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A Selective, Annotated Bibliography on the Nations of South Asia

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A SELECTIVE, ANNOTATED BIBLIOGRAPHY ON
THE NATIONS OF SOUTH ASIA

December 1982

Author: Barbara A. LePoer
PREFACE

This bibliography contains citations of monographs and serial articles relating to the countries of the Indian Subcontinent: Afghanistan, Bangladesh, Bhutan, India, Maldives, Nepal, Pakistan, and Sri Lanka. The compilation is selective and is intended principally as a reference work for research on the foreign relations, governments, and politics of the nations concerned. The bibliography is cumulative for 1982 and includes citations reported in the previous issue of this publication.

The user of previous bibliographies in this series may wish to note some changes in organization. This bibliography is divided into nine sections, one for each of the eight countries plus an opening section of general South Asian interest and reference. Each section is subdivided into monographs and serials, with the view toward aiding the reader who wishes to identify quickly a longer treatment of a particular subject.

Monographs are listed alphabetically by author or by title where no author is given. Wherever a copy of material being cited could be obtained, a brief abstract, review, or summary is presented with the citation. Where existence of a work was reported (e.g., in publishers' notices, review articles, etc.) but a copy could not be obtained by the time of publication, the monograph is merely cited, or cited with minimal description. Included among the monographs are some entries dated before 1982. In some cases these are books of scholarly interest listed in previous bibliographies of this series, but not described; in other cases they are materials not previously identified but considered useful and worth including here.

Serials are listed chronologically, thus affording the reader the opportunity to move progressively through the events of the year, and optimally to find accounts of particular events reasonably clustered together. Quarterly precede monthlies, which are followed by weeklies and dailies organized by date. Two entries of the same date are alphabetized by the name of the serial and thereunder by the author's name.

Contributors to this volume are Barbara A. LePöer, Douglas C. Makeig, and Russell R. Ross. Word processing was accomplished by Patti Saltsman.
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A SELECTIVE, ANNOTATED BIBLIOGRAPHY
OF THE NATIONS OF SOUTH ASIA

1. GENERAL INTEREST AND REFERENCE

a. Monographs


The authors trace the growth of civilization in South Asia from Paleolithic times through the great civilizations of the Indus Valley to the emergence of regional cultures and the spread of Indo-Aryan peoples. The book ends with the early Buddhist period and the rise of city-states in northern India and Pakistan. A revised version of the authors' The Birth of Indian Civilization (Penguin, 1968), the book includes recent scientific and archaeological discoveries. (bibliography, illustrations, index)


This book comprises a collection of papers from an international conference on the Indian Ocean held in Australia. It is divided into three sections on the roles of regional powers, external powers, and international organizations in the Indian Ocean. The book includes particularly useful papers on India and the Soviet Union, but is lacking discussions on the interests of Pakistan, Bangladesh, or Japan.


The authors, who have close ties with the Reagan administration, view the danger of Soviet military action in the Indian Ocean area as an immediate threat to the US vital interest of access to Persian Gulf oil. They emphasize the importance of Pakistan and support the prepositioning of US equipment there and the use of Pakistan as an American surrogate in the Gulf. Other essays in the volume deal with the growth of the importance of seapower and the need for a permanent US presence in the Indian Ocean, and present an analysis of the Strait of Hormuz.


This collection of essays on Islam written by Muslims covers a century of Islamic contact with the West and a search for Islamic religious identity in a modern world. Of South Asian interest are several essays on Islam in the subcontinent, both under the British and in the post-independence era of secular India. Several essays taken together as a case study examine the reemergence of Islam in Pakistan.

This interesting collection of essays on the military and ethnicity in Asia unfortunately does not include papers on Pakistan or Afghanistan. Included are papers dealing with ethnicity and the military in precolonial and postcolonial Burma, India, China, and Vietnam and in the postcolonial era in China, Malaysia, Singapore, and Indonesia. The British policy of selecting certain Indian races or classes for the army and rejecting others was well established by the late 19th century and by World War I characterized most of the army patterns of recruitment and organization. The paper by Ellinwood examines these patterns and how they were affected by the war. (bibliography)


"In this study an attempt is made to provide an understanding of some of the major energy issues faced by the policymakers of the nations of Asia and the Pacific, offering options and policy choices where appropriate." Information on the following topics are included: future suppliers of petroleum; energy demand and rising oil prices; nuclear power in the Asia-Pacific region; China in Asia's energy development; and environmental aspects of energy development. (tables, graphs, index)


The editors have compiled a brief but objective study of the intentions, aims, and practices of Soviet policy in the Third World. The book is divided into two sections composed of papers by experts in their fields. The first section investigates general aspects of Soviet-Third World relations and includes analyses of political, ideological, military, and economic factors. The chapter on trade is especially informative. Moscow's commercial ties with its trading partners in Asia, Africa, and Latin America are considered in some detail. Maps and charts abound, providing handy references. The second section examines Soviet policy in major regions of the Third World: the Middle East, Afghanistan, Iran, Turkey, Southeast Asia, and Africa. The format offers a historical background and introduction for each region, followed by substantive commentary, and concludes with a summary evaluation. If there is a pervasive theme in the book, it is that the Soviet Union is essentially opportunistic rather than adventurist, and wherever possible seeks to counter, balance, or replace Western and/or Chinese influence.


This is by far the most comprehensive source book on China's South Asian relations from 1947-1980. These two volumes contain 973 documents which
include statements by leaders of China and South Asia and full texts of important cultural, economic, and trade agreements and joint communiques. In addition, there are press interviews with government leaders and significant articles, editorials, and commentaries published in the Chinese press. Forty-five tables and appendixes present important data on commercial, cultural, economic, political, and sports exchanges, and Chinese aid projects of both arms and supplies. All documents are chronologically arranged. Volume I deals exclusively with China and India; Volume II is arranged by countries and conflicts among South Asian nations. The major flaw is the lack of a historical introduction to each crisis, period, or topic.


This is a small but useful general text on South Asian geography, including excellent maps, tables, and graphs. The opening section presents an overview of South Asia and a closing chapter discusses each of the major cities of the region. The intervening chapters deal with each of the countries separately, focusing on their economy, agriculture, industry, development, people, and politics. (illustrations, index, maps, tables)


This book examines the role of the Indian Ocean region in the international system and its relationship to other regions, particularly in regard to superpower interests and strategies.


Part I of this useful book surveys nations having nuclear energy programs, factors in considering a nuclear program, the economics of nuclear power, and the interplay between scientists and governments in dealing with nuclear power. Part II consists of country studies, including India (by R. R. Subramanian and C. Raja Mohan) and Pakistan (by Shirin Tahir-Kheli). Most of the studies were written by a national of the particular country who was asked to examine particularly the following topics: motives for undertaking a nuclear program; an evaluation of the scientific establishment at the outset of the program; how decisions were made in terms of nuclear vs. nonnuclear energy resources, reactor types, and foreign involvement; the relative role in the decision process played by scientists, civil servants, political leaders, and elites; and the interrelationship of politics, development, and decisionmaking in the country under study.

This study of security policies of key developing countries includes chapters on Pakistan (by Stephen Philip Cohen) and India (by Raju G. C. Thomas). The opening chapter contains a set of useful tables comparing data on each of the countries—military expenditures, 1969 and 1978; arms imports, 1969-73 and 1974-78; and domestic defense production, 1965, 1975, and 1979. The authors of each of the country studies address the following topics: perceptions of the external world, including threat analysis and strategic doctrine; force levels and disposition; weapons acquisitions and arms transfers; internal foci of security; and the military role in decisionmaking.


Volume 10 in Gale's International Relations Information Series is a selective annotated bibliography of English-language books and articles. The scope of the volume includes the international relations of the following South Asian nations: India, Pakistan, Bangladesh (formerly East Pakistan), Sri Lanka (formerly Ceylon), Nepal, Sikkim, Bhutan, and Afghanistan.


Maureen Patterson, the preeminent bibliographer in the area of South Asian studies, has devised an indispensable reference tool. She has drawn together over 28,000 periodical and monographic references to humanistic, social science, and nontechnical works on South Asia. These include works that date from the earliest times to the present day, and works in South Asian as well as Western languages. The citations are organized in accordance with indigenous South Asian concepts and categories within the threefold dimensions of time, space, and topic. These units and their relationships are first laid out in an outline of headings that comprise a self-contained reference outline of Indic civilization. Each unit and its subdivisions are then presented as the headings for the bibliographic sections that form the body of the book. The conceptual structure, in combination with author and subject indexes, offers the reader several means of access to the citations themselves, making South Asian Civilizations a work that will be of great use to a wide audience.


"A first-class book, by far the best book on arms sales"—Cyrus Vance; "The indispensable starting point for serious examination of the politics of arms sales"—McGeorge Bundy; "Will remain the standard work for years to come"—Stanley Hoffman; "A major work, not just in the literature of arms sales but
in the broader domain of international politics as well"--Brig Gen Peter Dawkins; "The most comprehensive book on arms trade"--Leslie Gelb; "Should be carefully studied by every member of Congress and by every citizen"--Townsend Hoopes; "A sophisticated analysis of arms sales as an integral part of international politics"--Barry Blechman.


This comprehensive guide to South Asian resources in Washington, D.C. is part of a series of guides sponsored by the Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars. The guide is divided into two sections—collections and organizations. Under collections are listed: libraries, archives, and manuscript repositories; museums, galleries, and art collections; sound recordings; map collections; film collections; and data banks. Under organizations can be found: research centers; academic programs and departments; US government agencies; South Asian embassies and international organizations; associations; cultural exchange and technical assistance organizations; religious organizations; and publications and media. Several appendixes add further information on such things as bookstores, and there are several indexes to help the user focus more precisely on the subject of his search. Sometimes so much information is included about the organizations or repositories that it is difficult to quickly sort out the South Asian holdings from the other material. (Appendixes, indexes)


This book sheds light on current US policies and problems in South Asia by tracing the formulation of the American position on the region during the Johnson and Nixon administrations. Included are discussions on food and economic aid, Diego Garcia, and the rearmament of Pakistan. The editor presents a number of policy recommendations based on the analyses.


This pamphlet is part of the series entitled Iconography of Religions.

Shapiro and Schiffman begin with an overview of the subcontinent's languages, then move on to a systematic analysis of India's linguistic diversity. Multilingual competence, the authors contend, is a central factor in the social life of South Asians in general and Indians in particular. The main attraction of this book is its comprehensive survey of South Asian sociolinguists, which will prove immensely helpful for researchers and scholars. Equally impressive are the authors' painstaking efforts to document the multiple sources of information in an exhaustive bibliography. (bibliography, illustrations)


This yearly report on the activities, strengths, and official dealings of various Communist party organizations around the globe includes separate sections on the countries of South Asia. Eliza van Holten writes on Afghanistan; Walter Andersen handles Communist party activities in India and Bangladesh; and Barbara Reid writes about Sri Lanka. All the articles contain brief summaries of the Communist movement in each country and notable events of the past year.


The purpose of the 1981 Military Symposium from which this collection of papers is drawn was to examine the nature of the US commitment to Southwest Asia, to analyze constraints on US policy, and to offer options for American decisionmakers. The symposium was sponsored by the Strategic Studies Institute at the US Army War College, Carlisle, Pennsylvania. Some basic agreements that came out of the discussion sessions of the symposium included: 1) there is a lack of consensus among American policymakers on what US national interests in the area really are, which results in US policy appearing disjointed and halting; 2) US strategy appears fatalistic and its response always seems to be too little and too late; 3) policymakers need to be well educated in Islamic sensitivities, regional cultures, and local traditions; and 4) US political leadership must generate multiple options for the area, vividly articulate US national interests, and understand the consequences of deviation therefrom. The chapter on "Pakistan Since the Soviet Invasion of Afghanistan" examines Pakistan's security situation since that event and analyzes Islamabad's security options. (bibliography, maps)


Soviet naval power in Northeast Asia and the Indian Ocean are treated in this two-part study, which, although dated, is useful for its historical background. Early Soviet naval activity in the Indian Ocean is discussed, as
well as the buildup of the Diego Garcia naval base by the United States. Two long appendices show photos and give specifications of Soviet naval surface and submarine vessels in the Far East.


The six island countries included in this study are Maldives, Comoros, Madagascar, Mauritius, Reunion, and Seychelles, all of which support efforts to have the Indian Ocean declared a "zone of peace." The profile of each country includes information on such topics as politics, demography, culture, economy, physical geography, transportation facilities, energy, and communications.


The author, a longtime academic specialist on South Asia, sketches a brief outline of the subcontinent. Chapters on Islam, the Great Game, and Washington's South Asia policy all gloss over the "high points" of each era and provide precious little narrative to hold the whole work together. The only exception to the brief lectures in history is the final chapter where the author gives his own advice to the State Department in the wake of the Soviet occupation of Afghanistan. Wolpert discourages US arming of the Afghan rebels and comes out in favor of South Asian detente and a substantial US economic recovery program. (bibliography, index, maps)


Begun more than 10 years ago and carried forward to early 1981, this work focuses on Southwest Asia, an area Ziring believes will be for the 1980s what Southeast Asia was to the 1960s. He is convinced this area is of primary strategic/geopolitical significance to the US, and that it may form the historical pivot for the remaining decades of the 20th century. The author regards the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan as a direct consequence of the failure of American influence in Iran and maintains that it would be equally possible to argue that the Soviet invasion represented a failure in the foreign policy of the USSR. He predicts that Iran is destined for an experiment with Marxism, while only deeply troubled Turkey may escape the spreading shadow of the Soviet Union. Ziring's dire warning is that the
northern tier of states in Southwest Asia is in the process of being transformed into the Soviet's southern tier of buffer states as the Russians play out their strategy and influence in the area. Specialists will find many points to dispute in such a wide-ranging analysis. The book is sound in its overall analysis, well documented (though from secondary sources essentially), and tightly written. However, it lacks fresh interpretation and has now been overtaken by events, rendering the narrative clearly outdated. (bibliography, index)

b. Serials


Unlike most Indian analysts who place great store in attempts by the littoral states to pressure the US and USSR to withdraw their naval forces from the Indian Ocean, Vivekanandan believes the Zone of Peace initiative is "an exercise in futility." The author argues that neither side in the great power rivalry will back down in the Indian Ocean, least of all the Soviets who have demonstrated an increasingly aggressive military posture in the region in recent years. Like Tito's ill-fated attempt to demilitarize the Mediterranean, the author believes the IZOP proposal is a nonstarter that ignores the geostrategic realities of the Indian Ocean and Persian Gulf. As an alternative, he recommends that the concerned states of the area concentrate on striving for "a balancing presence of the various navies at a minimum level in the Indian Ocean, so that no single navy would be in a position to pose a real danger to the stability and security of any littoral state."


The Indian Ocean has a long history of strategic importance dating from classical times. With the British withdrawal from the Indian subcontinent, a regional power vacuum of sorts arose, which both the United States and the Soviet Union have since maneuvered to fill. The article details the American buildup and cites the numerous advantages gained for the US defense establishment by the construction of the naval base on Diego Garcia and maintenance of a naval presence in the Ocean. Details of the Soviet presence in the Indian Ocean are given as well. US-Soviet talks on demilitarizing the region have been on hold since the Afghanistan invasion. The reaction of the littoral states to superpower presence in the Ocean has been uniformly negative. Both US and Soviet buildups are considered a violation of the "zone of peace" that the littoral states would prefer to see established in the Indian Ocean.

This entire issue comprises a very useful collection of summary articles on the 1981 political situation in India, Pakistan, Nepal, Bangladesh, and Sri Lanka.


The 1980s have brought South Asia into the foreground of superpower rivalry. Since the Soviet occupation of Afghanistan much of the focus of this rivalry has been on Pakistan. While the United States has resumed its military aid to Pakistan, the Soviets have applied both positive and negative pressure to enlist Pakistani cooperation for a resolution of the Afghan situation. Pakistan has responded by resisting any accommodation with the Soviets while simultaneously refraining from giving substantial support to the Afghan guerrilla movement. Both India and the Soviets have worked hard at maintaining the friendship between their countries in spite of the events in Afghanistan. US-Pakistani relations have improved markedly since the Afghanistan invasion brought about a convergence of their interests. Pakistan, however, continues to resist any establishment of US bases or facilities on Pakistani soil. Indo-Pakistani relations continue to be influenced greatly by each country's perception of the other's relations with the superpowers.


Representatives of seven South Asian countries (Bangladesh, Nepal, India, Maldives, Bhutan, Sri Lanka, and Pakistan) met in Islamabad in early August to discuss regional cooperation. Plans were laid for expansion of studies in progress on possible areas of cooperation, and a commitment was made for a ministerial-level meeting next year.


The US presence in the Indian Ocean is described as a move to establish military and political domination over the region and turn it into a "raw material appendage" for Washington. The littoral nations of the Indian Ocean have responded by attempting to set up a "zone of peace" free of nuclear weapons or foreign military buildup in the area. The Soviet Union supports the establishment of such a zone for the self-stated reasons of security of its southern borders, security of the only ice-free sea route between Soviet Europe and Soviet Asia, security of its vessels in the Indian Ocean carrying out research on the peaceful uses of outer space, and the security of nations in the region that are friends and allies of the Soviet Union. The United States, on the other hand, has taken a totally negative view of the zone of peace proposal, according to the article.

Islamic political leaders have long maintained that it is not sufficient for a Muslim country to be ruled by Muslims or to have Islamic laws governing personal behavior laws. Rather, the whole society and state should be founded on Islam. And yet, a blueprint for achieving an Islamic state has yet to be devised. The author surveys such attempts in Pakistan, Iran, Malaysia, and Indonesia.


Bangladesh's UN Ambassador Farooq Sobhan is the newly elected chairman of the so-called Group of 77, composed of members representing the 125-plus non-aligned nations of the world. A central goal of the group is to promote global negotiations toward a new world economic order. The article details the background, plans, and prospects of the organization.
2. AFGHANISTAN

a. Monographs


A detailed analysis of Pukhtun (Pushtun, Pathan) tribal social organization is presented based on fieldwork of the author when he served as a political agent in Mohmand Agency. Dr. Ahmed, an anthropologist of Pushtun descent, is the author of an earlier work Millenium and Charisma Among Pathans: A Critical Essay in Social Anthropology (Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1976).


An impassioned and rather primitively written plea for support of the Afghan insurgency, this volume adheres closely to the official line of the Zia regime. The author views the Soviet occupation as a menace to the subcontinent and to the Muslim world in general. The author's thesis is that the anti-Soviet campaign provides Muslims with a golden opportunity to seize the initiative, close ranks, and present the superpowers with a unified Islamic front. Not surprisingly, the author sees a role for Pakistan as the leader of this Islamic alliance.


The author was a US intelligence analyst in Afghanistan before the Soviet invasion. He traces, in a balanced and convincing manner, the course of Soviet-Afghan relations since 1919. There is a great deal of information on the events leading up to the Soviet takeover in 1979. He reveals what he sees as a consistent pattern of Soviet aggression through three post World War II phases. (bibliography, index, map)

The author analyzes the importance of *buzkashi*, the traditional Afghan folk game, in terms of its political and social significance. A parallel is suggested between the unfortunate headless calf that serves as the object of contention between teams of horsemen and Afghanistan itself caught between the forces of international rivalry. *Buzkashi* is examined as it relates to the provincial society and politics of northern Afghanistan. The game, which spread southward in the 19th century, was established as a national sport in 1953 by Prime Minister Mohammed Daoud. The annual Kabul *buzkashi* serves as a framework for observing political power in Afghanistan since that time. (footnotes, illustrations, index)


"Guerrilla warfare has consistently been the choice of the weak who oppose the strong, for it enables them to avoid direct decisive confrontations and rely on harassment and surprise." The book is divided into two parts: stories and analysis. The first chapter, written as a report by Chaliand for the International Institute for Strategic Studies (London) is entitled "The Bargain War in Afghanistan." It concludes that the Afghan resistance movement is extremely popular, and lacks weapons, not manpower. In terms of leadership and organization the movement is extremely weak. The insurgents, made up largely of peasants led by their tribal chiefs, control most of the countryside while the Soviets hold the cities, main roads, and military outposts. The report analyzes Soviet tactics both in Afghanistan and in relation to the international scene, as well as the prospects, or lack thereof, for an early resolution of the situation. (bibliography)


The French journalist and author reports on his two visits to rebel-controlled areas of Afghanistan. He provides the reader with a brief view of the historical setting and the events between the 1978 Marxist coup and the December 1979 invasion of Afghanistan by Soviet troops. He concludes that Afghan nationalism is a weak and uncertain movement, mainly because Afghan loyalties are religious, ethnic and tribal, but that the burden of foreign domination could lend impetus to the forging of a national identity. The
author concludes, however, that because Afghanistan is too useful as a Soviet outpost, it is not likely to shake free of Soviet control. Its geographical position, bordering the Soviet Union and China and on the Soviet route to the Persian Gulf, virtually precludes that. Meanwhile, Western diplomats are uncertain whether the Soviets have taken the first step in a more ambitious regional strategy or merely have executed a contained local maneuver. The author concludes with a brief analysis of the effect of the Soviet invasion on global politics. (annotated bibliography, chronology, index, maps)


A collection of 28 firsthand accounts by foreigners in Afghanistan, starting with Marco Polo and leading up to the present-day. Included are accounts of wars, massacres, sieges, and imprisonments, as well as descriptions of cities, countryside, and the courts of Tamerlane and other rulers through the centuries.


This six-part study of secular Marxism in Afghanistan from 1901-80 contains a detailed narrative of events precipitating the Saur (April) Revolution of 1978. The author views the coup against Daoud as being free of superpower involvement and occurring as a concomitant of the internal political dynamics in Afghanistan. Dupree, a noted anthropologist with an irreverent writing style, also narrates the Soviet invasion of December and the indomitable Afghan resistance movement which arose from it.


Outside of Asia, the most meaningful collection of archival material on the history of Afghanistan from the 17th to the mid-20th centuries is located in the Indian Office Records. The first part of the work gives a chronological overview of primary sources for nine periods beginning with the foundation of the East India Company and culminating around 1950. The second part comprises the records of the British Legation in Kabul from 1923 to 1948 and the following five appendixes: I. Summary list of principal India Office Records series relating to Afghanistan; II. Archival materials in other repositories; III. Representatives of the Government of India and the British Government in Afghanistan 1856-1947; IV. Rulers in Afghanistan 1747-1973; V. Glossary of races, tribes and leading families in Afghanistan. This reference work is printed privately and may be ordered from the
Indian Office Library and Records, 197 Blackfriars Road, London SE1 8NG, Great Britain.


A bibliography of both monographs and serials, this reference work is divided by subject area: general and reference works, geography, history, social organizations, social evaluation and institutions, political structure, economic structure, languages and literature, and art and archaeology. Annotations are brief and often nonexistent. Non-English language material is included, and there is an author-title index in the back of the book. The cutoff date is stated to be January 1982, but seems in most cases to be closer to early 1981. The number of entries (3,500) has doubled since the previous (third) edition.


In attempting to show how the present crisis in Afghanistan was reached, the author examines the Saur revolution and the two succeeding coups. He outlines the reforms forced on traditional Afghan society by the various governments and the resistance to them. Centers of Afghan opposition to the Soviet-supported government after 1979 are discussed as well as shown by map. The balance between the disintegrating Afghan Army and the divided Afghan opposition is examined, as well as prospects for the future of Afghanistan. In a postscript written in April 1982, the author notes that new forms of leadership are emerging among the opposition forces including: younger, better educated persons, not necessarily traditional, but working with the maliks and mullahs; more involvement of women; and new cooperation between old enemies and rivals. A grim picture is painted of life in Afghanistan and prospects for improvement in the near future. (bibliography, index, maps, photos, tables)


A West German Communist journalist sets out to bring back a "true" account of the "undeclared war waged by world reaction against Afghanistan." He visits government-controlled areas, notes the normal activities of the people and concludes that accounts of heavy fighting are simply unreliable reports spread by "Western propaganda media." The author touches briefly on mujahidin atrocities and their depredations against civilian targets. He describes at some length Soviet-Afghan relations and sums up motives for the 1979 intervention by noting that the USSR, "bound to Afghanistan by ties of more than sixty years of friendship and cooperation, came to the aid of the Afghan people in their struggle for the new life."

"The idea for this book arose from a visit to Kabul in March 1979 when it became immediately obvious that what was happening in Afghanistan bore little relation to reports appearing in the Western media." The author, accordingly, refutes both Western and Soviet accounts of the Socialist revolution in Afghanistan and the events that followed. The hero of the account is Hafizullah Amin. Charges by Amin's enemies on both the left and the right that Amin was a ruthless dictator are denied. Western journalists are particularly blamed for misrepresenting events in Afghanistan by ignoring statements and interviews with Amin and Prime Minister Taraki in favor of information from anonymous dissident students and leaders of the counter-revolution. (bibliography, index, tables)


An anthropological and historical study of two isolated hill tribes that were hemmed in the barren Wakhan Corridor after access to China and the USSR grazing lands was cut off. The book covers the groups' most recent flight to Pakistan after the Soviet occupation of Afghanistan in December 1979. (bibliography, illustrations, index)


b. Serials


A common error in evaluation of Soviet foreign policy is the assumption that the Soviet leadership is less prone to blunders than Western leadership.
There are at least four factors that might promote miscalculation in Soviet foreign policy: the tendency of the leadership to believe its own ideology and propaganda; the centralized, restricted nature of the Soviet decision-making process; the quality of analysis by its foreign affairs specialists; and the condition of its top leadership. Soviet foreign policy blunders have occurred in Algeria, Congo, Cuba, Egypt, Ghana, Mali, Sudan, and Togo. Included among the evidence of a blunder in Afghanistan is the argument that had the Soviets realized the strength of the Afghan resistance, they would have invaded with better trained, more appropriately equipped troops. The costly dilemma now facing the Soviet leadership is whether it can afford to pay the price of "winning" in Afghanistan (if a meaningful victory is even possible) or, on the other hand, whether it can afford the cost of "failure."


For the Soviet military, the operations in Afghanistan have provided an opportunity to test an array of new weapons as well as counterinsurgency tactics and the effectiveness of Soviet troops in conducting antiguerilla warfare. The United States should closely monitor the Soviet campaign, as the Soviets monitored US operations in Vietnam. The Soviet efforts in Afghanistan extend beyond military operations to include infiltration of the mujahidin by the KGB and remodeling the Afghan legal and educational systems along Soviet lines. Moscow also is undertaking projects to develop the country's infrastructure. This includes plans for construction of a second bridge across the Amu Darya (Oxus) River, a rail line into Kabul, the upgrading of airfields, and installation of air cushion vehicle cargo platforms to link the Soviet river port of Termez with Afghan cities along the Amu Darya. Military tactics used by the Soviets include the use of conventional motorized rifle troops to back up elite heliborne commando troops. Three types of chemical weapons reportedly have been used in about half of Afghanistan's provinces.


The Soviet invasion of Afghanistan is perceived as a carefully planned step in a much larger strategy of developing a southern tier of friendly, supportive nations across the Asian rimland from Vietnam to North Africa. This strategy is being pressed forward at a time when Soviet power is seen (by the Russians themselves in particular, and the world in general) to be in the ascendancy and US power in decline. The author draws some grim scenarios, which include: the dismemberment of Afghanistan into a northern section integrated into the Soviet Union; "independent" states of Baluchistan and Pushtunistan (incorporating parts of Pakistan); a weakened Socialist Pakistan as a buffer for a post-Gandhi Socialist India; and a Socialist Iran. US options in countering this are seen as limited, but centering on covert support and training of Afghan guerrillas (who could be used against the Cubans in Africa, if all else fails), better control of the US press, and
convincing Mrs. Gandhi to use her influence with the Kremlin in support of a political settlement.


Cover story notes that 2 years after the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan, the resistance, active within all of the country's 28 provinces, has grounds for self-congratulation. Observers traveling behind rebel lines report that the mujahidin now appear better armed, organized, coordinated, and prepared psychologically to confront the Soviet occupation forces than ever before. Diplomatic informants also report a perceptible deterioration in road security during the last year as a result of increased guerrilla ambushes and increased daylight attacks. In spite of this, there is no expectation that the guerrilla fighters can defeat the Soviets in a conventional military engagement fought on Soviet terms. To do so, the mujahidin would need more and heavier weapons and sufficient unity among guerrilla movements to place large military formations in the field.


The author summarizes the 2d year of Soviet occupation as a further setback for the Kremlin's plan of installing a pliant Communist regime in Kabul. The Karmal regime is torn by internal divisions; the Army is suffering from defections and poor morale; and the security situation in the countryside has deteriorated badly, due to mujahidin attacks. Economically, Afghanistan is slowly being drawn into the Socialist bloc and ties with the West have been severed for the most part. After expertly summing up the stakes involved in the Afghan independence movement, the author pointedly asks whether the United States and the world community have enough determination to assist the Afghans in dislodging the Soviets from their country.


Moscow's determination to crush the Islamic resistance and maintain a pliant Communist regime in power shows no end in sight. After visiting Kabul, staff writers for the magazine report that Soviet control extends little beyond the daylight hours in the centralmost districts of the capital city.


Russian military forces in Afghanistan are trying new carrot-and-stick tactics. Afghans prepared to cooperate with the regime in Kabul are offered a remarkable amount of freedom. Villagers who keep the guerrillas out of their areas can choose their own leaders and can request financial aid from the government. Inhabitants who continue to resist or shelter insurgents, however, are punished ruthlessly by Russian scorched earth tactics, indiscriminate bombings, and summary executions.

Six analysts at a US army academy try their hand at piecing together the strategic implications of the Soviet decision to invade Afghanistan in December 1979. After detailing the elements of surprise and massive show of force that were involved in the first days of the occupation, the authors draw some tentative comparisons and contrasts with similar Soviet maneuvers in Hungary, Czechoslovakia, Poland, and the Middle East.


US and Western support for the mujahidin in the form of such weapons as Red Eye surface-to-air missiles is urged as a means of forcing the Soviet Union to discuss a nonaligned Afghanistan and the withdrawal of Soviet troops. The mujahidin are viewed as a badly divided but determined force, while the Soviets are pictured as ruthless but demoralized and isolated both by guerrilla forces and world opinion.


After surveying the Afghanistan situation more than 2 years after the Soviet invasion, the author draws the following conclusions: 1) rather than a daring extension of influence, the invasion appears to have been more of a colossal blunder, demonstrating that "great power does not insulate its holder from great mistakes"; 2) in the formulation of decisions by the superpowers in the Third World, greater allowance must be made for the elusiveness of "popular support"; and 3) the United States should not attach too much significance to Soviet inability to achieve its goals in Afghanistan. The article examines the Soviet experience in Afghanistan in terms of Moscow's current policy, the range of options available to Kremlin policymakers, and factors affecting these options.

"Another Afghanistan." Asiaweek, 12 March 1982, p. 16.

Propagandists of the Karmal regime paint a rosy picture of conditions in wartorn Afghanistan. Life in the country is depicted as "calm and quiet as it always was" with government bulletins describing the post-Daoud years as "a period of prosperity and progress."


The Soviets are trying a subtle new tactic in Afghanistan. They are encouraging local culture and traditions in different parts of the country in the hope that Afghans will turn away from thoughts of national identity, which is the mainspring of the resistance to Soviet occupation.

A combined Soviet and Afghan Government offensive against the guerrilla redoubt of the Panjshir Valley caught the Afghan rebels by surprise and inflicted major losses. In a conventional attack that lasted nearly a week, Soviet and Afghan Government infantry supported by armor, heavy artillery, and airstrikes, advanced through the valley on two axes, killing up to 1,000 resistance fighters and civilian supporters. A major defeat was narrowly averted by the Afghan rebels when government forces failed to close one jaw of a pincer movement that was aimed at encircling the mujahidin units. Because many of the guerrillas narrowly escaped death or capture and managed to escape with their weapons, journalists have labeled the action the "Dunkirk of the Afghan Resistance."


Soviet propagandists are trying a new tactic in Afghanistan. The earlier strategy to polarize the Afghan population between the Pashtuns (who provide much of the driving force behind the anti-Soviet resistance) and the other ethnic groups by wooing the latter with special inducements has been abandoned. Instead, the Soviets are employing a more evenhanded approach to winning over the population. A recent appeal notes that "all nationalities and tribes" have equal rights and points out that the PDPA and DRA are committed to insuring those rights.


In a major punitive action that caused 600 guerrilla combat deaths plus 400 subsequent summary executions in the Sai'd Khel area of Parwan Province, Russian military forces have shown the will and capacity to inflict harsh reprisals on the mujahidin. Whether this tactic will set the tone of forthcoming Soviet strategy for Afghanistan remains to be seen. However, the Russian policy of massive, bludgeoning retaliation, irrespective of civilian casualties, has borne fruit in several areas, including Herat and Kandahar, where the urban population allegedly has requested the mujahidin to withdraw from these localities.


Soviet efforts to defeat the guerrillas continue to be hampered by the persistent rivalries that divide the Kabul regime. The recent PDPA congress which ended on 15 March apparently failed to heal the rift between the rival Parcham [Flag] and Khaq [Masses] factions. The conference itself produced a draft program for endorsement by the politbureau, but its real aim was to demonstrate consensus in PDPA ranks, a purpose which probably failed when seven people died in disputes and shootouts among party members.

The author sees Soviet encroachment into the Indian subcontinent as a calculated policy of expansionism that had its roots in the days of Czarist Russia. The results of this expansion have been felt most keenly by Pakistan, which may be the next target for the Kremlin. Acting in the role of safehaven for Afghan refugees and guerrilla partisans, Pakistan finds itself with few options but to oppose the inroads of the Soviet Union. The author predicts that Pakistan will some day have to open talks with the Karmal regime, with or without the participation of Iran or the Afghan political parties in Peshawar.


The author narrates a rather dry history of Socialist Afghanistan, starting with the Saur revolution, leading up to the purges within the Afghan Communist Party, and ending in the Soviet occupation of December 1979. Moscow, the author submits, is conducting a cynical propaganda campaign designed to cover up the brutality and naked aggression of Soviet troops.


The US State Department has been hard-pressed to satisfy sceptics that the USSR and its allies have used chemical weapons against the peoples of Afghanistan, Laos, and Cambodia. Last week, Secretary of State Alexander Haig once again stated Washington's case against Moscow in a 32-page report that documented over 10,000 deaths inflicted by chemical agents used or supplied by the USSR.


The author provides a short course in the history of Afghanistan from 1747 onward. The following reasons are given for the Soviet invasion in 1979: to counter US force in the Indian Ocean while the United States was distracted by the Iran hostage crisis; to prevent 30 years of Soviet gains in Afghanistan from dissolving; the potential annexation of Afghanistan's mineral and agricultural resources; paranoia over Chinese border threats; and the historic desire for warm-water ports. The Soviet strategy in Afghanistan has been two-pronged: attrition and Sovietization. Neither political solution nor weakening of the will of either the Soviets or the Afghan resistance appears anywhere on the horizon.

In the author's view, the 1978 coup in Kabul and particularly the December 1979 Soviet invasion have sharply increased the salience of Afghanistan and adjacent areas in the foreign policy thinking of China. Beijing views events there as part of a Soviet master plan aimed at controlling the oil routes of the Middle East, undermining the independence of Europe, and encircling China. The Chinese response has been to seek a united front with Western Europe, Japan, Pakistan, and the United States to counter Soviet expansionism.

"Old Bear in an Old Trap." The Economist, 8 May 1982, p. 68.

The mujahidin are once again on the offensive, undaunted by the setbacks suffered during one of the worst winters in memory. They have learned much in their 2½ years of fighting the Soviets and the puppet regime in Kabul, and they are better armed and equipped than at any previous time of the insurgency. However, their Soviet enemy also is now a much more formidable foe that has learned from its past mistakes and is adopting new tactics and new armaments to the Afghan battlefield.

"War of the Airwaves." India Today, 31 May 1982, p. 76.

The article covers the efforts of Bernard Henry-Levy and a network of French and Afghan supporters to set up a mujahidin broadcasting frequency inside occupied Afghanistan. The group's finances, accomplishments, and future plans are discussed.

Mehta, Jagat S. "A Neutral Solution." Foreign Policy, no. 47 (Summer 1982), pp. 139-53.

The continuing crisis in Afghanistan is the result of Soviet misadventures and misjudgments compounded by international misperceptions on the part of the United States. Soviet intervention in Afghanistan triggered such reactions as the massive rearmament of Pakistan and the Carter Doctrine which committed the United States to defend the Persian Gulf against any outside threat. This, in turn, led to buildup of both US and Soviet naval forces in the Indian Ocean. The positions staked out by each side are difficult ones from which to retreat. What is proposed, in order to return stability to the region and to Afghanistan in particular, is the "Swedenization" of South and Southwest Asia and a "Finlandized" Afghanistan. This is to be achieved by a regional conference of countries most affected (Pakistan, Iran, India, Saudia Arabia, United Arab Emirates, Bahrain, Qatar, and Oman) who would affirm their neutrality and nonaligned status, thus "Swedenizing" the region. After this buffer is established an enlarged group of nonaligned states would provide a peacekeeping group in Afghanistan to serve as observers while a new constitution is drawn up by a gathering of Afghan tribal representatives, elections are held, Soviet forces and Afghan refugees returned home, and an
Afghan-Soviet treaty negotiated along the lines of the Soviet-Finnish treaty.


The International Red Cross hopes to gain access to Afghan jails and prisoner-of-war camps and to place medical personnel on the battlefields in Afghanistan. The expectation comes on the heels of the release by the mujahidin of three Russian prisoners who are being flown to internment in Switzerland for 2 years, or for the duration of the war.


The latest Soviet and Afghan Army attempt to take the guerrilla redoubt of the Panjshir Valley appears to have been met with heavy resistance by the mujahidin. After severe fighting, the Afghan rebels of Burhanuddin Rabani's Jamiat-Islami claim to have killed 700 enemy and destroyed 21 aircraft, while acknowledging losses of 300 personnel, including civilians killed in air raids.


Soviet and Kabul regime forces are showing increasingly aggressive tactics in Afghanistan. In one operation against the rebel-held town of Kholm in Samangan Province, they reduced the city center to rubble by an artillery and mortar bombardment, killing 150 rebel fighters and 950 noncombatants, and abducted 4,000 villagers. The new tactics are proving effective against the mujahidin. By short, intensive assaults on key villages and towns, the Soviets are trying to free major communications routes and potential targets from the threat of mujahidin hit-and-run attacks.


Both sides are claiming victory in the recent Soviet and DRA offensive in the Panjshir Valley. Until the latest battles in the area, the Panjshir was the most liberated region of Afghanistan. It had become a symbol of the Afghan resistance because it had withstood several Soviet attempts to overrun it and had begun to flaunt its freedom, with rebels running schools, libraries, hospitals, law courts, and a radio station in the area. The Kabul regime reportedly has now moved two army regiments, three battalions of policemen, and 1,500 militia members to keep the valley in government hands.

For the first time in the Afghan crisis, Pakistan has exchanged views indirectly with representatives of the Kabul regime, using UN envoy Diego Cordovez as intermediary. Pakistani delegates in turn kept Iranian diplomats and Afghan insurgent leaders apprised of the proceedings. Iran had refused to attend the discussions and the insurgents deliberately were not invited. In the meantime, the Afghan rebel organizations headquartered in Peshawar are worried that the Pakistanis, having exploited the Soviet invasion to win US arms and diplomatic support, are now ready to defuse the Afghan issue to patch up their own relations with Moscow.


The article examines the complex relationships that exist between Soviet Islam and the Islamic revival outside the USSR. The author looks first at the attitude of the Soviet leadership and the official Muslim hierarchy in the USSR toward the revolutions in Iran and Afghanistan. Soviet leadership is seen as viewing militant Islam in a positive light because of its anti-imperialist and anti-Western nature. The Soviets have also tried to project an image of tolerance toward the Islamic population within its borders, numbering about 40 million. In Afghanistan, the Soviets have taken particular pains to portray the battle against the Afghan rebels as a "just war of the Afghan people for true democratic justice, for respect of the sacred Islamic tradition . . . ." The article describes other measures by the Soviets in Afghanistan to win acceptance through deference to Islam. The author also discusses the current state of Islam within the USSR and documents the approval by the official Soviet Muslim establishment of the Afghanistan invasion. The author discusses ways in which the Kremlin may use Islamic fundamentalism to serve purposes of Soviet expansion in Muslim areas. He concludes that Western analysts should concern themselves with how the rising level of political disaffection in the Muslim world may favor the Soviet Union's strategic interests in the Middle East.


There have been signs of an impending change of leadership in the Soviet-backed Afghanistan Government. President Babrak Karmal, who recently spent a month in Moscow, is reported to be seriously ill. Meanwhile Defense Minister Mohammad Rafie spent 6 months in the Soviet Union undergoing training. The Soviets are believed to favor an Afghan Government with a stronger military flavor rather than one bogged down in party politics as is the Karmal government. The Soviets would also favor a more national-front type of government with more tribal and provincial representation in order to present a more acceptable and legitimate face to the outside world.

The author, who spent part of his childhood in Afghanistan, served as an interpreter-observer for the Paris-based International Federation for Human Rights, and interrogated hundreds of Afghans both in refugee camps and while traveling clandestinely in Afghanistan. The article consists mainly of transcripts of taped interviews dealing with the horrors of the Soviet takeover of the country, both before and after the actual December 1979 troop invasion. The interviews include accounts of imprisonment, torture, mass execution, and use of such weapons as antipersonnel mines, incendiary bombs, napalm, chemical weapons, and helicopter-borne troops. The common thread running through the interviews is hatred for the Russians and the conviction that all atrocities and actions carried out by the Afghan Army were ordered by Soviet advisers.


Some 4,000 Afghan refugees are being airlifted from Pakistan to Turkey where they will be resettled. The group includes Kirghiz, Uzbek, Turkomen, and Tajik tribespeople.


More than 4,000 Turkic-speaking Aghan refugees from camps in Pakistan are being airlifted to new homes in Turkey. Among the first to leave were a group of Kirghiz tribesmen from the Wakhan Corridor. They are now in Anawa, in southern Turkey, where they will be given houses, land, grain and herds for resettlement, in anticipation of their eventually becoming full-fledged Turkish citizens. Others awaiting transportation include a mixture of Tajiks, Turkomens, and Uzbeks. Turkey is willing to accept them because they speak languages related to Turkish and are adherents of Islam.


Currently a standoff situation exists in Afghanistan between determined guerrilla forces and the Soviets who seem reluctant to commit themselves to the all-out effort that would be required for a decisive victory. Solution to the stalemate currently centers on Afghanistan's deposed King Mohammed Zahir Shah, in exile in Italy. Overthrown in 1973, Zahir Shah looks increasingly attractive to both the Soviets and the mujahidin as a face-saving compromise as head of a nonaligned government friendly to the USSR. Use of chemical weapons by the Soviets in Afghanistan is also discussed.

One result of the Soviet occupation of Afghanistan has been the rise of a number of guerrilla leaders, one of the best known of whom is Ahmadshah Massoud. Massoud, 28, leads the guerrilla forces in the Panjshir Valley north of Kabul. The valley was the scene of a determined Soviet offensive this summer. The article introduces several other Afghan guerrilla leaders and notes that they are a worry not only to the Soviets, but also to Afghan political leaders in exile in Pakistan.


The Soviet occupation army is having a hard time fighting guerrilla forces in Afghanistan. In a recent offensive in the Panjshir Valley, 8,000 Russian troops and 4,000 Afghan allies failed to kill or capture many of the 3,000-man guerrilla force based there. The Soviets have borne the brunt of recent fighting because of the unreliability of the Afghan Army, which has dwindled to a quarter of its former size of 80,000 as a result of desertions and disaffection with the Babrak Karmal regime.


Anatoly Mikhailovich Sakharov, a Soviet army defector being held by guerrillas in Afghanistan, claims that the Soviets are using three types of chemical weapons in their military operations. Reports from guerrilla forces in various parts of Afghanistan coincide with the description of the effects of the chemicals the Soviet soldier claims are being used.


The author, a senior research associate at the Institute of Oriental Studies of the USSR Academy of Sciences, traces events between the Saur revolution of 1978 in Afghanistan and the overthrow of the Amin regime in December 1979, without referring to the Soviet role in any of these events or developments since that time. The article gives a long list of reforms that reportedly have taken place since the advent of the Babrak Karmal regime, including release of 15,000 prisoners, establishment of trade unions and women's organizations, and improvements in the areas of health, education, and agriculture. Despite these improvements, however, the situation in Afghanistan "continues to be complicated and tense," largely due to the armed counterrevolutionaries who are receiving constant support from abroad, particularly from Iran, Pakistan, China, and the West. The Soviet Union declares itself ready to remove its military contingent from Afghanistan "after the infiltration of these counterrevolutionary gangs into Afghanistan has completely stopped."

The author relates his experiences while visiting Afghan guerrilla camps in the regions around Khost and Kandahar. The main impressions projected by the story are of the determination of the guerrillas, despite their poor equipment, in the face of modern Soviet weaponry. The insurgents' greatest need, according to the author, is for air defense weapons against Soviet helicopters and aircraft. The complete story of the journey will be published as In Afghanistan: An American Odyssey by Coward, McCann & Geoghegan, in the spring of 1983.


The Afghanistan occupation is exposing rifts in the Red Army between Slavic troops and conscripts from Central Asia. The Central Asian troops reportedly are confined to labor battalions or relegated to menial duties in combat units. Chances for promotion among the Central Asians are few, since most units are led by Russian or Ukrainian officers and NCOs. Under pressure of the Afghanistan occupation assignment, the situation has led to a high rate of violent incidents between the two groups. The author notes that the situation within the Army is but a reflection of Soviet society as a whole as the Central Asians increase in population in proportion to the so-called white Russians. While Slavs have held sway in Central Asia since the 19th century and ruled in almost colonial fashion, Central Asians are increasingly taking over the better jobs and gaining entrance to the universities.


There is growing antagonism toward the most successful Afghan resistance leader, Gulbaddin Hekmatyar, and his guerrilla organization, the fundamentalist Hezb-i-Islami. Gulbaddin established one of the earliest resistance groups and since then reportedly has received funds and other support from Pakistan, Iran, Libya, and the Gulf states. The Hezb-i-Islami, a group composed largely of Pushtuns, is favored by Jamaat-i-Islami political party of Pakistan and the Pakistani government agencies in Peshawar ministering to the Afghan refugees. Complaints about the Hezb-i-Islami include reports of their obstructing or even attacking fellow guerrilla groups, harassment of civilians, and using relief aid money meant for refugees for their own purposes.


Quoting Pravda reports, the author briefly describes helicopter gunship warfare in Afghanistan as not exactly an unqualified success.

The 2.6-kilometer Salang Pass tunnel through Afghanistan's Hindukush Mountains was turned into a gas-filled inferno by a road accident in which an oil truck crashed head-on into the first vehicle in a Soviet convoy. The Soviets, fearing a guerrilla ambush, sealed both ends of the tunnel; the fumes from the burning truck and vehicle exhausts caused the deaths of as many as 2,700 persons including 700 Soviet soldiers.


In an exclusive interview with Time in London, a KGB defector reveals how Brezhnev overruled KGB advice on Afghanistan and backed Taraki and later Amin in their establishment of a pliant regime in Kabul. He also revealed that the Kremlin, fearing a Muslim revolution in Afghanistan that would expel the Soviets, decided to send in 80,000 troops to assert control over the situation. Troops had already begun moving in, when a specially trained Soviet commando unit led by a KGB assault team (the members of which were dressed in Afghan army uniforms and used vehicles with Afghan army markings) attacked the presidential palace and killed Amin. Babrak Karmal, the KGB's original choice for Afghan leader, was then established as head of the Afghan Government. Major errors of judgment made thereafter by the Soviets, according to the ex-KGB man, included overestimating the Afghan Army's willingness to fight, underestimating the Afghan resistance, sending in too few troops, and using Central Asian troops who got involved in black marketeering of weapons and supplies and were often reluctant to fight their Muslim Afghan neighbors.


Progress under the "people's revolution" goes on in Afghanistan despite the opposition of "counterrevolutionary bands" supported by foreign "reactionary" forces. Among the progressive actions noted are: new housing construction; establishment of a Democratic Women's Organization to help educate women; setting up of cooperative farms in Kandahar Province on land formerly held by large landowners; development of various industries, handicrafts, and trade; and reopening of the National Museum and the Kabul-Nandari Theatre.


Given the events and situation in Afghanistan in the fall of 1979, the Soviets had perhaps three options in dealing with a rapidly deteriorating situation: 1) continue to back Amin, who they did not trust, against whose rule the country was in open rebellion; 2) abandon Amin and hope whoever emerged to replace him would be pro-Soviet; and 3) invade and establish a known pro-Soviet leader in the form of Babrak Karmal. In choosing among
these options the Soviets had to consider the effect of the decision on such issues as detente, the 1980 Olympics, arms-reduction negotiation in Europe, the unstable situation in Iran, and the sensitivities of India, Pakistan, and other regional nations. The lessons to be learned from the Soviet decision are: 1) stable borders are important to the Soviets; 2) when the Soviets place a Marxist government in power, they guarantee the survival of Marxism in that country; and 3) American influence was, and is, limited in Afghanistan.


For the 4th consecutive year, UN delegates to the General Assembly adopted a resolution demanding the withdrawal of Soviet troops from Afghanistan. The resolution also renewed the mandate of UN Secretary General Javier Perez de Cuellar to continue his peacemaking initiatives and the promotion of a political solution.


The United States is experiencing difficulty in generating any concern in the United Nations or among its Western allies about the Soviet use or supply of chemical weapons in Afghanistan, Laos, and Kampuchea. UN and Canadian teams have been conservative in their findings, saying that while circumstantial evidence seemed to be well-grounded, judgment was being reserved on some of the firsthand accounts.


A military stalemate persists in Afghanistan. The guerrilla movement continues to be widely popular and determined, but lacks leadership, organization, training, materiel, and a coordinated strategy. The Soviet and Afghan security forces, however, have been unable to develop the political or military policies necessary to seize control of the situation. Current Soviet strength is estimated at 100,000 with another 30,000 in reserve in nearby Soviet areas. Soviet casualties are estimated at 12,000 to 15,000 killed or wounded with six times that number having been hospitalized by illness, such as hepatitis. Problems of low morale, drugs, alcohol, and black-marketeering continue to plague Soviet troops.


Even with the change of leadership in the Soviet Union, a pull-out of Soviet troops from Afghanistan is unlikely for the following reasons: 1) the collapse of the Communist regime in Afghanistan would cause unacceptable
damage to Moscow's prestige; 2) withdrawing without defeating the Afghan guerrillas could have repercussions among Muslim minorities in the Soviet Union; and 3) the Soviets would be unwilling to risk having an unstable, hostile regime on its southern border. So, in spite of the military and diplomatic costs, the war for the moment must go on.


The Soviets are getting some return on the money they are spending in Afghanistan. Some 62 percent of Afghan exports go to Soviet bloc countries, mostly under barter agreements favorable to the Soviets. Some 95 percent of natural gas exports are piped directly to the Soviet Union at a price well below the world market price. Sugar, fruit, nuts, olives, fertilizer, and cement are also exported on terms favorable to the Soviets. The disruption and destruction caused by the war has forced the Afghans to import increasing amounts of food for which they pay by means of the barter agreements with the Soviets. The Soviets are reportedly making surveys of Afghanistan's mineral resources, including iron, copper, chrome, uranium, beryl, etc.


Washington is skeptical of any reported softening of the Soviet position on Afghanistan and doubts any intent by Moscow to withdraw its troops from the embattled country anytime soon. Recent anxiety displayed by the Soviets to accelerate the pace of the UN initiative spearheaded by special envoy Diego Cordovez, and the reputed overtures made to Pakistani President Zia-ul Haq by Soviet leader Yuri Andropov following Brezhnev's funeral, are dismissed by Washington officials as Soviet strategies to induce Pakistan to recognize the Kabul regime.
3. **Bangladesh**

   a. Monographs


   The author draws an analogy between colonialism in eastern Bengal under the British and the situation of "internal colonialism" that prevailed when the east Bengalis were politically and economically dominated by the West Pakistanis during the 24-year period between Pakistani independence and the independence of Bangladesh. He proposes that the oppressive presence of the "alien group" (West Pakistanis) in East Pakistan led to the maturation of Bengali nationalism that was first shaped in British India.


   This book is based on an energy sector study of Bangladesh that was carried out in 1975-76 under the sponsorship of the United Nations Development Program (UNDP) and the Asian Development Bank (ADP). The authors admit that the study is heavy on analytical methodology, but they assert that they have also tried to consider the social and institutional context of the country. Separate chapters are devoted to the analysis of the agricultural setting (since Bangladesh is largely an agricultural country), traditional and renewable resources, estimates of future energy demands and prices, the electric power system, the fuels and fertilizer system, and the design of the Bangladesh investment program. (Bibliography, index, maps, tables)


   Anyone with some feel for Asia will appreciate this detailed account of the influence of the World Bank, the International Monetary Fund, and the Canadian, American, Russian, British, Scandinavian, and Indian Governments in the development of Bangladesh during its first 3 years of existence. The book concludes that "there is overwhelming evidence of very considerable intervention in the domestic and foreign affairs of aid recipients, which can hardly be thrown off once a country has accepted a strategy for development based on a continuing flow of resources from abroad."

Covering the period between the late 1940s and 1980, the author analyzes the causes of the progressive economic decline of Bangladesh.


This study traces the political history of Bangladesh from the beginning through the government of President Abdus Sattar. The problems faced by the present regime—food shortages, rapid population growth, government corruption, and tense relations with India—are the same as those faced by Ziaur Rahman, whose administration is treated favorably in this study.

Franda, Marcus. *The Death of Ziaur Rahman.* Hanover, New Hampshire: University Field Service Institute, 1982. (Asia Report, no. 2)

Just as the title points out, this recent Franda article exhaustively details the drama and conspiracies surrounding the killing of Bangladesh's most able national leader. Franda paints a dreary picture of the episode. Included are biographical sketches of the leading actors in the drama and the numerous theories that surround the failed coup.


The underdeveloped countries of the world increasingly are becoming concerned about their growing independence on the industrialized nations through the transfer of technology. New development goals include increased self-reliance through development of technology that is more appropriate to the third world environment. In this case study, the problem of technology transfer is examined through the experience of India's Hindustan Machine Tools Company. From this company's experience, lessons can be derived for policymakers and managers of industry on how to go about seeking technology and how to go about managing it. (appendixes, bibliography, charts, index)


b. Serials


The little publicized unrest among the tribal peoples of the remote Chittagong Hill Tracts is the subject of this socioeconomic analysis of the growing rift between predominantly Muslim Bangladesh and its mostly Buddhist tribal people. The isolated life of the Chakma tribe has changed dramatically in recent years as a result of Bengali settlement on traditional tribal lands and the economic dislocations created by the Karnaphuli hydroelectric project. The feelings of exploitation and cultural rejection gave birth to the formation of the Shanti Bahini, a political and guerrilla movement with the objective of obtaining a measure of tribal autonomy. The author argues that the very real grievances against the central authorities have not as yet been translated into a strong political movement. Pressures from India to cut down on the number of illegal emigrants entering the northeastern states from Bangladesh has insured, however, that further encroachment on Chakma lands by lowland Bengalis will continue to exacerbate the problem.

Bhuiyan, A. W. "Bangladesh Politics: Continuity Amidst Change." The Indian Political Science Review, vol. 16 (January 1982), pp. 20-34.

Following independence, Bangladesh entered into a period of struggle for power among the leaders of the revolution--the liberation army (Mukhti Bahini), the guerrillas, the Communists, and the political parties. This paper examines the polarization of the political parties that resulted in a switch to a presidential one-party system led by Sheikh Mujibur Rahman, the subsequent takeover by the Army led by Major General Ziaur Rahman, and subsequent party politics under the Zia government.


Political instability in a country due to lack of consensus, strong political institutions, or leadership sets the stage for military intervention, in which the unstable civilian groups are replaced by a highly organized and efficient professional group in uniform. Military intervention in Pakistan in 1977 and Bangladesh in 1975 is compared in terms of the following: the
political instability that led to the takeovers; the capability, disposition, and opportunity to intervene; the relations between the civilian governments and the military; and the common history shared by the two armies.


Rather than discussing the "outlook for Bangladesh," this article gives a good summary of political developments and leadership in Bangladesh since 1971, as well as a listing of the overwhelming problems faced by any Bangladeshi government. President Ziaur Rahman's efforts at dealing with these problems are particularly lauded.


Post-harvest food losses, an age-old problem, have been estimated to be upwards of 10 percent of annual harvests, representing a serious depletion of world food supplies. A preliminary study in two regions of Bangladesh (Comilla and Tangail districts) indicates that loss problems are less likely to occur at the subsistence level where harvests are supervised carefully and less grain is stored for shorter periods of time. Problems arise on larger farms with less control of harvesting methods, or where there are surpluses that must be stored, or harvesting takes place in the wet season.


Prime Minister Shah Azizur Rahman's initiative to oust former petroleum minister Akbar Hossain from parliament has widened the rift in the faction-ridden Bangladesh Nationalist Party. Strife is also reported in the opposition party, the Awami League, where a power struggle between the two major wings of the party has intensified.


The widow of the late President Ziaur Rahman has withdrawn from the race for the chairmanship of the Bangladesh Nationalist Party. This decision by the former first lady of Bangladesh insures the unopposed election of President Abdus Sattar to the top party post. It has not diminished the precariousness of the President's position, however, as he walks a tightrope between the demands of the Army and the intrigues of various political factions.

Military strongman General Hussain M. Ershad has rejected as irrelevant the idea of a National Security Council composed of top civilian and military figures in the government. Ershad's rejection has placed in the balance the fate of Bangladesh's 2-month-old elected government. It is believed that the military hierarchy would prefer a smaller council of four or five top-ranking officers instead of the proposed seven civilians and three military men. This, however, is not likely to be acceptable to the Bangladesh Nationalist Party which views a military-dominated council as a threat to democracy.


Because this article was produced prior to the Ershad coup in March, the author met a deadline before the events in Dacca had been fully played out. Not surprisingly, Khan's thesis is already out of date. Khan places great store in the peaceful transition after the assassination of Ziaur Rahman. While he is alive to the fact that political stability has always been an elusive ideal in Bangladesh, Khan seems to be hoping against hope that the Sattar government can carry on the progressive legacy of Zia against the political inroads of the military. On the military side of the power equation, Khan confirms that the most recent power struggles have eclipsed the influence of the "freedom fighter" faction of the Army. The so-called "repatriates" who were interned in Pakistan during the 1971 struggle have emerged as the dominant faction under the Chief of Staff (and now martial law administrator) H. M. Ershad.


The first decade of political development in Bangladesh is assessed in terms of the military, political parties, the bureaucracy, the constitutional system, and the international environment. The author ignores for the moment the threats of economic and natural disasters that seem to hang constantly over the country to point out such recurring causes of political instability as: the shortage of professional civil servants at the provincial level; the friction between "freedom fighters" and "returnees" in the military; the lack of well-organized political parties; tensions between seclarists and Islamic fundamentalists; and conflict over the long-range role of the military in the running of the country.


Confronting a possible food crisis, President Abdus Sattar faces increasing restiveness from the Army and tries to appease dissidents in his ruling Bangladesh Nationalist Party by making the cabinet changes they are demanding.

In a move to consolidate his hold on power and meet some of the demands of his critics in the Army and the ruling Bangladesh Nationalist Party (BNP), President Abdus Sattar dismisses his entire 42-man cabinet and appoints a smaller one the following day. Sattar explains his action as the first step to eradicate corruption and inefficiency in the government.


Bangladesh President Abdus Sattar dismisses his cabinet, which has been the target of criticism by both the Army and the President's own Bangladesh Nationalist Party (BNP).


The Bangladesh Government, under army prodding, has taken a tough stance on law and order. Crackdowns on criminals for common law violations have disclosed that some of the malefactors have major political connections.


The failure of President Abdus Sattar's government to offer the country a strong and decisive administration seems to have finally persuaded the army leaders of Bangladesh to make their move. Accordingly, the country may have an Indonesian-style, army-dominated government in the very near future.


The bloodless coup staged by Lt Gen Ershad came as no surprise. The General had been openly demanding that the Army be given a formal role in government and that corrupt politicians be dismissed. President Abdus Sattar responded with ineffectual cabinet reshuffles that retained the same officials in power. Lt Gen Ershad has promised to appoint another civilian president and to set up an advisory council. One of his hardest tasks will be to reconcile the conflict within the Army between the "freedom fighters" who fought against Pakistan in 1971 and those military officers who were compelled to sit out the war in West Pakistan.


In the wake of the bloodless coup in Bangladesh, new military strongman Lt Gen Hussain M. Ershad is turning his attention to the rapidly deteriorating
economy which he inherited from ousted President Abdus Sattar. He has appointed 11 members to an advisory council which will monitor the work of the ministries. The council members will also serve as deputy martial law administrators. At a recent press conference, Ershad announced that his timetable for a general election and return to democratic rule was 2 years.


Lt Gen Hussain M. Ershad recently seized power in a bloodless, widely expected coup in Bangladesh. In his post-coup promises, the new military strongman pledges a clean-up campaign to eradicate official corruption and malfeasance, and appoints a combined military-civilian advisory council to help run the country. He divides the nation into five administrative districts governed by a high-ranking military officer and appoints Ahsanuddin Chowdhury, a retired judge, as president.


The regime of new strongman Lt Gen Hussain M. Ershad has shied away from major policy changes, preferring to consolidate itself first. One of the major preoccupations of the military government is not to appear too repressive in the face of the forthcoming meeting in Paris of the World Bank-led consortium of donor countries to Bangladesh. The regime, nevertheless, has promised to stamp out corruption and has streamlined the administration by reducing the number of ministries. On the economic front, Lt Gen Ershad has promised that investment policies would be made more pragmatic and liberal and has outlined the five-point economic program for his regime: achievement of a 7 percent growth rate for the next FY beginning in July; prevention of waste in the public sector; encouragement of private investment; achievement of food self-sufficiency; and curbing of runaway population growth.


Prior to the bloodless coup in Bangladesh, India was preparing a new bid to woo Dacca. Now this has given way to a wait-and-see attitude and the prospective trip of Indian FM Narasimha Rao to Dacca has been postponed indefinitely. Strategically, New Delhi's worst fear is that its three largest neighbors, China, Pakistan, and Bangladesh, will unite against India. During the past 3 months, delegations from Beijing and Dacca have exchanged visits and a Chinese military team was in Bangladesh in early March.

This brief piece, written before Ershad's March coup d'état, summarizes the political and economic turmoil that has faced Bangladesh in its first decade of independence. The author sees little immediate relief for the country's factionalized political parties. This power vacuum has left the way open for the military to take the lead in domestic politics. The author posits that the strapped Bangladeshi economy faces a "long road ahead." Economic issues will probably decide the fate of the regime in power.


Bangladesh's new military government appears to be achieving its objective of convincing the people that it is determined to carry out major social and administrative reforms that successive governments in the past have failed to do. The new military strongman Lt Gen Hussain M. Ershad has restructured the administrative system with a three-tier apparatus comprising at the top, the central government in Dacca, the districts in the middle, and at the lowest level, the thana (village or township, the lowest level of political organization). The thana also has been given sufficient authority to make decisions on local affairs. The idea behind the government shakeup, according to Lt Gen Ershad, is to decentralize the administration, bring responsive government to the people, and to create job opportunities at the local level. Bangladesh's new military rulers also have talked about land reform and have emphasized cooperative farming in the country.


Saudi Arabia appears to be giving more attention to the situation in the Indian Subcontinent. One focus of its concern is the relationship between India and Bangladesh. Indian PM Indira Gandhi presented New Delhi's perception of regional peace and security and its linkage with the Persian Gulf when she visited Saudi Arabia in late April. Bangladeshi strongman Lt Gen Ershad, during his own trip to Riyadh this month, impressed on his Saudi hosts a different view of regional security, pointing out that Bangladesh is more apprehensive of India than any other country in the region. Ershad also told the Saudi leaders that Dacca has been trying to forge closer ties with New Delhi and wants the speedy resolution of all outstanding bilateral problems. These problems at the present time include the sharing of the Ganges River water assets and the demarcation of land and water boundaries, with concomitant resolution of the ownership dispute over New Moore (South Talpatty) Island in the Bay of Bengal.

The Supreme Court Association of Bangladesh, by going on a 1-day boycott, has registered its discontent with a decision by the martial law regime to decentralize government machinery and make it more responsive to the people.


In a new industrial policy promulgated in early June, the martial law administration of Lt Gen H. M. Ershad wants to turn most Bangladeshi state industries over to private enterprise. The basic thrust of the new policy is comprised in a 15-point program to "expand the manufacturing sector with increased private sector participation, and to develop indigenous technology and encourage judicious application of appropriate technology."


Bangladesh Finance Minister A. M. A. Muhith has presented a tough budget for FY 1983 (began 1 July), cutting development spending and raising taxes. This follows a bad year in which the gross domestic product rose only an estimated 0.1 percent, while the cost of living increased 19 percent, and per capita income declined 2.2 percent. The agricultural sector, accounting for 55 percent of GDP, increased only 2.2 percent due to bad weather and pest attacks. In the new budget, the annual development program (ADP) was cut by 15 percent and about one-third of the proposed projects dropped. About 78 percent of the ADP is expected to be financed by foreign aid. Other major budget cuts include food and energy subsidies that will result in higher prices for food, petroleum products, and electricity. Also part of the budget message was a 12-point program of action, including inflation controls, incentives for exports, and encouragement of private sector enterprise.


The rural-oriented military government of Lt Gen H. M. Ershad has asked the union parishads, village committees that form the lowest level of local administration, to continue in office until the next elections, sometime next year. At the same time the institution of gram sarkar, or village government, established in 1980 by President Rahman, has been abolished and its powers transferred to the union parishads, thus strengthening the latter group and eliminating competition between the two levels of local government. The three remaining levels of local administration will be the zilla [district] parishads, thana [town] parishads, and the union parishads. The Ershad government plan is to make the thana, under which about 10 union parishads are grouped, the basic administrative unit.

Lt Gen H. M. Ershad is planning to retire in December 1983 in a move that will coincide with the lifting of martial law and the establishment of a government in which there will be power-sharing between the armed forces and an elected civilian government, according to a highly placed source. Observers are predicting there will be an elected parliament and cabinet with both civilian and armed forces representation. It is still unclear whether, under the new constitution, the civilian president will be directly elected or chosen by an electoral college. Ershad is not expected to seek the presidency but might be persuaded to accept the vice-presidency, which will probably be an appointed position. It is expected that the number of political parties under the new system will be reduced from about 70 to about 5.


Bangladesh plans to build a 300 MW nuclear power plant by 1989-90. Of the $660 million cost of the project, about $400 million will be in foreign exchange. The plant probably will be built by British manufacturer National Nuclear Corp., with perhaps 30 percent of the plant being manufactured in Bangladesh at local factories and workshops. About $200 million of the financing is likely to come from the British Government through its Export Credits Guarantee Department. Another $200 million plus has been offered by an American syndicate. Bangladesh is particularly suited for nuclear power because of its lack of easily exploited fossil fuels and its lack of hydroelectric potential in the western half of the country. Because Bangladesh began planning for nuclear power in the early 1960s, it now reportedly has the necessary technical personnel and infrastructure. Training of Bangladesh technicians by the supplier of the plant will also assure smooth running after the facility is installed.


Bangladesh is described as a praetorian polity in which the civil and military bureaucracies are far more highly developed than the political parties. The military has had strong incentives to move into the institutional vacuum resulting from a weak political party system. Most of the parties consist of shifting groups of elite politicians centered in Dacca with little concern for partybuilding at the "rice roots" level. In spite of the weaknesses and inability of the parties to serve as vehicles for representing popular interests, the Bangladeshi electorate has a long tradition of high political participation in elections, mass movements, and student activism. This combination of praetorianism and a high degree of politicization has resulted in a decade of fluctuation between civilian and military rule characterized by mixtures of relative democracy and relative dictatorship that are examined in some detail in this article.

The dilemma of self-sufficiency in food production in nations such as Bangladesh is how to increase production to eliminate food imports and aid without increasing domestic prices and leaving more people malnourished as a result of poverty. The author discusses the conflict of interests between consumer subsidies, direct aid to producers, and encouragement of the use of fertilizers and irrigation. Pessimism is expressed about the Bangladesh Government 5-year plan calling for self-sufficiency by 1985 in food production.


The author provides in detail the background (from 1947) of the Ganges River dispute between India and Bangladesh (and earlier Pakistan). Included are maps of the Farakka Barrage, India's proposed Ganges-Brahmaputra Canal, and the reservoir sites in Nepal proposed by Bangladesh.


Tea production prospects are up for 1982 in Bangladesh, as are expected tea prices. Replanting, begun in the mid-1960s, is a big factor in increased production, as about one-third of the tea acreage is covered with young, productive plants. The goal is to have one-half the total tea acreage under new plants within 10 years with emphasis on improved varieties. The government has begun increasing export incentives in order to increase the number of foreign customers, now numbering 18. Pakistan heads the list, accounting for 48 percent of the export trade.


Talks between Bangladesh President Lt Gen H. M. Ershad and Indian Prime Minister Indira Gandhi in New Delhi on 6-8 October, centered around the 1977 Farakka Barrage Agreement, which was due to expire November 14. The barrage was built to divert waters from the Ganges for the purpose of flushing the badly silted port of Calcutta and raising the water level to aid shipping during the dry season. Under the old agreement India was obligated to release fixed quantities of water downstream from the Farakka into Bangladesh during the 5 months of the dry season. The new agreement changes little the amount of water guaranteed to Bangladesh. It does, however, commit Bangladesh to the Indian view that the old agreement is not a permanent solution and the Indo-Bangladesh Joint Rivers Commission must reach an agreement on a proposal for augmenting dry-season flows within 18 months. Under the new agreement acceptance of the proposal will be automatic. The article describes the two rival proposals: New Delhi's plan for a canal
across Bangladesh linking the Brahmaputra in Assam and the Ganges in West Bengal; and Dacca's plan for a string of reservoirs on the Ganges tributaries in Nepal. The article also notes other problems discussed at the meeting between the two countries.


At an October meeting in New Delhi between Lt Gen Hussain M. Ershad and Prime Minister Indira Gandhi, a memorandum of understanding was hammered out by which India and Bangladesh both pledged to find permanent agreement on their Ganges River problems. The dispute concerns the Farakka Barrage, built in West Bengal at the point where the river divides, one branch going to India and the other to Bangladesh. The water is important to India to keep the silt-laden Calcutta port deep enough for ships to enter and to Bangladesh for irrigation of croplands.


Recent meetings between Bangladesh President Lt Gen Hussain M. Ershad and King Birendra of Nepal focused on the possible inclusion of Nepal in the Joint River Commission on sharing the waters of the Ganges. Ershad pledged that as long as Nepal was not a member, Bangladesh would not come to terms with India on the longstanding dispute over distribution of waters from the Farakka dam project. Bangladesh and Nepal both support a plan calling for the building of several reservoirs in Nepal, which would provide flood control during the monsoons, more water during the dry season, and tap the hydroelectric potential of the Ganges. India is interested in the project but prefers to deal with Bangladesh and Nepal bilaterally. Nepal is interested in cooperating as long as compensation will be made for any damage and dislocated villagers will be properly provided for. Also discussed at the meeting were trade between Nepal and Bangladesh and the need for improved transport facilities (road and canal) along the 14-mile corridor of Indian territory that connects the two countries.


Lt Gen Hussain M. Ershad is firmly in control of the martial law regime in Bangladesh, notwithstanding rumors to the contrary whenever he has gone abroad since taking over 7 months ago. Many of the powerful army commanders whose support he needs are either old friends or handpicked by Ershad. A particular tie links Ershad and the powerful commander of the Dacca-based 9th Division. They are both disciples of a well known religious leader, Hazrat Shah Sufi Moulana Hashmatullah, known popularly as Moulana Faridpuri. The author focuses on this tie and gives the background of the maneuverings that led to the overthrow of former president Abdus Sattar.

The October talks in New Delhi between Lt Gen Hussain M. Ershad and Indira Gandhi are being hailed as a diplomatic success. The reception was very cordial and Mrs. Gandhi accepted an invitation to visit Dacca, which she has not visited since 1972. Three important agreements were signed: 1) with regard to the Ganges waters dispute, the same formula agreed to in 1977 for sharing those waters downstream of the Farakka barrage will be retained for 18 months. At the end of that time, the two countries must reach an agreement on a plan to augment the river's flow in the dry months; 2) India granted Bangladesh a permanent lease over a narrow corridor leading to an enclave containing two Bangladesh towns surrounded by West Bengal state; and 3) an agreement was negotiated to set up a joint economic commission to promote bilateral trade and economic cooperation.


The Bangladesh Government of Lt Gen Hussain M. Ershad released 13 lawyers arrested for about a week in October for violating martial law regulations. The lawyers were protesting establishment of three more divisional benches of the High Court outside of Dacca as part of the government's plan to decentralize the judiciary. In a mediated settlement, the lawyers were forced to back down and the Bar Association rescinded their two resolutions to boycott the Supreme Court and resist decentralization.


In the recent meeting between Indian Prime Minister Indira Gandhi and Bangladesh President Lt Gen Hussain M. Ershad, agreement was reached in the permanent lease to Bangladesh by India of a narrow corridor of land that would link Bangladesh with its two villages of Angarpota and Dahagram, which are totally surrounded by the Indian state of West Bengal. It now appears that this agreement was reached without consulting the inhabitants of either country who are directly involved. On the one hand, the creation of the corridor creates another near enclave—a district of West Bengal virtually surrounded by Bangladesh. The people of this district fear an increase of raids by robber bands from Bangladesh when they become cut off from Indian protection. On the other hand, the residents of Angarpota and Dahagram are not certain they wish to be linked with distant Bangladesh as they currently are allowed to visit the much closer Indian market towns just across the border where prices are considerably lower than in Bangladesh.
4. BHUTAN

a. Monographs


Dr. Aris has produced a substantial and detailed history of Bhutan, the only remaining independent Himalayan kingdom in which a relatively pure form of Tantric Buddhism still prevails. The book covers the history of this small country, from the largely legendary early period around the 7th century to the 17th century. This is the first serious attempt to produce a sustained scholarly work on Bhutanese history in a western language and as such represents a pioneering effort by an occidental scholar.


Samuel Davis, a young lieutenant in the Bengal Army, was appointed in 1783 to join, as surveyor and draftsman, a mission to Bhutan and Tibet led by Samuel Turner. Two hundred years later, his drawings of the Bhutan countryside and excerpts from his journal have been published in a book that captures the timeless beauty of this mountain kingdom. A lengthy introduction provides interesting background of the local politics of that day as well as British interest in the region. (bibliography, illustrations, index, maps)


b. Serials


China is giving fresh indications that it wants direct ties with Bhutan, which has long maintained a special relationship with India. Beijing apparently regards as an obstacle a 1949 treaty under which the Bhutanese agreed to be guided by India in the conduct of foreign affairs.


The kingdom of Bhutan has begun expanding its ties with the outside world, although it continues to seek advice from India in external matters under the provisions of a 1949 treaty. Bhutan's new outward look coincides with greatly improved relations with India, which is its main trading partner and source of economic aid. Under a new agreement, India will facilitate trade
between Bhutan and other countries, including smoother transit across India for trade with Nepal and Bangladesh. India also has agreed to Sino-Bhutanese talks on the demarcation of that border. In other developments, Bhutan has diversified its aid sources to include the World Bank, the Asian Development Bank, Japan, Australia, and Switzerland. Ambassadors have been exchanged with Bangladesh and honorary consuls appointed to Hong Kong and Singapore. New Delhi is setting up a microwave link that will provide Bhutan with a telecommunications link with all the countries with which India is linked. Next year Druk Air, the kingdom's flag carrier, is scheduled to begin operation.

"Bhutan Limits India's Role." Intelligence Digest (London), 1 November 1982, pp. 2-3.

Bhutan shows signs of asserting its sovereignty although still very much under Indian tutelage. India has contributed just under 50 percent of Bhutan's 5-year development plan for 1977-82, and serves as Bhutan's major trading partner. Officially there are no Indian troops in Bhutan, although they are in fact observed there. According to a 1949 treaty between the two countries, Bhutan is an independent country whose foreign relations are "guided" by India. Recently, however, Bhutan has shown independence in formulating its foreign policy by pressing for bilateral border talks with China and by voting for the Pol Pot rather than the Heng Samrin government in Kampuchea at the last conference of nonaligned nations. A new air facility in Bhutan will reportedly allow tourists to fly there directly from Calcutta without obtaining Indian papers and visas. Bhutan is also beginning to diversify its aid sources and search out new trading partners.
5. **INDIA**

a. **Monographs**


Appadorai, Angadipuram. *The Domestic Roots of India's Foreign Policy, 1947-1972.* Delhi: Oxford University Press, 244 pp. (bibliography, index)


Indo-US relations in the decade 1965-75 are approached using the systems analysis method.


Chandra's book makes a substantial contribution to modern Indian history. It brings together 14 essays, most of them dating from the early 1970s. All of them relate to the theme indicated by the title of the book and raise issues that are crucial to understanding modern India: the nature of Indian modernization under British rule, the relationship between the Indian capitalist class and imperialism, the relationship between the capitalists and the Congress Party, and British and Indian ideas on economic development. The strength of the book is in the single point of view presented by all the
essays that colonialism transformed traditional Indian institutions fundamentally and brought about the growth of an indigenous middle class.


This account presents the patterns of Hindu culture that make ethical behavior comprehensible. Viewing Hindu ethics as a process, later moral developments then can be evaluated in relation to the original intentions of their sources.


Although Bihar state is rich in natural resources and fertile agricultural land, the majority of its population lives in poverty, largely due to a primitive, semi-feudal agricultural system. Surpluses created by the working peasantry are expropriated by the rich, and technological advances such as the Green Revolution have served only to consolidate the position of the latter. This collection of papers traces the agrarian movement in Bihar from the early 20th century to the more recent Naxalite activity. Also examined is the involvement of both the colonial and post-colonial state government in the problem. (bibliography, glossary, map)


This survey of the social and political status of 10 percent of India's population examines the diversity that characterizes the Muslim community. Although most Muslims aspire to the social solidarity that is a fundamental tenet of Islam, the political reality is that the Muslims of India are not a unified, cohesive grouping. Long neglected by the political process, except perhaps at election time, Muslims are still grappling for an understanding of their role in a secular society. Muslims must also contend with widespread suspicions that they can never be integrated into the mainstream of Indian political life because they still harbor loyalties to Islamic Pakistan. Franda concludes: "There is one, clear certainty: to the extent that Indian Muslims refuse integration on any terms, are excluded from any kind of integrative process by non-Muslims, or find themselves unable to engage in a meaningful dialog about integration, India's domestic and international problems will become the more severe."

The authors maintain that modern India was distinguished by two features that were really both sides of the same coin: the introduction of western influences under the British Raj and the reaction to it on the part of the Indians. It was the interaction of these forces that shaped the history of the period. Nowhere was this interaction more pronounced than in the sphere of religion, which provides the focus of this study.


This discussion of the history, economy, culture, social structure, and political system of Tripura provides some information as well on the problems of the massive influx of immigrants from Bangladesh and neighboring Indian states.


This book traces the development of the shift in India's defense policy from that of a passive stance in the 1950s to a posture of deterrence in the 1980s.


A critical study of the development of Indo-Arab cooperation is presented in this collection of more than 300 official documents and statements of both Indian and Arab leaders. The major issues of West Asia (Suez, Israel-Palestine, Algeria, etc.) are seen in this study from an Indian perspective, and South Asian issues (Indo-Pakistan, Indo-China conflict) can be viewed from the perspective of the Arab world.


This book traces the economic evolution of the Indian subcontinent from the 13th century to modern times. Historians, economists, sociologists, social anthropologists, and demographers collaborate to summarize existing knowledge and to undertake new research. (bibliography, index)

The author's thesis is that it was the British policy of divide and rule that led to the partition of India rather than the centuries-old rivalry between Hindus and Muslims. He also examines the various British policies designed to frustrate Indian nationalism by encouraging the divisive forces of communalism beginning in the 1920s.


The author describes her 4-month stay with a poor family in the south of India, during which time she shared their house, food, and work. This book has been compared to Oscar Lewis' *Children of Sanchez*.


Billed as "not just another study of Soviet-Indian relations," this work analyzes dealings between the two countries from the standpoint of influence. Influence is defined as the ability of one state to affect another's behavior in a desired direction. The focus of the study is on influence in the present state of relations as well as in the coming decade. Indo-Soviet relations are presented in a historical framework that moves quickly to 1969 as the turning point in bilateral ties between the two states. The plot thickens with the 1971 war over Bangladesh and its aftermath. The thread of influence, or lack thereof, is traced through the Emergency years, the Janata "interregnum," and the "return to normalcy?" under Mrs. Gandhi. (bibliography, index)


The 1981 edition of this annual carries 10 appendixes in addition to 26 chapters. It includes three maps showing the main rail links, national highways, and important tourist centers and air links, besides a political map and a few charts highlighting achievements in the fields of industry, agriculture, and other disciplines. A bibliography and index add to the usefulness of this monumental work and enhance its reference value. The volume is designed to meet the information and reference needs of all professionals and officials, students and academicians, research scholars and journalists, libraries and other institutions. It documents all that has been done in recent years to transform a traditional society like India into a future-oriented, fast-developing nation. It documents the progress achieved in various spheres of activity such as education, health, social welfare, transport, communications, science and technology, rural reconstruction, labor, housing, industry, commerce, agriculture, power generation, and other aspects of national life. In summary, *India: A Reference
Annual 1981 combines the characteristics of an almanac, a yearbook, a handbook, and a guide, and is perhaps the best available tool for current information on India.


The author offers both a concise and comprehensive account of 20th century India and a personal interpretation of the major political events in that nation's recent past. (bibliography, index)


Class division in rural Maharashtra and the patriarchal-patrimonial methods used by the Marathi elite to maintain their dominance is the subject of this study. (appendix, bibliography, index)


This work, published over a 12-year period, comprises unpublished documents drawn either from the official archives of the India Office in the custody of the India Office Records or private collections of the Viceregal papers in the India Office Library. The 12 volumes are titled separately as follows: vol. 1—The Cripps Mission, January - April 1942; vol. 2—Quit India, 30 April - 21 September 1942; vol. 3—Reassertion of Authority, Gandhi's Fast, and the Succession to the Viceroyalty, 21 September 1942 - 12 June 1943; vol. 4—The Bengal Famine and the New Viceroyalty, 15 June 1943 - 31 August 1944; vol. 5—The Simla Conference, Background and Proceedings, 1 September 1944 - 28 July 1945; vol. 6—The Post-War Phase: New Moves by the Labour Government, 1 August 1945 - 22 March 1946; vol. 7—The Cabinet
Mission, 23 March - 29 June 1946; vol. 8--The Interim Government, 3 July - 1 November 1946; vol. 9--The Fixing of a Time Limit, 4 November 1946 - 22 March 1947; vol. 10--The Mountbatten Viceroyalty, Announcement and Reception of the 3 June Plan. (Volumes 11 and 12 are to be published at a later date.) (bibliography)


The central theme of this study is the attempt by a group of leaders to create a unified Indian Muslim political constituency in the early 20th century based on support for the Ottoman sultan as caliph (temporal and spiritual leader) of Islam. This support for pan-Islam gave strength to the growing anti-British movement of that time. The book focuses on the emergence of the leadership and the Khilafat movement, the period of noncooperation and mass mobilization (1920-21), and the decline and fall of the movement (1921-24). The Khilafat movement sought not only to unite politically the Indian Muslim community by means of religious and cultural symbols but also to reconcile Islamic identity with Indian nationality. Examination is made of the Khilafat movement as it paralleled other nationalist movements, and was interwoven with them, including the Indian National Congress and the Muslim League. An understanding of the Khilafat movement is important to the understanding of modern Indo-Pakistani relations and modern Hindu-Muslim relations. (bibliography, glossary, illustrations, index)


This book is a collection of essays that lacks the coherence of a single unifying theme. The three essays which stand out are: "Three Interpretations of Indian Nationalism" by Rajat K. Ray, "Writing on the Transfer of Power, 1945-47" by A. K. Majumdar, and "The Civil Disobedience Movement and the Round Table Conference: The Princes' Response" by Barbara N. Ramusack.


A critical biography of the prime minister by her first cousin. The author uses family correspondence to portray a conceited, stubborn young girl, traits that she also criticizes in the woman. She is critical of Gandhi's "imposition on the nation," of her son Sanjay as an eventual successor, prior to his death in a plane crash in 1980. (bibliography, index)


The author's thesis is that the explosive situation in the North-East is basically the result of migration into the region from Bangladesh and the neighboring states of India, which has led to extreme competition between the original inhabitants and immigrants for jobs, education, and political offices.


This collection of political columns and articles by British journalist David Selbourne is sharply critical of Indira Gandhi. Selbourne blames Gandhi for corruption in India that goes beyond financial terms. He is particularly critical of her one-woman rule during the Emergency period and what he views as the decline of democracy in India since that time.


This book is authored by the Indian Ambassador to Iraq and published by the Arab Cultural Centre of the League of Arab States. First examined is how India coped with the challenge of the 1973 oil price rise through various means including switching to coal; increasing India's own oil production and exploration; increasing exports; expanding India's merchant fleet; encouraging tourism; and increasing economic and diplomatic contacts with the Arab states and Iran. The last-named policy has resulted in Indian involvement in development projects in those countries, increase of Indian migrant labor to (and remittances from) the Middle East, securing of oil on affordable terms, increase of exports to the Middle East, and the securing of OPEC foreign aid. The prospects for expanding this cooperation with the oil states are examined. India's nonoil energy resources are also briefly discussed including the nonconventional sources of nuclear, wind, and solar and such traditional sources as firewood, animal power, pedal power, and sailpower. (bibliography, tables)


This textbook provides worthwhile current data on Indian politics. However, as a whole it is less satisfactory than Robert L. Hardgrave's India: Government and Politics in a Developing Nation (3d edition, 1980), particularly for non-Indian students and readers who need greater background information on such a complex society. The Singh and Vajpeyi book also contrasts sharply, and in the reviewer's opinion unfavorably, with Rajni Kothari's brilliant and stimulating Politics in India (1970), the content of which is now dated, but which contains a very important analytical quality that the present book under review lacks. The Singh and Vajpeyi text is historical and factual in approach and, therefore, very useful as a snapshot of current history. It is recommended for beginning American students of Indian politics. (bibliography, tables)


A survey of Indian foreign policy during the 11 years of the Gandhi government prior to 1977. Based largely on secondary sources, the author's revised doctoral dissertation does, however, benefit from interviews with four foreign ministers of the Gandhi government, numerous political leaders, and Gandhi herself. An epilogue deals with Gandhi's return to power. The emphasis of the study is more from a political than a diplomatic perspective. (bibliography, index)


This is a pleasantly written brief introduction to modern India. In its eight chapters, the book summarizes the long history of the country and its principal religion, Hinduism. The work also presents vignettes on daily life, political culture, economic development, external relations, and the interaction between the past and the future. Its style and contents are simple without being simplistic, and though there are some oversimplifications of complex phenomena, there are no egregious errors. The text is suitable for senior high schools, community colleges, and public libraries. (bibliography, illustrations, index)


India has been conducting an increasingly vigorous foreign aid program, which is the subject of this systematic study. There is some discussion of the motives behind the program, but most of the emphasis is on the content of the program. As early as the 1950s, India gave aid to Nepal, Sikkim, and Bhutan; after 1971, there was a large aid commitment to Bangladesh. Since the 1970s, however, India's largesse has been extended to Southeast Asia, the Middle East, and Africa. The most useful aid exports are Indian skills in the fields of agricultural and industrial technologies suited to the particular needs and environment of Third World countries. (bibliography, index)

Forty million Indians are tribespeople, distinct from the great mass of Hindu caste societies. They constitute the oldest element in the population and have retained archaic life styles. In recent years, the tribemen's age-old isolation in hill and forest regions has come to an end; they are subjected to the pressures of expanding, land-hungry peasant populations infiltrating into their homelands, often displacing them from most of the cultivable land. The tragedy of the decline of ancient tribal communities has so far remained largely unreported, but in this book Furer-Haimendorf analyzes in detail the fate of Indian tribes dispossessed and exploited by moneylenders, corrupt officials, and landgrabbers. One reviewer says, "Many books are contributions to scholarship, and so is this one. But it is much more. It is a book for people, not just about them. Its finds are very important, with explosive implications" (James M. Freeman). (bibliography, illustrations, index)


Preferential policies--applied by governments worldwide--refer to laws, regulations, court orders, and other public interventions designed to provide a particular ethnic group certain public and private goods such as admission to schools and colleges, jobs, promotions, business loans, etc. India has two types of preferential policies: one provides special benefits to members of scheduled castes and scheduled tribes; the other provides preference to local ethnic groups in competition for higher status, higher salaried jobs with migrants from outside the state. This book focuses on the latter and grew out of an examination of internal migration policies. Three case studies are provided: 1) the policies of the Maharashtra state government in providing preferential employment for the local inhabitants of Bombay; 2) the long history of the government of Andhra Pradesh efforts to reserve employment and university positions for the local people of the Telangana region; and 3) Assam state, where a hundred years of immigration have transformed the social structure resulting in serious ethnic inequalities. In view of the present turbulence in this part of India this section has special relevance. (footnotes, index, maps, tables)


Considered the standard textbook on Indian history since it was first published in 1977, this edition contains new material in the three final chapters covering the period since 1947. Included are such events as the
collapse of the Janata government, the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan, and the Indo-Pakistani nuclear arms race.

b. Serials

"United They Stand, Maybe." The Economist, 19 December 1981, p. 46.

India's opposition parties are trying to unite once again to provide a credible, non-Communist alternative to the Congress-I Party. The example was given by the two Communist parties of India who patched up their quarrel last year and since then have been the most effective critics of a not very effective government. The lead has been taken by the once-ruling Janata party which maintains that only a united opposition can stand up to Mrs. Gandhi. The Janata initiative was welcomed by the Lok Dal, the farmers' party led by Charan Singh. The Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP), supported by middle-class Hindus, has remained aloof from jumping on the merger bandwagon because of past shabby treatment by other factions in the Janata coalition, but is prepared to join with other opposition parties for limited tactical objectives such as contesting elections.


Behind a lush facade of mountain scenery and picturesque tourist attractions, the Indian state of Jammu and Kashmir is the target of intense Pakistani efforts to subvert the population of the territory. In this biased article, the author contends that "border incidents provoked by the Pakistanis are becoming increasingly frequent" and that "spies, terrorists and saboteurs are being trained by foreign instructors in the part of Jammu and Kashmir unlawfully occupied by Pakistan for subsequent operations in India." In carefully worded allegations, the article also charges that Islamabad is "getting ready to wage a chemical and bacteriological war" against India and that chemical arms depots stockpiled with CBR agents of American origin have been set up near Islamabad, Peshawar, Quetta, and Lahore.


The employment of Indian migrant workers in construction of ASIAD '82 is only one example of a practice the scale of which has reached alarming proportions. There are two basic kinds of migratory labor. In the first, laborers from regions with high unemployment migrate on their own to areas of high economic growth where the market value of labor is higher. In the second case, employers seek out areas from which cheaper bonded or semibonded labor may be recruited and transplanted. This type of practice is characterized by nonpermanence, migration of large groups from one or more villages, recruitment by intermediary labor contractors, contractual binding of the laborer to the contractor by means of indebtedness, frequent gross underpayment of
wages, and inadequate provision of shelter, sanitary, and medical facilities for the workers.


In this critique of the World Bank's approach to canal irrigation projects in India, the author notes the failure to take into account the social and physical environment where the proposed projects are to be emplaced. After enumerating various problem areas, he notes that "what is good for the Bank as a lending institution is not necessarily good for adoption in the borrowing country . . . yet the Bank's money and prestige encourage nationals of the borrowing country to adopt its definitions of what the problems are and the nature of the solutions."


India's fragmented opposition parties fear that authoritarian trends in the country are growing and that PM Indira Gandhi will switch to a presidential form of government this year to consolidate her personal power.


Intercommunal violence has increased in India in the last 2 years. Law and order is gradually collapsing, especially in northern India. This is a phenomenon that has been made worse by the growing links between politicians and criminals. Intimidation of voters is an old practice that continues in India. The legal system with its long delays favors the criminal who may appeal a conviction, knowing it will take years before the case is heard. The lower judiciary is ineffective and riddled with corruption. The judicial process is seen increasingly as irrelevant by politicians, police, and the general public.


President Mitterrand of France is opening the way for burgeoning ties with India by offering economic and defense cooperation. The most important and immediate French interest is in selling India the advanced Mirage 2000 fighter, which New Delhi sees as matching the F-16s Pakistan is acquiring from the United States. France has tried to make the package attractive, offering easy credit terms and other weapons systems. If the deal goes through--150 aircraft worth 35 billion rupees ($3.18 billion), almost equal to India's annual defense budget--France could become India's second largest military supplier after the Soviet Union.

The yearly review of Indian affairs covers, in brief fashion, many of the issues that dominated the Indian political scene in 1981. Included is a recently completed public opinion poll that shows that Mrs. Gandhi's popularity rating has slipped among the voters. This could reflect poorly on her party's chances in upcoming state elections.


The USSR is waging a vigorous and successful propaganda war in India, blanketing the country with inexpensive, colorful and interesting books and magazines, including juvenile literature, Russian classics, mass circulation magazines, and even the Muslim Koran. According to an Indian survey, the Russians spend more on the dissemination of literature in India in 1 month than the US does in 1 year.


Taunted by her critics over the failure to produce a "government that works," PM Indira Gandhi has begun her 3rd year with a package of new promises and a reshuffle of her ministerial team. She is trying to assure a restive nation that she will produce results well before the next general elections due in early 1985.


Corruption has become part of the growing permissiveness in India's political culture. While over the past 30 years there have been over 200 government commissions which have inquired into official corruption, only a few politicians have left office as a result of findings against them. Corrupt politicians are difficult to bring to heel in India because of laws that specify that no charges may be brought against them without the sanction of the state governor or president. The height of official malfeasance in public office is symbolized by the recent case of A. R. Antulay, the Chief Minister of Maharashtra, who was finally ousted after a state High Court indicted him on charges of political corruption.


India has sent an expedition to Antarctica and may set up a permanent research station as a means of staking its claim to any future mineral and marine exploitation of the frozen continent.

A noted political commentator examines efforts by the deeply divided non-Communist opposition parties to forge a workable unity that is capable of providing an alternative to the Congress-I. Noting that past attempts did not hold together long, Verghese believes that a viable opposition is essential if Indian democracy is to remain intact.


The political coming of age of Rajiv Gandhi is the subject of this highly critical story on the Gandhi family. The authors cover the installation of elder brother Rajiv as head of the Youth Congress-I—a position that brother Sanjay used as a power base before his death. The magazine decries the mindless hero-worship and the unprincipled politics that are the marks of Sanjay's followers to this day.


The Congress-I government of Indira Gandhi has weathered a series of domestic challenges that have threatened, but failed, to undo the supposed "government that works." The corruption scandal brought on by the unethical practices of Maharashtra Chief Minister Antulay emboldened the fractious opposition parties and forced Mrs. Gandhi to exert more authority over her own wayward party members. Andersen stresses that India is, more than ever, a one-woman show. All major decisions are made by Mrs. Gandhi and subordinates are hesitant to chart new policies for fear of running afoul of the Gandhi family. Issues that dominated the domestic scene in India in 1981 included the farmers' protests, the antireservation stir, and the Khalistan agitation.


The Essential Services Maintenance Act has bestowed on PM Indira Gandhi the power to deem any industry she chooses, whether public or private, an essential service, and thereby subject to an official ban on strikes. In response, unions in India, faced with what they felt was only a thinly disguised plan to deprive them of the right to strike, staged a nationwide walkout which ended in both the government and the strikers claiming victory. The turmoil resulted in a dozen people killed, scores wounded, and 25,000 under arrest.


Proposing in rapid succession a friendship treaty and a permanent joint commission to review and promote Indo-Pakistani relations, PM Indira Gandhi
has wrested from Pakistan the diplomatic initiative generated by Islamabad's offer of a nonaggression pact. Nevertheless, at the conclusion of talks at the foreign minister level, Indo-Pakistani detente still seems remote.


Cover story analyzes the accomplishments and failings of the Gandhi government in India. While all the problems of an overpopulated and impoverished land are not necessarily of her making, Mrs. Gandhi, as the undisputed leader of the nation and as one who has been at the helm of state since 1966 (except for the Janata interregnum), is held responsible for much that is wrong with India, just as she is personally credited with the accomplishments of her government. The conclusion is that Mrs. Gandhi has failed to live up to her promises but her grip on power appears to be unshaken.


PM Indira Gandhi has a matchless national following and presides over a formidable majority in parliament. Nevertheless, her supremacy is an illusion and the dominance of the country's politics by a single party has come under severe strain as secessionist demands and regional strains on the central government challenge Gandhi's leadership. The article analyzes the various secessionist and dissident movements that are exerting a centrifugal force on the country. The article concludes that the Congress-I will continue to dominate national politics while Mrs. Gandhi is at the helm, but could disintegrate once she passes from the scene. This in turn could lead to unstable coalition politics in many of the states, at least in the short term.


Trade unions are protesting a law revived by Mrs. Gandhi under which citizens may be detained without trial, and an official ban on strikes in whatever industries and services the government deems essential. A 1-day strike on 19 January 1982 was denounced by Gandhi as antinational and aimed at ousting her from office. Political opposition and labor leaders remain undaunted at Gandhi's denunciation of the strike and the harsh measures taken to suppress it, as they prepare for another round of confrontation with the government.


This article traces the growth of the movement for a free Khalistan in the Punjab region of India and Pakistan and notes the political grievances of the
Sikhs who since independence have been reduced from landlords to small landholders tilling their own land. The Khalistan movement allegedly has no support among Indian Sikhs living outside the Punjab, but has drawn some adherents within the region and among the Sikh Students' Federation. It draws most of its sustenance from Sikh emigrants in the US, Canada, and Britain who have no stake in its establishment, and continues to be exploited by both its supporters and opponents to wring concessions from the Indian Government.


Gandhi's shakeup of top cabinet officers and announcement of a 20-point economic program may not be enough to rescue the Congress-I government from the shortfalls that inevitably result when one person—the Prime Minister—wields so much power.

Patten, Steve. "Is India Pulling Away from Russia?" U.S. News and World Report, 15 February 1982. (Includes an interview with Indira Gandhi.)

Mrs. Gandhi's friendly signals to Washington, Beijing, and Islamabad are cited by the author as evidence that India may well be in the process of distancing itself from the Soviet Union as part of an effort to recoup international prestige tarnished by the recognition of Kampuchea and an equivocal stance on Afghanistan. In an accompanying in-depth interview, Gandhi makes it clear that she will embark on no foreign policy venture that will jeopardize India's close relations with the Kremlin. While she is desirous of improved relations with the Reagan administration in the aftermath of the F-16 controversy, she still displays strong suspicions of American motives in supporting Pakistan at the expense of India's friendship.


The Ladakh region is demanding special autonomous status within the state of Kashmir. These demands led to violent riots last month in Leh. The state government of Sheikh Abdullah, the "Lion of Kashmir," is likely to oppose any erosion of its authority dictated by New Delhi to placate the Ladakhis.


Bombay union kingpin Dr. Datta Samant has carved out a veritable empire in the textile mills of western India. Industrialists, party-based unions, and government officials are fearful of the power being amassed by this union warlord. Samant is fiercely loyal to his union members and presses wage demands to the limit, often employing resistance techniques perfected during the independence movement.

After a rhetorical clash with Pakistan over the sensitive Kashmir issue, India has postponed indefinitely further talks on a possible nonaggression pact between the two countries. The chain of minor diplomatic skirmishes that led to the rupture makes little sense to anyone except Indians and Pakistanis who have fought two wars already over the disputed territory of Jammu and Kashmir. The Indian announcement cancelling the talks caught both government and public off guard in Islamabad, but Pakistani officials insist the negotiations will go on although they offer no estimate when they will be resumed.


One of India's leading defense hawks traces the change in foreign perceptions of India as a major power. In this respect, he sees India's reputation as having reached a nadir in the mid-1960s concurrently with the perceptions of China as a developing world power. The turning point for India, in Subrahmanyan's estimation, occurred in 1970 and 1971 in the war with Pakistan. This conflict aroused respect for Indian defense military prowess, while subsequent advances in agriculture, industry, and science, including the nuclear test of 1974, earned for India a growing positive image as an emerging world power. Among the other large nations of the world, only the United States, with perplexing obtuseness, has failed to come to terms with the concept of India as a major power.


Washington correspondent examines the controversy over the US decision to admit avowed secessionist J. S. Chauhan to the country on humanitarian grounds, despite New Delhi's vehement protests. Included is a lengthy interview with the controversial "president" of the Khalistan government-in-exile.


A spirit of compromise has prevailed in New Delhi and Kathmandu in sharing the resources of the Himalayan watershed. Bilateral talks in India last month have ironed out longstanding differences over three major Nepalese hydroelectric projects on the Karnali, Rapti, and Mahakali Rivers that will benefit both countries.

Activists in Assam propose that a wall, 4,000 kilometers long and topped by electrified barbed wire, be built along the Indo-Bangladesh border to stem the flow of Bangladeshi immigrants. The influx of migrants, both before and after the establishment of Bangladesh, has tipped the demographic balance in favor of the newcomers who now outnumber the Assamese and native inhabitants in some areas of the Indian northeast.


A high-level Soviet military delegation comprising Defense Minister Dmitri Ustinov, Soviet navy and air force chiefs, and 30 other generals visits India amid disclaimers from New Delhi that it has no knowledge of the precise nature of the trip. The initiative for the visit reportedly originated with Defense Minister Ustinov and may have been intended to dissuade India from varying the sources of its arm purchases which, so far, have been heavily dependent on Moscow. The Soviets clearly are concerned about the recent Indian signing of a memorandum of understanding with France to purchase 40 Mirage 2000 jet fighters and reportedly have offered India MiG-27s and MiG-29s at a fraction of the Mirage price.


India thinks over the proposal to make Nepal a zone of peace, thereby raising hopes in Kathmandu that the Himalayan kingdom could become an Asiatic Switzerland.


India recently was an embarrassed host to Soviet Defense Minister Dmitri Ustinov who brought with him to New Delhi, ostensibly on a goodwill visit, one of the most high-ranking Soviet military delegations ever to go to a non-Communist country. The Soviet group that came to India comprised some 40 senior officers, including the commanders of the Air Force and Navy, the deputy commander of the Red Army, and about 30 lieutenant generals. The visit was proposed entirely on Soviet initiative and may have been intended to dissuade New Delhi from seeking armaments from other sources so that Moscow could retain its edge as India's leading arms supplier.


Since 1979, the state of Assam has reeled under increasing agitation, a prelude to the massacres that followed in the wake of the January 1983 elections there. This article analyzes the changing demographic pattern,
from the mid-19th century to the present, that is generally believed to be the cause of the unrest. The major immigrant groups include: tea garden laborers brought in from Bihar, Orissa, Andhra Pradesh, and Madhya Pradesh beginning in 1858; East Bengal Muslims who began growing jute and vegetables on vacant lands beginning in the early 20th century; Bengali Hindus forced out of Burma and Bengal in the 1940s and 1950s; Nepalis brought in by the British as guards and soldiers; Marwaris from Rajasthan who began taking control of the commerce of Assam in the early 20th century; the Bangladesh refugees beginning in 1971; and others who have come to Assam in search of employment. Aside from the problems caused by the pressures of immigration and a growth rate that is the highest in India, is the feeling that the development of Assam has been neglected by the central government. Assam is rich in petroleum, natural gas, tea, jute, paper pulp, and many other resources, all of which are exploited with scant return to the state. Development of the infrastructure of Assam has also been grossly neglected. The author offers some suggestions for dealing with these problems. (tables)


The author, a longtime analyst of the Indian political scene, argues that the revitalized Congress Party under the post-Janata leadership of Indira Gandhi has restored the party of Nehru and Gandhi to center stage. Congress strengths still continue to be among noncaste Hindus and minorities, which comprise 38 percent of India's total population. Although the Congress share of popular vote has never been a majority, the party dominates the electoral process. Included in the insightful article are complete tables breaking down the 1980 voting.


India is the world's largest foreign aid recipient and yet in per capita terms receives the least aid of the developing nations. As substantial as foreign aid has been to India, it has only amounted to 10 to 15 percent of its development spending over the past 25 years, the rest being borne by India itself. There is considerable criticism of foreign aid within India itself. There is first the feeling that, in the longrun, underdevelopment can only be overcome by Indian endeavor. Secondly, there is the fear that major loans, such as the recent multibillion dollar IMF loan, are a sellout of Indian sovereignty and a reversion to a new type of dependence. There is also widespread criticism of planning by the central government in New Delhi and the way in which aid is utilized. German aid, according to the article, has been less subject to this type of criticism because it is largely direct, wide-ranging, and provided by nongovernment organizations that are able to circumvent the Indian Government's planning machinery.

A total cutoff of OPEC oil, a serious problem for western industrialized nations, would be disastrous for India. Agricultural production and prices would be seriously effected by increased costs of fertilizer production and diesel fuel for tractors and irrigation pumps. The escalation of Middle East oil prices since the 1970s has been an especially serious problem for India, which has insufficient oil reserves of its own. Consequently, India has turned to other fuel resources, all of which are fraught with problems. Its hydroelectric potential is considerable, but there is at least a 10-year lag between planning a hydrofacility and implementing operation. India has considerable coal reserves, but most of these are concentrated in the three neighboring states of West Bengal, Orissa, and Bihar, and will be costly to transport to power-generating plants in other parts of the country. India's oil reserves will be needed for agricultural, domestic, and transportation needs. Consequently India has turned to nuclear power, including eventual development of a fast-breeder reactor program. Aside from power production, this program will give India the potential for producing major nuclear weapons at an acceptable cost, which has already resulted in a dangerous nuclear arms race with Pakistan. There is further danger of spread of nuclear technology to the Middle East by either India or Pakistan in return for economic favors.


The struggle for the mantle of PM Indira Gandhi's succession, worn by the late Sanjay Gandhi, continues, pitting his widow Maneka against Rajiv, the eldest son of Mrs. Gandhi. Last week, the conflict split the Gandhi family. Maneka was expelled from Mrs. Gandhi's official residence and an exchange of acrimonious letters was published widely in the press.


The many problems facing the Congress-I Party seem to be coming to a boil and Mrs. Gandhi could find herself saddled with some unpleasant disciplinary actions. Political ineptitude at the state level and the family feud involving Maneka and Rajiv Gandhi are examined.


The ruling Congress-I Party failed to get a two-thirds majority in last month's election to the Rajya Sabha. This means that the major barrier to a constitutional change for a presidential form of government has been left intact. This is believed to be the type of government for which Mrs. Gandhi is planning, before her term ends in 1985. While the Congress Party has the required strength in the lower house, a constitutional amendment needs a two-thirds majority in both houses of the bicameral parliament.

Prior to the bloodless coup in Bangladesh, India was preparing a new bid to woo Dacca. Now this has given way to a wait-and-see attitude and the prospective trip of Indian FM Narasimha Rao to New Delhi's eastern neighbor has been postponed indefinitely. Strategically, New Delhi's worst fear is that its three largest neighbors, China, Pakistan, and Bangladesh, will unite against India. During the past 3 months, delegations from Beijing and Dacca have exchanged visits and a Chinese military team was in Bangladesh in early March.


In anticipation of forthcoming state assembly elections in four states, India Today publishes another public opinion poll to determine the mood of the voters. Also examined is the effect Mrs. Gandhi's wayward daughter-in-law Maneka is having on the fortunes of the Indian Prime Minister and her Congress-I Party.


After a fairly critical look at the problems India faces in looking ahead to the 1980s, the author comes to basically optimistic conclusions about India's development over the past 35 years and its prospects in the coming decade. Major problems include: 1) the Congress-I is in total disarray, rife with factionalism and corruption and lacking in grassroots organization except as an electoral machine lubricated by massive contributions; 2) the competence of the bureaucracy has declined greatly through political interference and low pay; 3) social unrest and violence are serious problems in many parts of the country, though less so than in much of the third world; 4) the economy is on the upswing, but still faces energy shortages, food shortages, and a serious balance of payments problem; and 5) although its superpower relations are in better balance than they have been in years, India has not been successful in its fundamental concern of keeping the Soviets and the United States out of South Asia.


The author investigates the rising tide of Hindu chauvinism in the volatile states of the Indian northeast. Organizations such as the Vishwa Hindu Parishad have intensified their efforts in the region, trying to counter the influence of Christian missionaries. The author believes that this Hindu revival has increased tensions in the region and has fed the separatist movements that have been raging since independence. In Assam, the Hindu revivalists are trying to convince New Delhi to eject only Bengali Muslims while increasing the strength of the Hindu community in the state by encouraging Hindu immigration.

Communal violence erupts in the Punjab as Sikhs and Hindus desecrate each other's places of worship. The government responds by banning the extremist Sikh organization, the Dal Khalsa. However, the Sikh political party, the Akali Dal, attempts to take its place and project itself as the champion of the Sikh cause against the Hindus.


Although Mrs. Gandhi is acknowledged as a strong leader, her control over some state governments is far more tenuous than it seems. In Haryana, the chief minister has maintained control over the bureaucracy through a large number of boards staffed by political cronies who have profited immensely from kickbacks. The state bureaucracy is demoralized and forced to acquiesce to the extortionary demands of politicians to avoid transfer or outright firing. In Karnataka, an obtuse chief minister who attempted to maintain all administrative reins in his own hands was soon overwhelmed by detail and compelled to hand back authority to the civil servants who subsequently have been able to work without interference from the politicians. The two poles represented by Haryana and Karnataka represent two of the eccentric patterns of Congress rule in a number of states. If Mrs. Gandhi's influence had penetrated sufficiently in such states, such patterns would not be emerging.


Rajiv Gandhi is beginning to appear as a liability to the Congress Party although he will not be drummed out as long as his mother survives politically. He has remained disdainful and aloof from the Congress Party which is a monumental network of corruption, extortion, and patronage, and which in many states maintains standing armies of thugs and bandits. He has remained isolated from the unsavory tangle of politicians about him, and has failed to establish any dominance over them. Rajiv Gandhi is a technocrat and his advisers are mostly young, westernized business entrepreneurs. He is serving his political apprenticeship by organizing the Asian Games, a task that is far removed from the often violent struggles of Congress politics.


Halfway through her 5-year tenure, PM Indira Gandhi has failed to win an absolute majority in the four states that elected legislative assemblies on 19 May. The election results may point to her waning charisma and the decline of one-party dominance in India's politics. It also may raise doubts about the Congress-I ability to retain its hold on the central government when India elects a new parliament in early 1985. In the recent elections, the leftwing coalition dominated by the Communist Party of India-Marxist (CPM) won a landslide victory in West Bengal, capturing 238 out of 294 seats. In the southern state of Kerala, the Congress-I won only 20 seats out of 140,
with the CPM getting 25. In Haryana, the Congress-I won 33 seats out of 90, with the opposition Lok Dal securing 31, and its electoral ally the Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP) getting 6. In Himachal Pradesh, the Congress-I won 31 seats out of 68, with the BJP getting 29.


Mrs. Gandhi's political magic failed last week when the Congress-I Party failed to win fewer than a quarter of the seats it contested in four state assembly elections and seven parliamentary by-elections. Its only victory occurred in Kerala where the Congress-I was part of an 11-party coalition that eked out a bare majority. The biggest defeat was at the hands of the CPM in West Bengal, which traditionally has been dominant in that state. The most humiliating setbacks were in Haryana and Himachal Pradesh where the Congress-I had campaigned long and hard.


In 1980, PM Indira Gandhi swept back to power on a campaign platform pledging a government that worked. Today, at the midpoint of her 5-year term, indications are that she has not lived up to her promise. Law and order nationwide remains a problem, and there appears to be no respite from economic woes. In last week's four state assembly and seven by-elections, candidates endorsed by Mrs. Gandhi fared badly and lost in four by-elections. At the state level, the Congress-I Party made an unimpressive showing. In West Bengal, the Marxist-led coalition remained in power. In Haryana, the Lok Dal and the BJP won a very narrow victory over the Congress-I Party. In Himachal Pradesh, the BJP lost to the Congress-I by only two votes. In Kerala, the United Democratic Front, an alliance led by the Congress-I won 77 out of 140 seats. Of a total of 486 candidates fielded by the Congress-I in the four state elections, about 130 were successful in winning office.


Prospects for detente on the Indian Subcontinent seem remote as ever despite President Zia-ul Haq's consent to a proposal from PM Indira Gandhi that the two governments resume their stalled dialog on bilateral relations. In a personal letter responding to Gen Zia, Mrs. Gandhi chided the Pakistani leader that some of his statements were not aimed at promoting goodwill between the two countries and referred indirectly to assertions from Islamabad that Pakistan's northern areas had always been an integral part of the country and not part of the disputed state of Kashmir. Nevertheless, the Gandhi letter proposed the resumption of a dialog on forming an Indo-Pakistani Commission, on a bilateral treaty of friendship and amity, and on Pakistan's proposal for a no-war pact. Gandhi's grudging concession to resume negotiations with Pakistan may have been due to a desire to regain the diplomatic initiative from Pakistan and to be viewed as an agent of peace and moderation in the region.

In India, political defection in which legislators switch party loyalties without regard for the constituents who elected them is a game carried on with impunity for the lure of power or money. In an egregious example of political defection in the recent state elections, the Congress-I Party retained power in Haryana although it won only 36 out of 90 seats. This was accomplished when New Delhi-backed Chief Minister Bhajan Hal, induced some 10 to 14 opposition legislators to defect to the ruling party, and rewarded them with ministerial positions. Opponents of Hal called the tactic political piracy and electoral fraud.


India seems to be moving toward a more balanced nonalignment, away from the cozy relationship it has had with its friendship treaty ally, the USSR. The most recent developments presaging the shift in policy are an equivocation that amounts to support for Britain on the Falklands issue; the decision by PM Indira Gandhi to visit the United States in July, though she has yet to visit Moscow since her return to office in January 1980; and Indian interest in acquiring American military hardware.


The frontrunner for the post of India's next president is lackluster Congress-I stalwart Zail Singh. Presently serving as Home Minister, Singh is regarded as one of the least effective Indian officials ever to serve in that position. He has no intellectual pretensions, little political acumen, and was picked by Mrs. Gandhi for the quality she prizes most in all her political associates: an unswerving loyalty to herself.


The political web that comprises the on-again off-again no-war talks between India and Pakistan is the subject of this incisive review. The author believes that both countries have become ensnared in the web and cannot break loose from it. In the absence of any rapid movement, both sides have resorted to stalling and sterile press debates about in whose "court" the diplomatic "ball" rests at a given moment. Despite these drawbacks, the author believes that "both Mrs. Gandhi and Zia realize that this is the time to bridge the India-Pakistan strategic divide that has enabled external powers to intervene in the subcontinent's affairs."

Violence toward "untouchables" in India, of both economic and religious origin, persists despite institution of legal reforms.


Mass conversions of "untouchables" to Islam in Tamil Nadu and Gujarat has led to widespread communal fighting in these states between Hindus and Muslims. The article details the continuing plight of India's 100 million untouchables, or scheduled castes, and notes that a term now preferred over harijan (meaning "children of God," coined by Gandhi) is dalit, meaning "downtrodden." Conspiracy theories popular among Hindus include the rumor that the untouchables were bribed with Persian Gulf money to become Muslims, as part of an Islamic plot to take over India.


Maneka Gandhi, widow of the late Sanjay Gandhi, has emerged as a serious political challenger to her mother-in-law, Prime Minister Indira Gandhi. Maneka's rise to prominence following her address to a convention of rebellious Congress-I members is seen among some observers in India as the first open split of Mrs. Gandhi's so far monolithic Congress-I Party; the existence of a determined opposition to Rajiv Gandhi, the prime minister's only surviving son whom she is grooming for succession; and the possibility that powerful supporters of Mrs. Gandhi might drop her and jump on another bandwagon which they see as gathering momentum.


India, long seen as tilting heavily toward Moscow, has begun to mend its fences with the Soviet Union's two arch-rivals—the United States and China. New Delhi also is set to resume the tortuous and slow-moving dialog with Pakistan to normalize fully its relations with Islamabad. Behind the Indian demarches is the awareness that the Soviets are likely to remain in Afghanistan indefinitely, and that either Pakistan must tilt toward Moscow or bear the brunt of Soviet-inspired instability. Neither scenario is comforting to New Delhi, which is now viewing its relationship with Beijing and Washington with considerably more flexibility than in the recent past.


Faced with a serious power shortage, India has prepared a long-term plan for developing its hydroelectric potential, of which only 10 percent currently
is being tapped. The most promising source of funding for these projects is the International Development Association of the World Bank, which encouraged India to draw up a hydroelectric plan. Since these projects will take years to build, India in the meantime is working to improve the output of existing thermal projects through updating present equipment or supplementing it with additional equipment.


The election of Mrs. Gandhi's nominee for president, Zail Singh, was assured by the July 12 presidential election in which the Congress-I party won a substantial majority in the electoral college. The opposition had pushed for an all-party consensus selection of the president, but this was ignored by Gandhi who chose instead her home minister, a Sikh from the Punjab and loyal supporter. In a government crisis the president appoints a prime minister, who can, through the power of government patronage, secure the majority for his party. The opposition contends Mrs. Gandhi has this in mind as well as plans to amend the Constitution to adopt a French-style presidential government with herself as president.


India has qualified recently for the status of "pioneer investor" as defined by the United Nations Law of the Sea Conference by spending about $30 million on exploring the seabed. Only 11 nations have qualified so far to be allotted sites for seafloor mining of polymetallic nodules in the 1990s. India has one research vessel and plans to purchase three more, as well as building extensive shore facilities and training as many as 3,000 technical personnel.


The magazine presents an extended political portrait of the new Indian president-to-be, Giani Zail Singh. While he is reputed to be an honest enough person to fill the prestigious post, the magazine agrees with most political commentators who believe that Singh was chosen for the post because he is a loyal "yes man" for Mrs. Gandhi and he is a Sikh.


Former Home Affairs Minister and ex-Chief Minister of Punjab Zail Singh is the frontrunner in the contest to elect India's next president. The position has little power, however, and Singh has scant credentials for the job. In spite of an imposing appearance, he projects little authority or command presence and has little formal education. The principal qualification that he brings to the position is a subservience to Prime Minister Indira Gandhi.
Zail Singh supporters argue that his appointment will help placate militant Sikhs on the Khalistan issue. However, Singh, who has had ample opportunity to do so in the past, has never exerted any effort to address or resolve this potentially secessionist issue.


Zail Singh, nominee of Prime Minister Indira Gandhi's Congress-I Party, has been elected India's seventh president and is the first Sikh to hold the office.


Bombay's textile industry, shut down off and on since January by strikes, has been largely engineered by one man, Datta Samant. Samant, a former Congress party legislator, quit politics to begin organizing labor in 1977. His strike of Bombay's 250,000 textile workers has cost 30 million man-days of labor lost in the first half of 1982, compared with a nationwide total of 22.5 million man-days for all of 1981. Samant's strike was opposed by the Bombay textile workers' union, Rashtriya Mill Mazdoor, which opposed the strike and yet was unable to insure the working of a single one of Bombay's 50 mills. Employers and traditional union leaders have denounced Samant for his tactics and wage demands. Nevertheless workers have deserted their unions in droves, as he has secured for them more wage rises than any other leader or organization.


Due to late and inadequate monsoons, India faces what may be the worst drought of the century. Experts are predicting a decline in yields and severe pressure on government reserve stocks of foodgrains. The deficiency of rainfall is also expected to have an adverse affect on hydroelectric power output, important to Indian industry.


India once again faces the specter of drought, but this time the nation may be able to overcome it without widespread suffering.


Mrs. Gandhi's recent visit to the United States is seen by the author as a genuine attempt by both nations to improve relations between them. Major
points of contention between the countries, both past and present, are pointed out, as well as Indian views of various American administrations. Indian goals achieved by the visit, according to the author, included bolstering of Indian and Gandhi administration prestige by the emphasis placed on the visit by the Reagan administration; establishing in the minds of the American electorate the image of India as a regional power and an industrializing nation able to feed itself; and making the point that India is truly nonaligned, not merely a Soviet camp-follower. US goals achieved by the visit included a warming of relations with India in the context of the Soviet occupation of Afghanistan and the hope of easing tensions between India and Pakistan at a time when there is particular need for solidarity in South Asia.


Shortly before Mrs. Gandhi's visit to Washington, the United States announced its willingness to sell India some military equipment, including the F-16 fighter planes. The upcoming sale of the latter to Pakistan by the United States had raised violent objections in India earlier this year. It's not clear whether the United States really expects or wants India to accept the offer. Also US arms are a good bit more costly and require stiffer repayment terms than the Soviet arms on which India currently relies. However, the Mirage-2000s, which India gets from France, are not really a match for the F-16s. India has also expressed interest in the US Hercules C-130 transport plane and some advanced missiles.


A record sugar harvest finds India with sugar surpluses at the time of a glut in the world sugar market. The Indian Government is expected to increase its stockpiles by buying up some of the surplus, thus helping to stabilize prices. But storage costs are high and a sizeable surplus is expected to remain.


India's first multipurpose satellite, the INSAT-1A, originally hailed as a triumph of Indian technology at the time of its launching, has been plagued by malfunctions. Both the C-band antenna, vital for communications with earth, and the solar sail, designed to counterbalance the solar panels on the opposite side of the satellite, failed to open. In addition, as a result of political and bureaucratic impediments, many of the earth stations intended to beam up signals and receive information from the satellite have yet to be completed.

Mrs. Gandhi successfully faced her third no-confidence motion since her 1980 return to power. The significance of the vote was that it was spearheaded by Soviet friend and former Gandhi supporter H. N. Bahuguna. Mrs. Gandhi has been steadily losing her leftist support as she backs away from supporting Soviet foreign policy positions. In her reaction to the vote, Mrs. Gandhi reportedly showed her intolerance with opposition in general and her reservations about the parliamentary system, which her critics say she is bent on replacing with a French-style presidential system.


The August police riots in Bombay are blamed on the insensitivity of the Maharashtra state government to the demands of the policemen as well as the sudden arrest of about 90 police union leaders. The state government claimed that it had intelligence reports that the police were about to take over armories and mount a campaign of violence and moved to prevent it. Angered by the arrest of their leaders, rioting policemen were joined by striking textile workers. The Army was called out to aid paramilitary forces in putting down the disturbance, which left at least 4 dead and 27 injured.


The author presents a good wrap-up of the background to the Tarapur nuclear powerplant disagreement between India and the United States. The author traces the history of the problem from the 30-year pact signed in 1963 in which the United States agreed to supply fuel for the Tarapur plant to the 1978 US law barring supplies to countries that had not signed the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty and to the present agreement under which France will supply fuel. The problem, from India's point of view, is that France, which is now a member of the so-called London Club of nuclear suppliers, may be pressured by the International Atomic Energy Agency into requiring stricter safeguards and inspections of Indian nuclear facilities.


Bombay police rioted on August 15, India's Independence Day. The police, joined by striking textile workers, burned buses and blocked road traffic. Army troops were brought in to put down the disturbances and at least five people were killed. Police unrest has recently been evident in other Indian states, including Haryana and Uttar Pradesh.

Although India is one of the few countries of the world whose constitution includes a commitment to environmental protection and improvement, the last few decades have seen increasing degradation of the environment because of the growing pressure of human and animal populations on resources. The main problems are air and water pollution from industrial development, soil erosion, deforestation, loss of wildlife, and urban sprawl caused by unplanned use of land and resources. The laws that have existed in most of these problem areas for 2 decades are inadequate or poorly implemented. No legislation exists in India to protect grazing lands, catchment areas of river basins, wetlands, estuaries, mangroves, commercial fishing areas, or to provide for disposal of chemicals other than pesticides, prevention of noise pollution, recycling of resources, or scientific land use.


Police riots in Bombay, put down by army troops, left 7 dead, 100 injured, and 1,000 arrested. The police organization, Maharashtra Police Karmachari Sanghatana, seeks major improvements in police living and working conditions.


In her visit to Mauritius and Mozambique in late August, Prime Minister Indira Gandhi stressed again her insistence on the demilitarization of the Indian Ocean. She also expressed Indian support for the return of Diego Garcia, an island leased to the United States by Great Britain for use as a military base, to Mauritius. On the economic side of the visit, India agreed to open a $10.5 million line of credit enabling Mauritius to import Indian goods and also to assist in the setting up of a state trading corporation and a national shipping line. Mozambique was also offered a line of credit for buying agricultural equipment from India.

"Bridging the Ocean." Economic and Political Weekly (New Delhi), 4 September 1982, p. 1430.

Prime Minister Indira Gandhi's visit to Mauritius and Mozambique underlined the concern about any escalation of superpower buildup in the Indian Ocean. The new government of Mauritius has decided to pursue bilateral talks with the United Kingdom and the United States regarding return of Diego Garcia, rather than taking its case to the International Court of Justice. Mauritius's case is based on UN resolution 1514, which prohibits dismemberment of colonial territories before they are granted independence.

PM Indira Gandhi will face a political challenge from within her own family when daughter-in-law Maneka Gandhi forms her own party next month. The action follows a quarrel between the two Gandhi women that led to the expulsion of Maneka from her mother-in-law's household. So far, the younger Gandhi has gained the allegiance of only 15 state legislators and 2 parliamentarians and it is doubtful that her party will win any seats in the forthcoming elections in four states. However, the presence of a new party could increase dissidence within the Congress-I and it is this factor that is a greater political threat to the PM than any opposition party.


Thirty years of economic development in the world's two largest countries are examined and compared in this article. Early available data and research revealed a significantly greater rate of overall achievement in China than in India, particularly in the industrial sector. More recent information and reinterpretation of the earlier data indicate, however, that China's developmental lead over India is not that significant. Agricultural prospects for the future appear brighter for India than for China but "decades of slow growth lie ahead before either nation emerges as a modern industrial state of developed-nation status."


The national Indian press is fighting to block a restrictive press bill recently pushed through the Bihar state legislature. The bill, which has been defended by Prime Minister Gandhi but not yet signed by her, is viewed by the journalists as a move to muzzle the media. There is no right of appeal under the bill, which provides a penalty of 2 years imprisonment for writing, editing, publishing, printing, circulating, and possessing "grossly indecent or scurrilous matter or matters intended for blackmail." A nationwide print media strike was held on 3 September to protest the bill, which journalists fear if not opposed would be applied to the whole country.


India will import 14 million tons of crude oil this year, which will account for about 40 percent of the total value of its imports. The government projects self-sufficiency in oil by the end of the decade based on estimated hydrocarbon reserves of about 15 billion tons, about two-thirds of it offshore. This ambitious plan calls for a massive exploration effort by foreign oil companies. Response to India's offer of offshore and onshore blocks for exploration, however, has not been overwhelming. India also faces a serious
balance of payments, which, aggravated by the cost of financing the exploration, may force it to postpone its goal of self-sufficiency in oil.


Nearly 95 percent of Indian grain arrives at the marketplace in a bullock cart, of which the country has 14 million. Bullock carts are still the major means of transporting goods and people over rough, short hauls. But the cost of a cartwheel alone is about 100 days wages for a laborer, and a whole cart is a lifetime investment. Research has been underway for 35 years to devise a better, cheaper cart. Now from Melbourne comes word of a newly designed cartwheel being tested that will cost one-fifth as much as a traditional wheel. Another problem facing the bullock cart industry is the deterioration of Indian breeds of bulls, said to be caused by neglect and a recent craze for imported breeds, whose resistance to local diseases is as yet unproved.


France has agreed to replace the United States as sole supplier of enriched uranium for India's nuclear powerstation at Tarapur. India is objecting, however, to the stricter safeguards being insisted on by the French. These safeguards require that not only the Tarapur plant be subject to inspection but also any facility that uses any by-product of the Tarapur plant. India is unwilling to accept these stricter safeguards, which will have no time limit, because they could place restrictions on her Cyrus research reactor and the R-5 research reactor that will be commissioned next year.


Act II in "The Wooing of India." The scene is Moscow. Mrs. Gandhi has just returned from a triumphal visit to Washington where she was warmly greeted and offered $1 billion in new military sales, and uranium from France for India's Tarapur nuclear powerstation. Brezhnev, in turn, rolls out the red carpet and offers India increased assistance in the buildup of such industries as steel, aluminum, coal, and pharmaceuticals; the purchase of 500 million meters of textiles yearly; and most likely, an offer of some sophisticated weapons to counter American offers.


The Indians and Soviets trace the history of their friendship back to 1905 when Mahatma Gandhi wrote "if the Russian people succeed, the Revolution will be regarded as the greatest victory, the greatest event of the present century." Lenin, in turn, spoke out against the British in India during the Bombay protest of 1907. The Nehrus visited the Soviet Union in 1927 and
Tagore in the 1930s. The two countries established diplomatic relations in 1947, before the official transfer of power. Since then, the Soviets have supported India on the questions of Goa and Kashmir and maintained a friendly neutrality during the Sino-Indian war. India in turn has been understanding of the Soviet position in Afghanistan. The article goes on to detail Soviet economic and industrialization assistance and trade between the two countries. A sidebar article traces contact between the peoples of the two regions from the second millennium BC.


The Indian Parliament has turned out a higher than usual volume of work since Mrs. Gandhi returned to power in January 1980. Both the opposition and Mrs. Gandhi's Congress-I Party are claiming credit for this burst of productivity. While the ruling party brags about its efficiency, the opposition points to the cooperation it has provided. A sidebar to the article gives an interesting rundown on all no-confidence votes since independence.


Having taken Washington by storm in July-August, Prime Minister Indira Gandhi headed for lesser-known capitals: Port Louis, Mauritius and Maputo, Mozambique. Mrs. Gandhi was the first invited guest of the new Mauritian Government led by Anerood Jugnauth, a Hindu. Of the island's one million population, 52 percent are of Indian origin. Mauritius also was anxious for Mrs. Gandhi's visit because of her expected support for Mauritian sovereignty over the island of Diego Garcia. Some 1,200 miles northeast of Mauritius, Diego Garcia was detached from the rest of the colony by the British in 1965, as part of the deal that led to independence 3 years later. The British subsequently sublet the island to the United States for use as a military base.


In this article previewing the succession of Jammu and Kashmir Chief Minister Sheikh Mohammad Abdullah by his son Farooq Abdullah, the author gives a good background of Kashmir's first family, complete with genealogy chart. The focus is on the differences between Farooq and his chief rival and brother-in-law, Khan Ghulam Mohammad Shah. Farooq is viewed as being much more acceptable to New Delhi. The author notes that the vacuum left by the Sheikh's death will be filled either by a government controlled by Delhi or one with a popular mandate large enough to chart its own course. The Sheikh's ruling party, the National Conference, is under heavy fire for blatant corruption, particularly for allotment of land to party sympathizers. Disruptive forces facing whoever leads the state include extremist Muslim groups, a large Hindu minority, and pressures from Pakistani Kashmir.

The author presents in detail the background of the Bombay police strike on Indian Independence Day and a blow-by-blow account of the mid-August eruption and its repercussions in other parts of the country. Blame is laid on the extremely poor working and living conditions provided the constabulary and the ineptness with which the government responded to the outbreak triggered by the suspension of the police organization Maharashtra Police Karamchari Sanghatana and the arrest of its leaders. The author notes that police problems are countrywide. Although the majority of Indian constabulary members possess some education, constable wages are equivalent to 60 percent of the wages of unskilled industrial workers. Most are never promoted, and only 35 percent are supplied housing as provided by law.


Maneka Gandhi, daughter-in-law of Mrs. Gandhi, has run into difficulties in her attempt at forming a new political party in competition with the Prime Minister's Congress-I Party. Maneka launched her new party, Akhil Bharatiya Sanjay Vichar Manch, at a press conference on 25 August, announcing also that two Congress-I MP's had agreed to join her. Within a few days both of the defectors, Kalpanath Sonkar of Uttar Pradesh and Ram Narayan Tripathi of Kanpur, had defected, reportedly as a result of considerable arm-twisting behind the scenes.


Bijoy Hrangkhal, leader of the Tripura tribals recently reported as kidnaped, has turned up in the Chittagong hill tracts. Speculation is that he went there to meet with Laldenga, leader of the outlawed Mizo National Front (MNF). Hrangkhal, a supposedly reformed rebel, had been receiving special treatment (in the way of loans and other financial aid) from the Marxist Tripura Government of Nripen Chakraborty in an attempt to win over the Tripura tribals under Hrangkhal's influence. Somewhat embarrassed, the Tripura Government continues to refer to Hrangkhal's disappearance and possible defection as a kidnaping.


Indian Prime Minister Indira Gandhi was expected to sign a bill passed by the Bihar state assembly outlawing "scurrilous, irresponsible journalism" and empowering the police to arrest any local journalist without a warrant. Journalists all over India stopped work for a day to protest the Bihar Press Bill. The specter of India's stifled press during the Emergency period of the mid-1970s still looms large in the memories of Indian journalists.

The death of Sheikh Mohammad Abdullah, leader of Kashmir for 40 years, raises some important questions. The succession question was answered immediately, as the Sheikh's eldest son Farooq Abdullah was unanimously elected chief minister. The next question is whether Farooq will be able to hold the leadership against the rivalry of his brother-in-law G. M. Shah without becoming beholden to Congress-I Party minority support and resulting New Delhi inroads into the Kashmiri autonomy that was so jealously guarded by the Sheikh.


Kashmir is once more in the news, but this time not because of the conflicting claims of India and Pakistan over the territory. Instead the focus is on the recent death of the Chief Minister and "Lion of Kashmir," Sheikh Mohammad Abdullah and his successor and eldest son Farooq Abdullah. Farooq is compared with his friend Rajiv Gandhi, described as another "political neophyte . . . suddenly projected into prominence as a dynastic heir." Mrs. Gandhi, who would like to have tighter control over Kashmir may attempt a merger or alliance between her Congress-I Party and the National Conference Party of the Sheikh, which holds the majority in Kashmir.


Indira Gandhi's July-August visit to the United States is described as extremely cordial and already bearing fruit for India in the form of new loans from the World Bank's International Development Association and a $1 billion arms sale. The author briefly traces the ups and downs of Indo-US foreign policy since Indian independence and notes that Gandhi seems to be at the moment trying to pursue a truly nonaligned policy and attempting to dispel the notion of India as a Soviet puppet.


In this report of the death of the 76-year-old Sheikh Mohammad Abdullah, the Lion of Kashmir is described as a freedom fighter, statesman, and hero of his people. Abdullah united Kashmiri Muslims behind the ruling Hindu maharaja in 1947 when the maharaja chose to join India rather than Pakistan. The Sheikh, first Chief Minister of Jammu and Kashmir state, was jailed for sedition in 1953 and spent 22 years in and out of jails, courtrooms, and exile. In 1975, in an agreement with Mrs. Gandhi, he was reinstated as Chief Minister. Upon his death, the Sheikh was succeeded immediately by his son 44-year-old Farooq Abdullah, who will be well occupied with holding his father's National Conference Party together against the Muslim extremist and pro-Pakistani parties.

Maneka Gandhi, daughter-in-law of Mrs. Gandhi, is attempting to organize a political party in competition with Mrs. Gandhi's ruling Congress-I. The wife of Sanjay Gandhi, Mrs. Gandhi's son and possible successor until his death in a place crash in 1980, Maneka was expelled from the Prime Minister's official residence 6 months ago. Since then she has been gathering around her former Sanjay supporters and other dissatisfied Congress Party members. On her 26th birthday, August 25, she called a press conference to formally announce her intention to form a political party. Her chief criticisms of the Congress Party are corruption, sycophancy, and lack of response to the country's problems.


New Delhi has been chosen to host the nonaligned summit meeting to be held in March 1983, the original host city of Baghdad being preoccupied with the Iran-Iraq war. Attending the summit will be about 3,000 delegates, including 90 heads of state, from 95 countries. Also expected to attend are about 20 delegations from various organizations such as the United Nations, the Organization of African Unity, etc. Although the logistics of preparing for the conference on such short notice are staggering, India stands to benefit greatly by doing so. As host of the 1983 meeting, India will be chairman of the nonaligned movement until the next conference in 1985.


Communications were broken with India's INSAT-1A multipurpose satellite on 6 September. Mechanical problems had plagued the INSAT-1A since launch in early April. The satellite had a combination of telecommunication, meteorological, and mass communication capabilities, which were transmitted through a network of ground facilities that will fall into disuse until the launch of INSAT-1B some time in 1983.


Sheikh Mohammad Abdullah, Chief Minister of Jammu and Kashmir who died on 8 September, was succeeded within hours by his son Farooq Abdullah, who had been appointed health minister by his father 2 weeks previously. One of Farooq's first acts after being unanimously approved by the National Conference Party was to announce that he would select an entirely new cabinet. Elections held in June will test whether Farooq can reverse the tide of disillusionment caused by corruption and poor administration within his party. Both Mrs. Gandhi and President Zail Singh attended the funeral of the Sheikh, partly to show support of the central government for Farooq and to honor the much-loved independence leader who was known as the "Lion of Kashmir."

This article offers a critical assessment of Mrs. Gandhi's recent cabinet reshuffle in which 27 members of the cabinet of ministers received new appointments. The article details all the various changes and notes the general criticism with which they were received. Most frequent criticisms were general lack of logic or purpose in the changes; the promotion of some ministers already under fire on charges of corruption, incompetence, etc.; the reshuffling of some portfolios, such as Labor that had undergone as many as six changes since January 1980; few appointments of younger members; and the inexperience of some cabinet members who have had no more than one term of office as ministers.


The author discusses the historical background of Mrs. Gandhi's trip to Moscow and speculates on some possible outcomes of the visit.


Prime Minister Indira Gandhi has taken particular interest in the politics of Kashmir since the illness and death of Chief Minister Sheikh Mohammad Abdullah. She visited the Sheikh twice in his final days and attended his funeral as did members of her government. The Sheikh's successor and eldest son Farooq Abdullah probably will call for elections in March 1983. He also faces the difficult task of holding together his father's faction-ridden National Conference Party.


Punjabi Sikhs are threatening a strike during the November Asiad (Asian Games) if their grievances are not redressed. So far they have concentrated on morcha, filling the jails to overflowing by courting arrest, as their major means of protest. Leaders of the Sikh Akali movement have their hands full containing their more militant members. The article contains interviews with Akali leaders Sant H. S. Longowal and Gurcharan Singh Tohra, as well as militant Sikh leader Sant Jarnail Singh Bhindranwale.


The Indian Ocean, once a "British lake," is described by the author as now being "a cockpit of confrontation" and "an epicenter of nuclear power play." Analysis is made of US naval strategy in the region, the prime motivating factors being to fill the vacuum left by the British and perpetuate Western
dominance; to insure freedom of the seas for the "free world"; to insure
stability in the littoral areas; and, most important, to protect Western
access to the resources of the region, particularly oil. US strategy is seen
as "offensive" in contrast to Soviet naval strategy in the region, which is
described as "defensive." The development of India's response to US strategy
is discussed and India's own strategic priorities stated as: 1) maintenance
of a "zone of peace" in the Indian Ocean; 2) establishment of India as the
dominant power of the region; 3) preservation of the Gulf oil routes and
other trade routes; 4) protection of deep-sea fishing and offshore mineral
exploitations; 5) prevention of the "satellization" of the countries in the
region; and 6) resistance to the presence of foreign powers in the region.

Wright, Theodore P., Jr. "Indian Muslims and the Middle East." Journal of South
Asian and Middle Eastern Studies, vol. 6 (Fall 1982), pp. 48-56.

The transnational loyalties of Indian Muslims have been called into question
by the Hindu majority of India at various times since independence, particu-
larly during the Indo-Pakistani wars. Indian Muslim ties with the Middle
East have been of three types: religious, political, and economic. Reli-
gious ties are longstanding and continuing. Political ties have been charac-
terized by the consistent support given by the Indian Government to the Arab
side of the Palestine conflict and its occasional attempts to bill India as a
major Islamic power, sometimes resulting in Hindu backlash. Economic ties
with the Middle East mostly began with the flood of Indian workers to job
opportunities in the oil-rich Gulf States after the OPEC price rise in 1973.
Nearly 40 percent of these workers are reported to be Muslims from Kerala.
Since 1980 Indian communal rioting has been on the upswing, fed in part by
rumors that Muslim countries, particularly Saudia Arabia and Pakistan, are
contributing monetarily to a resurgence of Islamic revivalism among Indian
Muslims. Muslim revivalism is as strong in India as in Muslim majority
nations, but far more dangerous to the Indian Muslim minority because of the
Hindu backlash that it provokes.

Bhatt, V. V. "Development Problem, Strategy, and Technology Choice: Sarvodaya
and Socialist Approaches in India." Economic Development and Cultural

Before and since independence there have been two major theories of economic
development popular in India: the Sarvodaya approach proposed by Gandhi and
the Socialist way espoused by Nehru. For Gandhi, poverty needed to be
attacked directly through the provision of full employment in the tradi-
tional sectors of agriculture and cottage industry. Nehru's strategy called
for large-scale industrialization with emphasis on capital and heavy indus-
try. After 25 years of planned development mostly following the Socialist
ideology, India still does not have a sound technology policy and poverty and
unemployment remain the major problems. It is neither practical nor desir-
able to provide a decent minimum of physical security to each family, Gandhi
noted, without providing it with employment. The need is to upgrade tradi-
tional technology while adopting modern technology in a manner consistent
with development objectives.

Indo-Soviet friendship is discussed in the light of Mrs. Gandhi's August visit to Moscow. Points of mutual agreement between the two countries are discussed and "scurrilous Western journalists" who constantly try to undermine Indo-Soviet friendship are denounced. The reader is reminded of the agreements reached during the Brezhnev visit to New Delhi in 1980; the results already achieved include the following Soviet-aid projects underway in India: new coal mines, electric powerstations, increased oil production, geological surveys, commissioning of an aluminum plant in Korla, near-completion of an oil refinery in Mathura, and the beginning of cosmonaut training in the Soviet Union for two Indian test pilots who will be members of a Soviet-Indian space crew in 1983.


A commentary on the joint declaration issued at the end of Mrs. Gandhi's visit to Moscow notes that it is "only natural" that India and the USSR share identical views on a number of international issues since both countries reject "imperialist positions-of-strength policy and all forms of neocolonialism and discrimination," and are struggling jointly for a "just international economic order." The commentator also notes that the similarity of views is attributed to the "coincidence of political aims of the socialist community and the nonaligned nations."


This article gives a brief rundown on arrests of Maneka Gandhi supporters in late September following the shooting death of one of her aides. Maneka has charged her mother-in-law, the Prime Minister, with trying to suppress her new party, the Sanjay Vichar Manch.


The Indian tea industry, the world's largest, is declining. Its share of the world tea trade has shrunk from about 40 percent in the early 1960s to a current 26 percent. Major problems include adverse weather conditions in the last several years; weak demand in both home and export markets; a weak marketing system that includes about 600,000 retail outlets; production costs largely fixed by government regulation; and inept management practices. Although some new developments are described, the author notes that the Indian tea industry has been basically ineffective in dealing with its problems.

The Soviets gave Indira Gandhi an extravagant welcome during her August visit to Moscow, and she in turn tactfully refrained from discussing the Soviet occupation of Afghanistan at any public occasion. When questioned about Afghanistan at a press conference for Western journalists, she replied that India was "against interference of any kind," but the situation was complicated by outside supplies of arms to guerrillas. The Soviets made a number of offers during the visit, including a steel mill and an increase in trade volume of 150 to 200 percent by 1986. Offers turned down include a 1,000-megawatt nuclear powerplant (too many problems with safeguards and outside interference), and MiG-27 fighters (India intends to buy Mirage-2000 aircraft from France). Mrs. Gandhi is determined to diversify Indian arms sources while continuing to assure the Soviets of the indestructibility of Indo-Soviet friendship.


Maneka Gandhi, daughter-in-law of the Prime Minister, has accused Mrs. Gandhi of trying to suppress her newly formed political party, Sanjay Vichar Manch (Sanjay Ideas Organization). Maneka claimed that 250 of her supporters were arrested in Uttar Pradesh and Bihar in late September following the shooting death of a Maneka aide. Among those arrested were three leading members of the party, including a defector from Mrs. Gandhi's Congress-I Party. The article gives the background of the family rift and formation and prospects of the new party.


The Soviets offered Mrs. Gandhi a number of "souvenirs," some of more value than others, during her August visit to Moscow. Probably of most interest were tenders of Soviet T-72 tanks and MiG-27 aircraft, the latter to provide a counterbalance to the F-105s that Pakistan is receiving from the United States. Other offers included some steel plants, an aluminum plant, and a textile agreement that will double India's textile exports to the Soviet Union. Also offered was a 1,000-megawatt nuclear powerstation, twice the size of the Tarapur plant. Speculation is, however, that Mrs. Gandhi will turn this down because of the Soviets insistence on safeguards and inspections, which the Indians would find difficult to accept. The article also takes note of discussions on Afghanistan during the visit.


During her September visit to the Soviet Union, Mrs. Gandhi announced that two Indian test pilots, Ravish Malhotra and Rakesh Sharma, will participate in a Russian spaceflight in 1984, after undergoing an 18-month course in zero-gravity conditions at the Soviet training center Zvezdny Gorod ("Star City").

More than 3,000 Sikhs belonging to the Akali Dal Party tried to storm their way into Parliament House in New Delhi last week. The police opened fire and four people were killed and scores injured. The immediate cause of the protest was the death of 31 Sikhs in police custody who were riding in a bus struck by a train. But the larger cause is the desire of the Sikhs for greater, if not complete, autonomy.


Britain and the USSR, traditional suppliers of military hardware to India, are competing for a greater share of the Indian armaments budget. Speculation is that the Soviets may offer even better terms than their 1980 deal, which provided for payment in rupees over 17 years at 2.5 percent interest. India under the 1980 plan is coproducing MiG-23 aircraft and T-72 tanks. If a new agreement is negotiated, India may receive MiG-27s and begin manufacturing them as well as spare aircraft parts for Soviet and Warsaw Pact countries. Meanwhile the British plan envisions Indo-British cooperation on developing new combat aircraft missiles and high-speed naval craft. The article details other offers and counteroffers to the various branches of the Indian military from the Soviets, British, and French.


India is being swept with election fever as the Congress-I Party prepares for elections, from district to national level, on 20 January. The long overdue party elections, not held since 1972-73, were postponed by the Emergency, Mrs. Gandhi's defeat in 1977, the Congress Party split in 1978, and an assortment of natural disasters. Gandhi critics note that the elections are long overdue, the party is wracked with feuds, and corruption flourishes at the highest levels. Another criticism is that the main reason Mrs. Gandhi is holding elections is to give legitimacy to the induction of her son Rajiv as a Congress-I officeholder. Rajiv reportedly would like to hold office in the organization, but wants to be elected to it to avoid charges that he was imposed on the party by his mother. There is doubt in some quarters that the elections will be held in January because Assembly elections are due in many states in February, several states have been ravaged by floods, and there is unrest due to the Akali agitation in Punjab. An accompanying graph charts the growth of Congress party membership state-by-state in the past decade.


The rivalry between Indira Gandhi and her daughter-in-law Maneka has become more acrimonious with the arrest of three of Maneka's lieutenants: Akbar Ahmed, her commander in chief; J. N. Misra, organizing secretary of Maneka's
new party, Sanjay Vichar Manch; and Kalpnath Sonkar, an MP and Manch official. All were arrested in connection with the shooting death of a Manch member, Tikori Singh, in Sultanpur. Singh signed a statement before his death that the shooting was accidental. The three were, nevertheless, arrested on charges of murder, theft, criminal conspiracy, and tampering with and giving false evidence. Maneka is charging political conspiracy and harassment of herself and her party. Meanwhile, Maneka and her brother-in-law Rajiv have both been on the political stump trying to outdraw each other in terms of crowds and enthusiasm.


The present and projected Soviet commitment to help India develop its economy is detailed in this article. Some statistics: Soviet-aid projects now provide 35 percent of Indian steel, 60 percent of domestic oil production, about half of the country's oil refinery capacity, 20 percent of total electricity generated and 40 percent of domestic coal production. More than 50 industrial plants have been set up across India with Soviet aid and 30 more are in various stages of implementation. Perhaps of even more importance has been the growth in Indo-Soviet trade in the past decade, which is shown in a graph accompanying the article. The greatest growth has been in the past 2 years, with the Soviet Union now the leading customer for tea, coffee, tobacco, cashews, pepper, tanned leather, and jute goods. The article goes into detail on the Soviet impact on various Indian industries and the pros and cons of such heavy dependence on Soviet markets.


The tangled history of India's nuclear policy extends over 34 years. Ambition marked the early years of nuclear planning. In 1965, it was projected that by 1980 nuclear power plants would be generating 2,700 megawatts of electricity; actual capacity in 1982 is 860 megawatts. India was shaken by the first Chinese nuclear bomb test in 1964 and refused to sign the 1968 Non-Proliferation Treaty. In 1974 India exploded its own bomb at Pokhran in the Rajasthan Desert. The author calls that action a mistake that cost India the international support and cooperation it had been receiving for the more peaceful side of its nuclear program. India's autonomy in the nuclear field, having stood up to many pressures to join the international club, now appears to be about to disappear. Through indirect pressures of France and the International Monetary Fund, the United States, according to the author, may be able to force India to open her nuclear facilities to inspection and accept certain safeguards.

Mrs. Gandhi and her aides returned from Moscow in a buoyant mood that seemed to reflect great pleasure at the outcome of talks there. One aide was quoted as saying, "A very useful friendship has been completely restored." Mrs. Gandhi reportedly told Brezhnev that India would like him to pull Soviet troops out of Afghanistan, but conceded that this would not be possible until other foreign intervention in Afghanistan had ceased. Discussions on economic assistance reportedly occupied the lion's share of the talks agenda. (See accompanying article by T. N. Ninan for a discussion of the present Soviet assistance commitment and projections for the future.) A tight veil of secrecy, according to the author, shrouds the two most important issues likely to have been discussed: the transfer of more sophisticated Soviet military technology to India and the ongoing negotiations between India and Pakistan.


Indira Gandhi's son Rajiv and her daughter-in-law Maneka vied for crowds at recent political rallies in Nagpur. Maneka's welcome in May was reportedly the warmest ever accorded a political leader by the city. Rajiv's well-staged rally in September dwarfed that of his sister-in-law, partly due to half-day holidays given to schools, colleges, and banks in order to help line the streets.


India is being wooed by the arms merchants of the world. France is selling her 40 Mirage-2000 fighter planes and hopes to persuade her to assemble another 110 in India. France has also offered to sell antisubmarine helicopters, 155-millimeter guns, tanks, and communications equipment. Britain has sold India eight Jaguar aircraft, half of which are to be assembled in India and is competing with France in the antisubmarine helicopter market. Under a recently concluded deal, West Germany is supplying submarines. The United States is prepared to sell F-16s, F-5s, and other aircraft. The Indian Government defends these purchases as necessary to counter the buildup of arms by Pakistan, and a need to diversify its arms sources, rather than relying on the Soviet Union.


The article provides background information on India's somewhat complicated wheat supply problems. A combination of delayed monsoons, drought, heavy rains, and flash floods are expected to cause the winter wheat crop to fall 12 million tons short of the target for this year. India has reserve stocks amounting to 13 million but will need to import more in order to maintain
price stability. Farmers and traders are expected to hold on to their stocks in order to force prices up. The Gandhi government, which has preferred even in surplus years to resort to imports rather than taking action against those withholding supplies, announced a few weeks ago another wheat deal with the United States.


Mass conversions of members of the scheduled castes (untouchables) to Islam in the past year, particularly in Tamil Nadu state, have caused widespread reactions among Hindus in that state and elsewhere. The author examines the history and causes of the conversions and the advantages gained by the converts, as well as the rumors that foreign money and influence are involved in the conversions.

"Film Stars Rule." The Economist, 23 October 1982, pp. 36-38.

Prime Minister Indira Gandhi's Congress-I Party increasingly is losing control in state and local politics as regionalism becomes a more important political force than nationalism in many sections of the country. In Punjab, where Sikhs make up 53 percent of the population, the Sikh political party Akali Dal staged a 75-day protest. Akali Dal demands include a greater share of interstate river water for Punjab and more control over the state government, currently run by the Congress-I Party. Regionalism and regional parties are also strong in Tamil Nadu, Andhra Pradesh, Kashmir, Nagaland, and Assam.


Indian Finance Minister Pranab Mukherjee reported that India's trade deficit for the year ending March 1983 will be about 15 percent, or about the same as last year's $6.42 billion. Total foreign debt stands at about $17 billion. On the bright side, growth was maintained in agriculture and industry with healthy gains in electricity generation, petroleum products, cement, steel, and coal production. In his discussion on the overall state of the Indian economy, the Finance Minister reported that local oil production is expected to exceed 146 million barrels with another 110 million barrels being imported.


Hindu-Muslim riots in Meerut, Uttar Pradesh are symptomatic of the rise of communal forces across northern India. The religious rivalry is nothing new but has intensified of late because of a rise in Hindu fundamentalism and increased demands by the minority Muslims for civic rights and a larger piece of the economic pie. In the southern state of Tamil Nadu, Hindus became
alarmed last year when all the harijans (untouchables) in two villages converted to Islam. The extremist Hindu view was that Arab petrodollars were financing a wave of conversions with the eventual aim of Islamic domination over the country.


Communal riots broke out in Meerut in September resulting in 30 deaths, 800 arrests, and widespread destruction of property. At issue was a small plot of land claimed as a temple site by Hindus and as a burial ground by Muslims. Local and district officials were blamed for not handling the situation well and allowing tempers to rise over a 9-month period. Outside agitators, including the Imam of Delhi's Jama Masjid, also were blamed for making inflammatory speeches. Meerut is one of the richest districts in the state of Uttar Pradesh and has a literacy rate of 40 percent. A Meerut University professor commented that, "Meerut's violence has exploded the myth that economic prosperity and education reduce communal tensions in a society."


The three top leaders of Sanjay Vichar Manch (SVM) political party who were accused of murder and conspiracy to murder a SVM party member were released on bail on 8 October. The SVM, a newly created opposition party led by Indira Gandhi's daughter-in-law Maneka, continues to reap reams of publicity from the whole affair. It appears over-zealous state leaders and Congress-I party officials seized on the case as a chance to embarrass the SVM leadership, only to have the whole effort backfire. Maneka and SVM leaders meanwhile are claiming political harassment.


In this long cover story, the author looks at the human tragedy of the warfare that has raged in the northeast on and off for the past 26 years. Trapped in the middle between Indian Army troops and guerrilla fighters are ordinary civilians: tribemen, villagers, townsmen, farmers, and government employees. The author interviewed soldiers, insurgents, civilians, and government officials in Manipur, Mizoram, and Nagaland. What emerges is strong criticism of army and central government handling of the turmoil in India's isolated northeast.


India tries to downplay the trickle of Chinese defectors who occasionally wander across its border. Rather than being greeted with open arms they are usually subjected to 6 months of interrogation by military intelligence, the Central Intelligence Bureau, and the police and kept under detention for a
year or longer. So far most defectors have been Tibetan monks, traders, or low-ranking soldiers. The Indian Government reportedly has ordered border officials to hand the defectors back to Chinese officials in some cases, in a desire to keep Sino-Indian relations on an even keel.

Mody, Piloo. "Who is in Control Mrs. Gandhi?" Newsmag (New Delhi), 31 October 1982, pp. 5-10.

In a highly critical cover story, various problems facing the government of Indira Gandhi are discussed, with particular focus on the recent police riots in Bombay, communal riots in Meerut, and the growing seriousness of the unrest in Punjab. The actions or inactions of government administrators, described as "corrupt and inefficient, easily swayed and bribed," are blamed for all of these problems. The Prime Minister is accused of using a "mafia" of unscrupulous individuals to return herself to power through delivery of votes and money, with the result that the mafia has become an autonomous force free to promote crime, gambling, prostitution, and the sale of illicit liquor. The Indian Army and police are described as helpless against the mafia, which is "hand-in-glove" with the political leadership of the country.


In this editorial, the author gives his view of why Third World countries, in this case India, that are more temperamentally in tune with the United States, see the Soviet Union as a more reliable ally. He recounts the times the United States sided with Pakistan (over Kashmir and Bangladesh), while the Soviets came to India's corner. He also compares the Soviet record of technical aid and trade with India with the much poorer showing of the United States.


Rioting broke out in late October in Amritsar, Punjab, when 30,000 Sikhs who had sought arrest in a "fill the jails" demonstration were released. The militant Sikh Akali Dal Party called for a "holy war" to press their demands for greater autonomy for the Punjab. For militant Sikhs this translates as an independent Khalistan ("Pure Land"), or homeland for India's 11 million Sikhs. The more moderate Akali leadership, under Harchand Singh Longowal, is having difficulty controlling the militant faction led by Sant Jarnail Bhindranwale. Prime Minister Gandhi, meanwhile, has indicated that maintenance of law and order is her top priority.


With the renewed Soviet support for Prime Minister Indira Gandhi, the Communist Party of India (CPI) is caught between a rock and a hard place. The
Soviet Government, partly at the request of Mrs. Gandhi, is putting pressure on the CPI to support her policies, or at least to be less critical. The CPI, which has been moving closer in philosophy to the hardline Communist Party of India-Marxist (CPM), fears it will lose all credibility if it now suddenly joins the Gandhi team. The CPI had been a strong Gandhi supporter in the mid-1970s, even through the Emergency, but moved into a more traditional government opposition role during the rightwing Janata party government.


Suzuki Motor Co. of Japan signed an agreement in October with a new Indian company Maruti Udyog to produce low-priced fuel-efficient passenger cars, commercial vans, and pickups. Production is to begin by December 1983 with 33 percent local components, going up to 90 percent by 1988. Suzuki's participation will mark the largest investment by any company setting up a new enterprise in India.


The continuing protest by the Sikhs of Punjab is the subject of a long cover story. Led by the faction-ridden Akali Dal Sikh Party, the movement has become increasingly militant and violent over the past year, resulting in the deaths of 70 by police firings and the temporary jailing of 25,000 Sikhs who courted arrest. The tearing apart of one of India's richest states by Sikh militancy and communal conflict between Sikhs and Hindus is probably the most serious problem faced by the government of Indira Gandhi at the moment. Any weakness shown in the Punjab by the government will serve to encourage separatist and dissident movements in other parts of India. But unless a satisfactory settlement is reached, dangerous conflict lies ahead. The cover story surveys the situation and in two sidebar articles identifies the major Sikh leaders and their points of view and discusses the major demands of the Akali Dal.


The 9-month-old Bombay textile workers strike has so far accounted for a loss of 43.4 million man-days and millions of dollars in lost wages, production, and profits. The strike is no nearer settlement now than when it was called in January by labor organizer Dr. Datta Samant, with whom the Mill Owners' Association refuses to deal. In striking, the textile workers followed Samant rather than their official union Rashtriya Mill Mazdoor Sangh (RMMS), which opposed the strike. A team of government labor negotiators who are trying to settle the strike has to deal first with legislation that recognizes only RMMS as qualified to represent the textile workers. It has become clear that in order to settle the strike, the negotiators will have to deal with Samant. It is also clear that they realize this and that the end of the longest strike in the textile industry is at hand.

India's Sikh separatist movement announced it will launch a "Holy War" on 19 November, the opening day of the 9th Asian Games, to be held in New Delhi. Prime Minister Gandhi's government responded that if there is violence it will deal sternly with it. Crack frontier guards from the Indo-Tibetan border will be deployed to protect the capital and the games. The government's tough stance has won support from many of the opposition parties who are mostly out of sympathy with Sikh demands for a Khalistan, or Sikh, homeland.


With the Asian Games about to begin in New Delhi, the government faces threatened strikes and a march on the capital by militant Sikhs hoping to bring attention to their demands for a separate Sikh state. Sikhs comprise 52 percent of the population of Punjab since the predominantly Hindi-speaking section of the state was split off to form the state of Haryana. The two states share the capital of Chandigarh, which the Sikhs would like returned in full to Punjab. Punjab is a prosperous agricultural state with the highest per capita income in the country. Punjabis feel that their substantial contribution to the economy of the country is not matched by central government investment, particularly in industry. They also oppose a central government decision whereby 70 percent of the waters from the Ravi and Beas rivers are to be shared with Rajasthan and Haryana. In settling these issues Mrs. Gandhi has to walk a narrow tightrope between Sikh demands and the threat of a backlash from neighboring Hindu states.


Debate rages in India over the pros and cons of bringing the latest industrial technology into the country. Those in favor point to India's heavy industry equipment, much of which dates from the 1950s and early 1960s, making it difficult to compete with more modern industry in other countries. Those opposed say the new equipment would replace people with machines and further aggravate the unemployment problem. They also point out the expense of the new equipment and claim that the increased cost of manufacturing would make India less, rather than more, competitive.


French foreign ministry officials denied reports that France had "capitulated" on inspection procedures when agreeing to supply enriched uranium to India, and said that inspection procedures would continue to operate. France and India have reached an agreement, after 4 months of negation, that will provide for the continued supply of enriched uranium for India's nuclear
plants. France, which is interested in increasing its relations with India and the Nonaligned Movement, is hoping to sell India 110 more Mirage-2000 fighters, Exocet missiles, and Puma helicopters.


Talks between the central government of India and leaders of the Sikh Akali protest movement in Punjab broke down in late November. Faction-ridden and pushed by the radicals within the movement, the Akali leaders have threatened to bring their protest to New Delhi on 19 November and disrupt the 9th Asian Games in order to draw attention to their demands. The talks foundered on both religious and political demands of the Akali. The return of Chandigarh to Punjab was a major sticking point as well as such religious demands as declaring Amritsar a holy city and renaming the Amritsar-Delhi train the Golden Temple Express. Opposition parties, for the most part, backed the firm stance toward the Akalis taken by Mrs. Gandhi's government.


Is India's Green Revolution running out of steam? For the past 3 years food grain production has not increased, and this year is expected to continue the trend. In the meantime, the country's population has increased by 50 million in the same time span. India is back to importing wheat after a couple years of self-sufficiency. Some blame the weather, which has brought both droughts and floods and generally erratic monsoons for the past several years. These observers say that technological breakthroughs are needed to develop seeds that will be resistant to the vagaries of weather, pests, and diseases. Other observers point out the need for use of present technology, noting that in some areas only one-quarter of the land is being planted with the new high-yield grains or being adequately fertilized. The lack of drainage systems and irrigation also is preventing India's croplands from reaching their full potential.


The author, in a breathless tone, gives a no-sources-named, detailed report on the historic minisummit meeting between Prime Minister Indira Gandhi and President Zia-ul Haq in Delhi on 1 November. Bilateral issues were the main focus of the talks, with some mention of Afghanistan, the upcoming nonaligned conference, and Mrs. Bhutto's health. Substantive results of the talks included agreement on a foreign ministers meeting on 23 December to discuss setting up a joint ministerial commission on nonpolitical matters and to examine the Indian-proposed friendship treaty and the Pakistani-proposed nonaggression pact. Zia and Gandhi agreed to meet again in March to sort out problems that might arise at the foreign secretaries meeting. The article also discusses problems of legitimacy of the Zia regime and Mrs. Gandhi's dilemma of how to deal with an unpopular regime whose future is uncertain.

France has agreed, after 4 months of negotiating, to supply India with enriched uranium fuel for its Tarapur reactor. France will replace the United States as the supplier under the 1963 agreement and will not require additional safeguards. This has been described as a diplomatic victory by India over the "London Club" of nuclear suppliers. This organization to which France belongs was formed in 1978, and prescribes stringent conditions for sales to nonmembers. France, after initially insisting on the stricter safeguards, justifies its departure from the rules by pointing out that the Tarapur agreement predates the formation of the London Club. France also has reportedly chosen India, along with Algeria and Mexico, as nonaligned developing countries to receive special attention in trade, aid, and technological assistance.


India's French connection continues to strengthen with the November visit to New Delhi of President Francois Mitterrand. France will indeed supply the enriched uranium for India's Tarapur nuclear powerplant (apparently minus the London Club safeguards) as well as Mirage-2000 fighter planes, assistance on heavy water plants and a fast-breeder reactor, and assistance in developing the Bombay High offshore oil field.


India and France reached agreement on the Tarapur nuclear plant issue after French President Francois Mitterrand reportedly intervened in the negotiations by removing certain clauses in the agreement objected to by India. During Mitterrand's 4-day visit to India, he also persuaded India to buy 110 Mirage-2000 aircraft (in addition to the 40 already purchased), offered to sell Exocet missiles, and asked that France be admitted as an observer to the next nonaligned summit meeting, to be held in New Delhi in March 1983.


The background of Sikh unrest in Punjab, including distant history and events of the past year, is given in this wrap-up article. Several accompanying sidebars include a calendar of communal conflict in northern India; the 45 Sikh demands; an interview with militant Sikh leader Jarnail Singh Bhindranwale; and a comparison of key economic indicators between India and Punjab, which in many respects is the most prosperous Indian state.
French and Egyptian leaders were in New Delhi in November, partly to court India's support for a French-Egyptian Middle East peace initiative. The hope is that India, who will be hosting the seventh nonaligned summit meeting in March 1983, will mount a nonaligned initiative to resolve the Arab-Israeli conflict.

The Bagmati River Project, a grand scheme to tame the Bagmati River in Bihar state, prevent floods, and provide an irrigation system, has gone awry. The 17-year project to construct sand-and-earth embankments on either side of the river from the Indo-Nepal border southward for 160 kilometers has resulted in turning the surrounding croplands into a dustbowl. It is now apparent that the farmers of the region welcomed the periodic floods both for the irrigation of the land and the increased fertility brought by the silt-laden waters. Nepal has protested the project from the beginning and claims it has caused unwanted flooding in their upstream regions. Meanwhile, cost of the project, expected to drag on 10 more years, has escalated and farmers have begun breaching the embankment in order to allow the river to flood their lands.

In late November the ship Polar Guide, (on loan from Norway) left India for Antarctica to establish a permanent Indian research camp of two all-weather huts and lay out a 10,000-foot airstrip. The purpose of the expedition is to give India a foothold on this minerals-rich continent from which it can join the community of developed nations already doing research there. The Indian Government is purchasing a US-built C-130 Hercules transport plane, which will use the airstrip. Also planned is the setting up of a direct electronic communications link between New Delhi and the research camp. India refused Soviet offers of its research sheds and runways, preferring to set up its own independent facilities.

Indira Gandhi's government managed to avert a crisis during the November Asian Games in New Delhi by taking the offensive against a threatened demonstration by the militant Sikh Akali movement of Punjab. The government mobilized some 50,000 policemen and paramilitary troops to seal off the capital. Routes into the city were blocked and all traffic subjected to searches for weapons. The central government also fed stories to the press that talks with the Akalis were nearing a conclusion and a settlement was at hand. The reports confused Akali leadership and followers alike. The Asian Games were over by the time it became clear that no solution was at hand.

Flushed with its success in hosting the 9th Asian Games in New Delhi, India is lobbying hard for the 1992 Olympics. The November-December games went off with few hitches other than some tension between the Iranians and Iraqis. Threats of disruption by the Akali Sikhs and other would-be demonstrators were deterred largely by strict security measures. The smoothness with which the games went off and the quality of the facilities were a credit to India, which had less than 2 years to prepare for the event.


India is still adding up the costs of hosting the 9th Asian Games in Delhi in November-December. The costs are expected to soar far above the original official estimates of $75 million. Construction included five new stadiums, renovation of 12 others, the games village complex with dining hall for 500 and a revolving tower restaurant, and new and improved roads and railways. Under pressure to complete the facilities on time, money became no object and costs mounted accordingly. Perhaps the biggest losses for the Indian economy occurred because developers were allowed to construct 10 new hotels, some financed with foreign exchange or foreign currency loans resulting in losses for Indian lending institutions. At least two of the hotels were built by expatriates with full rights to repatriate their profits to their current home country.


In one of the few events to mar New Delhi's staging of the Asian Games, China's official Xinhua News Agency criticized India for featuring in the closing ceremony dancers from Arunachal Pradesh, a northeastern Indian state, parts of which are claimed by China. The criticism was repeated by the Chinese ambassador, after which India announced its withdrawal of a delegation to Beijing to a ceremony honoring the memory of an Indian doctor who fought with the Chinese against the Japanese in World War II. More critical, however, is what the incident presages for the Sino-Indian talks scheduled to resume in January.


China's objection to the performance of dancers from the Indian state of Arunachal Pradesh at the Asian Games was a reminder of the ongoing territorial dispute between the two countries. Border negotiations, begun 2 years ago, are scheduled to resume early in 1983. The dispute dates back to the establishment of the McMahon Line in 1914 in an agreement between Tibet and Britain. China, although present at the conference, never signed the agreement on the grounds that Tibet was part of China and did not have the
authority to negotiate. China's position in settling the border, over which the two countries went to war in 1962, is that the two disputed areas (between Tibet and Kashmir and between Tibet and Arunachal Pradesh) must be settled as part of a package deal.


India's space program is criticized by its opponents as being prestigious but lacking in solid economic benefits. In terms of equipment and technology, India is years behind the industrialized nations that have space programs. Proponents, however, point to the capability India will soon have in using satellite systems for communications (including nationwide TV), weather forecasting, and exploration for mineral resources.


On the eve of the resumption of Sino-Indian border talks, China has chosen to stir the diplomatic pot. Relations between the two countries, which had been improving steadily through 1982 and reached a peak with the particularly warm reception given the Chinese athletes by the Indian home crowd, were dashed with cold water by a Xinhua News Agency report. In the report India was criticized for "using an international sports meet to spread a discreditable claim to territory along the Sino-Indian border," referring to the performance of a dance troupe from Arunachal Pradesh, an Indian state claimed in part by China, in the closing ceremonies of the Asian Games in December. India responded with firmness by officially protesting the report and cancelling the December visit to Beijing by an official Indian delegation. What effect all of this will have on the border talks due to resume in January remains to be seen.


French President Francois Mitterrand's November visit to New Delhi helped lay the groundwork for an expected increase in cooperation between the two nations. No joint communique was issued, but France did agree to supply low-enriched uranium for the Tarapur nuclear plant on the same terms as prescribed in the Indo-US agreement of 1963. Other negotiations included the planned coproduction of 110 Mirage-2000 aircraft in India in addition to the 40 already purchased. France indicated a willingness to sell Exocet missiles. France also expressed a desire to attend the upcoming New Delhi nonaligned summit as an observer. This is unlikely to occur, however, because of France's membership in NATO and because Iran, for one, already has objected.

This long cover story focuses on the upcoming assembly election in Karnataka, Andhra Pradesh, and Tripura and examines the state of the ruling Congress-I Party. In a parting shot, the authors warn that Mrs. Gandhi and her son Rajiv can either wake up to the growing discontent and decay within their party or "complacently wait for the day when the party, like a century-old banyan tree, with its trunk chewed up by white ants, crashes down with a tragic finality."


Settlement of the 18-month Akali agitation in Punjab is no further along after months of negotiation between Sikh and government leaders. The next pressure tactic to be applied by the Akalis (none of which have so far succeeded) will be the resignation on 23 January of 4 members of parliament and 36 members of the state legislative assembly. With 40 percent of the assembly seats vacant, a constitutional crisis may result.


The new Chief Minister of Jammu and Kashmir, Farooq Abdullah, has declared his intention to ban communal and secessionist parties in the state. Most of the parties involved have reacted strongly and vowed to ignore the threat. Legally such a ban would be difficult to enforce and would probably only result in making martyrs of the affected parties. The Chief Minister's statements have been chalked up, by some observers, to inexperience and the desire to prove himself worthy of the position he inherited.


The Akalis are getting little support for their demands from outside Punjab, largely because they impinge on the current territory of neighboring states. Rajasthan, Himachal Pradesh, Haryana, and Chandigarh would all lose territory or precious river waters if the Sikhs were to receive all of their demands. Some Sikhs living in these disputed areas would prefer to be united in a Sikh homeland, but many more non-Sikhs and non-Punjabis living in the areas would not.


French historian de Riencourt traces the history of relations between India and Pakistan to the present. He then analyzes the Soviet occupation of Afghanistan, which he calls a direct threat to South Asia. His advice is
that India and Pakistan should now close ranks in the face of this threat and seek some sort of rapprochement. Such a move could be accomplished primarily by the two nations only, but might be helped along by the United States and other countries. He suggests several positive steps toward dealing with the crisis, which he refers to as "the most serious and dangerous demonstration of Soviet Marxist imperialism since the end of the Second World War."
6. **MALDIVES**

a. **Monographs**


The first published general reference book on the Maldives is a mixture of history, linguistics, culture, ethnography, and sociopolitical analysis. Much of the first half of the book supports the thesis that prior to the arrival of Divehi-speakers from Sri Lanka, the islands were originally settled by Dravidian peoples from Kerala. The second half of the book, a description of contemporary social structure and culture, is based on the author's fieldwork. (bibliography, index)


b. **Serials**


President Maumoon Abdul Gayoom has firm but benevolent control over the partyless democracy of the Maldives. He is popular with the 168,000 inhabitants, having visited 170 of the Maldives' 201 inhabited islands, and is a shoo-in for reelection in November. By then a new constitution should be in force that will guarantee freedom of speech and association. President Gayoom has said that the right to form political parties also will be guaranteed, but doubted that any would be formed soon because of the homogeneity of Maldivian society. Maldives, however, is being dragged rather quickly into the modern world, and economic tensions, such as inflation and jealousy between the capital and the outlying islands, may bring politicization sooner than expected.


Maldivians have taken to reminiscing about the good old days, prior to 1752, when Minicoy belonged to the Maldives. They still share a common language, Divehi, as well as kinship ties. The Indian Government, which owns Minicoy, however, was annoyed somewhat when Maldivian President Maumoon Abdul Gayoom was quoted recently on two occasions in the Indian press as laying claim to Minicoy. These reports were later denied by the Maldives Foreign Office and by Gayoom. Until now, relations with India have been good, New Delhi having contributed substantially to the construction of the international airport in the capital, Male. President Gayoom recently announced a proposal by a Panamanian-based (but British and Canadian staffed) firm to build an oil refinery on the southern Maldivian island of Gan. Gayoom insists that,
despite speculation, Gan will not be open to naval vessels for refueling or servicing and that the Maldives values its nonaligned status too much to lease Gan to any foreign power for military purposes. Other recent excitement in the Maldives includes the appearance of an unidentified aircraft making passes over the Male airport on two successive nights without answering messages from air traffic control.


Maldives faces an economic crisis caused by the loss of its most important tuna fish customers. The two Japanese firms that have been buying the majority of the Maldives catch announced in May that it was no longer economical for them to do so. One firm has dropped out already and the other is expected to do so in February. Fisheries earn 40 percent of Maldives foreign exchange, and the industry employs two-thirds of the island's population. The article gives the background of the crisis and notes that official delegations sent to Thailand, Singapore, and elsewhere to line up new customers have so far met with little success.


In an apparent slip of the tongue, President Maumoon Abdul Gayoom of the Maldives laid claim for his country to the Indian-owned Minicoy Islands, coral islets north of Maldives. The occasion was a Maldivian National Day ceremony attended by the Indian high commissioner, who applauded enthusiastically, but innocently, the speech in Divehi, the Maldivian national language. The Maldives Foreign Ministry made a hasty retraction, but the whole incident had already been blown up in the Sri Lankan press. India, who is the major contributor to development of the Maldives, lodged a diplomatic protest. The main ramification of the incident, according to the author, is the embarrassment caused India over a maritime boundary at a time when it is trying to negotiate its maritime boundary with Bangladesh. So far maritime boundary agreements have been signed with Sri Lanka (1975), Indonesia (1977), Thailand (1978), and Maldives (1979). Agreement has yet to be reached with Bangladesh, Burma, and Pakistan.
7. NEPAL

a. Monographs


The problems faced by Nepali leaders in attempting to develop the country's economy include overpopulation relating to employment opportunities, depletion of forest resources, growing food shortages, balance of payments problems, and widespread unrest. The positive accomplishments of the building of roads and the spread of commerce have been counterbalanced by the lack of growth in the manufacturing and agricultural sectors. Entrepreneurial activities have concentrated on foreign-manufactured items, which do more to displace village artisans than create local employment opportunities. (bibliography, index)

b. Serials


Landlessness and near-landlessness is a serious problem in Nepal as well as most Asian countries. Development planning, public works programs, and "showpiece" land reform measures have done little to alleviate the problem. In Nepal, the landless, known as the Sukumbasi, have at various times taken matters into their own hands and engaged in spontaneous settlement of unsettled land, usually forested or semeforested areas in the Terai. This article studies the Sukumbasi movement of 1979 when large numbers began to occupy government lands in the Chitwan district (from which they were subsequently evicted) and discusses the continuing problem.


For Nepal's political system 1981 was a year of drift and decay despite the May election, which legitimized the administration of Prime Minister Surya Bahadur Thapa. More than one-half of the 112 seats of the Rashtriya Panchayat were filled with new faces, partly through "votes of frustration and rejection." But the new blood injected into the national legislature did little to spur the government into the necessary activity to combat the problems of a faltering economy, corruption, and a demoralized bureaucracy and populace.


The statistics of Nepal's 1981 general election are compared with those of the first general election in 1959. Tabulating the vote and announcing the
outcome took 10 days in 1981 and 11 weeks in 1959. Eligible voters had increased 83 percent, from more than four million to not quite eight million. Voter turnout is detailed by district. The most important difference in the two elections is that, whereas in 1959 there were 500 candidates representing 9 political parties and 268 nonparty candidates, in the 1981 election the 1,096 candidates all ran independently. In a referendum, the Nepalese electorate chose to retain the partyless panchayat system rather than return to the multiparty system. The new Rashtriva Panchayat (national legislature) is characterized by new faces (61 out of 112), an increase in representation from the Terai and minority tribal and Muslim groups, and a wider spectrum of political beliefs.


A spirit of compromise has prevailed in New Delhi and Kathmandu on sharing the resources of the Himalayan watershed. Bilateral talks in India last month have ironed out longstanding differences over three major Nepalese hydroelectric projects on the Karnali, Rapti, and Mahakali Rivers that will benefit both countries.


India thinks over the proposal to make Nepal a zone of peace, thereby raising hopes in the Himalayan kingdom.


Nepal's desire to be declared a zone of peace has received no support from India.


Nepal's partyless panchayat (council) system has been strengthened by a national convention bringing together 1,240 cadres from across the country. The convention, held over 4 days in mid-March, saw a majority of the cadres criticizing corruption and the country's economic failures. However, critics of Prime Minister Surya Bahadur Thapa were unable to muster sufficient support for his ouster and Thapa may have emerged from the convention stronger than ever.

Nepal's budget for fiscal year 1982-83 emphasizes development spending, up 70 percent from last year. Deficit financing, in the form of bilateral and multilateral loans and reserves, will account for Rs 3.6 billion of the Rs 5 billion for development expenditures. Donors in order of the size of the grant are World Bank, Asian Development Bank, Japan, India, United States, China, Britain, West Germany, and the Saudi Development Fund. There is also a 40 percent increase in defense spending, which will represent 4 percent of the budget.


The death of ex-premier B. P. Koirala has left a political vacuum in Nepal's opposition leadership. On the same day a memorial service was held for Koirala, Premier Surya Bahadur Thapa's government passed a bill empowering the government to dissolve or suspend duly elected lower levels of the panchayat structure at its own discretion. The action was seen as a move to block sympathizers of Koirala's banned Nepali Congress Party from infiltrating the lower panchayat levels.


Nepal faces critical food shortages this year due to several factors. The maize crop was about one-third below normal because of a lack of rain that is also expected to adversely affect the rice harvest. Another problem is that earlier this year the government allowed 100,000 tons of rice to be exported, and another 300,000 tons were smuggled across the border to northern India, where it brings higher prices than domestically. The Nepal Government has promised to keep future harvests at home.


An artificial food crisis in Nepal caused by hoarding of grain will soon become quite real in about 6 months when the drought-depleted new crop comes in. The price of grain has increased 90 percent in recent weeks and there have been reports of deaths from hunger-related causes. There have been daily demonstrations against the price rises and Prime Minister Surya Bahadur Thapa's ability to retain power may depend on how he copes with the food crisis. So far the government has provided some emergency relief and held sales of rice at fixed prices. They also have announced plans for distribution of 104,000 tons of food in drought affected areas and requested food and transport assistance from a number of countries and international organizations.

In a move seen as a victory for Nepali Prime Minister Surya Bahadur Thapa, King Birendra appointed a new 35-member council of ministers, dropping 19 members from the previous council including some Thapa detractors. Thapa takes over the defense portfolio in the new council, two-thirds of whose members are of the younger generation.


Mountaineering and trekking is becoming big business in Nepal, with 404 major expeditions in the last decade and nearly 30,000 trekkers during the 1982-83 hiking season. Nepal continues to encourage the mountaineering traffic as an important source of revenue. Particular beneficiaries are the Sherpa tribespeople who serve as guides for the major expeditions. Both inside and outside Nepal there is some concern over pressures on the fragile Himalayan environment as well as the over-exposure of Nepal's beautiful wilderness areas to increasing tourist traffic.


Nepalese Gurkha soldiers recently returned home to a mixed welcome from fighting with the British Army in the Falklands. Several Kathmandu papers criticized the government for sending young Nepalese men off to fight other countries' wars. At present about 45,000 Gurkhas serve in the Indian Army and another 7,000 in the British Army. The Nepalese Government considers remittances sent home by the Gurkhas important in helping offset the country's balance of payments deficit. The remittances are also important to the impoverished hill areas from which the Gurkhas come.


A major Nepalese political party, the Nepali Congress, for the first time in 26 years was permitted to hold a national conference in November-December in Kathmandu. The country is governed by King Birendra with an elected partyless *panchayat* (council). Permission to hold the conference was seen to have been given in response to rising antigovernment activity by extreme leftwing elements. At the conference, the Nepali Congress pledged its loyalty to the King while opposing the partyless *panchayat* system and resolved to work for a reconciliation between the monarch and the former parliamentary parties with a view toward restoring the party system.


Since the 1960s, Kathmandu has been a mecca for Western drug users seeking cheap drugs and a free and easy environment in which to use them. In recent
years, however, drug addiction has become a Nepalese problem as the youth of the country turn to narcotics rather than face problems of unemployment, family pressures, or boredom. The Nepalese Government has no facilities for rehabilitation of drug addicts and has preferred to ignore the problem. Heavy fines have been levied on drug dealers, but marijuana continues to be an important cash crop in parts of western Nepal.
8. **PAKISTAN**

a. **Monographs**


This book is divided into three sections, focusing on the politics, economy, and society of Pakistan. The sections reviewing political history and the economy are equally good; the chapters on Pakistan's economy are impressive, especially the overview by Eric Gustafson and the analysis by Shahid Javed Burki. Equally important in the political section are the contributions of Philip Jones, Shariful Mujahid, and William Richter. There is much substance in these chapters regarding political organization, electoral behavior and performance, and the constraints imposed on Pakistan's political process. Karl Newman also offers some creative and provocative philosophical explanations for Pakistan's continuing political dilemmas. (bibliography)


Essentially a picture book, but an incredibly beautiful one imparting more of the flavor of Pakistan than possible in reams of text. About one-third of the space is given over to useful description, mostly historical, cultural, and economic. (illustrations)


The book traces the rise and decline of private investment in Pakistan in the 1960s, and the factors affecting it. (bibliography, index)


This book represents an attempt to discredit two myths perpetuated by Western analysts, namely that Islam is a monolithic institution and that it is bent on the subjugation of Western civilization. For this purpose, 13 scholars examine Islam in various regions: the periphery (North Africa), the Arabian heartland (Saudi Arabia, Egypt, Syria, and Iraq), Non-Arab West Asia (Turkey, Iran, Afghanistan, Pakistan), Southeast Asia (Malaysia and Indonesia), the minorities (Thailand and the Philippines), and the Soviet Union. The editor introduces the problem and summarizes the work of his collaborators, showing that there are discernible patterns in which Islam has been used as a legitimizing agent both by forces committed to and opposed to a particular status quo. In spite of Ayoob's somewhat flamboyant style and his indiscriminate attack on the "Orientalists" as the "handmaidens of imperialism," the work is of great interest for both the expert and the student of Islamic institutions and politics. (bibliography, index)

In this study the author suggests that the removal of Ayub Khan from office was brought about by economic conflicts between the Pakistani dominant class, made up of industrialists and capitalist farmers, and the dominated class, which includes workers, peasants, artisans, and the landless. This same conflict, according to the author, caused a change in the central philosophy of the Fourth Plan. Previous to that, the guiding strategy of the economy was the growth philosophy in which resources were concentrated in the hands of a limited group, described as entrepreneurs. The theory failed, according to the author, in that the product of Pakistan's growth failed to trickle down to the ordinary man in the street. The author notes that the central philosophy of the Fourth Plan was made to reflect social justice with an emphasis on the equitable distribution of wealth.


This is a skillful examination of energy policy formation, utilization, and future development in Pakistan. The book raises fundamental questions about the country's distribution of economic and political power. (bibliography, map)


This is a plausible account of the fourth Indo-Pakistani War, taking place in October-November 1984. The author, a researcher at the Delhi Centre for Policy Research, plugs in believable facts and figures relating to troop
strengths, deployment, and levels of military technology as well as convincing battle scenes. The responses of other countries to the war also are believable in terms of past responses to Indo-Pakistani conflicts, US interests in protection of the Persian Gulf and the preservation of Pakistan, Arab support for a brother Islamic nation, and Soviet and US desires to avoid conflict with each other. A highly readable documentary-novel. (appendixes, maps)


This work discusses the roles of the bureaucracy, elites, the army, and opposition groups in Pakistan. (bibliography, index)


In this study of the constitutional history of Pakistan from an Islamic point of view, the author suggests that the turbulent history of that country is a result of the gap between the Islamic aspirations of its people and the inability of its leaders to implement Islam and its ideals in government and public policy. The study is divided into four parts: 1) a brief history of the Muslim League; 2) a discussion of the concept of sovereignty from Western and Islamic viewpoints and an analysis of the provisions of sovereignty in the various constitutions of Pakistan; 3) a comparative survey of Western democracy and the ideal of Islamic government, with an analysis of the latter's relation to Pakistan; and 4) a survey of fundamental rights in the West, in Islam, and in the constitutions of Pakistan.


This study of US-Pakistani relations begins in 1948, shortly after the creation of Pakistan. The first chapter provides a framework for the study by examining the context of the relationship, its expectations and benefits, and the key issues between the countries. The birth of Bangladesh in the context of US-Pakistani relations is examined in detail. The Bhutto years are viewed in the light of Bhutto's perception of US support, confrontation over nuclear issues, the fall of Bhutto, and charges of US involvement. One chapter, devoted to examining the correlation between arms and influence with regard to US-Pakistani relations, is particularly useful for its tables and other hard data. The development of Pakistan's nuclear policy and US response to it is traced from the Ayub years up through the impact of the Afghanistan invasion and US nonproliferation policy. (bibliography, index, tables)
After more than 3 decades of recurrent political instability, military coups, and violence, it is difficult to determine whether there has been any political development in Pakistan at all. In this volume, the author draws on his long experience as an observer of that country to produce an interesting and generally well-written account of politics. However, he does little to clarify the nature of the enigma, or even to relate his narrative to the concept of political development. Ziring treats his subject sympathetically but not totally uncritically. His account emphasizes the importance of Islam—the raison d'être for the country's creation in 1947—and raises several questions concerning its political role. One of these is the familiar issue of the tension between Islam and nationalism. An equally important issue, less frequently mentioned, is the conflict between Islam and constitutionalism. The author is pessimistic about the future of this latter phenomenon in Pakistan, and he seems to regard the prospect of an Islamic polity, such as that advocated by Pakistan's President Zia, with equally strong pessimism. (bibliography, illustrations, index)

b. Serials


President Zia-ul Haq has appointed a Federal Advisory Council, but it is powerless. The political parties refuse to join it, and continue to demand a direct, parliamentary election.


The Soviet invasion of Afghanistan in 1979 brought the Soviet Army for the first time to the borders of Pakistan. Since then, Moscow has sought to intimidate Pakistan, for the Soviet leadership regards the present Government of Pakistan as one of its principal obstacles to crushing the Afghan rebels. This policy is likely to continue in light of Moscow's apparent determination to suppress the Afghan rebellion by military force, however long that takes.

Contrary to the prevailing view that repression by the military regime in Pakistan is simply a transient phase representing a consolidation of the government's power, Amnesty International has reported growing imprisonment, torture, and execution of political prisoners in the country. The Amnesty report paints a consistent pattern of gross violation of human rights including systematic torture of detainees. The picture of the Pakistan Government that emerges from the document is that of an administration terrorizing its own people while simultaneously protesting the same brutalities and repression in neighboring Afghanistan.


Growing dissatisfaction with martial rule in the undeveloped province of Baluchistan has forced Zia to play his hand carefully. According to the author, the Baluch are a "strong political force" in Pakistan and a sharp veer to the left could leave moderate Baluch dissidents such as K. B. Bizenjo in the lurch. Zia has drawn up ambitious development plans for the province with the help of American and Saudi aid. The author believes Islamabad will, under current circumstances, back down on its pledge to deny the US base facilities at the port of Gwadar.


Pakistan's much heralded but impotent Federal Advisory Council holds its first session and is boycotted by all political parties of consequence.


Pakistan's new Federal Advisory Council holds its inaugural meeting amid considerable pomp in Islamabad. Though its functions are similar to the elected parliament it replaced, the council has little political clout or freedom of action. It is purely an advisory body, formed by presidential decree and its recommendations are not binding on the country's leaders.


India's fears that Pakistani proposals for a nonaggression pact might be a trap are expected to dominate the forthcoming discussions between the foreign ministers of the two South Asian nations. Pakistani Foreign Minister Agha Shahi will need to convince his Indian counterparts that Islamabad's forthcoming defense modernization program will present no threat to New Delhi and that Pakistan's Armed Forces are committed to a static defense with
no capability for the rapid shifts of deployment that are necessary for offensive warfare.


By the end of 1981 prospects for elections in Pakistan were more indefinite than ever as President Zia-ul Haq seemed to grow more comfortable in his leadership role and the opposition forces continued to be divided and lacking in leadership. In March, Zia promulgated constitutional changes that increased his powers and downgraded those of the civilian judiciary. The number of Afghan refugees topped the two million mark increasing the potential for problems in that area. The economy continued to improve and Pakistani prestige and activity in foreign affairs increased dramatically.


President Zia-ul Haq received a lukewarm reception on his recent visit to France. Because of the Zia regime's doubtful reputation in the field of human rights and suspicions that Islamabad seeks to develop nuclear weapons, the government of President Francois Mitterrand was not overjoyed about receiving the Pakistani leader. The Afghan crisis reportedly was at the center of Zia's talks while his French hosts tried to reassure him that France's interests in South Asia were not limited to New Delhi.


Pakistan's Federal Advisory Council, though powerless, has started a lively debate on national issues at its first session.


Pakistani Foreign Minister Agha Shahi returns from New Delhi fully satisfied with talks held with his Indian counterpart, FM P. V. Narasimha Rao. Both sides agreed to establish a commission to continue negotiations, and an Indian trade delegation is expected in Islamabad in late February. The move is expected to return trade between the two countries to the private sector and to provide some security for Pakistan's infant engineering industry, which is vulnerable to Indian imports.


Pakistani FM Agha Shahi's recent trip to New Delhi may have convinced suspicious Indians that Islamabad is serious about negotiating a friendship or
nonaggression treaty with the government of PM Indira Gandhi. One probable outcome of the talks, as expressed by PM Shahi, may be a bilateral commission that will help "bridge the communications gap whenever it may arise."


A steady stream of Iranian refugees are seeking haven in Pakistan from the vicissitudes of the Iranian revolution. The refugees fall into three categories: those persecuted because of their religion; political dissidents from the left and the right; and Baluch tribesmen. Already hard-pressed by the influx of Afghan refugees and not wanting to complicate relations with the Tehran regime, the Government of Pakistan is reluctant even to recognize that such an exodus is going on.


Allegations published in a popular Soviet daily that Pakistan is developing bacteriological weapons for use in Afghanistan at a research center in Lahore have resulted in the Pakistani expulsion of the American scientist heading the center. The article reporting the allegation, however, is full of inaccuracies and is almost certainly an example of Soviet disinformation.


In recent months, the number of Afghan refugees in Pakistan has swelled past the three million mark. UN sources describe the welfare work on behalf of the refugees as "one of the biggest ever undertaken in the history of the world body." According to UN estimates, one-fifth of the population of Afghanistan has fled the fighting and taken refuge across the border in Pakistan, imposing a financial burden on Islamabad amounting to 10 percent of its annual export earnings.

"The Case of the Exploding Koran." The Economist, 6 March 1982, p. 60.

President Zia initiates a law-and-order crackdown that leads to large-scale arrests and the discovery of substantial amounts of subversive literature and weapons in the Province of Sind. The crackdown may give inadvertent publicity to al-Zulfiqar, the terrorist movement initiated by the son of executed Prime Minister Zulfiqar Ali Bhutto, which so far has been a small and largely ineffectual organization.

"Tuning In." Time, 8 March 1982, p. 21.

Unconfirmed report from the inaccessible tri-junction border of Pakistan, Afghanistan, and Iran maintains the Soviets have succeeded in gaining permission from the Khomeini regime to establish a listening post in the
mountains north of Zahedan. Intelligence information acquired from the post allows the Iranians to monitor the movements of dissidents, while the Soviets keep an eye on the activities of the mujahidin and the Pakistan Army in Baluchistan.


FM Agha Shahi's resignation as Foreign Minister of Pakistan may lead to the adoption of a harder line by the military regime of President Zia-ul Haq on bilateral issues with India. Discussions for a nonwar pact with India were initiated by Shahi, and when the talks went nowhere, the disillusioned Foreign Minister submitted his resignation. This offer to step down was eagerly accepted by Zia and his aides who may have felt that Shahi was making too many concessions to New Delhi in an attempt to sell his nonaggression pact.


Moscow reportedly has threatened to suspend its supervisory role at the new Pakistani steel mill in Karachi and at the Soviet-built powerstation in Goddu unless Pakistani authorities come to terms with the government of Babrak Karmal in Kabul. Conversely, a moderation of attitude by Islamabad, Soviet officials have promised, will result in an expansion of economic assistance by the USSR.


A survey of military and economic relations between Pakistan and the Muslim world focuses on the potential for production of an Islamic bomb. Such a weapon is viewed by the Arab countries as essential to countering a nuclear-armed Israel and by Pakistan as an equalizer in its relations with India. The elements that lend themselves to producing such a nuclear coalition are Arab money, Pakistani technology and skilled manpower, the military leadership role being developed by Pakistan in the Middle East, and the unifying tie of Islam. An advantage to Pakistan in development of an Islamic bomb over a Pakistani bomb is that the criticism of the antiproliferation opponents is diffused toward 40 Muslim states. The author gives a grim recitation of the probable effects of the development of a Pakistan Islamic bomb.


The likelihood of Pakistan undergoing a second or a third "Bangladesh" is examined by the authors with particular attention given to the possibility of an independent Baluchistan.

This West German political scientist begins his article with a succinct statement: "Pakistan's main partners in the field of foreign policy are limited regardless of the nature of the government in Islamabad." Braun sees little chance of a markedly different regime coming to power in Pakistan. Pakistan's primary relations are with the United States, the PRC, and Saudi Arabia. The current regime is cultivating all three powers in order to minimize the threat from the Soviet Union and offer some security to Pakistan's territorial integrity. Pakistan will continue to resist India's inclination to draw Islamabad into a South Asian state system in which New Delhi is the paramount power.


A comparison is made of relations between Pakistan and the various Islamic Middle Eastern states under the governments of Zulfikar Ali Bhutto and Zia-ul Haq. The conclusion is that while relations with some have been strained, particularly by Bhutto's execution (Iran, Syria, Algeria), others have improved (Iraq and Saudi Arabia). Pakistan's role as supplier of military experts and technical manpower is viewed as a cornerstone of the various relationships, although somewhat subject to the whims of the Middle Eastern governments. The brotherhood of Islam is described as an important factor in the relationships but not a "reliable pillar" on which to rest the edifice of a foreign policy. The Islamic bomb reports are discounted as unlikely.


Pakistan's relations with the United States, the Soviet Union, and the People's Republic of China are the subject of this brief review of Pakistan's precarious security situation. The Chinese, while genuinely supportive of Pakistan, have little to offer in the way of military support capable of fending off a Soviet attack. Relations with the US have oscillated wildly in the past but now show signs of a new friendship of convenience growing out of shared security concerns over the USSR. Pakistan seeks to balance relations with all three superpowers by clinging to nonalignment. The author does not envision any warming of relations between the USSR and Pakistan as long as the Afghan insurgency is kept alive.


Pakistan's troubled relations with its immediate neighbors are the subject of this broad perspective on the current uneasiness in the Indian subcontinent. The author bobs and weaves between references to Afghanistan in the
Arthashastra, the Pashtunistan issue, and Zia's "diplomatic strategems." Somewhat cavalierly, the author predicts that "the military regime may collapse due to growing internal pressure;" in the next breath he concedes that estimating the effect of this downfall on Pakistan's relations with its neighbors "cannot be predicted."


A stalemate exists between the military government of Zia-ul Haq and the political elite of Pakistan. While the Zia government would not win any election held at this time, the badly divided political parties seem in no position to force the holding of elections. The author concludes that, although Zia may continue in power for some time, he has only partial control over the economic and strategic factors that may determine his survivability. Should Zia lose control, there is no guarantee his successor will head a civilian government.


In this survey of Pakistan's economic development the author focuses on two major problem areas: 1) the imbalances between the development of the various regions and between the social classes and their potential for conflict; and 2) Pakistan's dependence on international developments as far as trade, remittances, and debt are concerned.


The fall of the Shah, the Soviet push into Afghanistan, and domestic vulnerabilities have pushed Saudi Arabia and Islamic Pakistan into a close security relationship. While these ties date back to the mid-1960s, it has only been in the past several years that the Saudis have agreed to finance Pakistan's defense establishment in exchange for a large contingent of Muslim Pakistani troops to safeguard the interest of the Saudi royal family. According to the author, Zia's close identification with the Saudis has served to increase his value to the United States, which has declared the security of Saudi Arabia a primary foreign policy concern. The geopolitical aspects are particularly muddled for US interests due to the possibilities of conflicts involving either India or Israel. How the Pakistani-Saudi connection would respond to such a situation is unclear.


By 1981 the export of manpower from Pakistan for temporary employment in the Middle East had increased to the point where the remittances sent home by
these workers amounted to nearly 80 percent of Pakistan's total merchandise export earnings for that year. At present an estimated 1.25 million Pakistanis, or about 5 percent of the Pakistani labor force, are migrants in the Middle East. The author points out that Pakistan's labor export has been, and will continue to be, beneficial to its economy providing the exported skills are replaced quickly. The article summarizes the findings of recent research done on the nature and effects of Pakistan's labor export, including information on types of skills exported, home province of workers, value of income and remittances, how remittances are spent or invested. Also surveyed are Pakistan's prospects for labor export in the future, which will be determined in part by competition from other labor exporting countries and policies of the host countries toward migrant labor.


Development planning appears to be returning to Pakistan after a near 15-year absence. The guiding spirit behind it is Dr. Mahbubul Haq, a renowned Pakistani economist, who has just returned from a World Bank assignment. Haq has unveiled a five-pronged strategy for economic development centered on creating a strong production base to meet the social needs of the people. His strategy comprises the following policy objectives: a breakthrough in agricultural production; a revival of industrial growth; an all-out effort to develop the country's vast human resources through functional literacy; creation of safety nets for the most vulnerable groups in society; and a new charter for private and public sectors in future development.


The author accepts without qualification the jaded thesis that the US is bent on acquiring base rights in Pakistan in exchange for sophisticated weapons and international support for the floundering regime of Zia-ul Haq. Harking back to an earlier era of U-2 flights from Peshawar, the article posits that the underdeveloped port of Gwadar on the Makran Coast is earmarked for the Rapid Deployment Force. The author concludes haphazardly that the Pakistani military leadership's quest for an "assured guarantee" of a constant supply of US military hardware is fraught with uncertainty.


With the closing months of the 1970s, Pakistan was thrust into a leading role on the international stage by two events: the Islamic revolution in Iran and the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan. These two events led to a sudden reversal of the direction of US-Pakistani relations, which had reached a low point at about the same time. The author cites the renewal of these relations as a remarkable diplomatic achievement for both countries, and then goes on to detail the advantages that will accrue to each. The strengths and
weaknesses brought by Pakistan, and particularly the Zia government, to its role as a "front-line state" are the main thrust of the article.


In this rather pessimistic assessment of South Asian relations in the 1980s, the author warns that unless India and Pakistan are able to insulate their bilateral relations from the currents and cross-currents of superpower rivalry, "the slide toward an armed confrontation between the two countries seems inevitable." This analysis is made even grimmer by the specter of a steady progression toward nuclear weapons capability being made by both countries. Also, the growing divisiveness of subnationalism within Pakistan would likely result, in the event of an Indo-Pakistani conflict, in the dismemberment of Pakistan. In a final dark warning the author notes that the initiative for dealing with subcontinental problems seems to be slipping from the grasp of the regional contestants into the hands of the superpowers "for whom South Asia is merely another chessboard in their continuing game of competition for global power and influence."


Today, the poppy fields and primitive heroin laboratories in the inaccessible and semiautonomous tribal agencies lying along Pakistan's frontier with Afghanistan have overtaken Turkey as the major supplier of heroin to addicts in the West. Pakistan's opium production now greatly exceeds that of the Golden Triangle of Southeast Asia. This development has become of serious concern to US and West European drug enforcement agencies as well as the Pakistani Narcotics Control Board.


The author surveys the historical development of the Pakistani military over the first 3 decades of independence. The role of the military has changed significantly: no longer is it the guardian of the nation's defense, for over the years successive military leaders have assigned it the tasks of administering the state, controlling the bureaucracy, and stifling dissent. The author maintains that the Army now is, for better or worse, the primary political institution which has supplanted civilian leadership in the country. The article also provides a useful survey of the transformation the military has undergone under successive civilian and military governments.

As the fifth anniversary of the military takeover in Pakistan approaches, informed sources in Islamabad speculate that President Zia-ul Haq may mark the occasion by announcing regulations governing national elections to be held within 18 months. These elections could be nonparty contests held on the basis of proportional representation, which would insure that no single opposition party obtains a majority. Among the opposition parties, the Jamaat-Islami Pakistan is the unpredictable factor. The party, described by a European source as "an inverted, orthodox Communist party," proselytizes heavily, and is lavishly funded, disciplined, and organized. It has an influence out of proportion to its small membership and would seek to turn Pakistan into the world's first, truly Islamic state.


Mrs. Benazir Bhutto continues her defiance of the military regime of President Zia-ul Haq and maintains an intense personal commitment to the Pakistan People's Party (PPP) which represents the strongest domestic challenge to the Zia government.


Baluchistan has the potential to become the next Asian disaster area. Its tribal inhabitants occupy an area that encompasses parts of Pakistan, Iran, and Afghanistan. The region could be a tempting prize for an expansion-minded USSR, seeking access to the Indian Ocean. Pakistan is acutely aware of the potential Baluch problem. One of the nightmares of successive regimes in Islamabad has been that the Baluchs might one day arise to demand a sovereign state of their own apart from Pakistan. President Zia has a long way to go before he can count on the unqualified loyalty of the Baluch tribes, but he has managed to dampen some of the separatist sentiment that exists in the region.


Faced with an energy crunch and the increasing strain energy imports are imposing on the balance of payments, Pakistan is urgently developing its own resources and making better use of existing supplies. Currently, the country meets 68 percent of its commercial energy requirements from domestic sources and imports the remainder in the form of crude oil and products such as kerosene and high-speed diesel.

Pakistan's budget for fiscal year 1983 (began 1 July) reflects a reasonably good fiscal year 1982 in which the gross domestic product rose 6 percent and production in major industries rose 12.1 percent. Negative factors were the inflation rate, estimated by some independent economists to be as high as 20 percent, and the strain on the economy from imported energy costs, equivalent to 66 percent of Pakistan's foreign export earnings. The budget will raise nearly Rs 5 billion in new taxes, mostly import duties. The development sector of the budget is to be increased to Rs 31.46 billion, with about 15 percent of that amount coming from deficit financing. The development funds will be used to encourage increases in industrial production, electricity generation, agricultural production, and oil and natural gas output.


Pakistan is attempting to mobilize its private sector and increase investment in industry by 35 percent in 1983. There are several obstacles, however, to this optimistic plan, including the ability of the government to provide foreign exchange and local currency loans to industry; taxes, especially duty on imported machinery; the state of the government-owned infrastructural facilities that supply electricity, natural gas, and water; and the drain of skilled workers to the Middle East. Many of the problems are traced to the nationalization of key industries between 1972 and 1977 under the Bhutto regime.


Pakistan hopes to gain some things from the recent visit of Mrs. Gandhi to the United States. According to the author, the Zia government hopes Washington will be able to convince India of Pakistan's sincerity about normalizing Indo-Pakistani relations on the eve of the South Asian foreign ministers meeting. For this reason, and because Pakistan is interested in reviving relations with the United States in terms of military and economic aid, the Zia administration has kept a low profile in commenting on the recent Gandhi trip to the United States.


Pakistan is being subjected to a Muslim fundamentalist offensive that threatens to degrade the status of women in the country. The effort is being spearheaded by the mullahs of the Islamic Ideology Council which is rewriting and reviewing Pakistan's laws. Women already have been banned from participating in spectator sports except before all-female audiences and the capacious Islamic chador has been prescribed for wear by civil servants, teachers, and schoolgirls. Urban Pakistani women are fighting back by
stressing a creative interpretation of the Koran that permits all women preemptive rights to family assets, alimony, and the custody of their children.


By 1982 the United States and Pakistan had renewed a defense relationship suspended since 1965. The authors view this reversal of the Carter and earlier administration policies as a strategic reassessment by the US Government of its relationship with the Soviet Union. The two principal interests leading to this reassessment are identified as the unacceptability of Soviet control over the landbridge to Africa and the necessity of stability of the flow of oil from the Gulf, particularly to Europe and Japan. The US response to the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan is analyzed in light of these interests. Pakistan's internal and external political situation is discussed in some detail along with its ramifications for the future of the US-Pakistan relationship.


Pakistan's desire for nuclear weapons capability arises out of its fear of the size and military superiority of its neighbor India and 35 years of conflict and tension between the two nations. Proponents of US arms sales to Pakistan defend the sale on the grounds that it will lessen Pakistan's insecurity and need to counter India's might with nuclear weapons capability. The author contends, however, that sophisticated conventional weapons are too destabilizing in a region where enmities are so deeply rooted. He instead recommends a number of diplomatic steps designed to encourage rapprochement between India and Pakistan and bring stability to the region.


The results of a study of the causes of anti-American feelings in Pakistan between 1965 and 1979 are the subject of this paper. Indicators of anti-Americanism cited in the study include newspaper articles and editorials; letters to editors; anti-American demonstrations; and anti-American riots resulting in death or injury. The two main causes of antagonism indicated by the study were the extent of US economic and military aid to Pakistan and the extent of US hostility toward foreign policies favored by the Pakistan Government and/or people (especially the issues of Kashmir, nuclear weapons development, Indo-Pakistani rivalry, nonalignment, and bilateralism). The paper concludes with an analysis of these two causes seen from the perspective of the history of Pakistani-US relations between 1954 and 1979.

The article presents a survey of the shifting relations of Pakistan with the United States and with the Middle East since independence. The author proposes that the two major flaws in US policy in the region are its Arab-Israeli policy and its tendency to try and solve problems with large expenditures of military aid without giving careful attention to the political milieu into which the aid is being injected. Pakistan's foreign policy is described in terms of the dual considerations of security and the brotherhood of Islam. The author points out the common failure of secularized Western nations to appreciate the importance of religion in a nation such as Pakistan, which was born out of religious struggles. Pakistan's disenchantment with the United States and eventual withdrawal from CENTO is traced from its support for US policies during the 1956 Suez crisis, which was followed by US neutrality during the Indo-Pakistani wars. Thereafter Pakistan began courting the Middle Eastern states for support and friendship, joined the Nonaligned Movement, and in 1979 withdrew from CENTO. The author also discusses the current situation including Pakistan's alinement with the moderate bloc within the Islamic Conference and the difficulty of remaining on good terms with all members of the Conference. The author concludes that the present situation has many advantages for the United States: 1) Pakistan's commitment to Islam creates a strong national identity that wards off regional and ethnic divisiveness; 2) close economic ties with the wealthy Middle Eastern states means a reduction in the requirements of US military aid; and 3) Pakistan's moderate position on Palestine helps bolster Saudi Arabia. He also points out that Pakistan turned first to the United States after the Afghanistan invasion, and US-Pakistani military relations are better than at any time in the past 20 years.


In an effort to combat mounting terrorism in Pakistan, President Zia-ul Haq ordered the police to issue weapon licenses to "law-abiding citizens" last week after one of his closest civilian associates was gunned down, another killed, and a third critically injured in a mysterious road accident. In August, responding to the rising crime rate and terrorist attacks, Zia had announced tighter security measures and a major reshuffling of the top police administration. Critics of the government blame the growing unrest on the outlawing of political parties, censorship of the press, the postponement of elections, and the growing arsenals of various opposition groups. Although having made repeated promises to hold elections, Zia has been quoted recently as saying that "Islam does not believe in the rule of the majority."


A surge of lawlessness has broken out in Pakistan on the eve of President Zia-ul Haq's visits to China, North Korea, Indonesia, Malaysia, Singapore, and Washington. Zia's government is trying to respond to the crisis without
appearing to overreact and further damage its human rights record abroad. Blamed at various times for the rise in lawlessness have been bandits, rich teenagers, the CIA, and Al-Zulfikar, the Kabul-based organization of Pakistani dissidents led by the sons of the late prime minister Zulfikar Ali Bhutto. There are reports that Soviet-Afghan support for Al-Zulfikar is waning as Kabul attempts to improve its relations with Islamabad in hopes of a political settlement and normalization of relations between the two countries.

"Pakistani's Want Freer Travel to India." Newsmag (New Delhi), 15 October 1982, pp. 33-34.

An Indian journalist who recently visited Pakistan returned home with the following observations. Pakistanis, especially the younger generation, have generally warm and friendly feelings toward India and a deep urge to visit that country. They are suspicious of Indo-Soviet friendship and feel India has "appeased" the Soviets by not opposing the invasion of Afghanistan. Pakistanis seem puzzled that India, which is so large and powerful, should fear Pakistan and feel the need to have such a large army. Other observations included Pakistanis' annoyance over press censorship and prohibition of alcohol. Lahore and Karachi were compared favorably with Indian cities as being cleaner, freer of slums, and more orderly, and the people are better dressed and healthier. Karachi, however, was described as a "criminals' paradise."


Pakistan won a seat on the UN Security Council for the fourth time since it joined the organization 35 years ago. Pakistan, which will replace Japan on the 15-member council, will fill one of the five regional nonpermanent seats for a 2-year term.


Pakistan's politically active lawyers staged demonstrations and a boycott of Karachi courts in late October to protest the arrest of the president of the Karachi Bar Association, martial law, and restrictions on the judiciary. The emphasis placed on military and Islamic courts by the military government of Zia-ul Haq has seriously undercut the prestige, authority, and economic survival of the formerly powerful Pakistani legal profession.


Enroute to a tour of the ASEAN nations, Pakistan's President Zia-ul Haq was invited to stop for lunch with Prime Minister Indira Gandhi in New Delhi on
l November. In a friendly 3-hour meeting, the two leaders accentuated the positive with talks of trade and other exchanges and an agreement to set up a joint ministerial commission to discuss Pakistan's nonaggression pact proposal and India's formula for a peace, friendship, and cooperation treaty. While not able to eliminate the negative in this brief meeting, the two leaders did manage to avoid mention of such things as Kashmir, Afghanistan, etc.


Prime Minister Indira Gandhi described the meeting as "cordial." President Zia-ul Haq called it "excellent" and said "it could not have been better." It remains to be seen what will come out of the 2-hour luncheon summit held in New Delhi in November while Zia was between planes. The most firm outcomes were the agreement to set up a joint commission to discuss trade and cultural exchanges and the scheduling of a 23 December subministerial-level meeting in New Delhi to discuss the Indian-proposed "treaty of peace and friendship" and the Pakistani-proposed "no-war pact."


In January, Pakistan delinked its rupee with the US dollar in hopes of perking up its exports, which were sagging because of the appreciation in the value of the dollar-linked rupee. The delinking has so far not produced the desired effect, partly because of the continued recession in international markets and increased Western protectionism. But it's too soon to tell whether the move was a good one.


On his November visit to Malaysia, President Zia-ul Haq announced that the Hijra Award given by Pakistan to mark the beginning of the 15th century of the Muslim calendar will be awarded to Malaysia's first Prime Minister Tunku Abdul Rahman for his service to the Muslim community. Zia also offered Pakistan's assistance in setting up Malaysia's Islamic University and will give extra university places to Malaysian students who wish to study medicine, engineering, and other technical subjects. Malaysia will back Pakistan's reentry into the Commonwealth and a joint communiqué was issued at the end of the visit condemning the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan, Vietnamese involvement in Cambodia, and Israel's involvement in Lebanon. These same positions were subscribed to by Pakistan and Indonesia during Zia's visit to that country a few days earlier. Pakistan also changed its position on East Timor, accepting its integration with Indonesia.
Nusrat Bhutto, wife of former Pakistani Prime Minister Zulfikar Ali Bhutto, is seeking permission from the present government of Zia-ul Haq to go to Europe for treatment of suspected lung cancer and heart disease. The government has required a ruling by a local medical board, after examination of Mrs. Bhutto, to determine whether outside treatment is indeed necessary. Mrs. Bhutto is head of her late husband's Pakistan People's Party (PPP), the strongest opposition group in the country, and the Zia government fears that Mrs. Bhutto will use her trip to unite various PPP factions living abroad, particularly in London, which is a center of the anti-Zia movement.


President Zia and Prime Minister Gandhi agreed during their 1 November meeting in New Delhi to set up a joint commission for Indo-Pakistani cooperation, which would provide a permanent mechanism for economic, technological, cultural, and other exchanges. The establishment of the commission should help strengthen the seven nation South Asian forum, a recently established regional organization that has been made ineffective by the absence of normal relations between India and Pakistan. A meeting of the foreign ministers of the seven nations will be held sometime in 1983. There are still some major sticking points impeding normalization of Indo-Pakistan relations. Chief among these is Kashmir, which India feels should be settled bilaterally at the present line of control, whereas Pakistan would like to have a plebiscite and has asserted its right to take the issue to the United Nations. India also is opposed to either country leasing out bases or other military facilities to third countries and is particularly apprehensive about the current US-Pakistani military relationship and the possible restoration of US bases in Pakistan.


Two Pakistani submarines reportedly were hovering around the Maldives and were chased by the Indian Navy by sea and air for 110 kilometers. Numerous related rumors were reported, including that Pakistan has leased two of the Maldivian islands for military bases, and that there has been an increased American presence in the tropical archipelago recently.


Pakistan's President Zia-ul Haq made a goodwill tour of Southeast Asia in November that was described by Pakistani officials as a turning point in the country's foreign policy, which recently has been directed mainly toward the Muslim nations of the Middle East. In Jakarta, Zia endorsed the tripartite Cambodian resistance coalition backed by ASEAN and called for the withdrawal of Vietnamese troops from Cambodia. President Suharto in return called for the withdrawal of Soviet troops from Afghanistan and together they called for
an end to the Iran-Iraq war and satisfactory settlement of the Lebanon crisis. Zia also talked trade with the Indonesians and the Malaysians, hoping to redress the trade imbalance, long running in Southeast Asia's favor.


Nusrat Bhutto, widow of former Pakistan Prime Minister Zulfikar Ali Bhutto, has been granted permission by the government to go abroad to seek treatment for suspected lung cancer. Mrs. Bhutto had first applied to leave nearly 3 months previously, but the government required she undergo examination by a state medical board to determine whether the trip was necessary. Pressure from within Pakistan and from overseas may have caused the board to finally approve the trip. Mrs. Bhutto, who heads her husband's Pakistan People's Party (PPP), the strongest group opposing the Zia government, has promised not to indulge in political activity while abroad, and her destination was kept secret.

"We Have (Almost) No Detainess." Asiaweek, 26 November 1982, p. 17.

In a recent interview with Asiaweek staff, Pakistani President Zia-ul Haq responded to questions on relations with India, political prisoners in Pakistan, and the role of the Army in future governments of Pakistan.

"Zia Discovers That Patience is the Perfect Game for One." The Economist, 4 December 1982, p. 57.

On the eve of Zia-ul Haq's December visit to Washington, the Pakistani President's affairs are judged to be pretty much in order. He has had recent friendly meetings with Mrs. Gandhi, Mr. Andropov, and several Southeast Asian heads of state. Pakistan has a fairly stable economy, the Asian seat on the UN Security Council, and a great cricket team. The home opposition continues to be weak, although the Bhuttos are always a possible worry. Zia continues to make vague references to possible future parliamentary elections, but seems unhurried by any pressures to make any formal promises.

"Keepers of the Bhutto Flame." Asiaweek, 10 December 1982, p. 16.

Before Nusrat Bhutto left Pakistan for West Germany in November to be treated for possible lung cancer, she and the other leaders of the Pakistan People's Party (PPP) appointed a 12-member committee to handle party affairs. Heading the committee will be Benazir Bhutto, 29-year-old daughter of the former prime minister and Mrs. Bhutto, who has been under detention by the Zia government since March 1981, preceded by 2 years of imprisonment and house arrest. A crowd of 10,000 gathered to give the ailing party leader a resounding farewell.
Pakistan's President Zia-ul Haq came away from talks with the new Soviet leader Yuri Andropov, following the funeral of Leonid Brezhnev, with a new optimistic perception of the Soviet desire to solve the Afghanistan situation. Andropov reportedly offered a new formula by which Soviet withdrawal of troops from Afghanistan would be linked with the ending of external interference in Afghan affairs. Washington was less impressed with the apparent breakthrough, counseling caution and offering sophisticated radar technology for F-16 fighters, recently purchased by Pakistan, as perhaps an inducement to keep the Pakistanis from wavering.

Indian authorities are becoming increasingly concerned about the flow of opium and heroin across their border from Pakistan. The heroin is believed to be manufactured in laboratories in Pakistan's North West Frontier Province and smuggled into India by members of a Pakistani drug syndicate. Most of the heroin goes to Amritsar, which now has international flights to London. Indian and Pakistani authorities have not concerned themselves with the trade much in the past since most of the drugs were destined for markets elsewhere. But with a sudden substantial increase in the traffic, they fear a Golden Triangle type situation, such as that in Southeast Asia, may be developing. Enforcement agencies on both sides of the border face real difficulties in halting the traffic across a long, largely unpatrolled border, where smugglers are indistinguishable from residents on either side.
9. **SRI LANKA**

   a. **Monographs**


   This study analyzes the effects of certain government agricultural policies initiated to increase rice production and reduce imports. Included among the policies analyzed are expanded irrigation; guaranteed price system; fertilizer subsidies; and various schemes for crop insurance, rice rationing, and agricultural credit.


   This book presents a commanding synthesis of the major political, economic, and cultural forces that have shaped the destiny of Sri Lanka over the past 2,500 years. Centuries ago, this small island nation near the southeast tip of India was a center of Buddhist culture and the seat of a thriving civilization. Epochs of prosperity alternated with periods of incessant strife and growing Western influence. By the 13th century, the ancient civilization had been decimated by internecine warfare and the invasions of foreigners. The Portuguese gained control of the island in 1600; 60 years later the Dutch overthrew them; and the British, in turn, supplanted the Dutch at the end of the 18th century. Sri Lanka became wholly independent from Britain in 1948, and this book concludes with an evaluation of this relatively new independent state. One reviewer notes, "It will be the standard one-volume work on the history of Sri Lanka." (bibliography, illustrations, index)


   This study, mainly addressed to economic geographers, concentrates on population distribution, urbanization, the plantation system, and the development of manufacturing and industrial resources. (bibliography, illustrations, index)


   The author presents a rather comprehensive statistical volume on Sri Lanka, divided into the following sections: climate and land base; population;...
vital statistics and health; migration; education; labor force and wages; agriculture; forest and fisheries; mining and energy; transportation and communication; commerce and housing; trade and shipping; public finance; military, police and justice; government and politics; money and banking; price indexes; and national income. Information in some of the tables goes back to the mid-19th century or early 20th century. Unfortunately the most recent data is from the late 1970s. Each section is prefaced with several pages of description and analysis of the tables that follow it. (footnotes, index, 155 tables)


A study of the balance of payments of Sri Lanka is presented using the monetary approach.


This book is extensively researched. It covers a very large area of ground--aid and international finance, the main economic projects and directions, plantations, industries, tourism, food, jobs, transport, energy, demography, and environment. What this book conveys, through its maze of socioeconomic trails, is an astounding lack of political will by both leading parties coupled with an almost cynical disregard of economic common sense. The author has brought the recent economic history of Sri Lanka into a manageable and readable focus. He has an ear for the nuances of the country's politics and politicians, and the content is workmanlike, honest, and evenhanded. (bibliography, map)


Sri Lanka's 1978 constitution is compared with the country's two earlier constitutions as well as the French and British systems of government. Emphasis is given to the new "all-powerful" executive president, and the system of proportional representation is discussed with particular respect to Sri Lanka's pluralistic society.
b. Serials


Serious disagreement has arisen between Sri Lanka and India about the continued implementation of the Indo-Ceylon Agreement of 1964 which sought to end the problem of nearly a million stateless plantation workers of Indian descent who have lived and worked in Sri Lanka for generations. New Delhi has advised Colombo that the agreement is no longer valid and that it will accept only 500,000 Tamil repatriates, or 100,000 less than the original commitment. Sri Lanka has rejected the Indian point of view but has expressed confidence publicly that a compromise can be worked out.


Inadequate planning and undue haste to complete Sri Lanka's Mahaweli Development Project resulted in benefits that were greatly exceeded by the costs of the project. The objectives of the plan—to harness the Mahaweli River for hydroelectric power and to use its waters for irrigating vast areas of Sri Lanka in order to reach self-sufficiency in food production—exceeded the technical and financial resources of the country. Overall, food production has risen, but not to the levels projected because only some of the target areas have been irrigated. The outcome of the hydroelectric production part of the project is yet to be determined.


In order to understand some of the major political problems facing Sri Lanka today, such as the inherent instability of the export economy, land hunger of the peasantry, backwardness of rural agriculture, and Tamil separatism, it is important to understand the plantation economy that created many of the problems. This article focuses on the establishment and development of that economy in the late 19th century. Particularly examined is the role of the state in encouraging the establishment of the plantations, the enforced decline of paddy agriculture, and the consequent rebellion by the Ceylonese peasants.


A part of the breakaway faction of the Sri Lanka Freedom Party (SLFP) has rejoined the party under Mrs. Bandaranaike, who remains active in public life and addresses well-attended meetings on the shortcomings of the Jayewardene government.

The economic policies of the Socialist-oriented Bandaranaike government are compared with the entrepreneurial-minded Jayewardene government, and both are found to have their merits and demerits. According to the Physical Quality of Life Index (POLI), which measures how a nation performs in meeting the basic needs of its people, Sri Lanka by the 1970s (mostly Bandaranaike years) has done very well in terms of food, health care, and education. The costs, however, were high in terms of government controls, consumer shortages, and rising unemployment. The answer of the Jayewardene government, after winning election in 1977, was to provide the country with some badly needed economic growth through encouragement and deregulation of private enterprise. Also part of the strategy was weaning the Sri Lankan populace away from a welfare mentality, a policy that caused hardship in some quarters. Emphasis is also placed on such projects as the Mahaweli development plant for harnessing the hydro and irrigation potential of the country's longest river and the creation of an Investment Promotion Zone (IPZ) near Colombo to attract foreign investment.


Besieged by allegations of high-level corruption in his administration, President J. R. Jayewardene has accepted the resignation of Minister of Agricultural Development and Research E. L. Senanayake. A previous government investigation had cleared Senanayake of any malfeasance, but disclosed certain procedural irregularities in the award of government tenders.


In this series of articles, Salamat Ali reports that in a radical departure from the past, Sri Lankan President Junius Jayewardene has opened up his country to market forces and international investors, tilted his country's foreign policy toward the West, and ushered in a presidential form of government. While the economic prospects remain healthy in the longrun, pains of adjustment to a new system are showing through. The constitutional problems over proportional representation of the parties in the next election also pose serious impediments. The relentless victimization of the opposition Sri Lanka Freedom Party and the deprivation of the civil rights of its leader Sirimavo Bandaranaike could well make political martyrs of the opposition. Thus, the political scenario that appears to be emerging is one of a democracy under siege.

President Jayewardene has given the green light for inquiries into allegations of corruption against three of his own United National Party (UNP) lawmakers, including one cabinet minister. The moves have polished the President's image and convinced many Sri Lankans that he means business in his campaign of promoting Dharmista Samajaya (the Righteous Society).


The Sri Lankan cabinet recently has approved the drafting of wide-ranging changes to the country's election laws. The action has provoked charges by the political opposition that the ruling United National Party (UNP) is trying to bend the law to its own advantage, and has led to mounting speculation that President Junius Jayewardene plans to call for an early presidential election to take advantage of the current disarray among opposition parties.


President Junius Jayewardene has proposed constitutional changes that will enable him to call a presidential election 4 years into his 6-year term. Speculation is that he would like to seek an early mandate while the opposition is in disarray and the leader of the Sri Lanka Freedom Party (SLFP), former Prime Minister Sirimavo Bandaranaike, is stripped of her civic rights. Other proposed changes, which will be submitted to parliament in August, include shortening the present pre-election period to 3 to 5 weeks and empowering the president to dissolve parliament and hold a new election. The opposition vigorously opposes the proposed changes, particularly since they are without a strong candidate to field. The article speculates on the possible opposition candidate choices.


On the occasion of the announcement of elections to be held 20 October in Sri Lanka, the author speculates on whom the opposition parties will nominate to run against President Junius R. Jayewardene.


The scheduling of a presidential election for 20 October seems to make sense at the present time for President Junius R. Jayawardene and his United National Party (UNP), in spite of a number of domestic problems plaguing his island nation. The opposition Sri Lanka Freedom Party is in disarray and its charismatic leader Mrs. Sirimavo Bandaranaike is deprived of her civil
rights and unable to stand for reelection herself. A solid UNP victory in the forthcoming electoral contest would strengthen the party considerably for the general election to be held in 1984.


The article surveys the major political leaders and parties of Sri Lanka in the light of upcoming elections. President J. R. Jayewardene's United National Party (UNP) faces a disgruntled electorate with a history of "throwing the rascals out." The middle-of-the-road Sri Lanka Freedom Party needs the support of the left in order to return to power, but that alliance recently has been in shambles. The support of minorities (Tamils, Christians, Muslims, and Indian plantation workers) is viewed as a major factor in determining the outcome of the election.


Sri Lanka is in the midst of setting up its first official stock exchange, which will trade shares of about 100 companies (mostly local, except for about a half dozen subsidiaries of foreign firms) and about 160 plantation-management agencies, which are in liquidation following nationalization. Buyers of shares of the latter companies hope to qualify for compensation paid for nationalized property by the government. The exchange is being set up by a group of leading businessmen with the personal encouragement of President Junius Jayewardene, under whose government there has been a gradual move toward free-market economic policies.


Sri Lanka's nationalized tea and rubber plantations suffer from a decade of neglect after being used as objects of political patronage or major sources of revenue for the government. The plantations have been going to seed since the early 1970s when, under the threat of nationalization, overseas owners stopped reinvesting profits into the estates and sometimes milked the estates for whatever they would yield. The badly planned nationalization of the estates resulted in division of some estates among local farmers who stripped them bare and cut the trees for fuel. Professional managers were replaced with nonprofessionals and the estate workforce inflated through political patronage. The present government of President Junius R. Jayewardene has corrected some of the mistakes, but there is still a great need for modernization of the plantations and the factories that serve them.

An Indian cabinet minister has asked the Sri Lankan Government to commute the death sentences of two members of the Tamil Tigers secessionist group convicted last month in Colombo for murdering a policeman. The Tamil Tigers operate from bases in India, and the request for commutation has put a further strain on Sri Lankan-Indian relations. Tamil Nadu Chief Minister M. G. Ramachandran, who made the original request for commutation, is a founder of the Tamil separatist party, All-India Anna Dravida Munnetra Kazhagam.


Sri Lanka is toying with the idea of setting up the world's first international commodity exchange dealing in tea, as suggested to them by a delegation from the UN Food and Agriculture Organization. Currently all exported Sri Lankan tea is sold only through auction, putting the planters more-or-less at the mercy of the Colombo brokers. The tea industry, which directly or indirectly employs half of the Sri Lankan labor force, has been declining of late. The author prescribes introduction of production-oriented management, acquisition of marketing skills, and mobilization of local and foreign capital.


The eve of the presidential election in Sri Lanka finds the opposition Sri Lanka Freedom Party (SLFP) in disarray. The party head Sirimavo Bandaranaike is not permitted to run because she has been stripped of her civil rights. Hector Kobbekaduwa has been selected to run in her stead, although a more popular candidate would probably have been her son Anura Bandaranaike. Anura has so far failed to lend his support to the official candidate, whose candidacy was promoted by Anura's brother-in-law Vijaya Kumaratunga.


A pre-election wrap-up of the major candidates and their promises is presented along with a brief historical background of Sri Lanka's political scene. The author notes that one of the main issues is former Prime Minister Sirimavo Bandaranaike's civil rights, which were denied her in 1980 following the 1977 victory of President Junius Jayewardene's United National Party (UNP). One of the campaign pledges of Sri Lanka Freedom Party (SLFP) candidate and principal challenger Hector Kobbekaduwa is restoration of Mrs. Bandaranaike's rights. Leftist candidate Colvin de Silva maintains, however, that since it is illegal for a person without civil rights to aid a candidate for elections, victory by Kobbekaduwa could be invalidated by the courts because
Mrs. Bandaranaike is still president of the SLFP. Both major candidates are counting on the Tamil vote, which accounts for 300,000 to 400,000 out of 8 million eligible voters.


The Tamil United Liberation Front (TULF), the largest opposition group in the Sri Lanka parliament, has appealed to its members to boycott the 20 October elections. The TULF leadership has reaped criticism from all directions for its appeal, particularly from the militant components within the organization. TULF members have become increasingly resentful of the seemingly permanent presence of the Army in the Tamil-dominated north. They are also impatient with the inability of TULF leadership to win even minimum Tamil demands from the government.


President Junius R. Jayewardene is described as the darling of Western investors such as the World Bank and the International Monetary Fund and the favorite to win the upcoming election. Jayewardene's establishment of a free-trade zone brought $814 million in aid last year and the construction of 40 new factories employing 20,000 workers over the last several years. All is not entirely rosy, however, with an unofficially estimated 38 percent inflation rate, a foreign debt of 1.5 billion resulting largely from public housing, irrigation and electrification projects, and a trade deficit. Jayewardene has so far refused to denationalize the underproductive, overmanned state plantations and industries.


This lengthy article on the history of the Tamil nationalist movement in Sri Lanka provides the reader with a good backdrop against which to view the current Tamil struggles. Last year saw a major wave of rioting and guerrilla activity by minority Hindu Tamils against the majority Buddhist Sinhalese. Several new militant Tamil groups have sprung up to replace the Tamil Liberation Tigers who have been largely repressed by the Jayewardene government. The Tamil United Liberation Front (TULF), the major Tamil political party, lost its radical following after 1977 when it compromised on its original demand for a separate Tamil nation of Eelam in the northern part of the country.


Prior to the 20 October presidential election in Sri Lanka the opposition Sri Lanka Freedom Party (SLFP) was rent by internal feuding between the party's candidate, Hector Kobekaduwa, and Anura Bandaranaike, son of the SLFP party president Sirimavo Bandaranaike.

In the wake of President Junius R. Jayewardene's 20 October presidential election victory, the ruling United National Party (UNP) is contemplating parliamentary elections in order to give the president the backing he needs for his economic program. The election was essentially a referendum on Jayewardene's programs and the verdict was a strong 52.9 percent in favor. Hector Kobekaduwa, candidate of the Sri Lanka Freedom Party (SLFP), polled a respectable 39.1 percent of the vote, up more than 9 percent over the SLFP showing in the last election in 1977. In the northern Tamil areas, the voter turnout was only 46 percent, as compared with 81.2 percent nationwide, because of a boycott sponsored by the major Tamil party, the Tamil United Liberation Front (TULF).


The present Government of Sri Lanka has introduced a new initiative, District Development Councils (DDCs), as a way to defuse communal tension and thereby increase political and economic stability. The DDCs are the first major gesture by the Sri Lankan Government since independence in 1948 to allow the Ceylon Tamil population autonomy in administration of their own affairs. The article looks at the background of the DDCs, their mechanics, as well as analyzing their economic and political ramifications.


President J. R. Jayewardene won reelection in October to a 6-year term, winning 52.9 percent of the vote, compared with 39.1 percent for the Sri Lanka Freedom Party (SLFP). The choice perceived by most was between free enterprise under Jayewardene or a return to a state-directed economy under the SLFP candidate Hector Kobekaduwa. The choice was also seen as between the bread lines of the early 1970s under SLFP or rampant inflation, as high as 40 percent in the past year. Some 75 multinational corporations that have been established in a free trade zone near Colombo also had a stake in the outcome of the election. Meanwhile militant Tamils in the north, who wish to form a separate state called Eelam, boycotted the election on the urging of the Tamil United Liberation Front (TULF) Party. Other problems, besides inflation and Tamil unrest, include heavy foreign loans due in 1984 and international pressures to devalue Sri Lankan currency and denationalize the tea plantations.


One week after winning his second term as President of Sri Lanka, J.R. Jayewardene announced a referendum for December to extend the tenure of the current parliament by 6 years. Opponents of the ruling United National Party
(UNP) challenged the legality of the referendum in the Supreme Court, but lost. Jayewardene said he decided on the referendum on revelation of a plot to unleash a wave of violence and terror if the opposition candidate Hector Kobbekaduwa had won. The plot reportedly involved the takeover of the chief opposition party, the Sri Lanka Freedom Party (SLFP), by "undemocratic elements" who planned to assassinate or imprison not only the UNP leadership but also SLFP leader Sirimavo Bandaranaike and her son Anura. Jayewardene has promised to replace some of his unpopular MPs after the referendum. Regulations require only a simple majority for the referendum to pass, providing two-thirds of the registered voters go to the polls; if not, at least one-third of the registered voters must support the referendum for it to pass. The referendum has been opposed by various groups in the ruling and opposition parties as well as the Civil Rights Movement (CRM).


President J. R. Jayewardene's October victory in the Sri Lankan presidential election marked the first time a politician has led his party to two consecutive victories. The highly politicized, highly literate Sri Lankan electorate has a penchant for "throwing the rascals out." Jayewardene's showing, however, was not an unqualified victory. The chief opposition party, the Sri Lanka Freedom Party (SLFP), upped its performance by nine percentage points (to 39 percent) over its 1977 showing even though the party was rent by feuds and its leader disqualified from running. Furthermore, the low voter turnout in the northern Tamil areas (44 percent where 80 percent is normal) was an indication of the success of the election boycott called by the Tamil United Liberation Front (TULF), whose demands range from increased autonomy to a separate Tamil nation.


Sri Lanka's president J.R. Jayewardene, having won reelection to a 6-year term in October, convinced the Parliament, dominated by his own United National Party (UNP), to pass a bill extending their term of office 6 years. The bill, which passed by a two-thirds majority and was approved by the Supreme Court, now goes to the people for a referendum vote. The opposition parties are, of course, violently opposed. Jayewardene, meanwhile, has asked for the resignations of all his MPs and has promised to dismiss corrupt ministers.


The Tamil United Liberation Front (TULF) Party has nominated as an MP a man under sentence of death for killing a policeman. By doing so, TULF hopes to focus attention on the Prevention of Terrorism Act, which it opposes because it is applicable only in the northern Tamil region of Sri Lanka and not in the Sinhalese-dominated remainder of the country.

A major objective of the present Sri Lankan Government is the development of Colombo into an international financial center. With this in mind, the Central Bank of Ceylon recently discontinued its previous practice of fixing daily buying and selling rates for six international currencies and is transacting foreign exchange business with commercial banks in Sri Lanka exclusively in US dollars. This will hopefully assist exporters by promoting competition in commercial banks' foreign exchange dealings. The two local banks, the People's Bank and the Bank of Ceylon, are fearful of the increased competition the change will bring.


Sri Lanka's President J.R. Jayewardene has announced 22 December as the date of the referendum to extend the term of the present parliament for 6 years. All opposition parties are strongly opposed and nine parties have requested the government to lift the current state of emergency, declared 20 October in the wake of post-presidential election violence, in order to create an atmosphere more conducive to holding the referendum.


Sri Lanka, under the government of President Junius R. Jayewardene, is wooing international business investment at a feverish pace. The country is becoming a clear favorite with foreign investors who are offered as incentives cheap land, cheap labor, modestly priced building and utilities costs, and up to 10 years exemption from import-export tariffs, corporate and personal taxation, and taxes on royalties and dividends. There are no controls on the repatriation of earnings on profits, and constitutional guarantees against nationalization apply to investors from the France, Japan, Korea, Malaysia, Rumania, Singapore, Sweden, Switzerland, US, and UK. Sri Lanka now needs to move forward in the areas of transportation, communication, and power in order to accommodate the flood of investment business coming its way.


A referendum will be held on 22 December to decide whether the sitting parliament, in which President Junius Jayewardene's United National Party (UNP) holds the majority, will have its term of office extended for 6 years. Jayewardene, who won reelection in October, proposed the referendum in order to consolidate UNP power while the chief opposition party, the Sri Lanka Freedom Party (SLFP) is in disarray. The opposition parties are strongly opposed to the referendum and are working to defeat it. Jayewardene has
described the opposition as being dominated by "political hooligans" and has had some of its leadership detained, including Vijaya Kumaratunga, son-in-law of former Prime Minister and SLFP leader Sirimavo Bandaranaike.


The 22d of December 1982 marks the turning point in Sri Lanka's post-independence history. On that day the electorate will vote on a referendum that if passed will extend the present Parliament, in which the ruling party of Junius Jayewardene holds a five-sixths majority, until August 1989. The opposition is, of course, campaigning against the referendum, but its efforts are hampered by factionalism.