A SELECTIVE, ANNOTATED BIBLIOGRAPHY ON CURRENT SOUTH ASIAN ISSUES

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A SELECTIVE, ANNOTATED BIBLIOGRAPHY ON CURRENT SOUTH ASIAN ISSUES

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A Selective, Annotated Bibliography on Current South Asian Issues

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#### Abstract (Maximum 200 words)

This bibliography provides selective annotations of open-source material on two current issues: nuclear developments in South Asia, and tactics and organization of Afghan resistance groups. The monthly bibliography incorporates serials and monographs arranged alphabetically by author and title within each section.

#### Subject Terms

- South Asia
- Insurgencies
- Afghanistan
- Nuclear proliferation

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PREFACE

This bibliography provides selective annotations of open-source material and has recently been amended to cover the following topics:

- nuclear developments in South Asia, and
- tactics and organization of Afghan resistance groups.

The bibliography incorporates serials and monographs received in October 1985 and is the sixth in this series.

Entries are arranged alphabetically by author or title. Library of Congress call numbers, where appropriate, are included to facilitate the recovery of source material.

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**GLOSSARY**

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<tr>
<th>Abbreviation</th>
<th>Definition</th>
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<tr>
<td>AEMC</td>
<td>Atomic Energy Minerals Center at Lahore, which is responsible for the location and exploitation of Pakistan's uranium ore, thereby filling a vital need stemming from boycotts of Pakistan by international nuclear fuel suppliers.</td>
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<td>CHASHNUPP</td>
<td>Chashma Nuclear Power Plant, a projected 900-megawatt facility in Mianwali District, Punjab. The Government of Pakistan sanctioned CHASHNUPP in 1982 in order to create electrical power through light-water technology.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IAEA</td>
<td>International Atomic Energy Agency (United Nations)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>KANUPP</td>
<td>Karachi Nuclear Power Plant, a 125-megawatt reactor which was supplied by Canada on a turnkey basis and became operational in 1972.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NPT</td>
<td>The Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty, ratified by the UN General Assembly in 1968. Pakistan considers the NPT discriminatory, but has repeatedly offered to sign if India will do so simultaneously. Islamabad voted in favor of UNGA ratification of the NPT.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PAEC</td>
<td>Pakistani Atomic Energy Commission</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PINSTECH</td>
<td>Pakistan Institute of Nuclear Science Technology, the site of a US-supplied 5-megawatt &quot;swimming pool&quot;-type reactor installed in the 1960s.</td>
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1. NUCLEAR DEVELOPMENTS IN SOUTH ASIA

Recently India and Pakistan have both been making ambiguous public pronouncements on the acquisition of nuclear weapons. Lack of information about each other's nuclear programs may lie behind the wavering themes. The remarks of Indian Prime Minister Rajiv Gandhi, no matter how belligerent, suggest that he has not received conclusive proof of Islamabad's nuclear intentions, and that he will delay action until such proof is received. Pakistani President Mohammad Zia-ul-Haq has made strong pacific proposals for negotiations and inspections. At the same time, he has allowed persons associated with his government and its nuclear program to hint that Islamabad is developing both plutonium and uranium nuclear capabilities. The author finds this moment of uncertainty consistent with the region's modern history. Both countries began research to acquire a nuclear capability long before they had made political decisions to carry the research to its possible outcome.


Michael H. Armacost, US Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs, and Donald T. Fortier, Deputy Assistant to the President for National Security, visited India and Pakistan in September 1985 in hopes of calming South Asian's rapidly rising nuclear tensions. India forthrightly rejected American pressure to embrace at least one of Islamabad's proposals regarding regional nonproliferation. New Delhi has consistently said that South Asia cannot become a Nuclear Free Zone because China, a contiguous nation, has a demonstrated nuclear weapons capability. Rajiv Gandhi's rejection of the US mission, coupled with his ambiguous statements on other aspects of the regional nuclear issue, make it impossible to rule out the idea that he may lift India's nuclear capability to a "weaponable" level. The US is likely to continue urging him to repudiate any such preference because as long as India shows mistrust of Pakistan's motives in volunteering for mutual nuclear inspection or simultaneous signing of the NPT, Islamabad is unlikely to foreclose its own nuclear options.


Washington may believe that Rajiv Gandhi, unlike his predecessor, would be willing to sign the NPT if regional and international conditions favored other Indian interests. Recent signs from the US, including mild criticism of Mohammad Zia-ul-Haq and gestures of flattery toward Gandhi, indicate Washington is "tilting" toward India, much as it once tilted toward Pakistan. However, this may all be a ploy, as the US has not dropped its longstanding and unacceptable goal of persuading India to sign the NPT. The only other response the US would accept, according to the Armacost-Fortier delegation which visited South Asia in September 1985, is mutual inspection as proposed by Pakistan. Either course of action would involve India's bowing to a joint US-Pakistani pressure campaign. The superficiality of the term "tilt" indicates the dangers of compliance.
"No N-arms to Fight Pak: PM." Times of India (Bombay), 12 October 1985, p. 1.

Speaking at the Press Club in Bombay on 11 October, Rajiv Gandhi says that measures "other than a weapons program" would be taken in response to Pakistan's nuclear campaign, which Gandhi described as being at an advanced stage. The Prime Minister indicated that because security for India was his first concern, "there is no question of allowing New Delhi or any other city in the country to become Hiroshima or Nagasaki." Pakistan has made several proposals for mutual inspection but India has rejected such arrangements because they could not be made "fool-proof." External financing of the Pakistani weapon by unnamed countries remains one of India's main concerns.

"The Nuclear Option." Economic and Political Weekly (Bombay), vol. XX, no. 31, 3 August 1985, p. 1285.

India's strategy for opposing Pakistan's development of a nuclear weapon has been unrealistic. Rajiv Gandhi has been urging Washington to threaten curtailment of its generous aid to Pakistan unless that country gives up its nuclear program. Washington has clearly demonstrated that it is not willing to put nonproliferation ahead of worldwide strategic interests. Yet Gandhi has not laid out any substantive plan for lessening the chances of nuclear weapons in South Asia, leaving the Indian, regional, and international communities in doubt about New Delhi's desire for regional nonproliferation. If anything will slow or halt Islamabad's nuclear weapons campaign, it will be exactly this type of proposal from New Delhi.


At the 29th general conference of the IAEA, held in Vienna in September, Munir Ahmed Khan, Chairman of the PAEC, reiterated Pakistan's commitment to peaceful uses of atomic energy. However, because of its disastrous shortage of power and the many humanitarian applications of atomic energy, particularly in agriculture, Pakistan remains committed to developing its nuclear energy resources. [Ed. note: Pakistan had never previously participated in an NPT conference.]


While in New York to attend the fortieth anniversary session of the United Nations General Assembly, Mohammad Zia-ul-Haq hosted a 35-minute meeting at which he discussed uncomfortable bilateral issues with Rajiv Gandhi. The two leaders agreed to set up technical talks to reassure each other of the peaceful nature of their respective nuclear programs. Details of the talks were to be worked out later by the "technical people." In subsequent separate press interviews, the two leaders sustained their conciliatory tones. It was their third meeting, but the first set up exclusively for mutual review of bilateral problems.
Beijing surprised the 29th general conference of the IAEA with the announcement that some Chinese nuclear reactors would be opened to IAEA inspectors "at an appropriate time." Beijing also expressed opposition to the proliferation of nuclear weapons and said it would never help another country produce them. The last comment received special notice because of persistent allegations that Pakistan has received Chinese assistance in developing a nuclear weapons capability.


In the absence of outright denunciation of nuclear weapons, Pakistan and India can move toward regional nonproliferation through a series of confidence-building intermediary steps. Indian observers have proposed exchanging data on nuclear facilities, ratification by Pakistan of the Partial Test Ban Treaty of 1963, and mutual agreement not to attack each other's nuclear facilities. The talks which commenced when Pakistani Foreign Minister Yaqub Khan visited New Delhi in June 1985 hold promise for regional nonproliferation and should be earnestly continued. The author, a Lieutenant General of the Indian Army, discounts the idea that India faces significant danger from China and nuclear weapons on naval vessels of third countries in the Indian Ocean. Of greater likelihood are widespread hunger and backwardness if New Delhi and Islamabad channel substantial proportions of their already-sparse federal treasuries into an even-greater arms race.
2. TACTICS AND ORGANIZATION OF AFGHAN RESISTANCE GROUPS
"Afghans Accept Both Losses and Gains in 'Holy War' Against the Russians."

Three Jamiat Islami commanders of Baghlan Province recount their efforts against the Soviet-DRA forces. Amir Rasool, 32, proudly points out that in a recent encounter he lost 3 fighters while killing 19 Russians. Although many members of Rasool's family have been killed, they remain in Afghanistan in order to raise food for the resistance fighters. Another insurgent, Bashir Ahmed Shadadyar, has launched missions onto Soviet territory where he attempted to subvert the enemy by distributing copies of the Koran to Tadjiks who live under Soviet rule. The Soviets put an end to his campaign last year when a massive attack killed 600 of Shadadyar's 700 fighters and 2,000 villagers. Sufi Finder, the third commander, is in his fifties. Known for his daring and hatred of the Russians, he has used ruses such as prisoner exchanges to ambush the invaders. The article gives no indication of the relative importance of these three "general commanders," but clearly indicates the fervor and persistence of their efforts.


In beleaguered Paktia Province, Afghan insurgent forces have set aside their guerrilla tactics to engage Soviet military units in a major set-piece battle in the Khost area. Unlike the disorganized rebels in Kunar, the insurgents in Paktia are fighting under a single commander and religious leader, the respected Jalaludin Haqqani. They are unusually well-armed for irregular forces, with mortars, anti-tank weapons and surface-to-surface rockets at their disposition. They also have a few captured tanks which they are using as self-propelled artillery. Camel caravans to replenish exhausted supplies and ammunition reach the rebel ranks daily from Pakistan. Insurgent movements in the area, however, are inhibited by a sophisticated array of Soviet explosive devices and booby traps, including the much-publicized plastic "butterfly" mines, other delayed action mines, and a new antipersonnel weapon called the "trembler" which detonates only at the vibration of several men. The rebels, in this latest campaign in Paktia Province, are engaging a Soviet armored column of about 10,000 men, including elite Spetsnaz units, that is attempting to relieve the siege of Khost where there is an Afghan Army garrison of 3,000 men and 500 Soviet advisers.


On 22 July, the best-known and most controversial of the Afghan resistance leaders, Gulbaddin Hekmatyar, led a force of about 300 fighters in an attack on Asmar garrison. The mujahiddin employed surface-to-surface rockets and artillery. Several government soldiers defected and reported morale in the garrison to be very low. A month later a Soviet force arrived to relieve the garrison and break the insurgent siege.
Patrice Piquard, correspondent of the Parisian weekly L'Evenement du Jeudi visited Paghman, on the outskirts of Kabul, from 22 June through 13 July. He was escorted by a Jamiat Islami ammunition caravan. Piquard reported the area to be under resistance control. Resistance forces in the area count over 600 armed fighters affiliated with Jamiat Islami and Itehad-e-Islami (Sayyaf group). Piquard witnessed several mujahidin operations, all of which were well-planned and well-coordinated between the two organizations. Although many commanders work in the area, they meet regularly to insure full cooperation in combat, even on these occasions planning specific missions together. Piquard noted that the resistance forces used heavy as well as light arms, including tanks captured from the enemy in Logar and Paktia.

Commander Ahmad Shah Massud of Panjsher continues to urge unity among mujahidin commanders in northeast Afghanistan. He has sent emissaries to Kunduz, Ghorband, and Bamyan, and personally visited Asmara for 12 days. Groups associated with Harakat (Mohammadi) and several unaffiliated Hazara groups of Bamyan accepted his plan of forming a circle around Bagram Air Force Base. Hezb-i-Islami forces (Hekmatyar) agreed initially, but later killed a delegation sent by Massud to plan the Hezb role in the operation; these deaths occurred in Ghorband.