districts.

As of 1996, Japan’s domestic debate is driven by changing perceptions of international security challenges. There is a drift toward a more independent defense industrial base, along with a strong desire to build new structures for regional cooperation, complementing the U.S.-Japan security alliance and hedging against the future, not supplanting it.

Japan’s history over the past century is one of stability and prosperity when in alliance with a leading maritime power, and one of conflict and instability when it pursues a posture of strategic independence. Earlier this century, Japan had another defense alliance with a great Western maritime power, namely Britain. When the Anglo-Japanese alliance dissolved after World War I, Japan traded absolute security on a bilateral basis for a multilateral treaty system (the Washington Naval conference) that brought just the opposite. All countries in the alliance—Japan most of all—have regretted the consequences.
Japan and Other Asian Powers

During the Cold War, the Soviet threat was sold to the Japanese public as the primary rationale for the alliance and for Japan's Self Defense Forces (SDF). Since the threat disappeared, Tokyo's explanation for the continuing military requirements in an uncertain region have been less pervasive and more vague—e.g., uncertainty, instability. After relying so long on an exclusively threat-based security rationale, it is difficult for the Japanese, having forsworn war as a sovereign right, to deal legitimately with future uncertainty and potential threats.

At this juncture, too much Japanese assertiveness would be as problematic as an inability on the part of Tokyo to do more. Tensions in 1996 with south Korea over the uninhabited Takeshima/Tokdo islands, and a highly emotional Chinese response (including Hong Kong and Taiwan) to an assertion of Japanese claims to the Senkaku islands underscore the degree to which Japan's inability to come to terms with the legacy of the Pacific war continues to make suspicion of Japanese militarism an animating force in the region, most evident in Korea and China, as well as in Japan itself. Regional stability depends upon the perceived limits of Japan's security role. That is especially important to Beijing and Seoul, but is a factor in capitals throughout the region. A useful barometer of success will be the extent to which Beijing responds reflexively to Japan's changing security role and a reinvigorated U.S.-Japan alliance, which in turn will depend on the character of Sino-American relations.

Moreover, Japan faces a paradoxical predicament resulting from generational change: Those of the Baby Boom generation and younger now assuming the reins of power are far less captive psychologically to the burden of Japan's behavior during the 1930s and 1940s and that generation's denial and distortion of the past. Yet in Asian memories, this failure to come to terms with the past—punctuated by periodic comments defending the past or symbolic visits to the Yasukuni Shrine—continues to shape perceptions of Japanese intentions.

At the same time, North Korean nuclear ambitions and its missile and chemical weapon programs along with growing concern about rising Chinese power have become increasingly tangible issues. But the Japanese government has not been able to base its planning on politically controversial potential threats. That inability makes already constrained bilateral planning almost impossible. Given the difficulty of dealing with crises such as the Gulf War, the Kobe earthquake, and the subway gas attacks, the dearth of crisis planning has become a real liability. Informed Japanese observers know that a major crisis close to home—on the Korean peninsula, for instance—could rupture the alliance if American forces were heavily committed and Japan's response was insufficient.
China

The emergence of China—both economically after a decade of double digit annual growth and in politico-military terms with its modernization program and new assertiveness—overshadows all other external factors in regard to shaping Japanese security perceptions and behavior in the bilateral relationship. The timing of the Clinton-Hasimoto Summit in April 1996 was serendipitous. The summit’s success, centering around the renewal of the U.S. Japan Security Treaty, was facilitated by the March 1996 Taiwan Straits crisis, in which the U.S. deployed two carrier task forces into the East China Sea.

Concern over Chinese actions may facilitate bilateral collaboration and resolve doubts about the future of the security relationship more than any other single factor. There is an uneasy triangular relationship unfolding in which the U.S.-Japan alliance may impact both Sino-American ties and Sino-Japanese ties in unintended ways. Prudence would seem to dictate close bilateral cooperation, regional cooperation led by Washington and Tokyo, and carefully coordinated dialogue with Beijing.

Depending upon future circumstances, the U.S.-Japanese alliance may have to deal directly with Chinese military developments, but both Tokyo and Washington clearly wish to avoid this course if at all possible. In the eyes of the Chinese, there are serious consequences to more significant U.S.-Japan security cooperation. The challenge will be to avoid actions that Beijing construes as confirming suspicions of an anti-Chinese alliance. It will be left to Beijing to determine whether China’s emergence will be regarded as an opportunity or as a liability.

North and South Korea

North and South Korea each challenge Japan in different ways in the near-term; the prospect of Korean unification, possible by the early 2000s, may alter its security calculus. Scenarios of a North Korean attack across the demilitarized zone, or a collapse of authority and a refugee outflow, motivates many Japanese calculations. These scenarios have been in the mind of those who have urged Tokyo to expand its support for U.S. crisis operations. Despite modern instincts against involvement, it is increasingly difficult for Japan to deny its vital interest in stability on the peninsula, as well as responsibility for action if war or chaos were to break out.

South Korea presents a very different proposition. Seoul’s behavior in the mid-1990s makes clear the propensity for long-term competition across the Tsushima/Korea Strait. The sharp argument in 1996 over ownership of Takeshima/Tokdo island surprised many observers and was notable for its visceral character. This playing out of historic grievances between two major U.S. treaty allies puts the U.S. in a difficult position. At the same time, there are glimmers of optimism, in the intertwining of the Korean and Japanese economies and the imperatives of cooperation in managing the North Korea problem, as was prominent in the June 1996 Kim-Hashimoto summit at Cheju-do island.

North Korea is perhaps Japan’s most immediate security concern, and a likely test of the contemporary U.S.-Japan alliance. Either explosion (e.g., Pyongyang invading into the South) or implosion could cause an American military response. Moreover, the deepening famine could generate a refugee flow testing the peacetime Acquisition and Cross Servicing Agreement (ACSA) arrangements agreed to last April. In any case, it is difficult envisioning the current regime in Pyongyang having a lifespan that exceeds the next decade barring radical economic reform and large-scale foreign aid and investment neither of which appear on the horizon.

Japan’s Self-Defense Forces: Layers of Constraint

The legal and political context in which Japanese national security planners and military planners operate imposes severe constitutional and political restrictions upon the Self-Defense Forces. Therefore, civil-military relations are quite different from those in the West. In Japan, there is no counterpart for the ubiquitous American “rules of engagement,” which are customized to fit the situation and pro-
Japan-USSR/Northern Territories

The Russian occupation of Japan’s Northern Territories will impede good relations between Tokyo and Moscow. There is no prospect of armed conflict, but incidents—for instance over fishermen—could occur.

Vide general political guidance for the actions of military commanders in the field. Judgment concerning the latitude of action of the Self-Defense Forces is strictly reserved to the political leadership, which in most cases has studiously avoided applying it. Because the capability for national command and control is not well developed, effective internal direction and bilateral coordination are both difficult.

Japan’s Self-Imposed Constraints

Despite a large, if inefficient, defense budget, a number of profound constraints are imposed on Japanese security. While not universally held, Japanese pacifism has been fairly widespread legally, philosophically, and institutionally. That is one of the profound contrasts in an alliance rife with asymmetries. In the United States, war, albeit usually a last resort, is seen in Clausewitzian terms as an extension of politics. To the contrary, Article 9 of the Japanese Constitution disavows as a sovereign right the conduct of war as a means of settling international disputes. In its essence, this means that the Japanese government ascribes to the principle that it does not have the power to order its citizens to die for their country, except in the strict defense of Japan.

The SDF and the security relationship with the U.S. are accommodations to the right of strictly limited self-defense, but collective self-defense is proscribed by the definitive interpretation of Article 9 of the Constitution by the Cabinet Legal Bureau. These restrictions mean that Japan will not become involved in external disputes that do not affect the defense of Japanese territory—despite the tension such a posture creates in its Article Six commitment of the U.S.-Japan bilateral security pact to regional security. Instead, Japan takes a less-conventional approach to comprehensive security, often not noticed by U.S. observers. Tokyo blends foreign aid (overseas developmental assistance), diplomacy in the UN and ASEAN Regional Forum, confidence-building discussions with Russia, and new initiatives with Beijing and Pyongyang. Though not traditional military instruments, they enhance mutual security nevertheless.

Tokyo also has adopted a number of fundamental security approaches based on the Constitution’s principles. Japan’s non-nuclear principles forbid the manufacture, introduction, or possession of nuclear weapons, committing Japan instead to dependence upon the U.S. nuclear umbrella. The SDF has been assiduously controlled by extensive civilian oversight and restrictive rules of engagement. With the exception of severely constrained peacekeeping and humanitarian relief operations, the SDF has been denied the ability to operate abroad or project power. The profit motive for military expansion has been removed by preventing the export of defense equip-
ment by Japan’s defense industry. With the exception of dealing with the United States, the export of defense technology is also prohibited.

Instead, Japan has had to make its contributions to regional security and its own defense in broader terms through important unconventional means. It became a bulwark of democracy and a bastion of capitalism during the Cold War by providing access to extensive bases and facilities in Japan, and by providing financial and political support to the United States. Part and parcel of Japan’s contribution was the Yoshida Doctrine, which gave national priority to pervasive economic development and helped fuel Western and regional economic development as well. These important contributions remain the basis for foreseeable Japanese efforts and increasingly are responsible for the ability of the United States to remain engaged in Asia with forward-deployed forces.

Much of the Japanese establishment—business groups, leading newspapers, opposition politicians—advocates either reinterpretation or revision of Article 9, the “no war” clause in the Constitution. This process of redefinition will take some time, probably several years.

**Force Modernization**

Restrictions and limitations are evident in the new National Defense Program Outline (NDPO), but so are significant political developments, in addition to an emphasis on streamlining and force modernization. Despite Japan’s heritage of indirect contributions, the NDPO emphasizes SDF readiness, close coordination of the SDF with U.S. forces, and prevention of instability by maintaining the minimum necessary defense capability, and thereby avoiding a vacuum of power.

The NDPO, allows some streamlining and force structure reductions. SDF troops are authorized at 145,000 active personnel, down from 180,000. However, budgets for modernization with state-of-the-art equipment have increased for all services. Strong R&D funding reflects the continued Japanese emphasis on quality over quantity. So far, Japan’s programmatic priorities continue to emphasize forces complementary to American capabilities, rather than the development of a Self-Defense Force that is balanced across the board. However, Japan’s budget reflects increasing duplication of capabilities in the defense R&D effort, especially in missiles, aircraft, satellites, and other high-tech programs.

SDF personnel are highly trained career professionals operating with high quality, advanced equipment. However, their effectiveness is constrained by a number of institutional and cultural factors. The effects of excessive civilian control and lack of useful rules of engagement are predictable. The lack of broad-based intelligence and command-and-control capabilities reflects the virtual absence of inter-service cooperation and joint doctrine. Despite the number of U.S. systems in the SDF inventory, there is only very limited interoperability where it counts, both operationally and logistically. U.S. forces and the SDF seldom operate alongside each other, much less together.

Future SDF procurement may include some reordering of priorities. Internal service pressure for improved capabilities and a balanced force are bound to continue. Resentment over playing a perennial supporting role to the United States may become more of a political factor over time. New SDF missions already include peacekeeping and humanitarian assistance and disaster relief operations.

Eventually, additional missions will be likely, including some form of theater ballistic missile defense beyond the envisioned Patriot PAC-2 upgrade. The advent of the Japan Defense Intelligence Headquarters should significantly enhance the collection, processing, and dissemination of defense intelligence. In addition, the Japan Defense Agency (JDA) appears intent on having its own surveillance satellite capability. Other capabilities are under consideration, such as aerial refueling and long range strategic airlift. These developments notwithstanding, it is unlikely that Japan will have either a plan or the capability to project substantial military power any time soon, as political constraints are firmly embedded. Those new mission areas that do develop are likely to be rationalized as part of Japan’s new emphasis on SDF participation in peacekeeping and disaster relief.
The Unrealized Potential of Armaments Cooperation

Security and economics intersect in the area of defense technology in the major bilateral cooperative programs listed below. The connection can be a positive demonstration of cooperation and may be worth billions of dollars in production and jobs. It could become a two-way defense cooperation, strengthening support for the alliance, but the flow of technology back to the U.S. has so far been minimal. Equipment programs and acquisition planning continue to play important roles in shaping the alliance, albeit without much bilateral forethought or coordination. Japanese acquisition of major U.S. weapons includes state-of-the-art American systems, such as:

- F-4, F-15, and F-16-derived F-2 fighters
- P-3C antisubmarine patrol aircraft
- Shipboard AEGIS fleet air defense system
- AWACS early warning and surveillance aircraft
- Patriot air defense system
- MLRS rocket artillery system
- CH-47 and UH-60/SH-60 helicopters
- Naval guns, torpedoes, and surface-to-air missiles.
- AIM 7M Sparrow and AIM 9L Sidewinder air-to-air missiles

Potential future candidates for acquisition by Japan include additional units and upgrades to most or all of these systems, plus:

- Aerial-refueling aircraft
- Some variation of emerging U.S. theater missile defense systems

Follow-on fighter aircraft such as the F-22
- AIM 120 AMRAAM missile

It will take considerable effort to channel planners toward cooperation in this myriad of programs. The most beneficial political approach would be to seek agreement on an extensive requirements dialogue in order to rationalize expectations and planning for the next several decades.

Potential flashpoints

Alliance Strains

What might cause the alliance to falter? In a relationship noted for its asymmetries, imbalance in a number of areas described below could become so lopsided as to make the partnership unsustainable:

- Continued Exclusive Emphasis on the Defense of Japan: Japanese priority over the past several decades has been given almost exclusively to the defense of Japan (Article 5 of the Security Treaty) as opposed to regional security (Article 6 of the Security Treaty). In combination with operational restrictions, this political priority has forestalled effective coordination and military planning for contingencies such as a crisis on the Korean peninsula. The effective cap on the direct Japanese defense budget of 1 percent of GNP further limits direct Japanese operational participation. Indirect Japanese contributions have been more forthcoming, and are highly valued, but they have relatively little visibly direct effect in a crisis. Tokyo contributed $13 billion to the Gulf War effort. Host Nation Support amounts to $5 billion per year, which accounts for more than 70 percent of the non-salary stationing costs of U.S. forces in Japan. Japanese political support for U.S. negotiating efforts was invaluable during the recent crisis over the North Korean nuclear program. However, indirect efforts do not satisfy critics who decry the lack of apparent Japanese commitment.

- Okinawa and Base Issues: In 1972, Okinawa and the future of the American garrison there seemed to dominate events, much as they do in the mid 1990s. Another major Okinawan crisis would be a real body blow to bilateral defense cooperation. The character and results of the Special Ac-

Basic Guidelines for Japan's Participation in Peacekeeping Forces
(The So-Called Five Principles)

1. Agreement on a cease-fire shall have been reached among the parties to the conflict.
2. The parties to the conflict, including the territorial state(s), shall have given their consent to deployment of the peacekeeping force and Japan's participation in the force.
3. The peacekeeping force shall strictly maintain impartiality, not favoring any party to the conflict.
4. Should any of the above guideline requirements cease to be satisfied, the government of Japan may withdraw its contingent.
5. Use of weapons shall be limited to the minimum necessary to protect the lives of personnel.
tion Committee on Okinawa (SACO) will determine the quality of the relationship with the Okinawan populace well into the next century. After the SACO charter expires, constant attention to the management of base issues will be a high priority for both governments. Simply administering the return of Futenma Marine Corps Air Station and other facilities, and the relocation of functions elsewhere, will be an enormous challenge.

In all the activity centered on Okinawa, the strategic objective may have been obscured: in order to preserve the utility of U.S. bases in Okinawa, pressures on Okinawa are to be relieved—not by shifting capabilities around within Okinawa, but by moving forces from Okinawa to Japan’s four main islands.

- *Political fatigue and leadership lapses.* U.S. budgetary pressures on defense spending and neo-isolationist impulses found among both traditional liberals and minimalist conservatives in the U.S. could combine to jeopardize current levels of U.S. engagement. If such a scenario becomes a reality, bilateral divisions of political and military responsibility between Japan and the United States would come under severe pressure.

**Regional Crisis**

Directly related to the exclusive concentration on the defense of Japan is the potential for a regional contingency affecting Japan’s security. Foremost in the minds of most serious observers are the ramifications of a serious regional crisis, in which American troops are heavily engaged with numerous casualties. Conflict on the Korean peninsula, perhaps the most pressing near-term prospect, a real confrontation between Taiwan and China, and hostilities over conflicting claims in the disputed Northern Territories, Senkakus in the East China Sea or in the South China Sea would all challenge the U.S.-Japanese alliance. In these or any other external crises unrelated to the direct defense of Japan, two related issues would surface: what is Japan prepared to permit the U.S. to do from Japanese bases, and what is Japan itself prepared to do? The answers are changing as the security dialogue unfolds.

In this context instability on the Korean peninsula is of particular importance, where the alliance would be most sorely tested in the near- to mid-term. Insufficient response to a serious crisis could be extremely damaging. Given self-imposed and external constraints, would Japan’s contribution be sufficiently robust to satisfy American critics who know little and care less about the finer points of alliance asymmetries? For the moment, this is the worst case scenario. To what extent it should drive bilateral and national conclusions and planning is an essential question for Alliance managers.

**Trade And Security**

In 1996, bilateral trade friction diminished, despite unresolved issues such as insurance and air flight rights. Washington and Tokyo agreed on a computer chip accord in August. Other difficult issues continue; some will be sources of bilateral friction, others may play out in multilateral fora, particularly the WTO. Furthermore, corporate alliances will ameliorate differences to some degree. The bilateral trade deficit is down, if only because Japanese production is shifting offshore. However, if abrasive economic relations once again come to dominate the bilateral dialogue, the ability to manage the alliance would be seriously compromised. That would be especially true in the late 1990s, when the quality of overall bilateral relations will affect the outcome of the defense guidelines review.

Debate over the relationship between security and economics will continue to challenge the security relationship. The firewall between Japan and the United States that was erected during the Cold War is long gone, but an emphasis on trade should not imply a decline in the importance of security relations. Nor should constructive progress on security cooperation come at the expense of sorting out key trade and economic goals.

One important component of trade and security is cooperation on arms and security technology. There is little U.S. support for bilateral technology cooperation where it counts, in government labs.
Deployment of U.S. Forces in Japan outside Okinawa

and corporate R&D centers. With no appreciation for potential Japanese contributions, and less incentive to displace funding or adopt new solutions, no demand exists in the U.S. for Japanese technology, despite congressional and cabinet-level direction to pursue it. And there is no support from the Japanese side for providing technology. With no discernible transfer of Japanese defense technology to the U.S., the security relationship continues to pay a political price for the lack of progress.

The nature of this technological and equipment cooperation has several consequences. First, what is generally referred to as interoperability provides the basis (as yet unrealized) for close logistical and, ultimately, operational cooperation. Similar equipment tends to increase the potential for similar training regimes and operational doctrines, common experiences, and shared approaches. Second, fielding major American defense equipment tends to lock Tokyo and the SDF into the bilateral security system, thereby becoming as much a determinant as a product of security cooperation.

Less generally appreciated is the third consequence. Japan’s increased capabilities, based in several key categories on advanced U.S. equipment, create the potential for much greater U.S. reliance on Japan, whether as a spare-parts depot, a source of replacement equipment, a repair center, a wingman, or an extension of the battle line, holding the rear echelon (or the flank) with identical equipment.

U.S. Interests and Approach

Net Assessment

U.S. interests in the Asia-Pacific are large and growing. Sustained economic growth in East Asia is vital to American prosperity and economic expansion. The U.S. politico-military role in the region, its security guarantees for Japan and South Korea and larger role as balancer of last resort underpin stability and limit strategic competition. The U.S.-Japan security alliance remains the keystone of American security strategy in the Asia-Pacific. Moreover, forward-deployed assets in Japan are an important part of the U.S. global force projection capability.

At the same time, the U.S.-Japan security alliance appears more important to Tokyo now than it was during the Cold War. Northeast Asia is and will remain a volatile security environment over the next 10–15 years. The transformation of Russia is of uncertain outcome and China’s geopolitical weight will continue to increase, though its intentions and strategic direction will remain unclear. Furthermore, instability, if not conflict, will persist on the Korean peninsula. Historic suspicions of Japanese militarism make an independent strategic posture the recipe for a Northeast Asian arms race, and there is no apparent substitute for the U.S. as security partner. Thus reaffirming a modernized U.S.-Japan Security Treaty has fresh appeal.
U.S. Interests

Access to Japanese Markets

Japan is one of the largest potential markets for U.S. products, and it is one of the markets in which U.S. firms have had the most difficult time competing. The U.S. government argues that a large part of the problem lies in practices coordinated by the Japanese government. At times, this issue has assumed such importance as to overwhelm all other matters in the U.S.-Japan relationship.

As a related matter, the U.S. has an interest in free access to Japanese financial markets, including for investment in Japan. This issue has in recent years been much less contentious than trade.

Prevention of Hegemony or an Arms Race in East Asia

The U.S. does not want to see any hegemon in East Asia that could use a privileged position there to become in a few decades a true world power. The U.S. wants to guarantee its access to the East Asian markets vital for American prosperity, as well as to investment opportunities in the world’s fastest growing area.

The U.S. also wants to prevent an arms race in East Asia between countries suspicious of each other’s intentions. The U.S. would be ill placed to compete in such an arms race. The result of an arms race could be a decline in the U.S.’ relative military position in the region. Furthermore, with larger military forces, some state in the region might be tempted to use force against a neighbor to back up its claim in one of the region’s many disputes over territories at sea.

Protection of the Global Financial System, Including Exchange Rates

Japan invests more abroad each year than any other country, and its central bank has larger reserves than any other in the world. The largest foreign exchange market in the world is the market to trade yen for dollars. In short, Japan’s financial system is uniquely placed to assist the U.S. in its vital interest of ensuring stable and appropriate exchange rates, a sound global financial system, and low inflation. To that end, Japan and the U.S. coordinate closely on fiscal and monetary policy.

Sharing the Responsibilities for World Leadership

The alliance between the world’s two largest economies and major democracies offers the U.S. important leverage in shaping the post-Cold War system of economic and political relations. In particular, the U.S. has an interest in securing Japanese assistance in meeting the costs of world leadership, from foreign aid to security needs. The U.S. is the world’s remaining super-
power, but that does not mean that the U.S. can bear alone the full costs of humanitarian assistance, promotion of sustainable development, and protection of global stability. Japan’s financial contributions in these areas have become vital. Since 1993, for instance, Japan has been the world’s largest provider of foreign aid, outspending the U.S. by 50 percent in 1995.

U.S. Approach

Whether pacific Asia is a peaceful, stable, and prosperous region in the 21st century depends first and foremost on the relations among the three major powers: Japan, China, and the United States. Among these sets of relations, the crucial task is whether Japan and China can peace-fully integrate an ascendant China into the regional and international system. That peaceful integration cannot happen without a close-knit U.S.-Japan partnership. For the United States, the alternative to a vibrant alliance with Japan is not an alliance with China, as some in Japan posit, but rather withdrawal from the region and a resignation that it can no longer play a pivotal stabilizing role. For Japan, the alternative to the bilateral relationship with America is neither the role of tributary of China, nor some notion of cooperative security such as ASEAN. Instead, the alternative is an inexorable path toward conflict between the two great Asian powers of the next millenium.

American stature and influence are enhanced in every aspect of bilateral and regional relationships by the permanent presence of American forces based in Japan, along with those in Korea and access arrangements around the Western Pacific. These forces represent the unmit-gated U.S. commitment to the region, which enhances American political and economic influence.

Strategic Balance

America’s presence-derived political influence begets flexibility in dealing with predictable and emerging challenges. The effects are palpable in the bilateral relationship with Japan. Never before has a primary trading partner had such extensive influence as does the United States with Japan. Cultivating close ties precludes serious bilateral differences or an alliance rupture. The security and political dialogues are aimed at foreclosing alternatives by maximizing common bilateral interests.

Cooperation with Japan provides the maximum flexibility in political as well as military options for integrating a dynamic China into the region. If there are to be three major Pacific powers, it is essential that Japan and the U.S. be on the same side of any triangle that includes China. That need not imply conflict, as triangular relationships apply to engagement as well as to other intense approaches. Cooperation with Japan also is the most salient approach to preventing possible collapse or chaos in North Korea. Should diplomacy fail, it also is the best preparation for a possible crisis on the peninsula.

Together, the U.S. and Japan have an opportunity not only for bilateral actions but also for strengthening burgeoning multilateral forums for mutual dialogue and confidence building in the region that reinforce bilateral solutions.

Mutual Military Advantage

Because they are forward deployed and ready for immediate operations, U.S. forces operating from Japanese bases contribute an essential psychological ingredient to regional stability. Effective deterrence throughout the region depends upon the presence of U.S. forces. A U.S. withdrawal is feared throughout the region because a pullback would require a conscious, and unpredictable, political commitment by the president before forces could deploy from bases in the United States.

Japan has become the focus for U.S. military operations in and around Northeast Asia and beyond into the Persian Gulf. Base access for U.S. forces in effective Asian and Pacific locations is largely limited to Japan and Korea. Because of the flexibility the locations in Japan afford U.S. forces, the importance of maintaining force structure, troop strength, and unimpeded base access there is amplified. Politically driven or budget-driven reductions would have significant operational consequences and important implications for American credibility and influence.
After Drift in the Security Relationship, Real Success at the 1996 Summit

Significant alliance drift and reduced cohesion had become apparent by 1994, with increasing antagonism over economic issues, questions in both capitals concerning post-Cold War bilateral and national roles, and Japanese moves toward an Asianization of Tokyo's economic and diplomatic goals. The rebuilding process began in earnest in October 1994 with the first of a series of intense discussions in Tokyo, Washington, and Hawaii. The agenda was set to examine jointly the post-Cold War foundations for the bilateral security relationship, with the first phase originally scheduled to culminate in Tokyo a year later.

Focusing on bilateral, regional, and global aspects of U.S.-Japanese security cooperation, diplomats and security officials began to prepare for a November 1995 summit. They introduced the possibility of a defining security declaration to be promulgated by the president and the prime minister. This dialogue produced two key documents. The American document was the DOD's white paper on East Asia and the Pacific, the East Asia Strategy Report, released in early 1995. Tokyo's National Defense Program Outline followed in November 1995, defining Japan's defense and programmatic priorities.

Summit preparations were interrupted by the Okinawan crisis, but the alliance ultimately proved stronger as a result. Discussions and agreements had been set to culminate in November 1995. With most agreements in hand and a strong team in place, both sides were as prepared as possible for the storm clouds of protest that gathered in September 1995. The planned first-ever "2+2," the ministerial-level Security Consultative Committee meeting, was held on schedule that month in New York. Important in its own right, the "2+2" also focused the attention of the leaders involved: the U.S. secretaries of state and defense, and Japan's ministers of foreign affairs and defense.

When the November 1995 summit was postponed for U.S. domestic political reasons, the respite bought time for the ensuing cathartic domestic political debate in Japan over the future of the security relationship. It also allowed for the crafting of a dramatic American response to Okinawan demands for base closures and land returns. The ensuing five months were spent in furiously active security discussions preparing for the ultimately successful April summit.

Ironically, the real achievements of the April 1996 summit were made possible by the rigors of the preceding crisis following the rape of a young Okinawan schoolgirl by three U.S. servicemen. The resulting furor forced an intense and uncharacteristic public debate in Japan. This debate was a necessary precursor to redefining the security relationship and otherwise would have been out of reach of bureaucrats and politicians. The resultant American response also played a significant role. Impressing Tokyo with its seriousness, Washington pledged to return Futenma Marine Corps Air Station on Okinawa, thereby galvanizing the diplomatic and political process.

The emphasis of the alliance is shifting. From the outset, the Treaty of Mutual Cooperation and Security focused on two key tenets of bilateral cooperation—"the defense of Japan" (Article 5) and "regional security" (Article 6). In practice, Tokyo has concentrated almost exclusively on the defense of Japan, avoiding broader responsibilities and thereby significantly limiting Japan's contributions to regional security. Since the rise of Japanese fortunes and the end of the Cold War, this approach has come been criticized, as American expectations of a larger Japanese role in security issues have risen steadily.

However, public enthusiasm for even existing arrangements is weak, and domestic expectations in both countries presume diminished requirements and reduced costs. Bilateral economic and trade frictions have added to the uncertainty regarding the future of the security relationship.
This chapter differs from the others in the major-powers section in that it does not discuss developments within the major power, which in this case is the U.S. We assume that our readers are familiar with trends inside the U.S. and that they have readily available other sources on the U.S. domestic situation.

This chapter is similar to the others within the major-powers section in that it discusses potential flashpoints on the periphery of a great power. Furthermore, as with most of the flashpoints analyzed in the major-powers section, many of the threats to stability discussed here are of a low order of probability, but were they to occur, they would be of considerable interest to the U.S., even if they are of small scope and scale.

There is little prospect in the near term of a crisis in North America that would require U.S. military involvement. One reason is that the primary U.S. reaction or intervention in case of a flashpoint in the North American region will be political or economic first. However, there are some political developments that bear monitoring for the implications they would have for the U.S. military. For instance, were Quebec to separate from Canada, that would affect a host of bilateral U.S.-Canadian accords. Similarly, the end of the Castro regime in Cuba could lead to unrest or a wave of migrants to the U.S. Haiti has proved a difficult problem of domestic governance, one that has historically unleashed waves of migrants into south Florida, as discussed in the chapter on migration and population. Unlike the other potential flashpoints discussed in this chapter, Haiti has evoked a military and diplomatic response from the U.S., and will continue to do so in the future. However, these problems in no way threaten the territorial integrity or even the way of life in the U.S., and they are thus small-scale problems.

**Background and Trends**

As part of the global trend toward economic integration, North America has evolved in recent years into the largest single trading bloc in the world. The most evident manifestation of this is the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA), integrating the trade of the U.S., Canada,
and Mexico for a combined annual production of over $7.7 trillion and over 380 million consumers. The attendant increase in interdependence has reached a level where disengagement would exact a tremendous cost, both in lost trade and jobs as well as in increased instability and insecurity in all three countries.

This interdependence has made it difficult to draw the line between domestic and foreign interests within North America. U.S. trade issues with Canada, for instance, affect domestic markets, translating into political pressure. Different approaches to the Cuban situation cause a domestic uproar in southern Florida and New Jersey. Labor-regulation issues with Mexico are indistinguishable from U.S. domestic labor issues. It is thus impossible to separate national discussions of North American issues from domestic policy in the U.S., Canada, and Mexico. The possibility of domestic repercussions makes it difficult for policymakers to deal with regional issues. Conversely, it is difficult to make domestic policy when there is a significant foreign impact to consider.

**Trade as the Largest of Unifying Factors**

The forces in the region that facilitate integration include such issues as:

- **Shared economic interests.** The high volume of trade and interdependence have dictated shared economic interests within the region and in the region’s relations with the rest of the world. For instance, the North American automotive industry exports globally cars assembled in the U.S. of subcomponents manufactured in Mexico and Canada. Such is the volume of this type of commerce that the cost of disintegrating the region’s trade is too high to contemplate seriously.

- **Shared political objectives.** The NAFTA countries share human-rights concerns and a desire to promote democracy, both regionally and globally. Such goals are evidenced by the participation of the U.S., Canada, and Mexico in international organizations working toward stabilizing troubled states in the region. Despite sharp differences, all three have worked together when common ground is found, as in combating crime and drug smuggling, promoting security in the region, and participating in multilateral diplomatic fora.

- **Shared security concerns.** Shared security concerns are based on shared political goals but have been approached from different perspectives. There is a collective interest in maintaining peace and stability within the region, if only because stability engenders prosperity and increased trade. Stability takes many forms, but the tradition of self-determination through democracy has been a strong factor in determining regional relations.

- **Shared cultural interests.** There is no denying that migration has changed the demography of all three nations, providing each with a large number of expatriates from the others. Such population movement increases communication, educates and increases understanding of neighboring cultures, eases tensions, and also strengthens ties for commercial, educational, governmental, and cultural interaction.

In addition to the above considerations, many bi- and multilateral agreements have been signed, codifying the method, scope, and volume of relations. The U.S. has signed agreements with Canada on numerous issues, including trade, international standards, safety, air travel, and aerospace defense and warning. The two nations share membership in at least sixty-one international agreements. A similar situation exists with Mexico, with whom the U.S. shares numerous bilateral, and over thirty-five international, agreements.

**Disintegrative Factors: Differences in Governance**

Some forces work against regional integration, mostly governance issues involving ethnic and sociological considerations. These factors are not just disintegrative, splitting the U.S. away from the region, but also corrosive individually to Mexico and Canada as well:

- **Illegal migration.** Illegal migration is perhaps the single most divisive issue between the nations of North America, and it is especially so between Mexico and the United States. Conservative figures on
illegal border crossings range from 300,000 to 500,000 per year; hence, the problem is a tremendous challenge to U.S.-Mexican relations. It contributes to a general trend of lawlessness along the border, exacerbated by the drug trade, which follows similar routes and processes. The annual monetary value in Mexico of the migration ($1–2 billion in fees collected by the smugglers) and drug trade (up to $10 billion), not to mention migrant remittance income ($3 billion), is indicative of the magnitude of the problem. A Mexican tradition of accepting money for governmental services rendered (known in the U.S. and Canada as “corruption”) contributes to the ease of laundering illegal profits, facilitates drug smuggling, and adds to the difficulty of maintaining cordial relations. That there has been any improvement in joint efforts to combat these problems shows the level of diplomacy and commitment to maintaining cordial relations despite these difficulties. Such problems are not serious between the U.S. and Canada but are increasing in frequency and magnitude between Canada and Mexico.

- Nationalism. It is difficult to quantify nationalism, especially as a factor working against regional integration. But nationalism exacerbates the cultural biases inherent in any multilateral grouping, sowing discontent without justifiable cause. It is especially damaging when used by emigre groups in neighboring countries (e.g., Mexicans in the southwestern U.S., Central Americans in Ottawa) to pressure governments for special-interest policies relating to either welfare or foreign policy. The end result is an ethnic divisiveness that adds to already divided cultures and strains relations at a national level for little or no gain.

### Potential Flashpoints

Potential flashpoints in North America are few and not likely to become more explosive soon, but their proximity to the U.S. makes them important. The potential flashpoints identified here are those that have implications for U.S. security, serve as push factors for migration, and generate concern among domestic U.S. interest groups.

**Mexico: Governance under Stress**

There is a significant possibility of a flashpoint in Mexico, if the government grossly mismanages the political and economic reforms needed to address the lack of credible governance throughout the nation. The increasing willingness in Mexico to resort to violence and assassination
as a means of resolving political problems does not bode well, and the unwillingness or inability to bring to justice the perpetrators or participants in the rampant corruption simply reinforces this trend. The possibility exists that more revolts will erupt against Mexico’s sixty-year-old governing party, the Partido Revolucionario Institucional (PRI), harking back to the era when Doroteo Arango (aka Pancho Villa), Venustiano Carranza, and Emiliano Zapata fought each other and the government in Mexico City.

The principal concern for the U.S. in Mexico is the inability of the government to reform itself and provide adequate political and economic stability. Deteriorating domestic conditions could affect the economic interdependence with the U.S., endangering U.S. access to Mexican oil, sparking widespread violence, and causing massive migration from Mexico, and creating pressure for the U.S. to act. Specific action could range from reducing economic or technical assistance to direct military presence reinforcing the border.

A more likely scenario is for rural conflict to continue at present levels, causing stress to the governing body, exacerbated by socioeconomic problems, drug trafficking, and accompanying corruption. Illegal migration, economic instability, and trade issues will dominate U.S.-Mexico relations for many years. Drug-related violence and corruption will probably increase in the late 1990s while the U.S. deals with internal debates within both countries over how best to manage the war on drugs.

Electoral Reform in Mexico

Any political party in power as long as the PRI becomes accustomed to the perquisites of power and privilege and the comfort of corruption, centuries-old habits and traditions at the core of Mexico’s political system. Since 1994, there has been a seemingly endless cycle of violence, including assassinations at high levels of government and, increasingly, assassinations with possible connections to the drug mafias. It is apparent that the wave of power-sharing and anti-corruption politics throughout the hemisphere has not yet fully hit Mexico. Electoral and economic reform has been a
priority issue for the administrations of Carlos Salinas and Ernesto Zedillo, and though results have been less than expected, recent reforms have involved opposition parties and may achieve implementation. Both of these administrations represent a change for Mexican politics, a new generation of technocrats attempting to take over from the old, entrenched power brokers in the PRI. While neither administration has been completely willing or able to make a clean break, that such technocrats are gaining strength is a positive sign for Mexican governance.

The Rise of Participative Democracy

Democratization in Mexico means the enfranchisement of political parties other than the PRI. Traditionally minor opposition parties have made significant inroads throughout the country, as seen in their successes in state and mayoral elections, but on the national level, no one has been allowed to challenge the PRI. Despite the public demand for a pluralistic political system, it will take decades to remove the PRI from national power, unless massive mismanagement and corruption threaten the standard of living, as happened in 1983. Should significant popular unrest ensue, it is possible that the PRI will impose an authoritarian regime to remain in power.

The traditional disenfranchisement of fringe political parties, longstanding governmental neglect of rural needs, and the monopolistic grip of the PRI on political appointments are the main factors in the recent rise of insurgency movements in Mexico. Having no recourse for political action, disenfranchised people resort to violence. President Zedillo's recent proposals to liberalize participation—for example, instituting the election of mayors rather than their appointment—preempts many of these issues and bonds well for the future. Access to power by opposition parties, however, does not immediately translate to accession to power; so the tendency to violence among marginalized political movements will continue if the PRI machine wins many future elections, and especially so if there is evidence of corruption in the electoral process. Also, there is little evidence to suggest that the opposi-

In the new democratic environment, there are over 60 separate political parties in Haiti, 95% of them to the left of center, with the power held by party leaders based on personality rather than ideology. This splintered and contentious political arena makes it difficult to build consensus on any single issue. Continued uncertainty over security and political stability, as well as long delays in passing key legislation (e.g., privatization and civil-service reform) and the resultant delay in releasing pledged funds by the International Monetary Fund, World Bank, and the Inter-American Development Bank—plus a legacy of poor governance—have led to a stagnant and poor economy and 80 percent unemployment. The economic problems are ameliorated by many humanitarian agencies, the black market, and income from the growing illegal drug business.

Barring continued international political pressure, the political scenario in Haiti is not a hopeful one, because of the lack of consensus among politicians on what constitutes governance. President René Préval is slowly moving to overcome the obstacles created during the period of Aristide's presidency, including removal of unqualified personnel appointed to positions in the security agencies who resisted reform, and the passage of legislation on privatization and civil-service downsizing and reform (over opposition of pro-Aristide deputies). However, these reforms have thus far not improved the lot of the average Haitian. Aristide supporters still hold a significant amount of power and are unwilling to shed their socialist views in favor of Préval's (or the international community's) more pragmatic approach to governance. Without further movement in favor of privatization, actual cuts in government bureaucracy, an increase in security, and guarantees of accountability, the international community will be hesitant to release more money and assets to a nation long-plagued by a serious lack of political and economic discipline. The delay in economic revitalization and job creation has exacerbated the security and political situations.

Whether Haitian successes are transitional or permanent depends on the country's current and future political actors. Until Haiti improves its governance to the point where the average Haitian sees no need to become an economic refugee, the country will remain a potential flashpoint for violence that could erupt at any time. It also remains a potential flashpoint for further large-scale refugee flows, due to political violence which, while currently not at the levels prior to 1994, is slowly increasing on both sides of the political spectrum. The further extension of UNSMIH and continued concentration on economic reform and development will be needed for some time. With continued leadership from Préval, this could bring about a significant long-term improvement in the basic situation, though consolidation of any institutional gains will depend on his successor. It is not clear how the U.S. or the UN would respond in the future should the situation deteriorate significantly. Intervention could take the form of migrant interdiction. It also could mean another occupation and a lengthy peacekeeping and nation-building operation.
tion parties are free from corruption, so a change in governing parties may not improve governance.

**Increasing Accountability Fights Corruption**

A major obstacle to good governance is the entrenched lack of accountability within the government. The electorate’s awareness of government corruption has increased the viability of opposition parties, forcing the PRI to reform the bureaucracy. Examples of governments (or at least individuals) being held accountable for personal corruption abound in the hemisphere, increasing the public’s perception that it is a serious problem in Mexico, too. If accountability is not improved demonstrably in the short run, domestic confidence in the ruling party will continue to erode. Should this erosion coincide with decreasing economic performance and spreading violence and revolt, the possibility is quite high that the PRI will revert to its authoritarian tendencies, roll back the electoral reforms, and impose a one-party regime with tight control over politics and the economy by the central government.

**Revolt and Banditry**

The Ejercito Zapatista de Liberacion Nacional (Zapatista Army for National Liberation, or EZLN) revolt of January 1994 caught Mexico by surprise, highlighted the rebels’ complaints of neglect by the national government. The military’s initial response was to invade and call for political talks. The EZLN still has not been eradicated, and its complaints have not yet been adequately addressed. Thus peace and stability have eluded the region of Chiapas, because there are many other ethnic, religious, and political groups with complaints not addressed by either the political reforms of the Zedillo administration or the peace negotiations with the EZLN. Land seizures, drug trafficking, and crime exacerbate the situation. Nevertheless, that Mexico City would seek a political (and not just a military) solution demonstrates how much politics has changed in Mexico.

The regions of Guerrero and Tabasco have long been hotbeds of discontent, with rumors of military or police activity against shadowy subversives, precipitating a recent military and police crackdown on dissidents. It is too early to know the exact nature of these movements, but the timing and coordination of the events suggests a sophisticated network of insurgents, though the numbers are probably still small and their ideology is unclear. However, the mere existence of such situations, coupled with the government’s ability to control media releases on such events, is an indicator of just how far the political reforms have to go outside of Mexico City.

**Drugs Subverting the Government**

The U.S. shares a 2,000-mile border with Mexico, one that increasingly is becoming the world’s largest drug-smuggling crossing point. Approximately 70 percent of cocaine, 50–80 percent of marijuana, 5–15 percent of heroin, and up to 80 percent of the methamphetamine consumed in the U.S. enter through Mexico. The Mexican drug mafias earn up to $10 billion a year, money they are not shy about using to subvert police and government officials at all levels. Government officials in Mexico have always accepted patronage and payoff as a way of life, creating an environment that compromises the integrity of the police forces and judicial system. The military has sought to prevent its personnel from becoming corrupted by drug money but may become so if it follows the example of other militaries in the region.

Two potential developments would significantly change the nature of Mexico’s drug-trafficking problem:

- Increased smuggling. The increasing participation of the Mexican drug mafias in the trade and production of illegal drugs gives them increased wealth and
more opportunities to take advantage of the ingrained corruption of the government. Increasingly, they are taking advantage of Mexico’s largely unregulated financial sector as a means of laundering illegal profits. Already a strong influence, the mafias are a major threat to Mexico’s national security through the easily corruptible government. Narco-corruption is becoming a serious impediment to stemming the flow of narcodollars, and remains Mexico’s major challenge, as money laundering is not yet a criminal offense.

- Increased counter-drug role for the armed forces. The Zedillo Administration increased the military’s involvement in counter-drug operations, directing it to conduct operations other than crop eradication and the destruction of clandestine landing strips. As a test case, the military has been designated the national law enforcement agency for counterdrug operations in the state of Chihuahua, in an attempt to reduce the operational reach of the thoroughly corrupt police force. Other tasks include greater involvement in intelligence collection and joint operations targeting the major drug mafias (the Gulf cartel, and the Juarez, Tijuana, and Guadalajara cartels).

Quebec Separatism

Quebec is determined to control its political and economic future, and could very possibly succeed as a viable independent state. The 1995 referendum on secession resulted in an almost even split, with the vote decided by less than one percent of the total, only 50,000 votes. Polling since then has given conflicting data on which way support has swayed, though the federalists will probably win future referendums, barring any unforeseen event. A majority of the Francophone Quebeois live in the southern part of the province and the English-speaking Indians in the northern part have no desire to separate from Canada. Ottawa’s “tough love” approach to the question as a Canadian (versus a Quebec) issue, raising the possibility of splitting Quebec into two sections (French and English) should independence succeed, is having a negative effect on the

NORAD: U.S. and Canada in Defense of the Homeland

Despite the end of the Cold War, the protection of U.S. and allied territory against weapons of mass destruction, and nuclear weapons in particular, remains a key element of U.S. national security. The U.S. position is that vigilance against ballistic missiles, cruise missiles, and bombers is an important aspect of defense of the homeland. Since 1958, the United States and Canada have cooperated in aerospace defense and warning through the North American Aerospace Defense Command. The agreement was renewed in 1996, extending the bi-national command to the year 2001. This was the eighth extension of the agreement, and emphasizes the importance the two countries place on cooperative aerospace defense. As long as any power has the ability to reach North America with ballistic missiles or an air-breathing threat, the United States will want to continue to cooperate with Canada in homeland defense.

Both nations have also assigned armed forces units to assist in the interdiction of drug smuggling. For example, the NORAD Regional/Sector Air Operations Centers cooperate with law-enforcement agencies in tracking and identifying suspect aircraft. AWACS aircraft, manned by Canadian and U.S. forces, also participate in this effort, which entails monitoring both nations' air sovereignty to detect and respond to threats that could reach North America.

separatist movement. A follow-up referendum will take place after the next Quebec provincial elections as early as 1997, so the issue has not yet been resolved. The Canadian Supreme Court may be called upon to decide if a provincial plebiscite is sufficient grounds for deciding an obviously constitutional issue. Should the results of the past or future Quebec plebiscites be ruled invalid, the response by separatists will raise emotions and the volume level of the debate. There is some potential for instability thereafter, depending upon the civility of the debate.

The issue of Quebec separatism is not likely to become a flashpoint, but it is an issue that bears watching because of its implications for relations with the U.S. The principal question for the United States is not whether Quebec will separate or remain in the confederation, but rather the possible deterioration of stability, leading to increased pressure on the United States to do something in order to maintain the traditionally high standard of stability and economic interdependence. In the event of Quebec separation, it is possible that some or all of the remaining provinces, especially the newly isolated maritime provinces and possibly the western provinces, will seek greater accommodation with the United States, even to the point of seeking statehood. A more likely scenario is that separation would spur a new Canadian nationalism, including a tinge of anti-Americanism, with Canada remaining as a viable nation without Quebec. The likelihood of violence during a process of separation is practically non-existent.

Quebec's secession would undoubtedly change Canada's defense establishment. At the very least, Quebec has 25 percent of the nation's manpower pool (the total population of the province is seven million), has a significant number of defense industries (as well as several military bases) and accounts for a quarter of the nation's GDP. Such a loss of assets would probably affect Canada's contributions to NATO, UN peacekeeping forces, and the North American Aerospace Defense Command (NORAD). Should Canada split, the Canadian Defence Force (CDF) would withdraw from Quebec, forcing the latter to establish and direct its own defense force (though it is also possible that the CDF's assets would be divided, with some part going to an independent Quebec). Quebec's economy is fed via maritime trade routes, but there are no naval assets based in the province. Quebec would be forced to fund and establish naval forces to complement its maritime interests. A major question to be resolved would be the division of military assets such as planes, ships, and troops.

The most likely scenario in the event of a separation is one in which the armed forces of both new nations retain their existing focus on domestic and collective security, oriented within the traditional international framework of cooperation with the U.S. and NATO. Agreements in place with Canada would be renewed with both institutions, reducing to negligible the concern that missile- and submarine-detection networks and other intelligence agreements might endanger the data and equipment involved. However, all analysis on this topic is highly speculative. How the U.S. and Canada would adapt its current binational military-to-military arrangement to a third military power is uncertain at best.
Cuba: Betting on Castro’s Mortality

As of 1996, Fidel Castro (though seventy years old) is in good health, and his family has a history of longevity. Consequently, there are only two credible scenarios under which Cuba could become a flashpoint for the U.S. during the 1990s. Yet if either scenario occurred, Cuba could become the bloodiest flashpoint in the region. The scenarios in question are: the assassination of Castro, or the decision by the U.S. to force him out of office. Apart from these, there are few foreseeable situations in which Cuba could present a threat to the U.S. greater than migration pressures. Barring Castro’s accidental death, security and economic stability (albeit at low levels) are well within the regime’s grasp for at least fifteen years. Yet even Castro’s death by accident or illness will not cause a major crisis, given the inherent stability of the regime. Raul Castro would most likely assume office, and maintain order for several years.

During his tenure in power, Castro has not allowed the growth of democracy or an open economic system on the island. After his departure, the situation could lead to demands for an end to U.S. sanctions. Castro’s death could lead to a violent struggle for power, provoking massive migration and involving Cuban exiles from the U.S., as well as demands for U.S. intervention. In the unlikely event of crisis, the emigré population in the U.S. and neighboring Caribbean nations will demand a U.S. response. The nature of the flashpoint, and U.S. involvement, would be determined by reactions to the method of Castro’s departure from the scene. U.S. policy options will make the flashpoint situation better or worse, even if unintentionally.

The primary concern in any scenario involving Castro’s abrupt departure would be dramatically increased instability. Specifically, deteriorating conditions would increase the poverty and misery on the island; increased repression or the start of a civil war would spark massive migration (most of it to the U.S.) as well as increased pressure on the U.S. to intervene. Any dramatic increase in instability is cause for concern, because it could lead to pressure from human rights groups demanding aid for refugees; anti-Castro groups demanding direct military intervention; and regional organizations and neighboring nations in general demanding intervention or non-intervention, depending on how close each is to the problem.

Who Will Succeed Castro?

Cuba’s political stability has remained constant for decades, with small periods of unrest during times of economic stress (the 1980 Mariel boatlift, the 1994 migration crisis). But the stability is a strained one, backed up by the communist regime’s willingness to use repression and force. Should Castro be removed from the equation, stability will be determined by the ability of a credible successor to take power and maintain institutional continuity. Should the communist regime disintegrate, the new leaders would most likely seek technical support from socialist parties in Mexico or Spain (but not from the U.S.) in order to regain stability and reform the government. The military would be the pivotal institution, providing a substantial stabilizing influence on any regime change, and other government...

Analysts Divided on Cuba Post-Castro

The issue of Castro’s value to the Cuban regime is one of intense scholarly debate. Most scholars agree that his departure will be the end of Cuban communism, in that there is no successor charismatic enough to keep the party alive. They also agree that the emigré community in New Jersey and Miami will demand a place in a post-Castro Cuba, which only adds to the instability of the regime change.

Many scholars believe that Castro is the glue that holds the regime together, and without him, everything will fall apart, though not necessarily overnight. His death, even if anticipated, will spark a counter-Revolutionary revolt. Because of the personalistic nature of his regime, the institutional vacuum created by Castro’s death would cause the regime to implode. Others believe that only Castro’s unanticipated death, such as through assassination, could spark instability on the scale required for such a revolt. The glue argument is seen as understating the inertia inherent in any institution: 30 years of control mean institutional cohesion in the short-run. Raul Castro, while not as dynamic, would maintain support and cohesion for several years. He is viewed as a caretaker leader, ceding eventually to a new leader willing to implement regime changes, assuming Cubans are willing to throw off the security of a welfare state.

Scholars are divided on the impact of the collapse of communism worldwide. This has obviously exacerbated the severe economic crisis, and has eroded the legitimacy of the regime, arguing in favor of dramatic change in a post-Castro Cuba. The principal point of debate here is the impact of the U.S. embargo after the loss of Soviet support.
Caribbean naval forces are ill-equipped to combat increasing drug trafficking.

institutions would most likely also survive initial reorganizations. Again, the degree of stability would depend in part on the reaction of the U.S. to events in Cuba. Distress of U.S. and of Cuban exile intentions remains strong in Cuba, and Cuban perceptions of U.S. reaction—as being either hostile or constructive—will be particularly important. The position taken by countries considered friendly to Cuba, such as Canada and Mexico, could be especially influential in determining the level of post-Castro stability in Cuba.

There is little indication that Castro has groomed anyone as a successor, though it is generally assumed that his brother Raul would step in, in the event of his demise. Chances for change under Raul are slim, though a period of instability can be expected from his brother’s departure, be it natural or violent. U.S. reaction (indifference, diplomatic engagement, or interven-
tion) would dictate the level of crisis, because Cuba would react to U.S. action, rejecting any overtures and blaming instability on the U.S. Wild-card scenarios involve a peaceful (but unstable and unpredictable) transition to another communist party leader after a power struggle; peaceful transition to an opposition political party acceptable to all; and a less than peaceful transition with interference from the emigré community in Miami.

Castro’s Economy is Muddling Through

The economy is key to Castro’s endurance, and recent performance indicates continued longevity. Absent a U.S. blockade, Cuba’s economy most likely will muddle through with Castro effecting minor changes to the privatization and liberalization reforms required to keep the population alive. Prosperity is a relative term in the Cuban economy, but under any definition it is not in Cuba’s future under Castro.

Economic pressure has proved the only effective motivation for Castro to change policies in Cuba. The loss of Soviet aid forced a liberalization in the early 1990s, bringing temporary relief from the austerity imposed by the loss of income. When the black market and private businesses began to grow and expand, however, Castro rescinded many of the reforms, as he will continue to do in the future. Yet, absent a blockade, the economy will not provide a flashpoint triggering U.S. involvement in Cuba.

Cuba as a Divisive Regional Issue

Conflicting views about how to deal with Cuba are one of the principal differences in the foreign policies of the U.S., Canada, and Mexico. U.S. attempts to pressure and isolate Castro have con-
The Panama Canal: Redefining a Security Relationship

The 1997 Carter-Torrijos Treaties stipulate a total withdrawal of all U.S. forces and full Panamanian control of the canal on December 31, 1999. The U.S. and Panama share a treaty obligation to ensure an open and neutral canal in perpetuity, despite the withdrawal of U.S. forces.

U.S. interests in Panama include stability, international access to the canal, and cooperation in confronting transnational threats. To this end, the U.S. and Panama are in the early stages of opening a dialogue, discussing mutual interests in arranging for a continued U.S. presence at certain bases past 1999, primarily for counter-drug operations. A small dedicated U.S. force could serve also as a visible symbol of the U.S. commitment to support not only the canal, but also regional stability and democratic government. The shared interests of the two countries provide a substantial basis for reaching an agreement that would allow for U.S. access to Panamanian facilities under conditions which ensure full respect for Panama's sovereignty.

Narco-corruption in the Caribbean

The Caribbean basin is an area of strategic interest to the U.S. for many reasons, including strategic sea lines of communication, its use by the drug traffickers, and trade. The U.S. has been reducing its presence in the region, relocating SOUTHCOM from Panama, removing the Navy training center from the Guantanamo naval base, and consolidating its diplomatic presence throughout the region. But the Caribbean remains an area of potential crisis because of its diversity, geography, and the nature of the governments involved. Within the region, there are thirty-eight million people, twenty-six territories, sixteen independent states, and four official languages, in addition to many Creolized languages, making for an extremely diverse region, including many barely viable mini-states. The most obvious potential flashpoint is the instability caused by economic hardship, rampant corruption within the governments, and the increasing influence of the drug mafias, as well as the growing crime and piracy that threaten U.S. citizens. Governance could deteriorate to such an extent that the U.S. would see it necessary to intervene—as it has previously intervened in Grenada, Haiti, and the Dominican Republic—to restore order and the rule of law. In all three instances, U.S. intervention involved active participation of other friendly governments, which enabled less involvement by U.S. forces and greater international acceptance of the intervention. In contrast, the 1989 unilateral intervention in Panama was broadly condemned.

Patrolling and protecting this vast Caribbean area has proved an insurmountable task for the small and relatively weak regimes in the region. Economic and social pressures render the region vulnerable to the influence of drug mafias, who corrupt governments and law-enforcement and judicial entities. Drug scandals involving government officials have erupted continually during recent years, indicating the vulnerability of not just individuals but also whole governments. Traffickers are laundering money through the tourist industry so vital to the economy, through casinos, resorts, real estate, and through the porous and secretive banking system.

One serious problem is the shallowness of institutions. Because of low population levels, in most cases the bureaucracy throughout the Caribbean is one or two people deep. Furthermore, there is a low level of operational coordination between the ten defense forces, five police departments, and various coast guard forces. The capability is there on paper but professional capabilities vary widely, and coordination of policing efforts is almost absent. Vast patrol areas quickly absorb all the assets available, and the more remote regions suffer accordingly.
It is not coincidental that the nations most corrupted by mafias (Antigua and Barbuda, St. Kitts and Nevis) are the farthest from the closest U.S. presence, the embassy in Barbados. As the U.S. presence departed, the drug mafia presence increased. St. Lucia, St. Vincent, and Suriname are also at risk of becoming narcostates because of their geographical isolation or convenience to the drug traffickers.

Drug corruption is making inroads in the region. Money laundering is a major problem, as is migration from the Dominican Republic, Haiti, and Cuba, especially through the Bahamas. The general trend for drug traffic through the Caribbean is for increasing diversification and sophistication of the routes and methods involved. Also, the smugglers are shipping more to Europe, where the market for drugs has been growing more rapidly than in the U.S. It is difficult to quantify the relationship between the drug mafias and the effectiveness of counterdrug operations. In 1993, the U.S. redirected its forces away from interdiction in favor of source country eradication. The lowered level of attention paid to the region has resulted in increased drug traffic through it. Any future effort will last into the late 1990s before regaining ground lost in the fight against the well-funded, well-equipped, and well-motivated forces of the drug mafias.

U.S. Interests and Approach

Net Assessment

Overall, the potential for a flashpoint in the North American region is quite low. Mexico will most likely experience a difficult transition to a more stable economy and improved governance through electoral and political reform, with the new generation of technocrats and opposition parties gradually wresting power away from the old guard PRI politicians, resolving some of the problems that sparked revolts and allow the drug mafias to corrupt the system. Canada will most likely reach accommodation between the Quebecois and the federalists, maintaining the stability that has historically characterized U.S.-Canadian relations. Cuba will most likely remain a totalitarian, communist state under Fidel Castro’s control, muddling through economically with occasional use of migration as foreign policy to relieve socioeconomic pressures on the system. The Caribbean nations, however, are a more difficult group for which to predict a positive scenario. The most likely scenario is for continued encroachment by the drug mafias, subverting individuals within the governments to work in their favor. The influx of drug dollars will negatively affect the tourism industry, increasing crime to the point of requiring U.S. assistance to regain rule of law.
U.S. Interests

Were there to be a security challenge (in the traditional sense) in North America, reversing that challenge that would quickly rise to the top of the list of U.S. interests. However, as of 1996, there was no such security threat to the U.S. and little prospect of one arising. Cuba, once a major disruptive force in the hemisphere, has been reduced by the demise of communism to a mere shell of its former power. Its government is a danger only to the Cuban people, except when it uses the threat of migration as foreign policy.

Democratic Neighbors

Since the mid-1970s, the U.S. has earned a reputation for placing an increased emphasis on linking foreign policy with respect for human rights. The change in emphasis helped lead the region out of a long period of military or authoritarian governments. The U.S. reputation as a human rights champion has increased, with a new interest in treating nations (not just individuals) as equals. Democratic governments now rule in all but one hemispheric nation, and it is in the U.S.’s interest to maintain that status quo.

Access to Markets

The U.S. has led a push toward lowering barriers to trade in North America, as described earlier in this chapter. Though access to the North American market can probably be taken for granted because of proximity and volume, recent moves to include other hemispheric actors indicate an interest in remaining an active participant in the trend to integrate markets. This interest complements the increased attention in democratic regimes, as these tend to liberalize economic as well as governance policies. Access to the NAFTA market is critical to the U.S. economy, and access to Mexican oil is of vital interest to the U.S. energy policy.

Control over U.S. borders

Control of U.S. borders is a rather obvious interest, but not necessarily the easiest to achieve, for two major reasons: the illegal drug trade and illegal migration. Both run afoul of domestic security interests, and both arouse public sentiment. The military is not, and in our judgment will not be, the main instrument by which the U.S. government responds to these problems, although the military is and will continue to be used in a supplementary role, especially during periods of crisis.

Cuba has used illegal migration as an instrument of foreign policy. It is in the United States’ interest to ensure that Cuba is thwarted in any future efforts in this regard.

U.S. Approaches

Regarding the promotion of democracy, a key element is the support for increased democratic enfranchisement in Mexico through electoral reform, both reform within the PRI and regarding opposition parties. Such support, be it overt or behind-the-scenes, is designed to avoid any perception by the Mexican public that the U.S. is interfering in Mexico’s domestic politics. The nationalism in Mexican society would reject strong overt U.S. efforts to improve or reform anything. Mexicans consider a domestic issue, and such efforts would increase instability and hinder future relations.

A major U.S. initiative regarding its interest in democratic neighbors has been the policy to limit Castro’s options to maintain himself in power. Long-range analysis of what motivates Castro has demonstrated the value of direct economic pressure. There have been few instances, economic or otherwise, of Castro responding to incentives to open his political system to tolerate dissent, criticism, or opposition interest groups. The few times the U.S. has succeeded in pressuring Castro in a desired direction were when, as in the Helms-Burton Act, severe budgetary constraints were threatened, such as limiting dollar remittances from the U.S. or enacting sanctions against third-parties who deal with both the U.S. and Cuba. Economic sanctions thus remain the primary means of pressuring Havana into changing to a more open, democratic system of governance.
INSURGENCY IN COLOMBIA: INCREASING THREAT TO SOVEREIGNTY

Though Colombia has a long history of being one of the most violent societies in the world, the mid-1990s have witnessed a dramatic increase in instability, both at the hands of the drug mafias plying their corrosive trade and of the leftist insurgents and their involvement in the drug trade. Overall, these two groups control approximately 30 percent of the Colombian economy and territory, and constitute an increasing threat to the nation's institutions and sovereignty.

The Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia and the National Liberation Army (known by the Spanish acronyms, FARC and ELN, respectively), are both Marxist-Leninist in ideology with the common goal of overthrowing the government. With an estimated troop strength of 12,000–15,000, both groups use extortion, kidnapping for ransom, robbery, and involvement in all phases of the drug business (cultivation, production, and distribution) as sources of income. Their revenue is estimated at $400 million annually, of which more than half comes from the drug trade. The FARC now dedicates up to 60 percent of its forces to the drug business.

Venezuela, Brazil, Peru, and Ecuador have all suffered casualties at the hands of both the insurgents and traffickers. Relations with Venezuela have become tense several times in the mid-1990s, requiring national-level diplomacy to defuse emotions and stand down their respective armed forces alert status.

The United States may wish to assist the Colombian government in ending the insurgencies. However, the possibility of direct military involvement is remote, as the Colombian armed forces are capable of controlling or defeating the insurgency, if properly directed, funded, and organized. U.S. involvement will most likely be in financial, matériel, logistical, and training assistance, rather than direct combat support.

To promote better U.S. access to markets, as well as other U.S. objectives, Washington supports continued economic reform in Mexico. The U.S. provided major loans as part of the December 1994 peso-crisis bailout. A High-Level Contact Group was established to defuse and resolve contentious differences between the two countries. U.S. policy has shifted to treating Mexico as an equal, which has proved to be a successful approach.

Also as part of the effort to secure U.S. access to markets, the U.S. approach is to keep cordial but correct relations with both sides of the debate about Quebec's future, with the aim of maintaining the existing trade and political cooperation with all parties in Canada, be they separated or unified. So far, that policy has succeeded in not alienating either side. Should Quebec succeed in separating, the most likely U.S. approach would be a continuation of the present set of policies. New security, trade, and customs agreements would have to be signed with the new nations.

Trade and cooperation have been at the center of U.S. policy towards the Caribbean in the mid-1990s. The primary constraints to smooth relations have been the disparate size of the partners and markets and their vulnerability to uncontrollable factors, such as the limited market for Caribbean agricultural products (bananas, sugar), and weather (damaging to the tourist industry). The Caribbean Basin Initiative, begun in the 1980s, has proven successful in increasing trade and job prospects.

Perhaps the most difficult U.S. goal is stemming the flow of illegal drugs. Criminals hold the advantage of initiative, and governments can only react, playing catch-up in an attempt to raise the risk to the drug traffickers. U.S. policy has focused on promoting regional cooperation in a coordinated multilateral counterdrug effort and on keeping the corrosive effects of drug smuggling out of the governmental structures of the hemisphere. The Caribbean drug-trafficking problem has been more difficult to address, in part because the trend toward disengaging U.S. forces has left a power vacuum in the region.

The intensification of counterdrug efforts with Mexico has been difficult to implement because of Mexico's great concern with sovereignty. The U.S. has provided some support for the increased profile of the Mexican military in the war on drugs because of the potential increased operational capability, but the policy has been controversial within the U.S. government because of the possibility that Mexican armed forces will become corrupted by the narco-dollars.
The 1991 Persian Gulf War restored a regional balance of power more favorable to U.S. interests by rolling back Iraq’s occupation of Kuwait and reducing Iraq’s military capability. Iran’s military and economic potential had already been weakened by the Islamic revolution and eight years of war with Iraq. But the Gulf remains a region with many conflicts, including border disputes, competition over pricing and markets for oil, ideological conflicts, ethnic and sectarian challenges to fragile states, and issues of regime legitimacy. Moreover, both Iran and Iraq will remain committed to revising the status quo in their favor.

These conflicts are likely to keep the region volatile and potentially unstable over the next decade. Despite these conditions, U.S. vital interests are and will continue to be engaged in the Gulf because of the global need for access to the region’s energy resources. To protect these interests, the United States has an enhanced forward military presence in the region. While mindful of the need to maintain some kind of equilibrium between Iran and Iraq, the United States is not likely to support one as a balance against the other. That policy is considered to have failed with Iraq’s invasion of Kuwait. Rather, the United States, largely through its military capability, has become the major force in deterring aggression and will have the chief responsibility for protecting access to a global resource.

Background and Trends

Continuing Challenges to the Balance of Power

The two major powers in the Gulf, Iran and Iraq, are rivals for Gulf dominance, although they are themselves unequal in power. Iran, with a shoreline that stretches from the head of the Gulf to its foot and into the Arabian Sea, has three times the territory and population of Iraq. However, Iran’s relatively stagnant oil revenue and growing population continue to erode its per capita income. Iraq, by contrast, has only twenty-six miles of shoreline on the Gulf, rendering it virtually landlocked. Several of its cities lie less than twenty miles from the Iranian border, and it must rely for strategic depth on Arab
neighbors who often have conflicting interests with Baghdad. However, oil resources estimated as second only to Saudi Arabia provide Iraq with a potential per capita income greatly surpassing that of Iran. Both countries possess land armies in excess of 350,000; air forces of about 300 combat aircraft; and the capacity to obtain or develop weapons of mass destruction (WMD) and their delivery systems. Mutual hostility and fear stemming from the Iran-Iraq War and rivalry for Gulf dominance will spur arms buildups in both countries unless checked by outside forces.

The weaker Arab countries, grouped together in the six-member Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC)—Bahrain, Kuwait, Oman, Qatar, Saudi Arabia, and United Arab Emirates (UAE)—rely on Western (mainly U.S.) military support to deter Iran and Iraq and to counter their military capability. Since the Gulf War, modernization of their military forces and equipment, greater U.S. military access to the region, and a significantly enhanced Western military presence in and near the Gulf have improved GCC security against external aggression. However, the GCC states on their own are no match for either of their two powerful neighbors. Only a sustained U.S. military presence in the Gulf can redress the inherent military asymmetry.

The balance of power in the Gulf is unlikely to remain static. If Iran fails to improve its economic and political situation, deteriorating domestic conditions could cause unrest and even a regime change or precipitate challenges to Gulf neighbors and to the West. Iran will attempt to reduce the U.S. military presence and its accompanying political influence in the Gulf, the better to enhance its own. Meanwhile, underlying strains between Iran and Iraq, and Iran and the GCC, could erupt into
conflict, although the domestic weaknesses of Iran and Iraq probably preclude a major war between these two Gulf rivals in the next few years.

Iraq will eventually seek to regain control over its oil resources, its air space, and its territory, and, as the September 1996 attack on Irbil demonstrates, will continuously challenge UN-imposed constraints, which may compel U.S. military responses. Iraq’s rehabilitation will require substantial increases in its oil revenues, and competition with Gulf states for oil markets might revive Iraqi military attempts to intimidate its Gulf neighbors. As Iraq acquires additional oil revenues, its military will be strengthened, both for domestic and external purposes. Elimination of the no-fly/no enhancement zone in the south of Iraq would reduce the warning time given the United States and the GCC states if Iraq contemplates an attack on Kuwait or Saudi Arabia.

The most significant realignment of Gulf forces could come from a regime change in one of the Gulf States, most of whom face growing domestic tensions. In Iraq or Iran, such a change could be favorable to U.S. interests. A new regime in either country could bring a different political direction and leaders more willing to accommodate U.S. concerns. In either case, threats to U.S. interests would be reduced. But changes could also bring negative results. In both countries, the overthrow of current regimes could lead to domestic instability, unwanted foreign interference in their internal affairs, and the potential for either Iran or Iraq to emerge as a dominant Gulf power. A regime change in a GCC state, such as Saudi Arabia, although unlikely, could undercut the U.S. strategic position. Short of regime changes, a range of domestic shifts in the GCC could affect the strategic balance and support for the U.S. military posture. Anti-U.S. sentiment from local opposition, combined with sabotage and terrorism, could cause GCC leaders to seek a less intrusive and obvious U.S. presence. Such was the case in September 1996 when Saudi Arabia did not support air attacks on Iraq from its territory. In this case, the U.S. could find itself facing continued threats from Iran and Iraq with less GCC host nation support. Continued military reinforcements to deter Iraq — and possibly Iran — may become increasingly onerous to regional allies. It is more likely, however, that GCC states will weather their current domestic difficulties and maintain their strategic links with the U.S. over the coming decade.

**Temporary Slowdown in the Persian Gulf Arms Race**

In the 1980s and 1990s, the Persian Gulf has been the locus of a major arms race. Between 1987 and 1994, the Near East accounted for 55 percent of all arms transfers to the developing world, of which 60 percent went to the Gulf. Saudi Arabia alone accounted for 29 percent of this trade.

Arms transfers to the Gulf have declined since their peak during the Gulf War, but projected sales of missiles to Kuwait and aircraft to the United Arab Emirates (UAE) indicate that the region’s appetite for arms has not diminished, and, as Gulf economies improve, arms purchases will intensify:

- In Iran, arms agreements in 1990-94 were down 75 percent from a high point in 1987-1990 and its suppliers were mainly non-Western (Russia and China). However, Iran is still acquiring naval assets and missile systems that increasingly challenge its Gulf neighbors.
Iraq’s foreign military purchases have been almost completely curtailed by the UN sanctions regime, but once sanctions ease, Iraq is expected to rebuild its conventional forces.

The GCC is absorbing a high level of arms purchased during the Gulf War. Arms import agreements are down but Saudi military expenditures remain high relative to total central government expenditures (41 percent in 1994).

GCC members, however, do not rely on their own militaries for defense against their larger neighbors, Iran and Iraq, but rather on an enhanced Western (especially U.S.) military presence. This includes an air wing operated from Saudi Arabia (that conducts Operation Southern Watch in southern Iraq); the U.S. Fifth Fleet, headquartered in Bahrain; and pre-positioned equipment in several GCC states. With improved logistical support, the U.S. can put one to two brigades on shore within twelve to seventy-two hours of a crisis.

Maintaining this enhanced forward presence on a sustained basis may become increasingly costly to GCC states, economically and politically. In some GCC states questions have been raised about the visibility of this presence, its potential as a target for domestic opposition to GCC regimes, and its affordability in a period of expected economic austerity. Terrorist bombings of U.S. military personnel in Saudi Arabia in 1995 and 1996 highlighted U.S. vulnerability, as have Saddam Hussein’s repeated military challenges.

Increasing Tensions within the Arabian Peninsula

As the impact of the Gulf War subsides, Gulf states are shifting their focus to domestic affairs, a trend encouraged by the increased U.S. role in Gulf security and the GCC assumption that the United States and its Western allies will handle major external threats. Economic constraints, flat oil prices, and domestic politics may strain cooperation among GCC states on such issues as border disputes, succession problems, differing foreign-policy orientations, and tribal and personal feuds among rulers.

Some progress has been made in solving border disputes between Saudi Arabia and Oman, Saudi Arabia and Yemen, and Oman and all of its neighbors. But two divisive local disputes are likely to continue: the one between Saudi Arabia and Qatar and the one between Qatar and Bahrain. Also, tensions remain between Saudi Arabia and Yemen. Succession issues could also strain GCC relations if a younger, more independent generation gains power. The young Amir of Qatar, who replaced his father in a June 1995 coup, may be a bellwether. He does not abide by GCC rules, and both his method of succession and his independent foreign policy are causing strains in the organization.
Increasing Ethnic and Sectarian Instability

Many Gulf states are multi-ethnic and multisectarian in composition. Kuwait, Bahrain, and the Eastern Province of Saudi Arabia have substantial Shi'ah Muslim populations dominated by Sunni Muslim governments. In most GCC states, large numbers (sometimes majorities) of foreign workers are drawn from neighboring Arab states, the Indian subcontinent, and East Asia. Iran and Iraq are multi-ethnic as well as multisectarian. Persian speakers constitute only half of the Iranian population; the rest of the population speaks mainly Turkish, Kurdish, or Baluchi. In Iraq, where Arab Sunnis have traditionally dominated government, a Kurdish minority (15–20 percent) is situated in the northwest; an Arab Shi'ah majority (55–60 percent) in the south, and an Arab Sunni minority (15–20 percent) in the center.

Within these states, anti-government activity is growing among key ethnic and sectarian communities, and could generate cross-border frictions. Hostile neighboring governments often use such groups to undermine rival regimes. Of all these groups, the two most likely to be troublesome are the Shi'ah of Bahrain and the Kurds of Iraq. Unrest among the former could spread to Kuwait and the Eastern Province of Saudi Arabia. And though the Kurds are not situated directly on the Gulf, their potential for destabilizing Iraq and for involving two of Iraq's neighbors—Turkey and Iran—is high. In cooperation with the British, French, and Turks, the United States plays a leading role in enforcing a no-fly zone north of the 36th parallel in Iraq, in part to protect the Kurdish population. In the summer of 1996, an Iranian incursion into northern Iraq in support of one Kurdish faction, prompted another faction to invite support from Saddam Hussein. Iraqi forces advanced into the city of Irbil, prompting the U.S. to strike military targets in Iraq and to extend the no-fly zone in the south of Iraq to the 33rd parallel (from the 32nd parallel). Further expansion of Iraqi control over the Kurdish region or more Kurdish

Marked differences of wealth and political orientation among peninsula states could also strain relations. Bahrain, Oman, and Yemen are relatively poor in oil; Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, and Abu Dhabi have larger reserves. Within the peninsula, the smaller GCC states resent Saudi Arabia's dominant position and often resist its attempts at leadership. These differences could foment intra-GCC conflict and even the dismantling of the GCC, although the latter is unlikely. Outside the GCC, the most serious potential conflict involves Saudi Arabia and Yemen. Yemen, a non-monarchal country with a large population (including a substantial portion of Saudi Arabia's blue collar labor force), has caused persistent problems for Saudi Arabia. These include territorial disputes over water-rich Asir province and extensive, undemarcated oil-rich desert areas.
All Gulf countries are likely to engage in ever sharper competition for market share and for oil revenues to shore up badly strained economies. Neither Iran nor Iraq (when it can control its production) is likely to pay much attention to OPEC discipline on prices and quotas. Saudi Arabia, which has sometimes sacrificed its own domestic interests to shore up prices, faces a high domestic debt (75 percent of gross domestic product); an austerity budget; a burgeoning, youthful population unable to find acceptable jobs; and rising domestic unrest, indicating that in the future it will protect its market share and revenues.

Potential Flashpoints

Iraqi Military Threat

Although Iraq’s military forces have been degraded by the Gulf War and sanctions, the United States still faces ground-force threats on the border between Iraq and both Kuwait and Saudi Arabia. Iraq lost at least 40 percent of its ground strength during the Gulf War and has had virtually no access to new weapons and technology since then. Nevertheless, Iraq still possesses a land force that is larger than and qualitatively superior to all the GCC states combined and Iran. With an active ground force of over 350,000 (and a reserve of 650,000), over 2,000 battle tanks, and 4,500 armored vehicles of various kinds, Iraq dwarfs its GCC neighbors. Saudi Arabia and Kuwait together have only 80,000 ground troops and slightly over 1,000 tanks. In the air, Saudi Arabia may be a better match for Iraq with 300 modern combat planes to Iraq’s 316 aging aircraft. Since the Gulf War, Iraq has reorganized its army command structure and revived some of its military industries and can now repair major weaponry. Local industry can produce small arms and spare parts for its best (T–72) tanks, but even so, the remaining equipment is more thinly spread among units than in pre-Gulf War times.

fighting could bring Turkish and Iranian forces into Iraq, and it might generate further U.S. military action in Iraq.

Stagnant Oil Income

Oil incomes, while difficult to predict with certainty, are likely to stagnate or decline for GCC states through the year 2000. Although oil prices may increase temporarily, economists do not predict a return to the oil boom of the late 1970s and 1980s. The return of Iraqi oil to the market may depress prices, at least in the short term. Moreover, while overall global demand is expected to increase, especially in the dynamic Asian markets, the GCC will face new global competition. New oil sources (Central Asia, China, Colombia) are developing, and rapid advances in technology are reducing the costs of recovery in hitherto expensive fields (the North Sea). However, the Persian Gulf will retain its preeminent status as the major source of excess oil capacity.
Despite Iraq’s substantial ground forces, there is some question of how well Iraq’s military would perform in a conflict with the U.S. and its Gulf neighbors. Sanctions have greatly eroded its logistic and support capacity, while repeated purges of officers raise doubts about loyalty and morale, even in the more privileged Republican Guards. Lack of spare parts means that Iraq cannot easily undertake extended campaigns, and it has no high-tech equipment. Iraq has no navy and is highly vulnerable in air power and land based air defense. Among its 350 aircraft, as few as 80 may be serviceable with another 30 semi-serviceable. Iraq’s air defense system has a low level of operational efficiency. In time, however, as sanctions ease, Iraq will use its additional resources to repair these deficiencies.

Iraq could threaten its neighbors with military actions of several sorts:

**Iraqi Conquest of Kuwait**

Despite Iraq’s acceptance of a UN resolution acknowledging Kuwait’s sovereignty, many Iraqis believe that Iraq has a justifiable claim to the country based on a legacy of Iraqi control over Kuwaiti territory for a brief period during the Ottoman Empire. Claims to Kuwait have been made by a long succession of Iraqi leaders and are unlikely to end. Many Iraqis, including Saddam Hussein, harbor revanchist sentiments against Kuwait and Saudi Arabia for their role in the Gulf War. Kuwait’s oil policies are blamed for precipitating the war; Saudi Arabia cooperated with the West in the war effort and the subsequent buildup of the U.S. forward presence in the Gulf. The most important military operation monitoring southern Iraq, Operation Southern Watch, is based on Saudi soil. Iraq’s consider this operation a major infringement of their sovereignty and will pressure their neighbors to discontinue Southern Watch.

Even with Iraq’s weaknesses, no combination of the Kuwaitis, Saudis and other Southern Gulf states could hold off a determined attack by Iraq. U.S. military planners estimate that, absent a Western military presence, Iraqi land forces could take Kuwait and the Eastern Province of Saudi Arabia in days. However, it is assumed that U.S. retaliation would levy unacceptable costs on Iraq. Even the modest U.S. presence in the northern Gulf would be unable to prevent the occupation of Kuwait, although the subsequent cost of such an action to Iraq and its regime should be high enough to preclude such an attempt. Over time, if Western readiness in the Gulf declines and Iraq’s military capacity improves with an easing of sanctions, such an invasion will be more plausible.

**Border Revision**

Iraq could occupy territory in Kuwait along the border, such as the islands of Warba and Bubayan. Iraq accepted only grudgingly the border with Kuwait established by the United Nations after the Gulf War. The new border gives Kuwait a strip of territory previously controlled by Iraq, about half of Iraq’s port city and naval base Umm Qasr, and the southern tip of the Rumailah oil field. Most Iraqis, especially those in the current government, resent these provisions and are likely to attempt to reverse them. Iraqis also resent their limited access to the Gulf—only 26 miles of Gulf shoreline. Iraq’s main port, Basra, lies on the Shatt al-Arab River, shared with Iran. A second port, Umm Qasr, lies on an estuary, the Khor Abd Allah channel, which Kuwait shares. For years, Kuwait has refused to cede or lease to Iraq the islands of Warba and Bubayan, which control the entrance to the waterway. The absence of ports directly on the Gulf makes Iraq dependent on its neighbors for pipeline transport of its oil, a vulnerability it wants to rectify. Iraq will continue its efforts to expand its Gulf shoreline at Kuwait’s expense.

**Pressure on GCC States**

Iraq has traditionally viewed itself as the eastern frontier of the Arab world, the major Arab balance against Iran, and, as such, the preeminent Arab Gulf power.
While Iraq is currently too weak to assert this position forcefully, its aspirations will revive when its economic and political fortunes improve. Linked to these aspirations is Iraq's need for higher oil revenue. Of all the Gulf states, Iraq will have the greatest need for increased oil revenue to repair the ravages of the 1980s and 1990s. With an estimated future oil export potential of six million barrels per day, Iraq will be a sharp oil competitor when its oil embargo is lifted and could find itself in persistent conflict with Saudi Arabia over oil pricing and markets.

To put pressure on GCC states, Iraq could attempt to subvert or destabilize the governments of Saudi Arabia and Kuwait. It could also mobilize forces on Kuwait's borders to intimidate Kuwaiti and Saudi leaders. Countering such actions would raise the defense costs for GCC states and the U.S. and could strain the U.S.-GCC partnership. The attempt by the U.S. to move additional forces to the Gulf after Iraq's invasion of Kuwait in August 1990 met with limited support from GCC states.

**Threats to the U.S. Military Presence**

Iraq also poses potential threats to the U.S. military presence in the region and to the personnel of various UN and allied missions. These include challenges to the UN inspectors monitoring Iraq's compliance with the WMD regime and attacks on U.S. personnel or the sabotage of U.S. facilities in Saudi Arabia or Kuwait.

While the most serious of these threats are highly unlikely because of their risks and costs for the Iraqi regime, even lesser threats can damage U.S. interests by causing a rise in oil prices, instability among allies, and possible damage to U.S. lives and assets. To meet plausible threats at the low end of the scale and deter less plausible but more serious challenges, a sustainable military presence is required. This presence must be both acceptable and affordable to local GCC allies.

Meeting this challenge will be a major task in managing Gulf security. A military presence that has too low a visibility to potential aggressors poses risks to deterrence; yet local perceptions of too high a visibility poses risks to GCC stability and may weaken the alliance. The challenge for the United States is to find the right mix and to lessen defense costs, possibly by seeking to spread the burden more equitably among allies, particularly those in Europe and East Asia, which benefit economically from Persian Gulf security.

**Iranian Naval Interdiction in the Gulf**

Iran could disrupt shipping in the Gulf, especially at chokepoints like the Strait of Hormuz and the shipping channels surrounding the disputed Gulf islands of Abu Musa and the two Tunbs. Iran has continued to exhibit hostility to U.S. interests in the Gulf and animosity toward some of its GCC neighbors.

Iran's conventional forces are still recuperating from the Iran-Iraq War. Iran has increased its active ground forces to about half a million with an additional 350,000 in the reserves; its tank force is just under 1,500; its armored vehicles number about 1,000. Efforts to improve its air force appear to have founded on scarce resources. Some estimates put Iran's operational combat aircraft at only 175, most of them second and third generation.

However, Iran has focused its military upgrading on its naval and missile capability in the Gulf, where improvements have been significant. These assets now include three Russian Kilo-class submarines; 12 patrol boats with anti-ship cruise missiles; shore-based anti-ship missiles with ranges up to 20,000 meters; nine surface-to-air missile (SAM) sites with SA-5, SA-6, and HAWK missiles; and some 35 ballistic missile sites with over 400 SCUD Cs, Bs, and SS-8s. Iran's ballistic missiles are capable of reaching all of Bahrain, Kuwait, the
Despite these goals, Iran is concerned over the U.S. military buildup in the Gulf. Much of that buildup has been designed to deter a potential land-based threat from Iraq, but in the increasingly charged atmosphere surrounding U.S.-Iranian relations, signals from both sides can be misinterpreted. Tehran increasingly views the military presence as an attempt to encircle Iran, possibly to topple the regime, and in some circles sees it as a provocation for war. Some of Iran’s military preparations could be described as defensive, but they feed growing apprehensions about Iran’s intentions in the Gulf.

Iran could use sabotage and terrorism, including attacks on U.S. personnel and facilities in GCC states, an increased Iranian military presence in the Gulf, and deniable sabotage of key GCC facilities, to intimidate GCC governments into reducing host-nation cooperation with the United States.

Iran can be expected to seek actions with plausible deniability. Given the growing differences between the United States and its European allies over Iranian policy, coordinating a response to such actions could also be difficult.

**Disputes between Iran and the UAE**

Iran has a longstanding dispute with the UAE over the islands of Abu Musa and the two Tunbs, which lie athwart Gulf shipping channels. Iran has challenged a 1971 agreement with the UAE that provided for shared control of the islands and has been encroaching on UAE rights and enhancing Iranian armed forces on the islands. These include HAWK, SA-5 and SA-6 SAMS with a 90 km range, upgraded Silkworm surface-to-surface missiles, and an enhanced ground force presence. Threatened by these moves, the UAE has asked for international adjudication of the dispute and has been pressuring the United States to support its position. Meanwhile, militarization of the islands poses a potential threat to shipping channels in the Gulf.

Iran’s military posture on Abu Musa could be directed at U.S. naval assets. Iran could use the islands to interdict traffic in sea lanes and to interfere with U.S. naval exercises. Missile emplacements, both on
the islands and the Iranian mainland, are well positioned to stop traffic passing through narrow channels. Iran could continue to exert pressure on the UAE to cede control of the islands, creating a crisis. UAE leaders see their situation as similar to that of Kuwait before the Iraqi invasion. The UAE could become the focal point of a military clash with Iran that gradually draws in U.S. forces.

**Interdiction of Naval Traffic through the Strait of Hormuz**

Iran could mine the strait or create an incident in which a commercial vessel or a U.S. naval platform is sunk or damaged there. Permanent physical blockage of the strait is impossible but would not be necessary to stop or slow traffic. Fear of interdiction by mines or military attack could create panic. A rapid rise in insurance rates would contribute to this effect. Both factors would slow or halt normal commercial traffic, at least temporarily.

The Iranian capacity to interdict naval traffic in the Gulf is disturbing. Iran’s stagnant economy and unresolved political difficulties make it unlikely that Iran would risk a full-scale military encounter with the United States. But under certain circumstances, Iran might be inclined to lash out, particularly if plausible denial were possible. Increased domestic political pressures might make that option more attractive. Iran’s relative isolation, and Washington’s growing impatience with Tehran’s behavior, have led to more belligerent rhetoric and possible misinterpretation of events and signals by both sides. Under these circumstances, threats from Iran are likely to be ambiguous and difficult to predict; it may be even more difficult for Washington to arrive at a consensus with its allies on the appropriate response, if Iranian culpability cannot be clearly established.

**Acquisition of WMD by Iran or Iraq**

Iran and Iraq, both hostile to U.S. interests, are the key proliferators of WMD in the Gulf. Both have the indigenous potential to develop nuclear programs and to continue programs in chemical and biological weapons. Both have undertaken development of long- and short-range delivery systems, and Iran is importing these systems from China and North Korea. Development of nuclear weapons presents the most difficult challenge for both countries because of the costs involved, the difficulty of developing the technology domestically, and the likelihood of outside detection. For these reasons, both may turn in the short term to clandestine purchase of fissile material or weapons components. For both, the acquisition of chemical and biological weapons poses far fewer difficulties, as indicated in the chapter on proliferation.

Indigenous production of accurate delivery systems for nuclear weapons also poses a problem for these states. For both, therefore, the most likely nuclear scenario would involve acquiring a weapon from outside that could be delivered by a conventional platform or used in a terrorist attack. For the foreseeable future Iraq’s situation will differ from Iran’s since Iraq is under an intrusive inspection regime that will hinder attempts to develop WMD. The WMD status of both countries is discussed in the chapter on proliferation.
could draw in the United States as a mediator or a defender of U.S. interests. A small peninsula war could endanger U.S. military personnel and facilities and reduce or eliminate host-nation support in one or more countries. Numerous tensions among these states led to military clashes in the past, and they could do so again. Several causes are possible: border disputes, foreign policy differences, Saudi Arabia’s role as peninsula hegemon, and tribal and family disputes.

No single issue is likely to lead to an interstate clash, but overlapping disputes among states could, in the absence of a strong mediating power, lead to military action. The most serious situation would be a clash between Saudi Arabia and Yemen. Yemeni claims on Saudi Arabia include significant desert oil-bearing areas and all of Asir province, the major agricultural area on the peninsula. While Saudi Arabia’s military assets, especially its air power, now dwarf those of Yemen, the latter has battle-hardened troops accustomed to years of fighting. If Yemen develops substantial oil revenues and a more unified polity, it could pose a substantial military challenge to Saudi Arabia in the future.

A Bahrain-Qatar conflict that drew in Saudi Arabia is a second possible scenario for peninsula conflict. Relations between Saudi Arabia and Qatar are already severely strained by the increasingly independent GCC policy undertaken by Qatar’s new Amir, who has consistently challenged Saudi leadership. With a deteriorating domestic situation in Bahrain, which could be exploited by Qatar, a clash cannot be ruled out, but Saudi Arabia’s overwhelming advantage in arms, money, and resources should bring any such military encounter to a rapid close.

However, such conflicts would drain Saudi resources, already scarce; undermine the legitimacy of the Saudi ruling family, already under attack from Islamic opposition elements; and weaken Saudi domestic stability. If Saudi forces suffer reverses, as they might in a struggle with Yemen, the impact on regime legitimacy could be devastating. A clash involving Saudi Arabia

Potential uses and motives behind both states’ acquisition of WMD are two. First is power and prestige. Both countries desire leverage against neighboring states in various political, economic, and military disputes. Second is defense, including against each other. In particular, both seek a deterrent to the kind of damage visited on Iraq in Operation Desert Storm.

In both countries, the use of nuclear and biological weapons is much less likely than their acquisition. Uses to which they might be put are:

- **Terrorism.** Iran or Iraq might put a crude instrument in the hands of a terrorist, if the action could be plausibly denied.
- **Intimidation.** Weaponization of biological weapons at or near points of contact with U.S. forces, as on the Kuwaiti border, would maximize their intimidation effect.

- **Regime survival.** The likelihood of use will rise if the United States or its allies threaten either the Iranian or the Iraqi regime. If a conflict breaks out in the region (especially if U.S. forces are involved) and if no clear counterproliferation policy has been enunciated, the threshold for use of nuclear weapons would be much lower.

**Arabian Peninsula Conflict**

Disputes between Arabian peninsula states are unlikely to lead to full-scale interstate war, but minor military clashes
and Qatar or Qatar and Bahrain could result in a collapse of the GCC and an end to joint GCC efforts as part of the defense of the Gulf. A military clash between two members, even if it did not involve the United States, would reduce even current cooperative efforts.

The United States trains and advises the militaries in various GCC states and helps maintain much of their military equipment. A serious military action in the peninsula could put some U.S. personnel and equipment at risk and might draw the United States into the conflict. The U.S. military might become a target by accident or design, and a loss of U.S. lives could raise demands in the United States for retaliatory action. At a minimum, such a clash could have negative consequences for continued U.S. access to local facilities in GCC states. The withdrawal of U.S. forces from one GCC state could unravel the network of U.S. access agreements with all GCC states, with serious consequences for the U.S. strategy and deterrent posture in the Gulf.

U.S. Interests and Approaches

Net Assessment

Recent events have weakened the two main U.S. antagonists in the Gulf—Iran and Iraq. Despite this shift in the military balance and an enhancement of the military capacity of the six GCC states, the GCC is still no match for either Iran or Iraq. To offset this military asymmetry, the U.S., with support from Western allies, has enhanced its military presence in or near the Gulf and is effectively acting as the chief deterrent to regional aggression.

Managing this Gulf security environment will be a major challenge for the United States. Underlying tensions among Gulf countries will keep the region volatile and conflict-prone. Contentious issues include a strong desire by Iran and Iraq to change the balance of power and reduce or eliminate the U.S. military presence; potential for a renewed arms race, including the acquisition of WMD; tensions among member states that could weaken or fragment the GCC; growing ethnic, sectarian, and Islamist opposition that could destabilize Gulf states; and continuing economic strains in Gulf states friendly to the U.S.

Over the next decade, the most likely threats to U.S. interests in the Gulf will be low level: attacks on U.S. facilities and personnel, attempts to destabilize regimes that support U.S. policy and host U.S. forces, and conflicts within and between GCC states that put U.S. defense strategy at risk. High-level threats to the U.S. and its GCC allies from Iran and Iraq are less likely because of the economic and military weakness of both countries and the array of international constraints they face. In time, these constraints are likely to weaken. These threats pose the highest risk to U.S. interests and must be addressed.

U.S. Interests

Access to Oil

The U.S. has a vital interest in unimpeded access to the oil resources of the Gulf at reasonable prices. Some 65 percent of the world’s proven oil reserves lie in the region, which in 1996 supplied the United States with 19 percent of its needs, Western Europe with 24 percent, and Japan with 70 percent. Indications are that these figures will climb by 5 to 10 percent by the year 2000.

Oil import patterns vary markedly between the United States and its Group of Seven allies. Europe and Japan rely more heavily on Gulf oil and conduct high levels of commercial trade with the GCC, but the United States and the GCC will increasingly bear the defense burden for the region. This growing imbalance in roles will give the United States and the GCC a strong interest in having Europe and Japan share in the defense burden. In such a case, allies are likely to demand a greater say in defense policy and strategy toward the Gulf.

Access to Strategic Lines of Communication

Preventing naval interdiction of key waterways (e.g., the Suez Canal, the Bab al-Mandab Strait, and the Strait of Hormuz) is critical to the flow of oil and to
free commercial traffic. The latter interest will grow as the global economy increases in importance. Overflight rights in the Middle East and the Persian Gulf—both connecting links between three continents: Europe, Africa, and Asia—are also critical to trade and to military deployments.

**Balance of Power**

The United States, through its forward presence, has become the major force preserving a balance of power in the Gulf favorable to Western interests. Until stable and friendlier governments emerge in Iran and Iraq, the United States will be responsible for containing and deterring those countries. Should a key country within the GCC, such as Saudi Arabia, fall prey to instability or come under a regime antipathetic to the West, the entire U.S. military and strategic posture in the Gulf would be in danger. The U.S. has an interest in sustaining its forward presence in the region as long as it is needed and in assuring access and host-nation support for its facilities, at costs acceptable to itself and to its GCC allies.

**U.S. Approach**

**The U.S. Military Presence**

The United States has increased its access and its forward presence in the Gulf since before the Gulf War by trying to keep its footprint to a minimum and maximizing its strategic agility and power projection. At the end of 1996, U.S. forces there included a naval component (organized as the Fifth Fleet) under a Naval Forces Command headquartered in Bahrain. This force regularly includes a battle carrier group and other naval assets; a maritime intercept operation enforcing the UN sanctions regime on Iraq; and a Marine Expeditionary Force with pre-positioned equipment in the Gulf. The Air Force has an air wing conducting Operation Southern Watch in southern Iraq, under the command of a Joint Task Force in the Gulf. For deterrence, the United States has forward-deployed Patriot batteries and special operations teams. Although the United States has no permanent ground troops stationed in the Gulf, by the end of the decade it may have pre-positioned equipment for five brigades. Ashore, there are three sets for heavy Army brigades, one each in Kuwait and Qatar, and discussions are underway about the location for a third set. Afloat near Diego Garcia in the Indian Ocean are already 20 ships, which contain among other things equipment for another Army brigade as well as a Marine Expeditionary Force (MEF) Forward, which is somewhat larger than an Army brigade set.

The United States has also increased its exercises in the Gulf, although many of these are small in scale. Through security assistance and training programs for military forces in the Gulf and through sales of U.S. equipment, the United States has greatly improved its ability to mount a defense.

The challenge for the U.S. is to manage its security relationship with the GCC—including its forward presence—in a manner that deters adversaries without undue costs and risks for Gulf allies. To do so, the U.S. must preserve a balance between the need for a visible deterrent in the Gulf and sensitivity to domestic concerns of GCC states. Too much visibility raises the risk of destabilizing host nations and reducing access. Too little raises the risk that potential adversaries will not be deterred.

**Dual Containment**

The dual containment strategy is an outgrowth of the Gulf War. The previous U.S. policy of attempting to maintain a balance of power between Iran and Iraq col-
lapsed when Iraq invaded Kuwait. Dual containment reflects a post-Gulf War policy designed to contain both Iran and Iraq, using the instruments of military presence to deter aggression and economic sanctions to induce either a change of behavior (Iran and Iraq) or a change of government (Iraq). Diplomatic efforts have also been made to isolate both regimes, with more success in Iraq than Iran. Containment of Iraq is much more stringent and internationally acceptable. It involves enforcing no-fly zones in the north and south of the country; an embargo on military sales and oil exports; and tight trade restrictions. U.S. legislation prohibits U.S. trade and investment in Iran and the U.S. has attempted to extend that legislation to limit non-U.S. investment in Iran’s oil and gas industry. These efforts, opposed by some G-7 allies, are designed to raise the costs to Iran of pursuing unacceptable behavior, such as support for terrorism. While deterrence has succeeded in preventing aggression, a change of behavior in both countries has been unacceptably slow on most issues of concern to the U.S.

The dual containment strategy faces several challenges. First, it is not entirely satisfactory to U.S. partners because it implies equal treatment for two countries with different political dynamics and posing different kinds of threat. Moreover, it is not clear that a stringent containment policy can be maintained over time. Some European and Gulf allies would prefer the use of dialogue and engagement—especially commercial engagement—in Iran, believing this would moderate Iranian policy and tie that country to the West. Commercial interests in Europe and the U.S. are eager to do business in both countries. Periodic military responses from the U.S. to challenges from Iraq, such as the military buildup in the Gulf in late summer 1996 after Saddam’s incursion in the north of Iraq, put economic and political stress on some GCC states. Iran and Iraq’s neighbors in the GCC fear as well a future backlash at home from too much isolation of the two regimes. The U.S., emphasizing its security role, prefers increasingly tough sanctions on Iran and continued constraints on Iraq. The costs of the dual containment strategy on alliance cohesion will have to be balanced against its effectiveness in deterring aggression in the Gulf.

There are also domestic economic and political costs to dual containment in the U.S. and the GCC. As Saudi Arabia and other GCC states face rising economic difficulties and domestic opposition, the U.S. may find GCC financial and political support for the forward presence reduced. In the U.S., incidents such as the Khobar bombing and the need for budget cuts may raise questions about the costs and benefits of the policy. The challenge will be to sustain a suitable force presence that is affordable and acceptable to the local population in the Gulf. The U.S. may also need to consider whether both the burdens and the responsibility for Gulf security may be more equitably shared.

Dealing with GCC Partners

A third approach for the U.S. is to improve long-term stability of friendly regimes in the Gulf by encouraging GCC states to address the underlying causes of domestic tensions. This approach favors an evolution to more economically viable and politically accountable systems capable of meeting the demands and expectations of their growing, youthful populations. This need not be construed as importing Western-style democracy or intrusive interference in domestic politics, but in finding ways to support indigenous reform. It will also mean assuring that the U.S. military presence and the policy of dual containment are pursued in ways that do not destabilize critical GCC partners.
North Korea, as presently constituted, cannot endure indefinitely without substantial international aid. Pyongyang appears to have three choices:

- Cling to the established system and resist change. Such an approach virtually assures the ultimate collapse of the regime and the state.
- Try to muddle through the present agricultural/economic crisis, loosening internal restraints and engaging the outside world just enough to ride out difficulties before reimposing central control.
- Transform the system into something more economically viable and less threatening to the South and to the region and, possibly, open the door to national reconciliation and reunification.

Pyongyang’s behavior during the mid-1990s suggests that it has adopted a muddle-through approach, in the belief that the country’s difficulties are caused primarily by temporary forces over which it has no control (e.g., the weather) rather than by systemic deficiencies. Should the muddle-through approach fail, however, the North’s two remaining options doom the existing regime to extinction. And therein lies the danger.

Given the military resources at its disposal, the otherwise grim circumstances in which it finds itself, and the poor prospects to halt and reverse its downward trajectory, North Korea in its current weakness and decline potentially poses a greater threat to South Korea and to U.S. interests in the region than at any time since the summer of 1950. Attempting to moderate North Korea’s evolution will tax U.S. and South Korean statecraft in ways that the one-dimensional military confrontation never has.

But if the late 1990s represents a period of significant risk, it also affords unique opportunities to shape the future of the Korean peninsula to the benefit of U.S. interests. Whether the North’s process of transformation will see heightened tensions on the Korean peninsula and possibly renewed conflict, or a lessening of tensions and a peaceful resolution of the Korean conflict is the central concern for Washington and Seoul.
Background and Trends

As of 1996, the Korean peninsula is in the midst of an historic transition. The enmity and military confrontation that have marked intra-Korean relations since the Korean War are unabated, as the recent submarine incursion demonstrates, but the rivalry's international context has been transformed. For decades the hostility between the two Koreas was an element of the Cold War, with the Republic of Korea (South Korea) solidly aligned with the United States, and the Democratic People's Republic of Korea (North Korea) shifting adroitly between the Soviet Union and China. Relations between the South and the North during this period were confined almost exclusively to a military standoff.

With the demise of the Soviet Union and the transformation of China into a "market-Leninist" state, geostrategic and economic considerations have eclipsed the ideological component of the Korean confrontation. As a result, North Korea finds that it is left largely to fend for itself. South Korea, on the other hand, has become an increasingly important independent actor on the world stage, as well as a major U.S. ally and trading partner. Economic dynamism, the success of then president Roh Tae Woo's "Nordpolitik," and recent democratic reforms completed South Korea's transformation from a ward of the United States in the 1950s to a respected member of the international community in the 1990s.

Economic Crisis in the North, Boom in the South

During the Cold War, North Korea's abundant natural resources, mobilized population, and assistance from friendly regimes in Moscow and Beijing enabled Pyongyang to mask the deficiencies of its economic policies. In the late 1990s, however, it apparently can no longer sustain itself, notwithstanding the overblown claims of Kim II Sung's juche philosophy of self-reliance. North Korea is growing weaker economically, both in absolute terms and in relation to South Korea. Without sig-
The extent to which the younger Kim grasps the necessity for economic reform, much less has the power to institute reform, is unknown, but he has very little room to maneuver as he attempts to consolidate his power. Unlike other successor-generation leaders (Nikita Khrushchev of the USSR and Deng Xiao Ping of China), the younger Kim cannot blame the ills of the system he inherited on his immediate predecessor; on the contrary, to deviate from his father’s practices and theories would undermine whatever claim to power he holds, even though the system his father created has given North Korea six successive years of negative economic growth and the prospect of widespread famine and disease.

The dynastic succession in the North stands in stark contrast to the nascent democratic institutions taking root in South Korea after decades of political tumult. Since its founding in 1948, South Korea has had seven presidents. None of the first six came to a happy end. But the election of Kim Young Sam in late 1992 for a constitutionally-mandated single five-year term ended more than three decades of rule by military men and may prove a watershed in South Korea’s transition from an autocracy to a democratic political system.

Diplomatic Record Mixed in the North, Adroit in the South

For North Korea, the diplomatic picture is mixed. On the one hand, the North is more isolated from the outside world than ever. Soviet and Chinese regimes, supportive of Pyongyang in the past, have been replaced by governments that have established diplomatic and economic links with South Korea and distanced themselves from North Korea. On the other hand, there have been some tentative openings to the outside world, principally to Washington and Tokyo. Moreover, North Korea’s maneuvering in regard to its suspected nuclear weapons program demonstrates that Pyongyang is capable of effectively conducting skillful diplomacy—a diplomacy marked by a penchant for brinkmanship tactics and the creation of artificial “crises” designed to grab the attention of U.S. officials.

Institute for National Strategic Studies
South Korean Defense Budget

There has been some progress on the issue of U.S. servicemen missing in action from the Korean War and on the North Korean missile program as a consequence of the North's strategy of engaging the U.S. and trying to isolate itself from any dealings with the South. But the U.S.-North Korean dialogue has yet to result in a full lifting of U.S. economic sanctions against North Korea or the opening of liaison offices in Washington and Pyongyang. And while Washington is interested in a permanent peace on the Korean peninsula, it has rejected Pyongyang's demand to negotiate a separate U.S.-North Korean peace treaty to replace the Armistice Agreement, insisting that Pyongyang deal directly with Seoul on formally ending the Korean War.

The U.S.-South Korean proposal for four-party talks among South Korea, North Korea, the United States, and China, issued by Presidents Clinton and Kim at their Cheju Island summit in April 1996, is intended in part to create an opportunity for the two Koreas to address a permanent peace arrangement. Progress on this issue would likely improve the political atmosphere for increased international aid to the North as well.

South Korean diplomacy has been particularly adroit since the late 1980s. With the encouragement of Washington, South Korea capitalized on its hosting of the 1988 Olympic games to expand its diplomacy to former adversaries. South Korea's establishment of diplomatic relations with the USSR in 1990 and China in 1992, coupled with the simultaneous entry of the two Koreas into the United Nations in 1991, confirmed that the South had won the competition with the North for international standing. South Korea's ability to establish ties with former adversaries while maintaining its traditionally close links with the United States demonstrated the strength of U.S.-South Korean bonds and South Korea's newfound diplomatic skill.

North Remains Militarily Powerful, South Closing the Gap

Only in the military realm does North Korea retain any significant power. The large, heavily armed, and forward-deployed military forces of North Korea continue to pose a serious threat to South Korea and to U.S. forces stationed there. Though North Korea's population is only 24 million, it fields the world's fifth-largest military, with an active force of 1.28 million backed by a reserve force of 4.7 million. While many of its units are armed with equipment from the 1950s and 1960s, other elements are more modern. Of particular concern to U.S. and South Korean commanders are North Korea's:

- Numerous, forward deployed, and well-protected artillery assets
- Growing arsenal of missiles
- Large and well-trained special operations forces
- Chemical and biological warfare capabilities
- Military doctrine, force structure, equipment, and deployment patterns, all of which are designed for a rapid offensive thrust into the South
The Armed Forces of the Two Koreas

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Armored Forces</th>
<th>North Korea = 1,128,000</th>
<th>South Korea = 633,000</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Tanks</td>
<td>3,400</td>
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<tr>
<td>APC’s</td>
<td>2,200</td>
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<tr>
<td>Artillery</td>
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<tr>
<td>SSM’s</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>Helicopters</td>
<td>363</td>
<td>538</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
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Air Forces

| Combat Aircraft | 509 | 461 |

Naval Forces

| Surface Combatants | 40 |
| Submarines         | 6  |


*In this case, defined as frigates and destroyers
APC = armored personnel carriers (including fighting vehicles)
SSM = surface-to-surface missiles

But the Korean People’s Army (KPA) both exacerbates and suffers from the deterioration of the North Korean economy. So far, the KPA has been largely shielded from the effects of the food crisis, but the shortage of fuel, along with Pyongyang’s lack of hard currency, bad credit rating, and loss of major-power sponsorship all reduce the KPA’s combat readiness. As a result:

- Large-unit training exercises have been canceled
- Pilot proficiency is low as planes sit idle owing to lack of fuel
- New equipment and spare parts are in short supply

By contrast, the South’s spectacular economic growth finances a steady qualitative improvement in South Korean forces, narrowing the gap with the KPA in terms of combat power. However, the remaining gap would be even smaller or non-existent had South Korea in the late 1980s not begun to cut its defense budget as a percent of GNP and not devoted significant defense funds to the purchase of equipment and capabilities designed for hypothetical, non- peninsula threats rather than the extant threat from the North. Apparently acting on the assumption that North Korea will not attack as long as the U.S. remains committed to the defending the South, South Korea has devoted considerable resources to more mobile forces that could make it a regional power. South Korea pays close attention to its military might relative to that of Japan.

Potential Flashpoints

Deterrence has been effective on the Korean peninsula since 1953, and a rough equilibrium has marked the military confrontation since then. In the late 1990s, however, the erosion of North Korea’s power could put stability at risk. Although North Korea probably could not mount a successful blitzkrieg campaign to conquer the South, and would risk extinction if it tried, the North remains a potentially dangerous adversary in a variety of other conflict scenarios.

Accident, Incident, Provocation

An accident, incident or miscalculation in the Demilitarized Zone (DMZ), at sea, or in the air could escalate out of control because of:

- North Korea’s demonstrated willingness to use terror as a weapon
- North Korea’s propensity for brinkmanship

Nuclear Crisis

North Korea’s announcement that it would withdraw from the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT) led in the spring of 1994 to U.S. warnings of even tougher economic sanctions and to speculation about preemptive strikes against its nuclear sites. When Pyongyang responded by threatening to turn Seoul into “a sea of fire,” war seemed a distinct possibility. The immediate crisis eased when former president Jimmy Carter’s visit with Kim Il Sung revived the stalemated U.S.-North Korean nuclear talks, culminating in the October 1994 signing of the Agreed Framework Between the United States and North Korea. Under the terms of the agreement, North Korea must freeze (and eventually dismantle) its nuclear weapons program and meet NPT and IAEA safeguards in exchange for proliferation-resistant light-water reactors and other interim energy sources. With the creation of the multinational Korean Peninsula Energy Development Organization, and with all parties living up to their obligations as of 1996, the Agreed Framework has established a basis for continued U.S.-North Korean dialogue.
North Korea's refusal to meet its Military Armistice Commission responsibilities

- The lack of a functioning military-to-military channel of communication between the opposing forces

- The close proximity of the opposing forces

In the past, South Korea has acted with restraint in the face of severe provocations by the North. The shift in the balance of power on the peninsula, however, means that Pyongyang cannot assume restraint will be practiced in the future.

Breakdown of the Agreed Framework

If the Agreed Framework does not hold and North Korea revives its nuclear weapons program, the United States—assuming it would not acquiesce to North Korea's becoming a nuclear armed state—would face the same choices it confronted in early 1994. That is, the U.S. could either seek UN economic sanctions, which North Korea has labeled an act of war, or it could resort to preemptive strikes to destroy the North's nuclear facilities. In either case, war would be likely.

Coup d'état in the North

Kim Jong Il is potentially vulnerable to a rival faction coalescing around an alternative leader, especially if the loyalty of the internal security forces or the military were in doubt. A coup attempt could come from within the inner circle, perhaps with the backing of China, if the economy continues to deteriorate and Kim Jong Il fails to implement reforms.

Chaos in the North

A coup attempt or further economic deterioration could lead to the collapse of North Korea followed by chaos and possi-
The necessity to absorb a failed North Korea could stall South Korea’s economic engine and overwhelm its nascent democracy. The potential for social instability and violence would be high and might not be confined to the peninsula. Given the history of the two Koreas and the zero-sum nature of Korean politics, the administration of the North by the South Korean government could prove to be quite harsh, if only to preclude mass migration south. Some experts estimate that, following a merger of the two Koreas, as many as two million North Koreans might attempt to move south in search of relatives and a better life. Unrestricted competition for jobs between impoverished workers from the North and the South Korean labor force could lead to social unrest and could inflame South-North regional animosities.

**Attack on Seoul**

Located just twenty-five miles south of the DMZ, Seoul is the political, financial, educational, and cultural center of South Korea—and home to one out of every four South Koreans. The city is vulnerable to North Korean attacks ranging from harassment, through the firing of artillery and missiles for the purpose of intimidation, to a massive, combined arms assault to capture the city.

The U.S.-South Korean Combined Forces Command is determined to prevent the North from seizing Seoul. If Seoul were to fall, however, South Korean authorities would have to decide whether to continue the war (and probably carry it to the North) by combining its surviving forces with massive reinforcements from the United States, or to accept a negotiated settlement on the North’s terms to preclude further damage to Seoul.

**U.S. Interests and Approach**

**Net Assessment**

A negotiated end to the division of the Korean peninsula is unlikely given Korean culture and political traditions. Absent a significant incentive or threat, there is almost no likelihood that North Korean
leaders will pursue compromise with their rivals in the South. The greatest disincentive from the North Korean elites' standpoint is their likely fate under a peninsula-wide South Korean government. Because the rule of law has never been firmly established in the South, politics has had few constraints and victors have wielded great power. Those who lose political power are left largely defenseless against their rivals in a society where those in power tend to use state resources as weapons against their opponents.

Pyongyang's dialogue partner of choice is Washington, not Seoul. It has become increasingly clear that North Korea sees the United States as the key to its survival over the long term. Pyonyang views the Agreed Framework as the foundation for improved relations with Washington, to include the easing of economic sanctions, increased diplomatic interaction leading to the opening of liaison offices and ultimately the establishment of diplomatic relations and increased economic activity.

For its part, Washington has made it clear that the pace of improved U.S.-North Korea relations will be determined largely by the degree to which North Korea is willing to deal with the South.

This diplomatic activity, of course, is being conducted against a backdrop of potential collapse. Systemic failings and the loss of outside aid have so weakened North Korea that its ability to withstand additional stress is in question.

**U.S. Interests**

**Support South Korea against the threat of aggression from the North**

Since 1950, the U.S. has supported South Korea against the threat of aggression from the North. The original rationale was the geostrategic importance of the Korean Peninsula during the Cold War, including the importance of forward defense of Japan from Soviet or Chinese aggression. That no longer remains valid. The North, devoid of external backing, remains the only direct military threat to the South. At the same time, however, U.S. interests on the peninsula have grown from their original, Cold War security aspects. The South's economic growth and its increasingly democratic political institutions have transformed it from solely a bulwark against communism to a dynamic international player with whom the U.S. desires to maintain a close, multifaceted relationship.

**Preserve stability in East Asia**

As a status quo, non-expansionist power, the U.S. has long sought to preserve peace and stability in East Asia and the Pacific, a region of tremendous economic growth and strategic importance. The U.S. has a strong interest in ensuring that no state in the region becomes a hostile hegemon and that it retains strong allies in the area.
Maintain access to open markets

Continued U.S. economic prosperity is tied to a system of open markets, and nowhere is the potential for economic activity greater than in East Asia. In that regard, access to the South Korean market is important to the U.S. economy.

Foster the growth of democracy

The U.S. has an interest in seeing that South Korea becomes a full democracy, which is more likely to be a stable and powerful ally of the U.S. By guaranteeing the security of South Korea, the U.S. has given the South Korean people the time necessary to build robust economic institutions and to sort out their domestic politics so that the process of democratization could begin.

U.S. Approach

The United States has extended its nuclear umbrella to cover South Korea. It also stations almost 37,000 military personnel and substantial conventional combat power in the South and leads both the United Nations Command and the U.S.-South Korea Combined Forces Command (which handles deterrence and defense). Maintaining the U.S. force structure in South Korea and the region will maximize the chances for continued successful deterrence. But more than military power is needed to address the evolving situation on the Korean peninsula.

The U.S., in cooperation with South Korea, seeks to keep the process of change on the Korean peninsula manageable and peaceful, and to find an alternative to the potentially catastrophic scenarios that have dominated speculation about North Korea’s future. The United States’ cautious engagement of the North, predicated on the continuation of the freeze on Pyongyang’s nuclear weapons program, springs from the convictions that the most desirable alternative to the continued existence of North Korea, the negotiated reunification of the peninsula, is highly unlikely anytime soon; and that the most likely alternative, the need for the South to absorb the failed North, is highly undesirable and potentially dangerous.
Food Crisis in North Korea

According to the U.N. World Food Program, North Korea is no longer able to feed its people adequately. Systemic problems of poor land management (e.g., refusal to leave land fallow, failure to rotate crops, and over-fertilization) have been exacerbated by the floods of 1995 and 1996 (which left large tracts of farmland covered with sand) and by insufficient fuel to power the machinery that could clear the land.

The resulting poor harvest has further lowered food stocks. With no access to credit, little hard currency, and no food aid in the pipeline, North Koreans face continued widespread shortages and malnutrition. Collective farmers, who are expected to be largely self-sufficient and are therefore outside the Public Distribution System, have been particularly hard hit. Morale is down, energy levels are low from lack of food, and fewer people are available to work the remaining arable land as they are forced to forage farther and farther from home.

Foreign visitors have reported a noticeable disparity in the physical size of people living in rural areas as compared with the relatively pampered residents of Pyongyang. Physical standards for the military draft have reportedly been lowered as a result of the long-running food crisis.

While outside experts are not predicting mass starvation anytime soon, they do expect continued malnutrition, with increasing numbers of people succumbing to disease.

How well South Korea's budding democracy could withstand severe shocks is an open question, and, short of war, it is difficult to envision a greater shock than sudden reunification brought on by the collapse of the North. For the foreseeable future, the deterrent role of the U.S.-ROK Combined Forces Command remains the best guarantee that, over time, a durable peace can be built on the Korean peninsula. South Korea needs time for democracy's roots to sink deeper, for its political institutions to mature, and to prepare for the Herculean task of consolidating the nation. North Korea needs time to acclimate itself to the outside world. Both Koreas need time to resolve the legacy of more than half a century of bitter rivalry so that they can progress toward a reunification that contributes to regional stability.

Even after the North Korean threat diminishes or disappears, and with it the necessity to plan for a major regional contingency, U.S. strategic interests in the region would still be served by a continued military presence on the Korean peninsula. Future U.S. force structure on the peninsula will be determined by many factors, including the nature of U.S. relations with Korea, China, Japan, and Russia. Ideally, U.S. force structure on the peninsula following reunification would:

- Reflect a regional, rather than a peninsular, orientation
- Emphasize quick-reaction forces with the lift and mobility to project power over long distances
- Rely more on air and maritime forces and less on heavier assets like the 2nd Infantry Division currently deployed between Seoul and the DMZ

Careful advance coordination with Seoul would preclude the possibility that South Korean officials would mistakenly perceive force structure changes as a signal that the United States had decided to withdraw from the region, and would give officials in both capitals time to prepare public opinion for a modified U.S. military presence. Officials in Washington and Seoul understand the strategic rationale for a continued U.S. presence, and making the case to the American and Korean people should not be difficult.

North Korean military forces continue to pose a serious threat to South Korea and to U.S. forces stationed in the South. The larger reality, however, is that in virtually every area of competition, save that of the military, South Korea, with the strong backing of the U.S., has emerged as the clear victor over the North.
Five years after the start of the Madrid peace process in October 1991, the Arab-Israeli conflict is at a turning point. Despite its notable accomplishments, particularly the Israeli-Palestinian Oslo accords of September 1993 and the Israeli-Jordanian peace treaty of October 1994, a series of bloody suicide bombings carried out in February–March 1996 by Palestinian Islamic extremists in Israel has put the process on hold. These events shook Israelis’ confidence in the ability of the Palestinian Authority (PA) to halt terrorist attacks and prompted Tel Aviv to break off negotiations with Syria. (Damascus supports the groups that carried out the bombings.) These events also contributed to the May 1996 election in Israel of a Likud government, which rejects the concept of “land for peace,” that underpinned the Madrid process. Consequently, it is unclear whether the next decade will see the consumption of the Madrid peace process or a new cycle of violence and perhaps war.

This chapter discusses the potential for conflicts among states or involving the PA. (For analysis of radical movements that could destabilize individual states or the PA, see the chapter on Middle East Radicalism in the Troubled States section.)

**Background and Trends**

There is a heightened potential for renewed Arab-Israeli violence in the late 1990s, owing to several factors: the wide gap separating the basic positions of the two sides, Israeli frustration over continued terrorism, Palestinian frustration with the lack of progress in negotiations, and Syria’s continued support for anti-Israel terrorism. Moreover, the indirect, covert efforts of nations like Iran, Iraq and Libya to scuttle the peace process by supporting rejectionist groups opposed to peace heightens regional tensions and could increase the possibility of a confrontation with Israel. Even if a comprehensive peace could somehow be reached, however, ongoing competition for influence and lingering resentment on both sides over the terms of a settlement would create friction between Israel and most, if not all, of its Arab neighbors.
Continuing Differences between Israelis and Palestinians

The Oslo I (September 1993), Gaza-Jericho (May 1994), and Oslo II accords (September 1995) established a roadmap for achieving peace between Israel and the Palestinians. These agreements provide a timetable for transferring authority over parts of the West Bank and Gaza to the PA, and for conducting final-status negotiations regarding borders, security arrangements, settlements, refugees, water issues, and Jerusalem that will determine the final contours of a settlement between Israel and the PA.

For Israel, these agreements provide a mechanism for ending its rule over nearly two million Palestinians and for creating the basis for peaceful coexistence between the two peoples, though the final outcome of the process—autonomy, confederation with Jordan, or statehood—remains unclear. For Palestinians, the agreements provide a means to achieve the Palestinian leadership’s declared objective of an independent Palestinian state with Jerusalem as its capital.

The Oslo II accords fleshed out commitments made in earlier agreements and called for both sides to take several steps before the start of final-status negotiations:

- Redeployment of the Israeli army in the West Bank and Gaza, including the transfer of 27 percent of the land mass and 99 percent of the Palestinian population there to PA control. This phase was largely completed by December 1995, except for the politically explosive redeployment in Hebron.
- Elections to select a Palestinian president and legislative council, which were held in January 1996.
- Amendment of the Palestinian covenant within two months of elections (a side agreement, not the text of Oslo II). This was provisionally accomplished in April 1996.
**Mixed Progress toward Peace between Israel and the Arab States**

In five years of negotiation, Israel and Syria have made little progress bridging gaps in their positions regarding the four main issues under negotiation:

- The nature of peace
- The depth of Israel's withdrawal in or from the Golan
- Security arrangements including early warning stations, demilitarized zones, monitoring arrangements, and water sharing regimes
- The timetable for implementing an agreement

In 1996, the suspension of negotiations, Syria's continued support for the Lebanese Hizbullah and Palestinian terrorist groups opposed to the Arab-Israeli peace process, and the election of a Likud government committed to fight terror as its first priority all increase the likelihood of a major Israeli...
The 1979 Egypt-Israel Peace Treaty divides the Sinai into three zones: in Zone A, Egypt is permitted one mechanized infantry division; in Zone B, four lightly armed border battalions; and in Zone C, only civilian police to supplement the three battalions of the U.S.-led MFO peacekeeping force. Before the treaty came into full effect, several buffer zones were set up to separate Egyptian and Israeli forces.


Relations between Israel and Egypt remain cool. Egypt—seeing Israel as a potential rival for influence in the region, conscious of the growing weight of domestic opinion critical of its peace treaty with Israel, and fearing the loss of its pivotal role in the Arab world—has further slowed the pace of normalization with Israel and tried to reestablish itself as a key player on the inter-Arab stage. Specifically, it has spearheaded efforts to build an Arab consensus concerning the peace process and Israel that reflects Egyptian priorities, and it has tried to bring international pressure to bear on Israel to sign the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT), raising tensions with Israel and the United States. Egypt has also tentatively raised the possibility of terminating the mission of the Multinational Force and Observers (MFO) in the Sinai—mainly for financial reasons. This could become another source of friction with Israel.

By contrast, Israel and Jordan have succeeded in creating a relatively warm peace between governments, based on the close personal ties between the late Prime Minister Yitzhak Rabin and King Hussein and a shared interest in containing Palestinian nationalism. However, Palestinian-Israeli tensions in the fall of 1996 led to a cooling of ties. A small but symbolically important tourist trade has emerged between the two countries and there are plans for joint development of the Jordan Valley, increased trade, and joint business ventures. Moreover, military and security cooperation—which predated the peace treaty—has moved forward without fanfare. The warmth of Israeli-Jordanian relations, however, will be tied to the quality of the relationship between Israel and the Palestinians. It will be hard for Jordan to embrace Israel openly if the latter’s relationship with the Palestinians remains strained, although Israel and Jordan are likely to continue to cooperate quietly in dealing with potential security threats emanating from the West Bank and Gaza. The closeness of Israel’s relationship with the Arab states of North Africa and the Gulf will likewise be more or less linked to the quality of its relations with the Palestinians and, to a lesser degree, progress in negotiations with Syria and Lebanon.

Palestinian-Israeli clashes following the opening of an archaeological tunnel in Jerusalem in September 1996 brought a chill to Israel’s relations with Jordan and the Arab states of North Africa and the Gulf.
Continuing Hostility between Israel and Rogue Regimes

Throughout the next decade, Israel will probably remain in a state of war with the three “outer-ring” states—Libya, Iraq, and Iran—whether or not it makes progress toward resolving its conflicts with its immediate neighbors. All three of these states oppose the Arab-Israeli peace process and are likely to continue providing political, military, and economic support to terrorist groups working to undermine it. Moreover, all three states have acquired and are developing weapons of mass destruction (WMD). Given the hostility of these states to Israel and their radical policies, it is possible that one of them (or one of their surrogates) may attack Israel or the U.S. with WMD. For this reason, these states could become the target of an Israeli preventive strike (with possible U.S. support) on WMD production and storage facilities or delivery means.

The proliferation of WMD is more advanced in the Middle East than in any other region of the world (for more details, see the chapter on proliferation). For this reason, a future Arab-Israeli war could involve the use of these weapons, with horrible implications for the region. Moreover, stemming the proliferation of WMD is growing increasingly difficult. In particular, countries are becoming more skilled at concealing their WMD activities. This will make it more difficult to identify new programs, identify potential WMD production and support sites, assess the maturity of programs underway, and ascertain the scope of nuclear, biological, and chemical weapons proliferation in the region. This will make preventive and preemptive strikes more difficult to accomplish and increase the relative importance of deterrence and defensive measures in confronting the threat posed by WMD proliferation.

Potential Flashpoints

Escalating Israeli-Palestinian Violence

In 1996, terrorism by Hamas and the Palestinian Islamic Jihad succeeded, at least temporarily, in disrupting implementation of the Oslo I and II accords. Terrorism by opponents of the peace process and perhaps a new intifada are likely. (For analysis of the potential for terrorism that disrupts the peace process, see the chapter on Middle East Radicalism.) Palestinian frustrations concern restrictions on employment in Israel, the slow pace of negotiations, as well as the progress of final-status talks. If the situation deteriorates, Israel could close off the West Bank and Gaza and send its forces into areas currently controlled by the PA (zones A and B of the Oslo II accords). The range of Israeli responses might vary from covert operations (to abduct or assassinate wanted men) and reprisal raids of varying size, to large-scale cordon and search operations. Likewise, the participation of Israeli Arabs in a new intifada could prompt Israel to send troops into PA-controlled areas, although other measures, such as the punitive closure of the territories, seem a more likely response.
In all of these cases, U.S. military involvement is unlikely. Israel would probably have better operational intelligence regarding the whereabouts of wanted men and the structure of terror cells and would therefore have little need for U.S. help in this area. Moreover, the context of Israeli military intervention in the West Bank or Gaza might, for political reasons, preclude the U.S. from providing military assistance.

**Israeli Intervention in an Unstable Jordan**

The radicalization of the Palestinian community in Jordan, brought about by a renewed and more violent intifada or greater contact with Palestinians living in PA-controlled areas, could produce unrest and instability in that country. In such circumstances, Syria or Iraq may be tempted to intervene covertly or overtly on the side of domestic opponents of the Hashemite regime, repeating Syria’s military intervention in Jordan during the civil war of 1970. In response, Israel might threaten to intervene, to preserve Hashemite rule as it did during the 1970 Syrian intervention, and it would probably act on these threats if they failed to deter. In such a situation, the U.S. would probably provide Israel with intelligence to facilitate its intervention. The U.S. might also intervene on its own, using air and naval assets located in the region, ground forces from outside the region, pre-positioned equipment located in Israel, and perhaps staging areas in Israel and Saudi Arabia.

**Violation or Abrogation of the Israeli-Egyptian Peace Treaty**

Though unlikely, instability in Egypt—driven by political extremism, rapid population growth, and seemingly insoluble economic problems—could lead to a change of government, a coup, or a revolution. A new government or regime (whether Islamist or secular nationalist in orientation) might decide to violate Egypt’s peace treaty with Israel by exceeding permitted force levels in the Sinai, or it might abrogate the treaty outright. Either step would raise tensions and could spark a major crisis with Israel, prompting a withdrawal of the U.S.-led peacekeeping force—the 2,700-man MFO—that has monitored implementation of the treaty in the Sinai since 1982. In such circumstances, the MFO might have to withdraw from the Sinai under chaotic and possibly hazardous conditions. Such an operation would resemble noncombatant evacuation operations undertaken elsewhere in the past, and would require naval, amphibious, and air forces large enough to cover the removal of
of a lightly armed brigade-size force to neighboring countries or to ships offshore. Beyond the immediate implications for the safety of U.S. personnel serving in the MFO, such a contingency—entailing the failure of one of America’s most successful peacekeeping operations—could undermine popular support for potential peacekeeping operations elsewhere, particularly in the Golan.

Syrian-Israeli Confrontation

Continued Israeli-Hizballah violence in Lebanon, Syrian support for Hizballah and Palestinian attacks on Israel, and the lack of progress in negotiations have the potential to spark a Syria-Israel confrontation in Lebanon, or even a war.

Operation Grapes of Wrath, launched by Israel in April 1996 in an effort to halt Hizballah attacks against Israel’s self-declared security zone in southern Lebanon and northern Israel, demonstrated the fragile nature of the status quo in Lebanon. Should Tel Aviv launch a major ground operation against Hizballah (something it avoided in Operation Grapes of Wrath), Israel could be drawn into an open confrontation with Syria, which maintains 35,000 troops in Lebanon (including a mechanized division, an airborne division, and several special forces regiments). Moreover, Israel might be tempted to attack Syrian forces there in order to punish the regime of Hafez al-Asad for its support for Hizballah. In either case, Israel and Syria would probably try to limit the conflict to Lebanon (as they did in 1982) and avoid the spread of hostilities to the Golan.

Conversely, if negotiations between Israel and Syria remain deadlocked, Syria might try to retake the Golan by force, or at least seize a symbolic toe-hold there in order to facilitate the resumption of talks from a position of strength. In an attempt to limit the scope and duration of the conflict, Syria would try to mobilize international support for a quick cease-fire and threaten to launch SCUD missiles against Israeli cities if fighting continued. Israel would, at the very least, try to restore the pre-war status quo and punish Syria by threatening Damascus and inflicting heavy
losses on the Syrian military—the principal pillar of the regime.

Despite its relative political isolation, Syria could expect some help from several other countries in the event of a war with Israel. For instance, Iraq and Iran might dispatch token expeditionary forces, consisting of small ground and air contingents. Iraq, moreover, might allow Syria to launch SCUD missiles from its territory, thereby complicating Israeli efforts to find and suppress missile launchers. Iran, likewise, might replace Syrian SCUD missiles expended or lost in combat; Tehran might even launch missiles against Israel from its own territory in support of the Syrian war effort (assuming it eventually acquires missiles capable of reaching Israel). It is even possible that Libya and Iran might also try to intercept merchant ships or civilian aircraft bringing war materiel to Israel from the United States or elsewhere.

While Israel is more than strong enough to go it alone in a war with Syria, it might still benefit from U.S. assistance in several areas, including:
- Information: missile launch-warning data from DSP satellites, target intelligence for counter-SCUD operations deep in Syria, and information to aid the interdiction of foreign expeditionary forces arriving from Iraq or Iran.
- Hardware: TMD systems—such as anti-missile lasers, UAVs, and missiles—and penetrator or other specialized munitions to deal with hardened or underground facilities.
- Manpower: personnel to operate TMD systems.

**Rogue Use of WMD and Israeli Preventive Strikes on Rogue WMD Capabilities**

While a Libyan, Iraqi, or Iranian attack on Israel or the U.S. using WMD currently seems unlikely, it is not implausible. Such an attack would most probably occur within the context of a regional conflict, such as Operation Desert Storm, in which Israel or other U.S. allies are targeted in order to deter U.S. intervention. Moreover, if deniability could be ensured through the use of covert delivery means (such as terrorist saboteurs), the inhibitions against the use of WMD could be greatly reduced.

Chemical and biological weapons would probably be the weapons of choice for a covert attack. Even small amounts of a biological agent could cause thousands of casualties and would probably be detected only after the fact, making it difficult—if not impossible—to determine responsibility.

Such an attack might be launched simply to inflict casualties, though Iraq and Iran are more likely to threaten Israel in order to attain particular objectives (as Iraq did during the Gulf War). Furthermore, such an attack might aim to provoke a war between Israel and one of its other enemies (i.e., Iraq might covertly attack Israel in the hope that it would retaliate against Iran). Iraq or Iran might also attack the United States with WMD in the event of a regional conflict involving Israel.

In the event of a WMD attack against Israel, the United States may be called on to provide:
- Information: launch-warning data from DSP satellites, target intelligence for counter-SCUD operations, and data to help Israel target WMD-related facilities.
Material and equipment: TMD systems, mass quantities of vaccines for use against biological agents, NBC protective gear for civilians and troops, and penetrator or other specialized munitions to aid the destruction of WMD-related sites.

Personnel: to operate TMD systems, assist in the decontamination of populated areas, and help treat and care for mass civilian casualties in the event of a chemical or biological attack.

Given the danger posed by the proliferation of WMD in the region and the potentially horrific consequences of their use, Israel—perhaps with U.S. support—might take preventive action (including sabotage or air strikes) against WMD research, development, and production sites and facilities associated with WMD delivery systems, such as airfields and missile bases.

The Israeli attack on the Iraqi Osirak reactor in June 1981 provided a model for future operations of this type. Since then, Israeli officials have suggested on several occasions that they would, if necessary, attack WMD-related facilities in the region again. Israel’s Air Force has a proven long-range strike capability, and its acquisition of twenty-four F-151 strike aircraft in the late 1990s will greatly enhance its capabilities in this area.

For both political and military reasons, Israel might not consult with the United States before attacking the WMD facilities of rogue regimes. If it were to consult, however, Israel might ask for help in a variety of areas, including information (targeting data); hardware (penetrator or other specialized munitions); and operational support (in-flight refueling).

U.S. Interests and Approach

Net Assessment

In the late 1990s, the U.S. will face difficult challenges ensuring the viability of Arab-Israeli peace agreements concluded thus far, maintaining the momentum of the Arab-Israeli negotiations, and defusing potential conflicts between Israel, the Palestinians, and Syria. Low-level Israeli-Palestinian violence is likely to continue and a Syrian-Israeli confrontation in Lebanon is possible in the period under consideration. Syria might, moreover, initiate a limited action in the Golan to obtain a foothold there and spur a renewal of negotiation from a position of strength. On the other hand, though the potential for widespread unrest in Egypt and Jordan is low, political instability in either could have severe consequences for the durability of the peace both countries have forged with Israel—and thus for U.S. interests in the region.

Libya, Iraq, and Iran will remain at war with Israel, and barring a change in regimes, opposition to the Arab-Israeli peace process and broader U.S. interests in the region will remain a key feature of the policies of these countries. Given their continued hostility to the U.S. and Israel, the risk posed by rogue regimes’ possession of WMD will be among the most difficult and dangerous challenges the United States and its friends in the region will confront in the late 1990s. For this reason, an Israeli preventive strike against WMD-related facilities in the Arab world or Iran will remain a possibility during the period under consideration. Moreover, the possibility of WMD use against U.S. troops, allied countries, or even against population centers in the continental U.S. will increase, particularly in the event of a war between any one of these countries and the U.S. or its allies in the region.

Finally, while the U.S. may be called upon to provide military assistance to its friends in the region, it is unlikely to be necessary (as it was in the past) to intervene militarily, or to threaten to do so, to secure its interests in the Arab-Israeli arena.

U.S. Interests

Ensuring the Survival of Israel and Moderate Arab Governments

The U.S. has a historic commitment to Israel, based on such shared values as democracy. The state of Israel has had great difficulty securing recognition from its neighbors, some of which spent decades challenging Israel’s very right to exist.
as a nation. The U.S. has a long-standing commitment to defend that right. Similarly, the U.S. has a strong interest in upholding moderate Arab governments to ensure that the region is not overwhelmed by anti-Western radicalism that could unleash a wave of terror and threaten the supply of oil from the Persian Gulf.

Preventing a Violent Arab-Israeli Conflict

The end of the Cold War eliminated, at least temporarily, the possibility that an Arab-Israeli conflict could spark a superpower confrontation. Continued Arab-Israeli violence, however, threatens the integrity of existing peace treaties and the stability of governments friendly to the U.S., and provides ammunition for radical Islamists and radical regimes such as Iraq and Iran. The Middle East, moreover, could reemerge as a focal point of conflict and competition between the U.S. and Russia were the latter to assert itself overseas and reclaim the role once played by the Soviet Union. Moreover, because the proliferation of WMD is more advanced in the Middle East than in any other region of the world, a future Arab-Israeli war could very well involve the use of these weapons on the battlefield or against civilian population centers—with horrible implications for the region. Averting this possibility will be a key U.S. interest in the Middle East in coming years.

U.S. Approach

In the late 1990s and into the twenty-first century, the United States will face an environment in the Middle East that is more complex and challenging than ever before. And more than ever before, U.S. policymakers will need to integrate political, economic, and military instruments to achieve their objectives in the region.

Resolving the Arab-Israeli conflict remains a priority for the U.S. Thus, the U.S., co-sponsor (with Russia) of the Madrid peace process, will continue its efforts to broker an Arab-Israeli peace; to promote economic development to bolster friendly governments and create for the peoples of the region a stake in peace and stability; and to ensure that allies (including Israel, Egypt, Jordan, and Saudi Arabia) are able to defend themselves against potential regional threats, while ensuring that Israel maintains its qualitative edge. Peace, however, is unlikely to yield a significant dividend in the form of a reduction in defense spending, though it may alter spending priorities (e.g., more money for counter-terror forces and long-range strike and missile defense systems, and less for conventional ground forces). Accordingly, Washington will be asked to maintain current levels of security assistance to Israel, Egypt, and Jordan to ensure that these allies possess the means to defend themselves and thereby keep the peace.

Furthermore, U.S. efforts to broker an Israeli-Syrian peace—if successful—could create additional military requirements for the United States. Specifically, the U.S. might be asked to help monitor implementation of an Israeli-Syrian peace treaty and participate in peacekeeping operations on the Golan. Thus, even if a comprehensive peace is achieved, the U.S. will retain important military commitments in the area.

The U.S. will also continue its efforts to limit the troublemaking potential of both Iran and Iraq in order to prevent them from undermining the Arab-Israeli peace process or creating a new rejectionist bloc opposed to the peace process and U.S. interests in the region. (For more discussion of this issue, see the chapter on the Persian Gulf.)

Lastly, though there are few situations that would require direct and massive U.S. military intervention, U.S. forces and personnel could be indirectly involved in future conflicts, or be targeted by hostile terrorist groups or states. As a result, the U.S. will need to enhance its ability to deal with terrorism and WMD, the threats that pose the greatest danger to its personnel and interests. In particular, the greatest challenges are preventing the delivery of WMD by nontraditional means (such as terrorist-driven trucks), destroying hardened and buried targets and mobile missile launchers, and protecting U.S. and allied civilian populations against attacks by WMD.
For India and Pakistan, many of the geopolitical realignments that occurred as a result of the end of the Cold War had only a marginal effect on their immediate security concerns. To be sure, India’s loss of its superpower patron, the Soviet Union, was a blow to the country’s global prestige and regional standing. Similarly, the withering of Pakistan’s tie to the U.S. has increased Islamabad’s security anxieties. Yet the end of East-West confrontation has not significantly altered the state of rivalry between India and Pakistan, only the context.

Indo-Pakistani disputes have brought the two countries to war in 1947, 1965, and 1971, and perilously close to conflict again in 1987 and 1990. Each conflict has been relatively short and, with the exception of the 1971 war, indecisive in terms of resolving issues or altering the status quo. In addition, each arose primarily from accumulated internal pressures rather than an extra-regional security threat.

Background and Trends

The republics of India and Pakistan, and the Indo-Pakistani conflict, were born in 1947, with the departure of the British. At the time of its creation, Pakistan was divided into East and West Pakistan, which were separated by nearly 1000 miles of northern India. (In 1971, after the last Indo-Pakistani conflict, East Pakistan became Bangladesh.) With the end of British imperial dominion, rulers of the princely states were given an Instrument of Accession by which to join India or Pakistan, as they chose. Most states sided with their religious majority (Hindus to India, Muslims to Pakistan); however, an estimated twelve million refugees fled across the borders, and nearly one million more are estimated to have died in related hostilities.

India: Striving for Global Recognition

From the initial post-independence period onward, South Asia has been regarded by U.S. officials as a region of secondary importance to the United States.
During the Cold War, U.S. alignment with Pakistan made South Asia a significant part of East-West competition. India under its first leader Jawaharlal Nehru helped lead the non-aligned movement from the mid-1950s. Neither the U.S. nor the USSR took India’s non-aligned stance and its hegemonic aims seriously, although Moscow benefited from them and they angered the U.S. From 1971 through the end of the 1980s, India maintained close ties with Moscow. This relationship brought India large-scale military and economic assistance. Soviet weapons and military equipment formed the backbone of India’s formidable conventional military capability and steered its foreign policy and security strategy as well. But in the 1980s, India began to shift its foreign policy and security policy toward the West.

At the same time, Indian internal politics underwent a shift. The Congress Party, which had ruled India for all but two years since independence, began to lose support in its northern Indian heartland. That provided an opening for the Hindu nationalist Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP) to attack Indian foreign policy. The BJP blamed the Congress Party (the dominant political party since Indian independence) for the vexing problem of Kashmir. The BJP also condemned the Congress Party for an overly solicitous approach to the U.S.

U.S.-Indian relations have been both the beneficiary and the casualty of shifts in Indian internal politics. A dramatic change in attitude among Indian voters was reflected in the May 1996 elections in which the BJP (in confederation with two allied Hindu nationalist parties and two smaller splinter groups) won 22 percent of the popular vote. Although the Party captured the largest bloc of seats in the new Parliament, it lost its first test of parliamentary strength. Less than two weeks later, the BJP leader, Atal Bihari Vajpayee, was forced to concede his inability to form a coalition, and President Shankar was obliged to turn to the United Front (formerly known as the Left Front) coalition to try its luck in forming a government. As of late 1996, the coalition government led by Prime Minister Deve Gowda remains in power.

Events of the mid-1990s suggest two important trends which will have dramatic consequences for India. First, the hold of the Congress Party on India’s political system has been broken. Secondly, political power is shifting from New Delhi to the provinces, which could initiate a period of genuine federalism, focusing the public’s attention on the great disparities in wealth among the Indian states and thereby illuminating the gap between the very rich and the very poor.

**Pakistan: Seeking Allies to Contain the Indian Threat**

To manage its rivalry with India, since the mid-1950s Pakistan has sought allies that might come to its defense in a crisis,
or at least tried to project the impression of such alliances to India’s leaders and key regional and world powers.

To this end, Pakistan sought closer relations with China and the United States. Despite these efforts, Pakistan was unable to achieve military parity with India. None of Islamabad’s efforts produced the dividends envisioned by Pakistan’s security architects, largely because India is such a formidable foe. Pakistan’s efforts to court China, for example, have had only limited success, having been held hostage to mercurial Sino-Soviet relations. And Pakistan has never appreciated the magnitude of the gulf in defense expectations between it and the U.S.

During the Cold War, Pakistan was an important regional surrogate in a global network of U.S. allies whose purpose was to contain Soviet power. At the same time, to Islamabad, Washington was a potential protector against India’s hegemonic designs. But Pakistan’s early expectation that its relationship with the U.S. would lead to a codified treaty or defense pact was never realized.

Despite statements by a succession of Pakistani governments and defense officials publicly acknowledging this asymmetry in expectations, and accumulated anger in Pakistan’s public opinion at U.S. refusal (once hostilities began) to assist Pakistan in its 1965 and 1971 wars with India, many continued to harbor the hope that the strategic relationship could expand, particularly so long as the Cold War continued. The relationship with the U.S. also provided Pakistan with a sense of strategic belonging, a boost to its chronic sense of insecurity.

Pakistan was able to use the U.S. need for a regional ally to obtain large amounts of military and economic assistance and to continue its pursuit of a nuclear weapon for a time, with a wink and nod of tacit approval from Washington. However, the 1985 Pressler amendment requires that at the beginning of each fiscal year the president must certify that Pakistan does not possess a nuclear device; failure to certify non-possession would freeze all U.S. secu-

rity assistance to Pakistan. Adoption of this amendment followed efforts in 1984 by the Reagan administration to warn Pakistan that activities at several of its nuclear facilities (principally the Kahuta enrichment plant) imperiled its security assistance relationship with the United States. U.S. concern over the proliferation of nuclear weapons on the subcontinent was subordinated to the more urgent goal of containment, however, especially during the struggle to oust the USSR from Afghanistan. But with the Soviet departure from Southwest Asia following the end of the Cold War and the breakup of the Soviet Union, the U.S. imposed sanctions against Pakistan under the Pressler amendment. Islamabad believed that the sanctions signaled U.S. disregard for Pakistan with the end of its utility in Washington’s struggle against the Soviet Union, rather than illustrating genuine concern over Pakistan’s nuclear program.

The death of President Mohammad Zia ul-Haq and many of his senior generals (as well as the U.S. ambassador, Arnold Raphel) in an August 1988 plane crash hastened the end of an era of close U.S.-Pakistan security relations. Elections in 1988 brought to office as Prime Minister Benazir Bhutto, the daughter of former prime minister Zulfikar Ali Bhutto who was hanged by Zia breaking the Army’s ten-year hold on power. The constitutionally correct but politically suspicious ouster of Prime Minister Bhutto in 1990 by President Ishaq Khan (acting under pressure from the Army) highlighted the fragile state of democracy in Pakistan and the extremely confrontational and personal nature of Pakistan’s political environment. Bhutto was returned to power in the 1993 elections.

On November 5, 1996, Pakistani President Farooq Ahmad Khan Leghari, using his constitutional powers, dismissed the government of Prime Minister Benazir Bhutto, dissolved the National Assembly, and appointed a caretaker Prime Minister. This was the third time in six years since the end of the Zia regime that a sitting Prime Minister in Islamabad has been ousted in mid-term, for reasons of incompetence, corruption or mismanagement. As Pakistan’s constitution requires, Leghari promised to hold elections within
ninety days. Leghari's actions were in response to concern of the business community, the army, and many politicians that widespread corruption and authoritarian rule were destroying confidence in the democratic process, as well as provoking an economic crisis. The major question is whether the President's actions will lead to a reformed, stronger democratic process and a sounder, less corrupt economy, or the continuation of the past situation under a new prime minister.

Overall, Pakistan faces at least eight serious challenges:

- A weak economy
- Badly weakened parliament, civil service, and political parties
- Rampant corruption
- A breakdown in public order owing to the Afghan war's legacy of a growing trade in narcotics and increased terrorism and religious activism
- Rising tensions among rival ethnic groups, which resulted in riots in Karachi
- Continued preoccupation with the struggle over Kashmir
- Radical movements benefiting from the country's internal chaos, including increasingly powerful Islamic groups and a greater nationalist feeling against Indian oppression of the Kashmiris
- Growing resentment of the United States among Pakistanis, which limits Islamabad's ability to support U.S. regional goals

Widespread Political Unrest Despite Good Economic Prospects

Increasing ethnic and sectarian violence in the Sindh province of Pakistan (most pronounced in the provincial capital of Karachi) and continued violence in India's provinces of Kashmir and Assam limit both countries' prospects for economic growth and overall stability. The Indian and Pakistani governments have usually blamed each other for inciting internal upheaval, adding to the perceptions of both publics that the regimes in New Delhi and in Islamabad are determined to meddle in the internal politics of their neighbor. Indeed, Pakistani support for insurgencies in India constitutes a not-so-subtle approach of keeping India slightly on edge, tying down Indian forces, and providing a distraction during which Pakistan hopes to attend to its comparatively inferior conventional forces.

The tension embodied in the Kashmir dispute has become a major political issue for both countries. Most Indian politicians recognize that Indian efforts to manipulate the political process in Jammu and Kashmir (beginning with the elections in 1989) have failed. But many Indians will not acknowledge that the government's public position—that the Kashmiri insurgency is a creation of Pakistani incitement rather than a genuine, internally driven movement for political change—has been discredited. Further, many Pakistanis may be reluctantly coming to the conclusion that the Muslim insurgency is over and Kashmir will remain an Indian state.

Adding to the outlook for unrest is the continuing high, though declining, birthrates and declining infant mortality rates. For example, India's population has nearly tripled in the past fifty years and is projected to exceed that of China by the year 2020.
Kashmir's History

When Pakistan and India were created in 1947, Kashmir was unique in that it was a cultural composite of Hindus, Muslims, and Buddhists. It was also the largest princely state and was contiguous to both India and Pakistan. The maharajah of Kashmir initially refused to sign the Instrument of Accession. But following a full-scale attack by militants supported by Pakistan one month later, he signed with India on the condition that his state receive Indian military assistance. Pakistan, however, did not accept the legality of the Instrument of Accession and continued fighting.

The 1947 arrangement for accession was predicated on the location and the predominant faith of each of the princely states. Kashmir presented a dilemma because it was contiguous to both India and Pakistan, and was ruled by a Hindu with a majority of Muslim subjects. Kashmir reinforced Prime Minister Jawaharlal Nehru's concept of a secular India as a more powerful India. Thus, the Kashmir maharajah's signing of the Instrument of Accession provided the Indian Army with the justification to defend Srinagar.

India referred the Kashmir issue to the United Nations in December 1947. Nonetheless, the first Kashmir war, primarily a limited series of land battles, continued until a U.N. resolution was adopted on January 1, 1949. At that time, India and Pakistan agreed to a cease-fire along their existing Kashmir positions, to withdrawal of forces, and to a Kashmir plebiscite under which citizens would determine their future. India was left with two-thirds of Kashmir, and Pakistan controlled one-third. The cease-fire line represented an Indian loss of nearly 5,000 square miles of Kashmir and divided the state into Indian-controlled Jammu and Kashmir (referred to simply as Kashmir) and Pakistani-controlled Azad (Free) Kashmir. This division was followed by a dramatic increase in military spending by both India and Pakistan. The continued importance of Kashmir to India was evident in 1962 when, during India's war with China, several thousand Indian soldiers remained stationed along the Kashmir cease-fire line.

The second Kashmir war lasted from August 5 through September 21, 1965. This conflict received much global attention because it involved the largest tank battle since World War II. It was halted, but not settled, by another U.N. resolution.

The Indo-Pakistani conflict of 1971 led to the creation of Bangladesh (formerly East Pakistan). That was a solid victory for India, by then the dominant power in South Asia. With the separation of East and West Pakistan, Pakistan lost one-fourth of its territory and more than half of its population, so that it had fewer Muslims than India. This conflict precipitated the Simla Agreement, which was distinct from previous Indo-Pakistani treaties in that it emphasized bilateral, rather than third-party-mediated or multilateral, solutions to the problems that besieged the two countries. That agreement modified the U.N.-imposed Kashmir cease-fire position, establishing a line of control based on the positions of Indian and Pakistani troops as of December 17, 1971.

Despite this agreement and a follow-up 1988 agreement concerning northern Kashmir, the territorial dispute remains. One reason has to do with the border itself. When the first cease-fire line was drawn in 1949, cartographers abandoned their border marker about thirty miles south of Kashmir's northern boundary, the foot of the Saltoro Mountain Range. Negotiators merely stated that the line would continue "thence north to the glaciers." The wording remained unchanged following the second and third Indo-Pakistani conflicts, since there had never been any desire to brave conditions at the foot of K2—the world's second-highest mountain—until 1984, when India sought to repossess territory long overseen by Pakistan. Pakistan attaches great importance to maintaining control of the territory it occupies in the north because the territory provides direct access to China via the Karakoram highway. Pakistan values the network of roads it has constructed (with Chinese assistance) that links the remote northern regions of Pakistan to China's Xinjiang province.

Despite the pressures from population growth, the outlook for the economy in the next decade is better than in the past. For the first 45 years of independence, Pakistan's economy generally outperformed India. India was building a somewhat more modern and technologically based economy, but doing so in an environment stifled by government intervention in every aspect of the market. In contrast, Pakistan's economy, reminiscent of 19th century English landlord agrarianism grew in an environment where market signals had some influence upon prices and investment decisions.

Economic conditions in both countries have improved since 1993, although more significantly in India than in Pakistan. In 1991, Indian Prime Minister Rao initiated the most sweeping economic policy changes since India gained its independence. The country abandoned closed, regulated socialism in favor of moving toward a more free-market system. Since that time, inflation has been cut by one-third and exports have tripled. Prime Minister Bhutto was pursuing an economic and financial liberalization program. In the longer term, this effort will be less successful than that of India owing to, among other factors, higher illiteracy and lingering dependency upon agriculture in Pakistan. Another indication of economic change is that privatization continues in earnest in both countries, expanding the consumer middle class. This economic progress has generated social conflict over growing disparities in income distribution at a time of rapidly escalating population growth.

The combination of the structural divergencies in the two economies with the human capital divergence (Pakistan's education system is, for example, in near collapse) suggests a fairly clear prognosis for the medium term. Within fifteen years, and barring a relapse by India, its economy will begin to acquire the same features as the economies of Southeast and Northeast Asia, supported by a technical workforce of international standard, although constrained by a large poorer class within the population. With its much larger modern industrial sector and a more rigorous policy framework, India will become stronger and much more integrated into the global
Comparative Army Corps Distribution: India and Pakistan

Economy than still largely traditional Pakistan. Pakistan will continue to rely upon an agrarian-based economy with a small technical workforce significantly below international or even regional standards, but also with a large poor class.

Instability in Afghanistan

Since a Moscow-backed regime (which came to power after Soviet invasion forces fled the country) was toppled in 1992, two major factions have battled for control of the country. In 1994, the Islamist Taliban movement declared illegitimate the government of President Burhanuddin Rabbani and military commander General Ahmed Shah Massoud, which was dominated by ethnic Tajiks who are about 20 percent of Afghanistan’s population. The Taliban, based in the Pashto ethnic group which makes up half of Afghanistan’s population, started as a small Islamist movement in Kandahar in southwest Afghanistan, but capitalized upon widespread popular war-weariness and disenchantment with the old Afghan factions, to grow rapidly. Its military success was facilitated by the collapse of regime support. There has been strong Pakistani sympathy for Taliban, but the latter has not depended heavily upon outside support. At the end of September 1996, the interim government of Afghanistan led by President Rabbani fell to the Islamist Taliban movement, which in late 1996 controlled two-thirds of the country. The Taliban capture of the capital Kabul in September 1996, the brutal murder of the former Soviet-backed leader, Najibullah, and Taliban’s harsh version of Islamic law stunned many who discounted the radical Islamic movement’s appeal. However, a military stalemate then occurred as the Taliban’s opponents regrouped.

Afghanistan’s future concerns its neighboring states not only because of interest in what regime may gain control of Afghanistan, but also the prospect of opening trade and oil pipeline routes connecting Central and South Asia. The change of regime in Afghanistan alarms Russia, Iran, and India, all of whom had supported the Rabbani government. Moscow fears the installation of an Islamist regime in the region and the opportunity for that government to deal independently on economic and security issues with the nations of Central Asia as well as a source of subversion and terrorism directed against Central Asian regimes close to Moscow. Iran has been supporting Rabbani and is very nervous about a Sunni Islamic movement over which it has no control and which it fears is backed by the U.S., via Pakistan. India is alarmed by the ascension of a mujahedeen-led Islamist government in the region which is likely to ally itself with its regional rival Pakistan and could look vengefully upon the way India has treated Moslem Kashmiris. Further, Pakistan is likely to be sympathetic to and supportive of a Taliban government as it might provide an opening for Islamabad to Central Asia, which it has courted with only marginal success.
Conventional Military Strength

India and Pakistan are locked into a reactive cycle. While both nations would like to reduce the burden of defense on their societies, strong historical forces and genuine fears of attack dominate security planning. Indian and Pakistani defense experts doubt the two countries would go to war again, but if a conflict erupts, they discount the possibility of nuclear escalation. Their professional military journals include little material on the subject of nuclear doctrine or deterrence theory, and neither country has taken steps toward actively defending against the use of nuclear weapons. There are, for example, no civil defense programs to cope with large-scale evacuation in the event of a nuclear exchange. Rather, defense planners in both India and Pakistan tend to focus on how a range of conventional scenarios (most of which are Kashmir-derived) might evolve, with relatively little analysis of targeting or other tactical concerns.

India: Military Power Weakened with Loss of Soviet Support

India spends roughly $8 billion annually on defense; that is slightly less than 3 percent of its gross domestic product and nearly 17 percent of its national budget. Roughly one-third of India's land and air combat power is concentrated in the west and northwest, presumably to respond to Pakistani threats. Nearly 20 percent of India's land force is committed to battling the Kashmiri rebellion and other insurrections. The Indian Army receives about half of the country's defense budget and consists of three armored divisions, seventeen infantry divisions, and ten mountain divisions. The principal role of the Air Force is to defend the country against Pakistan. Although the country hopes to build a blue-water navy, there is little prospect of this. There are plans to begin modernizing the fleet, but support for naval expansion would have to come at the expense of the other military services, which is unlikely.

With the loss of its principal source of arms—the Soviet Union—Indian conventional military strength weakened during the early and mid-1990s. Still, roughly 70 percent of Indian military equipment is of Soviet origin. While Russia continues to provide modest but insufficient support for Indian forces, all three of India's services suffer from lack of spare parts and cash to sustain readiness and maintenance programs. As a result, India has moved more aggressively to expand an indigenous arms industry.

Pakistan: The Army Continues to Dominate

Pakistan spends $3.3 billion annually, or nearly 8 percent of its GDP and close to 30 percent of its national budget, on defense. In 1994, Pakistan pledged to freeze defense spending for several years to attract larger loans from international lending institutions. In fiscal year 1995-96,
A rivalry exists between the Army and Air Force, and there is debate among the military regarding whether the Air Force should redefine its primary mission, which is to support Army operations during war. More than half of the Pakistan Air Force is dedicated to close air support operations. These units played a key role in defending Pakistani territory during the 1965 and 1971 wars. But the Air Force has been weakened by the Pressler amendment, which has stalled delivery of F-16 aircraft for nearly six years. The Clinton administration hopes to sell these aircraft to a third country so that Pakistan can be repaid for the planes. It is very unlikely that the F-16s will ever reach Islamabad.

The Brown amendment, signed into law in January 1996, was designed to relieve some of the pressures created by the Pressler sanctions, which had crippled parts of the Pakistani military, particularly the Air Force. The Brown amendment allows nearly $370 million of previously embargoed arms and spare parts to be delivered to Pakistan. It also permits limited military assistance for the purposes of counter-terrorism, peacekeeping, anti-narcotics efforts, and some military training.

**Calculated Ambiguity in Two de Facto Nuclear States**

India and Pakistan have made little progress in addressing the most alarming threat to the region—the potential proliferation of weapons of mass destruction. India and Pakistan are de facto nuclear weapons states. Both countries could assemble a nuclear device relatively quickly. India has even tested a device in what it called a peaceful nuclear explosion. But neither country is believed to have fitted nuclear weapons to delivery systems.

India and Pakistan have both concluded that the potential capability to deploy nuclear weapons is essential for their national security and political interests. Their citizens generally agree that nuclear deterrence has served both countries well, although Indians typically favor a more overt nuclear stance, while most Pakistanis are more reluctant to declare their nuclear status unless and until India does.
Nonetheless, both countries have limited the pace and breadth of their nuclear programs, thus avoiding the danger inherent in expanding to full-fledged weapons development. Some of the factors constraining the programs, however, have been involuntary and include financial barriers, technical obstacles, and policy concerns. In short, it is unclear (largely because the programs are shrouded in secrecy) whether the nuclear programs in both nations are limited more by circumstances than by choice. Regardless, as the programs mature and tensions build, and if either or both nations expand the programs and approach actual deployment, a purposefully ambiguous approach may no longer be sustainable. Among the factors that could escalate a conflict quickly is the continuing development of ballistic missiles by both countries. International efforts are highly unlikely to be able to reverse this trend, particularly if they center exclusively on the nuclear nonproliferation regime that exists as of the mid-1990s.

One of the few issues on which Pakistanis and Indians agree is their opposition to the Treaty on Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT), which neither has signed. Despite earlier supportive statements from New Delhi, India’s 1996 rejection of the draft Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty (CTBT) forced a negotiating compromise (engineered by Australia) to remove the CTBT deliberations from the UN Committee on Disarmament in Geneva, thereby circumventing Indian opposition. The treaty was tabled at the General Assembly, where in September 1966 it was approved in a vote by more than 150 nations, including the five acknowledged nuclear powers. Indian refusal to sign the agreement, however, could still block its eventual ratification and entry into force. It may also doom prospects for a fissile material cutoff treaty. Pakistan’s position on the CTBT is that it would not sign the treaty unless India did so first.

India. India’s nuclear weapons program, which began in 1964, predates the Pakistani effort and is more technically advanced in certain areas. India conducted its only nuclear test in 1974. By the late 1970s, India had expanded its plutonium-production capability. Some estimates conclude that India’s plutonium stockpile could fuel nearly fifty weapons. India also has the capability to enrich uranium to bomb-grade levels at the Bhabha Atomic Research Center near Bombay and at a pilot-scale facility at Rattehalli. Neither facility is subject to inspection by the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA).

India has tested two missile types, the Prithvi (150–250 km) and the Agni (2500 km). The Prithvi is single staged and liquid fueled. Its limited range suggests it was developed almost solely for use against targets in Pakistan. The two-stage Agni, which has been flight tested at least three times, is better suited for use against China. The Agni program has reportedly been subordinated to accelerate work on the Prithvi, including efforts to increase the latter’s range. To this end, India has tested an extended-range Prithvi. Either the Prithvi or the Agni can reportedly deliver nuclear weapons. India could also deliver nuclear ordnance using aircraft, including the British-French Jaguar, the French Mirage-2000, or the Russian MiG-27. As for longer-range missiles, India began an ambitious space-launch vehicle development program in the mid-1970s. Three vehicles have been developed that could be converted into intermediate-range ballistic missiles or intercontinental ballistic missiles.

Pakistan. Pakistan’s nuclear program was launched shortly after the country’s losses in the 1971 war with India and accelerated after India’s first nuclear test in 1974. The program is not as broad as India’s, principally because Pakistan lacks an extensive civil nuclear power infrastructure. Instead, Pakistan has based its weapons program on the use of highly enriched uranium (HEU) and has built a clandestine procurement network to support its weapons program. It has become self-sufficient in several technical areas (e.g., fabrication and engineering) and in the enrichment of uranium to levels suitable for weapons. Nearly all of its nuclear program is focused on military applications and centered in a few facilities, the most impor-
tant of which are the Kahuta enrichment plants. China has assisted Pakistan's nuclear program since at least 1986, when the two countries signed a nuclear cooperation agreement. The precise extent of cooperation is not known, although it reportedly includes transfer of nuclear weapons technology for both the design of weapons and the enrichment of uranium fuel.

Pakistan has several methods for delivering nuclear weapons. In addition to the 280 km range M-11 (supplied by China in 1992 but probably not yet deployed), Pakistan could employ U.S.-supplied F-16 aircraft or the French Mirage. Pakistan's operational missile, the Haf, has experienced serious design difficulties. Furthermore, it is limited to a range of 80 km and lacks accuracy. Only a few of the Haf-1 model have been produced and deployed; a Haf-2 and Haf-3 are also under development. The Haf-3 is based on Chinese technology and can carry a 900 kg warhead for 300 km. There is some speculation that the Haf-3 is actually the Chinese M-11.

Since 1989, Pakistan's official position has been that it will not begin to assemble nuclear weapons. In July 1991, reliable reports from Islamabad confirmed that Pakistan had frozen its production of HEU and halted the manufacturing of nuclear weapons components. By the mid-1990s, however, Pakistan had begun to build a plutonium-production reactor at Khusab with Chinese assistance, raising concern that Pakistan's weapons designers were diversifying the HEU program to allow for plutonium-based weapons as well. (India has moved similarly to diversify its bomb-grade fuel production, by developing an HEU-enrichment capability to supplement its plutonium-based programs. Uranium production may also be designated as a way to fuel Indian submarines.) The Khusab facility, like that at Kahuta, will not be subject to IAEA inspections. With the Khusab and Kahuta facilities, the fuel-reprocessing facility at Chasma, and a pilot-scale plant at Rawalpindi, Pakistan will have substantial access to bomb-grade plutonium. Three of Pakistan's nuclear reactors (the KANUPP power reactor in Karachi and the PARR I and PARR II research reactors near Islamabad) are covered by IAEA safeguards; the Chasma power plant will be covered as well.

Potential Flashpoints

Threats of Another War in Kashmir

More than 350,000 Indian soldiers are deployed throughout Kashmir, a portion of them occupying the Indian side of the Siachen Glacier in the far northeastern region of Kashmir in the eastern Karakoram Mountains. Their Pakistani counterparts are dug in seven miles away on the Baltoro Glacier. At nearly 18,000 feet above sea level, howitzer shells are lobbed back and forth, out of sight and hearing of the rest of the world. Popular interest in this decades-old stalemate seems as thin as the atmosphere, yet scores of deaths a week (most resulting from harsh conditions) are attributed to the continuing conflict.

The Kashmir crisis has compelled both governments to expend enormous sums to support the deployment of forces in this region. The costs to both India and Pakistan of the Siachen Glacier deployment alone are estimated at more than $1 million a day, amounting to more than $5 billion since the sporadic fighting on the glacier began in 1984.

The Kashmir dispute embodies Indo-Pakistani antagonism. The positions are clear-cut: India insists on maintaining the status quo, while Pakistan refuses to accept Indian jurisdiction and control. Initially, one could have described this dispute as a battle between Indian insistence on a secular approach and Pakistani guardianship of Muslim rights. However, Hindu-Muslim religious rivalry and the debates surrounding the original partition of India have ceased to be the focal point of this dispute. Over time, the ability of competing politicians in both countries to exploit this issue for political gain has eclipsed the secular-religious debate.
Since 1990, the Kashmir insurgency, concentrated in the Muslim-majority state of Jammu and Kashmir, has gained momentum. In the mid-1990s, it is not only the most serious flashpoint in the region but also among the most likely accelerants for a nuclear crisis anywhere on the globe. Thus, an internally driven crisis has evolved into a regional security threat that also provides a political rallying point, particularly among nationalist groups who favor a more overt program of nuclear weapons acquisition.

Kashmir’s demographics illustrate the complexity of the issue. The territory can be divided into three regions—Jammu, the Kashmir Valley, and Ladakh—each of which is dominated by a different ethnic group. Jammu is inhabited mainly by a Hindu majority, the Kashmir Valley is settled by a Muslim majority, and a Buddhist majority resides in Ladakh. While there is an identifiable Kashmiri ethnicity, the three groups are ethnically distinct, complicating any notion of “Kashmiri nationalism.” The implications of these divisions have to be acknowledged whenever the call arises for an independent Kashmir, determined by plebiscite and with its future tied to neither India nor Pakistan.

The concept of partition is anathema to Indians. Kashmir’s symbolism to India is as critical a consideration as any security significance associated with this fragment of ice and rock threaded by a beautiful valley. India is unwilling to lose even one additional hectare of this land. New Delhi is also concerned that Kashmiri autonomy would set a precedent for breakaway movements in other Indian states (e.g., Punjab or Assam). To Pakistan, Kashmir is symbolic of its national ethos and commitment to protect Muslim interests against Indian encroachment. It believes that the creation of a separate, strongly sectarian nation is incomplete without contiguous Kashmir. Kashmir, in brief, symbolizes the enmity that Hindus and Muslims harbor for one another. Ironically, the fact that India and Pakistan are de facto nuclear powers may help to dampen the fire underlying this issue because a fourth Indo-Pakistani war could entail a nuclear exchange.

The most likely scenario for conflict between India and Pakistan would stem from the continuing unrest in Kashmir. It is difficult to imagine how India and Pakistan could settle this dispute in a mutually satisfactory manner. India’s position is clear and transcends political debate. Any arrangement that cedes portions of the state of Jammu and Kashmir (the only majority Muslim state in India) to Pakistan is not acceptable. Pakistan, on the other hand, insists on the right to protect Muslims living in Kashmir; consequently, its support for Kashmiri militants continues.

Pakistan suspects that India could inflame the Kashmir dispute as a diversion to launch an attack on Pakistan. It further fears that such an attack would focus on the destruction of Pakistan’s nuclear infrastructure, much of which is located within striking distance of the Indo-Pakistani border. Indian determination to retard Pakistan’s nuclear weapons program has infected the Kashmir issue to the extent that many Pakistani security experts assume that an Indian preemptive attack on Pakistan’s nuclear facilities is plausible, despite an agreement between the two nations not to attack each other’s nuclear plants. Furthermore, India will not acquiesce in Pakistan’s support for the Kashmiri insurgency; therefore, New Delhi is likely to continue supporting Indian deployments in Jammu and Kashmir. Because Pakistan will not be able to match Indian conventional strength, it is possible that should Indian forces be positioned along Pakistan’s border in what appears to be a threatening manner, Islamabad could use the nuclear card, threatening to remove its nuclear weapons from storage areas and relocate them with battlefield units.

**Nuclear Escalation and Competition**

The uneasy balance of nuclear capabilities and ballistic missiles in South Asia is not sustainable over the long term. The accelerated research-and-development programs for ballistic missiles endanger this equation. In a crisis, deterrence could break down and missiles armed with nuclear weapons might be deployed or used, perhaps even for preemptive purposes.
The general assumption is that Pakistan could probably deploy several nuclear weapons, while India's force is substantially larger, estimated at twenty-five to fifty weapons. For both countries, the nuclear inventory (assuming the availability of delivery systems) would consist of gravity bombs and ballistic missile warheads.

A prominent goal of India's approach to dealing with Pakistan has been to block or at least delay the weaponization of Pakistan's nuclear program. However, New Delhi's refusal to sign the CTBT may embolden forces in Pakistan which have argued for an open nuclear weapons stance as the only hedge against Indian conventional superiority. Further, the Indian refusal to sign the CTBT could initiate a new round of recriminations by both India and Pakistan, focusing on the inability of the nuclear powers to initiate dramatic reductions in the size of their nuclear arsenals.

In the late 1990s, New Delhi could accelerate development of the extended-range version of the Prithvi missile and the medium-range Agni missile. Such a move would signal India's breakthrough from its restrained stance on long-range missile development and its focus on the Pakistani threat toward a more concentrated effort aimed at China. Similarly, Pakistan may increase development efforts on the Haf, which has experienced technical problems and long delays in development.

Until the mid-1990s, China has been a more distant nuclear concern for Indian planners. While China could strike critical parts of India with its intermediate-range ballistic missiles, India would require a missile with a range of at least 2000 miles to target China's heartland, and even then reaching Beijing from the Sino-Indian border would be difficult without extending the Agni's range. In 1996, it appears that while India remains very concerned about the pace of Pakistan's nuclear program, China is likely to grow in importance as a focus both for nuclear planning and longer-term threat assessments.

Indian military leaders are aware of Pakistan's conventional inferiority and its tendency to rattle the nuclear saber. Consequently, New Delhi could come under pressure to authorize preemptive strikes on Pakistan's nuclear facilities in a crisis in order to prevent a Pakistani nuclear response to an Indian conventional attack. Analysts generally agree that the Indian military has virtually no role in India's nuclear weapons program (unlike in Pakistan, where the program is controlled almost exclusively by the military). Thus, it is difficult to know how Indian military expertise would be brought to bear in planning for the use of atomic arms, including targeting.
Having been soundly defeated in 1971, Pakistan is unlikely to withhold the nuclear option if it appears that India is prepared to use military force on a massive scale. Little is known about the nuclear doctrine of India or Pakistan, although discussions with Indian and Pakistani planners suggest that there have been few of the simulation or gaming exercises that dominate U.S. and European nuclear contingency planning. Additionally, command-and-control systems to manage nuclear forces are essentially nonexistent. These factors, combined with the primitive state of the Pakistani arsenal, suggest that any Pakistani nuclear response could be haphazard and ill managed.

Two aspects of Indo-Pakistani nuclear competition are most concerning. First, neither country has a second-strike capability, and therefore an important element of stability (which was an important crisis-management tool in U.S.-Soviet nuclear competition) is absent. Additionally, both lack the national technical means (NTM) of verifying through intelligence assets, whether the other side is preparing to launch or, even possibly whether a launch has occurred. As noted below, the U.S. may be of assistance in this area.

Four possible outcomes for the nuclear programs are:

- **Rollback.** Prospects for this outcome are virtually nil. India and Pakistan have determined that their national security requirements are well served by at least the potential of a nuclear deterrent. Pakistan has been prepared to risk alienation from a major security benefactor, the U.S., by quietly pursuing the nuclear option despite U.S. legislation and sanctions. The Indian nuclear program is even more entrenched and in certain areas more advanced technically than that of Pakistan. Further, India’s state of nuclear development is indigenously supported and not as subject to pressure from outside powers, making rollback even less probable. Indian and Pakistani determination to pursue a nuclear deterrent transcends partisan politics in both countries and is an important element of public and political faith. A continued focus on achieving rollback through pressure from the United States or other external powers may well contribute to growing pressure for the worst outcome: declaration and escalation.

- **Declaration and Escalation.** This scenario, the most alarming of the four, could place South Asian security at the mercy of a hair trigger, with the temptation for both countries to decide upon a first strike in a crisis. India and Pakistan may be moving in this direction. Should both nations abandon ambiguity and restraint and declare themselves to be nuclear weapons states, monitoring their nuclear programs would be precluded, even in the unlikely event they were admitted to the NPT as weapons states (nuclear weapons states are effectively protected from scrutiny under the NPT). Missile deployments on the Indo-Pakistani border would heighten escalatory pressure on both sides.

- **Status Quo, No Regime.** This approach has worked effectively for both states. Neither country has felt obliged to undertake a massive nuclear program or to move from possessing a nuclear capability to fully developing or deploying nuclear weapons and the missiles that could deliver them. However, this mutual self-restraint is unlikely to be sustained indefinitely, as each country reacts to the perceived progress of its neighbor. Both might feel compelled to continue research and development as a hedge against conventional failure in a crisis, or as a means of keeping up with other nations. Internal political pressures also could move India and Pakistan to a declared nuclear status and the actual deployment of missiles.

- **Regional Deterrence and Reassurance.** A new long-term approach could enhance stability on the subcontinent and eventually lead to mutual agreement that nuclear capability is no longer necessary. Compliance and confidence-building measures that pursue longer-term non-proliferation through quiet dialogue could prove more effective than formalized treaties. Formal treaties or a U.N. Security Council action guaranteeing protection for Pakistan and India against external attack are out of the question. However, informal reassurances like those reached among the United States, Russia, and Ukraine—which led to
Ukraine’s denuclearization—could serve as a precedent. A key step towards reassurance would be cautious sharing of intelligence data, which the U.S. could broker. This could be quite valuable in refuting alarming, inaccurate reports and ultimately help minimize Indian and Pakistani misapprehensions about transparency. Timely, quiet intelligence sharing during the Indo-Pakistani crises in 1987 and 1990 helped dispel alarming reports that were agitating both sides and helped avoid escalation into conflict.

**Terrorism: A Proxy War?**

At least five major terrorist groups incite secessionist violence on the subcontinent. India blames Pakistan for training and equipping Kashmiri terrorists who have been tied to the bombings of numerous government buildings and the assassination of prominent Hindus. Pakistan realizes that waging a proxy war by supporting Indian Kashmir’s struggle for self-determination is cheaper and safer than directly attacking India. This meddling, however, has incited militant Hindu groups and defense hardliners in India to call for military measures to halt Pakistani assistance to separatist movements within India.

Pakistan’s support for separatist groups in India may simply be seen as an opportunity by Islamabad, to intervene in regions and situations where Pakistan may wield influence—Islamabad’s initial support for the Taliban insurgency in Afghanistan was such a case. Pakistan also recognizes that its status as a leading Muslim nation does not guarantee influence everywhere. Among the new and predominantly Muslim nations of Central Asia, Pakistan’s influence is limited compared with that of Iran, Saudi Arabia, and Turkey. In Kashmir, by contrast, Pakistan is a force to be reckoned with. In India’s eyes, fighting Kashmiri terrorists is tantamount to fighting proxy Pakistanis. Torture by Indian troops and police—and by Pakistani terrorists in the region—is commonplace and often unreported.

**U.S. Interests and Approach**

**Net Assessment**

The principal security problem in South Asia remains a seemingly intractable rivalry between the region’s major powers, India and Pakistan. The Kashmir dispute, simmering competition over nuclear weapons and ballistic missile delivery systems, Hindu-Muslim rivalry and the legacy of the 1947 partition creating Pakistan, all combine to yield one of the most dangerous potential flashpoints on the globe. Further, as this chapter has noted, the internal political climate in both countries and a shift in political, demographic, and economic trends, combine to exacerbate the bilateral tensions, adding to the insecurity of both states. Finally, the relatively weak domestic political position of the governments in New Delhi and Islamabad have tended to prevent the leaders in both countries from pursuing negotiations or even from engaging in a continuing dialogue to reduce tensions. Despite more than 25 years of peace, the prospects are for continuing tension which could result in a fourth Indo-Pakistani conflict.

**U.S. Interests**

**Prevention of an Indo-Pakistani War, Especially a Nuclear War**

The primary U.S. interest in South Asia is to maintain the state of relative peace between India and Pakistan. A succession of governments in Washington have defined this to mean a limited U.S. role in the region, since direct U.S. intervention on one side or another could tip the perceived balance between them.

Although the United States must remain concerned about the continuing rivalry between India and Pakistan, and the regional security implications of a deterioration in that bilateral relationship, the U.S. does not have identifiably vital interests to protect in South Asia. While another conflict on the subcontinent would be a regionally dangerous event, the con-
conflict itself would not directly affect vital U.S. national interests. That strategic reality has understandably limited the willingness of American administrations to become deeply involved in negotiations over disputes between India and Pakistan. Additionally, the absence of war for more than two decades between these two nations has tended to reassure U.S. policymakers that outright conflict in the region is unlikely.

Prevention of an Indo-Chinese War

The U.S. has an interest in preventing a conflict on the subcontinent that escalates beyond India and Pakistan. Preventing China from becoming involved in an Indo-Pakistani war would be paramount, particularly concerning the recent history of Chinese military assistance to Pakistan, which has created some tension with India. Indian memories of the humiliating defeat by the Chinese in 1962 are still fresh with much of the Indian military leadership.

U.S. Approach

The U.S. policy of managing the Indo-Pakistani rivalry has dictated an approach toward the two protagonists of relative even-handedness, particularly on matters that are strategically sensitive, such as military and economic assistance. To be sure, neither India nor Pakistan interprets the history of U.S. policy in the region as balanced. The continuing suspicion in both capitals of a U.S. tilt in one direction or another, and the asymmetries that characterize the differences between India and Pakistan will remain a feature of the political landscape for the foreseeable future.

The result of the U.S. approach to the subcontinent has been to effect a rough balance of power between India and Pakistan, thereby preventing a fourth Indo-Pakistani war. Renewed Indo-Pakistani conflict would upset that balance and risk the use of nuclear weapons. While it is widely assumed that U.S. forces would be deployed to forestall a nuclear crisis in other regions of the world (e.g., the Middle East, Persian Gulf, or Northeast Asia), it is doubtful whether such forces would be brought to bear in South Asia.

The possibility of any commitment of U.S. military forces to the subcontinent is remote at best. The United States has no regionally based network or infrastructure to support such an operation. U.S. air forces could be introduced from distant bases, including Diego Garcia, Guam, or the continental United States. In addition, U.S. naval assets in the northern Arabian Sea and Indian Ocean, as well as Marine expeditionary forces, might be deployed as an indication of U.S. willingness to protect any of its citizens caught in the fighting. The availability of a U.S. carrier could be problematic, depending on the aircraft carrier battle group rotation schedule and the reduction in the global carrier force.

In any situation that involved the use or threatened use of nuclear weapons, the U.S. would almost certainly find it essential to support the side showing greater nuclear restraint. Should Pakistan determine that India would be willing to launch a preemptive strike at Pakistan's nuclear weapons storage sites or assembly areas, Islamabad could determine that it faces a "use or lose" situation. Should such steps become known to Russian and Chinese intelligence (it is unlikely that either India or Pakistan would detect early the other's preparations), the cost of U.S. intervention would rise sharply, particularly if Moscow or Beijing felt obliged to transmit the information to the two belligerents. Offsets (e.g., security assurances to both parties or offers to enhance the security of nuclear weapons) would then have to be made with lightning speed. Overall, the likelihood that U.S. military forces would be deployed on the subcontinent is remote.

In attempting to recalibrate its relations with Pakistan and India, the Clinton administration paid attention to how India and Pakistan reacted to U.S. overtures to one nation versus the other. The simultaneous establishment of bilateral working groups on defense-related issues, chaired at the assistant-secretary level on the U.S. side and at the under-secretary level on the Indian and Pakistani sides, has calmed some regional security concerns, but both Islamabad and New Delhi can be expected to closely monitor the relative progress of these groups. Despite the best efforts of
any U.S. administration, it will be difficult to break out of the zero-sum game of South Asian security.

Pakistan: Is There a Basis for U.S. Security Ties?

The dominant post-Cold War U.S. approach to India and Pakistan is benign neglect. The long-standing rivalry, along with much of the tension in Pakistan, stems chiefly from the marked asymmetry between the economies, populations, size, and military forces of the two countries. Pakistan is, quite simply, dwarfed by India. Islamabad’s reactions to Indian provocations, and India’s response to those of Pakistan, spring from this reality. The relative inferiority of Pakistan affects U.S. relations with both nations, as illustrated by Pakistan’s concern that New Delhi’s efforts to improve its relationship with Washington will automatically eclipse any initiatives taken by Pakistan.

Pakistan’s efforts to achieve a long-term security relationship with the U.S. have never been natural or comfortable for either country. There are no historical, cultural, or linguistic affinities between the two nations. The retreat of Soviet forces from Southwest Asia ended any lingering Pakistani hopes of a long-term U.S. presence and commitment and served as a reminder that Pakistan could never move beyond the status of ally of convenience.

President George Bush’s October 1990 decision to refuse to certify that Pakistan was not producing a nuclear weapon completed the devaluation of Pakistan as a U.S. ally. This refusal to certify forced Islamabad to make critical choices regarding the pace of its nuclear weapons program, taking into account internal pressures to move ahead. At the same time, Washington began to listen more attentively to requests from India for the transfer of high technology, and the U.S. Congress defeated a move to apply the Pressler sanctions to India’s nuclear program. Many who voted against extending Pressler sanctions to India accepted Indian claims that its 1974 nuclear test was indeed, as had been advertised by the government, a peaceful nuclear explosion. For many Pakistanis, Washington’s actions confirmed that the U.S. tilt toward Pakistan had ended. While the Brown amendment has removed some of the sting created by the Pressler sanctions, the political effect of that legislation will be a long-term irritant in the bilateral relationship.

India: Relations Improve

U.S.-Indian relations have warmed considerably since 1992. Such a development is beneficial to the U.S. goals in the Pacific region because it works with this ascending South Asian power rather than against it, which may facilitate a bilateral entente that could prove useful in countering perceived Chinese hegemony within the greater Asian region. Reductions in U.S. military forces and deployment may increase the desire for enhanced participation by some regional allies in regional security.

The global power status to which India aspires is more a function of economic and technological prowess and political hubris than one of conventional military strength. The United States applauds India’s privatization efforts. Increased economic strength will enhance India’s political voice—assuming its parliament can channel the din of a billion voices into focused national, regional, and global approaches. With respect to Indo-U.S. cooperative defense initiatives, free-market economics will stimulate increased technology transfers. Command-and-control and communications compatibility to enhance joint and combined exercise participation, for example, would be a key first step, with further shared technology leading to a closer defense relationship.

In the final analysis, U.S. policy options in South Asia will be significantly constrained by the reality of Indo-Pakistani rivalry, which shows no signs of abating anytime soon.
Even in the depths of the Cold War, the United States and the Soviet Union held one interest in common: nonproliferation of nuclear, biological, and chemical weapons. As the Cold War came to an end, however, second and third tier states such as Iraq tested their ability to acquire nuclear, chemical, and biological weapons and missiles to deliver them (NBC/M). The former Soviet Union, once the chief U.S. partner in developing measures to reduce the proliferation of NBC/M, is now a troubling potential source for leakage of NBC/M capabilities. A new black market may be further enabling states to circumvent existing measures to stem proliferation. More than at any other time, states appear to be pursuing NBC/M capabilities, and their incentives to do so are a powerful combination of political, military and economic objectives—making efforts to dissuade and deter acquisition of NBC/M through traditional means ever less effective. Thus it is that the United States is confronted with the likelihood that future regional contingencies will take place in an NBC environment. While this promises to make the next five to ten years a dangerous time, this period may also offer a unique opportunity to turn the tide of this proliferation to make the threatened use of NBC less attractive.

**Background and Trends**

**Why Escalating Proliferation Despite Renewed Norms?**

**Political Incentives to Proliferate**

In the post-World War II era, the United States has maintained a fairly constant set of regional commitments. These commitments were established based on its perceived interests in these regions as well as the anticipated costs of defending those interests. U.S. interests in the Persian Gulf and Far East have been relatively well defined, even within the scope of the Cold War confrontation with the Soviet Union. Even in that context, certain regional states sought tools they hoped would change the regional status quo. With the power vacuum resulting from the end of the Cold War balance of power, these states have
increasingly sought to redefine their power relationship vis-à-vis not only their regional neighbors but also the United States—the sole remaining superpower.

The value of NBC/M as a tool for rogue regimes to attain their political goals will remain so long as these weapons are perceived as valuable tools for coercion, and as long as regional states and their allies, including the United States, remain vulnerable. By changing the potential costs associated with defending U.S. interests in these regions, these states appear to have sought to alter the U.S. calculation of interests, to deter U.S. intervention, to seek to break up U.S. coalitions, and perhaps to obtain U.S. renunciation—though conflict or negotiations under threat of conflict—of its defined role in the region.

Potential NBC/M-armed opponents may also see the threat of use of NBC/M against U.S. coalition partners or allies as a powerful tool in undermining U.S. options for coalition warfare or in seeking through NBC/M coercion to undermine U.S. basing or other support for operations in a foreign theater.

Military Incentives for Proliferation

Unlike the U.S. attitude toward biological weapons, potential adversaries see NBC as a valuable military tool. Each type of weapon has its own effects, but generally the military utility of NBC/M is twofold: changing the conduct of the war through the threat of use; and changing the conduct of the war through actual use.

In the face of a credible threat of use of NBC/M, the United States and its coalition partners must make operational changes which may degrade, but certainly will alter, the preferred mode of operations, i.e., the way the U.S. would conduct operations against an enemy armed only with conventional weapons. States pursuing NBC/M are likely to understand this and seek to use the threat of these weapons to make U.S. operations more difficult and more costly. An example of the military utility of the threat of use of NBC/M is the substantial resources the United States made during Desert Storm in searching for missiles. States thus may value mobile missiles not only for their threat value, but also for their contribution to drawing U.S. forces away from other targets.

During the Cold War, the United States and the Soviet Union appear to have agreed that the deterrent value of nuclear forces was primary. Rogue regimes pursuing NBC/M, while recognizing the potential deterrent value of NBC/M, may also see them as valuable warfighting tools. This may be particularly true if they want to oppose the United States. These regimes may see these weapons as a means of balancing the United States' overwhelming conventional superiority and, through raising casualties dramatically, of undermining the U.S. will to fight.

It is thus possible that in the next regional conflict, NBC/M will be used in war in a battlefield mode. If this is true, it is as likely that they will be used early in the conflict as that they would all be held in strategic reserve. Virtually every stage of U.S. operations is made more complicated by the requirement to operate after the use of NBC/M, beginning with deploying through vulnerable ports and staging facilities. Far from being weapons of last resort, NBC/M may be a weapon of choice for rogue regimes. States are unlikely voluntarily to yield weapons that offer them a force multiplier and means to balance U.S. conventional superiority.

The military incentives to proliferate exist because states currently perceive vulnerabilities to the use of NBC/M that make them worth the financial and political investment in their acquisition and the risk of the consequences of their use. The task for the United States is to deny a potential enemy the benefits it might seek through employment of NBC and increase the risks and costs associated with use.

Economic Incentives to Proliferate

In addition to the political and military value states appear to attribute to NBC/M, regimes apparently are increasingly viewing the development and possession of NBC/M as providing near and long-term economic benefits. States may seek to produce NBC/M and sell these production capabilities or systems for cap-
Strategic Nuclear Launchers

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Note: The FSU launchers include 44 bombers in Ukraine. The rest are in Russia.

Ital or barter for other weaponry. Indigenous production also enables states to avoid the consequences of export controls. Some states, including Iran and India, have touted the spin-off benefits associated with indigenous production of higher technology capabilities. Finally, some states may see production of NBC as a means of extracting money from the western nations. North Korea, for example, has used its NBC/M potential to extract financial infusions from outside sources including the United States and Japan.

Current NBC/M Trends

Nuclear Proliferation—A Mixed Record

Nuclear proliferation clearly receives the greatest attention internationally. Some cite the indefinite extension of the Nonproliferation Treaty (NPT) and the signing by many states of a Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty (CTBT) as indicative of a renewal of the international norms against nuclear proliferation. Further evidence of a positive trend against proliferation includes Brazil and Argentina signing the Treaty of Tlatilco, which mandates a nuclear-weapons-free zone in Latin America; Ukraine, Kazakhstan, and Belarus joining the NPT as non-nuclear weapon states; and South Africa’s announcement that it had eliminated its nuclear weapons and its nuclear weapons program.

The other side of the ledger, however, is disturbing. Countries with hostile intentions toward the United States, including Iran, are pursuing nuclear weapons capabilities. Many other states, currently not hostile to the United States, have the technical potential to develop nuclear weapons.

The perceived value of these weapons is reflected in the often cited statement attributed to former Indian Army Chief of Staff Sunderji: one principal lesson of the Gulf War is that, if a state intends to fight the United States, it should avoid doing so until and unless it possesses nuclear weapons.

Presumably, in the eyes of proliferators, nuclear weapons would serve to coerce and deter the United States from responding to aggression such as Iraq initiated against Kuwait or, at a minimum, would complicate coalition building within and outside the region. North Korea must also perceive enormous value in possessing nuclear weapons, perhaps by threatening Japan in order to deny the United States access or by actually using nuclear weapons against targets such as key ports and airfields in the south. The potential political and therefore military impact of the use of even one nuclear weapon is of such magnitude as to require careful consideration in devising possible responses and defenses.

Biological Weapons—the New Weapon of Choice?

Although often treated as less threatening than nuclear weapons, increased attention is now being given to the biological threat. Many of the Cold War assumptions about the strategic and tactical utility of biological weapons (BW) no longer appear valid. In fact, given the diffusion of the dual-use technologies involved, the pursuit of BW is now recognized as a relatively cheap and easily available path to acquire a weapon of mass destruction—the poor man’s atomic bomb. The absence of unambiguous signatures for BW facilities, reducing their vulnerability to attack, only adds to the attractiveness of biological weapons for rogue regimes. Finally, such regimes can hope that the United States and any possible coalition partners would be deterred from attacking a biological or potentially biological weapons facility due to concerns regarding collateral damage.

It is possible for BW agents to inflict massive casualties against soft targets such as cities to an extent that rival’s megaton nuclear weapons. Further, because only small quantities of these highly lethal agents are needed to achieve significant effects, an aggressor can choose between multiple delivery modes and attack options. Moreover, as the number of states engaged in BW research has grown, the sophistication of their work has also grown, leading to technical advances (e.g., microencapsulation to
produce more stable agents for use over longer periods) that may permit biological agents and toxins to be used in a more controlled fashion to advance military goals. In fact, while BW can be a weapon of mass destruction, BW can also be used in a more discriminate fashion, for example, against troops and such assets as ships and naval task forces. BW use on the battlefield and against such critical targets as airfields—once considered unlikely because of the delay before some biological agents work and their susceptibility to meteorological and prophylactic factors—may well become a significant threat in the future.

The inability to detect BW at a distance, and therefore to defend effectively against BW attack, further compounds the challenge. While gas masks can be effective against most agents with warning, and while progress has been made in such areas as vaccine research, current defenses cannot reliably protect U.S. forces or civilians. Even planned improvements will only reduce the scope of the problem, not eliminate it. Moreover, the United States has only begun the process of developing strategic and policy responses to the BW threat.

The psychological and strategic impact of the threat or use of biological weapons cannot be itemized, but will likely be extremely significant. Their invisibility combined with the particularly unattractive symptoms highlights their potential impact. Potential allies would need to give grave consideration to supporting the United States in any endeavor that might place their civilian population at risk of BW use. This is particularly true should the U.S. not be able to offer some assistance to defend against the agents.

Chemical Weapons—the Threat Remains

Chemical weapons are currently possessed by more states than either biological or nuclear weapons, and are the only one of the three to be used in the post-World-War-II era. There are significant differences between chemical weapons (CW) on the one hand and BW and nuclear weapons on the other. For example, the lethality of CW is substantially less; a considerably greater quantity of chemical agent is needed to inflict a given level of casualties than for either BW or nuclear weapons. Likewise, significant differences exist in the feasibility of defenses. Although exceptions exist (such as chemical agents developed by the former Soviet Union capable of penetrating gas masks), it is possible to provide high-quality CW defenses, even for civilian populations, at relatively low cost, should the will to do so exist.

Because of these differences, some experts tend to minimize the potential consequences of CW use, arguing that CW does not merit consideration as a weapon of mass destruction. In fact, analysis suggests that CW use against U.S. and allied forces and critical infrastructure facilities can have a major impact on the outcome of a major regional conflict. Even with early warning, well-equipped and trained forces are likely to take some losses from CW attacks. Such use—or even the threat of use—will have a dramatic effect on performance, particularly if use is prolonged. Finally, the introduction of CW in a conflict will most likely have profound political consequences which will, in turn, have a direct impact on the operation and outcome of the war, raising issues from war aims to the possible use of nuclear weapons in response.

Ballistic and Cruise Missiles—Extending the Threat Ever Further

The majority of NBC proliferators appear to view missiles, and specifically ballistic missiles, as the delivery system of choice. More than a dozen of these countries have operational ballistic missile programs. Although the ballistic missiles in the arsenals of these proliferators today are, for the most part, limited in range to about 600 kilometers, missiles capable of much longer ranges are being aggressively pursued. For example, Iraq, on its own, was able to increase significantly the range of its Soviet-supplied Scuds. North Korea is actively exporting longer range Scuds, has flight tested the 1,000-plus kilometer No Dong, and has under development a 3,500-plus kilometer missile, the Taepo Dong II. Potential buyers for these Korean missiles are numerous. Similarly, as cruise
missile technology becomes widely available (e.g., with the availability of global positioning system technology), cruise missiles will almost certainly become more attractive, offering a low cost but highly effective means of NBC delivery.

At the same time, regional states are more likely than the United States to be creative in designing delivery modes for NBC weapons. Novel delivery modes, if not openly tested, provide a lower confidence in the effect of weapons, but also present the United States with detection and defense challenges.

**Potential Flashpoints**

Some states have given up their NBC/M capabilities in recent years, but in virtually every case this has been the result of regime democratization. Regime change or other circumstances could lead states to a position in which they conclude, perhaps for a second time, that possession of NBC/M capabilities is in their interest. Given the difficulties associated with proving that a state possesses such capabilities, states could enjoy a significant lead time in perfecting and expanding its capabilities. The following addresses some of the countries currently engaged in proliferation and demonstrates the extent of the problems facing the U.S.

**North Korea**

The military balance on the Korean peninsula was fairly stable until the North began actively pursuing its offensive NBC and ballistic missile capability. With these programs, it has sought to extract diplomatic advantage from the U.S., as well as to threaten U.S. forces and allies throughout the region. At the center of this threat is North Korea's aggressive ballistic missile program. North Korea reverse-engineered the 300 kilometer Scud B missile and developed the 500 kilometer range Scud C missile. The No Dong, which reportedly is being funded by Iran and Libya, will have a 1,000-1,300 kilometer range. This missile, flight tested in 1993, would allow North Korea to put at risk all
U.S. forces in South Korea and most of Japan. According to CIA Director John Deutch, the No Dong is expected to be deployed by the end of 1996.

In addition, Pyongyang is also developing the Taepo Dong I and II. The CIA Nonproliferation Center’s March 1995 report indicated that the Taepo Dong I and II will have ranges of several thousand kilometers. Other estimates of the Taepo Dong II’s range are even larger. With a 4,000 kilometer range capability, North Korea can target Hawaii and all of Alaska. With a 6,000 kilometer range, it could threaten Seattle, San Francisco, and Los Angeles. Until 1996, the CIA position was that the Taepo Dong I and II missiles could be deployable in 1999-2001. However, the missile development programs failed to achieve the milestones needed to meet that schedule, and the intelligence community currently estimates slower progress.

North Korea has become a key supplier to other rogue states that have not yet perfected their indigenous ballistic missile production capabilities. North Korea has sold Scuds to Iran and Libya. North Korea has also assisted Iraq and Syria with their missile programs and may be helping other rogue states such as Libya.

North Korea has a chemical weapons (CW) program that, according to the CIA, includes mustard and blister agents. Since the 1960s, it also has had a biological weapons program which, according to the 1996 Secretary of Defense report on the proliferation threat, gives it the capability to produce infectious biological warfare agents and biological weapons. Estimates that North Korea had extracted sufficient fissile material from its illicit nuclear program to manufacture one to two weapons in recent years, mean that North Korea may have the capability to threaten or actually attack U.S. forces or allies with nuclear weapons or with radiological weapons which spread radioactive material.

Iran

Iran possesses an impressive arsenal of ballistic missiles and understands the great political and military utility of these weapons—particularly if their enemy is undefended. The CSS–8, provided by China, has a 150 kilometer range. The 300 kilometer Scud B missile, sold to Iran by North Korea, gives Tehran the ability to threaten U.S. forces in the Gulf. The 500 kilometer Scud C, also acquired from North Korea, puts key oil installations and ports under threat of attack. If armed with nuclear, chemical or biological weapons, these missiles, despite their inaccuracy, could present a major threat to U.S. and coalition forces in the area. According to the CIA, Iran is seeking to supplement its existing ballistic missile inventories with the purchase from North Korea of the 1,000–1,500 kilometer No Dong. Iran is also, with North Korean and Chinese help, seeking to develop and produce its own ballistic missiles with the objective of producing a medium range ballistic missile to threaten targets to a distance of 3,000 kilometers.

The CIA Nonproliferation Center’s (NPC) March 1995 report on the proliferation threat states, “Iran is aggressively pursuing a nuclear weapons capability and, if significant foreign assistance were provided, could produce a weapon by the end of the decade. Tehran is devoting significant resources to its nuclear program.”

Iran has had a biological weapons program since the 1980s. While the NPC assessment places this program in the research and development phase, the U.S. Arms Control and Disarmament Agency in 1996 concluded that Iran “probably has produced biological warfare agents and apparently has weaponized a small quantity of those agents.”

Iran, itself a victim and user of chemical weapons in its war with Iraq, has made sure that it also has the ability to produce and use chemical weapons. Iran produces a variety of chemical agents, including blister, blood, and choking agents. It has cumulatively produced, at a minimum, several hundred tons of agents to support ground operations and against targets such as ports, airfields, and oil installations throughout the Gulf.
Iraq

Iraq’s NBC and missile programs suffered a major setback from its defeat in Desert Storm, with many key facilities heavily damaged or destroyed by U.S. forces and others rendered inoperable through continuous intrusive inspections. Nevertheless, Rolf Ekeus, the director of the UNSCOM UN inspection program, reports that stockpiles of chemical and biological weapons materials remain unaccounted for. Furthermore, he reports that Iraq retains the knowledge and equipment necessary to quickly resume its large scale programs were the inspectors to end their activities.

Iraq may still retain several dozen of the over 800 Scud missiles it bought from the former Soviet Union. Iraq has also saved critical missile production machinery and rebuilt facilities that could be used for Scud-type production. The December 1995 interception of 100 sets of advanced guidance equipment for ballistic missiles on their way to Iraq indicates that Baghdad has not given up its offensive missile program. In fact, it appears determined to improve that capability. While UN sanctions prohibit Iraq from producing ballistic missiles with ranges greater than 150 kilometers, Iraq has been able to focus its missile production efforts on those programs that are permitted within the UN guidelines but which offer the greatest opportunity for range extension.

Baghdad has retained a significant amount of chemical weapons production equipment, which is monitored by UNSCOM. Some chemical weapons production could be resumed in weeks if inspections ceased. Iraq’s offensive biological program, which produced thousands of gallons of anthrax bacteria and botulism toxin, is of the greatest concern. Production could begin at any time, were inspections to end.

After years of denying that it had a BW program, Iraq reversed itself in 1995, subsequent to the defection of Saddam’s son-in-law Hussein Kamal, who had been in charge of special weapons programs. Iraq revealed to the UN that in the year before the January 1991 start of Desert Storm, a total of 11,800 liters of concentrated botulinum toxin and 8,575 liters of anthrax were produced at Al Hakam, Daura Foot and Mouth Disease Institute, and Salman Pak. Large scale weaponization of BW agents began in December 1990. Iraq filled more than 150 bombs and 50 warheads with agent. All these weapons were dispersed to forward storage locations but then were not used during the war.

Iraq also retains the expertise and technological base to resume its uranium enrichment program, including machine tools and centrifuge designs. Even though Baghdad’s nuclear program has been disrupted, its continued deception and evasion on all related issues indicates an intention to resume the quest for nuclear weapons once freed from international sanctions.

Libya

Libya has demonstrated an almost obsessive desire to possess ballistic missiles and chemical weapons. At least in the case of ballistic missiles and chemical weapons, which it has acquired, it has also demonstrated a willingness to use these capabilities. In 1986 Libya fired two Scud-B missiles at a U.S. facility on the Italian island of Lampedusa. Libya is also one of the few nations to have employed chemical weapons in the last decade, having dropped chemical agents from an aircraft against Chadian troops in 1987.

Libya possesses the short range SS-21 and the 300 kilometer Scud B. In addition, Libya is reportedly trying to acquire the 500 kilometer Scud C and is continuing to work on developing its indigenous Al Fatah missile, whose range is variously estimated at between 200 and 950 kilometers. Of greater concern than its indigenous program, however, is the prospect of a Libyan purchase of No Dong missiles from North Korea.

While the Libyans reportedly obtained their chemical agents from the Iranians, they have not been satisfied with external sources and have sought an indigenous production capability to supplement their external purchases. Following the fire at the Rabta chemical weapons facility, Libya constructed an underground facility at Tarhuna which the U.S. is con-
Nuclear Proliferation 1995

- Declared Nuclear-Weapon States
- Soviet Successor States With Nuclear Weapons on Territory: Belarus, Kazakhstan, and Ukraine have ratified the NPT as non-nuclear weapon states. All are transferring nuclear weapons on territory to Russia.
- Undeclared Nuclear-Weapon States: Israel, Pakistan, and India are believed to be able to deploy one or more nuclear weapons rapidly or to have deployed them already.
- Active/Suspected Nuclear Weapons Programs: North Korea, Iran, and Libya have taken steps in the past several years to acquire nuclear weapons capabilities.

Recent Renunciations: These nations were known or believed to have had active nuclear weapons programs during the 1980's, but renounced such activities by opening all of their nuclear facilities to international inspection and/or by ceasing clandestine research on nuclear arms. Iraq's program was dismantled by UN inspectors after Iraq's defeat in the Gulf War and is under special UN-mandated long-term monitoring.

Abstaining Countries: These industrialized countries have the technological base, but not thus far the desire, to develop nuclear weapons. A number have installations under international inspection that can produce weapons-grade nuclear material.


Confident is to be used for chemical warfare production. CIA Director Deutch has estimated that Libya has 100 tons of mustard and nerve agent. With regard to acquiring biological and nuclear weapons, Libya's efforts have—thus far—been undermined by its own lack of technical infrastructure.

Syria

Syria is a major missile proliferant in the Middle East with a long track record of seeking to obtain weapons of mass destruction and ballistic missiles to deliver them. Syria has deployed FROG-7 and Scud-B surface-to-surface missiles acquired from the Soviet Union shortly after the October 1973 War. In the 1980's, the Soviet Union supplied Syria with the more accurate and longer range SS-21 (120 kilometer). North Korea has reportedly sold Syria 24 Scud-PiPs, an indigenous, more accurate variant of the Scud-B which carries a 700-kg payload to a range of approximately 500 km. Syria reportedly took delivery on 24 missiles and 20 mobile launchers in March 1991, and may have received additional missiles and launchers since then. It appears that China is transferring M9-related components and technology to Syria that
will allow the Syrians to assemble their own missile, which will have
a range of 600 km. Syria is reportedly developing indigenous missile production capabilities with North Korean and Chinese assistance at facilities in Aleppo and Hama.

Syria has complemented its ballistic missile efforts with efforts to obtain chemical and biological munitions to arm them. The Arms Control and Disarmament Agency has reported that it is highly probable that Syria is developing an offensive biological warfare capability. Syria has reportedly developed the capability to produce both mustard gas and nerve agents and to arm its surface-to-surface missiles with chemical warheads.

U.S. Interests and Approach

Net Assessment

The past decade has witnessed some limited proliferation successes. Three states of the former Soviet Union, Argentina, Brazil, and South Africa all appear to have given up their nuclear weapons programs or capabilities. International legal norms regarding proliferation are being reinforced.

Despite these positive steps, however, the evidence indicates that international legal obligations and norms are inadequate to address the proliferation problem. States have apparently assessed that the political, military, and economic incentives to proliferate outweigh any costs perceived in going against these norms.

The NBC/M threat could radically alter the way the United States thinks about and plans for force composition, forward presence, force projection, and the conduct of combat operations. Given the range of U.S. and coalition vulnerabilities, the multitude of potential adversaries, and the many delivery methods available for the employment of NBC, the spectrum of plausible scenarios for the use of NBC is wide and varied. Based on an examination of a series of such scenarios, the NDU Center for Counterproliferation Research (CCP) has concluded:

- The increasing utility of unconventional delivery will require a fundamental reassessment of how the United States defends against the NBC threat.
- The growing prospect of use (or threat of use) early in a conflict will require major changes to U.S. doctrine, force design, planning, and training.
- The expanding capability for long-range delivery will deny the United States a homeland sanctuary, making essential both missile defense and emergency response capabilities.
- The unique challenges NBC weapons pose for coalition warfare will affect the way the United States conducts war.
- Biological weapons will become weapons of choice.
- Deterrence is becoming a two-way street. Traditional deterrence based primarily on punishment and retaliation will become problematic, requiring a strategy of deterrence by denial.

U.S. Interests

Protect Americans from NBC/M attack

The principal U.S. interest regarding proliferation is to protect the U.S. and Americans from NBC/M attack. While there is small prospect in this decade that a proliferant will acquire missiles with which to attack the continental U.S. with NBC weapons, attack by unconventional delivery means, such as terrorism, is possible. Furthermore, U.S. forces abroad are vulnerable.

Preserve Stability in Crucial Regions

Proliferation of NBC/M weapons can undermine stability in regions crucial for the security of the U.S., such as the Persian Gulf or Northeast Asia. The U.S. is particularly interested in ensuring that its allies are not targeted by NBC/M weapons in the hands of rogue regimes.

Interests Not Always Consistent with Counterproliferation

The United States’ efforts to stop and reverse proliferation often come in conflict with other valid U.S. interests, including:

- Diplomatic interests. The U.S. has an interest in maintaining good relations with important states, which may at times engage in behavior that the U.S. judges is not helpful from a counter-proliferation
perspective. For instance, Russia is constructing a nuclear power plant in Iran despite U.S. objections, and Washington has not judged this issue sufficiently important so as to endanger U.S.-Russian relations.

- Commercial interests. The export of U.S. goods and services are sometimes constrained by either U.S. prohibitions on exports of items that could be useful in another state's proliferation or by sanctions or other limitations on trade imposed as a means of enforcing U.S. proliferation policy. For instance, the U.S. trade embargo with Iran, imposed in part because of proliferation concerns, cuts the U.S. out of that potentially lucrative market.
- Arms control interests. U.S. efforts in pursuit of arms control and nonproliferation related agreements have often put constraints on U.S. military programs that might support or be essential for defense against or deterrence of NBC use, as in the case of the ABM Treaty, a Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty (CTBT), and the Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC).

U.S. Approach

Diplomacy and Dissuasion

Since the dawn of the nuclear era, the United States has demonstrated its continuing interest in limiting proliferation. For example, the U.S. has led efforts to eliminate biological weapons since the late 1960s, being a sponsor with the Soviet Union and Britain of the 1972 Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention. In addition to U.S. support of the 1925 Geneva Protocol which bans the use of chemical weapons in war, the U.S. led in developing and implementing export controls to diminish the ease with which states manufacture chemical weapons and led international efforts to negotiate an agreement to ban the possession and production of chemical weapons, the CWC. The United States also led the effort to constrain the export of ballistic and cruise missiles or the capability to manufacture missiles with parallel unilateral constraints under the Missile Technology Control Regime.

Arms control and proliferation agreements have worked with states inclined to act consistent with the rule of law. However, arms control treaties may be perceived by rogue states as a means of cover and concealment for their NBC/M programs. For instance, Iraq was not found to be guilty of any wrongdoing by the IAEA prior to 1991—despite the fact that it was quite close to developing a nuclear weapon.

Besides arms control treaties, other instruments of diplomacy and dissuasion designed to persuade states not to choose the proliferation path have been the establishment of alliances and regional balances of power supported by U.S. security guarantees that enable a state that exists in a dangerous region to forgo NBC/M. For instance, the U.S.-Japan security alliance played an important role in reassuring Japan that it need not develop nuclear weapons, much as NATO did with respect to Germany.

Deterrence

In the event that a rogue regime acquires NBC weapons, deterrence is clearly the first and preferred line of defense. Many of the assumptions on which U.S.-Soviet deterrence was founded may or may not hold with rogue regimes. For example, the United States ascribed a basic and shared rationality to Soviet leaders. However, regional states motivated by messianic anti-western zealots or by regime survival may well act differently. Another difficulty in articulating a regional deterrence strategy is the complexity of the potential uses of these weapons, especially biological weapons; for instance, they could be used surreptitiously against urban centers. In addition, it is difficult to determine how such weapons are viewed by potential users in a way that makes it possible to develop deterrent and retaliatory responses.

Conventional superiority may well be able to deter NBC use in most cases, particularly as conventional weapons become capable of extracting destruction comparable to or greater than weapons of mass destruction, and if the U.S. deploys active and passive defenses. However, it is not certain that U.S. conventional forces will be successful in all circumstances. Moreover, a potential adversary is likely to assess the political-military equation differently than the United States, and it is
Missile Defense Systems

**PAC 3 (Patriot Advanced Capability):** Point or limited-area defense system. PAC 3 improvements include upgrades to radar and an improved hit-to-kill missile known as ERINT. Operational prototype in late 1990s.

**THAAD (Theater High-Altitude Area Defense):** Ground-based theater missile defense (TMD) system that will provide a wide-area defense capability by intercepting longer-range theater-ballistic missiles at higher altitudes and at greater distances. Provides upper-tier defense to complement point defense, such as Patriot. Several emergency-use batteries in 1998; fully operational in early 2000s.

**Navy Lower Tier (AESIV/SM-2 Block IV A):** Could provide tactical ballistic-missile defense capability similar to PAC 3 from the sea. Full deployment in 2001.

**Navy Upper Tier:** Could provide extensive theater-wide protection, intercepting theater ballistic missiles outside the atmosphere as well as in the ascent and descent phases. If selected, available in early 2000s.

**Corps SAM/MEADS (Medium Extended Air Defense System):** Mobile lower-tier missile-defense system designed to protect moving combat forces against theater ballistic and cruise missiles. To be developed in cooperation with France, Germany, and Italy. Available in 2005.

**Boost Phase Interceptor:** An interceptor fired from an aircraft to shoot down a ballistic missile during the missile’s booster phase when it is most vulnerable. In concept exploration as of 1996; available at the earliest in 2005.

How the United States can best deter NBC use will differ by region, country by country. In developing regional deterrent and defense strategies, it is essential to understand the military, political, and cultural dynamics which are critical in identifying which assets should be held at risk for deterrent purposes. It is also essential to determine how best to communicate intentions, both public declaratory policy as well as private communications and non-verbal messages to demonstrate resolve.

Until the United States can ensure that it can defend against NBC/M with a high degree of confidence and prevail militarily even if NBC/M is threatened or used, states will maintain a strong military and political incentive to acquire, threaten, and perhaps to use NBC/M. So long as the incentive to acquire these weapons exists, there will also remain powerful economic incentives to possess them. States who seek to deter the United States or would seek the demise of America as a world leader may reason that until the U.S. possesses the capability to defend against NBC attacks, it can be forced to choose between preemptive strike, physical or political withdrawal, and the threat of nuclear retaliation. These pose politically, legally, militarily, and morally difficult choices.

**Military Means**

If it is to deter the use of NBC weapons, or to defend itself and its coalition partners against NBC attacks by rogue states, the United States must continue to develop core military competencies suited to operating in an NBC environment. These run the gamut of military capabilities, and include doctrine and training adjustments; deployment of active and passive defenses; deployment of forces which can eliminate the rogue’s NBC weapons; and intelligence and analysis capabilities.

**Doctrine and training.** One of the areas where immediate improvement can be made is in doctrine and training. Joint NBC doctrine is in its infancy. The services have only begun to come to grips with the operational consequences of an NBC-armed adversary and methodologies for assessing
the operational impact of NBC use against U.S. forces remain inadequate. A key requirement is to understand an adversary’s likely NBC employment concepts—which are likely to differ from Soviet plans to use NBC weapons to achieve mass destruction.

Active and passive defense Largely through the efforts of the U.S. Army Chemical Corps and the requirement to fight in a chemical environment if war broke out in Europe, U.S. forces have long familiarity with chemical weapons. However, while new, lighter suits will mitigate this condition somewhat, soldiers operating for long periods in chemical protective gear exhibit sometimes severe degradation in capabilities. Large scale targets—like ports and airfields—are inviting targets for CW and BW. This imposes requirements to have both adequate active missile defenses to shield these fixed targets as well as large scale decontamination capabilities so targets that are struck can be operating as quickly as possible.

Should the United States possess robust active and passive defenses, the value to potential adversaries of their nuclear, biological and chemical weapons, and the most threatening means of their delivery, ballistic missiles, would be significantly degraded. Such degradation could persuade an adversary that use of NBC/M, given significantly diminished effect, is not worth the potential cost that could be associated with a response to an NBC/M attack. The deployment of active and passive defenses offers some possibility, therefore, of turning the tide of proliferation even among states currently hostile to the United States.

The Department of Defense currently has a number of theater missile defense programs. The question of future directions for ballistic missile defense and U.S. ability to deploy robust systems to meet an increasingly threatening range of ballistic missile capabilities is currently being addressed within the context of the 1972 ABM Treaty which prohibits the United States from deploying ballistic missile defense beyond 100 interceptors which could be deployed in accordance with the ABM Treaty. While it is hoped that the Clinton Administration’s new ABM Treaty-related agreements with the states of the former Soviet Union will lead to restraint by Russia with regard to its strategic offensive forces, continued U.S. compliance with the Treaty will put an upper limit on the capability of the antiballistic missile systems the United States can use to defend its territory, forces and allies.

Forces to strike NBC targets. Successful deterrence and defense requires not only the ability to operate in a chemical or biological environment, but also the ability to hold at risk—and destroy if needed—an adversary’s NBC forces. Potential enemies have learned from the Gulf War both to be mobile and to locate key targets underground. Mobility and hardness constrain the U.S. ability to destroy NBC targets. Given the problems identifying and then hitting these targets, it would be difficult to have confidence that the U.S. had destroyed a rogue regimes’ NBC targets. This seriously diminishes the attractiveness of preemptive strikes on NBC targets, which in any case would be problematic because of the potential for adverse international reaction.

Intelligence and analysis. The proliferation of NBC has put special pressures on intelligence and analysis. The margins for acceptable variance and error in estimates are smaller than for conventional capabilities while the difficulty of developing and delivering acceptable estimates is far more difficult.
Over the centuries, attempts to draw the geographic boundaries of states (political entities) so that they coincide with those of nations (communities of people) have caused substantial problems in the Balkans. The principal reason for Yugoslavia’s dissolution has been various ethnic groups’ fears of being minorities in a state. The fear of slipping into minority can have lethal consequences. This phenomenon helped propel Slovenian independence, led to civil war in Croatia and Bosnia, and still threatens Macedonia. The post-World War II Balkans found temporary order in the imposition of communist regimes in Albania, Bulgaria, Yugoslavia, and Romania. With the revolutions of 1989–1991 ethnic, religious, social, and economic fissures resurfaced in the former Yugoslavia and may spill over into the Balkans as a whole.

**Background and Trends**

It is by no means certain that the forces of modernization and democratization will bring the Balkan states into the Western community of stable, democratic, and prosperous states. Events in the former Yugoslavia, and the Bosnian crisis in particular, call attention to:

- The limits of U.S. peacekeeping and peace enforcement, the continuing relevance and viability of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), the unity of purpose of the European Union (EU), and the post-Cold War roles of the United States and Russia.
- The EU’s incomplete willingness and inability to act decisively toward conflicts in its own backyard; NATO’s weakness when the United States and its European allies disagree on a course of action; and NATO’s still-formidable power and influence when members agree and the United States assumes its traditional leading role, as in the Dayton peace conference of November 1995.
- The efficacy and extent of Russian participation in Western councils, which helped persuade the Serbs to sign the Dayton Accords but may have negative effects if Russian foreign policy becomes more nationalist and confrontational.
The Dayton Accords: A Framework for Regional Stability?

The Dayton Accords were essentially imposed on the three warring factions in Bosnia (Croats, Serbs, and Muslims) following a combination of economic and military pressures against Serbia and the Bosnian Serbs, respectively, and the promise of political and economic rewards for Croatia and for Bosnia’s Muslims and Croats. The accords attempt to strike a balance between the Bosnian Serb and Croat preference for partition of Bosnia-Herzegovina, followed by union with their ethnic counterparts in Serbia and Croatia, and the Muslim preference for a unified, multi-ethnic state. They establish the framework for a loose confederation of two constituent entities, a Serbian republic and a Muslim-Croat Federation, each controlling roughly half of the country. A national presidency, parliament, and judiciary will be based on proportional representation from the three communities but will require extraordinary majorities to enact all key decisions. The national government’s powers will be limited initially to foreign affairs, but subsequent negotiations among the communities will consider expanding the scope of government authority.

In sum, there are two elements to the Dayton Accords dilemma. First is the practical problem of the separation of people, forces, and territory. Second is the more ‘ideological’ problem of returning people to their original areas and integrating communities into a common political order. The problem is that they wanted to separate, but they do not want to reintegrate. Therefore, the second part of the Dayton Accords will be much more difficult to implement than the first.

Military Disengagement Has Fared Well So Far

The NATO-led Implementation Force (IFOR), with nearly 60,000 troops, including 17,000 from the U.S., took over peacekeeping duties from the United Nations in December 1995. It has successfully implemented the military provisions of the peace agreement. The feared quagmire that would result in numerous casualties did not materialize in 1996, as IFOR’s clearly defined mission, impartiality, and willingness to use military power secured compliance and deterred would-be assailants. A rogue challenge to IFOR, although possible given the highly charged political atmosphere and the ragged chain of command among the three combatant armies, is unlikely so long as IFOR continues to be seen as strong and impartial and does not substantively expand its mandate to include nation-state building, aggressive pursuit of those wanted for war crime, and other activities that would indicate mission creep, increase its exposure, and compromise its neutrality. The military situation could quickly deteriorate, however, if IFOR’s U.S. contingent departs abruptly at the end of 1996 without provision for an adequate follow-on force. The Dayton Accords charge the three ethnic groups with a series of stringent political obligations that will seriously test the peace among them for several years.

Ethnic Boundaries and Separatist Impulses

Although a few displaced persons have returned to their respective ethnic enclaves, more people have become refugees since the accords, with the exodus of some 60,000 Serbs from Sarajevo being the most glaring example. The short-sighted poli-
cies of all three communities’ leaders have left Sarajevo a Muslim city rather than a multi-ethnic exemplar. And this pattern is likely to be repeated elsewhere, making ethnic separation complete.

Interethnic relations are only modestly better within the Muslim-Croat Federation. Nearly three years after its inception and nearly one year since the Dayton Accords reaffirmed its existence, the Federation remains essentially a shell encompassing separate Muslim and Croat entities that often intimidate and exclude one another’s citizens. That is particularly true in Mostar, the putative seat of the Federation, which is nominally governed by a Muslim-Croat Council elected in July 1996 but which consists of hard-core nationalists on both sides. Only after a second, post-Dayton summit among Contact Group officials, Slobodan Milosevic, Franjo Tudjman, and Bosnian acting president Ejup Ganic did the Federation begin to establish ethnically based cantons, customs and tax collection agencies, and a defense law that set up a ministry of defense and a joint military command. But backpedaling typically follows such commitments and, the Federation apparatus is likely to remain very weak. Mostar is important because a good resolution there would open doors to solutions throughout the Federation. Unfortunately, events suggest that this is not happening.

Although the September elections were peaceful, the hardening of ethnic boundaries and separatist impulses resulted in the reaffirmation of Bosnia’s divisions rather than commencing the reintegration of its three ethnic communities as the Dayton Accords had intended. The requisite conditions for free and fair elections for national, cantonal, and municipal offices, as well as for the assemblies of the Federation and the Republic were conspicuously absent. In addition, the political environment remained highly polarized between and within the two communities, guarantees for freedom of movement and association were weak, ruling political parties hampered the emergence and campaigning of rivals, and the press and broadcast media in all three communities encountered obstacles in reporting the news. As a result, the three dominant ultranationalist parties swept the election and will control Bosnia’s emerging political institutions at all levels and the power of each to veto legislation will make for prolonged gridlock.

Delays in setting up nationwide political, economic, and social institutions are likely to make the daunting task of rebuilding Bosnia’s shattered economy and infrastructure even more difficult because donor countries and multilateral institutions will begin to lose interest. Furthermore, the rebuilding effort must contend with a per capita income that is one-fourth of its prewar level and industrial production of merely 10 percent of the prewar level. As of mid-1996, nearly 50 percent of Bosnia’s prewar population of 4.6 million are refugees, and 75 percent are unemployed. After some hesitation, two donor conferences hosted by the EU and the World Bank garnered pledges of more than $1.8 billion (of which the U.S. share is $832 million) toward reconstruction costs that the World Bank estimates will exceed $5 billion ($3.7 billion for the Federation and $1.4 billion for the Serbs) by the end of the 1990s and tens of billions of dollars over the longer term.
Bosnia and Herzegovina at the time of the Dayton Accords

Potential Flashpoints

Bosnia

The Dayton Accords and IFOR have stopped the fighting temporarily. But the multi-ethnic, confederal state called for in the accords, and possibly a permanent peace, will remain elusive because the war exacerbated ethnic hatred and the three communities all field well-armed forces. In addition, the accords are ambivalent on the core issue of whether Bosnia will be essentially divided or unified, and the major foreign powers are similarly ambivalent about the efficacy of their involvement in the Bosnian imbroglio.

The Threat of Sectarianism in Bosnia Still Reigns

Persuading Muslims, Croats, and Serbs to rebuild Bosnia's polity and economy is likely to prove far more difficult as ultranationalist leaders exploit war-related ethnic hatred and mistrust. Under these circumstances, progress on a more lasting peace settlement entailing democratization, reconstruction, and reconciliation is likely to be slow and uneven. At best, the Bosnian protagonists will remain engaged owing to war weariness, pressure from the five-power Contact Group managing the peace process (the U.S., the U.K., France, Germany and Russia), and the grudging willingness of Croatian President Franjo Tudjman and Serbian President Slobodan Milosevic to rein in their Bosnian clients as a means of ending their own countries' isolation.

Bosnian Serbs, who are determined as ever to live apart from Croats and Muslims, are making every effort to slow or derail the aspects of the Dayton Accords that would create a loosely unified Bosnia, while focusing tenaciously on those establishing a separate Serb republic. De facto Serb leaders and indicted war criminals Radovan Karadzic and General Ratko Mladic, for example, continue to preach separatism and intolerance: in March 1996 they urged Sarajevo's Serbs to flee the city rather than live under Muslim rule, and in April, Bosnian Serbs refused to take part in a fund-raising conference as part of an all-Bosnia delegation, thereby foregoing several hundred million dollars in reconstruction aid.

Bosnian Croats, too, are dominated by hard-core nationalists, such as Kresimir Zubak and Dario Kordic, who are wary not only of their Bosnian Serb arch-rivals but also of their erstwhile Muslim partners, against whom the Croats fought a vicious war within the broader Bosnian conflict. Croats have employed a scorched-earth approach when carrying out mandated territorial transfers to the Serbs. They have also hung on stubbornly to
their self-declared state and are making only a minimal effort to lend viability to the Muslim-Croat Federation.

The Muslims, long considered to be the eventual core of a reunited and multi-ethnic Bosnia, also are opting for sectarianism. President Alija Izetbegovic's increasingly Islamic-oriented Party of Democratic Action is transforming the Muslim part of Bosnia into an Islamic-oriented, one-party state. Party leaders have ousted from their ranks the secular faction led by former prime minister Haris Silajdic, which favors a multi-ethnic Bosnia, and co-opted senior military leaders with appointments to high party posts. Their parochialism is evident as well in the virtual exclusion of Serbs and Croats from Sarajevo's municipal council, the purging of remaining Serb and Croat officers from key military posts, and, most important, the subtle encouragement of an exodus by Serbs from Sarajevo's suburbs before the area's return to Federation control. Muslims, too, are making few efforts to help the viability of the Federation with the Croats, preferring to govern through the central government, over which they exercise near total control. They also have forged a foreign policy with a decidedly Muslim cast, including strong ties to their military benefactor Iran and a reluctance to expel the remaining Iranian fighters from their military's ranks, though the United States has demanded they do so before the U.S. will begin a promised program to train and arm Federation forces to even the balance with Serb forces.

The Return of Refugees Will Be Problematic

Widespread clashes could follow strict implementation of the Dayton Accords' call for freedom of movement and for all refugees to either return to their homes or receive adequate compensation. To Serbs, and Croats to a lesser extent, this provision is tantamount to nullifying their gains on the battlefield, since the great majority of refugees are Muslims. For the same reason, the Muslims are likely to press for its full implementation. In fact, all three sides continue to set up illegal checkpoints and will likely continue to deny opposing ethnic groups freedom of movement and access to their former homes. The Muslims in particular may try to exploit these provisions to regain several strategic towns, such as Doboj and Brcko in northern Bosnia, while urging Muslims still in Serb territory to resist Serb pressure to leave. This obstructionism has led to escalating clashes between rival civilian groups that could eventually draw in their respective military forces and embroil IFOR or any successor to IFOR.
The Election Process Could Present Trouble

The national elections, held in September 1996, might have provoked widespread violence and put foreign election monitors and IFOR troops at risk. The major hurdle was the Dayton Accords’ clause requiring refugees and displaced persons (roughly half of Bosnia’s electorate of two million) to vote, as a general rule, in their prewar places of residence. Though intended to be a linchpin of Bosnia’s political reintegration, the clause if fully implemented threatened to derail the elections. The question was “resolved” by establishing voter centers in refugee locales and in peripheral “border zones”.

Violence was avoided when the election commission of the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe accommodated the wishes of parties to the Dayton Accords. Voters were asked to cast ballots for candidates where they currently reside despite initial Muslim protests, and strict enforcement measures were taken by IFOR. Some refugees were allowed to return to their homes. The elections were relatively peaceful, but the elected governments and parliaments are almost certain to come under the sway of ultranationalists, quickly experience gridlock, and ultimately provoke violent confrontations.

The Issue of Brcko Could Hinder Progress

Another flashpoint in Bosnia is the strategic northern town of Brcko. The Serbs see it as the key to securing the five-kilometer Posavina Corridor connecting the two parts of their republic. The Muslims want to keep the city for that reason and because it is a gateway to the Danube River basin countries to the north. The issue nearly derailed the Dayton peace conference and is set to be settled through arbitration by December 1996. Alija Izetbegovic has vowed to take Brcko by force, while Serb forces are arrayed to defend it. Unless the arbitration commission can protect the interests of both sides, one or both may resort to military force. If that happens, the large portion of U.S. forces stationed in and around Brcko could be dragged into the conflict.

The Pursuit of War Criminals Could Endanger the Peace

The United Nations International War Crimes Tribunal in The Hague, established in 1993, indicted seventy-one Bosnians, most of them Serbs, by late 1996. These actions could prove to be a flashpoint if IFOR tries to hunt the suspects down in earnest. The Serbs, Croats, and Muslims all believe fervently in the righteousness of their cause in the Bosnia conflict and have rallied around their leaders, including Serb leaders Karadzic and especially Mladic, whom Serbs consider a war hero rather than a war criminal. Although Milosevic, Tudjman, and Izetbegovic have agreed to cooperate with the tribunal and have handed over a few of those indicted, such as Bosnian Croat General Tihomir Blaskic, any attempts by IFOR to seize top Serb leaders would encounter forceful resistance. And subsequent televised trials could further damage relations and increase the risks to IFOR and other foreign personnel in Bosnia. Recent charges by Fikret Abdic and the Bosnia Serbs against Izetbegovic may exacerbate the problem.

The Arming of the Muslim-Croat Forces Is a Delicate Operation

The U.S. plan to train and equip the Muslim-Croat Federation’s army, within the limits imposed by the arms control portion of the peace agreement, as a way of creating a balance with Serb forces could just as likely set off an arms race, compromise IFOR’s neutrality, and renew a split between Washington and NATO’s European members, most of whom have serious reservations about the efficacy of arming Federation forces. The goal is to create

Bulgaria’s Turks

Bulgaria’s population of nine million (85.3 percent ethnic Bulgarian, 8.5 percent Turk, 2.6 percent Gypsy, and 2.4 percent Macedonian) holds the potential for ethnic problems. Discrimination against Turks, which was exacerbated during the last years of Todor Zhivkov’s Communist regime, has been terminated under the new government and has contributed to the warming of Turkish-Bulgarian interstate relations. However, higher demographic growth rates for Bulgarian Turks than for ethnic Bulgarians continue to contribute to low-level tensions.
Eastern Slonia

The status of oil-rich eastern Slonia, the last parcel of rebel Serb-held land in Croatia, threatened to be a deal breaker in Dayton until Croatian president Franjo Tudjman and Serbian president Slobodan Milosevic agreed to a one- to two-year transitional period, after which Slonia will revert to Croatian control. The region experienced some of the most vicious fighting of the Serb-Croat war, and its prewar population of 70,000 Serbs has been augmented by another 80,000 driven from their homes elsewhere in Croatia. Slonia's 125,000 Croats, formerly the majority, were expelled. The United Nations has been administering the region as a protectorate with 5,000 UN troops, but most rebel Serbs are expected to move out of eastern Slonia as the date for its transfer to Croatia approaches.

and arms purchases, the latter made easier by a Russian decision to sell arms to countries in the former Yugoslavia. And the Europeans will continue to worry about having in their midst an increasingly armed Muslim entity with strong ties to Iran and other Muslim states.

The Federation Remains a Volatile Union

The Muslim-Croat Federation is a forced marriage of convenience and therefore inherently unstable. The forces that divide Muslims and Croats from Serbs—differing histories, religions, and economic and territorial aspirations, as well as the recent brutal conflict—also divide Muslims from Croats. Yet, while the separation of the Federation and the Serb Republic has helped them achieve a modicum of stability in their relations, Muslims and Croats must settle many unresolved issues that could easily lead to renewed conflict between them. Disintegration of the Federation would cause a major outbreak of fighting, particularly in central Bosnia, that would endanger IFOR and spell the end of the Dayton Accords and a unified Bosnian state. For this reason the U.S. launched the Federation Forum in April 1996. Its second high level meeting in May led to an agreement on the Federation Defense Laws.

What If the Serbs Seek to Join Greater Serbia?

Although Bosnian Serbs, and especially Belgrade, have temporarily jettisoned their drive for union in the face of strong resistance from Muslims, Croats, and the international community, a number of untoward developments could revive the push for unification. Certainly, a breakup of the Muslim-Croat Federation would be a likely catalyst, especially if it were to lead to renewed fighting among all three communities. The emergence in Russia of a communist or nationalist regime willing to take on the Serbs' cause and make them a client state could serve the same function. Ultimately, it would be almost impossible to stop the Serbs; Belgrade rather than the Bosnian Serbs would have the final say on whether to opt again
for a Greater Serbia, and Milosevic's calculations would be influenced more by the political costs to himself and the economic and military price for Serbia than by the wishes of Bosnian Serb leaders.

**Kosovo**

Constitutionally, Kosovo (an autonomous province of Serbia) maintained the status of an autonomous region of Yugoslavia. Ethnic Albanians (Kosovars) make up approximately two million (90 percent) of Kosovo's total population; Serbs comprise the remaining 10 percent.

Kosovo has a deep historical significance for Serbia because of the 1389 battle at Kosovo's Field of Blackbirds. Although the Battle of Kosovo ended in a Turkish victory and the collapse of Serbia, it has long been the rallying point for Serbian nationalism.

During the early 1980s, the Serbs began to restrict the rights of the Kosovar majority in Kosovo. After a wave of unrest in 1989, Serbian president Slobodan Milosevic unconstitutionally revoked Kosovo's autonomous status, and since 1990 the Serbs have expanded repression by driving Kosovars from their jobs and government positions and shutting down Kosovo's Albanian school system. Denied the fundamental rights of citizenship, many Kosovars already have fled Serbia, and those remaining have formed their own underground government, led by Ibrahim Rugova of the Democratic Alliance of Kosovars (LDK) Party.

Since 1992 tension has run high, as the Serbs maintain their domination through military force. According to some estimates, as many as 40,000 regular military troops and 30,000 paramilitary and police forces are stationed in Kosovo. The result has been a modified system of apartheid in which two societies share the same territory in virtual isolation from each other.

Milosevic has acted cautiously as a result of a U.S. battalion's participation in the UN Protection Force and the warnings by Presidents Bush and Clinton that civil war in Kosovo could lead to a U.S.-Serbian confrontation. Though Milosevic has reined in ultranationalist paramilitary leaders, he has recently limited humanitarian assistance to Kosovo from nongovernmental organizations (e.g., the International Red Cross and Catholic Relief). And Rugova faces increasing pressure from Kosovar radicals, such as Rexhep Qosa and Nevzat Halik, who see no results from his moderate policies.

Ethnic Albanians in Western Europe have provided economic assistance to Kosovo, and many in Albania and Macedonia have provided arms to their Kosovar brethren. If violence were to break out, many Kosovars would be slaughtered and an estimated 400,000 or more would flee. Massive refugee flows would have drastic consequences for Serbia's neighbors. Though many Kosovars could flee to Albania, where planning for large refugee flows presents major problems, the majority are likely to escape to Macedonia, where President Kiro Gligorov cannot even publicly discuss plans for refugees because it would
destabilize the government. Since its refugee planning is inadequate and its resources are nonexistent, Macedonia could not accept many refugees. Their movement to safety in the West therefore would likely continue south toward Greece, although some would arm themselves and return to fight Serbs in Kosovo.

A failure by the U.S. and its EU and NATO partners to deal with the military and humanitarian aspects of the crisis at that point could lead to a worst-case scenario in which the Serbs move into northern Macedonia to search for and destroy renegade Kosovars, and the Greeks prevent Kosovar refugees from entering Greece. Since Macedonia has no ability to resist, Bulgaria would probably intervene to protect Macedonians, whom they consider ethnically related, and Albania would send volunteers and weapons to assist Albanians in Macedonia. Turkey would likely respond by taking action against Greece in Macedonia or in the Aegean Islands, which would destroy NATO’s southern flank and create a crisis within the alliance.

Macedonia

Macedonia’s emergence as an independent state generates many internal dilemmas and creates external problems as well. In Macedonia, and in the Balkans generally, the simmering tensions between ethnic Albanians and Slavs, and possibly Greeks and Turks, could turn violent. Macedonia is geopolitically important because, if a conflict were to begin there, an expanded Balkan war would be difficult to prevent and contain.

After the Balkan wars and the 1913 Bucharest peace treaty, Macedonia was divided into three parts, with the current state of Macedonia coming under Serbian rule. During World War II, the Macedonian Republic was proclaimed a constituent republic of Yugoslavia. Macedonia, an independent, multi-ethnic state of two million people, declared its independence from Yugoslavia in September 1991. As of 1996, roughly 65 percent of the population consists of Slavic Macedonians, and 20–35 percent of ethnic Albanian Muslims. The Muslims have one of the highest demographic growth rates in the world—almost 3.5 percent per year.

The challenge of nation-state building is so daunting in Macedonia that the viability of the state is in question. One indication of internal tension is the government’s claim that Albanians make up only 22 percent of the population, while Albanians claim to make up 35–40 percent. At stake is the issue of state legitimacy. Though Albanians hold 21 of the parliament’s 120 seats and 5 ministerial positions in the moderate Gligorov government coalition, they are underrepresented in the Army and virtually excluded from local police forces and local government.

This disparity has been accentuated by neighboring Albania’s claims that one million Albanians live in Macedonia and two million Albanians live under Serbian domination in Kosovo. The Albanian government believes that the Macedonian constitution and census discriminate against Albanians. Until 1996, Tirana supported extreme nationalists in the ethnic Albanian Party for Democratic Prosperity (PDP). Political activities among Albanians in the states of Albania, Macedonia, and Serbia (Kosovo) have obstructed Macedonian nation-state-building efforts.
Albania, recognizing the benefit of stability and a moderate government in Macedonia, has opened the port of Durres to facilitate the flow of goods from the west through Albania to Macedonia and has been less vocal in its support of the Tachi faction. Similarly, Macedonia has become critically dependent on commerce traveling to Bulgaria and Turkey. If the west-east trade route is not improved so that it remains viable and can handle the demands of ever-more traffic, Macedonia will lose its lifetime.

But Macedonia’s large ethnic minority is unreconciled to its meager share of political and economic power and government posts, and the Slav majority is just as determined to remain dominant. Radicals in both communities keep up the pressure on the teetering multi-ethnic coalition government, despite the improvement in Greek-Macedonian relations and in economic conditions following the lifting of the Greek economic embargo. Assassination attempts against key leaders, mob violence, or another economic downturn could bring tensions to a boiling point. If economic difficulties result in unrest, the government could divide along ethnic lines, producing serious conflict. Serbs, Greeks, and others could seize the opportunity to fill the vacuum unless an international force prevents them.

**U.S. Interests and Approach**

**Net Assessment**

In 1996, the worst of the turmoil was probably over in the former Yugoslavia, and the region’s protagonists most likely will not soon again resort to all-out war. Moreover, Bosnia’s destruction and the suffering of its people set a sobering and lasting example of the folly of such conflict among neighboring peoples—such as the Kosovars, Macedonians, Albanians, Hungarians, Bulgarians, Greeks, and Turks. Still, the ethnic furies unleashed in the region by the Cold War’s end and the after-
The breakup of Yugoslavia's breakup will create recurring bouts of ethnic unrest, military confrontation, and occasional clashes. This will be especially likely in Bosnia but could also happen in Serbia's Kosovo region and between ethnic Albanians and the Slav majority in Macedonia. Any of these events would put U.S. and other NATO forces in the region at risk. Dealing with that risk and the issues at stake in the Balkans also may sorely test Contact Group and trans-Atlantic unity on questions such as the future of IFOR, the controversial U.S. policy of arming and training Muslim-Croat Federation forces, and the extent to which the United States should press compliance with the Dayton Accords.

**U.S. Interests**

The United States' main interests regarding the Balkan States are the following:

**Stability and Respect for Humanitarian Values throughout the Balkans**

The U.S. has an interest in upholding minimal standards of human rights, including the prevention of genocide and crimes against humanity that shock U.S. public opinion. More generally, the U.S. has an interest in promoting full observance of human rights, religious tolerance, and democracy, as a means over the long run to a stable community of peaceful nations. To this end, the U.S. has taken the position that it has an interest in preventing the partition of Bosnia along ethnic lines, through the establishment of the multi-ethnic state envisaged in the Dayton Accords.

**Containing Ethnic Conflicts to within the Borders of One State**

In the event that the U.S. is not able to successfully achieve its interest in preventing armed conflict among ethnic groups, the U.S. has a security interest in seeing that any such ethnic conflict is contained within the borders of one state. Bad as may be an ethnic conflict within one state, there is the grave risk that such a conflict could set off a wider war that could involve U.S. allies supporting opposing sides. One example of what could happen would be an ethnic conflict in Kosovo. That could lead to a conflict with Serbia over support to Kosovar insurgents and to refugee flows that could undermine the viability of Macedonia, draw in Albania, and exacerbate the Greek-Turkish situation.

**Preserving the Unity and Effectiveness of the Western Alliance**

The U.S. has a strong interest in sustaining NATO's reputation as an effective security organization and as an institution binding together Europe and North America. IFOR's role in Bosnia has put NATO's prestige on the line. Indeed, if IFOR fails, Bosnia implodes, and war engulfs other Balkan states, NATO's future may come into question and U.S. ties to Europe would be significantly eroded. This interest argues for developing a common European and U.S. position and for limiting the NATO role to tasks that can be demonstrably accomplished. That may conflict with the interest in establishing a viable Bosnian confederation.

**History of the Balkans**

In 1453 the Ottomans ended one thousand years of Byzantine rule in the Balkans, but the region also abutted the Austrian Empire and the Kingdom of Hungary. During four hundred years of continuous violence, the Hapsburg and Ottoman Empires clashed on the Balkan peninsula well into the nineteenth century.

In 1878, the great powers carved up the spoils of the Ottoman Empire at the Congress of Berlin, which both dashed and provoked Balkan nationalist aspirations. Greece received nothing; Montenegro, Serbia, and Romania retained independence; Bulgaria was cut by a third; and the Hapsburgs were given a mandate over Bosnia-Herzegovina that angered Serbia and Montenegro.

Before World War I the decline of the Hapsburg and Ottoman empires led to Bulgaria's gaining independence and Austria's annexing Bosnia-Herzegovina in 1878, which frustrated Serbian aspirations and humiliated Russia. In the Balkan War of 1912, Bulgaria, Serbia, and Greece defeated the Turks and fought amongst themselves over Macedonia and Albania. In 1913, Bulgaria attacked Greece and Serbia in a second Balkan war; the outcome was that Serbia, Greece, and Bulgaria shared Macedonia while Greece received Thessaloniki. The third Balkan War, of 1914, erupted into World War I when Gavrilo Princip, a Bosnian Serb who wanted to unify Bosnia-Herzegovina with Serbia, assassinated Austrian Archduke Ferdinand in Sarajevo.

When World War I ended in Europe, though Yugoslavia was created and Romania enlarged, war continued in the Balkans in the Greek-Turkish War of 1921–22. Between 1939 and 1941, Germany cemented relations with revisionist Hungary, Romania, and Bulgaria and then invaded and occupied Greece and Yugoslavia. During World War II, the Germans convened an alliance with Croatian fascists against the Serbs. After World War II, in Yugoslavia, Josip Broz Tito managed to establish a communist regime by 1945, and civil war continued in Greece until 1949. When Tito died in 1980, Yugoslavia managed to survive under a joint presidency until 1990.
U.S. Approach

Insisting on a viable Bosnian confederation is likely to entail high costs in funds, a continued military presence, and possible renewed friction with NATO allies. Hence, the chances for the confederation’s survival will be very low. The costs of the U.S. IFOR deployment already have exceeded expectations, owing to a number of unforeseen developments, and are likely to grow, as will costs for civilian reconstruction. The Europeans long have been skeptical of the U.S. effort to hold Bosnia together and of Washington’s embrace of the Muslims, which they believe helped scuttle earlier, European-sponsored programs that called for three loosely-tied entities. Although they have accepted the Dayton Accords, the Europeans will be reluctant to bear the costs of full implementation, particularly in the unlikely event that U.S. forces withdraw from IFOR and the Europeans again stand alone. This situation could set the stage for yet another NATO crisis that could spill over into other security issues and could adversely affect U.S. relations with Moscow, as Russian views on Bosnia are closer to those of the Europeans than to those of the United States. Except for the possibility of greater friction with Turkey and other Muslim countries, the costs of reinterpreting the Dayton Accords, either formally or de facto, to provide for a looser association of the three communities would be lower than insisting on confederation, and the chances for a more narrowly defined success would be higher. Settling on a looser association may speed up a final settlement, pave the way for a reduced military presence and reconstruction bill, and keep relations with the Europeans on an even keel. However, even this less ambitious scenario would require a continued NATO presence for several years and still might not prevent the resumption of at least limited hostilities.

Dealing with a civil war in Macedonia would most likely entail changes in force structure and equipment (e.g., deciding whether to involve heavy armored units, as in Bosnia, or light units), and would involve the U.S. in peace enforcement. It also would need to deal with larger refugee populations from Kosovo.

The United States can also help stabilize Albanian-Slav relations and the relations of both groups with NATO allies Greece and Turkey.

The challenge for the United States in the Balkans is to:

- Use economic assistance as leverage to encourage democratic procedures and a more equal distribution of power between Macedonia’s two ethnic groups.
- Press Belgrade to restore autonomy to Kosovo without giving Kosovars the impression that the United States would help them in a Bosnia-type operation.
- Assist Albania’s economic and democratic development while insisting that it curb cross-border subversion into Macedonia by Albanian radicals.
- Encourage further reconciliation between Athens and Skopje without projecting the impression that Washington gives as much consideration to a non-NATO country as to a NATO ally.
- Remain sensitive to Balkan Slav and Greek suspicions of Turkey’s intentions in the Balkans, while using Ankara as a positive influence on Balkan Muslims and Albanians.
CHAPTER THIRTEEN

Sub-Saharan Africa

In the post-Cold War world, the United States has few substantial security interests in sub-Saharan Africa; with the possible exception of South Africa, the region does not figure centrally in U.S. international political and geostrategic calculations. Yet, for several decades, the probability of U.S. force deployment to Africa has remained consistently high—although most interventions are relatively small-scale contingency operations of short duration. And that is likely to remain the case indefinitely because of:

- The alarming condition of the continent
- The frequency of coups, conflicts, and major humanitarian crises
- The resultant pressures to contribute to the international response to events in the region

- Reduced the often excessive levels and types of military aid, training, and outside military support available to African countries
- Made UN Security Council approval of multilateral peacekeeping operations more likely

On the negative side, it has:

- Decreased official political and economic interest in the region
- Lowered levels of international aid
- Left little U.S. domestic or congressional constituency for action and commitment of resources, even to deal with the most serious crises
- Released ethnic, religious, and tribal tensions that were constrained by regimes bolstered by U.S., Soviet, or European patrons

Democracy and Economic Growth

The worldwide trend toward democracy is evident in sub-Saharan Africa. In 1989, only four states were considered democratic; in the next seven years, forty of forty-eight sub-Saharan countries began the process of democratization. About 20 nations that could be considered democracies have been established, while another 20 nations could be considered in transi-
tion to democracy. As of fall 1996, seven nations were expecting transitional elections within the next twelve months. There are, of course, also reversals and setbacks. In Nigeria, the Gambia, Niger and Burundi, democratic processes have been reversed by the military. In other cases—e.g., Angola, Sierra Leone, Liberia and Sudan—movement toward freely elected democratic governments has been delayed or disrupted by internal conflict.

Africa’s modest economic progress is significant because it reverses the negative trend of 1980–1992. In 1996, the economic success of a number of African countries is due to conditions of security and stability, a policy environment conducive to investment and growth, and government implementation of macroeconomic reforms, such as:

- Monetary policies that cause export earnings to rise
- Privatization and the opening of markets, which enhance trade, investment, and local business opportunities
- Governments that largely allow market forces to determine exchange rates
- Reductions in the size and cost of the public sector and in budget deficits, with beneficial effects on inflation and interest rates

The International Monetary Fund has predicted that Africa will experience a 5% growth in gross domestic product in 1996, and that African countries would experience lower inflation and other benefits of structure reform.

Islamic Extremism

A number of countries in the region retain colonial political boundaries based on conquest, ease of administration, or economics instead of coherent ethnic or religious lines. As the colonial period ended, the new nations that emerged in the northern part of the continent (the Sahel and some states to its south) were populated in the north by Muslims and in the south by people of other religions.

In a number of states, the rise of Islamic fundamentalism provides a fertile field for the development of radical fundamentalism and could lead to closer ties with elements the United States has branded as terrorists, especially in Iran, Iraq, and Libya. In other cases, the radicalized Islamic state could become a threat to its own neighbors. A possible example is Sudan, which has been accused of plotting to assassinate Egyptian President Mubarak last year. The UN has already imposed diplomatic sanctions against Sudan and threatened sanctions against Sudan Airways if three Egyptians suspected in the assassination attempt are not extradited from Sudan.

Civil War and Ethnic Disorder

All ten major conflicts in Africa after 1980 were waged largely or entirely within a country or territory of one country and involved fighting between government forces and the armed forces of one or more internal resistance movements. In 1996, a
state of armed conflict existed in Sudan, Liberia, Somalia, Northern Uganda, and the Zaire-Rwanda-Burundi border region. Conflicts in Angola and Sierra Leone appear to be approaching peaceful—but shaky—conclusions. The frequency of ethnically-focused, intrastate conflict in Africa should not lead to the impression that tribal warfare is unique to the continent. Tribal or ethnic warfare and abuse can be found around the globe, whether in the current Balkan war in Europe, persecution of minorities in and around China, or persecution of the Kurds by their Iranian, Iraqi and Turkish neighbors.

Refugees and Displaced Persons

In the 1990s, the problems of refugees and internally displaced persons grew dramatically, stressing neighboring countries, international relief agencies, and aid donors and leading to tensions along the borders of the countries involved. As of December 1995, Africa had some 5.2 million refugees and almost 10.2 million internally displaced persons, representing, respectively, some 34 and 48 percent of the world totals and constituting a tremendous economic and financial burden on the world’s poorest region, even with international assistance.

Potential Flashpoints

Rwanda and Burundi

The conflicts in Rwanda and Burundi exemplify ethnic strife leading to civil war. The horrific abuses accompanying the civil war in Rwanda between the Tutsi ethnic minority, which ruled in precolonial times, and the Hutu majority drew in a reluctant international community too late to stop the genocide. Neighboring Burundi suffers from similar ethnic tensions, mounting ethnic violence, and deep divisions over the distribution of power between the Tutsi, who dominate politically and economically, and the Hutu, who hold little power. In both countries, the ethnic groups (pre-genocide) were approximately 89% Hutu, 14% Tutsi and 1% Twa.

Rwanda

Belgian colonial authorities preparing for departure from Rwanda in 1959 were convinced that Tutsi nationalists were too radical, so they put the Hutu in control. Thousands of Tutsis fled to neighboring countries. After independence in 1962, a cycle of Tutsi cross-border raids and Hutu gang attacks continued until a large, well-trained, and well-equipped force of Rwandan Tutsi soldiers in the Ugandan military, calling themselves the Rwandan Patriotic Front (RPF), crossed into Rwanda in 1990 as the Rwanda Patriotic Army (RPA). Only the

Conflict Spillover: Eastern Zaire

The fighting in Eastern Zaire in the fall of 1996 demonstrated how an internal conflict can spread to neighboring countries, with profound consequences. Eastern Zaire has long been a region of instability due to anti-regime sentiments among Zairian ethnic groups. From late 1994, tensions were aggravated by the presence of more than a million Hutu refugees massed along the border. These camps were dominated by armed Hutu militants, many of them former Rwandan government officials and soldiers, among them hundreds of individuals suspected of directing or participating in the Rwandan genocide of 1994.

These armed Hutu elements regularly mounted raids and insurgent supply operations into Rwanda and especially Burundi. Ethnic reprisals and counteractions also developed within Zaire, between the Zairian forces, Hutu military elements from the camps, and long-resident Zairian Tutsis (known as Banyamulenge). In October 1996, these tensions came to a head. Following threats of expulsion or extermination against the Banyamulenge, well-organized Banyamulenge militias, aided by Rwandan army elements, rapidly overran key Zairian towns along the border, defeated local Zairian forces, dispersed the Hutu camp populations into the countryside and denied air access to Zairian reinforcements.

The failure of either the local antagonists or the concerned international actors to effectively address the problems of the camps, and the provocative activities conducted both within Zaire and across the borders, led inexorably to a crisis of even larger dimensions.
In 1994, after a plane crash killed the president of Rwanda and the president of Burundi (who was a guest on the plane), a well-prepared and well-organized genocide was launched by the Hutu-dominated government. Even though the RPA fought its way to the capital, taking control of the government after about three months, hundreds of thousands of Tutsis were massacred throughout the country. The international community took no effective action, and UN military personnel in the country were ordered not to intervene. The Hutu army of the previous government was escorted to Zaire by French forces, where they established base areas for future operations.

UN troops left Rwanda in April 1996 after the failure of a nearly three-year mission to halt the ethnic-based killing. Estimates of the casualties in the 1994 genocide range between five hundred thousand and one million people. The minority Tutsi, having defeated the Hutu-dominated government army in the civil war, still blame the United Nations for failing to halt the killing, and when the UN mandate expired in March 1996, the government refused a further extension.

In the summer of 1996, more than 1.7 million Hutu refugees from Rwanda remained in neighboring countries, afraid of retribution if they return in spite of government assurances to the contrary. Exacerbating this fear were threats and intimidation of potential returnees by former Rwandan government officials living in the camps. The departure of UN and OAU troops and observers reinforced the fears of camp residents, but in fact the situation seemed to change very little after those departures, probably because the UNAMIR troop strength during the final six months of its operation was too small to make a noticeable difference. Immediately following the withdrawal of troops, there was an increase in incursions by rebels from Zaire, but the numbers quickly subsided. However, the mere presence of the large number of refugees presented problems of support and supply for host countries and the international community, and
provided a reservoir of disaffected persons for mine laying and cross-border raids. Concurrently, 250,000 long-displaced Tutsis within Zaire were being forced off their land, both by Zaireans and by the recently arrived, well-armed Hutus.

In October 1996, these simmering issues exploded into a long-anticipated crisis in eastern Zaire (see the box on eastern Zaire).

Burundi

In Burundi, similar outbreaks of ethnic violence have occurred frequently since independence. Between 1993 and 1996, more than one hundred thousand people were killed in ethnic fighting and massacres. As Hutu insurgents, operating from secure areas in Zaire, stepped up their attacks in the spring of 1996, and the Tutsi-dominated government army responded viciously, another one hundred thousand people fled the country.

The growing insurgency has crippled the economy and called into question the government's ability to meet its financial obligations, and perhaps even to survive. The Burundi military, in its continuing struggle with Hutu insurgents, has been guilty of serious human-rights abuses, eroding its own support in the countryside. As the struggle continues, it threatens to draw in Rwanda and potentially the neighboring states of Zaire, Uganda, and Tanzania. Hutu refugees from Burundi have also continued to cross into neighboring countries, where they strain the limited infrastructures of the host, place additional demands on relief agencies, and provide a pool of discontents who operate in support of rebel attacks against the government in Burundi. In July 1996, a military coup against the shaky Hutu-Tutsi coalition government brought Tutsi Major Pierre Buyoya (who had previously ruled Burundi from 1987 to 1993) to power. Ethnic violence intensified, and Buyoya's refusal to promptly return to civilian rule prompted Burundi's neighbors to impose stiff trade and economic sanctions on Burundi.

The alarming deterioration of the Burundi situation raised expectations of some form of international intervention, and the UN Secretary General repeatedly recommended raising a stand-by intervention force. Other intervention initiatives were proposed by the OAU and by Burundi's neighbors. But the probable need for a large, heavily armed fighting force made potential donors wary, and the willingness and ability of the international community to actually commit troops to Burundi remained in doubt. As for the United States, it made it clear that it might be willing to provide airlift and some financial and logistical support.

U.S. Involvement

U.S. objectives in Burundi include promoting national reconciliation and supporting Burundi's transition to democracy, including rights for minorities. U.S. development aid has stopped because of the war and human-rights abuses, but humanitarian aid and aid to promote democratic governance continue. A small International Military Education and Training program was reactivated in 1996 and current year activities were completed in July, just before the coup. The program's aims are to encourage greater professionalism within the Burundi military and to increase understanding of the role of a military in a democratic society, including respect for human rights.

Drought and Famine: Providing Effective Early Warning?

Early warning of drought and potential famine makes it possible to focus limited resources on a problem area and give self-help an opportunity to work before a major interventions becomes necessary.

For sub-Saharan Africa, USAID has established the "Famine Early Warning System" (FEWS). FEWS is managed and funded by USAID, but operated by a private contractor. It collates data from 15 African countries (from East, West, Central and Southern Africa) considered susceptible to famine, the UN's Food and Agriculture Organization, and the National Oceanographic and Atmospheric Administration Meteosat satellite orbiting over Africa. Combining the collected meteorological, agricultural and market data, FEWS publishes a monthly report providing both the raw data and vulnerability assessments of areas in danger. This information is then employed by USAID, FAO and the UN World Food Program to react appropriately to drought and famine. The FEWS system is a good example of how civil expertise, applied in the early warning and prevention phases of a potential disaster, can reduce or even eliminate the need for an ultimate emergency military humanitarian response. Under USAID's Greater Horn of Africa initiative, USAID plans to expand the system and to rationalize it with other systems in the region.
Failed States in the Making?

Sudan

The conflict in Sudan arises from ethnic and religious frictions aggravated by perceived inequities in economic and developmental programs. The civil war, which began in 1983, is essentially a revival of the 1963–1972 conflict between southern rebels and the northern-based government. The interfertility of both sides means that the most likely prospects for Sudan are continuation of the war or an ultimate division of the country. Complicating the international aspects of the situation is the growing perception that the regime is engaged in radical activities, including support of terrorism, to advance its Islamic agenda in the world.

Sudan’s relations with its neighbors have soured. Sudan has accused Uganda of involvement in cross-border support of southern Sudanese rebels, and Sudanese forces and planes have crossed the Ugandan border several times. Similar incidents have occurred along the Ethiopian and Eritrean borders. Civil war is likely to continue and could broaden into a regional war.

U.S. military assistance to Sudan totaled $296 million between 1980 and 1985, the highest U.S. aid level in sub-Saharan Africa. However, aid levels fell as the U.S. Congress began to insist on progress toward peace as a prerequisite of aid and concern grew over Sudan’s growing ties with Libya and its inability to deal with economic problems.

In 1996, the United States and Sudan had no security relationship. The closing of the U.S. embassy in 1996 points to the small likelihood that normal relations will soon revive. Despite the war, the United States and other potential external actors appear to have little interest in costly humanitarian or peacekeeping operations in southern Sudan. The United States will probably not become directly involved in military operations involving Sudan unless the war more violently crosses Sudan’s borders into Uganda, Ethiopia, or Eritrea. In the meantime, the United States will probably become more involved in military assistance and training in support of those nations, largely to pressure the Sudanese regime.

Nigeria

Nigeria’s crisis dates from November 1993, when the head of the temporary government of national unity handed power to the minister of defense (General Abacha), who imposed military rule and dissolved all democratic institutions. In May 1994, Abacha convened the National Constitutional Conference as a vehicle for peaceful transition to civilian rule and, based on its recommendations, in October 1995 set out a program and timetable to institute civilian rule by October 1, 1998. Despite international complaints about the length of that timetable and about human- and political-rights abuses, the government seems determined to proceed according to the program and timetable.

The pivotal issue facing the leadership that emerges in Nigeria in 1998 is whether the military leadership will leave power in the hands of a democratically elected civilian leadership. An almost equally daunting question is whether Nigeria’s political elite can govern the country effectively and equitably. If not, the military will step back in. Persistent resentment of the dominance of the northern elite and severe and declining economic circumstances make renewed national violence in Nigeria a potential concern. If the regime collapses, the resulting large-scale strife or chaos could raise demands for U.S. intervention in Nigeria, in a large-scale humanitarian operation, or as part of an international effort to restore internal peace.

U.S.-Nigerian relations in the mid-1990s are rocky. Nigeria is the fifth largest oil supplier to the U.S. and the second largest market for U.S. goods in the region, but the United States has been at odds with Nigeria over suspicions of Nigerian complicity in narcotics trafficking, adverse regional politico-military developments, human-rights violations, and poor airport security. Because of U.S. concerns and a perceived lack of progress in transition to a civilian government, the U.S. has suspended military-to-military relations, restricted the issuance of visas to Nigerians, and in November 1995 temporarily withdrew the U.S. ambassador.

The lack of vital U.S. political or military concerns, and the U.S. belief that Belgium and France should shoulder major responsibility for handling the crisis, make the commitment of U.S. forces to peacekeeping operations in Burundi unlikely. Nor are U.S. forces likely to be committed to peacekeeping operations in Rwanda.

However, some (even some substantial) U.S. commitment to humanitarian operations remains possible. The United States has already had low-level military involvement in Rwanda. As genocide and large-scale population displacement developed in 1994, U.S. military forces were deployed to reinforce in-place relief operations. U.S. military personnel assisted in improving airport capabilities at Goma (Zaire), Entebbe (Uganda), and Kigali (Rwanda) in response to emergency requests for air movement of humanitarian supplies. More than 1,200 airlift sorties delivered almost 15,000 tons of humanitarian aid in Operations Distant Runner and Support Hope.

This Rwanda precedent and an outburst of genocidal ethnic fury in Burundi would certainly lead to new demands for international intervention. If the United States were to agree to support another international intervention in Rwanda or Burundi, U.S. forces would likely be limited to air transport, and technical and logistical support of peacekeeping forces, or to a strictly humanitarian mission, with the emphasis also on air transport, logistic support, and possibly provision of specialized (e.g., medical) personnel and equipment.

Angola

The still unresolved Angolan conflict exemplifies African civil wars fought mainly for political advantage rather than ethnic considerations. The three movements that fought the Portuguese colonial government in the late 1960s and early 1970s—the Popular Movement for the Liberation of Angola (MPLA), the National Front for the Liberation of Angola (FNLA), and the National Union for the Total Independence of Angola (UNITA)—were unable to agree on transitional arrangements leading to the election of a constitutional assembly. The struggle among the groups quickly became internationalized. After
In 1996, some 7,000 UN troops (UNAVEM II) were stationed in Angola, the largest ongoing UN operation in the world. Most of UNITA's soldiers have been encamped and are to be demobilized or incorporated into the new armed forces. UNITA's political cadre and leaders have been offered positions in the government. Nevertheless, animosities remaining from twenty years of civil war make the transition to peace difficult and uncertain. Killings, violent crime, and deep distrust between the government and UNITA plague the country. Violations of the accords by both sides have given observers reason to doubt their full commitment to the process. On balance, however, optimism prevails.

During the Angolan civil war, the U.S. covertly supplied support and military equipment, first to the FNLA and then to UNITA, to counter the influence of the Soviet Union in Africa and the presence of Cuban combatants. With the signing of the Bicesse accords in 1991, the United States terminated military aid to UNITA. Since then, the U.S. has invested much diplomatic capital in helping bring peace to Angola. The U.S. also has substantial commercial interests in Angola's energy sector, since Angola provides 5 percent of U.S. oil imports.

Liberia and Somalia

In Liberia and Somalia, ethnic rivalries and disputes have transcended the civil war phase and destroyed the institutions of the state. Some analysts have described the result as a new phenomenon: the failed-state syndrome.

Liberia

In Liberia, the conflict initially involved the government of Samuel Doe, which took power in a coup in 1980; the National Patriotic Front of Liberia (NPFL), formed in 1989 by Charles Taylor; and the Independent National Patriotic Front of Liberia (INPFL), which broke away from the NPFL in mid-1990. Each side—and, over time, other factions and splinter groups—attacked civilians of ethnic groups supporting the others.
Despite the efforts of a force of 11,500 sent by the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) in 1990, and numerous subsequent diplomatic initiatives and peace conferences, fighting continued, fueled by exploitation of the country's natural resources by the faction leaders and shadowy international business associates. The principal warlords have consistently defied all pleas and demands of the international community to negotiate a peaceful end to the conflict.

The civil war has destroyed the country. The majority of its citizens have been dislocated. Some 150,000 citizens have been killed. The economy has been surrendered to vicious warlords supported by thousands of militiamen, many of them child soldiers. In addition, the U.S. lost an estimated $400 million in facilities.

In the fall of 1996, Liberia remained divided between the NPFL; the United Liberation Movement for Democracy in Liberia (ULIMO) and its splinter group, ULIMO-J; and the Liberian Peace Council. The factions claim a combined force of sixty thousand fighters, although this number is certainly exaggerated, and most of the fighters have no formal military training. In August 1996, the armed factions signed the latest of many peace agreements. In September, a transitional government, led by Africa's first female head of state, took office but has been unable to prevent further outbreaks of violence. In practical terms, the "government's" authority seems limited to Monrovia.

The U.S. and Liberia have had a long-standing special relationship, strengthened by:

- The founding of the country by freed American slaves in the 1840s.
- The development of economic links in the first part of the twentieth century.
- A security relationship that began during World War II, including guaranteed access to Roberts Field and the port of Monrovia. (In the 1980s, Roberts Field was an important transit and storage point for U.S. official supply flights to Central and Southern Africa.)
- The establishment of a Voice of America relay and important diplomatic and intelligence electronic facilities in Liberia during the Cold War.
- Liberia's ranking during the first half of the 1980s as the top per capita recipient of U.S. aid to Africa.

Nevertheless, when the civil war broke out in 1989, the United States denied the special relationship and any obligation to intervene. Liberia's low priority in a post-Cold War world was not enough to warrant military intervention to nip a civil war in the bud. This approach has remained firm to date, although the U.S. has remained active diplomatically and has spent hundreds of millions of dollars in humanitarian aid and in aid to the West African peacekeeping force.

The crisis has required the U.S. to maintain naval and marine forces offshore for long periods (in 1990 and 1996) and to conduct several noncombatant evacuation operations (NEOs). Another NEO could be required unless the United States either intervenes to put an end to the chaos or closes down its diplomatic mission.

Given the constancy of the U.S. nonintervention approach from 1989 to 1996, it is unlikely but not inconceivable that the U.S. would participate in a peacekeeping or major humanitarian operation requiring...
deployment of U.S. military forces on the ground. But any such intervention would most likely be driven by renewed media attention to the carnage, not by national interests. In that regard, the plight of Liberia has gained the attention of the African-American constituency in the United States, and there have been a number of approaches to Congress and the White House for sterner action. Some articles and editorials in the mainstream press have also encouraged U.S. involvement in ending the fighting. If the United States were to involve its military in a direct peacekeeping operation in sub-Saharan Africa, Liberia would be the most likely venue.

Somalia

Following colonization of Somali territories in the 1880s by Italy, France, and Great Britain, ethnic Somalis lived in

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**Noncombatant Evacuation Operations**

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French Somaliland (later Djibouti), northern Kenya, the Ogaden, and what is today Somalia. When the British gave the Ogaden to Ethiopia in 1897, it set the stage for later conflict in the region.

After independence in 1960, Somalia began a quest for arms in response to popular sentiment for regaining the Ogaden, Djibouti, and northeast Kenya. Rebuffed by the West, Somalia turned to the Soviet Union in 1964, and for more than a decade received a lavish flow of Soviet weaponry. However, in the Ogaden war in 1977, the Soviets assisted the Ethiopians (also their client) in defeating the Somali invasion. Cuban troops also quickly deployed to Ethiopia and were not withdrawn until 1989.

The Somali regime under Siad Barre proved dictatorial and intractable, and domestic opposition gradually grew. Small, clan-based insurgencies supported by Ethiopia since the Ogaden war flamed into major incursions in 1989–90, and a brutal Somali army response soon led to a complete deterioration of relations with much of the populace, and then to a full civil war. The Somali army soon fractured, and by January 1991 rebels had gained the upper hand. Siad fled, the government collapsed, and clan-based factional fighting badly damaged central Mogadishu and left the populace to be preyed on by extortionist bands in the employ of dozens of warlords. From this chaotic situation would emerge starvation, humanitarian disaster, and, in late 1992, a massive international intervention.

In 1980, the United States established a new politico-military relationship with Somalia to gain access to port and air facilities at Berbera and Mogadishu. This development reflected implementation of the Carter doctrine to prepare for a military defense of American interests in the Arabian Peninsula and its environs. Subsequently, the United States mounted a program of large-scale economic assistance and limited military assistance designed to avoid giving the Somalis the capability to threaten their neighbors again. Despite the close relationship and the access agreements, U.S. forces did not use Somalia as a staging base, and U.S. interest in expanding the facilities gradually waned over the 1980s with the passing of the Cold War.
After a decision not to intervene in the Somali civil war, U.S. military helicopters in January 1991 evacuated U.S. embassy personnel and several hundred relief workers from the new embassy grounds in Mogadishu. In August 1992, the United States launched Operation Provide Relief, in which 75 cargo sorties carrying 28,727 metric tons of food and 19,435 metric tons of relief supplies were delivered to Somalia. The operation's success was evident in July 1992, when peacekeepers from Somalia delivered another 338,000 metric tons of relief supplies. Unfortunately, the operation was defeated by the local warlords and fighting resumed soon after the U.S. forces left in May 1993, terminating the UNITAF operation. The residual U.S. force—supporting the revised and expanded UN military effort (UNOSOM II) including combat elements, and the UN was deeply embroiled in the Somali tribal politics, and little attention was paid to implementing urgently needed projects to revive the nation.

When the U.S. and UN (UNOSOM I) humanitarian efforts in Somalia failed to ease the crisis because of interference from Somali fighters and along the highways, the United States led a UN-sanctioned Unified Task Force (UNITAF) into Mogadishu in December 1992. The large-scale UNITAF operation quickly opened Mogadishu's port and major highways and ended the food crisis. However, the operation was restored by the local forces left in May 1993, terminating the UNITAF operation. The residual U.S. force—supporting the revised and expanded UN military effort (UNOSOM II) included combat elements, and these were reinforced in the summer of 1993 by elite ranger elements dispatched in what came to be perceived as a manhunt for the most formidable Somali warlord, General Farah Aideed. The U.S. and the UN were now deeply embroiled in Somalia tribal politics, and little attention was paid to implementing urgently needed projects to revive the nation.

Forty-four U.S. soldiers were killed and 175 were injured or wounded in the humanitarian and follow-up nation-building efforts in Somalia. But efforts to capture or break the warlords failed. Instead, public and congressional pressures generated by mounting casualties and dramatic media coverage forced a phased U.S. withdrawal ending in March 1994, followed in March 1995 by total UN withdrawal.

With the exit of the would-be peacemakers, Somalia reverted to a state of lawlessness; but the famine has not returned, and commercial activity has revived somewhat at the local level, in some cases with international connections. In 1996, the international community seems to have accepted Somalia as a failed state with no functioning central authorities, and currently not deserving of further political or social engineering.

The failure in Somalia and widespread adverse reactions from the public and Congress greatly reduced the enthusiasm of the U.S. government for peacekeeping operations anywhere, and weakened...
its ability to call on others to take action. Any near-term commitment of additional U.S. forces directly into Somalia in support of humanitarian or peacekeeping operations seems most unlikely.

**U.S. Interests and Approaches**

**Net Assessment**

The stress of internal chaos and financial collapse in some African countries has led to the end of government and the collapse of state institutions—the troubled-state syndrome. In almost every case, militant ethnicity and unwillingness by the dominant ethnic faction to share power seems to be at the center of the problems. As of 1996, Liberia and Somalia were failed states. Angola, Zaire, Sierra Leone, Sudan, Rwanda, and Burundi were approaching the syndrome, and Chad, Nigeria, Niger, and others showed similar tendencies. Those states that have utterly failed must either be rescued or left to flounder in their own incapacity.

On the other hand, taken as a whole, Africa in the 1990s has made substantial progress towards democracy and has made modest economic progress. With continuing attention and assistance from the international community, these positive trends should be sustainable. The progress of South Africa is particularly significant.

**U.S. Interests**

U.S. interests in sub-Saharan Africa are modest.

**Promotion of Stability**

U.S. political interest in Africa has historically been low. The event that most increased U.S. interest and involvement in the region was the beginning of the Cold War. Over the Cold War’s four decades, U.S. interest in the region alternately waxed and waned; many policymakers tended to regard regional problems as part of the East-West struggle and superpower competition and to allocate resources fairly generously to regional clients. After the Cold War, U.S. political interest and commitment of assistance resources again waned, reducing the priority attached to African issues and the leverage available to U.S. politicians and diplomats attempting to help Africa address its problems and crises.

**Defending Humanitarian Values**

U.S. values are shocked when hundreds of thousands of people die from natural disasters like the mid-1980s Sudan drought or from genocidal civil war as in Rwanda in the early 1990s. While these situations may not threaten vital U.S. national security interests, the U.S. will act on humanitarian grounds in face of a dire situation. However, in those situations where it is unclear what can be done to help, as is often the case in civil unrest, the U.S. may not act, despite extensive suffering.

**Access to Trade**

Sub-Saharan Africa plays only a small role in overall U.S. trade: in 1995, its forty-eight countries accounted for less than 1 percent of U.S. commodity exports and approximately 2 percent of U.S. commodity imports. The United States’s one important economic interest in Africa is oil: in 1995, Angola provided 5 percent of U.S. oil imports, Nigeria 8.6 percent.

**U.S. Approach**

Despite sub-Saharan Africa’s position at the bottom of U.S. policymakers’ priorities, the United States in the 1990s has committed military forces to large-scale peacekeeping operations and humanitarian missions in Somalia and Rwanda and to frequent evacuations of U.S. citizens.

There is less contact between the U.S. military and armed forces in sub-Saharan Africa than there is in any other area of the world. Except for about 50 military attachés and security assistance officers and about 200 Marine embassy security guards, there is no permanent stationing of U.S. military personnel in Africa, nor do U.S. national interests in the region require it. There exists no vital U.S. military interest in the sub-Saharan region that might lead to a major deployment of U.S. forces. Nevertheless, the region has been a fre-
quent area of operational activity for the U.S. military, mainly in humanitarian operations and NEOs. Circumstances will very likely oblige the U.S. military to participate in several small military operations in the region by the early years of the twenty-first century.

Because conflict and humanitarian disasters may require some form of U.S. response in Africa, the U.S. approach encompasses the following areas, with emphasis on preventive action:

- Financial support of operations carried out by other nations and by international organizations.
- Assistance to African states in developing capabilities for conflict resolution; subregional, regional, and international peacekeeping; and humanitarian relief in order to contribute to regional stability and eventually reduce the need for and cost of such activities. (Since fiscal year 1994, the United States has provided modest financial support to the OAU. In 1996, the United States provided an additional $30.4 million in assistance to the West African force in Liberia, apparently contingent on measures to improve its effectiveness.) On a broader scale, the U.S. has very recently offered to help organize an “African Crisis Response Force”, which would deploy into crisis areas around the continent and establish safe havens for civilians. The force would be composed of carefully selected African units, which the United States would help train, equip and fund. While the initial European response to the idea has been unenthusiastic, several African nations have expressed support, and the proposition was given high prominence in Secretary Christopher’s trip to Africa in October 1996.

- Intensive diplomatic activity to address potential and actual catastrophes.
- Increased attention to early warning of impending drought and famine.
- Substantial support of humanitarian activities through international agencies, nongovernmental organizations, and private voluntary organizations, such as transport and logistic support, air support, intelligence sharing, and possibly combat support to provide essential security services in exceptional cases.

U.S. forces will be used for multilateral peacekeeping or peace enforcement operations only in rare circumstances, and then only for short-term periods and with minimal involvement of combat elements. The U.S. contribution would normally be limited to the same type of support as for humanitarian interventions, and in most cases would be of short duration, until forces from other nations could be prepared to fill those roles. Unilateral U.S. peacekeeping or peace enforcement operations in Africa are not anticipated, with the possible (albeit unlikely) exception of Liberia.
CHAPTER FOURTEEN

Middle East Radicalism

This chapter focuses on the internal challenges to stability in individual countries in the region from North Africa through Iran. For discussion of Arab-Israeli issues, see the chapter on the Arab-Israeli Conflict. For discussion of potential areas of conflict between Persian Gulf states, see the chapter on the Persian Gulf.

Many regimes in the Middle East and North Africa region will face troubled times owing to looming succession/transition-of-power crises and economic shortfalls resulting from flat revenues, burgeoning populations, and overspending. At the same time, they are confronting perhaps their most serious challenge yet from radicalized Muslims who are demanding political reform, greater economic justice, an end to foreign influence, and shelter from change. Most of the regimes are not yet at imminent risk of overthrow or of having to concede or share power with new parties or interest groups. Similarly, U.S. interests in the region are probably not at risk in the short term. However, the strategies of regional governments for coping with their Islamist and other critics could present problems for U.S. policies in the longer term, if the region’s pro-U.S. ruling families lose their grip on power, economic conditions worsen, and opposition elements become better organized.

Background and Trends

Although often perceived as chronically unstable and troubled, the governments of the Middle East have shown a remarkable stability and resiliency for several decades. Several heads of state in power in 1996 had been in power since the 1960s or earlier: Jordan’s King Hussein has ruled since 1952, King Hassan of Morocco since 1961, and Oman’s Sultan Qaboos since 1970, Syria’s President Assad since 1971, Iraq’s President Hussein since 1968, Sudan’s government was toppled by a military coup in 1989, Qatar’s by a family spat in 1995. But in the last 20 years, only Iran has experienced a revolution. Elections have regularly replaced governments in Israel, assassination has triggered political successions in Egypt and Israel, and ill health has forced the peaceful replacement of rulers in Egypt and Saudi Arabia. In most of these changes, the ruler was replaced but the system of government and, most often, the party remained in power.
The region experienced several major and minor wars—the Arab-Israeli conflicts of 1956, 1967, and 1973; Israel’s incursion into Lebanon in 1982; the rout of the Palestinians from Jordan in 1970; the eight-year-long war between Iran and Iraq; and Iraq’s invasion of Kuwait in August 1990. None of these events toppled governments. In 1995, five years after Saddam Hussein invaded Kuwait and four years after the first Oslo accord granted self-determination to the Palestinians, the region looked much the same as it did in the 1960s and 1970s, when many of the rulers first took power.

Religion As the Answer to All Problems

For many in the Middle East and North Africa—confused by the demands of change, uncertain of what the future may bring, and frustrated by military defeat—Islamic revivalism is providing both explanation and vindication. Islamic activists demanding reform are becoming increasingly vocal and influential forces in the region. It is not the religion that has suddenly become radical. Rather, a small but growing number of Muslims have become radicalized, have a political agenda, and claim to see in Islam justifications for their actions.

What Radical Islamists Want

Islamic revivalism has been a recurring theme in Islamic history and politics. The current wave of reformers, like their eighteenth- and nineteenth-century predecessors, demand an end to rule by corrupt, un-Islamic rulers, and a return to the purity of early Islam. Modern radicalized Muslims are motivated by several other factors:

- The Iranian revolution of 1979 and the establishment of clerical rule signaled to many in both the Sunni and Shi‘ah Muslim communities that radicalized Islam could define and even force political change.
- Foreign-inspired, secular ideologies, such as Gamal Abdel Nasser’s brand of pan-Arab nationalism, the Ba‘thists’ version of Arab socialism, and the shah’s brand of Persian nationalism, failed to protect the Arabs or Iran from military defeat or loss of territory, or to provide solutions for the basic problems of poverty and lack of regime accountability.

- The defeat of the Soviets in Afghanistan through the holy war against the Communist regime gave Muslim militants from the Arab and non-Arab world a chance to train and bond together in a common cause.
- The success of extremism and terrorism against Israel and attempts to force pro-Western regimes to change foreign policies has fueled the Islamic cause. The attack on the Marine barracks and the taking of Western hostages in Lebanon are examples of acts of terror by Islamic radicals that forced the U.S. to alter its foreign policy and militarily retreat from Lebanon.

In most countries of the Middle East and North Africa region, Islamic activists are becoming more outspoken in demanding government reform and more insistent that communities conform to Islamic standards of morality and politics. Activist Islam has two basic forms: a more moderate, nonviolent, accommodationist side that opts to work within the political system; and a more militant, extremist side that believes that the system must be destroyed and seeks confrontation with the regime through violence and terror. In Turkey, Egypt, Lebanon, Jordan, Morocco, Kuwait, and Yemen, Islamic activists are trying to work within the political mainstream to shape the institutions of civil society, introduce Islamic law, and monitor government actions. Examples of more militant Islamist radicals, who believe terrorism and violence are their only recourse, include the Islamic Salvation Front and other extremist factions in Algeria, al-Gama‘at al-Islamiyyah and al-Jihad in Egypt, and elements of Hizbullah in Lebanon. But the differences between the two kinds of Islamic activists are primarily tactical, not strategic.

Radicalized Islamists Gaining Strength.

Radical Islamist groups are not monolithic. Their agendas and actions are shaped by local events and situations, not by any impending clash of civilizations, as Samuel Huntington and other scholars have warned. Several trends are becoming increasingly evident:
Most groups are and will continue to be locally based and locally led. Most will be self-supporting, depending on tithes of the local community and donations from wealthy rulers and expatriates living abroad. The exception is Hizballah, which will continue to rely on Iran for assistance, specifically, for humanitarian subsidies to Lebanon’s impoverished Muslim communities and for logistic matériel needed to battle Israel. Their activities will still be centered in mosques in small, rural towns and among the mosques and religious centers in the poorer neighborhoods of such cities as Cairo, Istanbul, Manama, and Amman, where migrants and minorities are concentrated.

The appeal of the more moderate Islamists will spread to broader segments of the population because of stagnant or declining economic conditions, and the activists’ ability to fund a wide range of religious and social welfare programs. This is especially true for Hizballah in Lebanon and the Muslim Brotherhood in Egypt— their popularity is boosted by their ability to fund humanitarian outreach programs in the event of natural disasters (such as the 1992 Cairo earthquake, which devastated sections of the city) and the shelling of south Lebanon by Israel this year in response to Hizballah rocket attacks on settlements in northern Israel. As in 1982, the Israeli attacks on civilian populations served to boost local support for Hizballah rather than diminish it.

Agendas will be centered on domestic political issues—reforming the political infrastructure, gaining power, implementing Islamic law, ensuring that new laws conform with Islam, and gaining influence over decisions affecting the economy and education. This focus on domestic agendas and the need for financial support to advance their agendas means foreign influence will probably be limited to provision of financial assistance.

Radical Islamist leaders and groups will continue to expand their contacts with like-minded groups outside their country. Networking will help them acquire training, logistic and financial assistance, broader community support, and enhanced operational capabilities.
Iran and Sudan, the only states headed by radical Islamic regimes, will continue to provide support to Islamist factions, some of which—Hizballah, Hamas, and the Palestinian Islamic Jihad—use terrorism to achieve their ends. They will support Islamic causes because they believe it is their duty and a relatively cheap way to expand national influence and promote their anti-Western brand of Islam.

Even if the region's radical Islamists accept peace with Israel, they will not accede to any resolution of the Jerusalem issue that leaves the city in Israeli hands. Some Arab Muslim governments—such as Saudi Arabia—have already said they cannot accept a final settlement without Jerusalem, while Islamic radicals could use their governments' failure to defend Islamic interests in Jerusalem to challenge the domestic credibility, legitimacy, and popularity of those regimes. The Islamists would accuse the regimes of following a U.S. diktat rather than serving Islamic interests, language intended to rouse popular passions against the rulers.

Over the next few years, radical Islamist groups could face growing internal strains caused by leadership rivalries, disagreements over tactics to be used in challenging or cooperating with the regime, reliance on foreign supporters, and response to the prospect of an end to state-sponsored opposition to Israel. Leaders of Algeria's Islamic Salvation Front—most of whom are in prison or exile—have little control or influence over the militant elements fighting the civil war in Algeria or over the more moderate Islamists with whom the regime is willing to hold talks. Factions within Hizballah or the Muslim Brotherhood organizations in Egypt and Jordan could grow increasingly frustrated over the slow pace of reform or the lack of progress gained from twenty years of good behavior. The disagreements could also be more cosmetic than real, intended to divert attention away from clandestine operations.

Regime Responses

Most governments are trying to rival the Islamists' popularity by adopting some of their political and humanitarian programs. Such good works include support

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The Five Pillars of Islam: The Radical Version

The Koran sets forth five specific duties that a righteous Muslim must perform. They are testimony (the profession of faith that says "There is no god but God, and Muhammad is the messenger of God") prayer, charity, fasting during the daylight hours of the month of Ramadan, and a pilgrimage to Mecca and Medina by every adult Muslim, at least once in his lifetime.

Islamic activists—be they moderate or extremist, Sunni or Shi'ah—agree on an additional set of basic principles:

- Accountability. They demand replacement of the rulers of most Muslim populations because the rulers are corrupt and incapable of reform.
- Justice. They insist on the establishment of Islamic government and rule by Islamic law (Sharia) as the basis of all law.
- Purity. They seek to eliminate foreign influence and interests—especially U.S.—from the region. In particular, they oppose the presence of foreign, non-Muslim forces on Saudi soil to protect the heartland of Islam.
- Jihad (holy war). In Arabic, the word implies personal or political struggle to achieve the just society, the Islamic state. For some, this can mean only war.
- Rejection of peace with Israel. They oppose the existence of the state of Israel because, they say, Jews cannot rule over the Islamic ummah (community) or waqf (territory or wealth held in trust for the community). They view the Oslo accords as selling out Muslim rights to Jerusalem and its holy places, an act which they argue, no Muslim or Palestinian has the right to do.

Many Islamists advocate the use of Western-style democracy to come to power, but they deny it is a suitable system by which to rule believers. Academic specialists are divided on the willingness of Islamic activists to rule democratically once elected. Would Islamists allow elections that would result in their defeat? Some scholars argue for a politics of inclusion, which holds that, once elected, Islamists will act like politicians in general and seek accommodation to make political gains. The activists themselves are ambiguous on the issue of democracy. The more moderate Islamists tend to talk, especially to Western audiences, about the legitimate transfer of power by democratic means to their cause; they do not discuss whether they would be willing to transfer power subsequently to non-Islamic groups if they lost an election. Radical Islamist leaders such as Hassan al-Turabi, head of Sudan's National Islamic Front, and Hassan Nasrallah, a Shi'ah cleric prominent in Lebanon's Hizballah, see democracy as man-made and therefore flawed, a means to the end of true Islamic government.
In Iraq, U.S. Marines construct a refugee camp to house Kurdish refugees fleeing from a post-war Iraq.

for beleaguered Muslims in Bosnia, Kashmir, and Central Asia, and patronage of local religious institutions. As of 1996, money for arms and clinics is freely given, King Hassan built the largest mosque in the world in Rabat; King Hussein has sold personal assets to renovate the Dome of the Rock mosque in Jerusalem; Saddam Hussein has been lavishly refurbishing Shi’ah Muslim shrines in Karbala that his forces destroyed while suppressing the rebellion of 1991, and so forth. Few radical Islamists are won over by these charitable works or appearances of piety, and there is little impact on U.S. policy.

Most radicalized Islamists demand the elimination of U.S. influence and presence from the region. The demand is loudest in the case of Saudi Arabia, where opponents of the Al Saud criticize them for allowing foreign, non-Muslim forces on Arabian soil to protect the Muslim homeland. Though regimes may look for assurances of U.S. protection and presence as they perceive a growing threat against their rule from domestic forces, they may also separate themselves publicly from U.S. initiatives. They could refuse requests for expanded pre-positioning of military equipment and billeting of personnel, and deny greater access to military facilities or move U.S. forces to isolated areas to render them invisible. It is unlikely that they would refuse to participate in joint training exercises, but they are likely to become increasingly reluctant partners in burden sharing, i.e., paying the costs of U.S. deployment in the region.

The governments in Tunisia, Libya, Egypt, Algeria, Syria, Oman, Bahrain, and Saudi Arabia apply draconian tactics in dealing with potential and real Islamist opponents. Those suspected of membership in or having sympathies for Islamist movements—be they moderate or militant—are watched closely, isolated from society by denial of jobs and housing, arrested, interrogated, tried in military courts rather than civilian ones, and condemned to exile, prison, or death. Police shoot-outs with terrorists often do not discriminate between the presumed innocent and the guilty. Violations of human rights and civil liberties are common, and U.S. protests are viewed by most governments as interference in their internal affairs.

Several pro-U.S. governments that allow elections, parliaments, and transparency in government are finding that unrestrained democracy can work against their self-interest. Algeria, which allowed elections and lost, is the example given by governments elsewhere trying to avoid the same mistake. Other tactics include banning political parties based on religious lines in most countries; canceling elections in Algeria; changing voting procedures and gerrymandering electoral districts with Islamist representatives in Jordan; arresting Muslim Brotherhood leaders before elections in Egypt, and changing elective municipal offices to appointive offices to avoid Islamists winning office, again in Egypt. The regimes see these actions as internal matters and assume they will have U.S. support because of shared security interests and treaty commitments. Islamists regard the U.S. government as hypocritical in not supporting their quest for traditional, basic American values of democracy, equality, and the application of constitutional safeguards. The United States asserts its right to meet with whomever it pleases but shies away from contacts with dissidents that might seriously disrupt relations with regimes that support U.S. policies.
Dynastic Difficulties

In most Middle Eastern countries, the issue is not so much who will succeed—that has been determined by family or party consensus and in many countries follows long-established tribal traditions—but how successful the new leader will be in maintaining stability, deflecting Islamist critics, and balancing the interests of friends and foes. Succession does not always pass from father to son but it almost always reflects a delicate balance of family, sectarian, and military-civilian interests. There are two standard methods of succession: royal blood lines and republican sheikhs.

Royal Blood Lines

In most Middle Eastern societies, succession follows family lines. Traditionally, family councils determine through consensus who will rule. In Jordan, Morocco, and Saudi Arabia, the designated successor, or crown prince, is a son or brother who, in general, supports the king’s policies but lacks the charisma and popularity the king has enjoyed in the decades he has ruled. Jordan’s King Hussein and Morocco’s King Hassan have been able to balance various interest groups to maintain power, but their successors are perceived as weak and possibly unable to wield the strong hand necessary to keep oppositionists in line. The two kings have an additional and rare claim to political legitimacy that tends to disarm their political rivals—they are descended from the family of the Prophet Muhammad.

Republican Sheikhs

Military and party coups have determined succession in several Arab states, including Iraq, Syria, Libya, Egypt, and Yemen. To consolidate their rule, these leaders have portrayed themselves as presidents for life elected by mass votes (98 percent for Assad in a December 1991 referendum, 99.6 percent for Saddam in a 1995 election). Even Egypt, which has an elected parliament, turned out a 90 percent vote for President Mubarak. The leaders also cloak themselves in traditional forms of legitimacy—as nationalist figures, symbols of their country’s religious and historic past, leaders of secular and Muslim causes, and defenders of the beleaguered
Palestinians. Saddam Hussein, for example, portrays himself as a republican sheikh—as an elected president and a traditional tribal leader—as well as a descendant of the Prophet, an army general, and, after the occupation of Kuwait, as a hero of the Palestinian and Islamic causes.

Economic Uncertainties

In the 1960s and 1970s, the Middle East region (from North Africa on east through Iran) performed as well or better than any other region of the world in income growth per capita, equality of income distribution, improvements in life expectancy, primary-school attendance, and literacy rates. These successes reflected high oil prices, small populations, and a less competitive world market. Many states could provide generous safety nets for their citizens.

For the past decade the region has been in economic decline. A 1995 World Bank study described the region’s economic performance as poor, despite its former favorable record and considerable underlying economic advantages. According to the report, the reason for the decline lies in the region’s economic and political policies, including a reluctance to reform, and in the international economic environment, including lower oil prices, greater competition, and increasingly mobile capital. The decline began in 1986, with the collapse in world oil prices, a fall in productivity, and increased international competition. In some countries, producers and consumers are being asked for the first time to pay for services they have always received for free. In the Gulf, for example, token user fees are applied to electricity, education, water, telephone, and health care, and in Saudi Arabia, gasoline prices have been raised. The problem is compounded by governments’ postponing or refusing to implement reforms because of corruption and fear of taking on entrenched interest groups. Companies that benefit from protectionist policies and cheap credit, and a middle class accustomed to subsidies and well-paying public sector jobs, are reluctant to see their privileges erode. The result is static economic growth, low or no growth in productivity, and growing dissatisfaction from groups and individuals frustrated by their seeming loss of power and frightened of changes that could result in a loss of status and lowered standards of living. Middle Eastern states spent about $850 billion on their armed forces in the past decade. Their militaries absorb about 7 percent of GDP and 20 percent of overall government expenditures—more than twice the average for developing countries.

Most countries in the Middle East and North Africa—be they oil rich or oil poor—face unprecedented austerity measures because of overspending, corruption, high birth and lowered death rates, and subsidies most governments can ill afford. In the late 1990s, economic downsizing

Ethnic Map of the Middle East
will have a significant impact on countries like Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, and the United Arab Emirates, where pursuit of wealth has been the primary preoccupation and the current generation has known only privilege and economic security. The impact will hit even harder in countries like Egypt, Jordan, Bahrain, Syria, and Yemen, which have large populations, mounting debt, and little or no resource base. In those countries, government is no longer able to be the employer and provider of last resort, foreign-aid packages are shrinking; and the oil-rich Arab states are reluctant to hire the nationals of these states or subsidize their fragile economies.

**Potential Flashpoints**

No government in the Middle East and North Africa is likely to be overthrown by radicalized Islamists within the next three to ten years, but all will have to deal with challenges to their rule from Islamist political opponents. Only one, Algeria, is at risk of civil war, but Bahrain, Egypt, and Turkey are all at increased risk of violence and demands for political reform from outspoken, radical Islamist factions. Jerusalem could prove the catalyst for violence by Muslims against their governments and against U.S. interests. The following provides an overview of flashpoints in the region.

**Stalemate in Algeria**

Islamic radicals and the military-controlled government have been on a collision course since the government canceled the second round of elections in early 1992. The first round in December 1991 had been called by then president Chadli Bendjedid as an experiment in multiparty democracy. It culminated in a landslide victory for the Islamic Salvation Front (FIS). The military then forced Bendjedid to resign, canceled the results of the December election, and formed a five-man collective presidency to govern in Bendjedid’s place. The cancellation—provoked out of fear of a second Islamist victory—triggered escalating violence in which Islamic radicals began targeting foreign workers as well as women, intellectuals, and government bureaucrats. The government declared a state of emergency in February 1992 that enhanced the powers of the security forces and in 1994 appointed Liamine Zeroual president. In more than four years of virtual civil war, more than fifty thousand civilians, militants, and military personnel have been killed. Neither the government nor the radical Islamists has been able to attract broad support among the Algerian population or deal a knockout blow to the other.

The Algerian military’s goal is to eliminate the Islamic radicals, introduce economic reform, and use dialogue with tame Islamists to marginalize the FIS and other opposition parties. Zeroual was elected president in elections held in November 1995, in what the government described as a large turnout. This enhanced the government’s legitimacy and reinforced the generals’ commitment to eradicating the insurgents. Zeroual also offered to open dialogue with some Islamists—not the FIS—but there will probably be no concessions to the Islamists to broker peace, and the violence probably will continue. The larger than anticipated turn-out in the election, the militants’ inability to disrupt it, and the opposition’s failure to sway the voters almost certainly has strengthened the government’s hand. While the United States has few assets in

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**The Devil is in the Demographic Details**

Statistics from the World Bank, among other sources, suggest some potentially alarming demographic trends:

- There is a profound generation gap between the rulers and the ruled. In most Middle Eastern countries, political leaders over 60 years of age are governing societies where more than half of the population is under the age of 15.
- The population of the region is nearly 300 million and rapidly growing. Annual growth rates range from 1.4 percent for Israel (excluding immigration) and 1.9 percent for Egypt to 2.3 percent for Iran, 2.7 percent for Bahrain, 3.7 percent for Saudi Arabia, 3.7 percent for Iraq, 4.0 percent for Yemen, and 4.5 percent for Gaza. Correspondingly, the number of children that a typical woman will bear in her lifetime (the total fertility rate) ranges from 2.8 in Israel to 7.7 in Gaza.
- Unemployment and underemployment are serious problems, usually more serious than official figures on unemployment indicate. Unemployment is extremely high in pockets of poverty, such as Shi’ah villages in Bahrain, and among young males who are looking for their first job. In Algeria, Egypt, Jordan, and Syria, educated young male workers account for 60 to 80 percent of the unemployed.
Pakistan, U.S. facilities have been attacked twice and U.S. citizens are at risk from renewed terrorist attacks. U.S. forces could be in danger in assisting evacuation of U.S. and other foreign nationals from Algeria should the conflict widen.

U.S. policy and deployments could also be affected by European and Arab perceptions of what is happening in Algeria. France, Italy, Germany, and Spain depend on Algeria for a significant percentage of their energy needs. They and Algeria’s North African neighbors worry about access to oil and natural gas resources, refugee spillover, and terrorist attacks should the situation in Algeria deteriorate further. Fourteen million Muslims live in Western Europe, eight hundred thousand of them Algerians living in France, and Islam outranks Protestantism as the second-largest and fastest growing religion. In 1995, a series of bombings in France by Algerian Islamic extremists killed 9 and injured 170 people. Algeria’s Arab neighbors believe the turmoil vindicates their crackdowns on radical Islamists and opposition to elections. Neither their nor European concerns will abate while Algeria sorts out its domestic economic and political crises.

**Bahrain as Bellwether for the Arabian Peninsula**

Home to one of the oldest cultures in the Middle East, Bahrain is also one of the first to become oil-poor and one of the few to face open, hostile political confrontation with an increasingly radicalized and vociferous opposition. Bahrain’s woes are those of the region in microcosm. A small, resource-poor country, Bahrain lives primarily on declining revenues from an oil refinery, Saudi largesse, and service industries. Its ailing but tolerant ruler, Amir Isa, has enjoyed widespread support from the Sunni and Shi’ah communities in the thirty-five years he has ruled. Isa governs in consultation with family members—particularly his brother, Prime Minister Khalifa, his son and designated successor, Crown Prince Hamad, and a small Cabinet, which has Sunni and Shi’ah representation. Political parties are prohibited, and Islamic law is a source rather than the source of law. Bahrain permits the consumption of alcohol and a relaxed style of Western dress not tolerated in neighboring Saudi Arabia; it also allows Christian, Jewish, Sikh, Hindu, and Bahai communities to practice their religion openly.

Poor by Persian Gulf standards, Bahrain has an economy many countries would envy. Per capita GDP in 1994 was $7,500 a year, GNP was $4.1 billion, and average life expectancy is about seventy years. The official unemployment rate is 15 percent, but the rate probably approaches 30 percent in Shi’ah villages. Bahrain’s
Shi’ahs generally hold lower-paying jobs and are the last hired, first fired. The annual population growth rate is 2.8 percent, low for the region, but the rate is higher among Shi’ah families than Sunnis, and new job creation cannot keep pace with new job seekers entering the market.

Manama is under increasing pressure from radical Islamists seeking an end to years of economic and political discrimination. The Islamists come mostly from the tiny country’s Shi’ah community, nearly 70 percent of the population. Joined by Sunni activists, these Islamists demand jobs, government accountability, and a return to the short-lived national assembly convened in 1973 and closed two years later because of its allegedly disruptive behavior and Saudi pressure. One anti-regime Islamist faction—the Bahrain Freedom Movement—claims loyalty to the Amir but wants reforms and the opportunity to work within the system; another faction—the Islamic Front for the Liberation of Bahrain—was responsible for an aborted coup attempt in 1981 and is depicted by observers as more militant and revolutionary; its leaders are in exile in Iran or London.

Troubles began after the end of the Gulf War. In 1992, three hundred prominent Bahrainis, including Sunni and Shi’ah clerics, signed a petition calling for the restoration of the constitution and parliamentary rule. The government responded by creating a new appointive, consultative council of thirty members, half Sunni and half Shi’ah. A second petition two years later called for political reform and the return of political exiles. Since 1994, there has been recurrent unrest, including street demonstrations, bombings of luxury hotels used by foreigners, and arson fires. In January 1996, the government arrested a prominent Shi’ah cleric and several hundred supporters for allegedly plotting to destabilize the regime.

Manama’s reaction to its troubles has been to blame Iran and to arrest, deport, and imprison oppositionists; in one case, an opponent was executed for killing a policeman. These activities serve only to arouse more anger and anti-regime demonstrations. Isa’s death and Hamad’s succession could fuel renewed unrest among Bahrain’s activists, for many Shi’ahs view the prince with suspicion, seeing him as anti-reform and anti-Shi’ah.

Bahrain is homeport to the U.S. Navy’s Fifth Fleet, with between five and six hundred military and civilian personnel on shore and extensive facilities for military and civilian use. U.S. interests have not been directly threatened by terrorist attack, but hotels and restaurants catering to foreigners have been bombed and U.S. personnel could become targets for Islamist extremists determined to drive a wedge between the government and its most visible backer.

**Egypt Confronts Its Islamists**

Radical Islam is the most serious political challenge facing President Husni Mubarak, but even if he were assassinated by Islamist militants, as was Anwar Sadat, radical Islamists are unlikely to displace the government. Egypt’s problems are long term and systemic: leaders tainted with charges of corruption and unhappy with Egypt’s diminished leadership role in the region, bureaucratic inertia that inhibits the emergence of new leaders and immobilizes any efforts to reform, an uncertain succession, an unemployment rate of above 20 percent (mostly among the young), and massive debt and inflation. The public sector produces more than half of the country’s GDP, and the government traditionally has been the largest employer, guaranteeing until recently free education, housing, and medical care. The military’s primary function is employment and production. Egypt has repeatedly failed to implement reforms promised to the International Monetary Fund, primarily because it fears a recurrence of the 1978 bread riots if it tries to eliminate a basic, popular subsidy.

Radicalized Muslim leaders have built on the country’s poverty, the regime’s lackluster leadership, and the government’s inefficient efforts to cope with crises to create popular and effective Islamist movements grounded in local neighborhoods. The first and most influential modern radicalized Islamist group in the Middle East, the Muslim Brotherhood,
originated in Egypt in 1928 and remains Egypt's largest Islamist group. It dominates the administration of education, provides a wide range of social and humanitarian services, and has control of most professional associations, including those representing lawyers, engineers, and teachers. Once known for its extremism and violence, the Brotherhood has changed tactics and is trying to become part of the mainstream political process dedicated to the gradual, nonviolent evolution of Egypt from a secular to an Islamic state. Less influential but more dangerous in the short term are Egypt's extremist radical Islamist factions—al-Gamā‘at al-Islamiyyah (the Islamic Group) and the new Al-Jihād. Both organizations claim responsibility for a number of terrorist acts, including attempted assassinations of senior government officials, secular intellectuals, and foreign tourists.

Cairo has declared war on its Islamists, be they the more pacific Muslim Brotherhood or the avowedly terrorist Gamā‘at. The government makes no distinction between the two and claims that all Islamists are in league with the Gamā‘at and Jihad groups and support terrorism. Egypt bans political parties based on religion and, prior to elections held in early 1996, conducted security sweeps and arrests of Brotherhood leaders, including prominent politicians, to neutralize their influence. There is probably little risk to U.S. military interests in Egypt although Cairo may be less willing to support U.S. policy interests. Mubarak's efforts to reassert a leadership role following the election of the Likud government in Israel in May were intended to boost his regime's Islamic legitimacy as well as its pan Arab credentials. In June, Cairo hosted the first Pan Arab summit since 1990 to try to create a common Arab strategy to deal with the Netanyahu government's opposition to continuing the peace process.

**Turkey Under Islamist Rule**

For the first time since Mustafa Kemal Ataturk seized power in the 1920s, Turkey in 1996 was ruled by a religious party acting in coalition with a secular political faction. Ataturk, founder of the modern Turkish state, secularized government and politics by declaring a republic, separating the religious institution from government, and banning many vestiges of Islamicized rule, including the Arabic alphabet, the chador for women, and the fez for men. The 1996 coalition raised key questions for the old-style nationalists in the government and the military, who have traditionally looked West for their models, and Islamist supporters of the new government, who call for Turkey to look East to a more Islamicized network of diplomatic and economic relationships.

The change came relatively peacefully, following several elections in which the Islamist Refah (welfare) Party won larger margins of the vote and key mayoralty elections, and after repeated failed attempts by secular political leaders to form a government. In the summer of 1996, after six months of political paralysis, a coalition government led by Refah Party leader Necmettin Erbakan and former Prime Minister and True Path Party head Tansu Ciller received a vote of confidence from the parliament in Ankara. The long delay in the successful formation of a government was due not just to efforts to exclude the Islamists but was also in large part due to deeply-rooted rivalries among...
the two larger conservative secular political parties—Motherland and the True Path—and personal animosities between party leaders. Refah Party leader Erbakan served in two previous governments in the 1970s, a period of instability and upheaval in Turkey. The governments were usually led by left-leaning regimes which created the conditions leading up to a coup by the Turkish military in 1980. The Turkish military, one of the most daunting and respected institutions in the country, is regarded by its leaders and much of the public as the guardian of Atatürk’s brand of secularism. Turkey’s generals have not hesitated to move forcefully in a crisis that they believe threatens the nation’s security interests, but they are aware of accusations in the West and inside Turkey where they have been too willing to intervene in domestic politics.

Besides the question of the role of Islam in political life, the other major issue facing Turkey is the treatment of the Kurdish ethnic minority. Ankara has been battling an insurgency movement, the Kurdish Workers Party (PKK), for many years. Not all of Turkey’s Kurdish population supports the PKK, but sympathy for the plight of the Kurds has increased abroad because of Turkish repression and polarized public opinion at home. Because of the ongoing Kurdish insurgency, in 1996 much of southeastern Turkey remained under martial law imposed after the 1980 military coup.

These changes in Turkey’s internal politics have raised questions about its stability and fueled an already heated debate over whether Turkey should be allowed to join the European Union (EU) as a full member. Many Turkey-watchers in Europe and in the EU have concluded that the growing pro-Refah vote and the continuing aggressive actions of the Turkish military in the country’s southeast (where the Kurdish population and the PKK is concentrated) signal a return to Ottoman-like policies of imperial control and repression which characterized Turkish geopolitics for several hundred years.

The fragility of the Turkish political system comes at the same time Turkey is making its transition from Cold War buffer state to New World Order buffer state and when political transition in Central Asia is raising new opportunities to expand Turkish national influence. The convergence poses a unique set of problems for the United States which depends on Turkish cooperation to monitor northern Iraq and not to upset Russia. The potential for conflict at this key geopolitical crossroads—where three continents meet and several countries’ national interests clash—is high and could indirectly affect U.S. strategic interests in the region.

The most likely locale for this to occur would be in southeastern Turkey:

- Turkey and Syria are enmeshed in a dispute over water rights and the Turkish GAP project, a network of hydroelectric dams which when completed threatens to severely reduce the flow of the Euphrates river downstream, to Syria and Iraq. Ankara accuses Syrian President Asad of harboring the leadership of the PKK in Damascus where they are protected from Turkish reprisals.

- Many in Ankara would like improved relations with Iraq. Turkey was an important ally in the 1991 coalition against Saddam Hussein. Thereafter, it permitted Operation Provide Comfort (OPC), which monitors activity in the Kurdish-dominated zone of northern Iraq, to operate from an air base in eastern Turkey. Ankara’s parliament must periodically reapprove the operation, which is not popular in nationalist and Islamist circles. Turkey would like to reopen its oil pipeline, which before the Gulf War carried two million barrels of Iraqi crude a day to Turkey’s Mediterranean ports, yielding $200 million annually to Turkey in pipeline fees and revenues. In April 1996, Saddam Hussein agreed to accept UN Security Council Resolution 986,
which permits Baghdad to sell $2 billion in oil for food and humanitarian needs; it specifies that most of the oil must be shipped via the Turkish pipeline. However, implementation of the resolution was put on indefinite hold in September 1996 following Iraq’s operations to expand its control in the Kurdish areas of northern Iraq. As of late 1996, the loss of those revenues and the Turkish military’s assumption that Operation Provide Comfort encourages separatism among Kurds in Turkey and Iraq were feeding a movement to end Turkish support for the operation.

- Turkey and Iran are competing for influence in northern Iraq among the Iraqi Kurdish factions. Since 1994, internecine warfare has been going on between the two main Iraqi Kurdish groups, the Iraqi Kurdish Democratic Party (KDP) led by Masud Barzani and the Patriotic Union of Kurdistan (PUK) led by Jalal Talabani. At various times, Iran has supported one or the other to different degrees. Turkey has been more supportive of Barzani, especially in 1994–95, in large part because Barzani agreed to move against PKK base camps in northern Iraq. When popular pressure among Iraqi Kurds led Barzani to cease cooperating with Turkish anti-PKK

Protecting Iraq’s Kurds Poses A Dilemma for U.S. Forces

The West mounted a major effort to protect Iraq’s Kurds against further Iraqi attack following the 1991 Kurdish rebellion in northern Iraq and threatened repression by Baghdad. The U.S. played a leading role in cooperation with British, French, and Turkish forces in supporting Operation Provide Comfort (OPC), a military mission to enforce a no-fly zone north of the thirty-sixth parallel in Iraq. A small Military Coordination Committee (MCC), consisting of the same international representatives, patrolled a small security zone declared in 1991—the only zone in which the U.S. has said formally that Iraqi ground troops may not enter. In fact, however, Iraqi forces withdrew in 1991 from a much larger area than the security zone, leaving most of the Kurdish-inhabited area of the north. This larger area, often referred to in 1996 by the U.S. media as a safe haven, has never been officially declared by the U.S. as an area in which Iraqi forces are not to enter, but in practice, the Kurdish parties, with U.S. support, administered the area without the presence of Baghdad’s forces.

In 1992–93, it appeared that the Kurds might develop a cohesive administration for the three provinces they controlled. Elections were held, and a coalition government was formed with equal weight for the two dominant nationalist parties—Masud Barzani’s KDP and Jalal Talabani’s PUK. However, in late 1994, they resumed their internecine feuding. Military skirmishes between the two factions caused thousands of deaths and a virtual partition of the north, with neither side able to exercise more than a marginal control over borders. The area was caught up in the political maneuverings by its neighbors. The radical anti-Turkish Kurdish Workers Party (PKK), which is encouraged by Syria, established a semi-permanent presence in the Kurdish area of Iraq. Since 1995 Ankara has made periodic military sweeps across the border to contain the PKK and announced in late 1996 that it was widening the scope of its activities in the region. Iran gave encouragement and assistance to Talabani’s PUK and to Islamist groups vaguely aligned with the KDP. In the summer of 1996, Iran twice crossed into a northern no-fly zone to hunt for Iranian dissidents, stir up Iraqi Kurds, and expand its influence via Talabani’s PUK. The result was an invitation by Barzani of the KDP to Baghdad to intervene. In September, Baghdad re-entered northern Iraq. This action triggered confrontation with the United States.

The Kurdish-dominated zone in northern Iraq could be a major flashpoint for military activities involving U.S. forces or those of its NATO allies. Several scenarios could involve U.S. forces:

- A major move by Iraqi military forces into the Kurdish zone of northern Iraq. Saddam may decide to send substantial forces into the area, irrespective of any agreement he may have with KDP leader Masud Barzani limiting Baghdad's role in the north. Other scenarios for Iraqi troop movements would be if fighting between the KDP and the PUK got out of hand again, or if Turkey and Iran decided to take advantage of the chaos in the north to send military forces into Iraq. In such circumstances, Saddam could decide to risk confrontation with the United States and send in a large, well-armed military force under the guise of protecting Iraqi sovereignty and establishing secure borders. This could trigger Kurdish refugee flows towards all the borders. Ankara, which has long viewed coalition protection for the Kurds in the north as fostering Kurdish independence, could try to block the way to a renewed Kurdish exodus across its borders, bar military actions by the U.S. from Turkish territory, and use the chaos in the region to pursue anti-Turkish Kurdish elements (the PKK). Turkey would be strongly tempted to support Saddam’s actions rather than accede to U.S. requests for increased flights or retaliatory missions.

- Turkish occupation of northern Iraq in a permanent security zone. This scenario would be triggered by a Turkish military operation intended to quell the PKK. Permanent stationing of Turkish troops on Iraqi soil would generate tension with the U.S., Baghdad, and Iraq’s neighbors, and interfere with even the most minimal of UN and coalition air operations over northern Iraq. It would also raise the risk of confrontation with Iran and Syria, who would see Turkish actions as paramount to territorial expansion and in conflict with their own interests. A Turkish move would probably follow an end to Ankara’s support for Operation Provide Comfort and denial of U.S. requests to fly missions over Iraq. In such an eventuality, U.S. forces in Operation Southern Watch could also be affected—they could not pick up the mission of monitoring northern Iraq and might find support eroding for their effort in southern Iraq.
efforts, Turkish enthusiasm for Barzani cooled, and Turkey turned towards more direct and open intervention in northern Iraq by its soldiers. U.S.-Turkish relations have been strained over the years by several other crises which have drawn congressional ire and made it difficult for the U.S. to unconditionally support Ankara. These controversial actions include the 1974 invasion of Cyprus and occupation of the northern part of the island by 30,000 Turkish troops, discussed in the chapter on Europe; the rising crescendo of protest against Turkish human rights abuses; and a stubborn refusal by Turkish politicians to address the Kurdish issue except by military means.

Hamas’ political wing has earned its popularity through generous social welfare programs and the occasional hint that it is willing to cooperate in building the new Palestine state. This militant wing, along with the Palestine Islamic Jihad, will continue to see violence as the only way to liberate Palestine and establish an Islamic state. Both receive assistance and encouragement from Iran and Lebanon’s Hizballah.

As discussed in the chapter on terrorism, Hamas has an ability to disrupt the peace process. It claimed responsibility for many of the acts of terrorism which rocked Israel in early 1996, contributing to the June 1996 electoral defeat of Israeli Prime Minister Shimon Peres by the more hardline Likud party leader Binyamin Netanyahu.

A particular stumbling block on the road to peace could be the fate of Jerusalem. The Palestinian objections are based primarily on nationalism, rather than religion: they claim Jerusalem as their capital. However, suspicions are strong among the Palestinian community that Israel seeks to undermine Islamic control over the holiest place, known to Muslims as the Haram al-Sharif (from which they believe Mohammed ascended to heaven) and to Jews as the Temple Mount (the site of the two temples described in the Bible). Such suspicions can lead to explosive violence, as seen in September 1996 when an Israeli action near the Haram (the opening of a door out of a tunnel) was the spark that ignited smoldering anger into violence that killed more than 50 people in three days of riots.

Furthermore, some Arab states such as Saudi Arabia take an intense religious interest in the issue of Jerusalem. Many devout Muslims, as well as radical Islamists, believe that no one has the right to barter away Muslim rights to the holy city nor to accept non-Muslim rule over it. Jerusalem’s sacredness for Muslims—its Arabic name, Al Quds, means Holy—makes it a political issue for Muslims of all nationalities. When an arson fire hit Jerusalem’s Al Aqsa Mosque in 1969, Muslim countries responded by founding the forty-seven member Islamic Conference
Organization (ICO). Jordan's King Hussein, whose forebears ruled over Mecca and Medina, sees as a matter of personal prestige and political legitimacy his long-standing guardianship of Jerusalem's Muslim holy spots.

**U.S. Interests and Approaches**

**Net Assessment**

The years from 1996 to 2005 are likely to be a critical period for many countries in the Middle East and North Africa. All have burgeoning populations and growth rates which will threaten to eliminate the modest economic growth gains of many countries. Most will have static economies tied to a flat oil market or shrinking expatriate remittances. Some governments will confront troubling problems of succession. Perhaps the most important and potentially destabilizing factor will be radicalized or politicized Islam—the use of religion by disgruntled Muslims as vocabulary and ideology to frame an agenda for political action. Islamic activism, either in its moderate accommodationist for which seeks to work within the system, or in its more extreme, militant version which uses terror and violence, will likely remain the primary voice of political opposition in the region in this period.

**U.S. Interests**

**Access to Oil and Strategic Lines of Communication**

As noted in the chapter on the Persian Gulf, U.S. interests in the Middle East are defined as securing unimpeded access to a relatively cheap and dependable source of energy, primarily oil, and maintaining open and safe lines of communication, mainly sea lanes, the Suez Canal, and the Straits of Hormuz.

**Balance of Business Power**

The U.S. is in a highly competitive race with European and Asian countries for increased access to lucrative local markets for expanded trade and business investment opportunities and arms sales. Russia is part of this equation although not with the same competitive or ideological edge as the Soviet Union could muster during the Cold War. Moscow has been supplanted by other suppliers eager to do business in weapons, nuclear energy, and other dual purpose industrial technologies. The stakes are high, with Russia, China and other countries offering cheap arms packages and European governments bidding for sales of advanced technology, arms sales, and the training and support packages that enrich long after the equipment is delivered.

**The Peace Process**

As noted in the chapter on the Arab-Israeli situation, support for an end to the state of war between the Arab states and Israel and for successful conclusion of the peace negotiations has been high on the agendas of the U.S. presidents for decades.

**Isolating Rogue Regimes**

The U.S. has an interest in isolating regional governments which support international terrorism, threaten regional stability, and pursue destabilizing weapons of mass destruction. The U.S. objective is to force these governments to modify their unacceptable behavior or, absent that, to weaken their ability to cause mischief.

**U.S. Approach**

U.S. strategies toward the Middle East are expressed in a number of policies, including those that support the peace process, advocate democracy and human rights, and seek to enforce international sanctions. These policies include trade sanctions on states supporting international terrorism (Libya, Syria, Iran, Iraq, and Yemen); sanctions on Libya because of the Pan Am flight 103 air crash and its refusal to comply with UN resolutions; and dual containment of Iraq and Iran to prevent both from acquiring weapons of mass destruction or participating in international trade unless they forego their specified actions.

The United States does not have a specific policy on Islam or Islamic activists as apolitical force. Senior administration officials have issued statements over the past
several years that the United States respects Islam as one of the world's major religions but deplores extremists who used the religion as a cover to justify acts of violence against their governments and the United States. In countries where the central government is at virtual war with internal Islamist opponents—Algeria for example—the United States has discreetly raised the issue of broadening popular participation and has maintained its right to meet with nonviolent Islamist politicians.

The challenges that the coming decade poses for regional regimes—economic downturns, transitions to new political leaders, and social critics wary of internal as well as external threats—will raise potentially disturbing questions for U.S. policymakers. Some of the issues will be especially difficult for those concerned with the possibility of renewed aggression from Iraq or Iran and involved in helping the regional states develop their own strategic defense. Urging purchase of expensive weapons and seeking donations to fund a wide range of U.S. interests at the same time regimes are taking measures to cutback expenditures on the domestic economy (including popular subsidies) overwhelms the regimes. It also raises questions among their domestic opponents of the regime's ability to provide for the well-being of the country. The U.S. is looking at ways to improve communications with both the regions' rulers and ruled, to emphasize the temporary nature of troop deployment, and to coordinate its military needs with competing civilian demands on local governments and local populations' tolerance for U.S. influence and protection.

Also at issue for the U.S. is the size of force structure, prepositioning of equipment, purchase of U.S. arms packages, number and size of joint military exercises, and responsibility sharing. High-visibility joint exercises and the appearance of a U.S. presence play an important role for the U.S. military in deterring external aggression. But, increasingly, this high U.S. footprint makes U.S. forces and facilities a terrorist’s target of opportunity and raises the pressure on regimes not to cooperate with U.S. policy objectives in the region. Furthermore, the problems for U.S. forces could grow if regimes in the Middle East handle badly the threats to their legitimacy and authority from Islamist movements. The risks come not just from terrorists determined to raise the stakes in challenging their governments. It will also come increasingly from politicians committed to an Islamist agenda which calls for the elimination of foreign forces and the redefinition of national security interests to forge alignments with Islamic, not Western, governments.

It is difficult to envisage circumstances under which substantial U.S. forces would be used to respond to the internal problems of troubled Middle East and North African states. Perhaps a few U.S. forces might be involved in monitoring an Israeli-Palestinian agreement, though even that seems unlikely. In each country, large-scale U.S. military involvement in response to domestic political turmoil would be counterproductive; it would inflame nationalist opposition, driving secular nationalists to unite with radical religious extremists. In countries where U.S. forces are present to defend against external aggression, the U.S. will seek to keep its military isolated from domestic political problems. The most likely roles for the U.S. military in the troubled Middle East states is in non-combatant evacuations and possibly limited peacekeeping operations.
For the purposes of this chapter, terrorism is defined as the use of indiscriminate violence for a political purpose by an individual, group, or state against noncombatants. The victims of terrorism are generally those whom the Western moral tradition describes as innocents. Terrorism’s purpose is to make a political statement or to create a climate of widespread fear that will lead to a desired political result.

The lines separating terrorism from general violence are far from impermeable, which presents a host of problems for analysts and policymakers alike. It is common for a government to label as terrorist any group that opposes it by force of arms, even if that group’s activities are focused against military personnel. To categorize any kind of illegal violence as terrorism, however, is ill-advised. It diminishes the true seriousness of terrorism’s immorality and illegality by lumping it with offenses less morally serious, and thereby enhances the credibility of the false adage, “One man’s terrorist is another’s freedom fighter.”

Narrowing the definition of terrorism can be helpful in efforts to combat terrorism by strengthening the moral and political consensus against it. When terrorism is defined as narrowly as suggested above, it is easier to understand why terrorism is always wrong, regardless of who practices it or on behalf of which cause it is wielded. No cause, however noble, justifies the deliberate use of indiscriminate violence against innocent people.

The term terrorism is sometimes applied to the indiscriminate use of violence by a government against its own civilians, or during war, against another state’s population. Prior to the Second World War, for example, it was common to speak of air raids against cities for the deliberate purpose of targeting civilians as terrorism. And in recent decades, critics have described the crimes of Joseph Stalin, Idi Amin and Pol Pot as state terrorism. It is sobering to reflect that in the course of the twentieth century, more human beings have perished at the hands of their own governments than have been killed by enemy weapons. This chapter does not discuss the use of indiscriminate violence by a government against its own population.
Background and Trends

A More Diffuse Terrorism Threat

Several trends are reshaping terrorism in the late 1990s. The collapse of the Soviet Union and the Eastern European bloc has deprived terrorist groups of substantial financial support, sources of training, and sanctuary on which they had depended in the 1970s and 1980s. Political settlements in such countries as El Salvador, Nicaragua, and South Africa, as well as progress in the Arab-Israeli peace negotiations, have deprived a number of terrorist groups of political support and put still others on the defensive. As a result of these settlements, and the end of the Cold War, states such as Cuba and Nicaragua no longer support terrorist groups, either because they do not want to or can no longer afford to. States such as Libya and Iran, which still support terrorist groups, are on the political and diplomatic defensive and are far more careful to disguise their pro-terrorist activities than they were in the 1980s. The Western powers have been fairly successful in isolating these states and making it clear that this isolation will end only when they cease to support terrorism.

While the disintegration of the Soviet Union and the Eastern bloc deprived many terrorist groups of weapons, training, and sanctuary, the chaos that has broken out in large parts of the world since those events is a matter of concern. By the mid-1990s, large sections of Central Asia and the Balkans had become mired in political strife and ethnic warfare. This chaos could become fertile ground for terrorist groups in the future.

Throughout the Muslim world, a resurgence in fundamentalism could enhance terrorist activity (see the chapter on Middle East radicalism). Although the advocates of a holy war against the West remain a minority, they will likely be a powerful source not only of ideological zeal but also of financial and military support for a few small but highly dangerous terrorist groups based in the Middle East and North Africa.

The capacity of a single individual or small group to acquire the technology with which to wreak havoc on the fragile infrastructure of urban civilization is growing at a frightening pace. With the growth of research centers throughout the world (for example, in China, India, Pakistan, South Africa, Brazil, and Argentina), knowledge about weapons technology is becoming widespread. The disintegration of the Soviet Union produced several thousand unemployed nuclear scientists whose future activities and affiliations are impossible to predict or control. Political turmoil and widespread corruption in Russia, Ukraine, and Kazakhstan could lead to the surreptitious sale of nuclear devices to a terrorist group or to a state that supports terrorism.

The technology for producing biological weapons is also advancing rapidly. The ease with which such weapons can be made in facilities ostensibly devoted to legitimate pharmaceutical and medical research will make it difficult to keep biological-warfare agents out of the reach of terrorist groups. Less spectacular but equally sophisticated forms of technology, such as advanced communications, global positioning systems, high explosives, and Stinger missiles, are also becoming more accessible to terrorists.

The communications, transportation, energy, financial, and health-care infrastructures that support millions of people in urban centers worldwide are unusually susceptible to disruption by terrorist acts. It is not difficult to imagine the catastrophic consequences that could result from the spraying of biological-warfare agents throughout a large city from a truck or small plane piloted by terrorists, the launching of missiles against a nuclear reactor, or the detonation of a small nuclear device in downtown Tokyo or New York.
The Blurring Line between Domestic and International Terrorism

In the 1970s and 1980s, serious terrorism was international. Those organizations involved in terrorism, regardless of their base of operations, received large infusions of foreign support. In the mid-1990s, governments are increasingly turning their attention toward domestic terrorism, that is, terrorist activities carried out by domestic groups with little or no international sponsorship. The most destructive terrorist act in U.S. history was the April 1995 bombing of the Murrah Federal Building in Oklahoma City, whose alleged perpetrators were tied to domestic right-wing organizations. Also in 1995, Japan barely escaped a calamity of massive proportions when members of Aum Shinrikyo, a religious cult, set off a nerve gas attack in the Tokyo subway system. In Colombia, terrorist acts sponsored by the Medellin and Cali drug cartels and by left-wing guerrillas continue to disrupt the country’s political and economic life and result in hundreds of deaths annually.

From the viewpoint of U.S. interests, it is most accurate to see terrorist groups as covering a broad spectrum. At one end are foreign terrorist groups whose activities are targeted against U.S. allies or personnel abroad. At the other are domestic terrorist groups or individuals, such as the Unabomber, who receive no foreign support. In the middle are groups inspired by foreign ideology and tied to persons residing in the United States, and that support terrorist attacks on U.S. territory. A prime example of the latter was the conspiracy that placed a bomb on the lower parking garage of one of the towers of the World Trade Center in New York City in February 1993. The perpetrators had extensive links to Islamic fundamentalist groups in the Middle East. Though primitive, the bomb was quite powerful, killing people and injuring several hundred. The event was described by the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) as “the largest improvised explosive device that’s been in the U.S. since we started doing forensic explosive investigations in 1925.” A second example of domestic terrorist groups with strong foreign connections are the extreme right-wing militia groups that advocate terrorist acts and that have extensive ideological and financial connections with German neo-Nazi groups.

Potential Flashpoints

For the U.S., the potential impact of terrorism is highest in the Middle East, because of that region’s political volatility and the weight of American interests involved. One example of such terrorism, but by no means the only one, is that directed against the Arab-Israeli peace process. In addition, terrorism remains active in other areas, such as the Andean nations (primarily Colombia and Peru) and Northern Ireland. Besides geographic-specific terrorism, vigilance is advisable against new and more deadly forms of terrorism, as illustrated by the use of chemical weapons by the Aum Shinrikyo group in Japan.

Terrorist Attacks Against U.S. Forces Abroad

As a global superpower with thousands of troops continuously deployed around the world, the United States needs
### Casualties Caused by International Incidents, By Region

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...to address the threat posed to these forces by terrorist groups eager to humiliate the United States and reduce its influence in sensitive regions. The June 25 terrorist attack against Khobar Towers military complex in Saudi Arabia, which killed 19 U.S. airmen, illustrates the serious dangers involved in this threat. The terrorists identified themselves as part of a radical Islamic group that wants to cleanse Saudi Arabia of Western influences and rid the country of what they describe as foreign occupiers. They used a bomb variously estimated at 5,000 to 20,000 pounds. Most of the victims of the explosion died as a consequence of shattered glass from blown windows. Until the attack, the Khobar Towers complex had been a high-visibility installation that housed about half of the 5,000 U.S. troops stationed in Saudi Arabia. A similar attack against an American-run military training center in Riyadh, the Saudi capital, using a much smaller 200-pound bomb, killed five Americans in November of 1995.

The Khobar Towers attack revealed the vital importance of taking seriously the terrorist threat and implementing preventive measures against it. A September 1996 official report issued by former Commander-in-Chief of the U.S. Special Operations Forces, Gen. Wayne Downing, faulted the base commander at Khobar Towers for ignoring ample warnings about the likelihood of terrorist attacks. Prior to the incident, intelligence analysts notified the base commander that terrorists in the area had the capability and intentions to target U.S. interests in Saudi Arabia and that the Khobar Towers complex was one of the highest priority soft targets in the region. A few simple precautionary steps, such as moving the perimeter fence around the apartment complex a few hundred yards further out and installing Mylar sheets over apartment windows, could have deterred the terrorists or reduced substantially the effects of their attack.

In response to the incident, the Defense Department decided to move all American personnel out of Khobar Towers to a remote Saudi air base 50 miles south of Riyadh. The move raises broader questions about the best way to protect U.S. forces overseas. Proponents argue that placing U.S. forces in faraway isolated locations in
One of the key targets of individuals or groups seeking to carry out terrorism on American soil is U.S. civil aviation which transports tens of millions of Americans every year. One of the individuals implicated in the bombing of the World Trade Center, the 28-year-old Ramzi Ahmed Yousef, was convicted in September of 1996 of masterminding an elaborate plot to blow up twelve American jetliners in East Asia in the space of a few days in January 1995. Had the effort succeeded, thousands of innocent people, including many Americans, would have died. Considered a genius by most counter-terrorism experts, Yousef developed a low-cost nitroglycerin-based bomb virtually impossible to detect with the technology used at most airports. He may be the prototype of a new type of terrorist being produced in vast numbers by the Middle East; young, full of religious and ideological zeal, technically skilled to a high degree, and determined not only to kill Americans overseas but also to bring terrorism to the American heartland.

In reaction to the growing concern about terrorist attacks against U.S. civilian airliners, Congress in late 1996 approved a package of anti-terrorist measures proposed by President Clinton. The measures, which will cost $1 billion a year, include installing new bomb-detection equipment for screening baggage; expanding Customs Service resources for air security; doubling research spending and the number of security agents for the Federal Aviation Administration (FAA); giving the FBI more agents and money for domestic intelligence; and a plan, controversial with many civil-liberties groups, to develop computer systems to profile and identify passengers with suspicious travel patterns or criminal records. The package also included studying the feasibility of adding chemical tags to explosives and increasing security at the federal government’s infectious disease research laboratories.

Meanwhile, a number of experts have sounded the alarm about a new terrorist threat, in the form of a “cyber attack” on the nation’s most critical infrastructure systems, such as telecommunications, electrical power, gas and oil storage and transportation. As these systems become increasingly dependent on computer and

Terrorism in the United States

The bombings of the World Trade Center in February 1993 and the Oklahoma City Federal Building in April 1995 highlighted the growing dangers of terrorism within the United States itself. At the 1996 Summer Olympic Games in Atlanta, thousands of U.S. domestic law enforcement personnel worked closely with the U.S. military to avert terrorist attacks. The one incident that took place, a bomb explosion that cost several innocent lives, does not appear to have been the act of international terrorists.

the host country makes it easier to protect them and also reduces their visibility and hence their symbolic value to terrorists. If few people can see the forces or are even aware of their existence, an attack against them is of limited value to terrorists, who value publicity and symbolism highly. But critics of this strategy wonder whether placing the forces in such isolated compounds does not actually increase their risk of being targeted and attacked by terrorists willing to run the risks. Moreover, the isolation may also detract from the forces’ deterrent role if the U.S. is seen to be less able or less willing to respond in a crisis.
information technology, they are becoming highly vulnerable to computer-based attacks such as logic bombs and viruses wielded by terrorists or foreign powers. In response, President Clinton created in late 1996 an inter-agency Commission on Critical Infrastructure Problems to assess the threat and develop strategies for dealing with it. Because most of the potential targets are in the private sector, the task of protecting them will require addressing complex legal, regulatory, and technical issues as well as close cooperation among many government agencies, and between government and industry.

**Terrorism and the Arab-Israeli Peace Process**

While the Middle East peace process has moved forward considerably in the 1990s, it remains in danger of unraveling as a result of terrorism. Two powerful terrorist groups—Hamas and Islamic Jihad—have actively sought to destabilize Arab-Israeli relations and sabotage the peace process. Both receive extensive assistance in the form of money, weapons, training, and sanctuary from Syria and Iran.

Founded in 1987, Hamas seeks the creation of an Islamic Palestinian state ruled by Islamic theocratic law. It has carried out numerous acts of violence against civilians in Israel, Gaza, and the West Bank. Like many other terrorist groups, Hamas is tied to and supported by a network of religious, political, educational, and charitable organizations that share its ideology and political objectives. These organizations themselves do not engage in terrorism and some provide humanitarian services. For that reason, action against them poses difficult political issues. However, without their support, Hamas could not survive. Hamas also receives substantial support from Iran. According to U.S. government statements, in the early 1990s, Iran provided Hamas with at least $30 million and agreed to train thousands of Hamas fighters.

Islamic Jihad, a movement that drew its inspiration from the Iranian revolution of 1979, is more extremist than Hamas. Based in the West Bank and Gaza Strip, this group considers itself part of the larger Islamic Jihad movement that originated in Lebanon in the 1980s. Like Hamas, its goal is to destroy Israel and remove all Western influence from the Middle East. Its victims have included large numbers of Israeli civilians as well as numerous Western hostages. Perhaps its most spectacular terrorist act to date was the 1992 bombing of the Israeli embassy in Buenos Aires, Argentina, which killed 32 people and injured 252. The U.S. Department of State has maintained that Iran had advance knowledge of the plan for this attack and was probably involved.

In late 1995 and early 1996, as negotiations between Israel and the Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO) moved into high gear and a Syrian-Israeli settlement seemed closer, Hamas and Islamic Jihad stepped up their terrorist activities in Israel. They hoped that attacks against civilians would incense the Israeli public and swing votes to the hard-line Likud Party, thereby stopping Israeli-Palestinian reconciliation in its tracks. The terrorist attacks in Israel during an eight-day period in February-March 1996 may have contributed to the victory of the more hard-line Binyamin Netanyahu over Prime Minister Shimon Peres in May 1996.

For more discussion of instability within Middle Eastern countries due to Islamic radicalism, see the chapter on Middle East radicalism in the troubled states section. On the issue of inter-state conflict between Israel and Arab countries, see the chapter on Arab-Israel conflict in the section on significant regional contingencies.
Slaughter by Fanatics

Middle Eastern terrorists have some prospects of influencing state policies, e.g., by undermining the Arab-Israeli peace process. In quite a different category are fanatical groups operating in stable societies with no prospect of causing social unrest.

There is the troubling prospect that such fanatics may become more deadly in the future. The March 20, 1995, nerve-gas attack on the Tokyo subway system demonstrates the dangers: 12 people were killed, and more than 4,000 were injured. The attack was the work of a fanatical Buddhist sect, Aum Shinrikyo (Supreme Truth), headed by His Holiness the Master Shoko Asahara. The group has attracted between twenty thousand and forty thousand adherents, including many scientists, engineers, and other well-educated individuals. The charismatic Asahara, who is partially blind, founded the sect with his wife in the mid-1980s. He considers himself to be the reincarnation of Jesus Christ and believes that Armageddon will occur in 1997. The accompanying cataclysmic events will include war between the United States and Japan and the use of chemical and biological weapons against Japan. Asahara ran unsuccessfully for the Japanese Diet in 1990. After his defeat, he concluded that the sect had to resort to extremist methods. He wanted the cult to become an independent nation within Japan—a goal that would require the acquisition of weapons of mass destruction and advanced technologies to protect it from the Japanese police and military.

The sect became wealthy as a result of numerous business ventures, including some of dubious legality. It developed a network of influential friends in the Diet and several political parties. It carried out proselytizing activities, business ventures, and political operations in Sri Lanka, Germany, Australia, and the United States. During the chaotic period that followed the break-up of the Soviet Union, Asahara found Russian officials, mafia businessmen, and military officers eager to do business. The cult maintained compounds in several Russian cities well known for their military research-and-production facilities. Cult documents retrieved by Japanese police contained price quotes for Russian nuclear devices. The cult also began efforts to mine uranium in Australia and import it.

Cult scientists designed a plant for the mass production of Sarin, a nerve gas. Sarin is so toxic that a dose equivalent to one ten-millionth of one’s body weight is fatal. Cult scientists were also involved in the production of other chemical agents, such as Tabun, VX, mustard, and cyanide compounds. The cult was also eager to develop biological weapons. Its leaders traveled to Zaire to observe the results of the deadly Ebola virus and to explore the possibility of isolating it for use in weapons. The cult had a laboratory for the production of biological agents, and in 1995 released some anthrax from the window of a Tokyo office building as part of an experiment.

A set of fortuitous circumstances prevented Aum Shinrikyo from causing greater chaos than it did. Asahara, fearful that the police would shortly carry out raids against the sect, decided to strike in haste. The Sarin plant was not yet in full operation; moreover, the product was improperly distilled and only 30 percent pure. The method of dispersal (the toxic agent was placed in plastic bags that were punctured with umbrella tips) was crude and inefficient.
The government of Alberto Fujimori in Peru continues its successful effort to eradicate the Shining Path guerrilla movement, which in the early 1990s was spreading terror throughout Lima and much of the countryside. By 1994, Shining Path, which less than a decade earlier had been the most dangerous terrorist movement in the Western hemisphere, had been crippled. It may never recover its former power.

Terrorism May Derail Northern Ireland’s Peace Process

Terrorist groups have been attempting to derail peace processes in Northern Ireland. In February 1996, following slow but continuing progress in Anglo-Irish talks over the future of Northern Ireland, the radical wing of the Irish Republican Army (IRA) carried out a series of bombings designed to push the British government into more sweeping concessions and to bait the Protestant Unionists into a terrorist retaliation. Extremists within the IRA fear that an Anglo-British agreement will render them irrelevant if Northern Ireland becomes dominated by the advocates of reconciliation.

U.S. Interests and Approach

Net Assessment

Terrorism against Americans is likely to increase from several sources:

- Attacks can be expected on U.S. forces abroad by shadowy extremists, motivated by hatred of the West and possibly aided by rogue regimes, along the lines of the two bombs in Saudi Arabia between November 1995 and June 1996.
- As shown by the World Trade Center bombing, attacks within U.S. territory can be expected from foreign terrorists tempted by the openness of American society and the richness of potential targets.
- There is a growing threat from U.S. groups with foreign connections and motivated by a foreign, anti-democratic ideology. This form of terrorism can straddle the dividing line between international and domestic terrorism.
The U.S. Terrorism List

As required by the Export Administration Act of 1979, the State Department each year lists which governments the U.S. judges have repeatedly provided state support for international terrorism. Those countries are subject to various sanctions, such as trade restrictions and U.S. opposition to loans from the World Bank. Since 1993 when Sudan was added to the list of state sponsors of terrorism, the countries on that list have been:

- Cuba
- North Korea
- Iran
- Iraq
- Syria
- Sudan
- Libya

Another growing problem is those who are propelled to terrorism by a deep sense of alienation from American society, with few if any foreign connections, such as the Unabomber and the perpetrators of the Oklahoma City attack.

U.S. Interests

Many terrorist acts, while reprehensible, have few strategic consequences. However, a few have extensive political and military repercussions by increasing tensions among states or pushing a state toward a particular domestic or foreign policy. An important case was the terrorism in Israel in 1995/96—the assassination of Prime Minister Yitzhak Rabin by an extremist Israeli and the bombing campaign by extremist Palestinians—that were major factors in the election victory in Israel of a government less enthusiastic about the peace process as pursued by its predecessor. If the Arab-Israeli peace process fails, it would be a strategic defeat for the U.S.—a defeat caused in no small part by terrorism. So terrorism can, at times, have significant impact on governments.

Physical Protection of Americans

The U.S. has an obvious interest in the physical protection of its citizens and their property. Americans appear to regard terrorist attacks as particularly disturbing crimes.

As a related matter, the U.S. has interests in stability, peaceful conflict resolution, the rule of law, and the freedom of innocent civilians from attack. Therefore, the U.S. has an interest in constructing an international consensus that terrorism is unacceptable, irrespective of the underlying political motivation. That is, no matter how serious the grievance, a turn to terrorism is unacceptable.

Sustaining U.S. Credibility

Whenever a terrorist attack a U.S. target (be it civilian or military) America’s reputation suffers in the eyes of many around the world. The implication is that the United States is not as strong, or as skillful, as America wants the rest of the world to believe it is. This is especially the case in cultures where reputation and the appearance of power count for much. In many non-western cultures, a successful terrorist act against the United States is seen as evidence of U.S. weakness and vulnerability and as an incentive to attempt similar acts that will discredit American power. If the United States is not strong enough to protect its own people or its own forces, doubt may be created about its ability to protect its allies or punish its enemies in faraway regions of the globe. As a result, terrorism can weaken relations with allies by intimidating or blackmailing a particular country into distancing itself from the United States or denying the U.S. access to particular facilities.

U.S. Approach

The U.S. approach to combatting terrorism distinguishes between antiterrorism and counterterrorism. The former refers to defensive measures used to reduce the vulnerability of individuals and property to terrorism. Since the mid-1970s, for example, the U.S. government has invested billions of dollars to make U.S. embassies and military installations abroad and federal buildings at home less vulnerable to terrorist attack. Through tighter security measures, such as the use of identification security badges, access to government buildings has been restricted.

The effectiveness of antiterrorist precautions, however, is limited, and the number of potential targets is vast. The funds and public will to make all of these targets invulnerable are lacking. Hence, antiterrorist efforts must be complemented by counterterrorist efforts. These are offensive measures to prevent, deter, and respond to terrorism. Counterterrorism has an unquantifiable, but very real, deterrent effect on prospective terrorists.

Counterterrorist Forces

While counterterrorist forces are superbly equipped and trained, their use is substantially limited by political constraints. During any major terrorist crisis abroad, the United States must consider the risks and costs associated with deploying U.S. military personnel. Chief among these are the
Casualties of Anti-U.S. Attacks, 1988-95

Source: U.S. Department of State, Patterns of Global Terrorism 1996.

potential loss of American lives, damage to the credibility of U.S. allies, and serious political opposition from U.S. allies and friends. Special counterterrorist forces cannot be used recklessly. They are a powerful instrument that is wielded only after much careful deliberation.

The United States has the world’s most capable counterterrorist forces. Those of Israel, Great Britain, and Germany follow closely behind. U.S. counterterrorist forces are part of the larger special operations forces, which have approximately twenty-nine thousand active-duty personnel and an annual budget of $3 billion. The portion of these forces and budget devoted to counterterrorism is classified information. However, DOD is confident that Congress will continue to fund the counterterrorist mission at appropriate levels.

Counterterrorist units train for a wide range of activities, including intelligence gathering, rescue operations, and direct attacks. These forces have been used in response to a number of terrorist incidents overseas. At the domestic level, they have provided support to antiterrorist forces of law-enforcement agencies and the U.S. Department of Justice. DOD policy prohibits the divulging of any details about these forces or their use. DOD willingly allows other entities to take the credit for successful efforts for which its counterterrorist forces have been responsible, both at home or abroad. Any advantages that might accrue from publicizing these successful exploits are more than outweighed by the benefits of denying U.S. enemies information about how these forces operate.

Military Retaliation

Military responses to terrorism are not limited to the use of special forces. One noteworthy example was the April 1986 air strike carried out by the Reagan administration against Libya. The mission caused a number of civilian and military casualties and extensive damage to Libyan government, military, and intelligence facilities, and endangered the life of Colonel Mu’ammar Ghaddafi himself. It was launched in retaliation for a number of Libyan terrorist actions, including the bombing of a Berlin discotheque popular with U.S. service personnel.

The attack did not deter Libya for long. In December 1988, operatives from Libya bombed Pan Am flight 103 over Lockerbie, Scotland. Amid concern over the return of the perpetrators, DOD Secretary Richard Cheney advocated that the 1986 military operation be repeated, only to be convinced by his advisers that diplomatic and economic sanctions would be preferable. While the sanctions have had their limitations, they have probably been more damaging to Ghaddafi than a one-time military strike would have been.

Economic Pressure

The United States has used sanctions and the denial of loans and technology against terrorist states. Some restrictions, such as an aid cutoff and votes against loans from multilateral banks like the World Bank, are required by law against all states on the Department of State’s list of terrorist-sponsoring governments. Other restrictions are adopted on a country-by-country basis.

The U.S. prefers to apply economic pressure in coordination with other countries, since otherwise, the targeted state can
substitute third-country sources for U.S. technology and loans. The most broadly supported economic sanctions against terrorism have been those on Libya. Following the failure of the Libyan government to surrender two of its prominent officials indicted for the four hundred murders caused by the bombing of Pan Am 103 and the bombing of a French airliner from the UTA company over Chad, the UN Security Council imposed a range of restrictions on Libya in 1992, which were then made tougher in 1994. However, the U.S. has been unable to convince either the UN or key allies, such as Italy, to agree to tighter restrictions. The costs to the Italian economy would be high, and Italy has little political interest in the Pan Am case, tragic though it was. In fact, Italy has traditionally avoided confrontation with Libya in order to maintain economic ties with the North African state and to avoid triggering Libyan terrorist attacks within its borders. Not satisfied with the pressure on Libya or Iran, the U.S. Congress unanimously adopted a 1996 law mandating U.S. retaliation against foreign firms that do substantial business in Libya or Iran. However, the president was given wide latitude for flexible application of the U.S. retaliation, in recognition that counterterrorism must be balanced against other U.S. interests, including the preservation of an open international economic system.

It could be argued that the restrictions on Libya have been successful, even though they have not brought to justice those responsible for the Pan Am and UTA bombings. As best as can be determined, Libya has not engaged in state-sponsored terrorism since the imposition of the sanctions.

If the sanctions on Libya are the counterterrorism measures that have enjoyed the broadest international support, those on Iran have had the least such support. While the U.S. argues that economic pressure is the only practical way to get Tehran to withdraw its support of terrorism in the Middle East, European governments claim that sanctions only further isolate Iran from the international community, strengthen the more hawkish elements within the Iranian leadership, and weaken the influence of those elements interested in improving relations with the West.

Counterterrorism Intelligence

No antiterrorism barrier or counterterrorist force is powerful enough to deter a sufficiently zealous and skillful terrorist. For these reasons, intelligence remains a highly useful instrument for fighting terrorism. The FBI collects intelligence on prospective domestic terrorist groups and engages in efforts to penetrate counterintelligence operations. The Defense Intelligence Agency and the CIA have begun to devote larger resources to foreign terrorist organizations and their impact on U.S. security.

Collecting intelligence against foreign terrorist groups is fraught with political and human risks. There are several ways to do it, each of which has different limitations and special advantages. One method is to employ foreign operatives. Because they are well-acquainted with the culture, they may be particularly useful for penetrating a foreign terrorist group; however, they may also be less reliable than U.S. operatives. A second method is to hire a citizen of the United States, preferably a retired U.S. military person with well-honed survival and combat skills. The usefulness of such an individual will be limited by cultural and ethnic factors. A third option is to use U.S. military personnel, such as special operations forces. Because of the high political risks associated with such a mission, this option is used sparingly. Lastly, it is possible to gather large, though not always adequate, amounts of intelligence using technical means. These operations carry the lowest level of political risk but are dependent on the enemy’s willingness to communicate through channels susceptible to technical interception and decoding.

Integrating Initiatives to Counter Domestic and Foreign Terrorism

In assigning responsibility for combating terrorist activity, Washington distinguishes between domestic terrorism and foreign terrorism. The former is the preserve of the Department of Justice and the FBI; the latter is the responsibility of the DOD and the CIA. Given the spectrum of terrorist activities under way in the 1990s, this dis-
The Effective Death Penalty and Public Safety Act of 1996

Approved by large majorities in both houses of Congress and signed by the president, the 1996 anti-terrorism legislation embodied a series of provisions that enhance the government's powers to deal with perpetrators of terrorist acts. These include:

- The act makes terrorism a federal offense, expands the FBI's anti-terrorism role, and imposes the death penalty for terrorism.
- The legislation sharply restricts the right of habeas corpus, limits the right to appeal and shortens the time between conviction and execution in capital offenses. This presumably will make it easier to execute convicted terrorists, and to do so more quickly.
- Federal authorities will be allowed to deport terrorists without having to reveal to a judge the evidence on which the deportation finding is based, to freeze the assets of foreign organizations determined to be terrorist, and to bar entry to the United States of foreigners belonging to suspected terrorist organizations even if they have not broken any laws.
- The Act authorized $1 billion for FY 1997–2001 years to combat terrorism.

The Clinton Administration initially had wanted to expand the wiretap authority of Federal agents and in certain cases permit them to involve the military in ongoing criminal investigations of terrorist acts, but an unlikely alliance among the American Civil Liberties Union (ACLU), the National Rifle Association (NRA), and several other civil-liberties and conservative groups defeated the two proposals. As passed, the act has elicited the concern of many who fear that important constitutional safeguards have been sacrificed in the name of fighting terrorism, and that many individuals who are not terrorists will suffer as a consequence of the legislation's sweeping provisions. This is particularly true of habeas corpus changes and the government's broader powers to classify a particular organization as terrorist and thereby limit the activities of its members. Proponents of the legislation argue that the act will make it easier for the government to deal with terrorism at a time when terrorists at home and abroad are becoming increasingly capable of wreaking havoc on American society.

Given the complex nature of terrorist activity, a single coordinated approach may be more effective. Key agencies—such as the FBI, CIA, and DOD—could collaborate to develop imaginative counterterrorism strategies, programs, and technologies. Collaboration would avoid duplication and inefficiencies and lead to the formation of a comprehensive, national approach. Activities could be subject to periodic review by the National Security Council. To complement this collaborative approach, it would be appropriate to broaden relationships with foreign allies and friends, especially in the field of intelligence.

While different mechanisms have been proposed for achieving such a approach, none is free of shortcomings. For example, encouraging the Department of Justice to take the lead might result in insufficient attention being paid to the international dimensions of terrorism. Giving the lead to DOD would not be popular among those who, for valid constitutional and political reasons, want the U.S. military employed only outside U.S. borders, except in the gravest of emergencies. A number of senior military officers share these concerns, though for somewhat different reasons. They believe that training the U.S. military for domestic counterterrorism might weaken their focus on foreign threats, diminish their overall capacity, and even result in abuses of power and corruption.

As terrorists become more creative and better able to wield ever more devastating capabilities, the U.S. government may also have to step up its funding for newer technologies, to encourage the search for more imaginative strategies with which to prevent and deter terrorist attacks.
Recent transformations in the global economy and in international political alignments have been a boon to the criminal underworld. Capitalizing on increased cross-border flows of goods, money and people, criminal organizations have expanded their territorial reach and augmented their wealth and power relative to national governments. This development has spawned various direct and indirect threats to U.S. national interests. On the one hand, the new face of organized crime introduces new uncertainties into the international political environment, complicating U.S. relations with a number of foreign governments. For example, powerful narcotics constituencies increasingly threaten electoral processes, the exercise of sovereignty and the rule of law in a number of Latin American and Asian states. In post-Communist countries, violence, corruption and predatory behavior associated with emergent mafia formations jeopardize democratic reforms and generate nostalgia for authoritarian rule. On the other hand, organized crime’s business lines—such as extortion rackets, and trafficking in weapons, drugs, or (potentially) fissile nuclear materials—are themselves a threat to public safety and the health of populations. The human misery inflicted by drugs in the United States is an obvious case in point.

Within the global criminal archipelago, some forms of entrepreneurship approximate traditional models of organized crime, even resembling formal organizations in certain operational aspects. But the contours of the new international crime threat are in certain respects diffuse and ill-defined. These new entities have fluid boundaries, no clearly-defined hierarchy and little permanent structure. Yet, small groups with few organizational resources and limited systemic penetration (in the sense of ties to officialdom or to the legal economy) may be capable of inflicting great harm on society. At the same time, the transnational properties of the more powerful and established organized crime groups need to be highlighted. Organizations that maintain permanent representation outside their home states, enjoy corrupt relationships with foreign leaders, forge strategic alliance with criminal counterparts abroad, and penetrate the legitimate economies of other states are by definition transnational.
Eight Major International Organized Crime Groups and their Principal Illegal Activities

1. China, including Hong Kong and Taiwan: the six Triads. Also active worldwide within the overseas Chinese communities. Engaged in drug trafficking, smuggling of illegal immigrants, arms dealing, vehicle theft, planting of CDIs, video tapes and computer software, usury, illegal gambling, prostitution and pornography.

2. Colombia: the Medellin and Cali cartels. Also active in the production and trafficking of cocaine and heroin, and the corruption of politicians, judges and police.

3. Italy: the Sicilian Mafia or Cosa Nostra, the Calabrian ‘Ndrangheta, the Neapolitan Camorra and the Sacra Corona Unita of Puglia. Also active in the Balkans, France, North and South America, Turkey and Thailand. About 350 “families” engaged in drug trafficking and virtually all other crimes. However, the Mafia is not involved in prostitution nor whitewashing.


6. Russia: the Russian and Caucasian Mafiya. Also active throughout Europe and North America. About 100 groups engaged in drug trafficking, black marketing, extortion, vehicle theft, prostitution, pillaging of state enterprises, arms dealing, money laundering, and the corruption of politicians, judges and police.

7. Turkey: about one dozen Turko-Kurdish clans. Also active in Germany, Spain, the Low Countries, Sweden, Switzerland and Central Asia. Engaged in heroin production and trafficking, document counterfeiting, illegal gambling, prostitution, extortion, and the planting of CDIs and video tapes.

8. The United States and Canada: the American Mafia or Cosa Nostra. Also active in Central America and the Caribbean. Twenty-five “families” engaged in drug trafficking, trade union corruption, usury, illegal gambling, financial fraud and pornography.


Background and Trends

Traditionally a domestic concern in a handful of countries (such as the United States, Italy, and Japan), organized crime’s increased scale of operations, territorial reach and destructiveness potentially threaten the stability of the international order. Largely as a result of expanded transnational activities, criminal organizations have been able to accumulate wealth and power on a scale that impairs the legitimacy and effective functioning of governments.

The Eight Principal Organized Crime Groups

Virtually no country is free from organized crime and almost every country has produced criminals who belong to or work for such groups. Nonetheless, eight countries have brought forth the largest and strongest of such organizations:

- China, Hong Kong-Taiwan: the six Triads
- Colombia: the Medellin and Cali cartels
- Italy: the Sicilian Mafia or Cosa Nostra, the Calabrian ‘Ndrangheta, the Neapolitan Camorra and the Sacra Corona Unitas of Apulia
- Japan: the Boryokuden, more usually called the Yakuza
- Mexico: the Juarez, Tijuana and Gulf cartels
- Russia: dozens of so-called Russian and various Caucasian mafias
- Turkey: the dozen Turco-Kurdish clans commonly known as “the Turks”
- the United States: the American Mafia or Cosa Nostra, which has also long operated in Canada
Of these, the Colombians, the Sicilians and the Chinese are generally considered the best organized, the most ubiquitous and the most powerful. Recently, however, Russian organized crime has begun to rival these in power and global reach; according to CIA director John Deutch, some 200 large mafia groups conduct extensive criminal operations throughout Russia and around the world. While they are smaller, criminal organizations based on Korean, Filipino, Thai, Burmese, Pakistani, Israeli, Albanian, Nigerian and Jamaican national bases also have begun to cause serious worry for law enforcement officials. All of these criminal organizations engage in the smuggling and sale of controlled substances and illegal drugs. But they also profit from other crimes such as smuggling illegal immigrants; loan sharking; currency and document counterfeiting; money laundering; arms trafficking; pillaging of financial institutions, and pirating of trademarked or copyrighted properties. Murder-for-hire, forced prostitution, terrorism, protection rackets and extortion, vehicle theft and the corruption of union, political and police officials are also profitable criminal activities. And all of these activities do direct and serious damage to American interests.

Wide agreement exists that organized crime corrodes and degrades the international environment and threatens Western visions of a good society. Yet the precise character and contours of the phenomenon remain unclear. Groups differ significantly along such dimensions as size, wealth, internal structure and cohesion, core activities and international links. For instance, Colombian organizations concentrate on one product line—drugs—while most other crime groups engage in a range of illegal activities. The Yakuza and the American Cosa Nostra derive most of their earnings from domestic activities, whereas Colombian traffickers’ profits depend almost entirely on international sales.

Additionally, traditional models of organized crime—emphasizing such attributes as hierarchy, continuity of operation and corrupt ties to governments—are inadequate descriptors of modern criminal enterprises. Much harmful criminal activity is carried out by groups that do not fit the formal model. Many, in fact, are small, loosely structured systems that expand or contract in accordance with changing opportunities and risks. Some groups are venture-specific: perpetrators come together to commit a crime, divide up the profits (if any) and then disperse. Such a pattern is characteristic of Chinese heroin groups and nuclear smuggling networks in former East-bloc states. In the United States, computer crime which costs U.S. companies an estimated $10 billion per year generally is perpetrated by small teams of digital “hitmen” or by isolated talented hackers. Vast organizational resources, elaborate hierarchical arrangements and coteries of compliant government officials are not prerequisites for serious crimes—including actions that can cause great damage to the planet.

Post-Cold War World Growth of Transnational Organized Crime

Massive changes in the global economy—stemming from disintegration of hostile power blocs, technological advances in transportation and communications and diminished government controls over flows of goods, service and money—have fundamentally changed the context in which organized crime operates. Increased legal commerce provides a handy cover and justification for the movement of illegal merchandise and cash proceeds. As a result, criminal organizations have been able to globalize their operations, to position themselves in new markets and to expand the range of their illicit activities.

The collapse of the Soviet empire and the re-introduction of capitalism in China has removed Cold War barriers to business but also to criminal activity. Expanding worldwide financial and market systems have increased the magnitude and frequency with which people, goods and money move across national frontiers. The sheer volume of transactions allows much criminal enterprise and money laundering to go undetected. The establishment of a free trade area in North America (NAFTA) and the ongoing low-
erating of customs and passport controls in Europe also has provided unintended opportunities for the spread of criminality in the guise of legitimate business. The fact that only about 3 percent of the 9 million containers that enter the United States annually are checked by U.S. Customs underscores the problem.

At the same time, the grave weakening of state power in the former Warsaw Pact countries and other ex-dictatorships has weakened their law enforcement and criminal justice systems. In former Warsaw Pact states porous frontiers and newly convertible currencies have increased the attractiveness to international criminals of local markets for drugs and other illicit substances. The demise of communism and the weakening of state power in these countries has diminished the resources available to law enforcement and criminal justice systems. As a result of such trends, organized crime in its various guises—drug trafficking, counterfeiting, dealing in stolen cars and art objects, arms smuggling and commerce in illegal aliens and human body parts—is flourishing in post Communist states.

Perhaps the greatest beneficiary of these global economic shifts and political realignments has been the illicit drug trade, which is both booming and evolving in new directions. World opium and coca leaf production have doubled since 1985, according to State Department estimates. Significant new opium production has appeared in Colombia, Venezuela, China, Vietnam and former Soviet Central Asia. Colombia, traditionally a "cocaine" country, now supplies at least one third of the heroin consumed in the United States. China is now an important transit country for Burmese heroin; also, entrepreneurial North Koreans are entering the heroin business, perhaps with the backing of the Pyongyang government. Poland, China,
Russia, Azerbaijan, Mexico and the Baltic States are emerging as important producers and exporters of sophisticated amphetamine drugs. Demand for cocaine, though stabilizing in the United States, is soaring in Western Europe; moreover entrepreneurial criminals increasingly are peddling cocaine and heroin to consumers in Eastern Europe and Russia.

Reasons That Organized Crime Is Growing

Organized crime—like many modern corporations—has developed new strategies and structural arrangements to compete more effectively in the international market place. That is, organized crime has become transnational. This new phenomenon is difficult to define precisely. Yet these transnational criminal enterprises (as opposed to those that merely sell products into foreign markets) appear to comprise several key characteristics.

- Establishment of affiliates or cells abroad. Like multinational corporations, major crime groups may station permanent representatives abroad to handle the organization’s main businesses. For instance, Cali-based trafficking organizations maintain networks of importers and distributors in most major U.S. (and some European) cities; these trafficking agents work under tight operational supervision of the head office in Cali. Every dollar, and every kilo must be accounted for and every customer for the merchandise requires prior approval from Cali. In Germany, the German Federal Police have identified 68 Italian crime cells, many with ties to Italy’s four major criminal formations, which engage in weapons and drug dealing, trafficking in stolen cars and money laundering throughout the country.

- Corrupt relations with foreign leaders. Perhaps the clearest examples of this pattern are in the Western Hemisphere, where crime and degradation associated with the South American cocaine industry have metastasized to other countries and regions. Over the past decade, Colombia’s cocaine cartels have reached beyond their home base to cultivate ties with political leaders and top level officials in a number of Central American and Caribbean countries: for example, Panama, the Bahamas, Antigua, the Turks and Caicos Islands and even Communist Cuba. The aim has been to enhance cocaine logistics and money flows—for instance, to obtain landing and refueling facilities, docking facilities, storage sites, permission to operate cocaine laboratories and various financial and money laundering services. Colombia organizations even are rumored to have contributed funds to the 1994 presidential campaigns of Ernesto Perez Balladares in Panama and Ernesto Zedillo in Mexico. (Recall that the Cali cartel paid $6 million to ensure the victory of Ernesto Samper in Colombia in 1994).

- Transnational strategic alliances. Like multinational cooperation, criminal organizations increasingly seek partners abroad to maximize market opportunities, improve logistics and reduce business exposure. Often this means relying on a foreign partner’s smuggling or money laundering networks and superior knowledge of local conditions (including corrupt connections to law enforcement). Archetypal examples of such cooperation include Colombia’s umbrella agreements with Italian crime syndicates to sell cocaine in Italy and Central Europe. These arrangements address such issues as terms of delivery, payment schedules, prices and market development. Italian police have recorded discussions between the Sicilian mafia and the Cali cartel regarding formation of a dedicated infrastructure of front companies to manage large-volume flows of narcotics and banknotes. Similarly, the Cali cartel has reached agreements with Mexican traffickers whose knowledge of the U.S. border and access to top Mexican police and judicial officials represent invaluable smuggling assets. Such ties extend even to former Warsaw Pact states, where the Cali cartel has cooperated with former Czech intelligence officers, Polish businessmen and assorted Russian criminals to open non-traditional land and sea routes to ship cocaine to Western Europe. Finally, the Sicilian mafia and other transnational groups have established a variety of money laundering arrangements with Russian crime syndicates.
Potential Flashpoints

Drug Trafficking

The booming global traffic in narcotics, manipulated by powerful international actors with supporting casts of domestic entrepreneurs, generates total revenues of $180 billion a year, according to United Nations' estimates. This enormous illicit enterprise threatens public safety, the health of citizens, the integrity of societies and the attainment of national goals almost everywhere on the planet. In the United States, law enforcement, correctional and public health costs of drugs are estimated by the White House to be $67 billion annually.

Surge in drug use since 1960s

For the moment, the harm done by the illegal drug activities of international organized crime poses the greatest threat to American national security interests. While Americans constitute only 5 percent of the world’s population, over 50 percent of the total supply of illegal drugs in the world each year are consumed by Americans. The widespread abuse of controlled substances that began in the 1960s in the United States causes many of the most serious social ills afflicting contemporary American society. Crime experts Roy Godson and William Olson point out that fewer than 30,000 people were arrested in the U.S. in 1960 for violating drug laws. Recently, drug arrests have numbered more than one million annually. In the 1990s, more people have been imprisoned for drug offenses than for all violent crimes combined. Furthermore, the majority of violent crimes committed in the United States occur under the influence of drugs or alcohol. The explosion of drug-related offenses explains why there are more than one million people incarcerated in American prisons.

Certainly the human and economic costs are terrible. Americans spent $49 billion on drugs in 1993, more than they spent on health insurance or furniture. According to the 1995 National Survey on Drug Abuse, 12.8 million Americans used illegal...
drugs at least once a month in 1995 and hospital emergencies related to drugs reached more than 530,000 in that year. In 1994 more than 8,400 people died from drug overdoses in the United States.

**Rising social costs of drug addiction**

Drug cases are clogging the U.S. court system and making the constitutional guarantee of speedy trials impossible to implement. The soaring costs of the American health system are in part due to: gunshot wounds, child and spouse abuse, tuberculosis, venereal disease, AIDS, cardiovascular disease, automobile accidents and crack baby cases filling hospitals. A great many of these cases are drug-related. One of the root causes of both poverty and increasing welfare costs in the United States is drug abuse. The widespread use of stupefying drugs by school children, in particular, supposedly innocent marijuana, weakens American public education. The use of marijuana by American high school students leaped by 50 percent between 1992 and 1995, from 8 percent of the tenth grade students having used marijuana in the last month to 17 percent. Drug abuse lies behind the destructive behavior which has devastated public housing. In general, much of the hopelessness afflicting the growing American underclass can be traced to the effects of substance abuse.

**Nuclear Smuggling**

A compelling international security concern in the 1990s has been the soaring illegal traffic in radioactive isotopes and other nuclear materials that originates principally in the nuclear complexes of former Soviet states. While most stolen materials offered for sale internationally have little military significance, at least eight diversions of weapons-usable uranium or plutonium from Russian facilities have occurred in the 1990s; in four of the cases the material was smuggled successfully to Central Europe before being impounded by authorities.

As of 1996, trafficking in radioactive materials has not been a primary or even a secondary source of business for Russia’s established mafia groups. Organized crime’s traditional business— narcotics, extortion, raw materials smuggling and the like—offer fewer risks and more secure profits. Yet organized crime’s involvement in brokering of “dual-use” materials (non-radioactive metals used in construction of atomic weapons but also in civilian industrial manufacture) has been amply documented.

Moreover, unlike other forms of transnational crime (drugs, for example), smuggling does not appear to involve an elaborate organizational infrastructure. That is, supply chains and mechanisms to transport such materials over long distances and across international boundaries already are a reality in the post-Communist world and in the West. Networks typically comprise loose assortments of former nuclear workers, small metals traders, opportunistic businessmen and petty smugglers. For instance, the trafficking chain that delivered 363 grams of plutonium-239 to Munich in August 1994 comprised three former employees of the Obninsk Institute of Physics and Power
Drug Used by 10th Graders
(In percent)

Note: Use shown is for current month for all except alcohol; for alcohol, use shown is for any time during life.

Engineering, a Moscow scientist, a Colombian medical doctor-turned-broker in military goods and two Spanish entrepreneurs in the construction business. In Russia, this nascent dealer network sometimes is supported by a crew of couriers and guards who transport radioactive material. Furthermore, nuclear trading channels at times are augmented by the participation of former and active government officials, diplomats, and intelligence operatives. Networks typically have fluid boundaries and tend to coalesce around one or two deals; yet some smuggling configurations or components of them (metals trading firms, for example) might handle nuclear materials on a fairly regular basis. In any event, nuclear smuggling while rudimentary in organizational terms holds ominous potential as an illegal specialty business.

Threats to Democracy

Organized crime presents two broad types of threats to an existing political authority. One is that the activities of criminals will merge with and reinforce existing civil conflicts or separatist tendencies. For example, the international traffic in drugs and arms has contributed to the breakup or partial disintegration of several nation-states: Burma, Afghanistan, Tadjikistan and Yugoslavia. Burma’s Shan United Army, for example, controlled territory and fought the government with proceeds from opium and heroin sales. In Colombia, cocaine traffickers and paramilitary groups sought in the late 1980s to create a quasi-independent anti-subversion bastion in the Middle Madgalena Valley. The Medellin kingpin Pablo Escobar created a Rebel Antioquia movement in the province of the same name as a final gesture of defiance against the Bogotá government in early 1993. In Colombia and Peru, communist guerrillas tax narcotics production and exports to further their revolutionary objectives. In Colombia, guerrillas’ levies from the cocaine and opium trade exceed $100 million annually. In the immediate aftermath of the Soviet Union’s collapse, many observers feared the prospect of a symbiosis of emergent criminal actors, the breakdown of law and order and centrifugal political tendencies in the Russian Republic. Had the government’s crime prevention system and control over the localities collapsed, Russia’s far-flung nuclear establishment would have been up for grabs.

A second type of threat is almost a mirror image of the former: that flagrant lawlessness and criminal threats to the legitimacy or integrity of governments will provoke a citizen’s backlash of sorts—facilitating the growth of extremist or authoritarian movements that promise to re-establish order and fairness. The Cuban Revolution of 1959 owed its success largely to the collusive relationship between the American mafia and the Cuban power structures in the 1940s and 1950s. The conversion of Cuba into a tourist mecca for cocaine, prostitution and gambling, and the criminals’ penetration of many sectors of the Cuban economy did much to delegitimize the Batista regime, offering a convenient political pathway for Fidel Castro’s rise to power.

In this respect, organized crime presents a particular threat to the growth of young democracies, notably in the ex-Communist states. Such countries lack government regulatory agencies and business codes to prevent the kinds of predatory commercial activity organized crime thrives on. Furthermore, following the collapse of the old dictatorships with which they were closely associated, the police forces of ex-Communist states tend to be demoralized, underpaid, underfunded and ill-equipped. As a result, what laws are in effect tend to be poorly enforced. Such a situation encourages both the offer and the acceptance of bribes, as well as the use of violence by organized gangs against honest law enforcement officials. The resultant atmosphere of flagrant lawlessness has hol-
allowed out support for democratization and free markets, discouraged Western investment, retarded economic growth and made a return to authoritarianism and state control of the economy seem attractive to many. In Russia, for example, intensified criminal activities fanned the discontent that produced ultranationalist Vladimir Zhirinovsky’s electoral success in the December 1993 parliamentary elections when his Liberal Democratic party won 23 percent of the Russian vote. Zhirinovsky’s platform included on the spot execution of criminal gang leaders by firing squads and seizure of criminal assets to finance a reduction of government budget deficits.

Collusive Relationships

Ironically, the organized crime sector—despite its potentially baneful implications for political systems—often functions with the acquiescence and even the support of governments. One reason derives from criminal economic clout in some societies. Take, for example, the Andean countries in South America. Cocaine is the region’s largest export (in fact it is Latin America’s second largest export after petroleum). Cocaine accounts for approximately 3 to 4 percent of the gross domestic product of Peru and Bolivia and 8 percent of Colombia’s. The cocaine industry employs 450,000 to 500,000 Andeans directly in farming, processing, transport, security, and money handling operations. Legions of others earn a living by providing goods and services essential to the industry.

Andean governments are reluctant to launch a frontal attack against an industry that is such a vital source of revenue and employment. Real or perceived threats such as violent retaliation from drug lords, a foreign exchange crisis, an economic downturn in narco-dependent industries (such as construction and retail trades), upsurges in guerrilla violence and migration of hordes of dispossessed coca farmers to Lima, La Paz, and Bogotá largely explain governments’ inaction on the drug front. A complicating factor is that narcotics organizations have taken over functions normally reserved to the state, especially in such areas as social welfare and (ironically) maintenance of law and order. In Mexico, Colombia, Bolivia, and Peru traffickers have devoted large sums to community development projects (such as roads, schools and housing). Such activities have expanded drug capos’ bases of political support among poor communities that governments were unable to reach. In Colombia and to a lesser extent Peru, paramilitary organizations financed by drug dealers supplanted a weak central government in providing local security against predatory guerrilla groups. Obviously, narcotraffickers’ intrusion into areas of the state and the law impact a new and ominous dimension to their activities.

Acquiescence sometimes verges on active collusion. That is, governments (or parts of governments such as military or intelligence organizations) employ criminals to accomplish specific political objectives. To some extent, this is not an entirely new reality. During the Second World War, the U.S. Office of Naval Intelligence formed understandings with both the American and Sicilian Mafias to help undermine the Fascist regime in southern Italy.

Contemporary Russia provides a good example of the relationships that have come into being between organized crime groups, and some national police and intelligence services. Such an alliance developed in the 1960s. In essence, the relationship was based on the ability of criminals to provide Soviet officials with consumer goods and services unavailable legally under the Communist system. As Gorbachev’s reforms evolved into capitalism in the early 1990s, Russian criminals were well positioned to take advantage of the new economics and grew rich accordingly. Russian organized crime retained its links to Russian officials. But the power relationship shifted greatly in favor of the criminals, as the state weakened and illicit profits soared. Furthermore, a good many ex-Communists were either forced from or chose to leave the police, security and intelligence services. Their old links to organized crime, as well as their knowledge and skills, made these former police and intelligence agents natural recruits for the Russian gangs.
Experts disagree on the degree to which the new Russian Foreign Intelligence Service (FIS), Federal Security Service (FSB) and the Interior Ministry (MVD) are allied to organized crime. Some argue that the links are purely personal, connecting some corrupt FIS, FSB and MVD officials to former KGB, MVD and police colleagues who now work in the underworld. Others believe that the FIS and FSB is officially employing the services of Russian organized crime to carry out assassinations, launder money and perform other services. Some observers of the Russian scene insist that one of the major reasons for the December 1994 Russian attack on Chechnya was to eliminate the brazenly independent Chechen mafia as a rival to Russian organized crime. There is little doubt that the late Chechen leader Dudayev was in league with organized crime leaders in his country.

Furthermore, legitimate economic elites in Russia find that the mafia fills an important vacuum in society. In the absence of functioning commercial and legal codes and a viable judicial system, mobsters provide protection of business, and regulation of disputes (including helping businesses avoid taxes, stave off unfriendly creditors and collect bills). As in South America, organized crime supplants the state in many areas, offering arbitrage services, providing employment, and contributing to charitable causes. According to Stephen Handelman, one St. Petersburg mobster, Anatolii Vladimirov, made a large donation to an impoverished astronomy research institute in that city in return for which grateful scientists decided to name an obscure star “Anvlad” after their benefactor.

U.S. Interests and Approach

Net Assessment

The immense profits that can be realized by the smuggling of drugs, military arms, nuclear materials and other banned products may not only tempt individual intelligence or security agents but even the leadership of such services. The large amounts of money to be made by turning an official blind eye to smuggling or even by engaging in it can be used not only for personal enrichment but to finance the activities of the intelligence organs of poor states. Even wealthier intelligence or security services may see such profits as a way to pay for projects not approved by governmental superiors. Furthermore, drugs, counterfeit currency or weapons may be considered a means to weaken an adversary state and their passage through their own country may be permitted by intelligence or security forces for such reasons. But, for whatever reasons such cooperation between organized crime and certain intelligence services may exist, the assistance by government officials to criminal gangs adds greatly to the national security threat that they pose. As was the case for terrorist organizations during the Cold War, when a criminal organization is aided by the resources available to intelligence services, it becomes far more dangerous.

U.S. Interests

While international organized crime does not present a military threat to the interests of the United States, it nonetheless is inflicting significant damage domestically and internationally. Intense transnational cooperation to reduce such a threat is thus warranted. The main objectives with regards to this subject are:

Prevent criminal activity from damaging the people of the U.S.

There is no prospect that organized crime could present a threat to the U.S. government. However, criminal activity in the United States victimizes individuals and undermines the nation's social fabric. Crime, whether at home or abroad, can damage U.S. business. The U.S. interest is in the prevention of criminal activity, irrespective of whether its point of origin is domestic or foreign.

Prevent organized crime from undermining emerging democracies

The U.S. has an interest in the enlargement of the community of democratic nations. It has a further interest in ensuring stable governments committed to
respecting international law, which will not undermine their neighbors. Organized
criminal groups could challenge these interests in several ways. In some coun-
tries, such as Colombia, criminal activities finance guerrilla movements that could
threaten social stability, even if their prospects of taking power are slim. Particu-
larly in small countries, organized crime can threaten to put its associates directly
into power in the government. And in countries in transition from authoritarian
rule, rampant organized crime can undermine support for the new political system.

Prevent criminal activity from damaging
the people of other advanced industrial
nations

There is little if any prospect that
organized crime could present a threat to
the governments of other advanced industrial nations. However, criminal activity
hurts the residents of those countries. As part of its general support for the welfare
of the community of industrial democracies, the U.S. has an interest in combatting
international organized crime. Furthermore, the spread of organized crime can
hurt the free flow of goods, money, and people across borders by requiring oner-
ous inspections and record-keeping designed to impede crime. That in turn hurts Americans who wish to trade, invest, and travel abroad.

U.S. Approach

The security challenges posed by
organized crime threaten the U.S. foreign policy objective of enlarging the community
of democratic and free market states. The principal instruments used to meet
this challenge will be non-military, such as
greater cooperation between national police forces, the sharing of criminal intel-
ligence, facilitating extradition and mutual legal assistance, and increasing flows of in-
ternational technical and financial assistance to law enforcement entities of drug-
torn or crime-torn states. Furthermore, crime control initiatives are linked to
broader policy initiatives—such as economic growth, free trade, and strengthening
of democratic institutions.

At the same time, the military will
continue to be used as an auxiliary instru-
ment against organized crime. Factors
affecting the use of the military can be
divided into those regarding domestic use
of the military and those regarding use of
the military abroad.

The Posse Comitatus Act

The Posse Comitatus Act of 1878 and
its subsequent interpretations forbid the
use of the Army and Air Force for the direct
enforcement of the laws of the United
States. Members of those services cannot
make arrests, seize drugs or other illegal
goods and are prohibited from involve-
ment in the formulation of anti-crime pol-
icy. However, court decisions have made
clear that those services may still render a
wide variety of support services to law
enforcement personnel. Furthermore, since
the services under his control are not cov-
ered by the Act, the Secretary of the Navy
can authorize the use of the Navy and Marine Corps to enforce American laws. In
practice, however, this has rarely been
done. Of course, the Coast Guard is exempt
from the provisions of Posse Comitatus.
Finally, the Air and Army National Guard
are under the authority of state governors
and do not fall under the Posse Comitatus Act. In any case, the law can be amended
by Congress as it sees fit. In the 1990s, Con-
gress significantly relaxed Posse Comitatus
restrictions with regards to counter-
narcotics activities. In 1996, bills were intro-
duced in the Senate to eliminate restrictions
of the Act as they pertain to terrorism and
the theft of weapons of mass destruction.

Use of U.S. Armed Forces Against
Criminals Abroad

The U.S. armed forces could be used
to carry out combat missions against the
members of organized crime and their
assets. But if carried out on the territory or
in the airspace of foreign countries without
their approval, such operations could be
perceived as attacks on state sovereignty.
Not only might such actions embroil the
United States in hostilities but they would
risk arousing nationalist sentiment in favor
of the criminals. Historical anti-American
animosity in a number of countries
plagued by organized crime, such as Mex-
ico and Colombia, could well make such assaults extremely counter-productive. In addition, military action could threaten the stability and legitimacy of host country governments and cause economic problems besides. Furthermore, even well-established organized crime groups are unlikely to possess the permanent and irreplaceable infrastructure that provides targets for conventional military operations. Therefore, the principal use of the U.S. armed forces to counter organized crime abroad will be through assistance to the local military and security services.

In the case of some small, crime-ridden nearby states, American offers of assistance may be rebuffed or, if accepted, effectively sabotaged. Instead, such situations must be addressed by U.S. diplomacy. Threats of economic sanctions or diplomatic isolation are the instruments of first choice. In some cases, it may prove necessary for the U.S. to use military force—possibly sanctioned by the United Nations and the Organization of American States—as the only way to end the rule of gangsters. Such an operation might resemble the invasion of Grenada in 1983 or the 1989 action in Panama. For more discussion of this issue, see the chapter on North America. The American armed forces are already taking part in counter-drug operations. By land, sea and air, the services have assigned units to interdict drug smuggling. The Defense Intelligence Agency is cooperating with the FBI and the DEA to translate and analyze seized records of criminal activities. Both active and reserve component forces also assist with counter-crime intelligence gathering including the conduct of electronic and aerial surveillance (including AWACS aircraft), and the interpretation of surveillance photographs. They also construct and maintain border fences and roads, examine vehicles for contraband at U.S. ports of entry, and operate X-ray and laser devices to search ships and planes. The military also provides transportation for law enforcement agencies and lends them various kinds of surveillance and transportation equipment.

The Department of Defense FY 1996 counter-narcotics budget was 814 million. Of this figure, 397 million is for interdiction activities. That is a substantial reduction from the 854 million spent on interdiction in FY 1992, largely because of the judgement that some of the more expensive activities were not cost-effective. A further 281 million was budgeted in FY 1996 for support to state and local authorities. Of this, 120 million was to aid law enforcement agencies along the border with Mexico, from which perhaps 50 percent of illegal drugs enter the U.S. The remaining 136 million of the FY 1996 Defense Department counter-narcotics spending was for research, prevention, and treatment.

While valuable in specific areas such as aerial surveillance, the U.S. military plays only an auxiliary role in countering narcotics. The military is neither organized nor trained for law enforcement. At a time of shrinking defense budgets, increased demands on the armed forces for non-military duties are opposed by many because they could diminish the ability of the forces to fulfill their primary missions. Furthermore, as “Drug Czar” Barry McCaffrey has pointed out, the terms “war on drugs” and “war on crimes” are misnomers. Conducting a war and fighting crime are actually quite different activities. Except in extraordinary circumstances, law enforcement groups will continue to be the U.S. government’s principal instruments against organized crime.
CHAPTER SEVENTEEN

Refugees, Migration and Population

Mass migration, whether through force or by choice, has always been a part of history. Often, it was through such population movement that new civilizations—new mixes of people—were formed. What is new in recent decades has been the scale and speed of migration. The forces contributing to the size of modern migration include:

- Technologies that reduce the cost of travel and make more available to people in trouble information about far-off places to which they may be considering moving.
- More open societies that are accustomed to foreign faces as travellers and workers, and political systems that value the freedom to travel.
- Ethnic and sectarian strife, sometimes genocidal, that makes entire populations scared to remain as minorities in their traditional home.

In the last decade, millions were forced from their homes and countries of origin because of war, civil conflict, and persecution. Millions more chose to relocate to another country for political, economic and social reasons. These migrants had substantial political impact in many countries, including several:

- The wave of East Germans who poured through Czechoslovakia en route to West Germany in the summer and autumn of 1989 were a principal reason why the East German government allowed free movement directly to the West in November 1989. It is hardly an exaggeration to say that East German migrants toppled the Berlin Wall, which was the key event in ending the Cold War.
- The French political scene changed with the rise of the extreme nationalist movement of Jean-Marie Le Pen, who parlayed concern about the social and economic impact of immigrants into a vote share that was at times as high as 20 percent nationwide. Concern about immigrants’ customs led to several sharp national debates, for instance, over whether Muslim girls could wear headscarves to school. Worry about the potential for a massive immigrant wave in the event that Algeria fell to Islamist extremists led some in France to argue that the country’s main security concerns were to its south rather than to its east. Were that view to prevail, it could have serious implications for the cohesion of European security organizations, since Germany is focused on the east, namely, the integration of ex-Warsaw Pact states into a European security architecture.
- Tougher attitudes toward immigrants became a hallmark of U.S. politics in the mid-1990s. Voters in California approved a 1994 initiative designed to crack down on illegal immigrants. In a variety of laws passed in 1995–96, Congress took aim at illegal immigration and also reduced access to U.S. social...
services by legal immigrants who are not citizens. Attitudes towards immigration hardened, with some arguing that immigrants were changing the character of U.S. society.

Migration is the most dramatic demographic development of the 1990s, but it is only part of the population story. The world’s population is expected to increase from 5.8 billion in 1996 to 9 billion in 2050. The greatest increase will take place in the developing world, where people are least able to sustain themselves and their environment. The resulting coalescence of rapid population growth, underdevelopment, poverty, and environmental degradation is likely to strain fragile societies to the breaking point.

These events will have important implications for security issues. For the U.S. military, a major effect will be to increase pressure to use the military for emergency humanitarian activities in times of crisis.

Background and Trends

Forced Movement of People is Becoming More Common

During the 1990s, massive outpourings of people from their countries of origin because of violent, man-made upheavals of dreadful proportions have been increasing. In 1960, there were 1.4 million refugees; by 1980, the number had swelled to 8.2 million; in 1996, there were 15 to 20 million refugees and approximately 25 to 30 million internally displaced civilians. Fully 80 percent of the displaced were women and children. In the 1996 global population of 5.8 billion, roughly 1 of every 120 persons was displaced by war, civil strife, or persecution.

Waves of Refugees Across International Borders

People who flee from conflict and cross international borders are generally recognized as refugees. More formally, according to the 1951 UN Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees—a legally binding treaty drawn up at the creation of the Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR)—and a 1967 Protocol, a refugee is any person who has a well-founded fear of persecution because of race, religion, nationality, political opinion, or membership in a particular social group and because of this fear has fled his country of origin.

After large numbers of Africans fled their homelands in the late 1950s and early 1960s as the result of civil wars, wars of liberation, or intra-African conflicts, members of the Organization of African Unity (OAU) in 1969 broadened the definition of a refugee to include any person who flees his homeland owing to “external aggression, occupation, foreign domination or events seriously disturbing public order in either part or the whole of his country of origin or nationality.” Although the OAU directive is not the legal definition of a refugee, most of the nations that signed the 1951 convention or the 1967 protocol observe this broader definition of refugee status.

A critical distinction is made between migrants and refugees for social and legal reasons. A refugee flees involuntarily. A migrant, on the other hand, relocates voluntarily either because of a desire for a better life elsewhere (a pull factor) or a deterioration of living conditions (a push factor) due to violence, environmental degradation, or economic circumstances.

Originally, the UNHCR was mandated to protect refugees produced by World War II and promote durable solutions to their problems. Protection was generally in legal terms, safeguarding the right of asylum-seekers not to be pushed back to their countries of origin once they had crossed an international border. Only in later refugee flows did the need for physical security—both protection from physical attack and through access to humanitarian assistance—become manifestly more urgent.

In the 1990s, refugee movements from countries in distress have been greater in number, frequency, and complexity. In many post-Cold War civil conflicts, such as those in Bosnia-Herzegovina and Rwanda, political leaders exploit ethnic, tribal, religious, and linguistic differences and incite neighbors to battle neighbors. Civilians
caught in these conflicts are no longer simply by-products of war. Instead, they become targets of war, part of the military strategy, even though the Geneva Conventions expressly forbid the purposeful uprooting of civilian populations.

Because of sweeping devastation, overpowering numbers of people seek safety at the same time. For example, in 1991, following the Persian Gulf War, people viewing television the world over were numbed by the sight of a sixty-mile stretch of humanity, two million Iraqi Kurds fleeing Saddam Hussein's forces, inching through mud and relentless rain into the rugged northern mountain terrain that separates Iraq from Turkey and Iran.

Yet even that sight did not prepare the world for what occurred in Rwanda in the spring of 1994. Following the genocidal massacre of at least 500,000 Tutsis and moderate Hutus and the subsequent defeat of extremist Hutus, the flight of people from Rwanda to Tanzania and to the Goma area of Zaire constituted an exodus of a magnitude never before seen in such a short space of time. A quarter of a million fled into Tanzania in the space of forty-eight hours at the end of April 1994; then one million crossed into Zaire within a four-day period in mid-July 1994.

More Internally Displaced Persons

An emerging category, resulting from the proliferation of internal conflicts in a number of countries, is an internally displaced person (IDP), which includes people who do not cross a border and are, instead, displaced within a state for the same reasons that a refugee flees across an inter-

Refugees and Asylum Seekers by Host Country

![Map showing Refugees and Asylum Seekers by Host Country](image)

Legend
- ■ = 10,000 Internally Displaced People
- □ = 100,000 Refugees and Asylum Seekers by Host Country

Source: International Federation of Red Cross and Red Crescent Societies, World Disasters Report 1996.
national border. Although not afforded protection under the U.N. convention, it is becoming more common for IDPs to be assisted by humanitarian organizations as though they did qualify for refugee status.

In the mid-1990s, more victims of conflict become internally displaced within their own borders than seek asylum by crossing an international border. However, with 25 to 30 million civilians internally displaced as of 1996, the international community is forced to grapple with the complex issue of conflict between national sovereignty on the one hand and the protection of basic human rights and humanitarian access to the internally displaced on the other.

At times, for a variety of reasons, a government cannot or will not bear the responsibility of protecting the human rights of its citizens. Some governments, burdened by armed conflict and the consequent displacement of people, simply do not have the resources to protect those displaced citizens. In other instances, a state may collapse, as did Somalia. Still other governments, such as that of Sudan, abuse citizens they are bound to protect by punishing segments of their population simply for being who they are—ethnically, religiously, or racially.

In all these cases, international organizations and nongovernmental organizations (NGOs) find it difficult, or extremely costly, or, in some cases, almost impossible to gain access to and provide protection for internally displaced civilians. Oftentimes, the internally displaced are trapped in the midst of armed conflict or live in a country where all governance has broken down, leaving no one with whom humanitarian organizations can negotiate access. In some cases, the very government charged with protecting its citizens may refuse access to those in territory held by rebel factions.
Population is Interrelated with the Environment and Stability

During the 1990s, as complex humanitarian emergencies follow one upon the other and disrupt the lives of millions, more and more attention is being given to addressing the root causes of violent man-made upheavals and thus preventing them. Demographers, environmentalists, economists, and sociologists, are coming to realize more fully the complex interrelationship among rapid population growth, environmental degradation, and economic and social underdevelopment.

Population Growth Rate is Slowing, But Size of Population Increase Remains High

Two contrasting trends are emerging in the field of global demographics. On the one hand, the rate of global population growth is slowing. The 1996 rate of 1.7 percent is expected to drop to 1.0 percent by the year 2025. But at the same time there is a fall-off in the birth rate, the total number of people will continue to grow about the same speed. In 1950, world population stood at 2.5 billion; this figure is expected to reach 8.5 billion in 2025. From 1950 to 1955, the global population increased by 47 million. By contrast, despite the lower growth rate, the world population is expected to increase by 98 million a year between 1995 and 2000 because the absolute number of people is so much larger.

The most dramatic areas of growth will be in the less-developed areas, where political, economic, and social conditions and infrastructures are least able to accommodate this growth. This region stretches from South Asia, into the Middle East, across into the middle sector of Africa, and down to the Cape of Good Hope. Between
Urban population will increase from 2.2 billion in 1990 to approximately 5.1 billion in 2025. As with absolute population growth, the most spectacular increase in urbanization will occur in the less-developed regions of the world. By 2025, more than two-thirds of urban population will live in developing countries. The urban growth rate will be fastest in Africa, where the urban population is expected to double between 1985 and 2000. For example, Lagos, Nigeria, the capital of Africa’s most populous country, had a population of under 300,000 in 1950. In 1996, the population was over ten million and by 2015 Lagos is expected to be the third largest city in the world with 24.4 million people. Cities in Asia are projected to absorb an additional population of some 500 million. Of them, only Tokyo will be in the developed world.

**Potential Flashpoints**

**Military Involvement in Man-Made Humanitarian Emergencies**

Since the end of the Cold War, the U.S. military has repeatedly deployed in response to mass sudden migrations, from the Kurds in northern Iraq to Haitians and then Cubans in the Caribbean, as well as Rwandans. On almost every continent there are many sites that could erupt, leading to the involvement of the U.S. military in either humanitarian or peacekeeping operations. The section on troubled states delineates some of the potential areas for U.S. involvement in the Balkans, sub-Saharan Africa, and the Middle East. The situation in the Balkans is particularly important to the U.S. military, because the 500 U.S. soldiers in Macedonia (in Operation Able Sentry) are right in a path that would be taken by ethnic Albanians fleeing trouble in Kosovo—and the Macedonian government would be reluctant to host these migrants, because they could add to the substantial ethnic Albanian minority in Macedonia.

1990 and 2025, it is estimated that the population in the more developed states will increase by 12 percent, while the corresponding growth in the developing world is projected at 75 percent, an explosive 142 percent. In the least developed countries, where more than one billion people live in abject poverty, the population will grow.

The changing distribution of age groups within the global population presents another concern. In absolute numbers, the largest increase will be among youth entering the labor force. Finding employment for these young people will be a challenge. In countries with high youth unemployment, extremist elements may find more success, as illustrated by Algeria’s experience.

**Megacities May Prove Destabilizing**

To a large extent, the growing populations will be urban. Whereas in the past the growth of population was absorbed on the farm and in the countryside (where labor-intensive activities required larger populations), nearly all population growth from the late 1990s on will be in cities.
When a large-scale humanitarian crisis arises, the UNHCR and humanitarian relief organizations must respond rapidly to assist and protect massive numbers of people, who are often in critical condition and who are also crossing international borders. More and more frequently, the UNHCR and NGOs find that they are not adequately equipped to respond to such crises without the support of certain specific, enhanced technical assistance of the kind only military forces can offer.

- Equipment and supplies for a rapid response to a chaotic, overwhelming humanitarian emergency, including the ability to move personnel and critical provisions such as food, potable water, medical supplies, and materials for the construction of temporary shelters.

- Security for relief workers and affected civilians as well as for air and sea ports, relief convoys, warehouses, and distribution points for humanitarian assistance. A military presence also provides a general sense of security to a traumatized population and to relief workers.

- A variety of additional services, from administering emergency medical care to repairing infrastructure, stabilizing civil disorder in an assistance area, engaging in mine removal, and providing a system of communication. Where necessary, military air transport can be enlisted to deliver emergency humanitarian supplies and personnel to remote or dangerously inaccessible areas.

If present trends continue, more humanitarian assistance will take place among internally displaced populations than among those that have crossed an international border. Providing for the internally displaced, often in the midst of active fighting, is relatively new territory both for relief organizations and military contingents involved in humanitarian assistance operations, as is their relationship
to one another in the midst of humanitarian crises. While the cultures of relief organizations and the military differ, the two can be complementary in the midst of a humanitarian crisis.

For relief organizations, the hallmarks of assistance are that it be neutral, impartial, and humanitarian. Neutrality assures all parties involved that those giving assistance will not take sides. Impartiality means that aid is given solely on the basis of need. The humanitarian principle guarantees sovereigns that the singular purpose of the presence of relief workers is to provide protection for the physical security of displaced civilians and to relieve their human suffering through the provision of such basic needs as food, medical assistance, sanitation, water, and shelter.

Traditionally, the military involves itself in situations of direct combat. Rather than being neutral or impartial, military forces direct their energies toward engaging in conflict with an enemy.

Frequently, warring parties view humanitarian assistance as interference on behalf of one party or the other and object to the presence of relief workers or even obstruct their relief efforts. The presence of military contingents, though present solely to assure the secure delivery of relief assistance to civilians in need, heightens the perception of partiality.

Denial of access to the internally displaced by humanitarian personnel is often used as a weapon of war by parties to the conflict. This is in stark violation of Article 59 of the Geneva Convention Relating to the Protection of Civilian Persons, which states that humanitarian assistance and personnel be guaranteed free passage to civilians in need.

The belligerents might not respect or observe international humanitarian law. For instance, efforts in Bosnia-Herzegovina were thwarted continually and relief workers were daily in danger of coming under fire or being hit by snipers’ bullets. Humanitarian activities and relief convoys were constantly blocked throughout the country. Water and gas lines to Sarajevo were cut. During the siege of Sarajevo, Bosnian Serb forces denied the people of the city access to food and basic medical supplies.

Operation Sea Signal—An Unqualified Military Success

Operation Sea Signal began in May 1994 when a U.S. policy decision to screen Haitian migrants for refugee status on board ships—rather than immediately returning them to Haiti—caused a sudden, heavy outflow of Haitian migrants. An initial attempt to screen and provide a safe haven for the migrants on board leased ships anchored off Kingston, Jamaica, was quickly overwhelmed by the large number of migrants, resulting in a decision to temporarily shelter them ashore at the U.S. Naval Base in Guantanamo, Cuba. In August 1994, Castro changed his internal policy and allowed Cubans to leave the island. The immediate exodus of thousands of Cubans further complicated matters.

Joint Task Force 160 (JTF–160) was organized to meet the needs of this mission. A customized Joint Logistics Support Command was created to feed nearly 50,000 migrants and 8,000 support personnel, construct and maintain living quarters, and provide potable water by desalinizing sea water. Sea Signal was an expensive operation, with incremental military costs of $373 million in FY 1994 and FY 1995.

The mission was an unqualified military success. Military forces had not been specifically trained in migrant support missions, but the long-term investment in capable forces, quality people, and resourceful leaders was a significant contribution to Sea Signal’s success. Drawing upon the U.S. military’s routine procedure of critiquing its own performance, Sea Signal began by drawing upon the lessons learned during earlier migrant support operations and then, during the operation, adapted procedures to the changing situation. Specific factors for the success included:

- Interagency coordination was facilitated by integrating into the JTF representatives of the Immigration and Natural Service, the Coast Guard, the State Department, and Community Relations Service. The World Relief Corporation coordinated private donations.
- Accountability was maintained by means of a database containing information keyed to a coded bracelet worn by each immigrant.
- Communication between migrants and JTF–160 leadership was provided by leaders elected in the camps and by newspapers and radio programs from Military Information Support Teams.
- Security and maintenance of order and discipline were given high priority, with frequent patrolling and isolation of troublemakers.
- Morale was boosted by organized recreational activities and, for volunteers, meaningful work improving camp conditions. Providing familiar foods lessened the shock of being in a strange environment with limited freedom of movement.
The United Nations Protection Force's (UNPROFOR) mission in Bosnia-Herzegovina was mandated to support and protect the humanitarian relief operations of the UNHCR. However, belligerents from all sides, most particularly from the Bosnian Serb forces, held up convoys, sometimes for weeks, in order to deny civilians in enemy-controlled areas access to food and medical assistance.

In 1993, the Security Council declared six Bosnian government-held enclaves to be safe areas. Sarajevo, Srebrenica, Tuzla, Zepa, Gorazde, and Bihac were to be neutral, UNPROFOR-protected areas where civilians could take refuge. Ideally, they would be safe from attack and would receive humanitarian assistance. But that is not what happened. In contrast to the forces protecting the safe haven created in northern Iraq for Iraqi Kurds, UNPROFOR troops were not accorded the same rights to threaten or use force for the Bosnian safe areas. Consequently, Bosnian Serb forces, who never accepted the neutrality of these enclaves, bombarded them and impeded passage of humanitarian convoys. In turn, Bosnian government forces used the enclaves for military bases. The end result was the fall in July 1995 of Srebrenica and Zepa to Bosnian Serbs and the slaughter of thousands of Bosnian Muslim men whose remains have been found in mass graves not far from the two designated safe areas.

Military Involvement in Natural and Technological Disasters

Just as the military is equipped to respond rapidly to catastrophic man-made humanitarian crises, so too do military forces have the capacity to assist in natural and technological disasters such as fires, earthquakes, hurricanes, typhoons, floods, nuclear plant failures, oil spills, and chemical and gas accidents. When it is beyond the capacity of international organizations and NGOs to respond adequately to the needs of affected populations, members of joint U.S. military forces frequently provide additional support at the request of the U.S. government or foreign governments. These forces can organize and coordinate the distribution of food, water, and medical supplies; provide for transportation and equipment needs; assess the loss of life and the extent of injuries and illness within the distressed population; and construct needed shelter and infrastructure.

For example, in the summer of 1996 additional manpower was needed in the western United States where wildfires were more fierce and spread over more acreage in more states than in the previous twenty years. At the end of August, to relieve and assist hundreds of exhausted firefighters, a 550-man Marine battalion from Camp Pendleton in California was dispatched to eastern Oregon while 500 troops from the Army’s Fort Carson in Colorado were sent to other areas.

The Bangladesh cyclone of 1991 was particularly devastating and overwhelmed the newly installed Bengali government. Nearly 150,000 people lost their lives and close to 3 million lost their homes, many of the latter being deprived of livestock and livelihoods as well. Following a request of the government of Bangladesh, and an assessment by the U.S. Pacific Command, the U.S. military, in cooperation with international organizations and NGOs, airlifted
Caribbean Migration Patterns

thousands of tons of relief supplies to the neediest and most inaccessible areas. Medical teams added their support, as did other teams in infrastructure repair efforts.

Caribbean and Mexican Migration Control

Given the turbulent nature of several regions close to U.S. shores or important to U.S. interests, circumstances could occur that would lead to U.S. involvement. The most likely locations involving mass migration where U.S. forces could become involved are the Caribbean basin and Mexico.

The migration of Caribbean people to the United States has been particularly troublesome during the 1990s. Thousands of men, women, and children have spilled out from Haiti and Cuba, risking their lives to reach the United States. Lesser flows of migrants have crossed the Mona Straits in boats to Puerto Rico and the Dominican Republic.

Boat people flee Caribbean countries for a variety of reasons, but the main cause of migration is economic. This creates a difficulty for the United States, because economic refugees are not recognized by the UN as having legitimate rights of asylum. However, political refugees do have such a right and, in the case of Cubans, have been welcomed onto the mainland since the rise of the Castro government. Boat people, as a result, pose significant dilemmas for U.S. decision makers. One question is whether U.S. immigration law is sufficiently flexible to deal with the complexities of Caribbean boat people in light of illegal economic migrants and legal political refugees. A second and related question is whether the national and international laws have been used appropriately in an environment that overlaps illegal maritime drug traffic. And lastly, Caribbean migration raises the issue of whether the United States is expected to do more to ameliorate the economic, political, and social conditions that impel people to take to their boats in the first place.

Because of the magnitude of migrant waves, the Clinton administration has had to shift the approach to outflows. Prior to his inauguration in January 1993, candidate Clinton stated that he opposed the Bush administration approach of interdicting fleeing Haitians on the seas. However, once inaugurated and faced with an even greater outpouring of Haitians, President Clinton at first interdicted Haitian boat people and returned them to Port-au-Prince, Haiti's capital. In May 1994, he reversed this position when he authorized that Haitian boat people picked up at sea could have interviews on board U.S. Navy ships to determine their refugee-status. Soon, however, the ships were overwhelmed and did not have the capacity to screen properly the great number of Haitians seeking refugee asylum. In June 1994, President Clinton announced that Guantanamo Bay naval base would serve as a site for future Haitian interviews. In early July 1994, as the exodus from Haiti continued to swell, the administration determined that no further Haitians arriving at Guantanamo would be considered for
refugee status. Instead, they would be held at Guantanamo, which was declared a temporary safe haven, with the military providing basic humanitarian assistance such as food, water, shelter, sanitation, and medical attention. At the same time, the Clinton administration sent U.S. troops to occupy Haiti in order to assist in restoring and securing democracy and facilitating the return of deposed President Jean Bertrand Aristide. In 1995, the U.S. declared that all those in the safe haven not determined to be refugees could safely return to Haiti. Those who did not go freely were repatriated against their will.

Cuban emigration also began to increase in 1994. Prior to that time, under the terms of the Cuban Adjustment Act of 1966, all Cubans who entered the United States were given permanent resident status one year following arrival. The Clinton administration reversed this approach and placed Cubans who had been picked up by the U.S. Coast Guard into the Guantanamo safe-haven camp. The Clinton administration reached an agreement with the Cuban government whereby the U.S. would admit up to 20,000 Cubans each year provided Havana took effective measures to prevent unauthorized departures from Cuba. The vast majority of the 33,000 Cubans at Guantanamo were paroled into the United States in 1995.

Future flows from the Caribbean and Mexico are quite possible. The chapter on North America analyzes the potential for chaos in Cuba following the end of the Castro regime. If either economic or social conditions deteriorate in Cuba, it can be expected that another mass departure will materialize with which U.S. forces will invariably become involved.

Of all the scenarios that threaten to destabilize the United States and that worry security planners, a mass migration north across the Mexican border is the most troublesome. The large population of Mexico is heavily concentrated from Mexico City north. Given the traditional nature of border crossings into the U.S. by Central Americans and Mexicans, this safety valve could easily become overwhelmed should a sizeable percentage of these people feel sufficiently threatened. Conditions in Mexico that could lead to this phenomenon are

ico that could lead to this phenomenon are discussed in the chapter on North America.

If protracted and severe violence were to erupt in Mexico, it is expected that the number of crossings would increase dramatically and overwhelm the capacities of the Border Patrol agents from the Immigration and Naturalization Service. The thousands of miles of border are not easily defended given the rugged nature of the terrain over large stretches. Further, the proximity of large urban areas to the border facilitates a fast transition from one side to the other, and the ease with which illegal immigrants can blend into the large Hispanic population makes identification of illegal immigrants very difficult.

Perhaps the most pressing issue in preventing by force mass crossings is the establishment of appropriate rules of engagement. Military forces are neither trained nor equipped as law-enforcement officials, and it could be difficult to prevent significant serious violations of human rights when using military forces to quell a massive movement of people across the southern U.S. border.

**U.S. Interests and Approaches**

**Net Assessment**

In all likelihood, further fragmentation of states, both from ongoing conflicts and new upheavals, will occur. Nationalism built on ethnic, racial, or religious exclusivity is on the rise in several areas of the world, as discussed in the section on troubled states. From that assessment, we see states in various parts of the world engaged in ongoing conflicts, renewing old hostilities, or poised on a precipice, ready to fall into crisis. Most of these conflicts will be civil conflicts giving rise to massive internal displacement of civilians. Access to the suffering populations will be dangerous and limited. In some situations, military intervention will be necessary to safeguard regional security and to protect the delivery of assistance as well as the lives of relief workers.
Furthermore, the combination of population pressures, the internationalization of economies, and travel-easing technological progress will make migration more attractive to people in countries with oppressive governments or limited economic circumstances. The U.S. may experience additional waves of migrants on its southern borders. The U.S. military may be called upon to assist in controlling these migrant waves.

U.S. Interests

Protecting U.S. Borders

In the 1990s, the U.S. national mood has shifted towards more vigorous enforcement of immigration laws. Some have argued for reduced numbers of legal immigrants, which could influence the attitudes towards sudden waves of refugees fleeing a far-off conflict. These trends look likely to continue, with the result that more emphasis will be put on the U.S. interest in protecting U.S. borders from those who would enter illegally.

Defending Humanitarian Values

Americans are shocked when hundreds of thousands of people flee from disasters like the genocidal civil war Rwanda of the early 1990s. While these situations may not threaten vital U.S. national security interests, the U.S. will act on humanitarian grounds in face of a dire situation. However, in those situations where it is unclear what can be done to help, as is often the case in civil unrest, the U.S. may confine its actions to relieving the immediate suffering of the emigrants, rather than addressing the causes of the conflict. It is quite possible that in messy internal strife, the U.S. may not act, because it may be difficult to find ways to provide relief without being drawn into the conflict.

U.S. Approaches

U.S. foreign policy interests dictate the kind and degree of involvement in humanitarian crises. The willingness of the U.S. government to become engaged on a large scale in humanitarian operations depends not only upon the extent of human suffering caused by the emergency but also upon the degree of U.S. interest in the area and the tasks engaging the military at the time. Important to military engagement in any situation is a clear mission statement, objectives, rules of engagement, and exit strategies, designed to ensure "mission creep" does not occur.

Involvement in some areas of the world is broader than in others. In an area not of historical or immediate strategic concerns, such as Burundi, contingency planning for military engagement is limited to diplomatic missions, military advice, and the provision of airlift and air support to any active peacekeeping force.

Close to home, in the face of growing antagonism toward immigrants and refugees, the U.S. government is making even greater efforts to secure U.S. borders which involve the military in a backup role.

The military is only one of the instruments that the U.S. government uses for humanitarian aid. Most of the responsibility falls on civilian agencies, often working through NGOs and international agencies.

Military humanitarian involvement can be effective in several areas. For instance, in refugee repatriation, troops can accompany repatriation convoys, protect civilians at reception centers, secure the distribution of seeds, tools, and supplemental foodstuffs, and help with the demobilization of soldiers. Military-operated equipment, trucks, and machinery can be used to remove landmines and rebuild roads, bridges, and other devastated infrastructure.

The U.S. is increasingly interested in developing early warning systems, engaging in conflict resolution, and addressing root causes of conflicts in order to prevent increasingly violent man-made upheavals. If preventive action becomes more widespread, the number, frequency, and complexity of humanitarian emergencies that call upon military humanitarian intervention may begin to diminish.
Environmental problems are a major concern of U.S. policymakers, and the attention given to these problems is sure to grow. The primary response to environmental problems will come from civilian agencies rather than from the military. The principal security impact of environmental problems will be the instability and conflicts to which the problems contribute. There seems to be relatively little prospect that the U.S. military will become directly involved in responding to environmental problems as such through, for instance, enforcement of environmental agreements.

Environmental Scarcities Can Contribute to Instability

The linkages between environment and national security have been analyzed and debated over the past several years, first in the academic community and now in the U.S. policymaking community. There is broad consensus about the importance of environmental issues; the differences are about the implications of the issues for the military. Scarcity of renewable resources such as cropland, forests, water and fish stocks results from degradation and depletion of resources (supply-induced scarcity), overconsumption and overuse of resources (demand-induced scarcity), and inequitable distribution of resources. Often these causes of scarcity work together to exacerbate the scarcity’s impact.

Environmental scarcities can interact with political, economic, social, and cultural/intellectual factors to cause instability. Particularly in poorer developing countries, scarcities can limit economic options and therefore force those already impoverished to seek their livelihood in ecologically endangered areas, including urban slums.

At the same time, elite groups, often ethnically, racially, or religiously-based, may use the opportunity afforded by scarci-
ties to capture valuable environmental resources, thus reinforcing their dominance. The multiple effects of environmental scarcity, including large population movements, economic decline, and resource capture by vested interests, can weaken the state’s capacity to address demands, thus further aggravating individual groups’ grievances. If the state’s legitimacy and potential for coercive force are undermined, the conditions are ripe for instability. If the state’s legitimacy and coercive force remain intact or are bolstered, the regime may turn more authoritarian and may threaten the U.S. national interest in encouraging the spread of democracy and free markets around the world.

During the twentieth century, environmental scarcity has rarely contributed to interstate conflict (one exception being the 1967 Israeli-Arab war, which resulted from a cycle of escalating tensions after a 1965–1966 dispute over water). Unlike with non-renewable resources such as fossil fuels and certain minerals, states cannot convert key renewable resources into strategic assets quickly or easily, and thus cannot exploit these resources readily. Also, states with the most extensive scarcities tend to be poor, thus less likely to succeed as an aggressor. (If the country obtains weapons of mass destruction to carry out its aggression, obviously its likelihood of success—and its security interest to the United States—would soar.) At the same time, environmental scarcities are of significant importance in a typology of threats to international security. Environmentally-linked instability is increasingly likely to spill over to other states in a key strategic region, or to result in a complex humanitarian emergency stemming from large-scale population movements.

Land scarcity can result from land degradation, unequal distribution of resources, overpopulation, or some combination of all of these factors. In several countries suffering persistent civil insurgencies, the environmental considerations are notably similar: lack of access to productive agricultural land coupled with excessive population growth, forcing migration to steep hillsides to farm. These hillsides prove to be especially vulnerable to soil erosion, eventually failing to produce enough to sustain the migrant farmers. Deepened poverty makes those eking out a marginal living particularly susceptible to the claims and promises of insurgency movements. Countries that have experienced similar scenarios include the Philippines and Peru.

Deforestation is widespread throughout the world and its pace is accelerating. Deforestation accelerates soil erosion, alters hydrological cycles and precipitation patterns, and limits the land’s ability to retain water during rainy periods. Resulting floods clog rivers and reservoirs with silt while destroying irrigation systems. Farmers and fishermen are both negatively impacted by siltification, which may force fishermen to abandon their work and seek a living through agriculture, thus increasing the competition for already scarce land. Siltification may also have serious economic consequences in the Panama Canal Zone. With reversion of the Canal to Panamanian control imminent, residents from nearby areas have encroached on this land, clear-cutting the trees and reducing the soil’s ability to retain water. The resulting siltification may severely constrain the operability of the canals’ locks, thus threatening this critical economic artery.

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**Effects of Overfishing: Changes in Catches of Atlantic Cod 1950–93**

(Catch in millions of metric tons)

![Graph showing changes in catch of Atlantic Cod from 1950 to 1993](chart)

Water scarcity may lead to conflict as many water sources are transboundary and water itself is critical to agricultural productivity. Almost fifty countries have more than three-quarters of their land in international river basins, while 214 river basins are considered to be international in character. Most disputes over water access and quality have been resolved diplomatically, including those between Hungary and the Slovak Republic; Cameroon and Nigeria; Burkina Faso and Mali; and Sudan, Egypt, and Ethiopia. Whether peaceful means will be sufficient to address water scarcity disputes in the future is questionable. Per capita water availability will decrease significantly over the next thirty years in several areas that may be especially vulnerable to instability and conflict.

Scarcity of fish stocks threatens the health and economic livelihood of many around the world. Fish remain the most important source of animal protein in many developing countries. All of the world’s seventeen major fishing areas are close to reaching, or have actually exceeded, their natural limits. Overcapacity in the fishing industry is the primary culprit; too many boats are chasing too few fish in just about every part of the ocean. According to the World Resources Institute, the global fishing fleet is now estimated to be at least 30 percent (and perhaps as much as 100 percent) larger than is required to fully and efficiently harvest available ocean fishery resources.

Disputes over fish stocks are often the province of wealthier countries; note the ongoing disagreements between the U.S. and Canada, Canada and the European Union, Iceland and Norway, Japan and Russia, and the Philippines and China. To date, diplomacy has been successful in heading off any violent confrontations, although issues of fishing rights, enforcement and bycatch (the inadvertent capture of unsought species) will remain sources of irritation in a number of bilateral relationships.
Some Significant Environmental Issues are Global in Scale

Many environmental issues are local, such as the pollution from a waste dump. Others affect entire regions, such as pollution of a large river. Increasingly, the most pressing environmental issues are on a global scale.

Global climate change is considered by many environmental experts as the leading environmental concern facing the world today. In 1996, the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change, an international group of scientists, economists, and decision theorists convened by the United Nations, completed its second assessment of the current state of knowledge regarding human-induced changes in the earth's climate and the possible consequences of these changes. By including the cooling effect of aerosols and stratospheric ozone depletion in its models, the Panel reported that a significant climate change has begun and that it is "unlikely to be entirely natural in origin," suggesting a "discernible human influence on global climate." A rise in sea levels, changes in agricultural productivity, changes in the patterns of the spread of diseases, and changes in the frequency or severity of droughts and floods may result from climate change.

Because of the long time span over which the global warming trend is occurring, the socioeconomic consequences are not clear. Working with limited data on some variables, the Panel estimates aggregate damage in advanced industrial countries at 1 to 1.5 percent of GDP and in developing countries at 2 to 9 percent of GDP. In some countries, such as small island states susceptible to coastal flooding, the aggregate damage could be much

Disappearing Forests

1981–90 Annual Percentage Rates

- 2% Decline in Forests
- 1%
- 0.5%
- Marginal or no Change
- Measurable Re-forestation
- No Data

higher. Although much uncertainty remains over the scale and nature of climate change, its consequences, and the costs of response, many in the U.S. policy making community are seeking action to mitigate the potential risk.

**Potential Flashpoints**

**Instability Exacerbated by Land Scarcity, Soil Erosion, and Deforestation**

Environmental problems relating to agricultural land could exacerbate domestic tensions in countries of particular concern to the U.S. The cases most likely to concern the U.S. are in countries next to its borders, namely, Mexico and Haiti.

**Southern Mexico**

As discussed in the chapter on North America, the Chiapas region of Mexico has been suffering significant political turmoil since January 1994, when masked rebels seized control of Chiapas' capital of San Cristobal and announced the formation of a revolutionary government.

Soil erosion affects 20 to 50 percent of the highlands of Chiapas. With torrential rainfalls a common occurrence, and given that it possesses much terrain with slopes greater than 5 percent, Chiapas is at a high risk for even further erosion. Over time, population growth and accelerated land degradation force more and more people onto marginal parcels of land. Farmers are unwittingly accelerating the loss of the soil's minerals and nutrients. The environmental concerns are closely linked with uneven distribution of resources. Much of Chiapas' population lives in poverty, and most of those in poverty are engaged in agriculture. Chiapas suffers from the added dimension of racial tension, with the native American population finding its occupational choices deliberately limited by economically-dominant elites.

**Haiti**

Deforestation is Haiti's most severe environmental concern, one that world relief agencies have explicitly tied to the country's refugee crisis which ultimately posed a challenge to U.S. national security. Satellite photos of Haiti and its island neighbor, the Dominican Republic, show vast, forested areas on the Dominican side; on the Haiti side of the island, the land has been stripped bare by rampant clear-cutting. Currently less than two percent of Haiti remains forested, and remaining forested areas are being rapidly depleted, primarily by those in search of wood for cooking. The cut areas, often steeply-sloped land, are particularly vulnerable to accelerated soil erosion. The United Nations estimates that at least 50 percent of the country is affected by topsoil loss, leaving the land unreclaimable. The disappearance of Haiti's forests and its consequent soil erosion are so extreme that rivers flood, carrying heavy loads of sediment. The resulting damage to coral reefs has resulted in devastating reductions in fish stock.

The resulting economic deprivation continues to drive people from their land, forcing many to flee to the cities, particularly Port-au-Prince, the capital, where they face limited economic opportunities and social decay. This, in turn, creates pressures to migrate to the U.S.

**Conflict in the Middle East over Water Scarcity**

Water scarcity in the Middle East could contribute to conflicts among states. The most prominent problem of recent decades was the Israeli-Arab dispute over the Jordan River, a problem which appears to be subsiding. Other conflicts remain, especially over the Tigris and the Euphrates.

The major rivers of this area of Southwest Asia, the Tigris and the Euphrates, rise in Turkey and flow through or along Syrian territory before entering Iraq. Iraq is the most heavily dependent on water from these two rivers, with most Iraqis relying upon the Tigris and the Euphrates as their sole source of water for all of their needs. Syria also relies extensively on the water provided by the Euphrates to meet its needs.
The GAP is of major concern to both Syria and Iraq. Estimates indicate that when complete, the dam system could cause Syria to lose up to 40 percent and Iraq up to 90 percent of their water from the Euphrates. Turkey has already shown a willingness to manipulate water flows using the project. In order to begin filling the reservoir behind the Ataturk dam, Turkish authorities actually stopped the flow of the Euphrates entirely for one month (mid-January to mid-February 1990).

The three riparian nations have had some success in addressing their differences over the project and other water issues peacefully. Bilateral agreements exist between Turkey and Iraq and between Syria and Iraq on certain issues in their water relations. However, the GAP poses a significant environmental threat to Turkey’s downstream neighbors in the next decade, a threat exacerbated by political and underlying demographic trends.

Indeed, Syria’s anger over the GAP project was a major factor in its decision in the mid 1990s to provide support to the Kurdish Workers Party (PKK) in Turkey. Fed by discontent over the status of Kurds in Turkey, the PKK then grew into a major terrorist threat to the Turkish state. (For more about the PKK, see the chapter on Middle East radicalism.)

### Environmental Problems on the High Seas

The high seas are the prototype of common property resources which lack any owner or government with jurisdiction to enforce sound environmental practices. As a result, environmental problems on the high seas are a particular challenge for the international community. Bringing to task those who damage the high seas environment has not been an easy matter.

The United States has enacted several laws which require the government to monitor the behavior of foreign fishermen in international waters. These laws are designed to protect Pacific salmon, dolphins caught in nets along with tuna, and turtles caught by shrimpers. These unilateral U.S. initiatives are not always appreciated by fishermen from other countries, though they have strong economic incentives to
cooperate. To date, the United States has relied for enforcement primarily on monitoring from a distance backed up by domestic law enforcement action against those who land salmon, tuna, and shrimp caught by methods that violate U.S. regulations. Neither the U.S. law enforcement community nor the U.S. Coast Guard is positioned to monitor such agreements on the high seas in areas far removed from U.S. borders. Although in theory the U.S. Navy could be asked to contribute to this function, it is extremely unlikely that the Navy will be assigned this task, since the addition to law enforcement would be minor. Also, even though the U.S. Navy is not subject to the Posse Comitatus law against military involvement in law enforcement (a law which in any case applies only on U.S. territory), the tradition against such involvement is strong. There is little sentiment for relaxing long-standing prohibitions (embodied in a Secretary of the Navy directive applying to the Navy the same restrictions as in the Posse Comitatus law) to enhance enforcement of environmental agreements.

Disputes over access to fishing grounds have long been a sore point for maritime nations. For instance, Britain was involved in the 1960s in what became known as the cod wars, although in fact the dispute was resolved diplomatically after only a few episodes in which minor force was used. In the 1990s, fishing disputes have become more acute, drawing in the navies of several U.S. allies. For example, in 1995 a sizeable part of Canada's navy was deployed against European fishermen, with some rather tense scenes between vessels of the Canadian and Spanish navies. So far, fishing disputes involving the U.S., including those on the high seas, have been handled by the U.S. Coast Guard, even where the dispute escalated into a dispute between governments. Such disputes seem likely to become more common, given the ability of modern fishermen equipped with ultralong nets (known as purse seine nets) to deplete the entire stock of fish in a rich fishing area. The United States is likely to be particularly insistent about foreign fishermen observing international agreements, such as those on net length, because U.S. fishermen are often small-scale operators who lack the sophisticated equipment and large fish-handling capacity of fishermen from countries such as Spain, Japan, Russia, South Korea, and Taiwan. Despite the prospect for escalating disputes on the high seas—which may well draw in naval forces from competing countries—there is little prospect that the U.S. Navy will become involved in such matters.

U.S. Interests and Approach

Net Assessment

U.S. concern about global environmental issues will increase over the foreseeable future. More attention will be paid to limiting pollution emissions and to protecting vulnerable species and their habitat. This focus on domestic environmental problems should spill over to concerns about issues such as deforestation and climate change. As environmental scarcities can be linked to conflict and complex humanitarian emergencies, any future U.S. involvement in peacekeeping or relief operations may raise the profile of the environment's potential role in instability. At the same time, the U.S. military's direct role in resolving environmental conflict is likely to be strictly limited to exceptional circumstances, such as resolution of disputes on the high seas.

U.S. Interests

Secretary of State Christopher, in a major policy speech at Stanford University in April 1996, spelled out the two principal U.S. interests in international environmental issues.

The environment has a profound impact on our national interests in two ways: first, environmental forces transcend borders and oceans to threaten directly the health, prosperity, and jobs of American citizens. Second, addressing natural resource issues is frequently critical to achieving political and economic stability, and to pursuing our strategic goals around the world.
These interests are long-term and the impact of challenges to them are often not immediately obvious. However, as the 1996 National Security Strategy observed, the decisions we make today regarding military force structures typically influence our ability to respond to threats in the future. Similarly, our current decisions regarding the environment and natural resources will affect the magnitude of their security risks over at least a comparable period of time. Even when making the most generous allowance for advances in science and technology, one cannot help but conclude that population growth and environmental pressures will feed into immense social unrest and make the world substantially more vulnerable to serious international friction.

U.S. Approach

The main U.S. approach to the protection of the environment is through international agreements and conventions. The 1990s have seen greater concern in the world community about the environment, as evidenced at the 1992 United Nations Conference on the Environment and Development, known as the Earth Summit, in Rio de Janeiro. Since Rio, there has been a significant increase in both multilateral and bilateral diplomatic efforts on environmental issues. Agreements in the 1980s and 1990s have included:

- The Montreal Accord on the emission of chlorofluorocarbons which damage the ozone layer
- The Framework Convention on Climate Change which set targets for emission of global-warming substances
- The Convention on Biodiversity which regulates the handling of genetically modified organisms
- Agreements on marine pollution, of particular interest to the U.S. Navy, including the London Dumping Convention and discussions through the International Maritime Organization about vessel discharges

The principal environmental role of the U.S. military is responsibility for safeguarding the environment through its own sound environmental practices. The military is devoting substantial resources to pollution prevention, cleanup and restoration at military bases, proper management/disposal of hazardous materials, range management, and enforcement of maritime regulations.

The environment is an important part of what Secretary of Defense William Perry called in May 1996 "preventive defense," i.e., a strategic vision of preventing the causes of conflict and creating the conditions for peace. Measures underway include:

- A system is being developed to provide adequate indications and warnings of potential crises in which environmental scarcity and/or degradation plays a significant role. The intelligence community has begun to take a leading role in this important area. It has the information-gathering infrastructure and the ability to perform integrated analysis on linkages between environmental problems and other instability factors necessary to contribute to an indications and warning system. Data it collects from satellites and other means can fill important information gaps for the environmental science community.
- The U.S. Navy, seeking to minimize conflicts over scarce ocean space and to maintain mobility and general operating rights in foreign straits, extended economic zones, archipelagic waters, and territorial seas, is developing its own methods for monitoring/predicting potential environmental collapses.
- Military environmental cooperation contributes significantly to democracy, trust and understanding. The most significant partner in military environmental relationships is Russia, a key nuclear power in the post-Cold War world. The Defense Department, led by the Deputy Under Secretary of Defense (Environmental Security) established by 1994 a relationship with Russia, and a trilateral agreement with Russia and Norway, focused on the environmental security of the fragile and militarily active Arctic region. Environmental cooperation thus has a significant role in promoting trust and understanding between NATO and Russia at this crucial time.
Force Structure

The analysis of flashpoints has demonstrated the conflict environment that the U.S. is likely to face in the next decade. In this section, we summarize what that means as far as threats facing the U.S. Based on our analysis of what types of conflicts the U.S. may face, we derive the military missions that will be needed to shape the international environment, deter war, and prevail if conflict breaks out. We also ask what constitutes an acceptable degree of risk that various missions can be fulfilled simultaneously. We then analyze some options for force structures to address those missions, within the resource envelopes expected.

Assessing expected risks is only one element of force structure planning. Many military professionals feel more comfortable basing force structure and force size decisions on judgments about what capabilities the military should have. While that may be a more satisfying approach to some, it is not possible to plan what capabilities are needed unless one has a general sense of what missions will be assigned. Furthermore, it can be hard to sell the American people on why certain capabilities are needed; they may want to know against what threat they are being defended when deciding how much to allocate for the defense budget.

Force structure and size decisions are inevitably based in part on the legacy of the past. The military cannot be changed overnight. Like any large institution, it must evolve. It takes years to shut down bases and to retrain personnel from one mission to another. It will take at least a decade to adjust to the profound changes with the end of the Cold War, which means that the adjustment will still be going on until the end of the 1990s.
Chapter Nineteen

Threat Assessment

The analyses of flashpoints in the preceding chapters demonstrate how diverse are the circumstances that could lead to conflict in the late 1990s or early 2000s. The analysis also demonstrated that the world’s hotspots can be divided into four types of problems: those involving major powers, significant regional powers, troubled states, and transnational actors. This list is ranked by order of the military challenge that the various problems present.

Major Powers

Relationships among the major powers—the U.S., Europe, Japan, China, and Russia—seemed less important in the immediate aftermath of the Cold War. Our assessment is that they will reemerge in the next five to ten years as the centerpiece of world affairs. In part, that is a recognition of their weight in the traditional measures of national strength: the major powers account for 70 percent of the world economy, 38 percent of the world’s population (admittedly 21 percent in one country, China), and 80 percent of the world’s military personnel. In addition, relations among the world’s major powers may become more contentious than just after the Cold War.

Threat Assessment

Despite recurring strains, relations among the United States, Europe, and Japan are growing stronger. Part of this trend is an increasing willingness among the three powers to manage their differences and expand cooperation. Events in the former Yugoslavia gave NATO a new lease on life, while the June 1996 NATO Ministerial enhanced the re-integration of France within the NATO military structure. U.S. relations with Japan have also become more cooperative since the April 1996 summit between President Bill Clinton and Prime Minister Ryutaro Hashimoto.

Russia and China are growing increasingly suspicious of longer-term U.S. intentions. Russia feels that it is not receiving the respect due a great power. Both Russia and China see themselves as divided nations. Russia is intensely concerned about the future of its near abroad, that is, the other states of the former Soviet Union. For its part, China is concerned about perceived Western opposition to its efforts to complete national reunification by reintegrating Taiwan, Hong Kong, Macao, and the Spratly archipelago. Although there are
intrinsic limits on how far any strategic cooperation between Moscow and Beijing might develop, both nations are clearly drawing closer together and simultaneously becoming less willing to cooperate with the West on broad strategic issues.

Russia and China will remain regional powers motivated largely by nationalistic concerns related to sovereignty and national prestige. Neither Russia nor China is a peer competitor of the U.S., capable of a mounting a broad military challenge to it. Both nations are well aware of their military deficiencies, both are focused on vital domestic priorities, and both, therefore, wish to avoid conflict.

Moreover, neither adheres to an ideology that compels or justifies a global challenge to American interests. Russia has repudiated communism and, although China retains a superficial commitment to Marxism, the imperative to spread global revolution has disappeared completely. In Russia and China, the function of ideology is being replaced by nationalism.

Accordingly, nationalism and concerns about sovereignty will be potent factors in Russian and Chinese foreign policies. Both Russia and China think of themselves as great powers and both are in a process of adjusting their relations with the international community. A central component of Russian nationalism is the determination to recapture Russia’s lost status as a great power. For China, great-power status is a means of ensuring that it will never again be subjected to the humiliations of the past.

In a corollary manner, safeguarding national sovereignty and prestige is and will continue to be a key influence on the foreign and national-security policies of both nations. Russia wishes to maintain the integrity of what it regards as its traditional territories and areas of special influ-
ence, while China wishes to complete the reunification of its national territory. Chinese security concerns will also motivate Beijing to assert its influence throughout North and Southeast Asia.

Russian and Chinese sovereignty concerns will be expressed within the contexts of their respective regions: for Russia, its near abroad and just beyond; for China, other East Asian nations, with their historic patterns of interaction and common dependence on seaborne trade. Relations between these two powers and their neighbors result from their expression of national concerns and their interpretation of where the legitimate boundaries of their sovereignty lie.

Thus, Russian and Chinese actions are crucially important to the security environment in regions where the United States has allies and vital interests. Russian actions in the near abroad will affect how NATO feels about its security, while China's national reunification plans for Taiwan and the South China Sea will directly affect the security structure of Asia. Moreover, both nations can concentrate considerable military capabilities in the areas directly adjacent to their borders.

**Potential Challenges for the U.S. Military**

If its strategy succeeds, the United States and the world can look forward to many decades free of hostile major-power rivalry. Nevertheless, the United States cannot entirely discount military challenges from a major power. It would be prudent to prepare for problems with a major power. The most obvious candidates are China or Russia, but possibly one of the larger regional powers, such as India, could transform it itself into a major military power in the next decade. It is not necessary to specify which one of these powers could be the source of problems, because all of the major powers that the U.S. might confront in the foreseeable future share sufficient characteristics that it is possible to describe a composite, which we refer to as a potential theater peer. That term captures the essence of the military challenge from such countries: they are not peers with the U.S., able to challenge it at world-wide, but they may have sufficient power to be a peer with the U.S. in the theater of operations near them.

Another reason that it is possible to plan against a composite threat from a major power, without having to specify which country is meant, is that the potential theater peers present quite similar military challenges. The basic conventional threat from theater peers reflects their investment in industrial-era forces with few if any information-era components. The potential theater peers have tank and artillery inventories; indeed, their armies are based around heavy units. Even though their theorists may have mooted the military-technical revolution, their revolution in military affairs is not well advanced. Nor have they yet made major investments in electronics.

Nevertheless, the potential regional peers are far more challenging threats than are the rogue regimes which might involve the U.S. major regional conflicts (MRCs):

- They are nuclear powers. They have ICBMs and nuclear missile submarines. They can destroy U.S. cities, inflicting unacceptable damage on the U.S. This is the most basic fact about the military challenge they present to the U.S.
- They are space powers. Their launch and satellite capabilities, though less efficient than those of the United States, allow it to throw a good deal of tonnage into space reliably. They have access to overhead imagery and global communications—capabilities likely to get better by 2005.
- They are nations of enormous size and resources with considerable strategic depth. For all practical purposes, they cannot be overrun or occupied.
- They are continental powers with relatively modest naval forces. They do not now have a blue-water navy capable of contesting U.S. forces for mid-ocean control, although they may aim to acquire one.
- They are important leaders of international institutions, unlike MRC countries. They are significant forces in the UN Security Council and are thus well positioned to block any UN actions against their interests. This will complicate any U.S. effort to assemble a coalition against them.
If a theater peer becomes involved in a conflict, it is likely to be fought over specific issues which that country sees as related to its sovereignty but which the U.S. sees as involving aggression against a neighbor. The conflict is likely to be limited in scope, scale, and duration. Because it is not capable of mounting sustained operations at any distance from its borders, a theater peer would also wish to avoid the escalation of conflict to include powers that are not direct parties to the dispute. It would try to establish clear political aims and objectives and control the pace and scale of operations to secure an advantageous political settlement. In short, they would make every effort to manage the conflict in order to achieve larger political objectives.

If a theater peer engages in aggression on its borders to protect what it sees as a challenge to its sovereignty, the challenge for the U.S. will be to find ways to respond without escalating into a full-scale war. U.S. interests are not sufficiently at risk in such situations to risk global thermonuclear war, but the U.S. may want to respond—especially if the country attacked is able to defend itself well. The problem is how to come up with a strategy for limited war. For example, were the U.S. to decide to assist Taiwan under missile attack from China, it would be difficult to come up with a strategy that stopped the attack but did not risk nuclear war. Similarly, if Russia attacked Ukraine and got bogged down (as we think it would, in this unlikely scenario), the U.S. might want to provide limited help to Ukrainian forces. That would be no simple matter, especially since the U.S. would not want to endanger its nearby allies (such as Turkey and potentially Hungary), from whose territory it might want to operate. In short, the military challenge to the U.S. in the event of a conflict with a theater peer will be complex and quite different in character from that posed by a major regional conflict.

Overall Response Approach

The broader challenge for U.S. policymakers, therefore, is to create an environment in which the possibility of major-power conflict is eliminated, or at least greatly reduced, by a strategy of suasion. Negatively, the suasion strategy aims to dissuade Russia and China from using military means to deal with their concerns. Positively, such a policy should persuade Russia and China that following a policy of cooperative participation in the international community is the course that best serves their interests. Even disputes that bear upon sovereignty are best resolved by peaceful negotiation and compromise. Persuasion also involves reassuring Japan and EU that continuing to maintain and develop solid alliance relations with the United States best meets their interests.

Dissuasion is a two-edged sword. The greater the military capability of the United States, the better it can deter the expression of hostile force and even dissuade other nations from engaging in future competition. However, the other effect of U.S. military superiority may be to lead other nations to believe that their interests are at risk, in which case they may decide they have no choice other than the use of force. The central strategic issue for the United States is thus (1) achieving and maintaining a military capability that will dissuade Russia and China from using force in the short term, and from investing the resources to become future opponents in the longer term, without (2) stimulating either to seek to match that U.S. capability. Clearly Russia and China as major powers have the right to a certain capacity for broad defense, and in many cases this might justify a greater capability than either possesses in the mid-1990s. Beyond some point, however, it must be ascertained whether such a capability is unwarranted and constitutes a challenge.

On the persuasion side, the U.S. seeks to widen areas of cooperation with the major powers by engaging them to solve common problems. That engagement has two major aspects: bilateral cooperation between the United States and either Russia or China to resolve regional difficulties, and the continued integration of all major
The Relations Among the Major Powers

powers into institutions and other arrangements designed to promote global interests. The common institutions for which broader Russian or Chinese participation are sought run the gamut from economic to political, scientific and technological. Particularly important militarily are a number of important agreements related to nonproliferation—such as the Missile Technology Control Regime, the Nuclear Suppliers Group, and the Wassenaar Arrangement. Such institutions help convey the West’s desire to see Russia and China interact with it on the basis of equal regard, so long as they play by the rules entailed by membership in these fora. However, the price of securing enhanced participation may involve a larger measure of receptivity to and flexibility about revising rules and procedures along lines the Russians and Chinese regard as better serving their interests.

Inducing China and Russia to adhere to the fundamental norms of international behavior will not be easy. Russia and China are intensely nationalistic and extremely committed to what remain relatively narrow concepts of sovereignty and national prerogatives. Nevertheless, in the longer run, a more successful strategy of engagement and enlargement, if based upon common interests and supported by committed allies and an appropriate mix of military capabilities, can make such tensions easier to manage and eventually resolve. The more the major powers are engaged, the less explicitly they need to be dissuaded.

Major Regional Conflicts

Threat Assessment

There are some potential MRCs to which the U.S. is not likely to send large forces, though U.S. forces might be deployed to monitor the situation and possibly to forestall spread of the conflict. The two most important such conflicts are an Indo-Pakistani war, especially given the danger that it could escalate to nuclear war; and an Arab-Israeli conflict. In the event of an Indo-Pakistani nuclear war, the U.S. military might provide humanitarian assistance following the conflict. Were there another Arab-Israeli conflict, the U.S. might provide additional military aid to Israel. In neither of these situations, however, is it likely that U.S. forces will be called upon for combat.

The regional situations in which the U.S. is most committed are those highlighted in the plan of preparing for two nearly simultaneous MRCs: the Korean peninsula and the Persian Gulf. The two threats have important similarities. Each presents a broad range of threats, from classic military invasion to seize territory all the way to terrorist bombings. Each could involve weapons of mass destruction (WMD), which means that U.S. forces may well have to operate under the assumption that they are at risk from at least missiles and chemical and biological weapons. In each case, an asset important to the U.S. is so close to the other side’s front lines that it could be overrun (Seoul in the Korean case, Kuwait in the Gulf).
Iran Has Not Carried Out Its Build-Up

In 1993, when the Bottom Up Review was conducted, Iran was publicly committed to a $10 billion five-year arms acquisition program. Its economy was growing at 7 percent per year, and it was attracting $10 billion a year in foreign loans and investment. The government was committed to building up domestic military and dual-use industries. It had a close relationship with many European countries and a budding strategic tie with Russia.

The picture looks quite different in 1996. Iran experienced a sharp economic crisis which forced it to cut its imports in half in 1994 to $12 billion a year, a level at which they remained in 1995 and 1996. Arms imports averaged less than $800 million. Meanwhile, Japan and European countries ceased lending to Iran. Their governments halted all shipments of military goods to Iran, and most implemented tight restrictions on dual-use equipment. Under U.S. pressure, Russia agreed to limit arms sales to the fulfillment of previous orders—not that Iran could afford to import even what that permitted.

As a result, Iran's ability to engage in land warfare has not improved as it had planned in 1993. The equipment of its ground forces is generally obsolete and in poor condition.

On the other hand, Iran has been able to acquire a wide range of weapons designed to impede shipping through the Straits of Hormuz, including submarines, missile-carrying boats, advanced mines, and shore-to-ship missiles. It has also conducted a vigorous exercise program in the Straits, including more than 50 exercises a year of an aggressive nature (e.g., practicing seizing offshore oil rigs or small islands).

Iraq Has Not Recovered from Desert Storm

In 1993, when the Bottom Up Review was conducted, it was generally expected that the post-Desert Storm restrictions on Iraq would be slowly relaxed, including an easing of oil export ban.

Instead, Iraq has engaged in further challenges to the coalition that have resulted in additional restrictions on its forces: the limitations on movement of ground forces near Kuwait after Saddam's October 1994 challenge and the extension of the no-fly zone to the southern outskirts of Baghdad after the September 1996 events in the Kurdish region. Meanwhile, the UN Special Commission (UNSCOM) has undertaken extensive destruction of WMD facilities, and it appears that the inspection regime will remain strict. Furthermore, the economic sanctions on Iraq remain in place unchanged, with mixed prospects for any easing.

As a result, Iraq has not been able to replace its war-damaged and aging weaponry. It has suffered serious desertions from its armed forces, indicating poor morale. There has been unrest in the officer corps and repeated purges and executions of officers, impairing command and control.

Iraq retains a formidable ground force compared to its GCC neighbors. It used previously redundant spare parts and domestic military industries to repair equipment left over from the Gulf Wars. If sanctions and arms control inspections were relaxed or ended, Iraq could and probably would rebuild its forces. Thus, future projections of the Iraqi threat, particularly on the ground, is dependent on the future of the current economic and military constraints.

The most important similarity is that in both cases, the threat is diminishing. It is even possible that the Korean threat will collapse. However, it is more likely still that the North Korean conventional military threat will remain but grow smaller. With each passing year, the North Korean armed forces are operating with equipment that is increasingly aging and obsolescent. The North Korean economies is in extremely poor shape. Similarly, Iraq's armed forces have aging equipment and its economy is doing badly. The most likely prospect is that the U.S. will face declining conventional military challenges in both areas, especially in Korea. As for Iran, its economic difficulties and diplomatic isolation mean that its forces on the whole are not improving; its ability to conquer ground is deteriorating, but its sea-denial capability is growing stronger.

A threat that grows larger each year is proliferation of nuclear, biological, and chemical (NBC) weapons and missiles to deliver them. To be sure, there have been successes in reinforcing international legal norms against proliferation and in persuading four countries to give up nuclear weapons (South Africa, Kazakhstan, Ukraine, and Belarus). However, it appears that some states have decided that the advantages of possessing NBC weapons outweigh the costs of going against these norms. There is a growing prospect that, in a confrontation with a regional power, the U.S. will face a threat of NBC use.

Potential Challenges for the U.S. Military

The two regional flashpoints in which the U.S. military is most likely to become directly involved are the Korean peninsula and the Persian Gulf. The rogue regimes there remain dangerous, though—for reasons discussed in the chapter on military missions—the prospect of near simultaneous conflicts in both theater are declining. Each theater presents a broad range of threats, from terrorist bombings to a classical military invasion to seize territory.
North Korea’s Military Readiness Slowly Declining

The overall security equation on the Korean peninsula is significantly different at the end of 1996 than it was in 1993 with the Bottom Up Review was completed. In 1993, Kim Il Sung was firmly in control. The impact of the loss of Chinese and Soviet/Russian sponsorship was just beginning to be felt. The economy had not slipped much, and food shortages were not yet a major problem. Most importantly, North Korea had a vigorous nuclear weapons program, with Pyongyang refusing to meet its obligations under the NPT and blocking IAEA inspections.

By 1996, Beijing and Moscow had clearly cast their lot with Seoul, leaving Pyongyang increasingly isolated diplomatically and unable to provide adequate sustenance for the population. The Agreed Framework had defused the nuclear crisis and established a basis for more regularized contact with the U.S. The domestic political situation was unclear; Kim II Sung’s successor, Kim Jong Il, had still not fully consolidated power in his own hands. In the military realm, North Korean deployment patterns remained both dangerous and provocative. However, it was not clear how ready are North Korean forces to launch and sustain an attack; the country’s problems had forced them to curtail field training. While the military remained potentially dangerous and the regime unpredictable, Pyongyang’s ability to mount and sustain high intensity, large-scale offensive combat operations designed to unite the peninsula by military conquest was increasingly in doubt. Absent significant internal reform and outside assistance—neither of which appears in the offing—this trend is likely to continue.

Given current and foreseeable conditions, major war would not seem to be a rational option for the North Korean leadership. Indeed, an all-out attack could be suicidal, spelling the end of the North Korean state. As the threat recedes, so will the necessity to plan for Korea as a major regional contingency.

Even as their military capabilities are declining, they remain powerful relative to the U.S. allies:

- The Iraqi ground forces are far larger and more powerful than those of its smaller neighbors of the Gulf Cooperation Council and will remain so for the foreseeable future. These states will not be able to defend themselves against Iraqi aggression. Nor could they mount an effective defense of the Straits of Hormuz, through which one-fifth of the world’s oil moves, against an Iranian sea-denial campaign.

- A risk remains that the heavily armed North Korean army on the verge of economic collapse might launch an invasion out of desperation. South Korea has not devoted full attention on developing forces that could counter such an invasion, relying on the U.S. deterrent power to prevent a North Korean attack.

The military challenge to the U.S. is to defend vulnerable territory against an enemy with powerful assets near the front line. For example, well protected North Korean artillery can do extreme damage to Seoul. Similarly, Iraqi divisions remain an easy drive from Kuwait City. Warfare in these theaters could erupt quickly and be highly intense. It is not clear if airpower deployed in the theater would be sufficient to protect the assets at risk, especially if the attack came with little warning. This places a premium on having significant numbers of ground forces that can reach the area quickly, e.g., from forces in place or using pre-positioned equipment.

Were Iraq or North Korea to attack, it is not clear what U.S. war aims would be. On the one hand, the U.S. will want to eliminate regimes that have shown that they will repeatedly engage in unacceptable actions. On the other hand, the U.S. will not want to risk involving other powers in a broader war (e.g., China in Korea) or becoming bogged down in protracted occupation (e.g., in Iraq). Given these competing concerns may not be resolved except in the midst of a conflict, the U.S. military must be prepared for the most demanding task it may be assigned, i.e., war until full victory.

Overall Response Approach

In pursuit of its basic aims of promoting stability and preventing aggression, the U.S. has adopted in each of the regional flashpoints different approaches to convincing the parties that conflict would not be in their interest. In the Arab-Israeli case, the U.S. has devoted a major share of its global diplomatic efforts, including much of the secretary of state’s time, to promoting the peace process. It provides substantial economic and military aid to Egypt and Israel. The U.S. also provides forces in the Sinai to monitor the Egyptian-Israeli agreement.

In the case of the three rogue regimes in North Korea, Iraq, and Iran, the U.S. approach is built upon deterrence via forward deployment. The presence of substantial U.S. forces in these regions, and the demonstrated will and ability to commit more forces in the event of a crisis, provide powerful evidence to the potential
aggressors that they would not benefit from launching an attack. It could be argued that had the U.S. had such a presence in the Persian Gulf in 1990, Saddam Hussein would not have miscalculated about how the world would respond to an invasion of Kuwait. U.S. presence in both the Persian Gulf and the Korean peninsula will almost certainly persist for the next decade and beyond. Irrespective of the fate of the present regimes, both areas will remain volatile regions in which the U.S. has vital interests.

If the common element in the approach to rogue regimes is deterrence, the difference in approach is in the U.S. evaluation of the value of engaging each regime. The U.S. is more optimistic about the prospects for engaging North Korea, less optimistic about Iran, and least optimistic about Iraq.

A central aspect of the U.S. approach towards all three rogue regimes is to form an international consensus for response to unacceptable behavior. The effort has been relatively successful in Korea, as evidenced by the consortium to finance facilities to replace North Korea’s dangerous nuclear program; and in Iraq, as seen in the continuing UN Security Council support for tough restrictions on Saddam. By contrast, the U.S. has not convinced its allies that containment is the appropriate method of dealing with Iran. This situation may well persist, though it is also possible that, at least regarding Iraq, international support may diminish as the perceived threat declines.

**Troubled States**

**Threat Assessment**

Since the end of the Cold War, the number of states undergoing serious, internal unrest involving violent disorder and major humanitarian/human-rights problems affecting important segments of the population has increased substantially. In several instances, internal unrest has generated high tension or conflict with neighboring states, while the flood of refugees has created serious internal socioeconomic and political problems for these states. These problems are of concern to U.S. interests in world stability and in advancement of human rights, as well as, on occasion, to U.S. interests in regions of present or future strategic importance. However, these problems generally do not affect the immediate vital national security interests of the U.S.

The troubled-state phenomenon—and attendant regional and internal unrest, serious humanitarian and human-rights problems, and high numbers of victims—is likely to continue undiminished into the twenty-first century. There is a growing propensity by people in many countries to turn away from the state toward ethnic, tribal, religious, or other forms of separatism as a source of solace, protection, and identity. They are at the center of the conditions that contribute to the systemic failure of the state.

International and regional organizations have responded to increased internal violence with a corresponding increase in external intervention, with the goal of mitigating the effects of the internal problems and, in some cases, resolving the internal conflict. Such intervention operations usually comprise a combination of humanitarian, economic, diplomatic, political, and security measures conducted by a wide variety of civilian organizations (e.g., the UN and its agencies, other international, regional, and nongovernmental humanitarian organizations) supported by a multinational coalition of military forces.

Some of the interventions have been successful, but others have not. Evidence as of 1996 suggests that, once a state has failed, peace does not easily return. The country becomes a battleground for heavily armed factions, many with commercial agendas and external connections, who have the unarmed citizenry at their mercy. Despite an investment of billions of dollars in peacekeeping and humanitarian interventions, Somalia and Liberia are largely controlled by local warlords, chaos and misery abound, and normal political and commercial activity is at minimal levels. On the other hand, as of late 1996, Haiti
seems to be on the mend, and the situation in Bosnia is much more hopeful than before the NATO-led intervention.

Potential Challenges for the U.S. Military

Messy domestic conflicts create problems for military intervention. Yet U.S. public pressure to prevent humanitarian disasters and genocide may encourage intervention in countries where the United States has few direct and immediate interests, as was the case in Somalia. No other issue has created a more difficult set of foreign policy problems for the last two administrations.

The U.S. military’s role in troubled states will probably be to provide humanitarian aid, protect non-combatants, separate hostile military forces, and prevent conflicts from spreading to other countries. The U.S. military is less likely to play a major role in nation-building, at which its success record is spotty at best. But, as the 1994–95 intervention in Haiti demonstrates, the military may well be assigned some nation-building responsibilities, such as urgent repairs to physical infrastructure. A danger in nation-building is that restoring political institutions often requires choosing sides in an ongoing conflict. The side not chosen may then see U.S. forces as the enemy and attack them, leading to casualties that erode public support for the operations. Of course, humanitarian operations can also have a downside: underlying problems that were suppressed when U.S. forces were present often re-emerge after those forces have departed, leading to questions about the efficacy of intervention.

Activities in troubled states in which the U.S. military might be engaged cover a widespread spectrum, including, in order of likely frequency:

- Direct operations, possibly in cooperation with others. These operations might be separation of hostile forces, evacuation of non-combatants, or enforcement of blockades, embargoes, or no-fly zones in support of peace operations.
- Logistics and other support for, perhaps direct involvement in, broad coalitions. U.S. forces directly participating would not be major combat units and would not be in command. These operations could range from:
  - Humanitarian operations in a benign environment involving assistance with rapid provision of large-scale relief surpassing available civilian capabilities, possible participation in protecting relief operations in a low-risk environment;
  - Small- or medium-size peace operations of an essentially military nature in a low-risk environment, including observation, force separation, and demilitarization.
  - A coalition peace force, either of medium sized and a moderate-risk environment or major expanded operations in an uncertain or hostile environment. The U.S. military role in these operations would typically be brief, with it handing over responsibility to a more low-key force and to civilian agencies, as occurred in Haiti. These civilian agencies, supported by the non-U.S. forces, would have responsibility for any nation-building activities that the international community decides to support.

In short, the U.S. will not typically commit combat forces to long-term operations in troubled states. The main challenges in troubled states for the U.S. military will be in monitoring, providing logistics and support, and handing over smoothly to civilian agencies and non-U.S. forces after a brief U.S. command role.

Overall U.S. Approach

The U.S. public is likely to support assistance to troubled states in those cases where the military can respond constructively and at a relatively low cost. One example would be the provision of relief after humanitarian disasters. Likewise, when a local conflict threatens to spill over into neighboring states, border monitors and military aid to the neighbor can often be effective. Similarly, when clashing parties agree on a political solution but are suspicious of the willingness of the other side to live up to its promises, peacekeepers can make a difference.
Early identification of potentially troubled states allows for action before the crisis stage, perhaps avoiding concerted international military intervention. Preventive diplomacy is cost-effective, compared to the alternative of periodic military engagement. However, the reduced budget for international affairs is making preventive diplomacy more difficult, as what resources are available are devoted to the most immediate crises and to the major powers rather than to preventing conflict in troubled states. The best bilateral and multilateral instruments to be used at an early stage are normal programs of diplomatic, political, economic, and security assistance—all with a view to reducing the causes of short- and long-term tension, enhancing stability, and improving governance. Such aid will be a challenge to provide in view of reduced congressional appropriations for foreign assistance. This trend will be difficult to reverse. However, not to do so will inevitably increase the burden over time on U.S. military forces, their readiness, and their budgets.

The second stage of the overall U.S. approach is early preventive action at the outset of a crisis, either to resolve or contain it, thereby avoiding larger-scale problems and a possible larger-scale intervention. This usually involves concerted multinational action of a primarily civilian nature, focused upon rapid delivery of crisis assistance (e.g., food, medicine, basic agricultural packages, and short-term job creation) plus regional or international teams to survey and assist with problems.

In the event of an interagency decision that a troubled-state crisis requires direct U.S. intervention, the actions that will be taken will include:

- Consultations with UN and other international and regional organizations, and various governments to communicate and learn responses to the U.S. position that action must be taken, the nature of action, the U.S. willingness to participate/contribute, and the nature and size of the role the U.S. is considering.
- Efforts to create a multinational core group willing to assist by using political influence, financial support, and/or direct civilian or military participation.
- Diplomatic approaches to UN and other international and regional organizations to mobilize support for and legitimation of intervention.
- Formation of a U.S. and/or multinational crisis survey and planning team for immediate dispatch to the crisis state or region.
- Establishment of both an exit plan and a plan to replace U.S. regular military units with other personnel, as soon as practicable after an initial stabilizing period.

When the U.S. decides to participate, there is no lack of capability but rather a problem in determining at what level, with what specific capabilities and skills, and with which units and personnel. Misuse or overuse of these capabilities has been shown to have a negative impact upon public support, military morale, operations and personnel tempo, and the availability and readiness of forces for other military operations.
Increasing the basic capabilities of others will enable them to operate effectively with greatly reduced U.S. participation. It will also facilitate the task of U.S. forces should there be a need to form a multinational coalition. This basic assistance may include improvements in transportation and logistics capabilities, standardization or interoperability of basic equipment and C2I capabilities, training, and so forth—so that the U.S. will no longer be called upon to furnish such a large portion of these requirements.

Transnational Problems

Threat Assessment

In some form, transnational threats—that is, international threats not due to the direct actions of governments—have been around for as long as there have been nations. From its very inception, the United States has had to deal with issues such as piracy on the high seas, epidemics transmitted from abroad, and unwanted immigration. However, in the 1990s, some transnational threats have become more urgent, or at least have appeared to be more pressing. These include sudden mass refugee flows, environmental problems, and drug trafficking and other forms of international crime.

One issue of particular concern to the military is terrorism. Attacks can be expected on U.S. forces abroad by shadowy extremists, especially in the Middle East. Furthermore, there is a danger of attacks within the U.S. by foreign terrorists or by U.S. groups with foreign connections and motivated by a foreign, anti-democratic ideology.

Potential Challenges for the U.S. Military

During the Cold War, the notion that the military might have a role in addressing transnational threats rarely surfaced. Since the demise of the Soviet threat, however, the U.S. armed forces have become free to address other tasks, such as disaster relief and constabulary functions. The question of whether the military is the appropriate agency to handle such tasks, however, remains open. The military’s role in responding to transnational problems is likely to be greatest with respect to terrorism. The military is likely to devote increasing attention to protecting its forces abroad from terrorist threats. It will also be involved through the use of counterterrorism forces—for instance, hostage rescue—but also through retaliatory raids in the collection of counterintelligence.

Overall U.S. Approach

The principal U.S. approach to transnational problems is through international civilian cooperation. For instance, environmental problems are addressed through negotiated agreements, such as the Montreal Convention limiting production of ozone-layer-weakening chlorofluorocarbons. Narcotics trafficking is countered primarily through assistance to host country police forces.

The U.S. government may continue the trend since the 1980s of treating terrorism as a form of organized crime, that is, as an illegal activity to be handled primarily by the law enforcement and criminal justice systems. Furthermore, the U.S. will continue to make use of sanctions to pressure terrorist-supporting states, such as the UN sanctions against Libya as well as the tougher U.S. unilateral sanctions on Iran. The greater use of criminal justice means and of sanctions can means a reduced role for military retaliation as a response to terrorism. At the same time, the military will have an increasing role in defense against terrorism, especially protecting U.S. forces abroad from terrorist attacks.

Conclusion

It would be fair to say that, at least for now, the U.S. is in a strategic lull, but faced with more complex and diverse set of smaller threats. By the phrase “strategic lull,” we mean that the U.S. currently has no global peer. Also, the most likely conflicts are the least threatening (the U.S.
could stay out of them); the most challenging are unlikely to occur soon. The most likely conflicts are internal to troubled states, and the areas at greatest risk are those in which the U.S. historically has been little involved. The U.S. could readily stay out of most of these conflicts without harming its vital interests, as traditionally defined. On the other hand, the most challenging conflict would be a confrontation with a major power over an extension of its influence into neighboring areas that it sees as naturally part of its sovereign territory. As was made clear by the tensions in the Taiwan Straits in early 1996, such a conflict cannot be ruled out and should be prepared for, though it is unlikely to occur.

The main short-term challenge is readiness for a major regional conflict with a rogue regime, including enhancing deterrence (e.g., through pre-positioning equipment) so that conflict becomes less likely. The U.S. will increasingly be challenged by transnational problems, and troubled states will continue to dominate the daily agenda. However, the U.S. also needs to hedge against the emergence of a major-power theater peer—in part because such hedging may help dissuade the major power from entering into an arms race that it knows it would lose.

With luck and skillful diplomacy, the current strategic lull may become a lasting calm, in which the security threats are relatively small. Or, it might be the prelude to a new competition with a major power. The outcome will determine the nature of the emerging international system.
CHAPTER TWENTY

Key Military Missions

Based on the experiences of 1990-1995, a broad consensus has developed that a review of the structure of the U.S. armed forces is in order. The force structure that followed from the Bottom Up Review is well configured to the primary scenario—the ability to fight and win two nearly simultaneous major regional conflicts—but it does not accommodate other scenarios well. Beyond criticizing the Bottom Up Review, consensus breaks down.

Although critics have offered a variety of proposals, their suggestions represent little change from the basic approach taken in the Bottom Up Review or, for that matter, in the Planning, Programming, and Budgeting System put in place during the McNamara era of the 1960s. The PPBS had a certain credibility in the past when the bipolar competition between the U.S. and its allies and the Soviet Union and its allies imposed a degree of structure, or apparent structure, on the global security system. Analysts felt they had a good understanding of the global security architecture and could even predict the types of challenges that U.S. forces would face. This at least provided a common starting point for force planners and a set of plausible planning scenarios against which alternative force structures could be tested.

No such certainty exists today. Indeed, a growing number of analysts are asking whether there is—if there ever was—a discernible pattern in the relations among nations or in the forces at work that shape the global security environment. These analysts point to questions that defy the conventional descriptive, let alone predictive, models. For example, why did the Soviet Union’s grip on the nations of Central Europe collapse so precipitously in 1989? For that matter, why was the collapse of the communist system so rapid and so complete by 1991 even in the Soviet Union?

Increasingly, analysts are suggesting that the U.S. step away from trying to impose a structure to explain global activity and view it in its full complexity—the full sum of a great many independent actors and forces interacting with each other in a great variety of ways. This means more than saying that the international order is complicated. It means viewing the international security environment as more spontaneous, more disorderly, more alive than the U.S. has regarded it in the past. Com-
The USS *Kentucky*, part of the U.S. nuclear deterrent

plexy theorists would argue that such an organic system could be in a rough balance between chaos and order and that creative innovations are suddenly generated at this edge of chaos. It is here that seventy years of Soviet communism, in the blink of an eye, gave way to political upheaval and ferment.

To the force planner, such a view provides an alternative to the linear, reductionist approach that dominates analysis and planning today. It leads away from the straight-line derivation of tomorrow’s forces based on an extrapolation to or prediction of challenges of the future based on the experiences of the recent past. It leads to plans for forces that are characterized by their agility, flexibility, and adaptability.

Unlike the days of the Cold War or even the planning for the Base Force and the Bottom Up Review, this new approach yields no simple, stylized set piece scenarios against which precise planning can be done. The emerging security environment is too unpredictable for that. In its place, it sketches a picture of the great complexity of the emerging security environment and illuminates the broad spectrum of missions the military will have to be prepared to execute in the coming decades. The spectrum of missions goes far beyond planning for two nearly simultaneous major regional contingencies. For the most part, these missions are different cases, not lesser included cases, and the military has had to execute them by adapting forces not designed for the mission at hand or by overtaxing special units that are in short supply in the U.S. armed forces.

This chapter specifies a series of military missions that the U.S. armed forces should be prepared to undertake as the U.S. enters the 21st Century. These missions are derived from the preceding threat assessment and are based on the types of flashpoints discussed in this volume. They are organized as responses to threats from theater peers, regional conflicts, troubled states, and transnational challenges.

**Theater peers**

The relations between the U.S. and theater peers—large powers who can challenge us in their own region, though not globally—will continue to be the key determinant of peace and order in the international community. Theater peers can be grouped into two broad categories:

- Those with whom the U.S. has a history of cooperation and maintains a formal alliance structure.
- Those with whom the U.S. lacks this history of cooperation but with whom the U.S. is striving to establish a constructive working relationship.

To maintain a strong cooperative relationship with its traditional large allies, U.S. armed forces perform two key strategic missions. Four additional missions are central to managing relations with theater peers with whom the U.S. lacks a long history of cooperation in the security sphere.

**Prevent nuclear strikes on the United States**

Protecting U.S. territory against weapons of mass destruction, and nuclear weapons in particular, remains a key element of U.S. national security. The prospect of a nuclear exchange with a theater peer has receded considerably since
the height of the Cold War. The U.S. and Russia have taken important steps to reduce arsenals of strategic nuclear forces, to retarget forces away from each other's territory, and to take large portions of the remaining forces off standing alert. Still, both Russia and China possess nuclear forces that can strike U.S. territory. Even though the likelihood of their use is remote, the consequences are terrible to contemplate, so, for the foreseeable future, the U.S. will require a force adequate to deter the use, or threat of use, of nuclear forces against it.

To this end, the U.S. needs a force:

- Capable of surviving a first strike with adequate lethality remaining to deliver unacceptable damage on the aggressor
- Compliant with START II agreements and the ABM treaty to ensure compliance by Russia as well

Anti-ballistic missile technologies may produce a national missile defense system to counter the threat of theater ballistic missiles launched by a rogue nation against an ally or against U.S. forward-deployed troops. New technologies could be adapted to a national missile defense system if those nations develop delivery systems that can reach U.S. territory. The administration feels that the U.S. is more than a decade away from facing this threat.

The contemplated systems focus on an attack of relatively modest size. They would be adequate to cope with a rogue nation that could deliver a handful of nuclear warheads against the U.S. or with the arsenal that China can be expected to have.

Estimates of when the U.S. might face a threat of nuclear strike from smaller nations vary. Critics of the administration plan feel that the administration is proceeding too slowly with the development and deployment of a national missile defense system. Their assessment is that a number of nations hostile to the U.S. are close to obtaining the requisite nuclear weapons fabrication and long-range missile technology. They have called for accelerated development of a national missile defense with an eye to initial deployment by 2003.

**Participate actively in key alliances**

The nations with whom the U.S. has formal alliances are relatively wealthy and technologically advanced. Although they find themselves in regions that have a history of instability and conflict and they do maintain a strong concern for their security, they have chosen not to translate their technological and economic prowess into offensive military might. Instead, they have developed competent military forces that provide largely local defensive power and for the rest of their security depend on alliance structures that include the United States. The U.S. provides global power projection capabilities that include strategic lift, global naval forces, and global intelligence coverage while the allied nations provide for the greater part of the local defense. The confidence that the U.S. possesses these strategic capabilities and is willing to use them removes the imperative for its powerful allies to develop them unilaterally.

The NATO alliance is in the process of adapting itself to a security environment characterized not by a large threatening military power on its very borders, but by instability and turbulence on its Eastern and Southern fringes. It is reorganizing its command structure to make it more responsive to crises on its periphery. It increasingly sees its role as an operation to stabilize Bosnia, not the defense of its home territory against a massive invasion by a hostile large power. It has further recognized the need to work with the former Warsaw Pact nations to bring them into a cooperative relationship with the West and to support the efforts of those nations to establish stable democratic governments in which the military occupies its appropriate role.

The existence of a permanent, active military alliance also provides the foundation for forming coalitions. The militaries of NATO plan together and exercise together, so that when they deploy to the field, they are willing to and capable of working together.

Successful cooperation of the NATO militaries was evident in Desert Storm and
and relieves it of insecurities about instability on the peninsula that might otherwise drive them to an aggressive buildup of military forces. It buys time for the U.S. to work with the nations of Northeast Asia to find a formula for long-term stability on the peninsula.

Standing forces in the theater are critical to U.S. defense policy in Europe. Their presence makes possible the day-to-day cooperation with European militaries that pays dividends on the battlefield. In addition, the presence of U.S. forces ensures that senior U.S. military officers and civilian officials are integrated into key positions in the planning staffs of NATO.

Respond in the event of a crisis involving a theater peer

During the Cold War, U.S. competition with hostile large powers was the primary determinant of the size and configuration of U.S. armed forces. While this is no longer the case, there are strains in relations with theater peers with which the U.S. does not have a long history of cooperation. U.S. military forces have a key role to play in managing those relations.

At present there is no other nation that can mount a global challenge to the United States. U.S. forces are far more capable than those of any other nation and since U.S. defense spending remains five times that of any other conceivable adversary, this is not likely to change in the foreseeable future.

Still, a theater peer can threaten U.S. interests by inappropriate or hostile action close to its own borders, in what it may regard as its sphere of influence. Tension will typically revolve around a large power’s concern about its sovereignty in the region. For example, Moscow may well feel the necessity to act militarily in its near abroad to reinforce its security and to reaffirm what it regards as its appropriate sovereignty in the region. China may do the same in Taiwan or the South China Sea. As a practical matter, nations on the periphery of a large power are vulnerable to intimidation or coercion. In addition,
the free flow of goods by sea and air could be threatened. The U.S. would want to thwart the efforts of a large power to disrupt, intimidate, or coerce in a way that conflicts with U.S. interests.

Responding to a crisis with a theater peer is fundamentally different than dealing with a mid-size regional power. Theater peers have nuclear forces that can strike the U.S., so there is strong motivation on both sides to avoid direct conflict or, at the very least, use considerable restraint to minimize the risk of escalation. Moreover, even if the U.S. were confident it could limit conflict with a great power to the conventional sphere, the size of a large power makes the idea of conquering it or inflicting total defeat on its armed forces unrealistic (and unnecessary) in today's world.

In any crisis with, or in the vicinity of, a theater peer, the U.S. would want to act in conjunction with its allies in the region. But allied support is by no means guaranteed. U.S. alliance partners, living in the shadow of theater peers, may well be more reluctant than the U.S. to be involved in an operation that could include military conflict.

In the event that a theater peer appears to be contemplating attacking a state on its periphery, U.S. national command authorities need first and foremost a timely and accurate picture of the situation. Detailed monitoring would be required of the military forces in the imme-

Flexibility and Simultaneous Crises

There is no question of building a force structure with units dedicated uniquely to each type of mission. Such a force would be inefficient, duplicative, and unnecessary. It would also be larger and more costly than what the country would support. Nor is it appropriate to maintain the Cold War assumption that one mission is so overwhelming that all other contingencies are lesser-included cases. In the existing environment of regional instability and crisis, the range of likely missions is broader than in the past. No one mission has the supreme priority that preparing for global war with the Soviet Union used to have.

Forces, then, will have to be flexible: prepared to execute a variety of missions. At the same time, if a unit optimized for one kind of mission were used for another, a larger force might have to be used than would have been required if units were available that had been designed specifically to meet that mission. For instance, a unit optimized for peacekeeping might have a preponderance of light infantry. If it were also to fight a major regional contingency against an armored threat, it would be less effective than heavy units optimized to destroy an armored threat. And in turn, that armored heavy force would not be particularly good for peacekeeping. Having forces that are flexible and possess a variety of skills is not in itself sufficient. The forces have to be large enough to respond to more than one mission at any one time.

The overall disparity in power between the United States and potential opponents would inhibit those opponents from challenging the U.S. militarily. The most likely states to do so—Iraq, Iran, and North Korea—have not had access to modern military equipment since the end of the Cold War and would be less inclined to engage the United States head on. The likelihood of facing two nearly simultaneous major regional military contingencies is receding.

The U.S. should prepare for growing problems in its relations with a theater peer; the U.S. need not prepare for Cold War II. The prospects for a confrontation with a great power are small although they may grow in the early years of the twenty-first century. The force requirements for thwarting aggression by a theater peer will be limited by the relative weakness of potential great-power opponents in the foreseeable future, and by the limited goals the U.S. would set in that kind of contingency.

Deterring a second MRC

The same time, the U.S. should rethink how to forestall a second conflict were one major conflict to break out. In such a situation, the U.S. should strengthen deterrence in other regions, e.g., by declaring that the U.S. reserves the right to commit more and more deadly military assets against any second foe who takes advantage of the first crisis. Washington would also need to make clear that, were a second crisis to break out while U.S. forces were responding to the first, the U.S. would remain fully committed to resolving the second crisis in a way favorable to American interests, even though it might be some time before the U.S. attended to that task.

As always, there is a risk that the U.S. would not be able to respond immediately in full to every crisis. However, the consequences of such an eventuality are not as great as they were during the Cold War. Then, had the Soviet Union overrun Western Europe, the war would have effectively been over. But in the post-Cold War era, should initial territorial losses be incurred in the event of multiple simultaneous military contingencies, the U.S. can be reasonably confident that the territory could be regained over time, although at greater cost. Indeed, in the event that a force incorporating the Revolution in Military Affairs is successfully introduced, U.S. forces would be in a better position to shift warfighting assets from one theater to the other promptly.
diate vicinity and of any activity that could affect the situation, such as deployments to air bases in the region or the dispersal of mobile missiles. The visible presence of U.S. forces would serve notice that the U.S. intends to protect its interests. This could give the power contemplating aggression pause, reassure U.S. friends, and stiffen their resolve. The U.S. military would need to be able to demonstrate the capability to hold an aggressor large power’s forces at risk. This includes dominating the airspace and sea along the littoral of that power, as well as protecting U.S. forces and U.S. allies from the threat of missile attack. The implied threat that the U.S. could neutralize or degrade the aggressor’s force in the immediate vicinity of the crisis would provide leverage at the negotiating table.

If the theater peer were nevertheless to attack a state on its periphery, the U.S. would have to consider its options. It is unlikely that the state attacked would be a formal ally of the U.S., but it could be a democratic state friendly to the U.S. Any U.S. military contribution would almost certainly be carefully circumscribed to minimize the risk of escalation to all-out war. For instance, it is highly unlikely that the U.S. would send substantial numbers of ground forces or launch air strikes at economic and population centers. At the same time, the national command authorities might well want options for disrupting the aggressor’s attack through precision strikes on key points such as bridges, rail lines and C3 nodes.

Furthermore, the U.S. might well want to reinforce its nearby treaty allies, to demonstrate to the large power that were it to continue the attack beyond some unspecified line, the U.S. commitment would dramatically escalate, and direct conflict with U.S. forces would become a possibility.

**Dissuade a theater peer from militarily challenging the U.S.**

No nation has the capability to challenge the U.S. as a global peer military competitor. The challenge for U.S. foreign policy is to manage its relations with theater peers to prevent their feeling the need or the desire to engage in an arms race. This calls for the U.S. to engage in constructive dialogue and, where possible, to cooperate to resolve issues in the domain of national security. This includes utilizing regional and global multinational institutions to involve large powers in the broad framework of international cooperation, and engagement with these nations in the military sphere will advance this goal. Military-to-military efforts in peace operations, educational exchanges, and combined training serve to build habits of trust and cooperation.

These measures may not succeed. A complementary strategy is to dissuade a rival from attempting to build a military that can rival that of the U.S. by cultivating certain military competencies to render futile attempts by other countries to compete. That requires the U.S. to sustain a clear superiority in leading-edge military capabilities, thereby making prohibitive the cost and time a would-be competitor would need to invest in military development.
This strategy will be more difficult to execute in the coming decades than it was in the past. Leaps forward in military capability depend increasingly on incorporation of information, telecommunications, and sensor technologies into military systems. Rapid advances in these technologies taking place in the commercial sector are available to any nation with access to technical expertise and hard currency. Determining a would-be competitor can no longer depend on restricting access to advanced technology. It requires a constant program to review technology, doctrine, operating concepts and organization of the armed forces to ensure that the U.S. remains at the leading edge of military capabilities.

**Maintain superiority in information warfare operations**

The rise of military information systems entails a corresponding responsibility to keep them operating correctly in the face of an information warfare attack. Such attacks can range from physical destruction of critical CI nodes to electronic warfare against communications links, the insertion of rogue software codes into computers and their networks, and various forms of spoofing.

Just as the U.S. military has learned to operate in the shadow of weapons of mass destruction, so too must it learn to operate in a hostile information environment. Means include stepping up operational security, firewalls, the use of cryptographic methods, and deliberate redundancy in nodes, links, and sensors. At times, the U.S. military may need to help allies with test/diagnosis/repair facilities, backup capabilities, and the ability to tie their forces directly to U.S. information systems.

The United States is also developing an ability to target and disable adversary information systems. The fact that U.S. companies supply a large percentage of the world’s information systems makes it easier for the U.S. military to understand how they function (and what their weak points are). Yet, compared to the U.S., the militaries of likely adversaries are less technologically advanced, less dependent on advanced information systems and thus less sensitive to attack on their information infrastructures.

The choice of what systems the U.S. military seeks to protect is yet to be resolved. Clearly, it must protect its own systems, and it does have legitimate concerns over outside systems it depends on (e.g., defense contractors, communication service providers to military facilities). So it would need the legal scope and special expertise to protect private elements of the overall national information infrastructure if their owners could or would not do so.

**Significant regional conflicts**

The Bottom Up Review analyzed in detail the need to fight and win two nearly simultaneous major regional conflicts. That requirement formed the basis for the Review’s force structure recommendations. The U.S. position relative to nations typically envisioned as adversaries in a significant regional conflict has improved since the completion of the Bottom Up Review in 1993. Both North Korea and Iraq lack sufficient modern military equipment. Moscow and Beijing have ceased to provide their latest equipment on advantageous terms, and North Korea and Iraq lack adequate hard currency to buy modern equipment on the open market. With each passing year, their armed forces operate with increasingly aging and obsolescent military equipment.

This is not to say that the threat of a major regional conflict from these forces has vanished. The Iraqi ground forces remain far larger and more powerful than those of its smaller neighbors of the Gulf Cooperation Council and should remain so for the foreseeable future. These states will not by themselves be able to defend against Iraqi aggression. Likewise, a risk remains that a heavily armed North Korea facing economic collapse might launch an invasion out of desperation.

The U.S. has more leeway in fighting in a significant regional conflict than in a conflict involving a theater peer because U.S. national survival is not at risk, so it
need not hesitate to strike key targets in an aggressor's homeland. Also, the nation's armed forces are smaller so it is plausible to inflict an overwhelming defeat on it.

**Defend friendly territory from invasion**

The United States will have to continue to bolster allies to defend against an invasion of the type launched against Kuwait in 1990. In the Gulf, defense against such an invasion begins with a demonstrated ability to bring combat power rapidly to a threatened area and rests on a multifaceted response with ground and air firepower. The most cogent and credible deterrence is provided by U.S. forces present in the region that can commit to battle quickly. These must be backed by forces that can reinforce the forces in theater rapidly (e.g., through positioning), and by forces that can bring combat power to bear from "over the horizon".

Likewise, the United States will, in the short run, need to continue its aid to the South Korean military. The U.S. forces in country, particularly the Second Mechanized Infantry Division, provide a strong deterrence to aggression by the North. U.S. air and naval forces in the region supplement the South's forces—bringing unique capabilities, especially long-range precision strike, battlefield intelligence, and air defenses.

Beyond defense on the immediate battlefield, the ability to hold strategic targets in an aggressor's homeland at risk is a powerful deterrent and a key element of a successful campaign to defeat the aggressor. Assured destruction of strategic targets calls for the ability to locate them precisely. For fixed targets this is relatively straightforward. Mobile targets require the ability to scan a large portion of the aggressor's territory in near real time and strike them promptly. This capability also permits precise timing of a strike on a time-sensitive target (e.g., a bridge just before a major combat or support unit is to cross). Successful targeting has to be backed by capability to penetrate air defenses in particular, since high value strategic targets tend to be heavily defended.

**Liberate territory**

Iraq had invaded and occupied Kuwait in 1990 before the U.S. could react. North Korea invaded and occupied large parts of South Korea in 1950 before the U.S. was able to counterattack. While U.S. defensive postures today are considerably better in both cases, a sudden invasion by either aggressor could still result in the loss of territory before the defense line stabilized. In the case of the Gulf in particular, forces that can drive an occupying army out of friendly territory, seize and hold that territory as the U.S. did in Desert Storm are required to bring a conflict to closure.

The experience in Desert Storm confirmed that ground maneuver forces are needed to liberate territory occupied by an aggressor. The punishing air strikes that the allied forces unleashed against the Iraqi forces occupying Kuwait did a great deal to destroy forces, unit cohesion, and morale. Nevertheless, the conclusion of the war and the expulsion of the Iraqi army took place only when U.S. ground forces drove them out.
Liberating territory will usually involve crossing the border into the aggressor’s territory to destroy enough of its combat power to end the war. Without this final phase, the liberated territory could continue to be held hostage to the aggressor’s forces. Operating in the territory of an aggressor is risky militarily and politically. Militarily, there is a danger of U.S. forces being drawn in too far and becoming bogged down in internal conflict. More dangerously, a counterinvasion could bring U.S. troops too close to a third nation and threaten to trigger a response, e.g., a Chinese response were the U.S. to occupy North Korea. Finally, if the operation drags on too long, the U.S. could be perceived as overreacting, becoming an aggressor in its own turn, and could lose the support of the international community. An operation that penetrates into an aggressor’s territory must have well-defined goals that can be articulated clearly and executed rapidly.

Operate in a theater at risk to WMD strikes

A growing number of nations in the Gulf region that might be hostile to a U.S. military deployment overseas possess weapons of mass destruction. An aggressor could threaten use of these weapons as a deterrent to U.S. forces deploying to defend allied nations in their region. Fear of a weapon of mass destruction could confound operational plans and undercut support in the U.S. for its presence in the region. It is thus critical that, in planning to fight in a region where the aggressor can threaten employment of weapons of mass destruction (WMD), the U.S. plan to minimize the risk inherent in the operation.

A number of approaches offer promise. While none by itself is adequate, a combination could limit the utility of WMD in the hands of a hostile nation.

- Passive defense. Lighter weight chemical protective gear would minimize the degradation in a soldier’s capability. Improved detection devices give a more reliable indication of when the contamination from chemical or biological agents has passed and the suits can be shed.

- Active defense. Large scale targets—like ports and airfields—are inviting targets for chemical warfare (CW) and biological warfare (BW). They require both adequate active missile defenses and large-scale decontamination capabilities, so that targets that are struck may resume operation as quickly as possible. An effective theater ballistic missile defense system would give an aggressor second thoughts about the utility of his weaponry and give friendly soldiers increased confidence that they have protection against the threat.

- Dispersed and stand-off operations. Warfighting strategies that emphasize dispersed, mobile operations rather than large concentrations of combat forces would complicate targeting for a weapon of mass destruction and thus minimize the effect of its use. This calls for new operational concepts in which ground forces are trained to operate in small, independent units with limited communication from a centralized command. Firepower brought to the battlefield by stand-off forces, out of range of the weapon of mass destruction or far enough away so target acquisition and accuracy are degraded, would further minimize its impact. This pattern of operation demands detailed, near real time dominant battlefield knowledge for success.
• Destruction. Destroying WMD before they can be employed is the most straightforward and certain way of meeting this threat. It removes any question of effectiveness of defensive systems and allows the forces of the U.S. and its allies to concentrate on winning the battle with less concern about a nuclear, biological, or chemical (NBC) strike. However, this mission is difficult. Potential enemies have learned from the Gulf War both to be mobile and to locate key targets underground. A successful attack against a mobile battlefield missile calls for precise battlespace knowledge coupled with a command-and-control system that ensures rapid response with precision strikes.

Form and operate in a coalition

In any conflict far from U.S. shores, and in most military operations close to U.S. shores, political imperatives will drive the U.S. to co-operate with others even when U.S. forces alone are adequate militarily. This cooperation is a relatively straightforward matter when working with traditional allies, particularly U.S. NATO allies where the militaries have a long tradition of working together. However, recent conflicts, operation Desert Storm in the Gulf being an important example, have put U.S. forces in the field with coalition partners whose doctrine, technological sophistication, and equipment differ considerably from the U.S. An ability to work with these forces and complement their capabilities would be key to the success, both politically and militarily, of a combined operation.

That is not an easy task. For decades, the NATO nations tried to standardize equipment and, that proving impossible, tried to ensure that their equipment was interoperable. Even the relatively modest goal of ensuring that communications gear was interoperable, a goal that every nation recognized as critical to the success of allied operations, has been only partially realized. Still, the planning and exercising done with nations with whom the U.S. has a formal treaty alliance allows identification of problems and developing procedures to work around them.

Because of the Partnership for Peace program, military-to-military exchanges and a gradual augmentation of combined exercises are expanding the number of nations with whom the U.S. can plan combined operations in advance. This has already proven helpful in the former Yugoslavia where U.S. and other NATO troops are in the field with troops of Partnership nations.

Operations will be more awkward when the U.S. finds itself in the field with nations with whom it has not planned and exercised, and whose training, doctrine, and equipment are much different from its own. Two approaches are useful in addressing this problem.
Ensure that the U.S. has an adequate cadre of special forces well trained to operate as liaison officers with forces of coalition partners.

Operate in vertical coalitions where the U.S. and allies who have advanced military capabilities such as airlift, logistics, deployable communications and surveillance equipment concentrate on those tasks and share information and capabilities with coalition partners. This rough division of labor could enhance the capabilities of the coalition as a whole through each member concentrating on the strengths it brings to the operation.

**Enforce an exclusion zone or embargo**

There will be some significant regional conflicts in which the United States is not involved but would want to ensure that the fighting does not spread. This would require establishing a firewall beyond which the warring parties are enjoined from operating. It could take the form of establishing a safe transit zone as in operation Earnest Will where the U.S. and its allies protected friendly shipping in the Gulf from attacks by Iran or Iraq. It could also take the form of enforcing a no-fly zone or a demilitarized zone on land to buffer neighboring states against the spread of fighting.

As a prelude to, part of, or postlude to a significant regional conflict, the U.S. typically will want to enforce an embargo to prevent military materiel from entering an aggressor nation. The U.S. might further want to restrict the flow of critical commercial goods to the country and prevent certain exports from flowing out. This action provides leverage to affect the outcome or limit the intensity of a significant regional conflict whether the U.S. is directly involved as a combatant or not. Moreover, when the conflict ends and a peace accord has to be reached, an economic embargo, or the threat of one, can be a powerful motivation to seriously negotiate appropriate peace terms.

Enforcing a military exclusion zone or an economic embargo requires the capability to monitor traffic on land, sea, or air. It requires the ability to blockade ports, limit air traffic, and control key overland transit points.

**Exploit defense engagement**

Managing post-Cold War dangers mandates the less traditional mission of engaging military and defense establishments around the world to further the spread of democracy and to build trust and understanding among nations. Here, the results are less immediately tangible and the ramifications for future military force structure are minor, but the mission's importance to U.S. security policy is no less significant.

"Defense engagement" is a relatively new term that describes low-cost, low-profile and non-combat political-military programs undertaken by both the armed forces and the Defense Department's civilian structure. These initiatives are designed to underscore U.S. commitment abroad, promote democratic ideals, strengthen civilian governance of defense institutions, improve collective military capabilities and relieve suffering.
The premise underlying this mission is two-fold. First, the U.S. is concerned about the armed forces in a world of emerging democracies. In many cases they are the most cohesive national institutions and often contain large percentages of the educated elite and control key resources. In short, these are institutions that can help support democracy or subvert it. Second, if the U.S. can build trust and understanding between military institutions in neighboring states, then trust and confidence between the nations themselves can follow.

The mission of defense engagement divides into two groups of initiatives. The first is Foreign Military Interaction (FMI), which includes military assistance; educating foreign officers and civilian officials; multilateral planning and training exercises in such areas as peacekeeping, disaster relief, and national building; and a broad array of small-scale traditional activities undertaken by the five regional Unified Commanders. The second category combines defense civilian as well as military outreach programs initiated from the United States that constitute defense diplomacy. Examples range from high-level official contacts, such as counterpart visits and defense ministerial meetings, to joint staff talks, academic research in support of policy, and the sharing of professional management expertise with allies and friends.

As funding for foreign policy initiatives has contracted, U.S. reliance on defense engagement has increased. In terms of force structure, necessary capabilities focus on engineering, medical, civil affairs, military police, intelligence, and communications units, and foreign-area expertise.

**Troubled states**

The U.S. military has been called upon to help restore order and stability in troubled states where internal order has broken down and widespread fighting or natural catastrophe threatens large portions of the populace. Since the close of the Cold War, these missions have steadily occupied a portion of U.S. armed forces roughly equal to a division of army troops (including a group of special operations forces) with a more robust slice of combat service support than typical, a brigade of marines, a composite wing of tactical aircraft, and a modest sized flotilla of ships. All indications are that there will be more demands on the international community for operations to stabilize troubled states.

**Maintain forces trained for peace operations**

In many cases the skills required for peace operations are similar to those required for high intensity combat in a significant regional contingency. But this is not true in all cases. Peace operations often involve greater restraint and the measured application of force to avoid escalation—skills that are quite opposite to those a soldier learns in training for high intensity combat.

Peace operations are not a lesser included case of combat. They require maintaining a cadre of forces that can deploy promptly with skills appropriate to:

- Monitor a peace accord
- Patrol a demilitarized zone
- Keep belligerents separate and negotiate with them as necessary
- Bring an appropriate level of force to bear while avoiding escalation
Deploy support forces adequate to sustain a peace operation

There will be some operations that the United States wants to see succeed but which it is not appropriate for the U.S. to lead. In these cases the U.S. may well want to provide enabling capabilities to a regional organization or coalition that can provide competent, well disciplined ground forces but lack the support required to execute a complex contingency operation. Examples of enabling capabilities include:

- Communications assets
- Intelligence collection
- Headquarters staff support
- Transport
- Logistics assets

Efficient use of these enabling capabilities would further require special forces specifically trained to work with and negotiate with the coalition forces.

Augment the host-state law enforcement capability

In the troubled state where stability has broken down, a critical ingredient to restoring it is a competent police force. This typically requires retraining or even creating an indigenous civilian constabulary force. While training a police force is not an appropriate mission for the military, military police, special operations forces or even regular military troops can help it maintain order while the police force is being recruited, trained, and introduced onto its beat. This mission has been critical in Bosnia and Haiti, to cite two examples. Military police and special operations forces units from the U.S. and other nations have been able to restore order and allow critical elements of the peace plans such as elections to proceed on schedule even as the new gendarmeries were still forming.

Provide humanitarian relief

The U.S. has committed military units to provide humanitarian relief to nations that have suffered from famine or drought, and to others that have suffered from the
breakdown of internal order or civil war. In the former case, the military’s contribution is primarily logistical: alone or working in cooperation with nations and international organizations to transport and distribute food, water, medicine, and other critical materiel.

Providing aid to a nation after civil war generally requires deploying combat units as well to ensure aid reaches its intended recipients and that those doing the distribution are not menaced or attacked. This need led to the deployment of combat forces to Somalia, Northern Iraq, and Rwanda.

**Evacuate personnel from a troubled area**

When order has broken down in certain regions, U.S. personnel have had to be evacuated. Most recently this has been the case in the former Yugoslavia, Rwanda, and Liberia. There the local law enforcement agencies were incapable of protecting U.S. citizens. Loss of control by a local government that can lead to rioting and the threat of attack on U.S. citizens can arise quickly. In these cases, U.S. forces could be called on to provide safe passage for evacuation of U.S. citizens and in some cases, other foreign nationals.

This requires special forces that can be inserted rapidly into a chaotic situation to direct an evacuation. In extreme cases, they will have to be backed by larger military forces to establish local order through force or intimidation long enough to complete the safe passage of the evacuees.

**Transnational threats**

Transnational threats drew scant attention from national security policy makers in the U.S. until after the close of the Cold War. More recently, attention has turned to the threat posed by terrorism, massive refugee flows, environmental degradation, narco-trafficking, and international organized crime to U.S. national security. The involvement of the military is embryonic in these areas and there is a lively debate over how deeply the military should be involved. Nevertheless, the problems posed by these challenges are likely to grow, so it is not too early to assess the limited role the military might be called upon to play by U.S. national command authorities.

**Assist civilian authorities in countering terrorism**

In the 1970s and 1980s the U.S. faced considerable terrorist activity sponsored by or supported by hostile governments or foreign organizations. In recent years the U.S. has turned its attention to the threat from domestic terrorism. The bombing of the Murrah Federal Government Building in Oklahoma City in April 1995 was the most destructive terrorist act in U.S. history. This was followed in 1996 by the detonation of a home-made pipe bomb in a crowded public park in Atlanta, Georgia, near the site of the Olympic Games. U.S. strategy for combating terrorism involves two approaches: antiterrorism and counterterrorism. The military has an important role to play in both.

Antiterrorist activity focuses on defensive measures to protect U.S. personnel and property. Effective defense of U.S. government deployments to troubled areas requires care that adequate defense is provided. Attacks and the threat of attacks on U.S. embassies and the bombing of U.S. armed forces in Lebanon in 1983 and in Saudi Arabia in 1996 underline the vulnerability of U.S. installations in troubled regions. Antiterrorist efforts alone are inadequate. The number of targets is so great that there will always be a vulnerability. Antiterrorist efforts must be coupled with counterterrorist efforts—offensive measures to deter and punish terrorist activity. Economic sanctions have been used against Libya and Iran to attempt to discourage them from supporting terrorist activity. But this policy has had limited success because other industrial nations have refused to join the embargo.
The military's role in domestic terrorism has yet to be clarified as the imperatives to combat terrorism are weighed against concerns about the appropriate scope of military involvement in domestic law enforcement. As appropriate, the military can contribute technologies that detect weapons of mass destruction, forces expert in counterterrorism, and intelligence on foreign organizations that might support terrorism on U.S. soil.

While coordinated response to domestic terrorism will continue under the leadership of the Justice Department, the trend at present is to seek ways to secure greater help from the military. Congress has included $150 million in the FY 1997 Defense budget for the military to refine technologies that can detect and disable weapons of mass destruction and to be prepared to provide emergency assistance in cases where expertise resident in civilian law enforcement agencies is not adequate.

Manage refugee flow

The military has begun to assist in maintaining an orderly process of immigration and in controlling U.S. borders against the increasing flow of refugees, economic and political. Twice in 1995, the U.S. experienced a sizable migration of refugees fleeing to the U.S. from the Caribbean, first from Haiti, then from Cuba. At the same time on the U.S. southern border, illegal immigration from Mexico and Central America continues.

While there are legal restrictions on how much the military can assist in managing refugee and illegal immigration flow across U.S. borders, the demand for such assistance is great, and the military can complement civilian agencies. For example, the Navy can help the Coast Guard manage the flow of refugees heading for U.S. shores by sea. That requires broad area surveillance coupled with enough ships of the right type to ensure a high percentage of intercepts and an infrastructure, such as the U.S. base at Guantanamo Bay, to process the refugees with appropriate deliberation. The military can also assist in monitoring the U.S. southern border.
by sharing technology with the Immigration and Naturalization Service to detect border crossings, especially at night.

Conclusion

The review of likely flashpoints presented in this report reveals a complex security environment that is much changed since the end of the Cold War. Accordingly, the missions the military will be called on by national command authorities to execute will focus on different challenges. This in turn implies a different center of gravity of U.S. military forces.

In broad outline there will be a greater need for forces that can:

- Provide a detailed monitoring of the battlespace in near real time
- Provide precise targeting information to strike systems
- Strike targets promptly with high precision
- Attack while standing off from the bulk of enemy firepower
- Bring firepower to bear on the battlefield with less reliance on large fixed targets such as ports, airfields, depots or terminals
- Deploy rapidly from one theater to another
- Operate in dispersed units while maintaining overall mission co-ordination
- Monitor and enforce a cease fire agreement between hostile parties
- Monitor and enforce an economic embargo or exclusion zone
- Conduct effective counterterrorist operations

In contrast, compared to the cold-war era, there may be a diminishing need for:

- Heavy ground forces that operate in large maneuver formations
- Air superiority aircraft whose main mission is to destroy enemy aircraft in the air
- Naval forces whose primary mission is establishing superiority in the open ocean

The need for a strong, competent military as a key instrument of national power remains undiminished. But the sheer number and wide variety of missions the military are being called on to perform is striking and represent a considerable challenge. What is unmistakable is that forces that are more agile, more flexible, and more adaptable are called for.
CHAPTER TWENTY-ONE

Force Structure

U.S. Military Force Planning

Recent History

During the four decades of the Cold War, the United States developed and honed a military force that was highly robust, capable, equipped, trained, organized, and optimized to meet a basic planning template built around global conflict with another military superpower. That all changed beginning in 1989, as interrelated phenomena marking the end of the Cold War shattered the template. Beginning in the early 1990s, the defense planning community sought to forge a new template to replace the one that had previously served so well but was no longer credible.

The Base Force Begins the Transition Away from the Cold War

The initial step was what Colin Powell—then Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff—termed the Base Force. Most military planners recognized the Base Force as a transitional device—a force level that could satisfy new demands for reduced defense expenditures without changing the structure or character of the U.S. military. The Base Force was to be the starting point from which the character, size, and structure of future U.S. military forces would evolve, if and when a different consensus on what was needed emerged in the future.

The Bottom Up Review

The year-long assessment initiated by the Clinton administration—the Bottom Up Review, or BUR, conducted in 1992 and 1993—was the second step in the transition to a new template and iterated many of the points that girded the Base Force. Like its immediate predecessor, the BUR assumed it was premature to design future U.S. military capabilities against a single, precisely defined contingency. As the Base Force had, the BUR sought to describe the broad capabilities future U.S. military forces should keep through the remainder of this century. The BUR was not a redesign of the existing force so much as an effort to reassert the consensus on what components of the existing force should be kept.
Cold War Planning Assumptions

A worldwide conflict centered in Europe was the accepted root of planning scenarios during the last two decades of the Cold War. Planners recognized that American forces had been and would be required to deal with other military contingencies, but this complication was usually handled as a lesser-included case of what was needed to meet the considerable demands of the basic planning framework.

The BUR differed from the Base Force, however. It explicitly rejected a return to the Cold War force size and dropped the notion of reconstitution and the Eurocentric global-war planning scenarios that went with the idea. In their place, it emphasized a planning context of regional conflict, that is, a conflict that would be constrained geographically and that did not carry with it the risk of escalation that earlier, Cold War scenarios did.

Two Nearly Simultaneous Major Regional Contingencies

The BUR postulated two major regional contingencies that occur nearly simultaneously. This formulation was a planning artifact, designed to require the kind of military capabilities the participants in the BUR believed should be maintained. It was not a prediction that the United States would necessarily face such a demand. Although the BUR architects referred to conflicts in the Persian Gulf area (with Iraq) and on the Korean peninsula, they did so as illustrations of the planning context rather than the specific contingencies for which U.S. forces would be designed.

The planning construct of two nearly simultaneous major regional contingencies in different parts of the world did, in fact, underline the kind of military capabilities most people believed should be maintained. It was, for example, a way of emphasizing a need for robust strategic mobility, something most planners thought would be increasingly important as many U.S. military forces withdrew from overseas bases. The notion of near simultaneity fit with the desire for forces that were globally agile, and the general planning context provided a rationale for maintaining the existing balance and character of the forces. It was a context that justified heavy ground forces (to fight in the deserts of the Persian Gulf area), light ground forces (for rapid strategic mobility and, in part, to deal with the threat of infantry in the rugged hills and urban terrain of Korea), a robust naval carrier force (for global presence and rapid response), and a robust Air Force (for both global response and theater operations against relatively formidable air defense systems). It was a planning context that was demanding, yet not as demanding as the kind of global war postulated during the Cold War. It was, in short, an accurate reflection of the consensus of what was needed at the time (October 1993) the BUR was published.

In Retrospect: A Transition from One Consensus toward Another

In retrospect, then, U.S. force planning in the first half of the 1990s is best understood as a transition away from the Cold War consensus on military needs. The underlying theme of those years was caution, played out against an understanding that the defense budget was shrinking. Force planners sought to reduce U.S. military forces without jeopardizing the organization, internal force ratios, doctrine, equipment, or quality of the personnel in the force. They agreed on the capabilities they wanted to keep: high readiness; robust strategic mobility; strong power projection; and potent and balanced ground, maritime, and air power. And they tried to maintain as much of those capabilities as the declining budgets would allow. But while there was widespread agreement that these were desirable traits, a new consensus on how they were to be obtained, how much of each was required, and what the resulting force should look like did not emerge. There has been—and continues to be—less agreement on the size and structure of U.S. military forces needed for the twenty-first century.

Planning U.S. Military Forces for the Next Century

Since the early 1990s, there have been a number of public articles and assessments outside the Defense Department that conclude force structure changes are both necessary and desirable. Two factors drive this belief: (1) a concern that the BUR force may be unaffordable; and (2) indications that advanced technology offers much greater military efficiency, particularly if it is combined with organizational adjustments that take full advantage of the new technologies.
Defense Budget Constraints Point to Decreases in Force Size

Concerns with the affordability of the BUR force are rooted in several issues, one of which is a tension between the existing and future readiness of the force. As of 1996, force readiness was relatively high, largely because defense budgets in the early to mid-1990s allocated considerable financial resources to budget categories that affect readiness—training, maintenance, and quality of life. In contrast, funding levels for procurement—money that goes to buy equipment—fell to historic lows. Procurement funding does two things: it modernizes future forces by introducing new and improved kinds of military equipment, and it recapitalizes the force by replenishing existing equipment. Procurement therefore affects the future readiness of the force, because the older the equipment is, the less ready it will be and the more expensive it is to maintain at high readiness levels. In the early 1990s, much of the capital base of the U.S. military—the tanks, ships, aircraft, and other equipment—was relatively new, largely because of the surge in procurement funds in the late 1970s and early 1980s. The downsizing of the force that began in 1990 cloaked the decline in recapitalization because, as the Department of Defense trimmed force levels, the older equipment went first, leaving the remaining forces with what was relatively new. But the decline in procurement slipped below the level needed to continue to keep new equipment in the force in the future.

As a result, each military service needs a recapitalization funding surge in the first decade of the twenty-first century. A lot of the equipment they have will wear out at roughly the same time, and replenishment will be expensive. The following figure, drawn from the Secretary of Defense’s March 1996 Annual Report to the President and the Congress, illustrates the problem for tactical aircraft programs. It shows that it will cost nearly four times as much as was spent on aircraft programs in 1996 to replenish and modernize the equipment in the tactical air forces. Similar surges of recapitalization costs face U.S. ground and naval forces—if the United States decides to maintain the size and structure of its forces at 1996 levels of readiness.

Prospects of block obsolescence, falling levels of readiness, and steep procurement increases lead some analysts to argue that either the defense budget must grow or internal adjustments—which could include changing the force structure—must be taken to assure longer-term readiness. Other analysts argue that the life-cycle costs of new equipment are underestimated, and that procuring, maintaining, and operating the equipment will cost more than currently estimated. If they are correct—and historical experience suggests they may be—then tradeoffs involving the size and structure of U.S. military forces will emerge in the annual budget debates, unless the defense budget rises appreciably in the years ahead.

But few analysts believe the defense budget is likely to increase significantly; most believe it will be driven lower, and they point to a number of straws in the wind as evidence. Instead of paying for contingency operations with supplemental appropriations, as was generally the case in the past, the Congress has required the Defense Department to meet some of the costs of operations in Somalia, Rwanda, and

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Cost of Tactical Aircraft Programs
(billions of FY 1996 dollars)

New Systems in or Entering the Force Structure

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Haiti by shifting funds within its budget. If the Congress deals with future operations in a similar way, this will further constrain the Department’s efforts to balance current readiness and future readiness. And many economists believe the national movement toward a balanced budget will generate further pressure for cuts in defense funding. Public opinion polling indicates that while most Americans believe a strong military ought to be maintained, few believe the defense budget will or should increase.

New Technology Presages New Operations and Perhaps Force-Structure Changes

Meanwhile, technological improvements in the late 1980s and early 1990s suggest the United States could dramatically improve the efficiency and effectiveness with which it can use military force. Three areas of military capability are of particular note:

- Intelligence collection, surveillance, and reconnaissance (ISR)
- Advanced command, control, communications, computers, and intelligence processing (C3I)
- Precision force, or weapons that increase the capacity to apply destructive power with greater range, speed, accuracy, and precision

Everyone agrees that systems embodying these capabilities will enable U.S. troops to be more efficient in using military force. That is, with them, U.S. forces will be able to identify and discriminate among potential targets and opponents faster and more accurately, apply military power at greater ranges with more precision, and assess the effects faster and more comprehensively.

Most also agree that the improved capabilities are likely to affect how U.S. forces operate. What is at issue is whether the improved military efficiency and effectiveness will be so much better as to constitute a discontinuous, or revolutionary, change in the normal, essentially linear line of improving force capability.

Some argue it will. They believe that the synergy among these systems represents the technological edge of a revolution in military affairs, and call for integrating such systems into the military as quickly as possible. These advocates of rapid change argue that if the United States can successfully integrate the individual improvements each of these systems promises, the result could be a discontinuous leap in military capability. That is, they speak of an emerging system-of-systems capable of generating such a disparity in military capability between the United States and opponents that the United States would be able to use military forces not only better than an opponent but also differently from that opponent and differently from the way in which military force is used and understood in 1996.

This hypothesis is the foundation of the argument advanced by the advocates of rapid change. They propose that the increasing ability of the United States to collect and process information rapidly from a relatively large area (40,000 square miles) will enable the U.S. military to identify and locate, in near “real time,” virtually all friendly, neutral, and opposing forces, facilities, machinery, weapons, vehicles,
and units that are militarily significant. That will provide the basis for much more timely and accurate situation awareness than an opponent can obtain—a condition referred to as “dominant battlespace awareness” (DBA). Further processing and computer-assisted correlation, they continue, will allow the United States to convert this edge in situation awareness to “dominant battlespace knowledge”—namely, the ability not only to identify and locate things of military significance, but to discern their relationships to one another and to the operational scheme that drives their activity.

This “knowledge” is not absolute. But it should give the United States a significant advantage via the ability to estimate quickly and accurately the hierarchical relationships among an opponent’s forces and the roles or missions the opponent assigns its forces. More important, this level of knowledge will allow the U.S. to give friendly forces missions and targets with the highest payoff. This process, in turn, will generate high leverage from the new class of precision and long-range weapons that are entering the inventories. It increases the probability that such weapons will be used where and when they will most degrade the overall capacity of an opponent—they will tend to be used against the targets that count the most.

Lastly, the system-of-systems postulates a relatively greater capacity to rapidly and accurately assess the effects of engagements and the application of force. That will allow the United States to stay ahead of an opponent, to adapt faster and better to the fluid changes characteristic of conflict, and to operate within the opponent’s decision-reaction cycle.

These views and hypotheses are not accepted by all U.S. force planners, and the advocates of rapid change are a minority. But because many in the government share some—but not all—of their views, their argument affects the internal debate over the rate of technological improvement and its implications.

Postulations about the proper structure and character of U.S. military forces in the future are entwined with these discussions in two ways. The first is in cost-effectiveness terms—whether, for example, the improvements promised by the emerging technologies will allow the same or greater level of military output with fewer forces. Some believe the efficiency improvements may allow the size of the force to be reduced without any degradation of military capability. They see technology as a means of offsetting looming budgetary pressures, but they do not believe that it is necessary or beneficial to move quickly toward organizational changes.

There is, however, a contending view. Those who see the emerging technologies as offering more profound changes tend to argue that for the United States to take full advantage of the technological improvements, it will be necessary to alter the existing structure and organization of the force. This group favors accelerating both the introduction of the technologies and making the structural, organizational, operational, and doctrinal changes that would take advantage of the technology as rapidly as possible.

The Character of U.S. Military Forces

The size and structure of U.S. military forces in the future will reflect myriad decisions dedicated to balancing change and continuity. In the absence of an identifiable threat, and with the satisfaction regarding the military’s prowess that has prevailed since Desert Storm, arguments against changing quickly will remain strong. But the sense that a new international era demands a different force structure, and the growing interest in accelerating what is increasingly referred to as the American revolution in military affairs, may bring about changes sooner rather than later. So it is hard to be precise about what U.S. military forces will be like in 2007.

It is easier to indicate a range within which the actual force may emerge. That is the approach used in the following discussion. It describes three notional force structures, circa 2007. Each reflects the kind of force that might emerge as a result of taking three different paths to the future. Each of these notional artifacts is designed to be

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internally consistent—their components fit together logically—and reasonable. All the models involve responses to improved technology, and the potential of different operational doctrine, as well as the missions U.S. military forces will face over the next decade. Many other "models" could be presented. But, together, the three discussed below span the range of what seems reasonable, and differ from one another largely in terms of how the United States may balance the contending pressures for continuity and change. It is important to note, however, that we neither predict or recommend any of the force structures. They are heuristic devices, offered to illustrate the effects of taking some of the paths available to the United States over the next decade.

Three Paths to Future U.S. Forces

A Recapitalized Force

The first potential force structure—termed the Recapitalized Force—could emerge, given moderate rates of change between 1997 and 2007. As the name implies, this path emphasizes continuity. It recognizes the difficulty of changing the character of the force rapidly, and the strategic, bureaucratic, and security utility of not changing too rapidly. It begins with the assumption that today's force is very good and seeks to maintain the high quality by adjusting incrementally and carefully to the downward pressures on the budget and to the opportunities afforded by advanced technology. It trades off minor changes in force structure and lower combat readiness for some units to assure the steady recapitalization of a force structure that changes relatively slowly.

An Accelerated RMA Force

A second option, the Accelerated Revolution in Military Affairs (RMA) force, reflects a desire to accelerate technological improvement—to build a different kind of force with much greater combat capability. While a decision to pursue this structure would recognize operational demands on

Basic Assumptions of the Force Design Paths

Recapitalized Force Assumes:

- Current Trends Continue
- Moderate Modernization
- Minimum Structural Change

Accelerated RMA Force Assumes:

- Strategic Lull Allows Rapid Innovation
- Accelerated Modernization
- Rapid Structural Change
- Active-Reserve Force Divergence

Full Spectrum Force Assumes:

- Many Current Trends Continue
- Accelerated Modernization
- Moderate Structural Change
- Tiered Readiness

the U.S. military in the interim, it assumes the likelihood of a major military conflict is low enough to accept the expense and risk of extensive organizational innovation and experimentation. The Accelerated RMA Force's template for technological advances is what the advocates of change call the system-of-systems in describing the force's technological foundation. It differs from the other two models primarily in the rate at which it seeks to embed these technologies and operational doctrine, and in the concerted effort to introduce concomitant structural changes as early as feasible.

A Full Spectrum Force

The third option, referred to as the Full Spectrum Force, seeks to maintain and develop the capability to deal with a broad range of requirements while accelerating modernization and technological improvement without drastic structural changes. The path to this option lies between the recapitalization and RMA paths—it seeks to maintain proven capabilities while developing and integrating advanced technology. Driven largely by a sense of broadened missions, it would seek to develop better capability at both the upper and lower areas of the range of mission demand without incurring the organizational turmoil associated with the
ganizational turmoil associated with the Accelerated RMA Force.

All three options respond to certain basic factors: budgetary constraints, technological developments, and the mission requirements laid out in the previous chapter. But they would do so differently, and the differences in approach would, over a decade, result in recognizably different, and in some cases radically different force sizes and structures.

### Pros and Cons of Each Path

**The Recapitalized Force Path:**
- Promises Little Disruption
- But May Miss Opportunities for More Effective Future Forces

**The Accelerated RMA Force Path:**
- Promises Dramatic Leaps in Force Efficiency
- But Would Be Risky and Disruptive

**The Full Spectrum Force:**
- Promises Improvements and Low Risk
- But Would Be Expensive

### The Recapitalized Force

Each of the military services is changing. In the Army, for example, a general shift in emphasis from attrition to maneuver warfare has dominated force planning since the mid-1970s. The Navy began an equally profound transition of its own in the early 1990s, and, as of 1996, was still in the midst of a doctrinal shift toward littoral operations. Meanwhile, the Air Force is refining its understanding of air superiority and updating strategic bombardment theory. All these internal service discussions are underway within the conceptual constraints of a growing compendium of joint doctrine. Such discussions carry implications for the future, and by drawing from them, it is possible to get a sense of what the salient characteristics of a force based on these ideas would be. This is the essence of the Recapitalized Force of 2007—the path to it would involve evolutionary development from 1997 that reflects a promi-

### Recapitalized Ground Forces

In the mid-1970s, the U.S. Army began a major doctrinal shift from attrition to maneuver warfare. Led by the Training and Doctrine Command, the mainstream of Army thinking moved away from a focus on using heavy fire to avoid losing territory—a concept captured by the phrase “defending with a wall of steel”—toward a focus on attacking the basic weakness of the Soviet operational scheme—the precision and timing required of its attacking echelons.

Army planners reasoned that if the timing of an echelon attack could be disrupted by attacking second and follow-on echelons before they arrived at NATO's forward defenses, the opponent’s operational scheme would be defeated. That was the essence of the Army’s conceptual shift, for it changed the central purpose of applying force from destroying as many of the opposing forces as possible to disrupting the flow, timing, and precision of the opponent’s operation. It was, in purest conceptual form, a shift from the implications of attrition to the behavioral imperatives of maneuver warfare. And this conceptual shift led to the organizational template that was to dominate thinking inside the Army into the mid-1990s.

Until the early 1980s, two approaches vied for this organizational template. The first argued for making ground combat units lighter, bolstering their potential with better situation awareness, and tying them more closely to aviation forces—from both the Army’s growing arsenal of rotary-wing attack aircraft and the Air Force’s fixed-wing assets. The contending solution called for the Army to move increasingly toward the heavier mobility of armored and mechanized combat forces, carrying a far more potent combat punch. The synthesis of these two concepts emerged in the early 1980s. The U.S. Army decided to alter its internal composition in favor of heavier divisions, build up its attack helicopter forces, and work
more closely with the Air Force to develop the details of deep operations. The result was the AirLand Battle, an operational and structural template most dramatically expressed in Desert Storm.

The Army continues to refine the operational concepts and organizational path it undertook in the mid-1970s, referring to this undertaking as Force XXI: The Design of the U.S. Army for the Initial Decades of the Twenty-first Century.

The Trend toward Heavy Forces

Force XXI maintains the Army's commitment to heavy divisions. With the exception of a new mobile artillery system and the Comanche helicopter (designed for scouting, reconnaissance, and deep attack), the Army plans to build Force XXI on existing kinds of weapons and vehicles, and it anticipates little organizational change. Army planners assume the division will remain the basic operational unit; that divisions of the future will retain essentially the same organization—multipurpose combat units with considerable organic capability—and that the relationship and functional connection between divisions and corps will not change. They posit little, if any, changes in the balance among combat, combat support, and combat service support elements in the active force and anticipate that the level of the active force—ten active divisions and an overall manpower level of about five-hundred thousand—will remain essentially the same well into the twenty-first century.

Changes in Situation Awareness and the Role of Reserves

The greatest differences Army planners see for the future have to do with improved situation awareness and the relationship between active and reserve forces. Under the rubric of the digitized battlefield, the Army is developing a sophisticated information system designed to provide a common, real-time understanding of the battlefield. The Army plans to parallel its development of the digitized battlefield with a far more comprehensive, secure, and dependable command, control, communications, and intelligence (C3I) system than exists in 1996.

Army planners assume, however, that these technical improvements will enhance existing organizations and operations rather than precipitate basic changes either in the way the Army is organized or in how it operates. The technology on which planners are building the enhanced situation awareness is at the forefront of the information revolution. But the dominant Army view is that this technology is best understood as a complement to what has been evolving since the mid-1970s, rather than a fulcrum from which structural or operational changes can or should be made.

The Army's view of the relationship between active and reserve/National Guard components has also been evolving. In the late 1970s, the Army leadership began to transfer combat support and combat service support elements from the active forces to the reserves. In the early 1980s, however, driven by the perceived need to deploy rapidly from the United States to Southwest Asia, the shift of support units from the active forces to the reserves was reversed, engendering greater reliance on the reserves and National Guard for combat units, in the form of round-out brigades. With the end of the Cold War, the trend regarding reserve combat support and combat service support units changed again. As a result, the Army Reserve of the mid-1990s is composed almost entirely of support units, while the
National Guard has continued to evolve toward a combat-unit-heavy structure. The National Guard has fifteen enhanced-readiness brigades (performing the same role as the round-out brigades in the 1980s) plus another eight combat divisions. The Army’s interest in restructuring Army Reserves in favor of combat service support units in part reflects its desire to shift the increasing burden of peacekeeping operations to the reserves. Army planners argue that peacekeeping needs are often best met by many of the service support assets that reside in the reserves (transport, engineering, medical services, military police, etc.). Relying primarily on reserve forces for peacekeeping operations, in this view, makes sense for a number of reasons. It allows reserve units committed to peacekeeping missions to hone their particular skills much better than they can do during their normal reserve training, meets the demands of the peacekeeping missions better than with combat units (who are often not trained for the kind of activities peacekeeping many times requires), and frees the active forces to concentrate on honing their war-fighting skills.

Data drawn from the various peacekeeping operations from the mid-1980s to the mid-1990s tend to support the view that reserves organized for single purposes—such as civil affairs, engineering, transportation, or military police activities—have done well where they were used. On the other hand, the use of active forces has generally been very successful in what may broadly be called peacekeeping roles. The 10th Mountain Division, for example, served with effect and efficiency in Somalia and Haiti. The dominant trend regarding peace operations, therefore, consists of two tactics. The first is to use particular active units, such as the 10th Mountain Division, as relatively self-sufficient, multipurpose organized units for those missions in which armed opposition is likely. The second is to draw from the reserve forces those support capabilities that may be essential to peace operations.

This approach is not cost free, particularly as long as the Army attempts to maintain a high combat readiness level across the active force structure. As long as the readiness condition of Army units is based on combat capabilities, peacekeeping operations will degrade readiness, for they divert units from training and maintenance. The demand for high readiness, in turn, colors the way the Army deals with non-combat missions; it tries to restrict the readiness degradation these missions impose to as few units as possible. That helps maintain high readiness on the part of most active units—the ones that are not tapped for non-combat operations—but it also creates high operational tempos for those units selected to perform the peacekeeping and other non-combat missions.

The two solutions to this tension used in the recapitalization model are to (1) designate some active units for non-combat missions and focus the training of these units on the skills necessary for non-combat operations, and (2) to accept lower readiness in the active force structure for some units. The second option follows from the first so far as the units committed and trained for operations other than war are concerned. But some relaxation of the required training, maintenance, and unit fill demands associated with high combat readiness could be expanded to more of the active force structure. Reduced readiness, driven by less combat training is a partial solution to the recapitalization surge the Army faces in the first decade of the twenty-first century.

Recapitalization and Role: Specters Haunting Future Ground Force Evolution

The Army’s planning for 2007 posits a force very similar in size and structure to that of 1996. There are, however, two factors that could undercut such a projection. One is the growing need for recapitalization. The other is increasing concern that the mix of heavy and light combat units may not be as justified as was previously believed. The Marine Corps also faces a recapitalization and modernization problem, particularly if the costs of its two major procurement programs—the V-22 and the AAV—limit the numbers procured and the rate at which they are introduced to the active force.
Much of the Army’s capital base is modern and relatively new, for, like all the military services, the Army replenished and modernized its equipment during the 1980s and, while downsizing in the early 1990s, purged weapons and equipment inventories of older items. But for several years in the mid-1990s the Army did not replenish major items of equipment, nor does it plan to buy many new tanks, trucks, weapons, or other systems in the late 1990s. As a result, concern about recapitalizing the Army will become more pronounced as the existing inventories wear out, particularly in the first decade of the twenty-first century. The more divisions and other combat units the Army maintains, and maintains at high levels of readiness, the worse its recapitalization crunch will be. This is also the case with the Marine Corps. Reducing the readiness of some part of the active force would help alleviate the pending recapitalization crunch because, if instituted before 2000, it would stretch out the deterioration of equipment and the resulting demand for recapitalization in those units that went to the lower level of combat readiness.

But the most direct means of avoiding the recapitalization surge is to reduce the size of the force. How large the Army and Marine Corps remains, and how they are structured in the future ultimately depends on what the American public wants them to do. Army planners argue that the U.S. Army is the ultimate expression of U.S. military power because only ground forces can control populations and territory. That may be true, but it ties the preferred size of the Army to the size of the population and territory the United States may wish to control, and to the power of the opposing ground forces the Army may have to destroy in order to ensure the desired control. If the U.S. sees the need to control large territories and populations, and believes opposing ground forces are likely to be formidable, then the large size and potency of the U.S. Army makes sense. If U.S. desires are more limited, such power may not make as much sense.

Likewise, the current size of the active Marine Corps is a function of what the nation defines as the role of the Marines in expeditionary force projection and peacetime presence. Both these requirements are variable, depending not only on the perceived demands of the future international security environment, but also on the mix of forces that can meet these demands. The size and character of the Marine Corps, like that of the Army, could change over the next decade.

The recapitalization model, therefore, assumes some marginal reductions in the active ground forces—both the Army and the Marine Corps—by 2007. These reductions would result from the conscious effort to meet the requirement to recapitalize and modernize the force without demanding a significant rise in the defense budget.

Some reductions of the reserve components of the Army are also consistent with the recapitalization path, but this model does not anticipate significant changes in the total force concept currently defining the relationship between active and reserve components. That is, the Recapitalized Force would still see the National Guard and Army Reserve as combat supplements to the active force. In the case of the Marine Corps, however, this model recognizes the possibility of deviating from the current 3:1 ratio of active to reserve components by adjusting the numbers of regiments in each Marine Division.
Recapitalized Naval Forces

In the early 1990s, the U.S. Navy began a transition that was as significant to future operations and force structure as was the transition the Army began in the 1970s. In the Navy's case, the shift involved a reorientation from sea control toward operations in littoral areas; and from the operational and structural implications of what was termed the maritime strategy toward those embodied by the Navy's 1992 white paper, *Forward . . . From the Sea*. Among other things, this reorientation resulted in planning decisions to reduce the number of U.S. nuclear attack submarines by roughly half; more closely integrate the operational use of Navy and Marine Corps aviation assets; procure the F/A-18E/F rather than a longer-range, stealthier aircraft; accelerate the decommissioning of frigates; and reduce the number of aircraft carriers to eleven, with an additional reserve carrier.

Navy planners, as of 1996, assumed the major structural changes required by the shift toward littoral operations had been completed. Because of the long lead times associated with ship building, their projections of Navy forces in 2007 therefore posited minor modifications to the existing force, although some more significant changes—planned to emerge fully later—would be visible by that time. Basically, however, the Navy on the drawing board derives from the Navy of 1996 and is consistent with the 1996 force structure.

Littoral Operations Mean Joint Operations

The maritime strategy that drove Navy planning from the early 1970s to the 1990s fit into the planning concept of a global war with the Soviet Union. It assumed the Navy would operate on the flanks of the Soviet Union, far from other U.S. forces and unable either to draw from or support those forces. Joint operations—demanding interoperable communications, logistics, weapons, and coordination among U.S. and allied ground, air, and naval forces, all working in close proximity with one another—simply did not figure greatly into calculations and the design of naval systems.

The shift toward littoral operations in the context of regional (not global) conflicts changed the importance of joint operations and interoperable communications. As a result, by 2007, virtually all U.S. Navy ships will carry communications suites that are interoperable with Army and Air Force components. But joint operations demand more than interoperable communications. If, for example, naval aviation is going to be part of a jointly commanded pool of aviation assets, then the aircraft contributed by the naval component ought to be able to use ordnance similar to that used by other components. In Desert Storm, that was not the case. In 1996, it was more so, and in 2007, standardized munitions will be the norm. And standardized delivery platforms, like the Joint Strike Aircraft, will be about to enter the inventories.

Joint Operations in the Littoral Mean Direct Involvement with Ground Operations

The littoral refers to an area encompassing both land and sea. When the Navy talks about littoral operations it is not just discussing the problem of projecting military power from the sea to the land but is also addressing how the Navy can directly influence the land battle. One organizational change could be an increasing integration of Navy and Marine Corps components. The Navy's decision in the early 1990s to incorporate Marine Corps F-18 squadrons into carrier air wings was driven in large part by the desire to spread the Marine Corps aviators' skill in and orientation toward direct support of ground operations throughout naval aviation.

But the general trend toward more direct Navy influence on ground operations is likely to have some other effects too, such as:

- An integration of sea- and ground-based air and missile defense assets. By 2007, Aegis-equipped surface combatants are likely to be seen as normal and essential sea-based components of the air and missile defenses established for ground forces.
- A more prominent specialization, in which the Navy's manned aircraft will increasingly focus on battlefield support
(air defense, close air support, or battlefield interdiction) while sea-based cruise and ballistic missiles take over deep-strike missions.

- The deployment of the arsenal ship; namely, a naval platform designed to carry a significant number of missiles that can be used not only for deep strikes (with the TLAM, block IV) but also in support of troops and in battlefield interdiction (using missile systems such as the Army tactical missile system [ATACMS]), and to provide the killing mechanisms for air and missile defense umbrellas for operations on shore.

- The way the Navy performs its overseas presence role. For example, because the presence of U.S. naval forces is increasingly seen in terms of influencing ground operations, the Navy’s large-deck amphibious ships—which are designed to project both air and ground power ashore—may increasingly become symbols of U.S. power. To the extent that this scenario emerges, the rationale for the number of carriers needed for forward presence (not war fighting) could change.

Hedging against a Challenge for Control of the Sea

Although Navy planners argue that the structural shifts required by the focus on littoral operations are essentially com-

plete and that the existing structure should be maintained pretty much as it is until at least 2007, they also believe some additional hedges against the rise of a naval challenger are necessary. The primary hedge is the roughly annual production of a nuclear attack submarine. The recapitalization path would adhere to the trend currently planned for the attack submarine inventory. It would also supplement this hedge by moving the number of surface combatants slightly below the existing level toward an all aegis equipped surface combatant force with a more robust overall Sea Launched Cruise Missile capability. This surface combatant force could include one arsenal ship.

Recapitalized Air Forces

The U.S. Air Force’s initial response to the end of the Cold War came in the form of a white paper—Global Reach, Global Power—that, coupled with the Desert Storm experience, underlies much of the Air Force’s view of the future. Global Reach, Global Power argued the United States would have to maintain its capacity to project military power throughout the world but, in the future, might be less able to rely on the global network of overseas bases it had during the Cold War. The Air Force therefore posited that the nation’s ability to project air power in response to new demands would rest on two pillars—modern equipment and new, more flexible organizations. So it proceeded, in the early 1990s, to devise a way to achieve both. But the approach the Air Force decided upon made one key assumption; namely, that the resources the Air Force would have during the remainder of the twentieth century would not grow appreciably.

Air Force Modernization

The commitment to technical modernization was not new, for the U.S. Air Force has long believed that its distinguishing characteristic is its consistent efforts to incorporate developments in aerodynamics, electronics, metallurgy, and computer technology into its operations. In the 1980s, much of this orientation had been
focused on stealth and had produced new generations of strike aircraft—the F-117 and the B-2. By the mid-1990s, the quest for modernization was focused on:

- Completing the introduction of the C-17 transport into the air mobility fleet, a step designed to replace the aging C-141 fleet with a transport capable of intercontinental range and operation from tactical airfields
- Adding new and highly accurate precision-strike weapons to the bomber and tactical air fleets
- Securing the introduction of the F-22 air superiority fighter, an advanced stealthy replacement for the F-15
- Pinning down the design and initial procurement funding for the Joint Strike Fighter that would replace the F-16 and F-15E
- Beginning a transition to cheaper space-launch capabilities
- Continuing development of the airborne laser for boost-phase destruction of ballistic missiles

Each of these programs pushes the edge of the technological envelope and, as such, is consistent with the Air Force philosophy of maintaining a strong advantage over the air capabilities of other nations. The recapitalization model would maintain these commitments and trends, but would reduce the numbers of tactical aircraft below the current level by 2007.

The Air Force Seeks Greater Organizational Flexibility

As for organizational modifications, the Air Force has been trying to develop more flexible operational entities—similar to the task-organized maritime forces of the Navy. The effort experiments with assembling different mixes of air assets and deploying them rapidly to overseas operating areas. Following Desert Storm, the focus was on what was termed a composite wing, a generic organization designed to carry a broad range of combat and support capabilities with it as it deployed to a crisis. In the mid-1990s, the emphasis has been on air expeditionary forces, units assembled for specific tasks that try to take only those combat and support assets not available in the operating area. Air expeditionary forces tend to be designed to integrate with the assets and capabilities brought to an operation by other service components. The composite wing tended to be designed for independent and self-sustained operations.

As the Budget Crunch Approaches

The modernization desires of the Air Force are ambitious and expensive, something Air Force planners recognize. Since they do not anticipate a rising defense budget, they plan to meet the costs of modernization in three ways. The first is to cut the cost of infrastructure and basing. Air Force planners believe that by reducing bases and privatizing many of the support functions, they can generate a large portion of the funds necessary to carry out the six modernization tasks listed above.

The second approach is to expand reliance on the reserve force components of the Air Force. Of all the service components, the Air Force has come closest to integrating its reserve and National Guard components into the day-to-day tasks it faces in peacetime, as well as planning for the use of reserves in war. Air Force Reserve and Air National Guard units have gradually taken over significant portions of various roles. As of 1996, the entire air defense mission for the continental United States was, and had been for several years, assigned to reserve components. Air Force and Air National Guard units fly more than half of all air refueling missions, up from less than 15 percent in the 1980s; during conflicts, the reserve components would be expected to fly in more than half of all search-and-rescue and close air support missions. If Air Force planners have their way in the late 1990s, Air National Guard and reserve units will take over more of the support for active units. And some of the long-range planning inside the Air Force envisions altering the breakdown of thirteen active and seven reserve wings in favor of a ten-ten split of the twenty fighter-wing equivalents planned under the BUR force.

The third way the Air Force believes it can resolve the potential conflict between its commitment to modernization and budget limitations is with much greater combat ef-
Recapitalization Is of Concern to the Air Force Too

The Air Force’s commitment to getting the F-22 and the Joint Strike Fighter (JSF) into the active inventory as soon as possible is related to the common problem facing all the military services: the prospect of existing inventory wearing out in the first decade of the twenty-first century. The Air Force faces a relatively dramatic increase in the average age of its fighters by 2007. If new aircraft do not replace the existing inventory as the Air Force hopes, the service will face some undesirable choices. It can continue to procure F-16 and F-15 aircraft to replace the older versions of the same aircraft, and push F-22 and JSF procurement farther into the future. Or it can attempt to cut the wear and tear on the existing inventory by reducing flying hours, an option that the Air Force would also prefer to avoid.

The recapitalization path does not anticipate a significant change from the 1996 level of active forces. It would, however, make several modifications to meet the perceived conflict between the service’s modernization and recapitalization interests and the constraints on funding.

One would be to adjust the number of active and reserve fighter wing equivalents. The Recapitalized Force model, for example, would shift the mix of thirteen active and seven reserve component wings to eleven active and nine reserve fighter wing equivalents by 2007. Another change would be made to the number of aircraft...

The Recapitalized Force Summarized

The Recapitalization Path to the future would seek to maintain current force structure patterns while modernizing at a moderate rate. It would continue to introduce advanced information technologies and precision weapons, and add new generations of tactical aircraft (such as the F-22) and ships (such as the arsenal ship). The primary focus, however, would be on meeting and alleviating the need to recapitalize the force on the assumption that the defense budget will not rise significantly. Accordingly, the Recapitalized Force that emerged in 2007 could be marginally smaller than in 1997, as planners would have traded off force structure reductions to avoid block obsolescence in major weapons platforms and to free the funding necessary to maintain modernization. Some adjustment of readiness in some of the ground forces might have been made, both to provide for specialized peacekeeping and operations other than war training for some active units and to stretch the longevity of some equipment. Planners embarked on the path to the Recapitalized Force would generally maintain existing relationships among active and reserve force components, although there might be an effort to further shift some of the combat structure of National Guard units toward combat service support units.
in each squadron. In 1992, the Air Force reconfigured its fighter force into smaller squadrons. Prior to that decision, the Air Force had usually organized its active fighter aircraft in wings of three squadrons, with twenty-four combat aircraft in each squadron. After 1992, however, most fighter squadrons were reduced to eighteen combat aircraft. By returning to the higher number of aircraft per squadron, the Air Force could generate some savings, primarily from reduced personnel requirements in such areas as command, staff, administration, and maintenance.

An Accelerated RMA Force

While the Recapitalized Force would be similar to the 1996 force, a force reflecting a ten year effort to accelerate RMA technologies would not. To understand why, it is helpful to examine the major element of the Accelerated RMA Force—what Admiral William A. Owens, former vice chairman of the Joint Chiefs, described as the system-of-systems.

The system-of-systems integrates systems that collect, process, and communicate information with those that apply military force. Advocates believe that doing this can produce an enormous disparity in military capability between the United States and any opponent, a disparity that will enable U.S. military forces to operate within an opponent’s reaction cycles and apply military force with dramatically greater efficiency and little risk to U.S. forces. The system-of-systems refers primarily to the technical basis of this argument and describes the capabilities that result from the interaction of new ISR, C4I, and precision force technologies.

There is an important corollary to the technical promises of the system-of-systems; namely, that to achieve the promise of the system-of-systems technologies, the United States must develop new operational concepts and military organizations that can take advantage of them. In this view, the United States has to move away from a force structure that is too ponderous to operate within the decision-reaction cycle of an opponent, and it must adopt operational concepts that are consistent with the capabilities the technologies offer.

How is a revolution in military affairs accelerated? In the case of the U.S. in the late 1990s, it involves higher funding for particular technologies, more rapid integration of these technologies into the force, and organizational change and experimentation to take full advantage of the new technology. The particular technologies are identifiable and a degree of consensus exists within the Department of Defense and Congress as to what they are. Various “technological road maps” have been published over the last several years, and—while there is no comprehensive agreement on what specific combination of technologies would generate the system-of-systems within a decade—there is a general understanding of the particular means of integrating information collection, processing, and communication at the center of the concept. Studies such as the Report of the Task Force on the Advanced Battlespace Information System describe them in enough detail to identify specific programs that could be accelerated, estimate when the technologies would come to fruition, and roughly assess what it would cost.
The System-of-Systems Hypothesis: New systems entering U.S. military inventories can provide:

- **Dominant Battlespace Awareness**—The capacity to gather quickly more militarily relevant information from a large geographical area (40,000 square miles) than an opponent, including the location and identification of military, paramilitary, and nonmilitary units and equipment.

- **Dominant Battlespace Knowledge (DBK)**—Information processing capacities that can describe, in near-real time, the relationships among military units, between the military units and the environment (the options for movement), and between units and operational schemes. DBK also involves the rapid identification and location of key nodes in the opposing military system, the destruction of which will most degrade the opponent’s capabilities and operational scheme.

- **“Near-Perfect” Mission Assignment**—The capacity to assign the right forces for combat missions and to target key nodes accurately with the forces best able to destroy them.

- **Precision Violence**—The capacity to act on DBK with speed, accuracy, precision, and destructive effect from extended ranges.

- **Immediate Battle Assessment**—The capacity to record and assess—in near-real time, comprehensively and accurately—the effects of battle.

But technological improvement—even accelerated technological improvement—is not likely by itself to be sufficient to reach the capabilities promised by the system-of-systems. To do so would require that the new technology be integrated to the force structure and the force structure and operational doctrine be adjusted to take full advantage of the technological promise. This means organizational change, something a number of documents, such as the Army’s pamphlet on Force XXI: Operations (Army Pamphlet 525-5), acknowledge. Some point to a force design that varies greatly from the existing structure, and are explicit about some of these changes, calling for less hierarchical command structures. Other changes follow by implication. Generally, smaller, more agile, and more mobile units emerge as a dominant design.

The Accelerated RMA model sketched below pushes these implications to their logical extreme. It describes the kind of force structure that could emerge by 2007 given a dominant assumption; namely, that national decision makers would seek to accelerate the American RMA at the fastest rate possible, given the demands of the international security environment. This path involves considerable risk and would not be followed if the decision-makers believe the chances of major armed conflict over the next half decade were relatively high. This is because a conscious and systematic effort to integrate advanced information technology to a force structure that was changing rapidly would involve considerable organizational turmoil and probably reduce operational readiness for some units some of the time. Yet, what is described is not a straw man. It is best understood as an hypothetical description of a force design path at the edge of feasibility—a logical extension into force implications of the line of thought of those who see the American Revolution of Military Affairs as the best course to the future.

**RMA Ground Forces**

In an Accelerated RMA Force, the central mission of U.S. ground forces would remain the destruction of opposing military forces through fire and maneuver. However, RMA capabilities would alter the relationship between these two activities. In 1996, the U.S. Army and the U.S. Marine Corps see fire as the means to close with and destroy the opponent or seize and control territory. But DBK and precision force could change this battle plan: indirect fire—delivered largely from non-organic sources—could become the primary means of destroying the opponent, and maneuver may become the means of directing fire onto the opponent while avoiding his counteractions. Not all ground combat
Technologies for an Accelerated RMA

Accelerating RMA technologies would involve higher priority and funding for programs that provide:

- Automated Target Recognition
- Integrated Target Tracking
- Automated Language Translation
- Adaptive Information Compression
- DTED-4 Mapping
- Deployable Fiber Optic Communications Cable
- Direct Broadcasting
- Cognitive Display
- Automated Protocol Translation
- Automated IPB Processing
- Automated Change Detection
- Automatic Filtering
- Automated Nodal Analysis and Target Assignment
- Real Time Combat Identification
- Dynamic Planning
- Automated Target Loading
- Cross Sensor Terminal Guidance
- Asymmetric Networking for Mobile Users

units would be lightly armed or would seek to avoid direct contact with the opponent. Indeed, some ground force units—attack helicopter and armored units, for example—would function primarily as shooters. But all ground force combat units would also serve as sensors for munitions delivered from other sources and platforms—regardless of whether those sources were land-, sea-, or air-based.

Shift Toward Agility, Less Organic Combat Support, and Unit Replacements

Access to RMA technologies points toward more agile ground force combat units. That agility is likely to result in part from smaller units with less organic fire and other combat support—all of which would be available, on time, from non-organic sources. This concept therefore carries significant potential structural changes. Much of the organic structure of the current major combat units, for example, is there essentially to assure that combat support (indirect fire support, combat engineer support, etc.) is available and responsive when and where the maneuver unit needs it. In the American case, one result has been a tradition of relatively robust, full combat spectrum maneuver units. The RMA hypothesis argues that because of better situation awareness, advanced C4I, and longer range precision weapons, it will be possible to increasingly rely on combat support provided from non-organic sources. These sources would, the argument continues, include the assets of other service components. Thus, in the broadest sense, the RMA path is one of increasing jointness and moves toward replacing the asset and capability independence that characterizes the 1996 military structure with greater asset and capability interdependence.

The purpose of these kinds of shifts would be, among other things, to make ground force maneuver units inherently more agile and more capable fast moving, dispersed attack operations. Accordingly, ground forces on the accelerated RMA path would shift toward smaller combat units, organized by task for the particular mission assigned them. The Army division might no longer be the nearly self-contained key combat organization it is in 1996, and the central combat organization in ground operations could devolve downward to the brigade or lower. Some functions and capabilities within the divisions could be assigned to subordinate units. And some of the functions now thought to be organic to various echelons might be reduced dramatically. The air defense of ground units and operations, for example, might be subsumed almost entirely by the Air Force and Navy. Likewise, many of the combat support and combat service support functions currently associated with the divisions, brigades, and armored cavalry regiments, and brigades could move toward greater consolidation inside the ground forces and migrate to other service components.

Greater unit agility, driven by the desire to meet the demands of dominant maneuver operations, could also alter the way in which some functions within the ground forces are conducted. The RMA postulates a high and sustained tempo of ground force operations by mobile combat units. That, in turn, implies a shift from individual to unit replacement, not because of anticipated attrition, but to maintain the tempo of operations. This, in turn, suggests that the ground forces would need a relatively high number of combat units to replace or relieve units as the tempo of operations eroded their effectiveness. These kind of changes, of course, would rest on deep alterations of the existing personnel systems and training processes.

New Combat Structures

One result consistent with the Accelerated RMA Force would be new structures designed to take advantage of RMA technologies and operate in accordance with RMA concepts. One such structure might be a significantly different combat unit, referred to here as a "maneuver group." The maneuver group might be designed and trained to operate in accordance with some of the organizational implications of the "sea dragon" experiments being undertaken by the Marine Corps. That is, each new group—of
New RMA Ground Force Combat Unit?

roughly 1,000 personnel—might comprise a headquarters—or “combat coordination” authority—and a number of combat teams. The combat coordinators’ primary task would be to implement the unit-replacement system that would shuttle the combat teams in and out of their operating areas and to adjudicate among competing fire support requests by the combat teams. The teams would rely largely on nonorganic sources of indirect fire support and tactical air transportation. The precise organization of such units is less important for the purposes of describing what could emerge from the accelerated RMA path than underlining the general notion that this route is likely to generate structural manifestations that would appear very different from what exists in 1996.

Transitional Bifurcations: Reserve Components as a Repository for the Old

In short, the accelerated RMA path not only postulates fairly rapid changes, but also posits significant changes that run through current ground force structure and the processes that support the structures. The scope of what is potentially involved therefore makes it unlikely that the United States could complete the kind of major ground force reorganization this

path envisions by 2007, for despite the assumption of vigorously pursued change, ten years is probably not long enough to realize all that is implied by a revolution. It is far more likely that, even given an early decision to move in this direction, the U.S. ground force component in 2007 would still have organizations and structures similar to existing ones. Overall, a structural overview of the RMA ground force component, circa 2007, would show a blend of the familiar and the new. The ground forces would in effect be bifurcated into some evolutionary extensions of today’s units and radically different organizations designed to operate in new ways. This would pose both management challenges and strategic risks, for if a major conflict were to break out during the transition to the new model, it would catch the United States in the difficult position of being in the midst of considerable organizational change and the decline in overall combat readiness that would probably accompany it.

However, the United States has effected considerable shifts in organization and doctrine within a ten year period in the past. The task of managing even a transition of the magnitude postulated by this model with the minimum degradation of readiness is quite possible. Technically, the military capability of the force would be increasing throughout the transition. But there is little doubt that this path would be challenging.

One hedge against the strategic risks associated with a rapid transition would involve the character and use of the Army Reserve, Marine Corps Reserve and National Guard units that constitute the ground force reserve components. The Accelerated RMA Force model uses these components as repositories of today’s structure and doctrine. They would become a primary means of hedging against some of the concerns likely to be generated during the period of rapid organizational, technological, and doctrinal change in the active components—a core around which the nation could field considerable ground force combat capability (organized
and operating in today’s manner) if that should be necessary for either an unexpected major military contingency or for operations other than war. This would not be done to exempt the active force components from contingencies—for surely they would always possess significant military potency (which would grow rapidly in the last five years of the transition to the RMA model). But the reserve components would be seen in this model as an increasingly different complement to the active force’s combat capability, for they would not be modernized or reorganized at the rate or to the extent that the active force components would during the transition.

As a result, there would be a growing divergence between the character of the active and reserve ground force components over the next decade. Near the end of that period, the nation might seek to again bring the reserve components into closer conformity with the structure and doctrine of the active components, which by that time would be nearing the end of the rapid transformation to the RMA model. But the accelerated RMA path carries major changes to today’s notion of a “total force” so far as the ground forces are concerned during the ten-year period of transition.

RMA Naval Forces

U.S. naval power revolves around the character, mix, and operations of ships and aircraft at sea. This is not to say that ships and aircraft are all that count in naval forces. The Navy’s shore establishment—an extensive network of construction, maintenance, training, and housing facilities in the United States and abroad—absorbs nearly half the money the United States allocates to its naval forces and employs most of the Navy’s personnel. But the ships, submarines, and aircraft that operate on, over, and under the sea are and will remain the core of U.S. naval power.

Thus, the effects of the RMA on U.S. naval power ultimately depend on how it will alter the character, mix, and operations of this core. And that imposes some important temporal constraints because, while changes in operations and the mix of ships can be made relatively easily, changing the character of the Navy’s ships and aircraft is not likely to be done quickly. These temporal considerations are important when the issue is what an RMA naval force could look like by 2007. A decade is long enough to introduce some significantly different naval platform designs to the active force. Indeed, the arsenal ship and mobile offshore base—two platforms that differ considerably from what exists in 1996—could enter active service by 2007. But 2007 is too soon to talk about wholesale revisions of the basic designs of the ships and aircraft.

Nor is it likely that the RMA would alter the way U.S. naval forces organize for operations. While the RMA posits rather dramatic changes in ground force organization, U.S. naval operations already emphasize an organizational flexibility built around mixing various types and numbers of ships for particular tasks.

By 2007, then, the most visible changes associated with the RMA would emerge in what the basic platforms carry, how they operate, and perhaps in the mix of ships and aircraft in the overall active inventory. Some trends consistent with RMA theory and technology are already visible (although initiated for reasons that have little to do with the RMA). The general shift toward operations in the littoral, for example, fits with RMA propositions of operational integration among service components and better ground force access to non-organic firepower assets.
Sea-Based Support to Joint Operations

Some of the RMA implications for naval forces are straightforward. Improved communications connectivity with other U.S. forces is one of the most obvious and important. Likewise, an Accelerated RMA emphasis on responsive, accurate, and precise engagement from extended ranges implies rapid buildup of longer range precision-guided weapons inventories and the inventory control improvements needed to make this capability more quickly accessible to a wider range of users. Doing that, however, entails more than increasing the purchase of weapons, accelerating the deployment of the arsenal ship, and increasing the number of vertical launch systems on Navy ships. It also means linking naval strike and air and missile defense systems with those of the Army and Air Force and expanding the Navy’s cooperative-engagement concept to encompass ground and tactical air forces. And it could mean much more interest in using Army and Air Force combat systems from naval ships.

The RMA, for example, builds on ideas like mounting the ATACMS on Navy ships or using structures like mobile offshore bases—built and operated by the Navy—as joint-use platforms. It does not argue for subordinating Navy assets to other service components. But the RMA notion of precision engagement will erode traditional boundaries and operational styles. U.S. naval forces would have to pick up some military functions that have traditionally been conducted by the Army and the Air Force.

The most obvious of these is air and missile defense of ground forces. The Navy seems the logical choice for building initial air and missile defenses over land areas in which the United States seeks to project military power. It is also the logical choice for establishing at least initial joint tactical C2I nets in such areas.

Overseas Presence

Today, the number of active Navy ships is a function of perceived overseas presence requirements and planned patterns and rates of maintenance, deployment preparation, transit, and operational tempo. The overall number of active Navy ships reflects the fact that it takes about five ships to keep one deployed overseas on any given day. There are at least three ways in which the American RMA could affect this ratio and the overall active ship requirement, assuming the peacetime overseas deployment locations present in 1996 remain.

First, mobile offshore bases could be added to the force structure. The immediate effect of stationing an MOB in the Persian Gulf would be to free four carriers for use elsewhere on a day-to-day basis. That, of course, implies—but does not necessarily mean—a potential reduction in the overall number of carriers required by a force that also includes the MOB.

Second, DBK, which exists before hostilities, could affect forward deployments. In the mid-1990s, the United States deploys forward forces for two reasons: to inspire awe of U.S. military prowess, and to deter and respond quickly to particular crises and contingencies. Since response time is a function of the awareness of a pending contingency, there is a tradeoff between the amount of advance notice and the timing of a response. That is, for every day of advance notice DBK generates, the United States can station its naval response force farther away from the potential crisis. Thus, to the extent response time affects forward deployment requirements, DBK may allow a shift away from the forward-deployment hub concept toward fewer hubs or, ultimately, to a different approach entirely—namely, a global surge concept in which naval forces are normally either (1) stationed near the continental United States and surge to the area of concern, or (2) dispersed and moving globally (the interest in building general, global awe mentioned above would drive this pattern). Both of these changes could, but would not necessarily, lead to a reduction in the number of carriers.

Lastly, the kind of overseas presence consistent with the Accelerated RMA Force might differ from the existing understanding of such presence. Carriers are the central component of the U.S. overseas naval presence, in part because they symbolize American military power well. Their deter-
current effect is rooted in the destructive potential they carry. But the symbols the United States wishes to cultivate in the future may be different, particularly if Washington wants to replace the idea that U.S. military prowess acts as a shield for allies (the underlying concept of extended deterrence) with the notion that it can empower them. Previously, apprehension over the overwhelmingly powerful Soviet threat bound allies to the United States. In the absence of an analogous threat, a pervasive and clearly overwhelming U.S. naval presence may be more cause for suspicion than for solace. The RMA approach to friendly great powers is to allay their suspicions and undercut any potential desire to compete with the United States, perhaps U.S. naval overseas presence should revolve around smaller force packages that still allow allies to tap into the DBK.

RMA Air Forces

Like the Army, U.S. Air Force organization traditionally has been relatively standardized. Terms like “squadron” denote a particular mix of personnel and equipment. Yet, like the Navy, the Air Force increasingly thinks of task organizing for operations. The most obvious example of this approach is what Air Force planners refer to as a “composite air wing.” Accordingly, when describing the impact of the RMA on the structure of the Air Force, it is probably best to first discuss the effects in terms of the overall mix of aircraft assets.

While the Air Force is the major contributor to American air power, it is important to note the contributions of the other military components and the services’ increasingly overlapping capabilities. Traditionally, air power focuses on two broad missions, each with subcomponents. The United States uses aircraft to support ground and sea operations—by providing close air support (CAS) to engaging units, battlefield interdiction (BI), and air defense. It also uses its air power to provide strategic strike—not necessarily with nuclear weapons, but to destroy the capacity and the will of an opponent to wage war. This second use has involved attacks against what the Air Force calls strategic centers of gravity (normally fixed facilities that constitute important nodes in an opponent’s communications, transportation, command and control, industrial production, and electrical power systems) and, more particularly, against the units, equipment, and facilities of an opponent’s air power. The latter mission set is often characterized as offensive counter air (OCA) operations. Successful air defense and counter air operations together provide what the Air Force sees as air superiority.

The separation of air operations into two broad classes of activity has never been precisely demarcated (a given bridge can be a battlefield interdiction target and part of the opponent’s transportation center of gravity), and there is an overlap in the capabilities that the United States can bring to these missions. The overlap is in part a function of technology—as target acquisition, timeliness, and precision improve, and the range, precision, and accuracy of weapons get better, more of the air assets of each force component can be used against a wider range of targets.

Air Power Overlap

Air power overlap is a perennial issue in discussions of service roles and missions, and analyses usually conclude that it is not necessarily bad. It provides assur-
### Operational Focus of Air Power Assets—Accelerated RMA Force

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- The Army drops organic air defense
- The Air Force shifts predominantly to air defense, BL, and strategic strike missions

Together, these shifts would have the effect of moving toward specialization.

### With the Possibility of Reduced Numbers of Tactical Aircraft

The greater precision, range, and accuracy of the weapons carried by U.S. aircraft in the future could reduce the need for the numbers of aircraft in the active inventories, particularly if, as in the Accelerated RMA Force model, the aircraft were able to work from a detailed, comprehensive common situation awareness and fit within a command and control system that approached near perfect mission assignment. And, if the numbers of aircraft carriers were reduced, there might be additional considerations why the number of tactical aircraft would go down.

There are, however, some reasons why significant reductions in the numbers of tactical aircraft and longer range bombers might not be made. First, the demand for concurrent operations could work against such reductions. While the shift from sequential to concurrent operations posits potentially shorter conflicts, it also implies very high tempo operations early in the conflict. Concurrent operations and the concomitant rise in air operations tempo, even for limited periods, could require more tactical aircraft than sequential operations. Second, while the numbers of carriers might go down in the Accelerated RMA Force model, the introduction of mobile offshore bases could make relatively large tactical aircraft inventories sensible. Rather than permanently stationing large numbers of aircraft on the MOB, they could be flown to it when needed.

### An Accelerated Shift toward Unmanned Aircraft

One of the distinguishing characteristics of the Accelerated RMA Force Model could be an accelerated movement toward unmanned aircraft. Unmanned aircraft would play an important role in collecting information. Of all three force models, the Accelerated RMA Force carries the greatest incentive to rapidly expand the inventory.
of surveillance and reconnaissance drones. But the interest in unmanned aircraft could also be accelerated by the effort to tie focused logistics to the kind of ground operations envisioned by this model. Focused logistics, in concert with the highly mobile, high tempo operations of relatively small ground force units, could put a premium on numerous, relatively small aircraft capable of delivering logistics support in relatively small packages, but precisely and on time. This posits a growing utility for relatively inexpensive unmanned aircraft as logistics delivery platforms as well as for information collection. Given the expanded situation awareness and precise, real-time tracking capability of the Accelerated RMA Force model, an early significantly greater reliance on unmanned aircraft would be consistent with this force design path.

Some Continuities: Reserves’ Role, Space Dominance, and Air Superiority

While the Accelerated RMA Force model deviates greatly in many respects from the 1966 forces, it would maintain some important continuities. One of these has to do with the role of Air Force and Navy reserve components, which, particularly with regard to the Air Force, are often fully integrated into many day-to-day active force air operations. Airlift, for example, currently relies heavily on reserve and National Guard components, and the Air Force has recently successfully experimented with relying on reserve components for aircraft maintenance in both the active and reserve components. This pattern is consistent with the Accelerated RMA Force, for while the model postulates significant differences in the current active-reserve component relationships of in the ground forces, this is not the case with regard to the current manner in which the Air Force, and to a lesser extent, the Navy, uses their reserve components.

The need for continued access to space is also an integral part of the Accelerated RMA Force model, for, of all the models, this one relies on space-based surveillance and communications assets the most. As such, going down this design path would probably elevate the importance of space dominance more than both of the other models. This is also the case with air superiority, which in this model becomes particularly important not only to conform with the concept of full spectrum protection, but because of the shift away from air defense redundancy.

The Full Spectrum Force Summarized

The Full Spectrum Force would seek to maintain a relatively robust force structure while pushing rapid modernization. In other words, the path to the Full Spectrum Force would attempt to avoid the risks associated with the kind of acceleration that emphasizes organizational change and force structure reductions, yet integrate system-of-systems technologies across a larger force structure involving both active and reserve force components. This would avoid the divergence of active and reserve component capabilities within U.S. ground forces. But it would also make the transition to the advanced capabilities and different operations associated with that path. The size of U.S. Naval and Air Forces would also be maintained at about today’s levels while advanced technologies would be integrated into these forces. There would be less interest in reducing air power redundancies, but increased efforts to move to shared situational awareness and quick response with longer-range standoff weapons of greater precision and accuracy. Overall, the path to the Full Spectrum Force would seek to achieve the benefits of the two other models, albeit at greater expense, and at a slower rate than that associated with the Accelerated RMA Force.

The Full Spectrum Force

The Full Spectrum Force, as the name implies, would be designed to meet a broad range of challenges and to cope with the prospect of continued ambiguity regarding the security environment in the years ahead. It is also a force designed to bridge the other two force models outlined in this assessment. That is, the Full Spectrum Force would embrace the central thrust of the Recapitalized Force—the effort to maintain the high quality and capability of the existing military force by minimizing disruptive changes to its structure and organization—and seize the promise of advanced technology and the “system-of-systems” that is central to the Accelerated RMA Force. This would involve considerable tension, particularly if accelerating the revolution
in military affairs requires organizational innovation. The Full Spectrum Force is in some respects an elegant solution to this potential paradox, for it would be selective in the organizational and structural changes it undertakes. It could be the most expensive force design path, for it would seek to maintain a very robust force structure while modernizing and recapitalizing.

Unlike the Accelerated RMA Force approach that would seek to make widespread organizational and doctrinal changes while accelerating modernization, the Full Spectrum Force would be less committed to rapid organizational change. Yet, unlike the Recapitalized Force, it would seek to accelerate modernization while maintaining a robust force structure.

**Full Spectrum Ground Forces**

From a structural perspective, the changes in ground forces associated with the Full Spectrum Force would be similar to those sketched for the Recapitalized Force. There would be a conscious effort to avoid radical, rapid, and disruptive changes to the existing structure. Accordingly, the ground force structure of the full spectrum model would conform much more closely to existing forces than to the more radical design of the Accelerated RMA Force. And, as in the case of the Recapitalized Force, full spectrum ground forces would adjust to readiness of some units and designate some active force units for specialized training—and perhaps equipping—for operations other than war.

But the motivation for making these adjustments would be different. With the Full Spectrum Force, the interest in adjusting readiness would be driven not so much by an effort to free resources for recapitalization, as by a desire to free portions of the force to serve as test beds for integrating advanced technology and as a means of meeting overseas presence requirements. The Full Spectrum Force emphasizes technological improvement, and while it would not undertake organizational changes in parallel with the introduction of advanced technology, it would reduce the readiness requirements on parts of the existing force structure to allow more rapid integration of the new technologies and experimentation with different operational modes.

**A Different Approach toward Overseas Deployments and Readiness**

The more significant aspect of readiness in this model, however, would involve the Army and encompass a different approach to overseas deployments. At present, U.S. Army forces are deployed overseas for two general kinds of missions. Most Army overseas deployments are for general presence purposes or, as most clearly is the case in Korea, to deter and prepare for a major conflict. The second general reason for overseas deployments has been for actual contingencies, often associated with operations other than war. Obvious examples in 1996 of such operations are the U.S. ground forces deployed in the Sinai, Bosnia, or the former Yugoslavia Republic of Macedonia on peacekeeping missions. Although the number of U.S. Marines deployed overseas is less than the total number of Army personnel abroad, the Marines' overseas deployments are devoted to the same two general purposes—presence and contingency operations or preparations for such operations.

But the way the two ground force components deal with overseas deployments differs. Most of the Army forward deployments in Europe, for example, involve permanent changes of station for the individual personnel sent there. The American military infrastructure in Europe is designed to accommodate both the combat, combat support, and combat service support units stationed there and the large numbers of family dependents that accompany the service personnel while they are assigned to forward stationed units. Army units assigned to forward deployments train continually in order to maintain a high degree of readiness. Active Army units assigned to stations in the United States likewise train more or less constantly to maintain a similarly high level of combat readiness, largely to be able to reinforce forward deployed units quickly without deficiencies in readiness. The Marine Corps
deals with forward deployments differently. For the most part they follow the Navy pattern of deploying units from home stations in the United States on a rotational basis. This rotational pattern involves a regular and scheduled movement through different levels of readiness. Units train in preparation for overseas rotations, achieving their highest level of readiness upon deployment. Upon rotating back to their home station, their readiness is at a relatively low level and they enter a cycle of training and restoration that returns them to the readiness required to again deploy overseas.

The Full Spectrum Force model would introduce a similar unit rotational scheme for Army forward deployments. Assuming the level of overseas Army deployments would remain similar to 1996, at the end of the 10-year transition to the new pattern, units deployed from home stations in the United States would remain overseas for periods of roughly 6 months before returning to the United States and reentering a training and preparation cycle that would prepare them for overseas deployments up to 9 to 12 months in the future. Like the current pattern associated with the cycle of Marine Corps units, this shift to a unit rotational deployment pattern would carry with it a different pattern of readiness.

Shift to Unit Rotation Pattern for Overseas Deployments Requires Relatively Large Numbers

The shift would entail important changes. It implies, for example, a reduction of the overseas structure that currently supports accompanying dependents, for this pattern would rest largely on shorter, non-accompanied overseas deployments for Army units. It also allows for the integration on a unit basis of the reserve components, for while the preparation period prior to overseas deployments would have to be longer for reserve and National Guard units, once prepared, these units could fit into the unit rotational patterns for some deployments (such as those associated with the Sinai peacekeeping operations) as effectively as active units.

But the salient implication of this shift would be the requirement for a relatively large active force structure. The unit rotation, pattern associated with this force design path for Army forces would generate the same kind of 3:1 preparing-to-deployed unit ratios experienced by the Marine Corps and Naval forces. Assuming, for example, that the roughly 20-battalion level the Army stations in Europe were replaced by a rotation framework, the Army would have to maintain about 60 battalions in the training and deployment cycle to assure that the forward deployments in Europe were at high states of readiness when deployed. In short, this model ties the level of land forces much closer to the level of forward deployments during peacetime than either the other two models or to the 1996 force. And, as long as those deployments remain at about 1996 levels, the model generates a requirement for a relatively large number of Army personnel.

Modest Organizational Change

The Full Spectrum Force would not rule out organizational changes or force reductions. It would, for example, introduce “new maneuver units” similar to those described for the Accelerated RMA Force, although these would be seen primarily as test beds and experiments and would not be as numerous as in the RMA force. The Full Spectrum Force design path would not try to use such changes as a means of accelerating movement toward different operational patterns. Instead, it would adopt a more measured, incremental approach in the same direction—faster and stronger than that adopted by the Recapitalized path, less accelerated than the Accelerated RMA Force design path.

Full Spectrum Ground forces, therefore, would not move as rapidly toward reducing some organic capabilities and assets from major combat units as might be the case with the Accelerated RMA Force. That is, the Full Spectrum model would maintain organic air defense and fire support units with existing organizations and it would retain greater similarity to existing force structure patterns not only because the relatively greater number of units in this model would slow organi-
zational changes, but also because the general shift toward integrated joint operations would not be as rapid. An underlying assumption of this force model is that independent capability that can be coordinated with the capabilities of other force components is better, more assured, and less susceptible to failure than functional interdependencies and near total reliance on other force components for the successful conduct of the function.

While this model would not seek the rapid structural changes associated with the Accelerated RMA Force, it could introduce a limited number of some of the new organizations—"maneuver groups", for example—sketched for the Accelerated RMA Force model. Such new organizations would tend to be treated as test beds, however, rather than accepted immediately as integral parts of the ground force structure.

Meeting Recapitalization and Modernization Pressures with More Money

The Full Spectrum Force is not designed to reduce costs. Although some downward adjustment of ground force levels could occur, any reductions would not be dramatic and would neither generate nor be sought for major cost savings or rapid organizational change. Nor would such adjustments alleviate the pressure for and interest in ground force recapitalization. Instead, the Full Spectrum Force's solution to these pressures would be to increase procurement, without making adjustments to free additional resources. In other words, this model would seek to resolve some of the potential contradictions in the design by at least maintaining the current defense budget level, or raising it. Like both of the other models, the Full Spectrum Force would make reductions in support and infrastructure personnel, relying on improved technology for the former and privatization for the latter. But these reductions would not be as substantial as in the other models.

Maintaining the "Total Force" Approach

The Full Spectrum Force Model would seek to maintain the current relationship between ground force active and reserve components. That is, it would continue to see the National Guard and Marine Corps components as potential integral parts of an expanded ground combat force structure, and Army Reserve components as structural combat service support complements to the active structure. This means that the Full Spectrum Force path would involve a concerted effort to roughly parallel modernization in the active ground forces with similar modernization within the reserve components. While this would not require a one-for-one matching with the rates of modernization in the active components, it would require a commitment to assure that the active force does not get too far ahead of the reserve components, and, as such, would loosely link the overall rate of modernization to that achievable for the reserves. It would also mean modernization would be relatively expensive, for integrating system-of-systems technologies to the force structure would have to expand to the reserve structure as well as the active.

Full Spectrum Naval Forces

As with ground forces, the Full Spectrum Force would not deviate from the existing structure of the naval force as much as the Accelerated RMA Force would, and while the full spectrum approach might reduce the number of carriers or other surface ships, such reductions would not be dramatic if they occurred. This model would, however, introduce both a mobile offshore base and arsenal ships to the Navy force structure.

The MOB would be seen as a means of increasing the deployment flexibility of a robust carrier force rather than compensating for any reduction of aircraft carriers so far as forward presence is concerned, and the introduction of arsenal ships would stem from the interest in accelerating the revolution in military affairs, particularly regarding integrated operations with ground forces. That is, the Navy would use the arsenal ships not only to provide a wide range of missile-delivered ordnance (surface-to-air, and surface-to-surface), but as the fulcrum around which to extend the cooperative engagement concept from the
sea to the joint arena encompassing ground operations. Among other things, the arsenal ship would be seen as part of a sea-based air and theater missile defense system for littoral areas and a sea-based fire support base for ground operations.

**Continuing Focus on Joint, Littoral Operations**

One of the salient characteristics of the Full Spectrum Force model, then, would be the continued movement toward more pervasive and central joint operational doctrine and capabilities on the part of naval forces. The path to this model would continue to emphasize the focus on littoral operations and this orientation would be bolstered by accelerating the development of improved communications interoperability with ground and Air Force units, the shift toward standardized munitions, and a joint capacity to build shared, real-time situation awareness.

**While Assuring Certain Continuities.**

At the same time, this model would maintain a number of the structural and procedural characteristics of today’s naval forces. It would, for example, maintain the organizational integrity of the Marine Corps. Unlike the Accelerated RMA Force, this model would not seek the rapid integration of Navy and Marine Corps fixed wing assets into a single naval aviation component. And it would maintain the 1996 emphasis on forward naval presence and quick response to emerging contingencies. This commitment would remain at the core of the model’s interest in maintaining a relatively robust naval force structure. It views U.S. naval forces as the most flexible instrument by which the United States seeks to shape the strategic environment and associates this function with the traditional forward presence—show the flag—role assigned to the U.S. Navy. Accordingly, this path would see system-of-systems technologies as essentially a supplemental means of enhancing forward presence naval activity, not as a substitute for or a means of reducing the impact of peacetime operational tempo or the numbers of ships and crews needed to assure a robust naval overseas presence.

**Full Spectrum Air Forces**

The Full Spectrum model would not move as readily or as rapidly to the kind of mission specialization characteristic of the Accelerated RMA Force for several reasons. First, the primacy of independent capabilities would be maintained over the transition period. The general approach would be to increase the individual capabilities and flexibility of the various force components with better communications and shared situation awareness, but not to push this concept toward mission specialization. In other words, this model would welcome mission overlap among Army, Navy, Marine Corps, and Air Force assets as a means of increasing the flexibility of American air power, and would not seek to trim the levels of force because of overlapping capabilities. The emphasis would be on maintaining as robust a force as possible while accelerating its modernization, not, as in the Accelerated RMA Force model, attempting to reduce mission overlap and force structure in order to speed modernization. Accordingly, any reductions of numbers of tactical aircraft in the Full Spectrum Force model would be
driven by cost-effectiveness calculations, leavened by a strong bias in favor of maintaining a robust overall capability.

The model would, however, continue to push for weapons standardization in parallel with the accelerated effort to move toward larger inventories of stand-off precision weapons. The shift toward standardized munitions would be driven, as in the case of improved communications and shared situation awareness, by the general desire to improve the capabilities of separate component air capabilities as they improve their ability to coordinate and support each other better.

As with the Accelerated RMA Force Model, this force design path would place a great deal of emphasis on assured use of space-based assets and on air supremacy. Therefore, the interest in maintaining a large and robust air structure would be paralleled by rapid modernization both of the platforms and the weapons and systems these platforms carry. This force model would seek development of the F-22 and JSF.

It would also seek early increases in the numbers of unmanned aerial vehicles, although the increases would be relegated almost entirely to the goal of increasing ISR capabilities and robustness. Experimentation with the use of unmanned aircraft for logistics delivery would continue, but because the shift toward highly mobile, dispersed operations by ground forces would not be as advanced as in the Accelerated RMA Force model, the Full Spectrum Force model would not seek to accelerate the use of UAVs for such missions or increase the inventories of such aircraft as rapidly.

**Fitting the Force Models to Missions**

The character of U.S. military forces has traditionally been influenced by two concerns: the demands of threat, as specified in planning scenarios and other analytic devices, and the constraints of the budget. For most of the latter half of the twentieth century, the threat was relatively easy to define, and because it involved the survival of the nation, threat tended to be the predominant consideration. That is not to say that resource constraints played little role in setting the size of the U.S. military. But with the stakes as high as they seemed during the Cold War, the planning bias was toward committing whatever resources were necessary to counter the potential threat.

Since the end of the Cold War, there has been much less consensus on what threats exist, while a range of problems to which the United States may want to commit military forces seems to have grown. The military missions associated with those many problems are emerging as a force-sizing alternative to specific threat-based scenarios, and, in the absence of a perceived threat to the nation's very survival, budget constraints are increasingly important in wrestling with the difficult question of how much is enough.

The missions outlined in the preceding chapter involve influencing the behavior of various international actors through both impression and the actual use of violence. The former— affecting behavior by influencing the calculations, assumptions, and inclinations of governmental officials or the leaders of other institutions as they decide how to act— falls within the broad category of shaping the international environment. It encompasses the rich theories of deterrence, compellence, persuasion and dissuasion. The character and operations of U.S. military forces have played a salient role in this realm and what U.S. military forces become and do over the next decade will continue to shape the environment, particularly in this single military superpower era. The distinction between shaping the international environment and the actual use of military violence is, of course, fuzzy, for the use of military force has an effect beyond the immediate destruction. Military violence not only directly alters the behavior—sometimes the existence—of those on whom it is focused. It also conditions the behavior of those who witness or are told about it. For the purposes of discussion, however, the following first addresses how each of the force models might deal with those missions that fall within the general category of shaping the environment. The
discussion then shifts to a more explicit consideration of how each force model might deal with large powers, regional conflicts, troubled states, and transnational threats by non-state actors.

All three force models—the Recapitalized, Accelerated RMA, and Full Spectrum Forces—could perform the range of presence and war fighting missions discussed in the preceding chapter. But in some cases they would do so differently. These are what those differences might be.

**Shaping the Environment: Overseas Military Presence**

The military forces of the United States are important instruments of the nation's foreign policy. Given the current status of the United States as the world's only military superpower—a status that is likely to continue for the foreseeable future—what U.S. military forces look like and what they do abroad will be an important factor in what other nations interpret as U.S. foreign policy goals, intentions, and its ability to shape the international environment.

The most direct means of shaping the international environment is, of course, through the use of military violence. Historically, this has been one of the primary means of creating or destroying states, shaping their geographical dimensions, and defining interstate relationships. But military forces, and for much of this century, U.S. military forces in particular, have shaped interstate processes, what states do in the world, and to some extent what goes on inside states, by their presence rather than military action. The presence of U.S. forces in Europe during the Cold War, for example, was an important component of the international system that existed then. In 1996, the presence of U.S. forces in the Persian Gulf affects the international actions of virtually all the nations in that region and what nations in other parts of the world and non-state actors do, as well. American military forces are deployed or stationed throughout the world during peacetime to provide military presence and in support of a broad spectrum of U.S. foreign policies. Yet, it is important to remember that while the presence of U.S. military forces can serve as a channel for many different kinds of international interactions and relationships, the fundamental and inherent signal carried by military presence involves the potential application of deadly violence.

There are some general presence considerations that would apply to all three force models. U.S. ground forces, for example, would be best for signaling certain things better than either maritime or air forces, regardless of the different ways in which each model would affect the size and structure of its ground force component. The physical presence of U.S. ground forces would remain particularly good at deterring a potential aggressor from invading the country in which the U.S. deploys ground forces, for two reasons. Ground forces constitute an important counter to the primary military forces used in an invasion—the aggressor’s ground forces. And, because they are relatively more difficult to withdraw once engaged, U.S. ground force presence constitutes a strong signal to the protected country and to the potential aggressor that the United States will intervene with additional forces to protect the lives of its soldiers or marines. American military “boots on the ground” are and are likely to remain the strongest signal that the United States is committed to the territorial defense of other nations. As such, to the extent that such commitments remain important aspects of U.S. foreign policy, each of the models would have to maintain sufficient ground forces to allow the United States to sustain an overseas ground force presence, and at least some part of those forward deployed ground forces are likely to have to be in addition to what is necessary for strictly war-fighting requirements.

There is another traditional aspect of military presence that would apply to all three force models—the kind of presence that implies a more flexible and ambiguous commitment on the part of the United States. This has usually been associated with the presence of naval forces, something that can be established relatively quickly in new areas. Naval presence carries the implication of considerable mili-
military force that can be applied quickly, without the same kind of irrevocable commitment to use it implies the presence of ground forces. For some purposes, this sort of U.S. military presence will remain useful, and all of the models recognize its utility (although, as described earlier, they may differ in terms of the mix of forces through which naval presence could be provided.) Finally, the global reach of U.S. military forces provides a kind of potential presence beyond that afforded in the immediate vicinity of U.S. forces. This capacity, often associated with the long range strike capabilities of U.S. air forces, long range missile forces, and strategic mobility, plays an increasingly important role in the capacity of the United States to use its military forces for foreign policy purposes. It represents the capacity to use military force virtually anywhere, on relatively short notice, with forces that may be relatively immune to countermeasures or to retaliation.

For almost half a century, U.S. military presence abroad has carried the connotation of direct American military intervention to protect U.S. interests and the shared interests of allied or friendly nations, and the context in which this image has been promoted affected the character of the U.S. military presence. That is, U.S. overseas presence has been conditioned heavily by the bi-polar structure of the international system and by the opposition of a military superpower. U.S. overseas presence tended to be cast in terms of demonstrating the capacity to successfully confront the military power of that superpower. This was certainly the case in Europe, where for nearly four decades the confrontation between NATO and the Warsaw Pact was the most immediate and acute, but it colored U.S. presence operations elsewhere as well. During the confrontation with Libya in the early 1980s, for example, the size and character of the U.S. force contingent employed to deter Libyan military actions in the Gulf of Sidra reflected a desire not only to affect Libyan behavior, but also to keep the Soviets from intervening if the United States and Libya came to blows. Within this context, U.S. overseas presence—often referred to by the descriptive phrase “forward presence”—tended to focus on two aspects: direct U.S. military involvement in a global struggle against an identifiable foe, and linking international security situations to American nuclear power. This policy affected how the United States conducted military-to-military relations with allied and friendly governments. Such relationships focused on cementing the notion of a common struggle against a common enemy, and as such, were often colored by efforts to increase the interoperability of U.S. forces with allied or friendly nations.

With the demise of the bi-polar international structure that so deeply affected what U.S. forces did overseas, the purposes of overseas presence have become more complex. Among other things, the U.S. military forces in presence operations are now used not only for the traditional purposes of deterrence, but also to serve as channels through which other military establishments are introduced to democratic approaches to civil-military relations. Traditional alliance structures are changing, and international security affairs increasingly revolve around coalitions whose members are interested in combined military operations with the United States only for particular situations at particular times.

These trends broaden the purposes of U.S. military overseas presence. The need for forces that can perform the traditional roles of demonstrating an American commitment to protecting shared security interests—with the parallel interest in developing the standardized and interoperable forces that facilitate combined military operations—are increasingly balanced by a U.S. interest in developing unique capabilities that can influence how other nations use their military forces, depending on the extent to which the United States shares or withholds access to those capabilities.

Each of the three force design paths will maintain a capacity to meet the traditional purposes of U.S. military overseas presence. But they differ in emphasis. The Recapitalized Force emphasizes maintaining interoperable forces, to both demonstrate a U.S. commitment to shared security interests and to actively protect such interests in effective combined military operations. While the Accelerated
RMA Force also maintains this capability, it leans in favor of developing unique capabilities, which might be shared with alliance members, coalition partners, or other nations, but which are consciously constructed to be superior and different from the capabilities of other national militaries. The Full Spectrum Force falls between these two extremes on this hypothetical spectrum.

Dealing with Large Powers

Shaping Relationships with Friendly and Potentially Hostile Theater Peers

Many of the missions associated with large powers deal with deterrence issues and the political relationships between the United States and such powers. The approach taken by U.S. decision makers armed with the Recapitalized or Full Spectrum Force could differ from that taken if they were armed with the Accelerated RMA Force. In future U.S. relations with large powers, for example, the Recapitalized Force design would emphasize continuing the existing symbiosis between the U.S. and friendly large powers (i.e., alliance partners such as Germany, France, Great Britain, and Japan) and maintaining the strategic rules that exist with potential large-power competitors, such as China or Russia. Indeed, one of the rationales for the Recapitalized Force is that its relatively slow pace of change would avoid rapidly widening disparities between U.S. and allied forces, and therefore help alleviate centrifugal forces in alliances. U.S. allies have structured and designed their own forces in part to fit with U.S. forces, and they understand and are comfortable with the existing structure, character, disposition, and operational mode of U.S. forces. That does not mean Recapitalized Force advocates would not seek to improve U.S. forces, but they would be inclined to tie changes, at least in part, to the rates at which allied forces evolve over the years 1996–2007.

Similar considerations would go into relating the Recapitalized Force to potential theater-peer competitors, such as China, Russia, or perhaps India. Because the Recapitalized Force design avoids rapid or radical departures from the existing character and capabilities of U.S. military forces, it might be seen—and certainly described by U.S. spokesmen—as relatively stable and consistent with formal understandings (such as strategic arms agreements and the Treaty on Conventional Forces) that work to inhibit arms races. But this specific conformity with existing arms agreements would be backed by a general desire to avoid giving potentially hostile great powers the impression that the United States was attempting to break out of the status quo. In this view, maintaining relatively slow improvement in U.S. military capabilities would be preferable to the potentially destabilizing effects of a concerted U.S. effort to improve its military capabilities rapidly.

The Accelerated RMA Force’s more radical deviation from the 1996 military has a different rationale. The Accelerated RMA Force assumes that maintaining alliances would revolve around developing a symbiosis different from that which existed during the Cold War era. With regard to NATO, for example, Accelerated RMA Force advocates would argue that a U.S. military able to provide allies with dominant battlespace knowledge, and thus enable them to use their own forces more effectively, is more assuring in the new age.
of ambiguous threats than maintaining a force similar to the one built to defend Europe against aggression by a military superpower. In this view, continuity of form and function is less conducive to alliance maintenance than implementing new military capabilities that meet emerging interests, even if these new capabilities increase the disparity between U.S. forces and those of its allies. Advocates of the Accelerated RMA Force might take their cues from the earlier way in which the United States was able to forge its technical lead in nuclear weapons technology into an alliance-enhancing multiplier. They would argue that, while the nuclear umbrella makes less sense in the absence of a superpower confrontation, technologies that help cut through international ambiguities and assist the application of force by allies are increasingly valuable as the bedrock of alliances and coalitions. And, just as the U.S. willingness to share the international utility of nuclear prowess reduced the perceived need by allies to develop their own nuclear weaponry or to try to match the arsenals of the super powers, so too could similar sharing arrangements with an advanced U.S. system-of-systems capability serve as a basis for maintaining existing alliances, build new coalitions, and shape the international environment of the future (without necessitating the costs of trying to match U.S. capabilities).

With regard to dissuading an attempt by a large power to match or surpass the military capability of the United States, advocates of the Accelerated RMA Force would argue it is best to increase the lead the U.S. has in RMA technologies and incorporate those technologies in a compatible force structure and operational doctrine rapidly. Doing so, they would argue, would make any effort to technically match the U.S. more difficult (at least until early into the twenty-first century), thus deterring efforts to match or counter U.S. capabilities because of the costs of trying to do so. Meanwhile, any growing suspicions could be alleviated by the concomitant reductions in force size and with new sharing mechanisms and stabilizing agreements.

In some respects, the Full Spectrum Force might be the most difficult to relate to both friendly and potentially hostile large powers, for it would be characterized by both relatively rapid technological improvement and a relatively large and robust force structure. That is, it would tend to diverge fairly rapidly from the technical base of allied militaries, and, in the eyes of potential rivals, could become relatively threatening because it was getting better and bigger (or remaining at the relatively robust level of 1996). As with the Accelerated RMA Force model, the concerns of allies and potential competitors might be met with sharing arrangements.

Implications for Nuclear Weapons and National Ballistic Missile Defenses

In approaching certain missions, the differences between the three forces would be minimal, and, accordingly, the size and structural implications of the missions for all three forces could be quite similar. That would be the case, for example, in deterring the use of nuclear weapons. None of the models posits a radical deviation from the projection of the agreement-constrained strategic nuclear force projections for the next century. Nor do the size and structure of any of the proposed forces suggest a marked shift in the U.S. approach to the strategic nuclear relationship between the United States and other nations.

That is a judgment, of course, and other judgments could lead to the conclusion that the Accelerated RMA Force might increase calls for a national missile defense system. Given the Accelerated RMA Force’s greater interest in and capacity for dispersed, standoff offensive operations (all three forces enhance the U.S. capacity for such operations, but the Accelerated RMA Force would produce more capability to conduct them by 2007), nations contemplating a confrontation with the United States might turn to nuclear escalation. That prospect could stimulate a greater interest on the part of the United States in a national missile defense system.

While wider commitment to a national missile defense system might emerge if the United States moved toward the Accelerated RMA Force, it is more likely to stem from other nations’ reactions to the Accelerated RMA Force than from anything in-
herent in the force. Nothing in the character of the Accelerated RMA Force ties it logically to a national missile defense system, nor does it undermine the ABM and START agreements or the U.S. stance on national missile systems.

Each of the force models would be compatible with additional reductions or adjustments in the mix of U.S. strategic nuclear forces. The United States will certainly want to maintain a viable and credible nuclear deterrent to attacks against U.S. territory (a strategic nuclear force that is not vulnerable to a debilitating first use of WMD) and a capability to dominate vertical escalation involving WMD in any regional conflict. This approach ties the size and structure of the U.S. strategic nuclear arsenal to the size and character of other nations’ arsenals. Given nonproliferation and verifiable reductions by others, the size of the U.S. nuclear arsenal could decrease, or the mix of systems could change. But it is unlikely that the U.S. strategic nuclear arsenal will be at zero by 2007.

The size of the nation’s strategic nuclear arsenal under each of the force models would generally conform to official projections that emerged from the Nuclear Posture Review, published in 1994.

War Fighting: Thwarting Regional Aggression by Potential Theater Peers

In addition to deterrent and assurance missions, each of the three models would have to address several war-fighting missions vis-à-vis large powers. How the United States would use any force model would be a function of the size and character of the opposition, the political goals in the particular contingency, and the environment in which the confrontation took place. Some commonalities in using the different force models would exist, but, more important, the different characters of the forces would give rise to some differences in approach to thwarting large-power military operations.

Each of the forces would be more capable of standoff attack than the existing force. They all would benefit from previous investment strategies that emphasized increased battlespace awareness, target acquisition, communications speed and fidelity, joint operations, and PGMs. But the Accelerated RMA Force would rest on about a decade’s effort not only to accelerate building the technical foundation of such capabilities but to incorporate them into structures and operational doctrine.

Differences in approach might be most noticeable with regard to the preemptive use of force. U.S. decision makers, armed with the Recapitalized Force in 2007, would likely deal with hostile military actions that threaten U.S. interests in ways analogous to those used today—particularly if the potential opponent were a large power. They would be inclined to deter such actions by threatening to respond with forces that could prevent the aggressor from achieving its goal or make the cost of achieving its goal too high. This approach would also color the way the United States would undertake overseas-presence missions with the Recapitalized Force. Presence would revolve around efforts to assemble enough visible force before a conflict began to demonstrate the U.S. capacity to either prevent or punish an aggressor’s actions. The level and character of the U.S. military presence would be more than bluff. It would be a precursor to the actual use of force and a preparation for the conflict Washington anticipates. U.S. decision makers might consider military preemption. But the Recapitalized Force would not generally push the option of preemption to a more central position.

With either the Full Spectrum Force or Accelerated RMA Force preemption might be more tempting for at least two reasons. First, these models might have a better technical capacity to preempt a potential opponent’s military operations—using destructive violence or disruptive informa-
tion warfare—without generating the kind of collateral damage that would pressure the opponent into an escalatory counterattack. If the greater investment the capacity to develop battlespace knowledge, effective nodal targeting, standoff and precise force application, and earlier warning of pending crises paid off—as anticipated by both these models—preemption might become more central to U.S. views on the use of military force than would be the case with the Recapitalized Force.

Second, preemption might become more interesting to U.S. decision makers because of some of the assumptions underlying the Accelerated RMA Force and, to a lesser extent, the Full Spectrum Force—in particular, the notion that accelerated incorporation of system-of-systems technologies promises a more pronounced military superiority over opponents. If this assumption turned out to be valid in 2007—or if U.S. decision makers then believed it was true—the fear of uncontrolled escalation might lessen. A preemptive approach makes sense if it can stop an undesired act by a potential opponent, and if the preemper can in turn preempt or successfully defend against retaliatory action. It follows that preemption works better where there is a wide disparity in military power. Potential military confrontations with large powers are inherently more difficult to predict and control, but the issue is one of degree. It is not far fetched that the Accelerated RMA or Full Spectrum Forces might make a preemptive approach more appealing in some situations, particularly if their capabilities lived up to the promise of the technologies in which they had made relatively greater investments.

Thus, the U.S. choice of a force model could carry important implications for the way the United States would maintain forward presence and go about thwarting aggression by a large power early in the twenty-first century. Assuming the Recapitalized Force would deal with forward presence in a manner similar to the approach of 1996—that is, to signal a capacity to prevent the success of an opponent’s offensive operation—then the size and character of the forces used to provide overseas presence ought to reflect the level of threat from the potential aggressor. If that threat involved large, mobile ground forces, backed by a combined force doctrine and relatively sophisticated equipment, the forces maintaining U.S. forward presence would have to be big enough to pose a credible challenge to a fait accompli by the opponent.

A presence backed by a greater willingness to preempt, however, might not have to be as large, particularly if the preemptive approach included nodal operations designed to minimize collateral damage. The United States would need to make clear its willingness to preempt military actions and to publicize the pre-confrontational actions undertaken by the potential aggressor. This approach would in effect sever the link between the size of the aggressor’s force and the size of the U.S. presence.

None of the force models are designed to be able to occupy and control the territory and populations of large powers, such as China or Russia. But the structure and operational doctrine associated with the ground component of the Accelerated RMA Force might make claims that the U.S. has no plan for territorial aggrandizement more convincing than either the Recapitalized or Full Spectrum Forces could. The RMA operational doctrine for ground forces moves further away from the notion that such forces are supposed to seize and control territory or to control large populations.

That suggests decision makers armed with the Accelerated RMA Force might be more willing to commit ground forces to the direct defense of areas subject to attack by large powers and to conduct offensive operations on the territory of a large power. The more conventional structure
and doctrine of the Recapitalized and Full Spectrum Forces make them more capable of traditional territorial and population control. Their ground components would be larger and composed of more organizations that previously have been used to occupy and control the territory of other states. In a confrontation with a lesser power, this ability could be an effective deterrent. In a confrontation with a large power, however, a military force that is perceived as designed to occupy territory could make crisis management more problematic. The history of warfare suggests that the threat of physical occupation by an opponent is the most terrifying prospect facing contenders. It is also the threat that inspires the greatest willingness and efforts to escalate the stakes in military confrontations.

**Force Size Implications of Dealing with Large Powers**

Deterrence, assurance, and war-fighting missions involving large powers do not posit small U.S. forces, regardless of how sophisticated or technically advanced those forces may be. The size of U.S. forces need not match or exceed those of other large powers, but as long as the goal is to influence the behavior of powers that can field relatively large, potent military forces, the United States must also maintain robust, large forces. That is particularly the case with power-projection capabilities—potential U.S. military missions associated with large powers require the ability to project significant power overseas, rapidly and effectively. The bottom line seems to be that while the number of U.S. ground forces may not have to grow, major reductions in U.S. air and maritime forces would be highly questionable, given the need for the missions associated with large-powers.

**Dealing with Significant Regional Conflicts**

**Coping with the Threat of WMD in Regional Conflict**

Most of the missions associated with regional conflicts deal with how to use, not just threaten to use, violence. War-fighting in this context would differ in certain respects from thwarting aggression by a large power in a contiguous region. The first, and most important, is with regard to escalation. While the United States would seek to control the level and character of any conflict it enters, its ability to do so is likely to be greater in a conflict with an opponent that is markedly less powerful. This does not mean that a significant regional conflict with a lesser power would necessarily be controllable or easily winnable. Indeed, because of the disparity of power between the United States and, say, Iraq, North Korea, or Iran, these potential regional aggressors might be impelled to escalate to weapons of mass destruction inside the area of contention, use their conventional forces in unconventional ways, or to use WMD against populations in the United States.

The different force models might offer differing benefits to U.S. decision makers contemplating military operations under the threat of in-theater WMD use. If the Accelerated RMA Force was capable of operating in the dispersed, highly mobile form for which it is designed, and if these capabilities were backed by a streamlined, just-in-time logistics system, it might be inherently less vulnerable to such attacks than either of the other force models. But regardless of the potential differences between the force models in the context of a battle subject to WMD use, a lesser power contemplating a fight with the United States must confront one very difficult fact. While it may be able to hurt the United States, kill large numbers of U.S. forces, and attack non-combatant U.S. populations with WMD, it faces the prospect of its own utter destruction.

**Coping with Fait-Accompli Strategies**

The second inherent difference in regional conflicts is that the United States will probably have the capacity to reverse any military gain by a lesser power, regardless of the force model the United States moves toward over the next decade. The cost of reversing a lesser power's military gain may inhibit the United States from trying, but any regional power going into a conflict with the United States faces the prospect...
Dealing with Troubled States and Transnational Threats

In a broad sense, the missions associated with troubled states and transnational threats differ from traditional war-fighting missions in terms of the anticipated intensity of the violence, the legal and political context surrounding military operations, and the character of the organizations and institutions that may oppose U.S. military forces. These are generalizations. Violence in peacekeeping can be quite intense. The organizations that may confront U.S. forces as they conduct counter-terror, counter-narcotics, or counter-criminal operations may be armed with modern and deadly weapons, including WMD.

The need for a quick response, situation awareness, focused logistics, and the precise application of military force can be substantial when dealing with the issues generated by troubled states or transnational organizations. But they are not war-fighting missions and do not normally involve confrontations with opposing military forces. Thus, these missions highlight some differences among the three force models. Because the active components of the Recapitalized Force and Full Spectrum Force are larger, and because their ground forces are organized similarly to existing multipurpose ground structures, they are better adapted to non-war-fighting missions than the Accelerated RMA Force.

Accorded the larger force structures in the Recapitalized and Full Spectrum Forces, U.S. decision makers would tend to adjust the training, equipment, and ethos of active force components in these forces to meet the tasks of operations other than war and peacekeeping. The Recapitalized and Full Spectrum Forces envision designating specific units—such as the 10th Mountain Division—for training and preparation for peace operations. These units would normally be called on for peace operations, and, in the event of conflict contingencies, their commitment to war-fighting tasks would be delayed until any deficits in combat training or readiness were remedied. The relatively larger force structures of these two force models allows reducing readiness with less risk.

that keeping the fruits of its initial military success depends on U.S. decision not to contest fully those successes. These considerations lead to some noteworthy potential characteristics of regional aggression by lesser powers. Faced with the prospect that military successes can be reversed, regional aggressors may be more interested in keeping the U.S. from intervening than in defeating U.S. military forces once they have intervened. To do so, they might take one of two basic approaches: The first is to raise the prospect of high costs, perhaps by threatening a protracted, low-intensity conflict or the use of WMD. The second is to conduct military operations with a view to establishing a fait accompli; that is, trying to change the strategic situation quickly, before the U.S. intervenes. For example, the political decision to expel Iraqi forces from Saudi oil fields—after Baghdad threatens it will detonate dirty thermonuclear devices it has implanted in the Saudi oil fields if the U.S. intervenes (thus removing Saudi oil production for a century)—may be a very tough call.

Such fait accompli scenarios underline the need for U.S. forces that can respond quickly to regional contingencies with sufficient force to undercut an aggressor’s options. And that emphasizes the utility of joint forces that are robust enough and large enough to maintain the necessary level of significant forces for a quick response. These scenarios do not necessarily raise the need for large ground forces, although a moderate level of quick-responding ground forces would be a valuable asset in virtually any conceivable regional contingency.
In the case of the Accelerated RMA Force, however, the reserve components would be seen as the primary military instrument for use in peace operations. National Guard divisions and brigades would be used as the repository not only for much of the heavy combat potential of existing ground forces during the transition to the RMA model, but as the source of the full-function divisions that carry a broad range of organic capabilities with them. And many of the capabilities needed for peace operations—military police, civil affairs, medical, engineering—would be found in the reserve components of the Accelerated RMA Force.

That is not to say that many of the war-fighting capabilities of the Accelerated RMA Force would not be applicable to peace operations. Because of their potentially greater capabilities in such areas as developing situation awareness and communications, active components of the Accelerated RMA Force could make major contributions to such operations. But other than supplementing the activities of reserve units with such relatively high-tech inputs, the active components of the Accelerated RMA Force—particularly its ground force—would focus on and be trained to carry out war-fighting missions.

**Some Pros and Cons**

Each of the force design paths has certain strengths, advantages, and potential payoffs. Each has risks, weaknesses, and limitations. The previous discussion revealed some of these pros and cons. Here we want to summarize the overriding advantages and disadvantages with each of the force models.

**The Recapitalized Force: Into the Future Carefully**

The fundamental strength of the Recapitalized Force is rooted in the quality of today’s U.S. military, which, by virtually all measures, is the best in the world and certainly among the best the United States has had in the twentieth century. This force design path sticks to what has been tried, tested, and proved, and, as such, it minimizes the turmoil associated with change. The changes and improvements associated with it are evolutionary and the mechanisms through which they would occur are the traditional ones.

The structural adjustments it would entail are exactly that—adjustments made carefully in order to maintain the essence of what exists in 1996, and, by modernizing and recapitalizing, make it better. This, in turn, would contribute to relatively high readiness. Operational doctrine would evolve smoothly and there would be few, if any, radical shifts in the training or the operations of the force. Of all the models, the Recapitalized Force fits the most comfortably with the way things are done in 1996.

This model would probably cost no more in inflation-adjusted dollars than the present force, and perhaps less. It recognizes the likelihood of downward pressures on the defense budget, but it does not anticipate precipitous reductions over the next decade. As such, it would appeal to important sectors of the American political and economic sectors and would be relatively less likely to focus acrimonious debate.

As its name suggests, the Recapitalized Force would deal directly and probably successively with one of the major difficulties facing the U.S. military in the future—the recapitalization bulge that is likely to emerge in all the services near the turn of the century unless steps are begun soon to avoid it.

Some of the potential problems with this approach are the obverse of its strengths. While this design path would be the least disruptive to the current structure and pattern of development, it could also miss the potential opportunity offered by the current international security situation. This view depends, of course, on how one interprets the current times, but if we are in a strategic lull that is likely to extend for at least the next half decade, then the evolutionary approach characteristic of the Recapitalized Force rules out the chance of developing, by 2007, a different kind of military that could, a decade from now, be more capable of assuring the kind of military superiority the United States now enjoys because of a coincidence of historic
events. This does not mean that the Recapitalized Force would necessarily be ill suited to the future, for it would change over the next decade, albeit in an evolutionary way.

But this design path would maintain the character of a military force designed, honed, and conditioned by an era that has passed. It is essentially a route that would retain the Cold War military the United States built over the last half century into the next, but the strategic viability of this course into the future is questionable on two grounds.

First, because this force design is traditional, potential opponents know both its strengths and weaknesses and may believe they could successfully match or counter it. This does not mean they can, for although its design is familiar, its military potency is high. But at least two asymmetric responses to this design are arguable counters to it: the kind of "national liberation" warfare demonstrated in Vietnam, and the specter of weapons of mass destruction that underlies the "what if WMD had been used in Desert Storm" speculation that captures both professional and journalistic imagination. And there may be enticingly new ways of coping with a Recapitalized Force a decade from now, for this force is essentially a refinement of what some call an "industrial age military". Those contemplating a military confrontation with the Recapitalized Force may believe their best chances for success lie not in replicating the counters that have arguably worked in the past, but in building their military from and consistent with what some call the successor to the industrial age of warfare: the "information" age. And their concerted effort over the next decade to do so might—by 2007 or shortly beyond—work.

Second, because the Recapitalized Force path involves a more or less linear extension of the Cold War force model, it carries with it some of the less visible assumptions of the Cold War. One of these was the assumption of an ever more dangerous military threat in the future. During the Cold War there was empirical support for such a view, because Soviet military capabilities continued to grow, particularly with regard to the quality and capabilities of their tanks, ships, and aircraft. Over time, a symmetrical assumption tended to characterize U.S. force planning; namely, that it was necessary to match such improvements with similar major platform modernization, and, more importantly, that the resources and budgets to do so would be available in the future.

The Recapitalized Force maintains this assumption. It would be designed to deal with the recapitalization bulge early in the next century that stems from the decline in procurement in the early 1990s. But it does not seek to alter some of the dynamics that created such a pending bulge, because it requires new generations of major weapons platforms—almost guaranteed to be more expensive than those they replace. As such, it carries the inevitable paradox of either demanding significant defense budget increases after 2007, or, by about 2015, facing the same kind of recapitalization bulge the design path was devoted to solving in the first decade of the 21st century. If the United States, by about 2010, faces a theater-peer competitor, armed with impressive industrial age military capabilities, then, the Recapitalized Force design path would have turned out to be a wise strategy. If the world does not return to something similar to the era in which the roots of a future Recapitalized Force were established, moving along such a path could turn out to be a mistake.

The Accelerated RMA Force: A Bold Leap Ahead

The Accelerated RMA Force is appealing to many of those who believe the foreseeable future offers the opportunity to build the kind of military that best provides U.S. military superiority and will bolster U.S. leadership in international affairs in the next century. Its advocates believe the United States currently leads all other nations in the technologies that promise these outcomes and that it should take advantage of and increase this lead.

This view is rooted in deeper assumptions, including the notion that the world has changed so much with the col-
Even if the risk is acceptable, there are other potential negatives with taking this design path. The inherent difficulty with the Accelerated RMA Force is different from that associated with the Recapitalized Force. With the Recapitalized Force the potential problem is not whether the goals associated with it are achievable—they are. It is whether the Recapitalized Force will be worth very much when it is achieved. The problem with the Accelerated RMA Force is not the goals for which it is designed, for greater force adaptability, agility, and technical capacity are universally applauded and the ideas of using military force with greater precision and accuracy, with greater speed, over longer distances, and with less risk have wide support both among American military professionals and within the American public. The problem is whether these goals can be obtained as easily or as quickly as argued by the Accelerated RMA Force path. And that problem is rooted in at least two concerns.

One is technical—whether the technology can provide what its advocates say it can as fast as they believe. This is ultimately a question of systems integration, for the potential power of this force design rests on integrating the various technologies that offer discrete advantages. Systems integration is inherently complex and difficult, however, and it is not enough to point to the specific technologies that promise improved military efficiency. To achieve the promises of these technologies will require writing a lot of computer code, a lot of refining and adjustment, a lot more interoperability than currently exists.

The other concern has to do with human institutions. The technological integration is easy compared to making the organizational and doctrinal changes necessary to reach the full military promise of the technologies, particularly now when the traditional reasons for making such changes in the U.S. military are absent. U.S. military organization and doctrine are not static, as any comparison between what exists now and what existed two decades ago will show. But for most of the

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F-14 Tomcat receives fuel behind catapult steam on USS Carl Vinson flight deck.
Joint Vision 2010 (excerpts)

Joint Vision 2010 is the conceptual template for how the Armed Forces will channel the vitality and innovation of our people and leverage technological opportunities to achieve new levels of effectiveness in joint warfighting. Focused on achieving dominance across the range of military operations through the application of new operational concepts, this template provides a common direction for the services in developing unique capabilities within a joint framework of doctrine and programs as we prepare to meet an uncertain and challenging future.

This vision draws on our most fundamental source of strength—our people. People are the Armed Forces; at the end of the day, success in war or in peace will rest ultimately on the men and women of the Armed Forces.

By 2010, we should be able to change how we conduct the most intense joint operations. Instead of relying upon massed forces and sequential operations, we will achieve massed effects in other ways. Information superiority and advances in technology will enable us to achieve desired effects through the tailored application of joint combat power. Higher lethality weapons will allow us to conduct attacks concurrently that formerly required massed assets, applied in a sequential manner. With precision targeting and longer range systems, commanders can achieve necessary destruction or suppression of enemy forces with fewer systems, thereby reducing the need for time-consuming and risky massing of people and equipment. Improved command and control, based on fused, all-source, real-time intelligence will reduce the need to assemble maneuver formations days and hours in advance of attacks. Providing improved targeting information directly to the most effective weapon system will potentially reduce traditional force requirements at the point of main effort.

All of this suggests that we will be increasingly able to accomplish the effects of mass—the necessary concentration of combat power at the decisive time and place—with less need to mass forces physically than in the past.

New Operational Concepts

Dominant maneuver will be the multidimensional application of information, engagement, and mobility capabilities to position and employ widely dispersed joint land, sea, air, and space forces to accomplish assigned operational tasks. Dominant maneuver will allow our forces to gain a decisive advantage by controlling the breadth, depth, and height of the battlespace.

Precision engagement will consist of a system of systems that enables our forces to locate an objective or target, provide responsive command and control, generate the desired effect, assess the level of success, and retain the flexibility to reengage with precision when required. Even from extended ranges, precision engagement will allow us to shape battlespace, enhancing the protection of our forces.

Full Dimensional Protection. We must also protect forces from the very technologies that we are exploiting. Unless we provide an adequate measure of protection for our forces, these new operational concepts will be highly vulnerable to disruption. We will achieve this required level of protection through the concept called full dimensional protection. The primary prerequisite for full dimensional protection will be control of the battlespace to ensure forces can maintain freedom of action during deployment, maneuver, and engagement, while providing multi-layered defenses for forces and facilities at all levels. Full dimensional protection will enable effective employment of our forces while degrading opportunities for an enemy. It will be essential, in most cases, for gaining and maintaining the initiative required to execute decisive operations. The concept will be proactive, incorporating both offensive and defensive actions that may extend well into areas of enemy operations.

Focused Logistics. Each of the preceding concepts relies on our ability to project power with the most capable forces, at the decisive time and place. To optimize all three concepts, logistics must be responsive, flexible, and precise. Focused logistics will be the fusion of information, logistics, and transportation technologies to provide rapid crisis response, to track and shift assets even while on route, and to deliver tailored logistics packages and sustainment directly at the strategic, operational, and tactical level of operations. It will be fully adaptive to the needs of our increasingly dispersed and mobile forces, providing support in hours or days versus weeks. Focused logistics will enable joint forces of the future to be more mobile, versatile, and projectable from anywhere in the world.

Full Spectrum Dominance. Each of these operational concepts will reinforce the others and will allow us to achieve massed effects in warfare from more dispersed forces. This synergy will greatly enhance our capabilities in high intensity conventional military operations.

However, the synergy of these four concepts transcends intense conventional warfighting. Without overspecialization, the development of these new operational concepts has great potential to fulfill more effectively the full range of tasks assigned to us. That is, taken together these four new concepts will enable us to dominate the full range of military operations from humanitarian assistance, through peace operations, up to and into the
last half century, the change has been measured, incremental, and slow. And it has been driven largely by forecasts of future threats, for which there was both an empirical foundation and widespread agreement. This historical driver no longer exists, and there is really no sense that the current force is somehow “broken”, despite a vague belief that it may not be well suited for the future.

That makes relatively rapid organizational and doctrinal change harder. The problem is what has to be given up in order to change. The barrier to the accelerated change postulated for Accelerated RMA Force is not getting people to accept the new, but to surrender the old.

The Full-Spectrum Force: The Safest — and Most Expensive — Path to the Future

The pros and cons of both the Recapitalized and Accelerated RMA Force have to do with trade-offs and balance between contending considerations. The Recapitalized Force, assuming constraints on the defense budget, trades off marginal changes in force structure to maintain and recapitalize the military within what is essentially the same configuration as in 1996. The Accelerated RMA Force trades off significant organizational and structural changes to get to a different, much more potent force sooner. The Full Spectrum Force design path, however, bridges both the desire to incorporate the technological promise of the RMA Force without the organizational turmoil and force structure reductions and the desire to assure sufficient military personnel and units to meet a broadening range of challenges in conventional ways. It does so by maintaining the current structure — but not as much as the Recapitalized Force — and pushing rapidly toward the systems integration at the heart of information age capabilities — but not in the manner, or as fast as, the Accelerated RMA Force. This is a logical approach to the broadened range of challenges the U.S. military may face over the next decade and a good way of hedging against the possibility of a major conflict before 2007. This is because the relatively large and robust force this model maintains would give it the mass and numbers necessary to deal with widespread demands for peace time forward presence and operations other than war without significantly reducing the combat readiness of the large remainder of the force. The size of the force also allows this model to isolate the organizational turmoil associated with rapid movement toward the RMA model to a smaller portion of the force, while spreading at least some of the benefits of the new technologies throughout the force. While the design path to the Full Spectrum Force might not create the kind of new force envisioned by the Accelerated RMA Force path as quickly, by 2007 it would be poised to move rapidly in such a direction. And during the decade’s transition to 2007, the Full Spectrum Force would be better able to insure a strong response to any major intervening military contingency.

In short, the Full Spectrum Force is consciously designed to cope with the major theme that emerges from the preceding review of potential flash points in world affairs and the assessment of the kind of military threats the United States may face over the next decade. It provides the conti-
nuity with today's doctrine and forces, as well as the force structure and numbers of personnel, to cope with the broadening potential challenges at the lower end of the conflict spectrum. And it improves the capacity of the force to deal with challenges at the higher end, including potential confrontations with theater peers.

But having what is in effect the best of both worlds (today's world in the form of the Recapitalized Force; tomorrow's world in the form of an RMA Force) would be expensive. Precisely how expensive would be a function of the specific force structure and technological changes the design path would require and when they came in. But an effort to maintain a relatively robust force structure and high rates of modernization and recapitalization would be at least as expensive as the 1996 force. Even with savings from administrative and procedural changes—such as additional base structure consolidation and reductions, headquarters personnel reductions, and privatizing—the Full Spectrum Force design path would cost more than either the routes to the other two models and could end up costing considerably more than the 1996 force.

So the central concern associated with this model is whether the resources necessary to move toward it will be available. From the perspective of 1996, it is hard to make a compelling case that they will. Changes in the international environment that result in a growing sense of threat could alter this prognostication, and continued economic growth and widening prosperity would make it easier for the nation to commit more money to defense while keeping defense expenditures to their current relatively low portion of gross domestic product. But such assumptions are challengeable and other phenomena could just as easily increase the political pressure in favor of reducing defense expenditures. And in the face of declining resources—or, a growing belief that the amount of money for defense will go down—it would be very difficult to do what, in essence, the Full Spectrum Force model proposes; namely, to achieve both continuity and relatively rapid change.

A decision that the path to the Full Spectrum Force is too expensive—reached within the next several years—could therefore in effect push the United States toward choosing between the first two force design paths. The real world of force planning and the political and bureaucratic processes that surround the actual arenas in which the real force of the future will be designed will not pose the choice in such a stark manner. But that is, in essence, what it could be.

As in both the other force models, the Full Spectrum Force carries some of its own inherent difficulties. Like the path to the Accelerated RMA Force, the Full Spectrum Force path requires considerable organizational change and promises a bifurcated force structure during the transition. It would seek to buffer the effects of change and associated turmoil by maintaining a relatively robust active-force structure and concentrating the changes in only a portion of the total active structure. But this approach would not alleviate the bifurcated character of the force during the transition, and it might stretch this condition over a longer period of time than the transition to the Accelerated RMA Force.