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**Abstract**
This bibliography provides selective annotations of open-source material on two current Indochina-related issues: Thailand's political strategy of solving the Cambodian question, and the tactics and organization of Khmer/ Laotian resistance groups. The bibliography was prepared monthly and incorporates serials and monographs arranged alphabetically by author and title within each section.

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PREFACE

This bibliography provides selective annotations of open-source material on three current Indochina-related issues:

* Thailand’s political strategy for solving the Cambodian question

* tactics and organization of Khmer/Laotian resistance groups

* the war in Cambodia

This bibliography incorporates serials and monographs received in the previous month and is part of a continuing series on the above subjects.

Entries are arranged alphabetically by author or title. Library of Congress call numbers, where appropriate, are included to facilitate the recovery of works cited.
## GLOSSARY

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Abbreviation</th>
<th>Description</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>ANS</td>
<td>Armée Nationale Sihanoukiste (Sihanoukist National Army)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ASEAN</td>
<td>Association of Southeast Asian Nations</td>
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<tr>
<td>CGDK</td>
<td>Coalition Government of Democratic Kampuchea</td>
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<tr>
<td>DK</td>
<td>Democratic Kampuchea (Khmer Rouge)</td>
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<tr>
<td>FUNCINPEC</td>
<td>National United Front for an Independent, Neutral, Peaceful, and Cooperative Cambodia</td>
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<tr>
<td>KCP</td>
<td>Khmer Communist Party</td>
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<tr>
<td>KPNLF</td>
<td>Khmer People’s National Liberation Front (Son Sann)</td>
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<tr>
<td>KPRAF</td>
<td>Khmer People’s Revolutionary Armed Forces</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>KR</td>
<td>Khmer Rouge (Pol Pot)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>KUFNCD</td>
<td>Khmer United Front for National Construction and Defense (PRK)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nao Nao</td>
<td>Progressive [lit: moving in new directions]</td>
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<tr>
<td>PAVN</td>
<td>People’s Army of Vietnam</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PCCS</td>
<td>Provisional Central Committee for Salvation (KPNLF)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PERMICO</td>
<td>Permanent Military Committee for Coordination (KPNLF and ANS)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PRK</td>
<td>People’s Republic of Kampuchea</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PRPK</td>
<td>People’s Revolutionary Party of Kampuchea, aka KPRP (Khmer People’s Revolutionary Party)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>RTG</td>
<td>Royal Thai Government</td>
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Siam Rat
Thai Nation

SPK
News Agency of the PRK

SRV
Socialist Republic of Vietnam

Su Anakhot
Forward [lit: going toward the future]
1. THAILAND'S POLITICAL STRATEGY FOR SOLVING THE CAMBODIAN QUESTION

Chairman of Saha Union Corporation Anant Panyarachun argues that ASEAN should start to tackle economic cooperation more seriously instead of wasting so much time on the Kampuchean problem. He asks the ASEAN nations, particularly Thailand, "Why do we spend 25 hours a day on Kampuchea?" He warns that unless the emphasis is changed ASEAN will eventually disappear.


With the Vietnamese in probably a more threatening position to Thailand than ever before, Prime Minister Prem and United States Secretary of Defense Caspar Weinberger have signed a memorandum of understanding on logistics which formalizes US guarantees of prompt assistance in times of international tension and sets out new directions for military cooperation. The overall aim of the agreement is to develop a new logistics system for Thailand compatible with that of the United States. One facet of the agreement is that all three Thai armed services will ultimately be plugged into the computerized American logistical system and a direct dataphone will allow them to punch in a requirement which will automatically be packed and delivered.
2. TACTICS AND ORGANIZATION OF KHMER/LAOTIAN RESISTANCE GROUPS
"A Retirement the World Will Welcome." Bangkok Post, 3 September 85, p. 4.

Editorial observes that few tears will be shed over Pol Pot's early retirement. His transfer to an "inactive" position will be welcome throughout the world providing it is a real "retirement." Pol Pot's successors--Son Sen and Khieu Samphan--are said to be moderates, but the newspaper cautions that only time will tell.


Reports that in 1984, several senior members of the Party of Democratic Kampuchea left the organization for a mixture of personal, ideological and practical reasons. They included Keat Choon and two of the Thioun brothers, Mumm and Thioun--all intellectuals who had played important roles in the communist movement. They left because they felt that little had been learned from the dreadful experience of the Seventies and that the party still was not interested in using people for their talents but for their ideological rigidity. The author concludes that there is reason to believe that dissatisfaction within the Khmer Rouge is not limited to these few who departed and that the DK today may have more than one faction.


Article chronicles clashes between the Khmer Rouge and the ANS between February and June 1985. General Toan Chay, the ANS chief of operations, reports that the incidents mostly involved Khmer Rouge troops commanded by Ta Mok, one of the most feared of the Khmer Rouge leaders.

Reports that other wars are being waged in Cambodia and on the Thai-Cambodian border besides the war against the Vietnamese. On the coalition's side, nobody trusts the Khmer Rouge and they in turn think their nationalist allies are little more than a bunch of smugglers. Such enmity is understandable. The hostility observed between the Sihanoukists and the KPNLF, however, is not so readily comprehensible and Bekaert comments that luckily it still remains mostly a war of words. The author admonishes the KPNLF to work with the Sihanoukists, who may have their share of imperfections and corruption, but who still have Prince Sihanouk, the main asset of the resistance.


Thai forces, Cambodian guerrilla groups and more than 300,000 Cambodian and Thai civilians are bracing for another seasonal offensive by Vietnamese troops along the Thai-Cambodian border amid conflicting reports about Hanoi's intentions. Thailand has moved to consolidate refugee settlements into three main evacuation sites which has made them easier to administer but more vulnerable to attack. The Vietnamese insist, however, that they have no intention of attacking along the border or of hitting the refugee camps. Lt. Gen. Tran Cong Man, the editor of Vietnam's army newspaper, is quoted as saying that "last year our intention was to attack bases of the three [guerrilla] factions along the border. This year it is to wipe them out in the interior."


Editorial is pessimistic on the future of the Cambodian resistance and states that there is no indication from either of the non-communist resistance forces that they are able to withstand another Vietnamese dry season onslaught.
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Resistance claims that they have been conducting guerrilla war in the interior of Cambodia, for some time have been met with some scepticism because of the lack of independent witnesses. As a result, access to operations in the interior has been granted to the media. Correspondents accompanying an operation mounted by 215 Battalion of the KPNLF reported that the operation was conducted with a high degree of professionalism. The unit was reported to be well trained with high morale but lacking sufficient arms.


In commenting on an article by Paul Quinn-Judge in the 12 September issue of Far Eastern Economic Review, Ben Kiernan mentions that Pol Pot has not reached the alleged retiring age of 60. According to the age he gave on his 1956 marriage certificate and French educational records he should today be only 57. He also notes that Pol Pot stepped down once before in 1976 but only temporarily and never bothered to announce that he had resumed his post.


A spokesman for the KPNLF is quoted as saying that the front's executive committee had decided to shift its efforts from stepping up military activities to concentrating on political work in the Kampuchean interior. A month earlier, Son Sann, the KPNLF leader, had said that Western nations had refused to give aid to the coalition because his troops were undisciplined, looted villages and lacked credibility. While in Paris he said that he was returning to Cambodia to tell his troops not
to alienate the population, the KPNLF's main source of support in the struggle against the Vietnamese.

Quinn-Judge, Paul. "Divided We Shall Fall." Far Eastern Economic Review, (Hong Kong), vol. 130, no. 42, 24 October 1985, p. 44. HC411.F18

As the dry season in Indochina approaches, the worst fighting seems to be taking place within the KPNLF. The front, in the past considered the most credible non-communist member of the tripartite Coalition Government of Democratic Kampuchea, has been paralyzed by a major internal division over cooperation with Sihanouk. KPNLF leader Son Sann has opposed virtually all efforts at coordination between the two resistance factions and the issue has brought the front's modest military activities to a halt. Western sources say that the KPNLF currently has fewer than 1,000 men inside Cambodia operating in three units and that none of the three is very active.


Reports that the Sihanoukist Army has changed its military tactics by abandoning major bases on the Thai-Cambodian border and maintaining only small mobile supply bases. Only a few hundred guerrillas are positioned at each border base to protect supplies for other guerrillas who operate inside Cambodia while their civilian followers are sheltered on Thai soil. According to sources, more than 5,000 Sihanoukist guerrillas have been sent deep inside Cambodia to conduct hit-and-run operations against the Vietnamese and there is essentially nothing left on the Thai-Cambodian frontier for the Vietnamese to attack during the next dry-season offensive.

"Weaknesses in KPNLF." Bangkok Post, 27 August 1985, p. 4.
Editorial notes that Cambodian Prime Minister Son Sann was not exaggerating when he said that his KPNLF needed a good dose of discipline to turn it into a more efficient fighting force. While visiting evacuation site 2, he told the civilian population that it was time for his troops to stop complaining about the lack of weapons "which you may not deserve" and bring law and order to the nationalist ranks instead. The newspaper observes that KPNLF soldiers, like their comrades in arms from the Nationalist Sihanoukist army, have a special responsibility in Cambodia and are expected to behave better, not worse, than the civilian population they are supposedly trying to help.