A SELECTIVE, ANNOTATED BIBLIOGRAPHY ON
THE NORTH KOREAN MILITARY

19961202 055

July 1986

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**Title and Subtitle**
A Selective, Annotated Bibliography on the North Korean Military

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Library of Congress  
Washington, DC 20540-4840

**Sponsoring/monitoring agency name(s) and address(es)**
N/A

**Supplementary Notes**
Prepared under an Interagency Agreement

**Abstract (Maximum 200 words)**
This bibliography, produced in monthly installments from an online database, provides selective annotations of serials and monographs on the army of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea (North Korea). Entries are arranged alphabetically by author in three sections: modernization of the North Korean army, strategies and tactics used by the North Korean army during the Korean War (1950-53), and strategies and tactics used by the North Korean army since the war.

**Subject Terms**
North Korea  
National security

**Security Classification of Report**
UNCLASSIFIED

**Number of Pages**
10

**Price Code**
298-102
This bibliography provides selective annotations of open-source material and covers the following topics:

- modernization of the North Korean Army,
- North Korean Army strategy and tactics in the Korean War, and
- North Korean Army strategy and tactics since the Korean War.

The bibliography incorporates serials and monographs received in the previous month and is part of a continuing series on the above subjects.

Entries are arranged alphabetically by author or title. Library of Congress call numbers, where appropriate, are included to facilitate the recovery of works cited.
### GLOSSARY

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Acronym</th>
<th>Description</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>CPLA</td>
<td>Chinese People's Liberation Army</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CFC</td>
<td>Combined Forces Command (US and ROK)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DPRK</td>
<td>Democratic People's Republic of Korea (North Korea)</td>
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<tr>
<td>NKA</td>
<td>North Korean Army</td>
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<tr>
<td>NKAF</td>
<td>North Korean Air Force</td>
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<tr>
<td>NKN</td>
<td>North Korean Navy</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>KPA</td>
<td>Korean People's Army (Comprises NKA, NKAF, and NKN)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>KWP</td>
<td>Korean Workers' Party</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ROK</td>
<td>Republic of Korea (South Korea)</td>
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<tr>
<td>ROKA</td>
<td>Republic of Korea Army</td>
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<tr>
<td>ROKAF</td>
<td>Republic of Korea Air Force</td>
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<tr>
<td>ROKN</td>
<td>Republic of Korea Navy</td>
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1. MODERNIZATION OF THE NORTH KOREAN MILITARY

In a briefing to President Chun Doo Hwan on ROK defense preparedness, Defense Minister Yi Ki-baek makes a key point of mentioning the NKA's improved capability to use chemical weapons in a future conflict. North Korea is said to be producing 14 tons of chemical agents annually at five factories and is believed to have 180 to 250 tons of these agents stockpiled for use in chemical weapons. Yi also told Chun that the forward deployment of NKA units, including five new mechanized corps and one new artillery corps, indicates North Korea is continuing to enhance its capability to attack South Korea. Chun is reported to have supported strengthening US-ROK military cooperation and improving ROKA early warning and logistics capabilities.


Article describes the strategic value of North Korea to the Soviet Union and discusses how closer military cooperation between the two Communist nations affects China, the United States, and other nations in Northeast Asia. The author argues that the Soviets are aiding the modernization of the KPA in exchange for access to North Korea's airspace and ports. Reportedly, a 1984 Soviet military manual says that the port of Najin on the east coast of North Korea has been integrated into the Soviet military system. Additionally, Soviet reconnaissance flights over North Korea and the Yellow Sea could be providing the Soviets with valuable intelligence about Chinese industrial facilities in Manchuria and international shipping in the region. North Korea's military modernization and increased Soviet use of North Korea for military purposes are said to have altered the military balance in the region, and for this reason, Plunk believes the US should continue providing foreign military sales credits to South Korea and develop closer military cooperation with Japan, South Korea, and its other allies in Asia and the Pacific.

South Korean Prime Minister No Sin-yong says that North Korea views the next two-to-three years as its last opportunity for launching an all-out invasion of South Korea. No made this statement at a graduation ceremony held at the Korean National Police Academy on 8 April. No called for national unity and social stability to prevent a repeat of past experience where, "the very existence of the country was endangered by social chaos and the disruption of national consensus."


Article cites figures on the KPA reported by an official of the Japan Defense Institute. Professor Hideshi Takeshada, in a paper delivered to a Tokyo symposium on Korean issues, listed the following developments: the NKA has been augmented by 53,500 personnel in the past year and has positioned ten armored divisions within ten kilometers of the DMZ; the NKAF has recently acquired 52 AN-2/COLTs, 26 MiG-23/FLOGGERS, and 47 Mi-2/HOPLITEs; and the NKN is believed to have commissioned 19 new warships in 1985. The AN-2/COLTs came from Czechoslovakia while the remaining aircraft were imported from the Soviet Union. The symposium was held 15-16 June at the Japan Press Center and was attended by scholars from Korea, the US, China and Japan. The Korea Herald believes this is the first time a spokesman for the Japanese defense community has commented publicly on current trends in the KPA.
2. NORTH KOREAN ARMY STRATEGY AND TACTICS IN THE KOREAN WAR

This book is a well researched analysis of the offensive tactics used by CPLA Commander Lin Biao at two key points in the Korean War. Much of the book is based on the eyewitness accounts of the commanding officers of units subordinate to the twenty-third regiment of the US Army's Second Division. The first CPLA offensive described was the 25 November 1950 breakthrough east of Kunii-ri in North Korea. The twenty-third regiment had no warning of the attack and was organized for offensive operations. The regiment was assigned the mission of protecting the Division's rear while other units retreated south. The second CPLA offensive occurred in February 1951 at Chipyong-ni in central Korea. At the time of the attack the twenty-third regiment was deployed about fifteen miles in front of the main line of the US Eighth Army and soon found itself surrounded and cut off from outside support. At one point as many as 90,000 CPLA personnel were employed against the approximately 5,000 American and French defenders of Chipyong-ni. The author believes that the success of the twenty-third regiment and its attached French battalion in holding Chipyong-ni against overwhelming pressure by the CPLA led Lin Biao and other Chinese military strategists to conclude that the Korean War could not be won with mass wave assaults on UN Forces.


Jacobs evaluates the contributions of light tanks, such as the M-4 Sherman, and medium tanks, the M-46 Patton for example, in the Korean War. Although the latter were more effective against the Soviet-produced T-34, the former were suitable for climbing Korea's hilly terrain and for "bunker busting" assignments. The author notes that the M-46, and latter the M-47, did not do well on the primitive roads in Korea, particularly during the rainy season. From 1951 on, the M-46/7 was usually held in rear areas to be called up as the combat situation required.
Weaver, William G. *Some Aspects of the Korean War*. Unpublished manuscript. c1966. DS918.W4

The inability of NKA armored units to exploit breakthroughs and accomplish its mission of taking over all of South Korea before reinforcements from the US could become a factor in the conflict is attributed to the NKA's poor logistics capability. Weaver also argues that if the US had made a concerted effort to research and counter Soviet weapon programs in the late 1940s, the country would have been better prepared to combat the NKA's Soviet-produced T-34 tanks in June and July of 1950. He believes that the emphasis placed on logistics support for US Forces gives them an advantage over the Soviet Army, the NKA, and other Communist armies because the latter still do not have logistics organizations as large or as efficient as armies in the West.
3. NORTH KOREAN ARMY STRATEGY AND TACTICS SINCE THE KOREAN WAR

An editorial criticizes the 17 June North Korean proposal to establish three way defense talks involving high level US, South Korean, and North Korean military officials. The editorial says that North Korea is trying to shift the blame for having unilaterally refused to continue inter-Korean talks and also may be trying to encourage anti-American sentiment among South Korean student activists. North Korea could also be planning military actions against the South while using the military talks as a ploy. The fact that 65 percent of all NKA units are deployed close to the DMZ is considered a good reason for suspecting North Korean motives.

"Incidental Intelligence." Pacific Defence Reporter (Kunyung, Australia), vol. 12, no. 11, May 1986, pp. 20, 21. Not in LC.

North Korea is assessed as having the capability to launch a blitzkrieg attack on South Korea with 300,000 NKA personnel assigned to three frontline corps positioned close to the DMZ. North Korea could then dispatch up to 440,000 reinforcements using NKA units stationed in rear areas. Japan Military Review is cited as the primary source. A second report in the section quotes a NKA defector to South Korea who told reporters that NKA units were placed on standby alert following the October 1983 North Korean assassination attempt on South Korean President Chun Doo Hwan in Rangoon, Burma. Lim Jong-chol stated that the NKA remained on alert for about a week.


It is argued that North Korea will not become a Soviet satellite similar to East Germany or Mongolia as long as President Kim Il-song is in power. North Korea's strategy in moving closer to the Soviets in recent years is said to be motivated as much by economic as by military concerns.
Pyongyang is said to have no sources for technological assistance other than the Soviet Union and Soviet allies. Regarding his military options vis-a-vis Seoul, Kim is believed to be continuing the buildup of NKA units along the DMZ in order to keep the possibility of another move into South Korea alive. The article speculates that Soviet leaders are willing to provide economic and military aid to North Korea now in the hope that future Korean leaders will continue pro-Soviet policies once Kim Il-song leaves the political scene.

"N.K. Can Overrun Pusan Within a Week, Oh boasts." *Korea Herald* (Seoul), 15 June 1986, p. 3.

Choi Eun-hui, a South Korean actress who was kidnapped and spent several years in North Korea, states that she overheard North Korean Defense Minister O Chin-u say that he believed the NKA could complete a takeover of South Korea in less than one week if it was given the order to do so by President Kim Il-song or heir apparent Kim Chong-il. Reportedly, O went on to say that he would like to have the chance to try and reunify the peninsula by force. Choi and Shin Sang-ok, a South Korean movie director who was also kidnapped to North Korea, both claim that various Korean officials told them they believed Kim Il-song, now 74, would live to see the reunification of the two Koreas. This is a reprint of an article which appeared first in the *Washington Post*.

"NK Tilt to USSR Discomfits China." *Korea Times* (Seoul), 18 February 1986, p. 3.

Chinese leaders are said to be closely monitoring current developments in Soviet-North Korean relations, including military contacts, in the wake of Soviet Foreign Minister Eduard Shevardnadze's January visit to Pyongyang. The fact that the Soviet Union has recently delivered 26 MiG-23/FLOGGERS to North Korea is reported to concern the Chinese.
"UNC Report to UNSC." *Korea Herald* (Seoul), 14 June 1986, p. 2.

An editorial in the Korean daily says that the NKA's "offensive military buildup" close to the DMZ indicates North Korea may be planning to invade South Korea in the next two-to-three years. It speculates that North Korean leaders are not even interested in carrying on the North-South dialogue and in reducing tensions on the peninsula. The editorial supports similar conclusions published in the 1986 annual report of the United Nations Command in Korea.


The final section of this article, entitled "The North Korean Threat," states that North Korea's military buildup and posturing of forces in recent years suggests that it may be preparing for an attack on South Korea. The author quotes US Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense James A. Kelly who told a congressional sub-committee in March that South Korea is entering its most dangerous era since the Korean War because of North Korea's military preparations. Kelly informed the subcommittee that the NKA is 40 percent larger than the ROKA and has sizable advantages in the number of tanks, artillery pieces and armored personnel carriers on hand. In other sections of the article, South Korea is said to be in far better shape under President Chun Doo Hwan than the Philippines was under President Ferdinand Marcos. The author believes that the Marcos debacle may accelerate the adoption of democratic reforms in South Korea.