A SELECTIVE, ANNOTATED BIBLIOGRAPHY ON CURRENT INDOCHINESE ISSUES

August 1985

19961202 092

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A Selective, Annotated Bibliography on Current Indo-Chinese Issues

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This bibliography provides selective annotations of open-source material on two current Indochina-related issues: Thailand's political strategy of solving the Cambodian question, and the tactics and organization of Khmer-Laotian resistance groups. The bibliography was prepared monthly and incorporates serials and monographs arranged alphabetically by author and title within each section.

Indochina  Insurgencies  Thailand

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PREFACE

This bibliography provides selective annotations of open-source material on three current Indochina-related issues:

* Thailand’s political strategy for solving the Cambodian question
* tactics and organization of Khmer/Laotian resistance groups
* the war in Cambodia

This bibliography incorporates serials and monographs received in the previous month and is part of a continuing series on the above subjects.

Entries are arranged alphabetically by author or title. Library of Congress call numbers, where appropriate, are included to facilitate the recovery of works cited.
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Acronym</th>
<th>Description</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>ANS</td>
<td>Armee Nationale Sihanoukiste (Sihanoukist National Army)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ASEAN</td>
<td>Association of Southeast Asian Nations</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CGDK</td>
<td>Coalition Government of Democratic Kampuchea</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DK</td>
<td>Democratic Kampuchea (Khmer Rouge)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FUNCINPEC</td>
<td>National United Front for an Independent, Neutral, Peaceful, and Cooperative Cambodia</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>KCP</td>
<td>Khmer Communist Party</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>KPNLF</td>
<td>Khmer People’s National Liberation Front (Son Sann)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>KPRAF</td>
<td>Khmer People’s Revolutionary Armed Forces</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>KR</td>
<td>Khmer Rouge (Pol Pot)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>KUFNCD</td>
<td>Khmer United Front for National Construction and Defense (PRK)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Naeo Na</td>
<td>Progressive [lit: moving in new directions]</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PAVN</td>
<td>People’s Army of Vietnam</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PCCS</td>
<td>Provisional Central Committee for Salvation (KPNLF)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PERMICO</td>
<td>Permanent Military Committee for Coordination (KPNLF and ANS)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PRK</td>
<td>People’s Republic of Kampuchea</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PRPK</td>
<td>People’s Revolutionary Party of Kampuchea, aka KPRP (Khmer People’s Revolutionary Party)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>RTG</td>
<td>Royal Thai Government</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Siam Rat
SPK
SRV
Su Anakhot

Thai Nation
News Agency of the PRK
Socialist Republic of Vietnam
Forward [lit: going toward the future]
1. THAILAND'S POLITICAL STRATEGY FOR SOLVING THE CAMBODIAN QUESTION

Thai Deputy Army Commander in Chief General Tienchai Sirisamphan implies that military strikes against Vietnamese forces inside Cambodia are possible if Hanoi carries out new border incursions into Thailand. At a press conference at army headquarters, he states that "If we are invaded, we cannot just sit back and do nothing. We will adopt the best defense tactic—which is to be on the offensive."

"Government Urged to Change Policy on Kampuchea."  Bangkok Post, 28 March 1985, p. 3.

The director of the Southeast Asia Program at the Institute of Security and International Studies at Chulalongkorn University, M. R. Sukhumpan Bonipat, states at a panel discussion that the Thai Government could help solve the Indochina problem by ending its support to the Khmer Rouge. Negotiations with Vietnam are stalemated and will remain so unless Bangkok offers to reconsider its policy toward Pol Pot. Bonipat suggests that the Thai Government disarm the Khmer Rouge or, short of that, disrupt their supply lines into Cambodia.


Analysts fear that Thailand may soon be drawn unwillingly into a more serious confrontation with Hanoi, and that current Vietnamese violations of the Thai border may simply be a prelude to more frequent and deeper penetrations during the next dry season. Despite Bangkok's current hard-line policy toward Cambodia, the Thais appear reluctant to engage Vietnamese ground forces. This is reflected in the thin deployment of Thai troops along the border and the slow response to cross-border operations by Vietnamese forces attacking Khmer resistance strongholds.


Thai Prime Minister Prem Tinsulanonda and Supreme Commander General Arthit Kamlang-ek reiterate Bangkok's principle of "offensive defense" against aggression by Vietnamese troops along the Thai-Cambodian border. Under this strategy, Thailand preserves the option of striking back at Vietnamese military targets inside Cambodia if frontier violations by Hanoi's troops become intolerable. The Thai policy was explained to visiting Malaysian Deputy Prime Minister Musa Hitam by Prime Minister Prem on 21 March 1985.

Two Plans."  Asiaweek (Hong Kong), vol. 11, no. 24, 14 June 1985, pp. 30-34.  DS1.A715

Thailand lends its support to a Malaysian proposal for indirect talks as a means of resolving the diplomatic impasse over Cambodia. Under the Malaysian initiative, the three Khmer resistance factions in the GDK and leaders of the Hanoi-backed Hong Samrin regime in Phnom Penh would engage in negotiations through an intermediary without directly confronting one
another. A Thai Foreign Ministry spokesman explains that the gambit "involves the principle that Cambodians have to resolve the issue by themselves, [as well as] the principle of national reconciliation, already supported by ASEAN. Thirdly, [sic] it involves negotiations and is a step towards a political settlement rather than a military solution."
2. TACTICS AND ORGANIZATION OF KHMER/LAOTIAN RESISTANCE GROUPS

Bekaert discusses the complexities involved in changing the hearts and minds of thousands of people who are used to their border bases, the presence of their families, and the convenience of the black market. He also notes that the resistance leadership must accept that the days of maintaining well-ordered base camps to impress foreign visitors are over, and speculates that the insurgents may penetrate deep into the Cambodian interior and there undertake classic guerrilla warfare. The article concludes that the burden to prove that the KPNLF is still a force to be reckoned with rests on the shoulders of the moderate and respected leader, General Sak Sutsakhan.


The intensity of the battle for Tatum was a surprise; the last thing most analysts expected was for the Sihanoukist soldiers to demonstrate strength and determination under the heavy shelling and frequent assaults. Although obliged to give up the base, the ANS nevertheless gained a great deal of needed credibility as a result of the battle. With moderate casualties, all three resistance forces remain essentially intact following the Vietnamese campaign. However, as Prince Sihanouk points out, there is a need to improve cooperation because large-scale planning or serious operations launched by the three factions are still unheard of. Ironically, the Vietnamese attack on Tatum probably did more than any other recent occurrence to strengthen the coalition.


The Khmer Rouge is the most formidable of the three Khmer resistance factions opposing the Vietnamese occupation of Cambodia. The movement reportedly has 35,000 to 50,000 men under arms and exercises control over some 37,000 civilians in the western part of the country. Its troops are lightly armed with Chinese-made AK-47 assault rifles, short-range mortars, recoilless rifles, and RPG rocket launchers. During Hanoi's dry-season offensive against insurgent base camps in western Cambodia, the Khmer Rouge offered spirited resistance to the Vietnamese advance and launched pre-emptive attacks of its own against the enemy's 7th and 8th Divisions. This defensive effort proved futile, however. Although the Vietnamese attackers suffered substantial losses, the Khmer Rouge base complex at Phnom Malai was overrun and its headquarters at Phum Thmei completely destroyed. An important effect of the Vietnamese dry-season campaign was to compel the Khmer resistance factions to forsake their static defense permanent base camps in favor of a return to guerrilla warfare to regain battlefield initiative. For this, the Khmer Rouge has the most experience and is in a better position to cope with the Vietnamese than the other resistance factions. In the future, this may affect the balance of power in the CGDK by further weakening the two non-Communist partners in the shaky alliance.
Sihanoukist and KPNLF resistance fighters announce that they will set up a joint military command. Although the two sides seem to have put aside their long-standing differences, the details of the command structure have yet to be worked out. A major task will be to find a chief, with a leading candidate appearing to be General Sak Sutsakhan, recently appointed KPNLF supreme commander. A similar move to coordinate militarily with the third resistance force, the Khmer Rouge, has not been undertaken and appears unlikely.


Hanoi's dry-season offensive of November 1984 severely shook the morale and motivation of the KPNLF, the non-Communist Khmer insurgent faction that bore the brunt of the attacks. The Vietnamese military operations dislodged the insurgents from their base camps at Ampil, Nong Chan, and elsewhere. The authors attribute these reverses to the faulty strategy of adopting a static defense in the face of a superior enemy force. As a result of its losses, the KPNLF may now have lost its effectiveness as a fighting force, at least for 1985. The movement's leadership appears to have shifted to a policy of classic guerrilla warfare, conducted well away from the border, but its troops remain untried in this type of combat. The Khmer Rouge also was subjected to punishing Vietnamese attacks against its base area at Phnom Malai. However, it emerged from the enemy onslaught with its combat capabilities intact because it refused to commit itself to the defense of untenable border positions. The Khmer Rouge leadership has placed great emphasis on maintaining steady guerrilla pressure around the Tonle Sap, Cambodia's strategic heartland, and it was partly to counter this policy and to draw the Khmer Rouge into defending its base complex that Hanoi's forces attacked Phnom Malai, but the ruse did not work. Khmer Rouge forces remained relatively unscathed and, in 1985, are likely to pursue the same tactics as before: attack when in strength; withdraw when outnumbered. For the time being, the Khmer Rouge remains the only viable fighting force opposing the Vietnamese in Cambodia.


Pol Pot is reported to have stressed in the course of two secret meetings that he was not worried about losing the border base camps because now he would not have to "look two ways at once" and would be free to concentrate on guerrilla operations inside Cambodia. Both the Communist Khmer Rouge and the two non-Communist factions in the CGDK argue that the Vietnamese offensive was a blessing in disguise because it forced them from their defensive positions and obliged them to adopt guerrilla tactics. The rainy season which usually begins in May and lasts till October is held to favor guerrillas over conventionally equipped troops. The three resistance factions will be under pressure from their allies to prove their guerrilla skills quickly (preferably before the fall) when the United Nations considers Cambodia's credentials for admission.
KPNLF leaders held a secret meeting in March at an undisclosed location along the Cambodian border to discuss their future. The meeting was presided over by Son Sann, who insisted on the need to maintain strict discipline among the movement's troops. KPNLF units are reported to be operating again inside Cambodia with some 400 soldiers from the Ritthisen camp recently having been sent deep into the country.

In the wake of defeats inflicted by the Vietnamese dry-season offensive of late 1984, the three Khmer resistance factions have changed their tactics. Large permanent base camps have been abandoned, and the insurgents are resorting to guerrilla warfare. Such tactics have long been the forte of the Khmer Rouge, however, now its non-Communist partners in the CERK are following suit as well. The new method of fighting involves sending squads of armed insurgents deep into Cambodia on ambushes and long-range patrols. "We conduct tactical hit-and-run operations in small teams, then withdraw," notes ANS leader and spokesman Prince Norodom Ranariddh. The Khmer Rouge, for its part, has adopted the practice of planting mines on roads frequented by military traffic and has penetrated as far as the outskirts of Phnom Penh, where its heightened presence reportedly prevents Soviet advisors from leaving the Cambodian capital except under heavy guard.

Since December 1978, the central issue in the international politics of Southeast Asia has been the Vietnamese invasion and subsequent occupation of Cambodia. Confronted by this event, the ASEAN states have sought to exert diplomatic pressure on Hanoi to withdraw its forces from its smaller, embattled neighbor. Failing in this effort, the ASEAN states (and China) have furnished a modest quantity of armaments to the Khmer insurgent groups to stiffen their resistance to the Vietnamese occupiers of their country. Hanoi, for its part, maintains that it was justified in overthrowing the despotic and brutal regime of Pol Pot, and that the situation in Cambodia is irreversible. In this volume, the contributors discuss the conflict from the point of view of each party involved in the dispute. The Thai perspective is presented in a separate essay by official spokesman for the Ministry of Foreign Affairs in Bangkok.