A SELECTIVE, ANNOTATED BIBLIOGRAPHY ON
THE NORTH KOREAN MILITARY

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### A Selective, Annotated Bibliography on the North Korean Military

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This bibliography, produced in monthly installments from an online database, provides selective annotations of serials and monographs on the army of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea (North Korea). Entries are arranged alphabetically by author in three sections: modernization of the North Korean army, strategies and tactics used by the North Korean army during the Korean War (1950-53), and strategies and tactics used by the North Korean army since the war.

**North Korea**
National security

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PREFACE

This bibliography provides selective annotations of open-source material and covers the following topics:

- modernization of the North Korean Army,
- North Korean Army strategy and tactics in the Korean War, and
- North Korean Army strategy and tactics since the Korean War.

The bibliography incorporates serials and monographs received in the previous month and is part of a continuing series on the above subjects.

Entries are arranged alphabetically by author or title. Library of Congress call numbers, where appropriate, are included to facilitate the recovery of works cited.
GLOSSARY

CPLA
Chinese People's Liberation Army

CFC
Combined Forces Command (US and ROK)

DPRK
Democratic People's Republic of Korea (North Korea)

NKA
North Korean Army

NKAF
North Korean Air Force

NKN
North Korean Navy

KPA
Korean People's Army (Comprises NKA, NKAF, and NKN)

KWP
Korean Workers' Party

ROK
Republic of Korea (South Korea)

ROKA
Republic of Korea Army

ROKAF
Republic of Korea Air Force

ROKN
Republic of Korea Navy
1. MODERNIZATION OF THE NORTH KOREAN MILITARY

This article discusses North Korean military activities that have been observed from a tower constructed on a hill near the DMZ in the South Korean town of Myongho, Kangwon Province. A howitzer brigade and an airstrip near the North Korean village of Ipsok (about 9 kilometers from the DMZ) and a naval base at Haekumgang are clearly visible from the top of the 9.4 meter tower. North Korea is also reported to have a "missile base" on a mountain in the vicinity, and to be building a number of bunkers, guard posts, and other military facilities in the area.
2. NORTH KOREAN ARMY STRATEGY AND TACTICS IN THE KOREAN WAR
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Several sections of this book focus on the multilateral causes for some of the military problems the US experienced during the Korean War. Chapter one discusses why the ROKA was not prepared to defend the country against the North Korean invasion of 25 June 1950, and chapters two and three follow up with discussions of why US intelligence agencies, Congress, and policymakers in the Truman Administration failed to understand the reality of the Korean situation before the invasion. There are good descriptions of North Korean tactics, particularly in chapter five where Collins focuses on NKA night operations and river crossing techniques in preparation for attacks on the Pusan Perimeter northeast of Yongsan in August 1950. In chapter eight the author does a credible job of presenting a firsthand account of how US intelligence grappled with the problem of evaluating Chinese intentions and capabilities in November 1950. Chapter 14 concludes with a comparison of the Korean and Vietnam Wars. Collins was Chief of Staff of the US Army during the Korean War.


Chapters one through twelve discuss the first three months of the Korean War from the initial Communist invasion of 25 June 1950 through the retaking of Seoul by United Nations' Forces on 25 September 1950. Middleton believes that US Forces in Japan at the beginning of the war were so busy with their occupation duties that they were not adequately trained to meet a contingency in Korea. He suggests that the most significant strategic error by North Korean leaders was their decision to consolidate control over territory as they moved down the Peninsula, thereby giving the allies time to regroup and establish strong defensive positions. NKA tactics are discussed throughout these chapters. The author notes that when the allies succeeded in stabilizing the Pusan Perimeter, the NKA was no longer able to employ the strategy of envelopment that had worked so well during the period from June to August 1950. Chapter 24 presents an interesting discussion on how the North Koreans were able to
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communicate with and control large numbers of their personnel who had been captured and sent to prisoner of war camps in South Korea. Here Middleton focuses on selected events in 1952 that reportedly were organized by Nam Il, North Korea's chief delegate to the armistice talks, to embarrass the US and South Korea and change the allied position on repatriating only those prisoners who wanted to return to North Korea and China after the war. The treatment of US prisoners of war in North Korea is also considered to have been politically significant.
3. NORTH KOREAN ARMY STRATEGY AND TACTICS SINCE THE KOREAN WAR

The article suggests that Chinese leaders dislike North Korean President Kim Il-song and implies that they are more interested in encouraging South Korean companies to invest in China's modernization program than in promoting the North Korean goal of reuniting the Korean Peninsula under communist rule. It focuses on interviews with a number of South Korean government officials and business leaders who are optimistic that China will slowly expand its trade with their country, while at the same time it continues to promote the semblance of solidarity with the North for political reasons.


The credibility of Pyongyang's July 1987 call for bilateral troop reductions on the Korean Peninsula is questioned because of the timing of the proposal and the state of North Korea's economy. The independent daily says that if North Korea is serious about promoting peace, it will resume talks with the South on economic or other issues that are much less sensitive than force reductions. Additionally, it points out that Seoul cannot consider opening North-South talks on bilateral troop reductions in March 1988, as proposed by the North, due to the South's plan to hold presidential elections in December 1987. President Chon Tu-hwan is scheduled to step down in February 1988 and his successor will need some time to prepare for talks.


Hao argues that North Korea does not have the military capability to attack the South and suggests that global military competition between the Soviet Union and the United States and peninsular military competition between
North and South Korea represent the major threats to peace in Northeast Asia in coming years. Yao says Kim Chong-il, North Korean President Kim Il-song's son and heir apparent, will probably succeed his father. However, if the KPA refuses to support the succession plan, Hao acknowledges the possibility that a military-led government in Pyongyang could promote conflict with South Korea and the United States. Hao explains the Soviet military buildup in the Far East as part of a Kremlin plan to counter the growth of US and Japanese influence in the region. He believes that Pyongyang's current leaders will not sacrifice the country's independence to Moscow, but, again, he points out that in the event the KPA rejects the succession plan, Pyongyang could reverse its priorities and promise to cooperate more closely with Moscow in exchange for that country's support in another Korean War.

The author is a Chinese scholar enrolled in a doctoral program at Johns Hopkins University's School of Advanced International Studies.


This article, by a former US Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense, is critical of US intelligence reports that have concluded that the Kumgangsan Dam project in North Korea does not pose a military threat to South Korea. Koch says, "the problem with American intelligence estimates is that they are prepared by Americans. Our track record for piercing historical and cultural differences to arrive at accurate assessments of what an adversary might do is not enviable." The article describes the damage that breaching the dam could cause to Seoul and its environs, and reminds the reader that North and South Korea have never formerly ended the Korean War. He also notes that some US intelligence reports have tied Kim Chong-il, North Korean President Kim Il-song's son and heir apparent, to the 1983 assassination attempt on South Korean President Chon Tu-hwan. Koch believes that South Korea and the United States must continue to regard North Korean motives with caution.
"North Korea Demobilizes 30,000 Troops to Ease Korean Tensions."

Yonhap, South Korea's official news agency, reports on a North Korean official's announcement that his country has demobilized 30,000 troops in the past two months in order to ease tension on the Korean Peninsula and to promote military talks with Seoul and Washington. Kang Sok-ju, North Korea's Deputy Foreign Minister, made this statement while in New York to participate in ceremonies marking the opening of the United Nations General Assembly. Yonhap reports that North Korean leaders are disgruntled over the US policy that prohibits American diplomats from holding political discussions with their diplomats at international forums.


Subversive and anti-American groups inside South Korea are said to represent a more likely threat to stability on the Korean Peninsula than North Korea. The author considers it unlikely that Pyongyang will attack Seoul in the near future because, "Pyongyang is not in a good position to fulfill such a mission." However, if subversive activities in the South and anti-Americanism lead to the spread of violence and require a response by South Korean forces under the Combined Forces Command, this will reduce US credibility in the country. Olsen sees this trend continuing, regardless of who wins the 1987 presidential election, unless the US changes its "1950s oriented" policies toward Korea. Among Olsen's recommendations is the suggestion that the a ROKA commander assume responsibility for the CFC, and a new command be established with ROK participation to deal with the growing Soviet military threat to Korea and other points in Asia and the Pacific. The author is a professor of national security affairs and Asian studies at the Naval Postgraduate School in Monterey.

Seoul Sinmun suggests that the Soviet Union shares North Korea's goal of eventually forcing the US to withdraw its troops from South Korea. The article reiterates several frequently mentioned warning signals which indicate that the two communist allies are coordinating their military strategies. These warning signals include North Korea's willingness to resupply Soviet naval vessels and allow Soviet military aircraft to reconnoiter China using its airspace. Gorbachev's July 1986 Vladivostok speech, in which the Soviet leader pledged to increase Soviet influence in Asia and the Pacific, is interpreted as another sign that the Soviet Union is a military threat to South Korea.


The author examines recent changes in North Korean laws and its policies toward South Korea and the West in an effort to determine if Pyongyang has deemphasized political and ideological control over its population to promote foreign contacts. Rhee concludes that as long as Kim Il-song and Kim Chong-il are in power, laws intended to promote foreign trade and increase the import of new technologies will not significantly influence the country's current ideology of Chuche, or self reliance. He argues that Kim Chong-il, the older Kim's son and heir apparent, has shown through his leadership of the Three Revolutions Movement and other political campaigns that he is committed to realizing his father's goal of reuniting the Korean Peninsula under communist rule. The author is a Professor of Political Science at the National Defense College in Seoul.

An editorial in the Korea Herald discusses a recent Washington Post story on the military value of the Kumgangsan Dam currently under construction in North Korea. The article, by a former US Deputy Assistant of Defense, suggests that the idea that the North Koreans could intentionally breach the dam in order to flood Seoul is not unrealistic, and it notes that flooding was used by a Korean general in the 7th Century to defend Korea against a Chinese invasion. The editorial recalls North Korea's construction of tunnels under the DMZ and its unsuccessful attempt to assassinate South Korean President Chon Tu-hwan in 1983 as indications that Pyongyang has not forsaken the goal of reuniting the Peninsula under communist rule.


North Korea's July 1987 proposal to reduce the size of the NKA to 100,000 by 1991 if South Korea does the same with the ROKA is viewed as a political ploy to enhance its image as a peacemaker. Reportedly, North Korea currently has 838,000 personnel in the NKA, NCAF, and NKN. This compares to an estimated 598,000 personnel South Korea has under arms. The article speculates that Pyongyang's immediate goals may be to promote discussion in the South on holding military talks with the North and to convince South Korean leaders to allow some events of the 1988 Seoul Olympics to be held north of the DMZ.