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Sea Lines of Communication: Potential for Japanese Cooperation

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**Abstract**

This study assesses the probable extent of Japanese cooperation with the United States in the maintenance of sea lines of communication (SLOC) in the event of a Pacific blockade or quarantine directed at resupply of US bases in Japan. It examines official Japanese interpretation of the sealane defense committee announced by Prime Minister Zenko Suzuki in 1981, the 1960 Treaty of Mutual Cooperation and Security between Japan and the United States (Mutual Security Treaty), and Japan's doctrine and practice of the Law of the Sea.

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SEA LINES OF COMMUNICATION: POTENTIAL FOR JAPANESE COOPERATION

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PREFACE

This study assesses the probable extent of Japanese cooperation with the United States in the maintenance of sea lines of communication (SLOC) in the event of a pacific blockade or quarantine directed at resupply of US bases in Japan. It examines official Japanese interpretations of the sealane defense commitment announced by Prime Minister Zenko Suzuki in 1981, the 1960 Treaty of Mutual Cooperation and Security between Japan and the United States (Mutual Security Treaty), and Japan's doctrine and practice of law of the sea.

Information for this study was derived from open sources in English and Japanese current as of 1 July 1985.
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SUMMARY

The Japanese Government's cooperation with the United States in the event of a pacific blockade or quarantine directed against reinforcement or resupply of US bases in Japan is likely to be limited, due to the following legal, constitutional, and policy factors:

- the Japanese Government's commitment to cooperate with the United States in the defense of sea lines of communication (SLOC) is limited to circumstances in which Japan or commercial shipping to Japan are under attack;

- the Japanese Government's doctrine and practice of the law of the sea, which are strongly influenced by Japan's paramount interest in freedom of commercial navigation, make it highly unlikely that Japan would interdict adjacent straits in the absence of a direct attack against Japan or commercial shipping to Japan;

- the Self-Defense Forces Law does not permit the Self-Defense Forces (SDF) to conduct armed operations, even in their own self-defense, without a defense mobilization order that must be approved by the Cabinet and the Diet; and

- constitutional doctrine, developed in nearly 30 years (from 1957 to 1985) of "unified interpretation" [toitsu kaishaku] by the Japanese Government, does not permit military operations by the SDF except in the defense of Japan.


There are no legal or constitutional restraints that would prevent Japan from providing US Armed Forces with certain forms of noncombat support, including intelligence-sharing and search-and-rescue operations.
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1. **INTRODUCTION**

The United States would probably regard a Soviet pacific blockade (quarantine) of shipping intended to interdict reinforcement or resupply of US bases in Japan, but which did not directly threaten commercial shipping to Japan, as an "emergency" under Article 6 of the Mutual Security Treaty of 1960. The degree to which the Japanese Government would cooperate with the United States to maintain sea lines of communication (SLOC) in the event of such a quarantine would be influenced by a number of policy and constitutional issues and by domestic and international legal considerations, including:

- Japanese doctrine and practice of the law of the sea;
- official interpretations and the constitutional standing of Japan's commitment to defend SLOC to a distance of 1,000 nautical miles from Japan; and
- Japan's policies governing port calls and transit of territorial waters by warships carrying nuclear weapons, and combat operations conducted from US bases in Japan under the prior consent provisions of Article 6 of the Mutual Security Treaty.

2. **BACKGROUND**

In 1960 the Japanese Government stated that US forces in Japan might take military action as far south as the Philippines pursuant to their treaty obligations to defend Japan.2

The 1,000-nautical-mile defense limit was assumed in Maritime Self-Defense Force (MSDF) development planning as early as 1966.3 In June 1973 the Director General of the Japan Defense Agency (JDA) Defense Bureau again mentioned sealanes extending 1,000 nautical miles that might be set up for the protection of maritime transport.4 In 1979 Japan signed an international Search and Rescue Treaty committing the Maritime Safety Agency (MSA) to search-and-rescue operations within 1,000 nautical miles of Japanese shores.5 The Japanese Government has not defined SLOC in precise geographic terms, although several hypothetical zones have been proposed (see figures 1, 2, and 3).

In May 1981 Prime Minister Suzuki informed the National Press Club in Washington, D.C. that Japan would endeavor to defend its sealanes to a distance of 1,000 nautical miles. Since that statement, the fullest explanation of the Japanese Government's position on sealane defense was published in the 1983 JDA White Paper.6

All Japanese official and public discussion of sealane defense has taken place in the context of the defense of Japan under Article 5 of the Mutual Security Treaty, and there has been no reported discussion of sealane defense under Article 6.
Figure 1. Hypothetical Sealanes

Figure 2. Hypothetical Radar Coverage of Sealanes

Figure 3. Hypothetical Maritime Patrol Zone

3. JAPANESE DOCTRINE AND PRACTICE OF LAW OF THE SEA

a. Types of Blockades in International Law

Under traditional laws of war, a "blockade" is an act of war directed at hostile coasts and ports, and may not bar access to neutral territory or international straits giving access to neutral territory. Modern long-distance blockade, such as the British blockade of German ports in World War I, interdicts ocean traffic on sea routes up to 1,000 nautical miles from the blockaded ports. Blockades must be directed at all shipping. The term blockade as used by Japanese officials refers to belligerent or wartime blockade. For example, in Diet testimony in March 1981 a Cabinet official stated that Japan has the right, in self-defense only (that is, when under attack), to search neutral vessels transporting arms to the enemy and to capture them when they resist.

"Pacific blockade" is an act of force between states not at war, and is limited in its objectives and duration. International law recognizes pacific blockade as a collective sanction under Article 42 of the UN Charter. Examples of pacific blockade directed at military or civilian resupply include the Soviet land blockade of Berlin in 1949, the US quarantine of Cuba in 1962, the US mining of North Vietnamese harbors to prevent resupply in 1971, and the British blockade of the Falkland Islands after the Argentine invasion in 1982. Statements by Japanese officials do not address the topic of defense against a pacific blockade of US forces in Japan.

b. The Territorial Sea and Innocent Passage

Japan also supports the right of warships to innocent passage through territorial waters. However, in a 1980 incident, Japan unsuccessfully requested a damaged Soviet submarine to state whether it was carrying nuclear weapons before transiting Japan's territorial waters. Japan's request was based on its Three Nonnuclear Principles—nonmanufacture, nonuse, and nonintroduction of nuclear weapons—and not on rules of international law.

There is no public Japanese discussion of whether transit privileges would be denied Soviet ships participating in a pacific blockade against US military shipping to Japan.

c. Straits Surveillance and Interdiction

In accordance with accepted standards of international law and due to vital economic interests, Japan strongly defends navigational rights in international straits. Japan exempts the Tsushima Straits, the Tsugaru Strait, and the Soya Strait from its 12-mile territorial sea limit.

Under the US concept of division of roles (see below), since 1981 the United States has pressed Japan to be prepared to mine or otherwise interdict the Tsushima, Tsugaru, and Soya Straits to limit access by Soviet naval forces to the Western Pacific. Given Japanese practice of the law of the sea, such interdiction of these straits is highly unlikely in the absence of a state of war between the Soviet Union and Japan.
d. The Role of Naval Interests in Japan's Ocean Policy

The effects of various Japanese maritime interests on naval warfare readiness and policy require further study. Japanese short- and long-range fishing interests, mineral exploration interests, and dependence on ocean transport for all of its oil, (see figure 4) most of its raw materials, and substantial agricultural imports dictates that the Foreign Ministry, the Ministry of International Trade and Industry, the Fisheries Ministry, and other agencies will interact with JDA in shaping Japanese ocean and maritime defense policy. Examples include:

- Japanese Government statements concerning interdiction of the Tsushima Straits may interfere with diplomatic objectives being sought by the Foreign Ministry, such as Japan's territorial claim to Takeshima (Korean: Tokto) Island.17

- Negotiations with the Republic of Korea (ROK) Government on defense cooperation in the straits may be linked with other bilateral issues. For example, in 1981 ROK negotiators requested $6 billion in economic aid from Japan to help offset the costs of the ROK contribution to Japan's defense as a bulwark against communism.18

- Joint MSDF-US Navy exercises vital to antishubmarine warfare readiness may conflict with Japanese fishing interests. The Japanese Fishery Agency and Ministry of Foreign Affairs have on occasion successfully lobbied within the Japanese Government against the JDA to have MSDF exercises halted.19

- Japanese long-distance fishing and defense interests may protest against Soviet underwater survey operations, while Japanese survey interests may seek to maximize international survey rights principles.20

4. UNITED STATES–JAPAN MUTUAL SECURITY TREATY

a. Prior Consultation

The revised Treaty of Mutual Cooperation and Security signed by the United States and Japan in January 1960 was accompanied by an exchange of notes governing the use of US bases in Japan. In the notes, the United States agreed to consult with the Government of Japan before making major changes in the equipment or disposition of forces on the bases and before conducting any combat operations from the bases pursuant to preservation of the security of the "Far East" under Article 6 to the Treaty.21 Neither side has ever publicly invoked the prior consultation provision of the agreement.22

b. Combat Operations

Successive Japanese Governments since 1960 have adopted a broad interpretation of the prior consultation requirement for combat operations, under the fiction that US military units are not using Japan as a base for combat operations if they receive their orders after departing from Japan.
Petroleum Tanker Routes: Persian Gulf to Japan

Figure 4. Japan's Oil Supply Routes
According to Congressional testimony by US officials, the present system of prior consultation has functioned smoothly in peacetime conditions.23

c. Port Calls and Transit Privileges

The policy of the Japanese Government, which is theoretically identical to that of New Zealand since 1984, prohibits port calls and transit of Japanese territorial waters by ships carrying nuclear weapons.24 However, implementation of the policy to allow port calls and transit by US warships is based on convenient fictions—that the United States and Japan agree on the meaning of "introduction of nuclear weapons"25 and that the United States would identify its nuclear-armed ships in requesting prior consultation.

5. OFFICIAL INTERPRETATIONS OF THE SLOC DEFENSE COMMITMENT

a. Constitutional Interpretation and Law

Specific Japanese defense policies, such as the doctrine of exclusive defense, the Three Nonnuclear Principles, and the nondispatch of forces overseas, have grown out of official interpretation of the Constitution by successive Japanese governments since the beginnings of the SDF in 1950.26 Such interpretations themselves are not law, but they enjoy widespread consensual support in Japan and inhibit legislation that would conflict with the prevailing interpretations. For example, the Self-Defense Forces Law of 1949 does not provide for overseas dispatch of Japanese forces and would have to be amended by the Diet to do so. A legal change would also be required to enable the Ministry of Transportation to exercise control over civilian vessels or to restrict marine navigation or air traffic in a "state of emergency."27 There is no legal basis for designating navigational zones in a time of emergency.28 Such legal changes would be difficult to carry out since they either conflict with longstanding official interpretations of the Constitution or would occasion intense public debate.

A broader problem is that the Self-Defense Forces Law of 1949 does not authorize Japanese SDF personnel to use force, or even to return fire under attack, until a defense operations order has been issued. Such an order requires approval both of the Cabinet and the Diet. In 1981 the JDA recommended that the law be changed to permit the use of weapons in self-defense by the SDF while still in a preliminary state of readiness, or in a defense operation alert order phase. (A defense operations alert order requires only the approval of the Prime Minister.)29 As of 1 July 1985, no bill had been submitted to amend the SDF Law.

The Japanese Government states that the MSDL can be ordered to use force only to defend merchant ships that are bound for Japan and are under attack, or to assist in the defense of US warships protecting such merchant ships.30 Japanese officials consistently state that the MSDL may not use force to defend US warships in the absence of an attack upon Japan.

b. The Japanese Government and Its Domestic Critics

There is broad agreement between the Japanese Government and most of Japanese society, including the press and the political opposition, on the principle of exclusive defense that was initially stated in the Basic Policy
for National Defense in 1957. This principle limits activities of the SDF to the defense of Japan and prohibits the SDF from becoming involved in the defense of the territory or military forces of other countries. The term for such prohibited involvement, used by the Japanese Government and its critics alike, is "collective defense." Fear of such involvement was the source of Japanese press and political opposition to Prime Minister Suzuki's sealane defense statement in Washington in 1981.

The Japanese Government defended Prime Minister Suzuki's statement against domestic critics by reaffirming the principle of no collective defense, which both government and critics share:

The Director General of the Defense Agency [Joji Omura] said Japan could not make any agreement with another power on the scope of its defense area, as this would run counter to the Constitution prohibiting the nation's "collective" self-defense right. However, Japan could defend the waters in question if the act was purely for its own defense, he added.

In 1979 when the decision was made to have MSDF forces participate in the RIMPAC (Rim of the Pacific) Exercises with US Naval units, the JDA affirmed to the Diet that participation was intended to upgrade the defensive capabilities of the MSDF, and was "not for the defense of a specific country [that is, the United States] with the exercise of the so-called right to collective self-defense as a premise."

The Japanese Government, invoking the doctrine against collective defense, uses similar arguments in discussing the question of blockading the Tsushima, Tsugaru, or Soya Straits and declares that the straits may be blockaded only to defend Japan.

c. Differences Within the Japan Defense Agency

In the early 1970s there were pronounced differences of opinion on the role of the MSDF within the JDA. Officers and policy staff in the MSDF at the time favored a blue-water navy capable of defending Japan's maritime supply routes. Other Japanese defense planners, including civilian officials in the Defense Bureau of the JDA, argued that the MSDF should be small and deployed along Japan's coasts to repel invasion.

In the 1980s Japanese Government policy statements and procurement decisions lean slightly toward the view that the MSDF should have a sealane defense capability. However, there are presumably those within the JDA who continue to believe that such a role for the MSDF is "unrealistic, unauthorized, and impossible." Internal budgetary pressures from rival service arms doubtless also played a role inhibiting MSDF procurement during the period from 1981 to 1985. Neither view of the MSDF role contemplates use of the MSDF except in the direct defense of Japan.
d. US Government Views

Current US policy sees a rational division of labor among Japan, the United States, and NATO as initially set forth to Japanese leaders in March 1981 by Secretary of Defense Caspar W. Weinberger. In the US view, the United States will provide the forces necessary to defend the ROK and will also provide sealane protection forces in the Southwest Pacific and Indian Oceans. Japan will carry out the "limited, self-chosen, self-defense goal" of defending its own sealanes (including sea and air approaches to its territory) out to a distance of 1,000 nautical miles.

Some US policy expectations conflict with the present Japanese policy against any involvement of Japanese forces in the defense of other countries:

Economically, there is no doubt of American and Japanese superiority vis-a-vis the USSR, North Korea, and North Vietnam. Achieving the capability to carry out Japanese and United States defense roles would, in the Reagan Administration's judgment, maintain United States and Japanese mutual security for the most reasonable cost for both countries. If either country is deficient, the risks are greater for both because the missions are interdependent.40

This suggestion of interdependency does not describe Japanese policy. Most defense commentators in Japan, including those who favor a much stronger role for the SDF, do not believe that Japan and the United States presently have a collective security agreement, that is, one that obliges Japanese forces to be committed to defense goals of the United States.41

6. CONCLUSIONS

a. Prohibition of Armed Operations

Current Japanese law, constitutional interpretation, and policies do not allow armed SDF operational assistance to US forces in the event of a pacific blockade that threatens SLOC being used to reinforce or resupply US military bases in Japan. This situation is unlikely to change in the near future.

b. Constitutional Doctrine

The use of Japanese forces to defend the goals, troops, or territory of other countries is prohibited by 30 years of constitutional interpretation. This line of interpretation is supported by both the Japanese Government and its critics in the opposition parties and media. According to this interpretation, the SDF may defend the SLOC only if Japan is under direct attack, and even then it may not render aid to US warships except in joint operations for the defense of Japan.

Although the precise meaning of this doctrine may be marginally modified by government statements, it cannot be fundamentally changed except by constitutional amendment.
c. Ocean Policy and the Law of the Sea

Japan supports freedom of navigation in international straits and innocent passage of foreign warships through Japanese territorial waters, and is unlikely to interdict the Tsushima, Soya, or Tsugaru Straits in the absence of an attack on Japan. In a 1980 incident, Japan acted with diffidence toward Soviet warships passing through Japanese territorial waters, and in challenging them, did not make use of arguments based on principles of international law.

Japan's ocean policy and its practice and doctrine of the law of the sea are a compromise that is influenced by numerous Japanese economic, diplomatic, and military interests, and that is shaped by the interaction of several Cabinet ministries, as well as interservice rivalries among the branches of the SDF. Japanese policy in this area is not likely to change abruptly or radically in the foreseeable future.

d. Legal Restraints

Even if Japan's policy against collective defense were not an obstacle to providing armed assistance to US forces, there are legal restraints. By law, the SDF cannot use force or be called into action except through a decision by the Diet. The Japanese Government has studied changes in the SDF Law of 1949 and other laws, but no bills to amend relevant laws have been submitted to the Diet.

e. Prior Consultation

Since the reversion of Okinawa to Japanese control in 1972, cooperation between the United States and Japan under the Mutual Security Treaty has been satisfactory for peacetime operations. However, the implications of prior consultation requirements under Article 6 for a pacific blockade scenario or other regional military crisis remain untested. The Three Nonnuclear Principles of the Japanese Government—nonmanufacture, non-use, and nonintroduction of nuclear weapons—could, if strictly interpreted, result in a nuclear free zone extending throughout Japan's 12-mile territorial sea. The US treaty obligation to consult with the Japanese Government prior to "introducing" nuclear-armed vessels into Japanese waters or territory has never been strictly defined or implemented by the two sides.

Prior consultation required by the treaty for US combat operations based in Japan, if strictly enforced, could restrict or eliminate US land-based air sorties in support of US ships under pacific blockade.

The United States and Japan have both stated that prior consultation under the Mutual Security Treaty is a matter touching on Japanese sovereignty and is not to be the subject of joint defense cooperation studies.

Any explicit change in the Three Nonnuclear Principles to allow US port calls or transit of territorial waters by nuclear armed ships could precipitate a major political crisis in Japan.
f. Potential for Cooperation

Japan could, under present laws and constitutional interpretation and at its own discretion, provide surveillance assistance, intelligence sharing, and search-and-rescue support to the United States in a pacific blockade situation. Surveillance of naval traffic through the three straits has steadily increased from 1981 to 1985.42
NOTES

1 Pacific blockade is the peacetime interdiction of specific materials, usually war supplies. It may involve the threat or use of force. For other possible Soviet strategies for the Pacific Ocean, see Larry Nilsch, "South Korea in Broader Pacific Defense," Journal of Northeast Asian Studies, (Washington, D.C.), vol. 2, no. 1, March 1983, pp. 89-92.


3 See testimony by JDA officials in April 1984, in "Dai hyaku ikkai kokkai (tokubetsu kai) ni okeru boei rongi" [Discussions on Defense in Special Session of the 101st Diet], Boei Antenna [Defense Antenna] (Tokyo), May 1984, pp. 3-4.


21Asagumo Shim bun sha, Boei Handobukku, p. 225.


23Emmerson, Arms, Yen, & Power, p. 89.

24Asahi Evening News (Tokyo), 9 January 1984, in FBIS/Asia and Pacific, 11 January 1984, Annex, p. 3 (FOUO); Japan's Three Nonnuclear Principles—not using, not manufacturing, and not introducing nuclear weapons—were introduced in 1967 by Prime Minister Eisaku Sato; and Akaha, "Japan's Nonnuclear Policy," p. 852.

25Akaha, "Japan's Nonnuclear Policy," p. 872. Japanese governments since 1967 have interpreted "introduction" [mochikomu] to include port calls and
transit through territorial waters, while the United States has understood "introduction" to mean offloading of nuclear weapons onto Japanese territory.

26Asagumo Shimbunsha, Boei Handobukku, pp. 337-338.


28The designation of sea routes is discussed in Defense of Japan 1983, p. 77.


30"The Japanese Self-Defense Forces, needless to say, are not authorized to execute their force in repelling an attack against US vessels when an armed attack is not made against Japan." Defense of Japan 1983, p. 76.

31Defense of Japan 1984, p. 59; and Asagumo Shimbunsha, Boei Handobukku, pp. 359-362.


34Asagumo Shimbunsha, Boei Handobukku, pp. 379-380.


38Author's telephone interview with Dr. Ronald A. Morse, Secretary, Asia Program, Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars, 10 June 1985.

39There are some commentators on military strategy who argue for a change in constitutional interpretation to allow collective defense. See Yamazaki Takio, "The Maritime Self-Defense Forces' Greatest and Most Difficult Mission," p. 22.
