A SELECTIVE, ANNOTATED BIBLIOGRAPHY ON
THE NORTH KOREAN MILITARY

June 1986

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A Selective, Annotated Bibliography on the North Korean Military

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This bibliography, produced in monthly installments from an online database, provides selective annotations of serials and monographs on the army of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea (North Korea). Entries are arranged alphabetically by author in three sections: modernization of the North Korean army, strategies and tactics used by the North Korean army during the Korean War (1950-53), and strategies and tactics used by the North Korean army since the war.

North Korea
National security

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NSN 7540-01-280-5500
PREFACE

This bibliography provides selective annotations of open-source material and covers the following topics:

- modernization of the North Korean Army,
- North Korean Army strategy and tactics in the Korean War, and
- North Korean Army strategy and tactics since the Korean War.

The bibliography incorporates serials and monographs received in the previous month and is part of a continuing series on the above subjects.

Entries are arranged alphabetically by author or title. Library of Congress call numbers, where appropriate, are included to facilitate the recovery of works cited.
## GLOSSARY

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Abbreviation</th>
<th>Description</th>
</tr>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>CPLA</td>
<td>Chinese People's Liberation Army</td>
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<tr>
<td>CFC</td>
<td>Combined Forces Command (US and ROK)</td>
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<tr>
<td>DPRK</td>
<td>Democratic People's Republic of Korea (North Korea)</td>
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<td>NKA</td>
<td>North Korean Army</td>
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<tr>
<td>NKAF</td>
<td>North Korean Air Force</td>
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<tr>
<td>NKN</td>
<td>North Korean Navy</td>
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<tr>
<td>KPA</td>
<td>Korean People's Army (Comprises NKA, NKAF, and NKN)</td>
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<tr>
<td>KWP</td>
<td>Korean Workers' Party</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ROK</td>
<td>Republic of Korea (South Korea)</td>
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<tr>
<td>ROKA</td>
<td>Republic of Korea Army</td>
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<tr>
<td>ROKAF</td>
<td>Republic of Korea Air Force</td>
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<tr>
<td>ROKN</td>
<td>Republic of Korea Navy</td>
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1. MODERNIZATION OF THE NORTH KOREAN MILITARY

Reports South Korean intelligence on the disposition and organization of NKA units in the frontline areas. Four NKA Corps—the First, Second, Fourth and Fifth—are stationed along the DMZ. Each of these Corps is believed to have four infantry divisions, two infantry brigades, one multiple-rocket launcher regiment, one medium-tank regiment, support battalions and companies. The NKA is also said to have one armored corps stationed in the frontline area.

Gittings, John "North Korea Counters US Flights with Aids Smear." Guardian (Manchester, UK) 1 April 1986, p. 9.

During a visit to the North Korean side of the DMZ, the author is told by an NKA Captain that US and South Korean claims that his country is digging tunnels as part of an invasion scheme are "nonsensical." Captain Ji Myong Chul says that soil analysis could prove that the tunnels discovered by South Korea were dug by both sides during the Korean War and would have no value in a future conflict. Captain Ji also says that tanks and armored vehicles are what will be needed to fight a modern war in Korea. While Gittings was in the DMZ, North Korean loudspeakers were broadcasting fictitious reports about an AIDS epidemic in South Korea. Captain Ji told Gittings that these broadcasts are for the benefit of local ginseng farmers.

"Incidental Intelligence." Pacific Defence Reporter (Kunyung, Australia) vol. 7, no. 10, April 1986, p. 20.

Article reports a North Korean defector's observations on North Korea's preparations for war. The defector said that during a three-year period farmers and civilian workers were mobilized to dig tunnels for military facilities in some areas of North Korea. However, information on the types of military facilities prepared and how recently the projects were undertaken is not provided. The defector also said that the civilian
population of North Korea is told to keep 15 days of combat provisions on hand at all times.

"Miffed at MIGs." Far Eastern Economic Review (Hong Kong), vol. 132, no. 14, 10 April 1986, p. 11. HC411.P18

The Soviet Union is said to have completed training "several squadrons" of NKAF pilots on the MiG-23/FLOGGER. It is also reported that Soviet reconnaissance flights over North Korean territory are increasing, including some flights close to North Korea's border with China.


Article describes the organization of KPA and paramilitary organizations. Three KPA organizations are discussed: the General Staff, the General Political Bureau, and the General Rear Services Bureau. The NKA's main reserve force, which comprises about 20 divisions organized into local Training Units nationwide, can be mobilized in about 24 hours. Two paramilitary organizations are described: the Worker-Peasant Red Guard and the Red Youth Guard. Border, coastal, and railway units of the Ministry of Public Security would also support the NKA in wartime. According to this report, Kim Chong-il, the son and heir-apparent of North Korean President Kim Il-song, controls the day-to-day activities of the KPA. Gunji Kenkyu claims that Kim Chong-il maintains a close watch over all troop movements through a reporting network called the "three lines, three days reporting system."

"NKA Order of Battle." Military Technology (Bonn), vol. 9, no. 13, p. 269. Not in LC.

Order of battle information for all countries of the world is provided as a reference guide. The source of information is The Military Balance 1985-1986, which is
"Soviet Union Delivers 30 SA-3/GOA Missiles to North Korea."

Article reports that the 30 SA-3/GOA surface-to-air missiles recently delivered by the Soviet Union to North Korea will be deployed in the Pyongyang area. It is also reported that North Korea has 800 SA-2/GUIDELINE surface-to-air missiles already in service.
2. NORTH KOREAN ARMY STRATEGY AND TACTICS IN THE KOREAN WAR

Chapter Three deals with the origins of the Korean War. The author believes that the Soviet Union, while heavily involved in training and supplying the NKA, did not play a major role in planning the June 1950 invasion of South Korea. He stresses the significance of the following: there were more soldiers in the NKA in 1950 trained by the Chinese than by the Soviets; North Korean Premier Kim Il-song disliked the Soviets in 1950, and the Soviet Union, particularly Joseph Stalin, had little interest in Korea before the invasion; finally, the Soviets did little to save Kim Il-song's regime when UN Forces advanced north of the 38th Parallel in September 1950. Cummings suggests that Kim Il-song and Mao Zedong shared similar views of the international situation in 1950, including a determination to prevent the Soviets from dominating Korea and China.


This book views the Korean War from the perspective of the GI in the foxhole at the frontline. The author provides eyewitness accounts of a number of early battles, including those for Seoul and Taejon. American forces were often outnumbered by ten-to-one as they attempted to slow down the North Korean advance. The NKA's use of light infantry in southeast Korea during July 1950, particularly at Chindongni near Masan, took advantage of weaknesses in the perimeter defenses established by US and South Korean forces. The author attributes the rapid disintegration of the ROKA following the June 1950 invasion to two factors: the fighting power of the NKA was enhanced by the assistance provided by China and the Soviet Union; and the ROKA lacked experienced officers and sufficient quantities of weapons to counter the NKA's offensive. Higgens stresses the costliness of underestimating the strength and intentions of a political adversary.

Chapter Two discusses NKA tactics during the first two months of the Korean War. NKA units performed well when they had room to maneuver and could combine frontal pressure with flanking operations. During this period, the intensity of North Korean attacks on South Korean and US Forces was an important factor in their favor. Chapter Three describes two North Korean offensives against the Pusan Perimeter. Rees points out that by the end of August the US had augmented the defense, while North Korean losses in manpower and equipment were beginning to deplete some of the offensive power of the NKA's frontline units. The fact that the NKA, UN Forces, and the CPLA all overextended their supply lines at various stages of the war is stressed. The author discusses CPLA strategy and tactics for the war in Chapter Eight. General Ridgeway's strategy for overcoming the numerical superiority of the CPLA is mentioned in Chapter Ten.


The author, an ROKA Brigadier General, says that if American and South Korean leaders in power during the Korean War had been more interested in coordinating military and political decisionmaking, North Korea would not now have the military option of threatening Seoul with a blitzkrieg attack. He argues that former President Syngman Rhee had clear strategic objectives, which apparently included the establishment of the DMZ farther north, and he claims that Rhee's ideas were not given serious consideration by US military commanders, diplomats, and political leaders. Changes in the current organization and mission of the US-ROK Combined Forces Command are recommended to improve the defense of Seoul.
3. NORTH KOREAN ARMY STRATEGY AND TACTICS SINCE THE KOREAN WAR
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The first section of the article assesses the military capabilities of North and South Korea. The force composition and deployment of the NKA are said to maximize the advantages for Pyongyang should North Korean leaders decide to launch an all-out invasion of South Korea. Although the primary mission of the NKN appears to be defensive, some naval vessels could be used to infiltrate NKA commandos into South Korea. Choi says the air defense capabilities of the NKAF are superior to those of the ROKAF because the North has a numerical advantage in aircraft and more hardened positions for its missiles and guns. The article does not discuss the NKAF's capability for carrying out offensive operations. The author believes that if North Korea attacks South Korea and takes Seoul, the ROKA will have a difficult time retaking the capital city. The second and third sections assess US capability for aiding South Korea in a future conflict and the status of South Korea's military modernization program, respectively.


The author believes that North Korean defense policies and the force structures of the NKA and NKN suggest that the country's leaders are prepared to conduct offensive operations against South Korea. In 1975, North Korea reportedly lowered the military draft age from 18 to 17. Lowering the draft age facilitated a five-year augmentation of the KPA from 500,000 in 1975 to 678,000 in 1980. The article provides information on North Korea's Strategic Forces Command (SFC), which is said to report to the KWP Military Committee rather than to the Ministry of the People's Armed Forces. The SFC controls three mechanized infantry divisions, three armored divisions, twenty light infantry brigades subordinate to the Eighth Special Corps, five training regiments, five surface-to-air missile regiments, five anti-aircraft artillery regiments, and ten surface-to-surface missile
battalions. Jacobs believes that in a conflict President Kim Il-song, as Commander in Chief of the Armed Forces, or his son and heir apparent Kim Chong-il, would personally command units of the SFC. These units could be instructed to independently strike targets in South Korea, or they could be assigned to a particular NKA Corps for a specific mission. The mission of the NKN is believed to be primarily offensive because of the number of landing craft in the inventory. The article includes additional information on the organization and disposition of NKA units, and a chart which lists those factories known to be involved in the production of weapons.


General Robert W. Bazley, Commander of US Air Forces in the Pacific, says that if the NKA crosses the DMZ South Korea and the United States should be prepared to fight the Soviet Union as well as North Korea. General Bazley's warning is based on the Soviet Union's increasing military presence in Asia and the Pacific and on the apparent development of closer military ties between Pyongyang and Moscow. He made these remarks at the Second Aerospace Symposium held at South Korea's Air Force Academy in Chongju.


The decision by Moscow to allow the delivery of MIG-23/FLOGGER fighter aircraft to North Korea is not interpreted as a sign that the Soviet Union will promote confrontation with South Korea and the United States on the Korean Peninsula. Moscow is said to be stepping up its military aid to North Korea in order to increase its political influence over Pyongyang. North Korea is expected to receive about 45 MIG 23/FLOGGERS by the end of the year.

An editorial in the South Korean daily criticizes North Korea for planning to use chemical weapons in a future war. The editorial says that South Korean military intelligence indicates that 180-250 tons of chemical and biological munitions have been stored in 170 tunnels just north of the military demarcation line. It is believed that an all-out attack on South Korea would include the massive employment of chemical weapons at the outset of hostilities to soften South Korean defenses, followed by a coordinated blitzkrieg offensive across the DMZ. The editorial calls on North Korea and the Soviet Union to stop producing chemical, biological, and radiological weapons. The South Korean Government is advised to upgrade the country's preparedness for defending against a chemical attack.


The author, an ROKA Brigadier General, cites two somewhat dated studies written in the United States to describe North Korea's current military strategy for a future conflict on the Korean Peninsula. The first study says the NKA is able to initiate largescale combined arms operations along any of the three main approaches to Seoul. As many as 200 tanks could be deployed in the frontline of an attacking force. The second study discusses how the NKN, NRAF, NKA light infantry and commando units, and North Korean agents in South Korea would support the invasion. The author argues that the US and South Korea need to improve command and control of allied forces to adequately prepare joint defensive operations in a future war. Rhee believes that US commanders should not always expect ROKA units to standardize their organization, weapons, and tactics to achieve maximum interoperability with US Forces.

The author believes that the longer Kim Il-song lives, the more likely it is that his son and designated successor will carry on his hostile political and military policies vis-a-vis South Korea and the United States. The major challenge for Kim Chong-il, the heir apparent, is to be able to place enough supporters in key government and party positions to solidify his control over North Korea. Kim Chong-il is said to be opposed by North Korean technocrats who want to promote more contact with foreign countries and reduce military spending. Scalapino expects the military situation on the Korean Peninsula to remain tense for the foreseeable future, but he does not expect Pyongyang to start another major conflict. He reasons that even if the NKA could take Seoul, North Korean leaders know that they could not prevent massive retaliatory attacks by the United States on targets in their country.