


**JTF STAFFS:**  
**PERMANENT OR TEMPORARY**  
**LEVEL OF COMMAND?**

A Monograph  
By  
Major James N. Hanley  
United States Air Force



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School of Advanced Military Studies  
United States Army Command and General Staff College  
Fort Leavenworth, Kansas

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
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
Approved by:

  
\_\_\_\_\_  
LTC Clarence Taylor, MMAS

Monograph Director

  
\_\_\_\_\_  
Col Danny M. Davis, MA, MMAS

Director, School of  
Advanced Military  
Studies

  
\_\_\_\_\_  
Philip J. Brookes, Ph. D.

Director, Graduate  
Degree Program

Accepted this 23rd Day of May 1996

## ABSTRACT

### JTF STAFFS: PERMANENT OR TEMPORARY LEVEL OF COMMAND? by MAJ James N. Hanley

This monograph seeks to determine an optimal solution for the designation and establishment of a Joint Task Force (JTF) headquarters for a contingency situation in an operations other than war (OOTW) environment. The principal aim of this study is to determine if further unification of service components below the regional Commander in Chief (CINC) is required. Specifically, should a standing JTF headquarters be provided to each regional CINC?

The study first examines the current and projected United States' military environment to assess any changes that occurred as a result of the Goldwaters-Nichols Department of Defense Reorganization Act of 1986 (GNA) and the reform in military education that followed. Also, the National Security and National Military Strategies are examined to determine the military's requirement to support future contingency operations. The paper then examines the necessary requirements, capabilities, and characteristics for a permanent JTF staff to present a model of optimum efficiency for a staff organization in an evolving environment based on previous rapid deployment forces/JTFs established by the United States in the past thirty-five years. It next reviews recent examples of ad hoc JTFs in the OOTW environment to include Operations RESTORE HOPE, SUPPORT HOPE and UPHOLD DEMOCRACY, and examines the lessons learned from these operations. A comparison of the permanent JTF headquarters model with the ad hoc headquarters examined are used to analyze the advantages and disadvantages of the two methods of forming a JTF staff for a contingency operation. Finally, the monograph makes recommendations as to the best method of providing the JTF staff for the next crisis.

The monograph concludes that the optimum solution for establishing a JTF headquarters for a contingency operation is to use an ad hoc staff based on existing Corps, Division, Marine Expeditionary Force, Navy Fleet, or Air Force, with augmentation by the CINC's staff and functional specialists. Through both joint education and training the U.S. military forces can take advantage of their unique capabilities to accomplish the goals established by the GNA and successfully execute their future missions.

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## **I. INTRODUCTION**

The armed forces of the United States have undergone numerous changes since the end of the Cold War and the withdrawal of forward deployed military forces from Europe. The world's military environment has been altered considerably. Today the United States has a new strategy that focuses on regional conflicts and relies on projecting military force from bases in the continental US (CONUS) to participate in overseas contingency operations and crises. This new global strategy has created a dilemma for the unified commanders in chief (CINCs) who are responsible for US military responses around the world.<sup>1</sup> The CINCs have had to rely on establishing ad hoc Joint Task Forces (JTF) to handle crises because of the lack of standing forces during the current downsizing of the US armed forces.

Because of its ad hoc nature, initial JTF staff work is consumed with organizing the force, determining its capabilities, and establishing standard operating procedures (SOPs). Studies done in the late 1980s and early 1990s determined that JTF headquarters exhibited evidence of operational dysfunction when first formed.<sup>2</sup> These studies suggested forming a permanent JTF headquarters and assigning them to the unified regional CINCs as a remedy. The need for a permanent JTF headquarters may no longer be required due to the positive effects of both the Goldwater-Nichols Department of Defense Reorganization Act of 1986 (GNA) and the Services' education reforms of recent years.<sup>3</sup> The military has changed since the studies mentioned previously were accomplished, and the GNA continues to transform the military today.

## Military Environment

Currently, the US's National Security Strategy (NSS) and National Military Strategy (NMS) focuses on regional conflicts. The NSS addresses the post Cold War era's dangers as global in nature. Because the United States has global interests, it must also be prepared for its world wide responsibilities. The principal danger, articulated by President Clinton in his NSS, that the military must address is regional instability throughout the world.<sup>4</sup> The success of Operation DESERT SHIELD/STORM (ODS/S) will discourage future adversaries from engaging in direct conflict with US conventional military forces. Therefore, unconventional strife will likely be the dominant form of conflict facing US forces in the future. This will increase the pressure on the United States to engage in operations other than war (OOTW), especially peacekeeping and humanitarian relief.<sup>5</sup> The Secretary of Defense's NMS has also changed its focus due to the NSS's emphasis on regional conflicts and the continuing downsizing of the military. In the Future Years Defense Program (FYDP) for 1995 to 1999, the Secretary of Defense provides detailed training guidance to the CINCs. Joint exercises and training received additional emphasis in the latest FYDP. The FYDP stresses interoperability, joint warfighting doctrine, and preparation for the joint task force commander (CJTF) and staffs for crises and contingency operations.<sup>6</sup> The regional CINCs were given the responsibility to plan for these tasks by the GNA.

The US armed forces currently emphasize joint military operations based on the expectation that future threats will more likely be encountered on a regional basis, and the requirement to respond to the conflicts with forces from the CONUS.<sup>7</sup> The military's

focus has shifted from countering a Soviet-led Warsaw Pact to dealing with contingencies in the Third World. There is no longer an easily identifiable enemy for the US military to focus on or plan for. The danger is now dispersed and requires wider and varying options to deter aggression and resolve regional conflicts.<sup>8</sup> The armed forces may focus on Korea and the Persian Gulf, but may be required to deploy elsewhere. For example, on any given day the European Command (EUCOM) staff monitors twelve or more situations in its theater. Most of these cases required some precautionary planning because no on-the-shelf contingency plans exist.<sup>9</sup>

The GNA made the CINC, and CJTF when activated, directly responsible to the President and the Secretary of Defense for the performance of the missions assigned by the National Command Authority (NCA). CINCs now have the authority to assign command functions to subordinate commanders and to select subordinate commanders. Both mission performance and command preparedness are now CINC responsibilities. Each CINC also has the responsibility for the employment and conduct of joint training for all of his assigned forces.<sup>10</sup> Table 1 shows how the CINC's functions changed as a result of the GNA. The GNA rearranged power among the institutions within the military. It increased the power and influence of the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff (CJCS) and the regional CINCs at the expense of the Service Chiefs. The GNA provided the impetus for reform within the military, particularly in terms of "jointness."

Significant improvements in military jointness, particularly in the areas of Joint Professional Military Education (JPME), training, and exercises came as a result of GNA and the military reform movement. Goals of GNA for JPME emphasized interservice

Table 1.  
CINCs Functions Before and After GNA<sup>11</sup>

CINCs Functions	Before GNA	After GNA
Responsibility	Only be Inferred	Stated explicitly and clearly
Accountability	Implied only	Explicit
Authority	Not mentioned	Explicit and strong
Capacity	Not mentioned	Spelled out in some specifics

cooperation, developing joint specialty officers (JSOs), and JTF commanders. The GNA made the CJCS responsible for all joint education and for establishing policies, programs, guidelines, and procedures for professional military education of the US Armed Forces.<sup>12</sup> To satisfy this requirement, the CJCS added the Military Education Directorate (J-7) to the Joint Staff and released CM-1618-93, "Military Education Policy Document." This document, and the J-7 Directorate, provided both the framework for JPME and the impetus to ensure that multiservice needs are considered when establishing requirements for doctrine, warfare simulation, and readiness tests for the CINCs and their forces.<sup>13</sup> The CJCS's mission of providing a solid joint education is accomplished by eight Service schools and three Joint schools.

These schools adopted the two-phase JPME program that was directed by Congress.<sup>14</sup> The two-phase joint education program was designed to enhance joint perspectives among all services. The intermediate service school (ISS) and senior service school (SSS) implemented all the recommendations made by the Panel on Military

Education of the House Armed Services Committee (also known as the Skelton Panel).<sup>15</sup> Appendix B lists the specific recommendations of the Skelton Panel and the status of implementation by the various services.

The JPME now taught at the service schools more than adequately instructs officers in multiservice matters and basic joint knowledge. Most ISS (Phase I) instruction is taught at the same level that is now required for JPME Phase II.<sup>16</sup> After graduating from these schools, today's officers have a more joint cultural outlook in stark contrast to the generation of officers that entered service before the GNA. Officers with a firm educational foundation in joint subjects are ready to hit the ground running as a JTF staff member or JSO.

Joint education is not limited to staff officers assigned to a JTF or JSOs. Commanders, and potential future JTF commanders, also receive instruction while attending the Capstone Course. The objective of the course is to make flag officers more effective in planning and employing US military forces in joint and combined operations. The course culminates with a one and one-half day crisis action decision exercise that exposes commanders to typical missions assigned to a CJTF. This course better enables the CJTF to make difficult, resource-constrained military decisions.<sup>17</sup> Classroom exercises alone, cannot replicate the lessons learned while working together on an actual JTF mission. That is why CINCs require joint training and exercises that link the JPME to practical team building and development of mutual trust and cohesion.

Training and exercises have stressed "military jointness" because of GNA and the military reform movement. Joint training instills the different services with common

planning and procedural steps for both warfare and contingency operations. This enables the US armed forces to successfully develop effective teamwork that can think, plan, and communicate faster than the enemy can react. The key to success is well-trained leaders and staffs. General Shalikashvili, CJCS, declared joint training a top priority when he assumed office in 1994.<sup>18</sup>

Today, commanders and staffs receive joint training in battle staff operations, planning, command and control, and synchronization through computer-assisted exercises (CAXs).<sup>19</sup> These computer simulation exercises have been conducted by each service and have enhanced joint training at all levels of command. CAXs used by Army and Marine Corps commanders for battle staff training received much of the credit for the success in command and control during ODS/S.<sup>20</sup> The reliance on simulations for joint staff training was a major recommendation made by the 1994 Readiness Task Force established by Secretary of Defense Les Aspin.<sup>21</sup> For example, the Army estimates it will spend over one billion dollars on simulations over the next few years for its battle staff training program.<sup>22</sup> General Shalikashvili supports the greater reliance on simulators in joint staff training due to budget cuts and the impracticality of conducting large scale exercises. These types of training and exercises present potential JTF commanders and staffs with the issues they will likely face during the next contingency operation in an OOTW environment.<sup>23</sup>

The military environment has changed tremendously in the first decade following the GNA and the military reform movement that followed. Changes include: the nature of the threat, the focus of the NSS and NMS, the emphasis on joint military operations,

the roles of the CINCs and CJCS in joint readiness, and improvements in JPME, training and exercises. These modifications have created the "joint-minded" commanders and staffs envisioned by Congress when it passed the legislation a decade ago. With this understanding of the current military environment, we can determine how best to form a JTF headquarters for contingency operations in the OOTW environment.

To do this, we must first define a JTF using current joint doctrine, and briefly examine the history of the US's rapid deployment forces and their assigned missions. Second, an analysis of a permanent joint headquarters will present the ideal organization needed when establishing a JTF staff. Next, a review of recent examples of ad hoc JTFs in an OOTW environment, how they are formed, their capabilities and characteristics, and the lessons they learned while handling crises. A comparison of the permanent and ad hoc JTF headquarters in an OOTW environment will permit an analysis of the advantages and disadvantages of these methods in establishing JTF headquarters. Finally, recommendations to address the best method of forming a JTF headquarters staff for contingency operations will follow. The ultimate goal of this paper is to answer the following question: Is an additional permanent level of unification required below the regional CINC for command and control during contingency operations?

## **II. JTF MODEL**

Joint doctrine describes several command options available to the NCA when designating a military force to handle a crisis. These include a: subordinate unified command force, joint task force, single-Service forces, functional component force, and Special Operations Forces.<sup>24</sup> However, the JTF has been the force of choice for several

recent forward projection, rapid deployment, contingency operations ranging from ODS/S to operations in Somalia, Rwanda, and Haiti. Attaining effective integration without diminishing the tactical freedom of action of the commander, or disrupting the cohesive bonds between the forces is the joint operations goal. The preferred method is to form JTFs only when required, and for only as long as needed for a specific mission. The United States has used a JTF for several short-term, quick-reaction contingency responses. For example, between 1990 and 1993 the United States committed JTFs to over two dozen crises throughout the world.<sup>25</sup>

Before proposing what the perfect model of a JTF staff should look like, it is necessary to first establish the definition of a JTF. Next, a review of previous JTFs/rapid deployment forces (RDFs) will explain how and why the United States chose to establish permanent JTFs in the past. Lastly, a model JTF staff is presented. A description of the the capabilities, characteristics, personnel requirements, and the size required for a permanent JTF staff, based on the possible missions of the task force will be included in the discussion.

#### JTF Defined

Joint Doctrine lists just four requirements for a JTF. First, it is mission oriented, activated for a particular crisis and then disbanded after the situation is resolved. Second, only the NCA, a CINC, or another CJTF can establish a JTF. The establishing authority has several additional responsibilities. It exercises Operation Command (OPCON) or Combatant Command (COCOM) over the JTF. The establishing authority assigns missions and objectives to the JTF and defines its area of responsibility (AOR).

Lastly, it ensures the JTF commander receives administrative and logistic support.

The third doctrinal requirement for a JTF is that it must contain two or more services. A component from Special Operations Command may also be allocated to the JTF. The last requirement for a JTF is that the CJTF has OPCON of all assigned and attached forces in the JTF. To establish effective OPCON over his forces the CJTF normally must augment his own staff with representatives from the other component forces.<sup>26</sup> After identifying the doctrinal requirements of a JTF, we will now consider what types of missions a permanent JTF can receive. To do this, we will examine several recent rapid deployment forces/JTFs.

#### US History of JTFs/RDFs

An examination of how the US's rapid deployment forces have evolved over the past thirty-five years will help establish the advantages of maintaining a permanent JTF. Table 2 depicts the current RDF and its three predecessors with their assigned missions. Shortly after his inauguration in 1963, President Kennedy instructed the JCS to develop a new command in the United States that would include the combat ready forces of only the Army and the Air Force. This new command was called Strike Command (STRICOM) and it was tasked to execute worldwide contingency missions and provide a strategic reserve force for the United States. However, the headquarters only controlled forces for scheduled exercises and not during actual operations. In 1970, STRICOM's AOR was narrowed to the Middle East, Africa south of the Sahara Desert, and Southern Asia (MEAFSA). STRICOM's staff was expanded to include Navy and Marine Corps personnel augmentees because of its new mission.<sup>27</sup> STRICOM was the first

Table 2  
US's Rapid Deployment Forces<sup>28</sup>

Organization	Year	AOR	Mission
STRICOM	1963	Global	Execute contingency missions and provide a strategic reserve of combat forces
STRICOM	1970	Global with focus on MEAFSA	Movement coordination of all Air Force and Army units to Southeast Asia
REDCOM	1975	None	Joint training of assigned forces, reinforcement of overseas commands
CENTCOM	1980	Southwest Asia	Be prepared to deploy and employ designated forces in response to contingencies threatening vital US's interests
ACOM	1993	None (1)	Train and deploy CONUS-based forces as a joint team

(1) ACOM does have responsibility for the Atlantic Ocean and the Pacific Ocean west of Central and South America and CONUS specifically as a CINC requirement.

organization to have responsibility for a permanent rapid deployment force/JTF. Initially its mission was global in scope, but eventually it focused on only one region--MEAFSA.

With the end of the Vietnam War in 1975, STRICOM lost its MEAFSA responsibility and was renamed Readiness Command (REDCOM). REDCOM had no geographic AOR. It had only a functional responsibility for training and providing Army and Air Force units to the unified commanders. The command also lost the Navy and Marine Corps personnel assigned to the STRICOM staff five years earlier. Eventually, REDCOM's responsibilities were expanded to include the requirement to plan and deploy a JTF/RDJTF to contingency operations not assigned to regional CINCs.<sup>29</sup> With its basic mission changed, REDCOM was redesignated as Central Command (CENTCOM) in

1980.

CENTCOM received responsibility for the RDJTF mission because President Carter wanted to demonstrate to Saudi Arabia, among others, that the United States was determined to maintain a strong presence in the Middle East. The RDJTF provided the "military teeth" to back up the Carter Doctrine. The President wanted a light, mobile, flexible US military force that could deploy to the Middle East or the Persian Gulf and conduct operations without relying on permanent operating bases in the AOR.<sup>30</sup> Now that CENTCOM had a regional responsibility, it received a complement of Navy and Marine Corps personnel for its headquarters staff. The Army and Air Force designated specific units to deploy to the CENTCOM AOR. The Navy and Marine Corps did not because these services had forces constantly afloat and moving between the various CINCs' AORs.<sup>31</sup> The CENTCOM staff was the only truly permanent organization in the command. The United States now had a joint staff with a clear chain of command that could plan together and develop SOPs, "military jointness," and bonds of trust and respect among its members. However, this advantage did not extend to component commanders and forces they would control because they would only be assigned during a contingency operation. CENTCOM's RDF/JTF mission was transferred to Atlantic Command (ACOM) after ODS/S was concluded.

ACOM is the current organization responsible for training most of the CONUS-based forces allocated to the regional CINCs. This command transitioned from a predominately naval headquarters to a balanced force containing all the services. While ACOM still has responsibility for an AOR, its principal purpose is to conduct joint

training and readiness for CONUS-based forces. ACOM must accomplish four basic tasks to fulfill this responsibility.

First, ACOM must support and advance US interests and policies throughout its AOR. Second, it must provide combat-ready, military forces to the regional CINCs. Third, ACOM must conduct military training operations as directed by the NCA. Finally ACOM's most important task is to conduct joint training for CONUS based units.<sup>32</sup>

Joint training is the key to developing the JTF staffs that ACOM is tasked to provide to the regional CINCs. ACOM conducts joint exercises contingency operations to include: peacekeeping, peace enforcement, counterdrug, disaster relief, and humanitarian assistance operations. ACOM set up a JTF staff training program that began training in January 1996. It emphasizes synchronization of forces, the development of checklists and putting military theory into practice by using actual mission scenarios to train the staffs. By 1997, ACOM will have conducted five JTF training exercises for potential JTF commanders and their staffs. Commanders participating in upcoming ACOM exercises include: the XVIII Airborne Corps commander, III Corps commander, 8th Air Force commander, II Marine Expeditionary Force (MEF) commander, and 2d Fleet commander.<sup>33</sup> Appendix C details the specifics of ACOM's JTF training program.

The United States has established permanent JTF/RDFs in the past based to serve the vital interests of the nation. When those interests changed, so did the composition and responsibility of the JTF. Today, ACOM has the responsibility for joint training of the military forces that the United States will use to project its presence throughout the

world. They must be prepared for a variety of missions since it is uncertain where and how these forces will be deployed in the future. The size and composition of a permanent JTF must correspond to this global mission. Based on this understanding we can now examine the ideal model of a permanent JTF staff headquarters.

#### Model JTF Staff

Military staffs provide a collective intellect that assists and advises the commander in the accomplishment of his/her missions. The staff must operate efficiently for this to occur. Military efficiency requires readiness, cohesion, effectiveness, and credibility.<sup>34</sup> The staff's characteristics, personnel requirements, and size must blend for the JTF staff to accomplish its mission. These areas will be examined next, using joint doctrine as a guide to design the model staff.

Joint Pub 0-2, Unified Action Armed Forces (UNAAF), delineates the five characteristics necessary for a joint staff to operate efficiently. A permanent JTF staff should include all of them. The first characteristic, unity of effort, is achieved through the command, control, communication, computers, and intelligence (C4I) system. The nature of modern warfare puts a premium on interservice cooperation to accomplish the mission.<sup>35</sup> Ardant du Picq stated in his book, Battle Studies, that:

A wise organization insures that the personnel of combat groups changes as little as possible, so that comrades in peacetime maneuvers shall be comrades in war. . . . From cooperation among men who quickly understand each other in the execution of warlike movements, may be bred brotherhood, professional knowledge, sentiment, **above all unity**.<sup>36</sup> (Emphasis mine.)

The United States emphasizes getting into the enemy's decision cycle. This means our

planning-processes and C4I must be swifter and more agile than his. A permanent JTF staff organization would satisfy the requirements for a "wise organization." Therefore, a permanent JTF staff will operate with the most efficient unity of effort from the initiation of an operation to its conclusion.

The second and third characteristics, centralized direction and decentralized execution, are tied closely together. Centralized control is normally achieved by communication of the CJTF's intent to all the subordinate commanders. A clear chain of command accomplishes this purpose. The commander cannot effectively use military forces if the force is not prepared and organized to follow a clear chain of command prior to the commencement of an operation. A permanent JTF staff, with a clearly defined organization, facilitates communicating the commander's intent and tasks to subordinate commanders for their decentralized execution. This is necessary because no single commander can effectively control and coordinate the large number of units required to conduct contingency operations in the OOTW environment.

Interoperability is the fourth staff characteristic identified in Joint Pub 0-2. The requirement to communicate and pass critical data between the service components in the JTF is critical and is often found lacking in an ad hoc organization. A Joint Staff team report in 1992 reported that interoperability was more a matter of chance than deliberate planning.<sup>37</sup> A permanent JTF staff provides a purposeful and deliberate method to directly exchange critical information and thus achieve interoperability in the task force.

The last staff characteristic necessary for joint command organizations is a

common doctrine shared between the staff. Standard operating procedures and a common joint doctrine, provide for mutual understanding and confidence in the JTF staff. This allows for timely and effective action to take place. The degree that the CJTF and staff communicate, impacts on the time required to plan and share the information with the various task force components.<sup>38</sup> Therefore, a common language, doctrine, SOPs, tactics, techniques, and procedures are essential in order for the JTF staff to operate effectively. The staff characteristics listed in joint doctrine are necessary to establish an efficient and effective joint staff and are most likely to be found in a permanent staff. We have looked at the first area --staff characteristics. We will now examine the JTF staff's personnel requirements.

The personnel assigned to a JTF staff should meet the following three prerequisites. First, they must be experts in their own fields of service. This allows them to speak with confidence about their individual services strengths and weaknesses. Second, the staff members must be aware of other services capabilities and limitations and the general operating procedures of each service component. By routinely operating with other staff service members, the JTF staff establishes common procedures, mutual credibility, and bonds of partnership. Staff members should focus on standardization and improving interoperability with the other service members in order to create an efficient organization.<sup>39</sup> The last JTF staff personnel requirement is the need to develop familiar relationships, both formal and informal communications links. This allows the staff to work more efficiently and quickly from the beginning of the mission. Knowledge of the personalities, as well as the strengths and weaknesses of the others, will allow the staff to

coordinate in the most effective manner. These personnel requirements combine to form a joint team that is familiar with each service's capabilities and limitations. With these personnel requirements fulfilled, the permanent JTF staff can develop into a homogeneous staff well versed in joint operations.

The size and composition of the permanent JTF staff are the last areas to be discussed. A JTF staff must be able to process all the information received by the CJTF. Joint doctrine lists the following positions as necessary for a joint staff: chief of staff; a personal staff group of the commander to include aides, political advisor, and public affairs personnel; a joint force staff division consisting of J-directorates; and liaison officers, used to facilitate communications from higher to lower levels in the command and to lateral components in the JTF.<sup>40</sup> The collective staff assists the commander to direct, control, coordinate operations, develop courses of action, and plan for the employment of military forces. JTFs also require liaison officers to the agencies and other organizations supporting the JTF. These include, but are not limited to: US government agencies, non-governmental agencies, and private agencies. Joint doctrine suggests numerous groups and agencies that the JTF staff should include as part of its organization when working in the OOTW environment.<sup>41</sup> Previous task forces have emphasized the need for qualified liaison officers because they have contributed significantly to mission success and aid in lubricating the joint team.<sup>42</sup>

The JTF staff must be capable of covering all the anticipated operations for the CINC in his AOR. Augmentees of some type will be necessary to add capabilities in both technical and specialized areas. The headquarter's size depends in a large degree on

the purpose of the JTF's mission and its expected duration. The permanent JTF staff must also contain, in key positions of responsibility, the appropriate members from each service or functional component, reflecting the composition of the force and the nature of its mission. Once personnel are assigned, the CJTF can task organize the staff and assign responsibilities as he deems necessary to ensure unity of effort and mission accomplishment.<sup>43</sup>

Previous joint exercises and operations after action reports have identified two successful JTF organizations, one for sea-based and one for land-based operations. The mission purpose differentiates between the two. Appendix D depicts these two organizations. As shown, even the perfect model of a permanent JTF staff must be flexible enough to operate in different environments as it is unlikely that it will deploy as an entire unit.

A permanent JTF staff reduces the fog and friction in the joint commander's headquarters during the initial stages of a crisis. A permanent JTF staff reacts quicker and makes decisions faster because it is a well-practiced team. It can accomplish the mission more efficiently and effectively because it encompasses all the desired characteristics and requirements of a joint headquarters. The United States has had, for the last thirty-five years, a permanent RDF/JTF to provide "military teeth" to the NSS. Its purpose was to interdict when US vital interests were at stake. The most efficient method of accomplishing this mission was with a permanent JTF. We will now examine the current methods that the US employs for forming ad hoc JTF's to handle contingency operations and crises.

### III. Current Practices

An examination of three recent operations will provide insight into how JTFs were formed and how well they accomplished their missions. Although a comprehensive review of joint task forces is preferred, an exhaustive review is beyond the scope of this monograph. This paper will examine JTF staff requirements and various training methods employed by the CINCs to prepare their forces for contingency operations. Because a JTF is the preferred command option of crisis response, we will examine how ad hoc JTFs accomplished their missions during Operations RESTORE HOPE, SUPPORT HOPE, and UPHOLD DEMOCRACY. Also we will review how several CINCs establish a JTF in their theaters. To evaluate the effectiveness of ad hoc JTF staffs, we will examine how effective they were in accomplishing their missions. This will be accomplished by reviewing the crisis environment, the time available to each JTF, and any lessons learned from the set up and operation of the JTF staff organization. By examining the regional CINCs' methods of establishing and training JTF commanders and staffs, we can determine if the CINCs provided adequate structure and organization for the operation of an ad hoc JTF.

#### Operation RESTORE HOPE

Operation RESTORE HOPE was conducted under UN authority in Somalia between 3 December 1992 and 4 May 1993. It was a multinational humanitarian assistance operation involving more than 38,000 troops, thirty nations, and over forty-nine non-governmental organizations.<sup>44</sup> According to the International Community of the Red Cross, Somalia was the largest relief operation since the end of World War II.<sup>45</sup>

The United States delivered over 20,000 tons of food per month during the six-month relief operation to Somalia.<sup>46</sup>

CINCCENTCOM directed I MEF to form the core of the JTF on 20 November 1992. I MEF began planning for the relief support mission and on 1 December 1992, the CINC activated the JTF. Its mission was to provide military assistance in support of emergency humanitarian relief by establishing a secure environment for relief agencies in Kenya and Somalia.

I MEF formed the nucleus of a 617-person JTF headquarters staff with 289 augmentees from other services. Originally, I MEF considered using only a 180-member organization structure to form the JTF staff. I MEF planners based this notional JTF staff on CINCCENTCOM's Plan 1200-90, the CINC's standing plan for peacetime emergency humanitarian assistance. The MEF used a table of organization developed during recent experiences and command post exercises (CPXs) to form the JTF staff. I MEF also used the unit's SOP handbook to organize the JTF staff sections.<sup>47</sup> Table 3 reflects the size and composition of the JTF headquarters on 21 December 1992.

The limited time available between alert and execution, (nine days) and the lack of a deliberate plan forced the JTF staff to simultaneously plan and execute the operation. There was no time phased force data development list (TPFDDL) for this mission because it was an unforeseen contingency operation. I MEF planners developed and revised the flow plan as the forces deployed into theater. The JTF staff did not have enough information to anticipate which forces would arrive next, and there was little time to properly plan and design the force necessary for the operation.<sup>48</sup> What

Table 3

Operation RESTORE HOPE JTF Headquarters Personnel<sup>149</sup>

Section	Planned # of personnel	% USMC	% USA	% USAF	% USN	% SOF	% Other (1)	Actual personnel On-hand
Command	28	79	10	5	3	0	3	28
Joint Information Bureau	59	29	32	25	14	0	0	31
Comptroller	3	66	33	0	0	0	0	3
Joint Visitor Bureau	37	65	19	8	8	0	0	33
HQ and Service Company	157	100	0	0	0	0	0	127
J-1	56	53	22	9	9	0	6	42
J-2	204	47	29	8	7	0	9	125
J-3	122	48	16	6	16	9	5	90
J-4	126	27	32	17	21	0	3	99
J-5	17	68	11	16	5	0	0	1
J-6	42	50	17	12	5	0	16	38
Total	851	57	19	9	9	1	5	617

Note: (1) Includes civilians, JSCE, DIA, and NSA personnel.

began as a deliberate planning process on 25 November 1992, quickly turned into a crisis action process (CAP) when the commander received the mission execute order on 1 December 1992. An off-the-shelf plan was not available for the JTF planners for this operation. As a result, the Marines went ashore without a comprehensive plan on 9 December 1992 in Mogadishu, Somalia. Appendix E describes the time line that the JTF staff worked under during its initial development and deployment into the AOR.

The JTF discovered numerous lessons concerning the organization and use of an ad hoc headquarters staff. Only three will be discussed here. First, the command structure of the JTF was seen as the key to the operation. It balanced the requirement of continuity with the integration of the additional capabilities of the specialists brought in to augment the staff. Contingency operations in the OOTW environment place a premium on certain specialists. These specialists also require JTF staff training to more effectively integrate into the JTF's headquarters and develop familiarity, cohesion and unity of effort among the staff.<sup>50</sup> It is important to identify and bring the specialists into the AOR early in the flow of forces during a contingency operation. Ideally, an advance team should enter the AOR with enough time for the commander to determine the size, structure, and composition of the staff and operational forces needed for the operation. This advance team can then form the nucleus of the forward JTF headquarters. However, time is usually the major limitation for a JTF during a contingency operation and sending in an advance team may not always be possible.

Second, the JTF identified a need for the joint community to develop a concept on how best to form, train, and deploy a JTF staff. The ideal JTF staff has fully qualified personnel with joint experience who have trained together and developed SOPs and habitual relationships before the mission. This staff lacked the benefit of this habitual relationship and experience. The JTF staff was composed mainly of Marine personnel with little training in joint operations. The Marines were not familiar with the capabilities of the other services and were reluctant to accept the advice of the other service members. Also, the pace of the operation prevented it from becoming a true joint

operation because most military objectives were achieved before the Army's main body arrived in the AOR.<sup>51</sup> To alleviate this problem, ACOM began providing JTF training to the CONUS-based forces, along with the courses conducted during JPME Phase I and II.

The third lesson learned concerning the ad hoc JTF staff is in the area of augmentation of the staff. I MEF required significant augmentation to become a JTF headquarters. Augmentation took the form of liaison officers and other specialists from the other four Services participating in this operation. The liaison officers provide coordination between the service components and other agencies, departments and organizations the JTF supported during the operation. Service specialists brought their technical expertise to the JTF staff and represented the subordinate component commanders points of view.<sup>52</sup>

These lessons learned demonstrate that the joint training envisioned by the GNA had not taken hold by 1992. Training for commanders and their staffs in joint tactics, techniques, and procedures had not yet been developed in time for Somalia. Finally, this mission proceeded directly to the crisis action procedures despite preliminary deliberate planning by the CINC's staff. The timeline was accelerated because of the deteriorating situation in the AOR. JTF commanders and staffs will not have enough time to receive joint training and establish working relationships with their service counterparts prior to the next operation.

#### Operation SUPPORT HOPE

The crisis in Rwanda was the inevitable result of 50 years of misrule, repression, and violence. On 6 April 1994, a transport plane carrying President Habyarimana of

Rwanda and President Ntaryamira of Burundi was shot down. Government and militia forces, blaming the Tutsi and moderate Hutus castes for this attack, killed tens of thousands in a rampage that lasted four months.

The United Nations and United States responded to alleviate the humanitarian crisis. The United Nations deployed 2,500 peacekeepers to Rwanda to stop the most recent genocide. The UN mandate limited the forces during the mission because it did not authorize the use force, except in self-defense.<sup>53</sup> Over a million Hutus fled to Tanzania and Zaire after the Tutsi led Rwanda Patriotic Front declared victory and established a new government. Deaths by cholera, dysentery, killings, and exhaustion were prevalent in the refugee camps there. It was this humanitarian crisis that led to the US response.

Shortly after the deaths were reported in the refugee camps, US Secretary of Defense Perry said US forces would deploy to Rwanda to deliver emergency humanitarian assistance. The forces, deployed from EUCOM, would leave the AOR after the flow of aid was established. The JTF task was limited to providing humanitarian assistance. The limited US mission to Rwanda was a result of American public opinion and its disinterest in intervening to stop Rwandan ethnic violence. Nation-building or peacekeeping operations were not to be conducted in the AOR.

In the CINC's words, JTF Support Hope was a humanitarian assistance mission to "stop the dying." According to the Secretary of the Air Force over 15,000 tons of relief supplies were flown to the Rwandan AOR via the strategic airlift bridge between 22 July 1994 and 29 September 1994.<sup>54</sup> The JTF was not part of the UN forces in Rwanda, as it

had been in Somalia. The JTF could not take sides in the internal conflict. Nor could it cooperate overtly with UNAMIR, the UN military command with a peacekeeping mission. US aircraft did, however, transport personnel for the United Nations.

This humanitarian crisis forced the United States to rush forces to the theater with little time for organizing or coordinating with other agencies. The JTF for Operation SUPPORT HOPE was organized on very short notice, in some cases literally as the elements were deploying. The EUCOM CINC received the Alert Order to deploy an advance team on 19 July 1994. The CINC activated the JTF on 22 July, and the first forces began to deploy on 23 July. This would be the norm for the rest of the operation. Planning and execution occurred nearly simultaneously. The CJTF wanted a minimum force in the AOR in order to make it easier to redeploy to Europe. Therefore, at no time did the JTF exceed 3,000 troops in the theater.<sup>55</sup> This would cause some problems which will be discussed in the lessons learned for this operation. Appendix E details the time line for the JTF staff during the initial phase of this operation. Without a firm joint doctrinal basis, the operation would have been almost impossible to plan and execute according to the after action report.<sup>56</sup>

The JTF headquarters structure generally followed standard lines. There were no service components designated below the JTF level. Therefore, subordinate commanders reported directly to the CJTF. This created a burden on the JTF staff because of its small size. Once a unit performing a particular function was no longer required in an area, it left the AOR along with its corresponding staff members. Because of this downsizing, the structure of the headquarters and subordinate commands changed

frequently adding more turmoil to the operation.<sup>57</sup>

Due to the urgent humanitarian assistance requirement, there was no time for formal staff estimates or detailed courses of action. The primary function of this JTF staff was to respond to the commander's taskings due to the limited time available for analysis and planning. This compressed time line also affected the ability to build bridges and liaisons with the UN and non-governmental organizations in the theater. There were already over seventy relief groups in the theater before the JTF arrived. A critical aspect of the mission was protecting these relief groups, but not all agencies were willing to cooperate with the JTF, even though the JTF was responsible for their safety.

The after action report (AAR) cited numerous lessons relating to the organization and use of the ad hoc headquarters staff. Three principal areas were identified. The first area concerns the size of the JTF headquarters staff. Most of the JTF staff remained in Europe and did not deploy to the AOR because the CJTF wanted to make it easier to redeploy to Europe. The AAR stated that additional staff should have deployed from Europe to the AOR.<sup>58</sup> This runs counter to the lessons learned in Operation RESTORE HOPE where 25 percent of the staff was found to be redundant and sent home early.

Second, the CJTF saw a need to include representatives from nonmilitary organizations in JPME and joint exercises in the future. These representatives should include non-DOD government agencies, the UN, and non-governmental and private organizations. The additional requirement for stepped up training and exercises in humanitarian operations for the CJTF and staffs with these agencies should adequately prepare joint forces for this type of contingency operation.<sup>59</sup> However, it is difficult to

define exactly which agencies should be included since each region and crisis is unique. Therefore, these agencies should be selected to support the particular training objective desired by each regional CINC.

Third, the AAR cited a critical need for a detailed and integrated plan, frequently exercised, for ad hoc JTFs in EUCCOM. At least one qualified person from each staff cell should always be available. These personnel need to understand both EUCCOM and Joint SOPs. By maintaining a pool of JTF-qualified personnel the CINC can respond to any contingency situation. JPME and frequent joint exercises will produce the necessary qualified personnel for this to occur.<sup>60</sup>

This operation demonstrated that the US military had developed the ability to rapidly respond to a humanitarian assistance crisis. Certainly, there was less time available to establish a plan and deploy forces for this operation as compared to Operation RESTORE HOPE. The JTF staff for Operation SUPPORT HOPE had only three days from the initial alert order until the JTF was activated and began deployment versus twelve days for Operation RESTORE HOPE. The firm joint doctrinal basis learned through JPME and joint exercises aided in the success of this operation. This operation demonstrated that by maintaining a pool of JTF-qualified personnel for contingency operations, an ad hoc organization can be a viable option in the downsizing military.

#### Operation UPHOLD DEMOCRACY

Operation UPHOLD DEMOCRACY was conducted under UN authority in Haiti between 19 September 1994 until 17 April 1996. As originally planned, the operation

was to be a forced entry operation to enforce UN resolutions, restore democracy, and reinstate the Haitian President, Jean Bertrand Aristide. On the evening of 18 September 1994, a delegation led by former President Carter arranged for the military junta to abdicate allowing for a permissive entry by US forces.

This operation transitioned, at the last minute, from a forced entry mission to a permissive entry operation when US forces entered Haiti on 19 September 1994. This last minute shift invalidated all of the planning assumptions the JTF staff developed for the operation. The initial aims of Operation UPHOLD DEMOCRACY now included: ensuring Haitian armed forces and police comply with the Carter-Cedras accords, protection of US citizens and interests, restoring civil order, and assisting in the transition to a democratic government in Haiti.<sup>61</sup>

Corps and Division headquarters became JTF nuclei for this operation. JTF-180 nucleus consisted of the XVIII Airborne Corps Headquarters. It was stationed on the carrier *USS America*, and had initially prepared for forced entry operations. The 10th Mountain Division formed the core staff of JTF-190. It was stationed on the carrier *USS Eisenhower*, and had prepared for permissive operations. The division staff had planned separately from the corps staff and was to activate as a stand alone JTF, and land after the 82d Airborne Division had secured an airhead.<sup>62</sup> Because of the last minute agreement between President Carter and General Cedras, JTF-190 ended up carrying out the permissive entry operation before JTF-180 (82d Airborne Division) executed its mission.

In contrast to Operations RESTORE HOPE and SUPPORT HOPE, there was

plenty of time to plan and prepare for this operation. However, the NCA did not include military planners until the last minute. JTF-180 staff was formed less than one week before D-day.<sup>63</sup> Similarly, the staff of JTF-190 had about eleven days to prepare for its operation.<sup>64</sup> This was hardly enough time for effective crisis action planning, and certainly not enough time for deliberate planning. Appendix E describes the time line in detail for this operation.

The AARs from the initial phase of the operation contained two observations regarding the JTF staff. First, the AAR noted the significant improvement in the amount of experience personnel had in joint operations. For example, the information systems command and the USAF personnel assigned to JTF-190 (10th Mountain Division) contributed significantly to the outstanding communications enjoyed in the operation.<sup>65</sup> The 10th Mountain Division had received adequate training and experience in previous joint exercises and operations such as Somalia. JTF-190 had a staff and commander well trained in joint operations and JTF-180 did not. The same could not be said of the XVIII Airborne Corps augmentees in JTF-180. As a result, JTF-180 had numerous members not adequately trained in joint staff procedures. These personnel had not received proper training in JTF procedures.<sup>66</sup> This was because many of the JTF augmentees were not the same personnel that had trained with the XVIII Corps during previous exercises. This operation clearly demonstrated that trained and experienced personnel can function effectively on an ad hoc JTF staff.

Second, the CJTF saw a need to incorporate into both Army manuals and Joint Doctrine the correct techniques and procedures for the use on the Navy's C4I platforms.

The CJTF was forced to use the Navy's equipment due to the limitations on the number of personnel and equipment that the JTF staff could bring aboard the carriers. In the future, ACOM should conduct its Phase III JTF training aboard Navy vessels to allow potential JTF commanders and staff familiarity with that service's equipment.<sup>67</sup> Joint training had a positive impact on the efficiency of the operation. However, there still is a need for increased JTF training for commanders and staff.

These three operations illustrate the improvements made in joint training for commanders and their staffs. All three operations shared characteristics common to contingency operations: that the JTF staffs had limited time to plan and prepare the forces; that a preponderance of the JTF staffs came from one service with augmentees from other services and government organizations--the specialists who were thrown together at the last minute; and the need for the United States to have a military force capable of responding to crises when necessary. The US military is improving its "jointness" in accordance with the intent of the GNA. Recognizing this requirement, each CINC has established some method of forming a JTF in his AOR. A more thorough discussion of the CINCs methodology follows.

#### CINC's JTF Methods

CINC's will rarely have a balanced force mix that he can prepare in advance for every sort of contingency operation. As a result, each CINC prepares his forces differently for these types of missions. CINCs achieve focus in their theater by applying structure and organization of their forces. Structure is a product of strategic objectives, forces allocated, and METT-T.<sup>68</sup> The four regional CINCs and their methods examined

include: EUCOM, PACOM, CENTCOM, and ACOM which was discussed in some detail earlier in this paper.

The first region examined is EUCOM. CINCEUCOM had studied and compared various methods of selecting and augmenting an existing JTF staff before selecting its current methodology. This CINC can draw from all five components to form JTF staffs in his theater. A EUCOM directive describes variations and stand-up procedures for establishing a JTF. Each of these component headquarters trains a nucleus of personnel to serve as a JTF core staff.<sup>69</sup>

The headquarters of each service component separately trains and exercises with their subordinate headquarters and collectively with the other services in forming and employing JTFs. This provides the habitual relationships and builds trust and confidence between the potential forces and staff members in the JTF. Most of the augmentees and specialists for the JTF staffs come from the CINC's staff. These personnel provide the additional experience and knowledge required in the ad hoc staff. Because of the amount of training and exercises accomplished in the past few years, one-third of EUCOM's staff has credible joint experience and is available for augmentation duty. The CINC relies heavily on CAX/CPXs to train CJTFs and their staffs. Benefits from this type of training include a more efficient use of training time, an increased emphasis on battle planning, joint staff procedures and command and control techniques. Because of the reduced military budget, the CINC plans to use even more computer assisted exercises in later years to maintain the benefits from this type of training.<sup>70</sup> The CINC's training and exercise program has created a pool of JTF-qualified personnel that he can draw from to

respond to any contingency situation in EUCOM's theater of operations.

The next region to be examined is PACOM. CINCPACOM has also designated each of the service component commanders and staffs to form the core for a JTF staff. Augmentees from the CINC's staff, a deployable JTF augmentation cell--(DJTFAC), provides a core of specialists designed to aid in the initial formation and deployment of the JTF. The DJTFAC augments the service staffs and assists in the initial headquarters operations. Once the CJTF and his staff establish themselves in the AOR, the DJTFAC reverts to the CINC's control. Joint training involving the service components and DJTFAC is conducted for a minimum of four hours per week to provide continuity and develop SOPs and trust between the units. The JCS evaluated PACOM's joint exercises and operations in 1995 and determined that the CINC had a well established JTF training program.<sup>71</sup> Similar to CINCEUCOM, CINCPACOM has designated his CJTFs in advance, provided them with many specialists from his own staff, and ensured sufficient training is conducted to keep these forces prepared for contingency operations. CINCPACOM provides adequate structure and organization for the establishing of JTFs in his theater.

CINCCENTCOM, with his headquarters in Tampa, Florida, has no permanent forces or headquarters in his theater. As a result, most of his forces receive their joint training via the ACOM JTF commander and staff training process discussed in Section I, "Military Environment." Like the previous two CINCs, CINCCENTCOM and CINCACOM rely on CAX/CPXs for joint training in much the same fashion as CINCEUCOM and CINCPACOM. They also provide significant number of augmentees

from their headquarters to the JTF staff.<sup>72</sup>

A review of three recent operations has revealed how previous ad hoc JTF staffs and commanders accomplished their missions within the limitations of a compressed time line and lack of a deliberate plan at the start of the operation. Over the years, joint training and exercises provided to the services component commanders by the CINC's have provided the necessary unity, command and control, and habitual relationships that allow JTFs to successfully accomplish contingency operations. The regional CINC's have developed methods of forming JTF staffs that best suits their theater. Each of the service component commanders and their staffs have already established semi-permanent JTF headquarters. CINC's have established solid training programs for their theaters, with ACOM designing a training program to fill the gaps in the JTF staff training experience. We will now compare and contrast a model JTF staff with the ad hoc type staffs discussed here to determine whether permanent JTF staffs should be established below the CINC to handle contingency operations.

#### **IV. Comparative Analysis**

Determining whether each CINC should establish a permanent JTF staff is the goal of this paper. The background behind this concept, a model JTF staff organization, and the current methods of establishing JTF staffs were covered in the preceding sections to identify past and present methods of forming a JTF. This section will now evaluate whether a permanent JTF staff or an ad hoc JTF staff will best accomplish the contingency operations for the future. The six principles of OOTW, as defined in FM 100-5--objective, unity of effort, legitimacy, perseverance, restraint, and security-- along

with the goals formed by the GNA-- streamlined joint command structure, chain of command given responsibility and held accountable for its actions, and a body of officers well qualified in joint operations--are the guidelines used to measure the permanent and ad hoc staff organizations. The two methods of forming a JTF headquarters are analyzed using these guidelines to compare and contrast their advantages and disadvantages to determine which should be the force of choice for future contingency operations.

#### Permanent JTF Staff

Permanent JTF staffs have two significant advantages over an ad hoc joint organization. First and foremost, a permanent JTF staff is an ordered and integrated organization. This type of organization allows the command to quickly identify the objective and develop plans that satisfy mission objectives at a faster pace than an ad hoc organization. The more demanding the task, the more order and integration an organization needs in order to solve it.

Staff relationships that exist only during times of crises have proven to be less effective than established ones. Ad hoc relationships, established during crises, increased friction and reduced team effectiveness.<sup>73</sup> Therefore, the staff needs to have tough, realistic, repetitive, and joint training well ahead of time to reduce that friction, allowing the staff to develop into an ordered and integrated organization. Joint training allows the permanent JTF staff to capitalize on its ability to quickly define the mission's objectives because staff procedures and formal and informal relationships have been developed beforehand. Ad hoc staffs require additional time to acquire the same relationships that were present during Operations RESTORE HOPE and by JTF-190 in

Operation UPHOLD DEMOCRACY. Without a permanent staff organization, the unit cannot train effectively and develop the ordered and integrated organization that enables the commander to effectively execute his mission.

The second inherent advantage the permanent JTF staff has is the unity of effort that is present in an operation in its initial phases. Unity of effort is defined as having all the forces operating under one commander and staff, in order to coordinate all the operations forces in the pursuit of the mission objectives. A single set of SOPs helps to obtain the unity of effort in the JTF staff. Unity of effort is especially critical when the very nature of contingency operations requires a responsive and unambiguous command and control structure from the initial planning of the operation to its termination.<sup>74</sup> A fixed staff structure and SOPs provide stability to the personnel in a rapidly changing operational environment. Training studies have shown that personnel assignment turbulence of 25 percent or more makes it virtually impossible for a unit to train to an effective level.<sup>75</sup> Therefore, an ad hoc staff, with new and unfamiliar members will have difficulty training to the level where it can operate effectively during a contingency operation. On the other hand, a permanent staff has the opportunity to train together as a team before an operation begins, thus taking advantage of an ordered and integrated organization, resulting in unity of effort.

There are some disadvantages associated with permanent JTF staffs. The two principal ones are discussed here. The first major problem is defining the size and composition of the staff. Although the permanent model discussed earlier will satisfy most operations, it cannot possibly represent the ideal organization for every crisis.

Contingency operations require tailoring of forces and augmentation of mission specialists to accomplish specific objectives. A single staff headquarters may not have all of the expertise required for an operation. Many of these resources lie outside the military, causing the commander to plan for and use an endless variety of forces and agencies in a crisis. Any adjustments and/or additions to the permanent staff cells may have an adverse impact on the unit's ability to execute because of disruptions. As a minimum, the formal and informal relationships of the permanent JTF staff may be impacted.<sup>76</sup>

The second major disadvantage of the permanent JTF staff relates to the goals of the GNA. Establishing a permanent staff below the CINC contradicts the intent of the GNA. Because the JTF would only be deployed during combat operations, paying for and training it during a long period of peace would be wasteful. Joint training comes at the cost of other service training. Service Chiefs and CINCs will be reluctant to choose between training and funding their component force's staffs and the permanent JTF staff. US military forces cannot be ready if they do not maintain a high level of activity and training.<sup>77</sup> The reduced military budget has forced CINCs to make these difficult choices. The CINCs' areas of operations are too large and diverse to justify expending personnel, equipment, funds and training on a permanent JTF headquarters against the backdrop of a downsizing military.

With a downsizing military, there are simply not enough personnel to assign a permanent JTF staff to every CINC. The declining budget has brought pressure to eliminate any unnecessary duplication. Eliminating duplicated staff levels was the very

purpose of the congressionally mandated "Commission on Roles and Missions in the Military (1993)." The Secretary of Defense stated in the 1995 Bottom Up Review that his goal was the elimination of excess infrastructure in the military.<sup>78</sup> Forming another staff layer below the CINC would just take even more personnel away from component staffs. Many of the talented and experienced personnel that deployed during previous crises have opted for early retirement.<sup>79</sup> The additional personnel necessary to man permanent JTF staffs are simply not available, even if the military was not downsizing. Not only would the creation of another staff violate the GNA's intent to streamline the command and control structure, but the manpower is simply not available for another level of joint staff below the CINC.

In summary, establishing a permanent JTF staff for each regional CINC would provide an ordered and integrated organization allowing for the unity of effort so critical in a contingency operation. Permanent JTF staffs, however violate the intent of the GNA because they do not streamline the joint command structure and they dilute the pool of available JSOs. An analysis of the ad hoc JTF staff will present its advantages and disadvantages for comparison with those of a permanent JTF staff.

#### Ad Hoc JTF Staff

As shown in the three operations we reviewed, the ad hoc staffs chosen by CINCs to plan and execute the contingency operations were not truly "ad hoc"--composed of various units and staff members thrown together at the last minute. The ad hoc JTF staffs used during these operations were based on an existing CINC's service component staff, with functional specialists and augmentees from the CINC's staff. These staffs

already have unity of effort, they have trained together with their augmentees, and they have developed formal and informal relationships on the staff.

These ad hoc JTF staffs have two significant advantages over a permanent JTF organization. First, an ad hoc JTF staff best satisfies the intent of the GNA to streamline the command and control structure of the military. The intent of the GNA was not to divide "joint" equally among the services, so that each had an equal share on a joint staff.<sup>80</sup> A JTF staff and force must be designed around its capabilities and not its degree of "jointness." A permanent JTF staff assumes that "jointness" or "purple" is the only solution for all contingency operations. This is not correct. The staff /force must be selected based on its efficiency and effectiveness to accomplish a specific mission. An ad hoc JTF staff /force is better suited to meet these requirements.

The second advantage of the ad hoc JTF staff is that it best accounts for personnel constraints in a downsizing military. It is not possible to clearly define and single-out the specific mission for the next JTF. Because it is not practicable to anticipate every crisis, the military should not organize ahead of time into preexisting adaptive joint force packages, or permanent JTFs. Therefore, the US military must rely on officers attuned to mission orders, highly trained in their specialized fields, and well qualified in joint tactics, techniques and procedures to execute contingency operations--JSOs.<sup>81</sup> These officers are serving on the service component staffs that will form the nucleus of any future ad hoc JTF staffs. Their improved skills and recognition of the different services capabilities and limitations, as taught during JPME and practiced during joint training and exercises, will enhance the joint teamwork on ad hoc JTF staffs. General

Shalikashvili, CJCS, stated that "... the unexpected has become the routine (and) we need people [JSOs and CJTFs] who are comfortable in an uncertain world."<sup>82</sup> The ad hoc JTF staffs currently used by CINCs allow for this, and should continue do so in the future.

Ad hoc JTF staffs do have one major disadvantage when compared to permanent JTF staffs. The time limitation--little advance warning before the crisis and the requirement to respond immediately, is a problem. Joint Doctrine considers timeliness as the most volatile risk concerning planning and execution of contingency operations.<sup>83</sup> This limitation affects the staff in developing unity of effort and defining the objectives of the mission. US politicians are often reluctant to authorize a military response due to a concern that a US military presence may worsen the crisis.<sup>84</sup> Therefore, commanders and their staffs are not notified and alerted for the mission until the last moment. The politicians desire an immediate response from the military, thus reducing the military's time to complete an in-depth mission analysis before deploying.

Even when the CJTF and his ad hoc staff are given advance notice of the operation, there is usually very little time to assemble the staff, develop a plan, establish SOPs, and deploy the force. Many of the augmentees and mission specialists are assigned from other theater component staffs and will require time to join the ad hoc JTF staff.<sup>85</sup> Even in EUCOM, where the CINC prefers to use ad hoc JTF staffs and has an excellent staff training program for these staffs, ad hoc JTF staffs suffer because valuable time is spent on orienting and organizing the staff and establishing SOPs.<sup>86</sup> Only through training and exercising crisis action procedures and practicing establishing ad hoc JTF

staff headquarters can the military hope to mitigate this key disadvantage.

In summary, ad hoc JTF staffs seem to be the best way to implement the GNA, but they can lack the responsiveness and initial unity of effort found in a fully deployed permanent JTF staff that participates in a contingency mission. As previously discussed, ad hoc JTF staffs have recently improved their capabilities during several JTF operations. As a result of joint education, training, and exercises, the ad hoc staff has proven to be a viable option for contingency missions in the downsizing military.

#### **V. Conclusions and Recommendations**

It is clear that a permanent JTF staff is preferable to an ad hoc staff. The draw down in military forces and GNA restrictions prohibit CINC's from forming another layer of command that may not be employed. This additional staff layer would compete for the same training resources that CINC's service component staffs require to establish their staff cohesion, unity of effort, and teamwork. All contingency operations are unique. JTFs must be tailored to meet the specific requirements of each contingency operation. Therefore, it is difficult to anticipate, plan and assign forces to a permanent JTF.

The military has changed into a more "joint" team as a result of the GNA and the military education reform that followed. General Shalikashvili has placed a greater emphasis on JPME, joint exercises, and training. The CINC's have complied with the CJCS's intent. They have implemented joint training and exercise programs for their assigned forces to prepare component commanders and their staffs to command and control future JTFs. These ad hoc JTF staffs successfully executed Operations

SUPPORT HOPE and UPHOLD DEMOCRACY. CINCs and component commanders have identified staff and augmentation personnel, trained them for joint operations, and exercised them as a JTF staff. Joint doctrine and interoperability are continuously stressed to prepare the component staffs for the next crisis. While the component staffs are not the ideal permanent JTF staff, they are more than "ad hoc." They provide a nucleus around which a JTF staff is built, similar to JTF-190 during Operation UPHOLD DEMOCRACY.

The theater component commanders and staffs are already permanently established units in the AOR with well-developed SOPs and command relationships. In practice we have taken these organizations and modified them to create JTFs for contingency missions, some better than others. While a lot has been done to prepare potential JTF staffs ahead of time, more joint education and training needs to be accomplished to smooth out the uneven parts. The challenge will be to continue the progress made by the GNA and the military education reforms during the downsizing military budget.

### **Recommendations**

There are four recommendations needed to meet this challenge. First, CINCs should maintain their practice of using component staffs to form the nucleus of a JTF staff. Their training programs and ACOM's complimentary programs will provide the cohesion that binds the staff and develops familiarity and SOPs. Joint training, both individual and collective, is the key to success for the next contingency operation.

Second, the US military should establish a Joint Advanced Warfare School, as

first suggested by Congressman Skelton. This school's curriculum would be similar to that of the School of Advanced Military Studies taught at Fort Leavenworth. Its purpose would be to develop officers with an expertise in the theory and practice of joint operations as part of their Phase II JPME training. The graduates of this course would then serve repetitive assignments as joint planners.<sup>87</sup> This additional education and training will provide the Armed Forces with sufficient numbers of well-qualified JSOs for future contingency operations.

Third, CINCs should use the mobile training teams provided by the Joint Warfighting Center (JWFC) and ACOM to provide preplanning and training support to their staffs and component staffs in the theater. These teams aid component staffs, augmentees and mission specialists from the CINC's staff, in developing JTF SOPs before their exercises and have proven to be very effective.<sup>88</sup>

Fourth, after a component commander and his staff complete the JTF training they should then be designated as the primary JTF staff for the next four months for any contingency force originating from the CONUS. The JTF staff training program will provide a ready source of trained CJTFs and staffs to the regional CINCs for future contingency operations.

As a result of the GNA and the military reform movement the US military has produced an environment that develops "joint-minded" officers into JSOs and potential JTF commanders for contingency operations in the OOTW environment. A dedicated JTF staff already exists in each of the regional CINCs service component staffs. Each component staff is fully capable of establishing an ad hoc JTF staff without the need to

spend funds and allocate resources to develop another level of unification below the regional CINC for better command and control during contingency operations.

## GLOSSARY

AAR	After Action Report
ACOM	Atlantic Command
ACSC	Air Command and Staff College
AOR	Area of Responsibility
CAX/CPX	Computer Assisted/Command Post Exercise
CGSC	Command and General Staff College
CENTCOM	Central Command
CINC	Commander in Chief
CJCS	Chairman Joint Chiefs of Staff
CJTF	Commander Joint Task Force
COCOM	Combatant Command
CONUS	Continental United States
CPX	Command Post Exercise
EUCOM	European Command
FYDP	Future Years Defense Program
GNA	Goldwater-Nichols Act of 1986
ISS	Intermediate Service School
JCS	Joint Chiefs of Staff
JMET	Joint Mission Essential Tasks
JOPEs	Joint Operation Planning and Execution System
JPME	Joint Professional Military Education
JSO	Joint Specialty Officer
JTF	Joint Task Force
JTTP	Joint Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures
JWFC	Joint Warfighting Center
MEF	Marine Expeditionary Force
MEAFSA	Middle East, Africa, Southern Asia
MEPD	Military Education Policy Document
NCA	National Command Authority
NMS	National Military Strategy
NSS	National Security Strategy
ODS/S	Operation Desert Shield/Storm
OOTW	Operations Other Than War
OPCON	Operational Control
PACOM	Pacific Command
RDJTF	Rapid Deployment Joint Task Force
REDCOM	Readiness Command
SOP	Standard Operating Procedures
SOUTHCOM	Southern Command
SSS	Senior Service School
STRICOM	Strike Command

## Appendix B

### Skelton Panel Recommendations and Service Implementations<sup>89</sup>

#### **Subject: Service/ Joint Expertise**

**Recommendation:** For joint education to be meaningful and productive, a prerequisite for officers is competence commensurate with rank in all elements of their own service in professional knowledge and understanding as well as demonstrated performance. Also an integral part of joint education is an officer's study of the other services.

#### **Implementation:**

##### Air Force:

ISS implemented. ACSC curriculum provides students with service competence commensurate with their rank. The school also covers five joint curriculum areas outlined in the Military Education Policy Document (MEPD) guidance, including joint forces, the operational level of war, organization and command relationships, and joint staff operations. In addition, warfighting area of instruction focuses on joint operations from an Air Force perspective. Joint courses include study of other service doctrine and operations.

SSS implemented. The Air War College provides officers with service competence as well as an understanding of other services.

##### Army:

ISS implemented. CGSC includes a study of Army elements as well as the study of operations of the other services in a joint environment.

SSS implemented. Officers attending here already have service expertise and have demonstrated operational competence. Officers concentrate on joint operations to include the study of the other services doctrines and operations.

##### Marine Corps:

ISS implemented. Joint instruction taught during the first part of the curriculum is viewed primarily from the joint perspective of each military department. In addition, a second part of the curriculum focuses primarily on Marine operations and the joint instruction contained in this portion is taught from a Marine Corps perspective.

##### Navy:<sup>1</sup>

ISS implemented. Officers sent to the college are well versed in all elements of their own service. In addition, officers become familiar with the roles, missions, and major organizations of the other services to include their capabilities and limitations.

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<sup>1</sup> The College of Naval Command and Staff, where both ISS and SSS are held, has a requirement to provide enough JPME to those Naval officers who can only attend one in-residence school due to a shortage of Naval officers. The curricula of the College overlaps extensively to accommodate the JPME needs of all attending officers.

**Subject: Teaching Service/Joint Systems**

**Recommendation:** The service ISS should teach both joint and service systems-- (organizations, processes, procedures, and staff skills)--to all students. This is necessary to meet the GNA requirement to revise the curricula of service schools to strengthen the focus of joint matters and prepare officers for joint duty assignments.

**Implementation:**

Air Force:

ISS implemented. Before academic year 1988-89, the school had a separate curriculum for officers selected to fill joint assignments. The Air Force has since revised its program to provide joint education to all students. Joint education represents about 47% of its curriculum, an increase from prior years.

Army:

ISS implemented. During the 1987-88 academic year the school had a separate elective program for officers nominated for JSO positions. This was in addition to a general knowledge based curriculum of joint subject matter taught within the core curriculum to all students. Since 1988-89, a joint curriculum designed to strengthen the focus on joint matters has been fully incorporated within the core curriculum to cover aspects of each service. The school encompasses the panel's as well as Military Education Policy Document (MEPD) guidance on joint matters, including joint operational warfare, joint systems, and joint operations planning.

Marine Corps:

ISS implemented. In teaching joint and service systems, the college relies in part on instructors and officers to share their experiences in both joint and service doctrine. The college believes to teach any part of the requirements in isolation or without integration could prevent the officer's exposure to the actual difficulties involved in joint operations that need to be planned for and overcome.

Navy:

ISS implemented. The education includes courses in organizations, processes, procedures, and staff skills. The college's ISS curriculum includes sessions that address both unified command planning and joint doctrine for the organization of forces.

## **Subject: Focus of Strategy by School**

**Recommendation:** The SEC DEF, with the advice and assistance of the CJCS, should establish a clear, coherent conceptual framework for the PME system. The primary subject matter for PME schools and, consequently, the underlying theme of the PME framework, should be the employment of combat forces for the conduct of war. Each element, of the PME framework should be related to the employment of combat forces. At the ISS level, an officer should broaden his knowledge to include both (1) other branches of his own service and (2) other military services and how they operate together in theater-level warfare. The ISS level should focus on joint operations from a service perspective. At the SSS level, an officer should broaden his knowledge to learn about national strategy and the interaction of the services in strategic operations. The SSS should focus on NMS.

### **Implementation:**

#### Air Force:

ISS implemented. ACSC devotes about 71% of its curriculum to warfighting at the operational level, with operational art as its primary focus. In addition, about 47% of the curriculum is devoted to joint education.

SSS implemented. NMS makes up about 52% of the curriculum. Also, 64% of the curriculum is devoted to joint education.

#### Army:

ISS implemented. The school focuses about 67% of the curriculum on large unit warfighting within the context of operational art. Within this focus, about 31% of the curriculum is devoted to joint and combined education.

SSS implemented. The primary focus is on NMS and includes 22% of the curriculum.

#### Marine Corps:

ISS implemented. The college devotes about 40% of its curriculum to operational art as its primary focus. In addition, about 50% of the curriculum is devoted to joint education.

#### Navy:

ISS partially implemented. The focus of the ISS is about 30% on NMS and the remainder focuses on joint operational art, NSS, and other elements necessary for a graduate degree level program.

## **Subject: Jointness Initiated at Intermediate Level**

**Recommendation:** Although students should be introduced to joint matters at precommissioning and primary-level schools, it is at the ISS that substantial joint education should begin.

### **Implementation:**

#### Air Force:

ISS implemented. ACSC abandoned its joint track and now offers joint education to all officers. In academic year 1988-89 there were 382 hours, or 44% of the curriculum devoted to joint education. In academic year 1990-91, a total of 403 hours, or 47%, was devoted to joint education.

#### Army:

ISS implemented. As stated previously the school abandoned its joint track and now all officers receive Phase I joint education. The school devotes 31%, or 189 hours, of its core curriculum to joint and combined education.

#### Marine Corps:

ISS implemented. 50% of the school's curriculum covers joint matters. College officials stated that most officers who have attained the rank of Lieutenant Commander or Major and who have had joint assignments and service staff assignments are required to understand joint doctrine. Additionally, officers attending ISS have gained sufficient understanding of their own services to articulate their capabilities in the joint arena and this service level knowledge is a requisite to be carried to the joint assignment.

#### Navy:

ISS implemented. In 1989-90 the college estimated that about 65% of the ISS core curriculum was devoted to joint matters. All hours at the strategic level are counted as joint hours.

## Appendix C

### ACOM's JTF Training Program<sup>90</sup>

ACOM has three tiers of joint training for all of the CONUS-based forces. Tier three focuses on CJTFs and their staffs. The objectives for each force are derived from operational level joint mission essential tasks (JMETs) assigned to each unit by the regional CINCs. JMETs drive ACOM training of military forces. ACOM hosts quarterly exercise and training conferences to ensure the JMETs and common joint tasks are sufficiently covered in its training for all of the regional CINCs. The commanders of the XVIII Airborne Corps, III Corps, 8th Air Force, II MEF, and Second Fleet train as the CJTF about once every two years. Tier three of ACOM's program is divided into the three phases described below.

#### Phase I:

This phase uses academic instruction and interactive computer learning to train the staffs of the commanders listed above. The curriculum includes responsibilities and functions of a joint staff, joint planning, joint doctrine, and joint tactics, techniques, and procedures (JTTPs). Each course is tailored for a specific audience: senior officers, action officers, and NCO level for staff support personnel. Training for this phase lasts one week and can be done at home station.

#### Phase II:

During this phase, the commander and staff develop a crisis action operations order (OPORD) concentrating on JTF planning, joint doctrine, and JTTPs. The JTF staff, with component liaison officers, accomplishes this level of training at home station or at the Joint Training, Analysis and Simulation Center (JTASC) at ACOM and lasts one week.<sup>91</sup>

#### Phase III:

This phase uses CAX/CPX to execute the JTF staff's OPOrd developed in Phase II of the training. The CAX/CPX uses a confederation of service models, a professional opposing force and observer/controller groups to support the training. Emphasis is on planning procedures, decision making, and the application of joint doctrine and JTTPs. This phase lasts between seven and ten days and includes participation by the regional CINC.

Appendix D

Model of a Permanent JTF Staff<sup>92</sup>

Maritime Operations	Land-Based Operations
Chief of Staff	Chief of Staff
J-1 Personnel Planner	J-1 Personnel Planner
J-2 Collection Manager	J-2 Collection Manager
J-2 Coordinator	J-2 Coordinator
Intel (USAF)	Intel (USAF)
Intel (USMC)	Intel (USMC)
Intel (USA)	Intel (USN)
IPB Analyst (USA)	IPB Analyst (USA)
J-3 Training Manager	J-3 Training Manager
J-3 SORTS Officer	J-3 SORTS Officer
J-3 SOF Coordinator (USA or USAF)	J-3 SOF Coordinator (USA or USN)
J-3 Civil Mil Ops Officer	J-3 Civil Mil Ops Officer
J-3 WWMCCS Operator	J-3 WWMCCS Operator
J-4 Log Planner	J-4 Log Planner
J-5 CAP Planner	J-5 CAP Planner
J-5 WWMCCS Operator	J-5 WWMCCS Operator
J-6 Comm Planner	J-6 Comm Planner
J-6 WWMCCS Operator	J-6 WWMCCS Operator
Fighter Ops (USAF)	Fighter Ops (USAF)
Airlift Ops (USAF)	Airlift Ops (USAF)
Airlift PAMO Planner	Airlift PAMO Planner
Ground Ops (USA)	Amphibious Ops (USMC)
Amphibious Ops (USMC)	Surface Ops (USN)

Air Ops Coordinator (USN)	Air Ops Coordinator (USAF)
USMC Air Ops Coordinator	USMC Air Ops Coordinator
Log Manager (USAF)	Log Manager (USAF)
Log Manager (USA)	Log Manager (USN)
Log Manager (USMC)	Log Manager (USMC)
Medical Planner	Naval Air Ops (USN)
PAO (USN)	PAO (USMC or USA)
Engineer	Engineer
Staff Judge Advocate	Staff Judge Advocate
Deputy PAO	Deputy PAO
WWMCCS Operator	WWMCCS Operator
WWMCCS Operator	WWMCCS Operator
WWMCCS Operator	WWMCCS Operator

NOTES:

1. Maritime operation assumes minimal USN augmentation.
2. Land based operation assumes minimal USA or USMC augmentation.

Appendix E  
JTF Operation Time Lines

Operation RESTORE HOPE<sup>93</sup>

<u>Date</u>	<u>Event</u>
15 Aug 92	President orders US military forces to support relief operations. JTF established to conduct emergency airlift of food and supplies into Somalia and northern Kenya --Operation PROVIDE RELIEF.
27 Jul 92	UN authorized emergency airlift of aid to Somalia.
20 Nov 92	CENTCOM notified I MEF concerning possibility of mission to support humanitarian efforts in Somalia.
21 Nov 92 joint	I MEF planning cell traveled to CENTCOM to begin developing plan.
23 Nov 92	I MEF planning cell returns to Camp Pendleton after laying ground work for Warning Order and Commander's Estimate. CENTCOM staff develops courses of action.
25 Nov 92	I MEF G-5 formed JTF Somalia future planning cell. Started using deliberate planning process.
30 Nov 92	<i>Tripoli</i> Amphibious Task Unit (ATU) moved toward a location 25 NM off the coast of Mogadishu, Somalia.
1 Dec 92	Warning Order received. JTF headquarters established with CG, I MEF as commander.
2 Dec 92	I MEF future planning cell changed to crisis action planning.
3 Dec 92	Planning Order received.
4 Dec 92	CENTCOM publishes its OPLAN.
5 Dec 92	OPORD published by CENTCOM. Execute Order given. <i>Tripoli</i> ATU in position.
6 Dec 92	JTF publishes OPLAN.
9 Dec 92	D-day, Marines conduct amphibious operations.

Operation SUPPORT HOPE<sup>94</sup>

<u>Date</u>	<u>Event</u>
19 Jul 94	Alert Order to deploy ADVON and follow-on assessment team (FOAT) received.
20 Jul 94	Execute Order given. USMC ADVON deployed from Europe.
21 Jul 94	ADVON arrives at Entebbe, Uganda.
22 Jul 94	President directs the CINC to assist the relief effort. JTF activated. ADVON arrives at Goma, Zaire. FOAT deploys from Europe.
23 Jul 94	FOAT arrives Goma. First water purification unit begins deploying. FOAT and ADVON now form JTF Forward.
24 Jul 94	Small element from JTF arrives at Kigali, Rwanda. First water purification unit arrives at Goma. Orders and authority to enter Rwanda in force and to open Kigali airfield for 24-hour operation received.
25 Jul 94	First water purification unit activated.
28 Jul 94	Main body of US forces starts arriving at Entebbe.
30 Jul 94	JTF opens Kigali airport for 24-hour operation.

## Operation UPHOLD DEMOCRACY<sup>95</sup>

<u>Date</u>	<u>Event</u>
30 Sep 91	Coup unseats Haitian President Aristide. Cedras takes over.
3 Jul 93	Aristide and Cedras sign accord to allow Aristide's return by 30 Oct 93.
8 Oct 93	Cedras reneges on accord.
10 Jun 94	President announces sanctions against Haitian government.
7 Jul 94	US sends 2000 Marines to waters off Haiti and states that US forces have been practicing for an invasion.
31 Jul 94	UN Resolution 940 allows for "application of all necessary means" to restore democracy to Haiti. This allows military intervention by the US.
7 Sep 94	CJCS briefed the President and his advisors on a three phase OPLAN for Haiti. First eight RO-RO ships of the Ready Reserve Fleet are activated.
8 Sep 94	CINCCACOM receives Alert Order to begin execution planning for the operation.
10 Sep 94	Joint Staff Response Cell activated in National Military Command Center. SEC DEF signs Execute Order for the operation.
11 Sep 94	Dress rehearsals for invasion take place at the National Defense University.
18 Sep 94	President signs the Execute Order. Former President Carter delegation reaches an agreement with the junta which allows for peaceful landing of the JTF. CINC initiates recall of the assault force.
19 Sep 94	CJCS sends Execute Order for JTF's unopposed landing. Lead elements arrive in Haiti.

## Endnotes

1. CINCs are responsible for the development and production of joint operation plans. During peacetime, they act to deter war and prepare for war by planning for the transition to and from war and military operations other than war. Their joint operation planning responsibilities are described in the Unified Command Plan and Joint Pub 0-2, and include conducting operations within assigned geographic or functional areas. The CINC, or combatant commander, refers to commander who is geographically organized for combatant command. His AOR is assigned by the NCA. The CINC prepares strategic estimates, strategies, and plans to accomplish the missions assigned by the NCA. Joint Chiefs of Staff, Joint Pub 5-0 Doctrine for Planning Joint Operations, (Washington, D.C., National Defense University Press, 1995), p. I-6. Joint Chiefs of Staff, Joint Pub 3-0, Doctrine for Joint Operations, (Washington, D.C., National Defense University Press, 1993), p. I-10.
2. These studies include: John E. Sterling, "The Corps in the JTF Role," (School of Advanced Military Studies, Ft. Leavenworth, Kansas, 3 June 1992), John C. Coleman, "Tumbling "Component Walls" In Contingency Operations: a Trumpet's Blare for Standing Joint Task Force Headquarters," (School of Advanced Military Studies, Ft. Leavenworth, Kansas, 16 May 1991), J. D. Chambers, P. J. Evans, and K. H. Johnson, "Command and Control in Low Intensity Conflict: Adequacy of Current Military Arrangements and Joint Doctrine," (Air University, Maxwell Air Force Base, Alabama, April 1986), Michael L. Henchen, "Establishment of a Permanent Joint Task Force Headquarters: An Analysis of Sourcing a Command and Control Structure Capable of Executing Forced Entry Contingency Operations," (U.S. Army Command and General Staff College, Ft. Leavenworth, Kansas, 1993), Marc R. Hildenbrand, "Standing Joint Task Forces--a Way to Enhance America's Warfighting Capabilities?" (School of Advanced Military Studies, Ft. Leavenworth, Kansas, 24 June 1992). Lance A. Betros, "Coping with Uncertainty: The Joint Task Force and Multi-service Military Operations," (School of Advanced Military Studies, Ft. Leavenworth, Kansas, 18 May 1991), Blair A. Ross, "The Joint Task Force Headquarters in Contingency Operations," (School of Advanced Military Studies, Ft. Leavenworth, Kansas, 14 May 1993).
3. 99th Congress, 2d Session, Report 99-824, Goldwater-Nichols Department of Defense Reorganization Act of 1986, ( Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1986), p. 3. This Congressional Act is the result of a congressional military reform caucus formed by key Senators and Representatives after the Desert One failure. It mandates the most far-reaching reorganization of the Pentagon since 1947. The Act passed the Senate with a vote of 95-0 in the face of strong Pentagon opposition. Jeffrey Record, Beyond Military Reform. Pergamon-Brassey's, (New York, New York, 1988), 7.
4. White House, A National Security Strategy of Engagement and Enlargement, (Washington, D.C., February 1995). pps. i-iii.
5. These thoughts were taken from the Army War Colleges's annual strategy conference in 1995 titled: "Strategy During the Lean Years: Learning from the Past and the Present," and published

in: Jeffrey Record, Ready for What and Modernized Against Whom? A Strategic Perspective on Readiness and Modernization, (U.S. Army War College, Carlisle Barracks, PA, Strategic Studies Institute, 10 April 1995), pps. iii-iv, 6. Dr. Jeffrey Record is a military historian and former staff member of the US Senate Armed Services Committee, and a legislative assistant to Senator Sam Nunn. Dr Record is a policy analyst at the Brookings Institution, the Institute for Foreign Policy Analysis, the Hudson Institute, and at BDM International.

6. Clarence T. Morgan, "Atlantic Command's Joint Training Program." JFQ (Summer 1995), p. 120.

A crisis is an incident or situation involving a threat to the US, its territories, citizens, military forces, and possessions or vital interests that develops rapidly and creates a condition of such diplomatic, economic, political, or military importance that commitment of US military forces and resources is contemplated to achieve national objectives. Department of the Army, Field Manual 100-20, Low Intensity Conflict, (Washington, D.C.: Headquarters U.S. Army, 1990), p. glossary-2.

A contingency is an emergency involving military forces caused by natural disasters, terrorists, subversives, or by required military operations. Due to the uncertainty of the situation, contingencies require plans, rapid response, and special procedures to ensure the safety and readiness of personnel, installations, and equipment. Joint Chiefs of Staff, Joint Pub 1-01.1, Compendium of Joint Publications, (Washington, D.C.: National Defense University Press, 1995), p. 88.

7. U.S. General Accounting Office, Joint Military Operations DOD's Renewed Emphasis on Interoperability Is Important but Not Adequate, (Washington, D.C., 21 October 1993), p. 2.

8. Paul D. Miller, "The Military After Next," Proceedings, (February 1994), p. 41.

9. Jack W. Ellertson and Robert Kloecker, "The Challenge of Joint Forces Training in USEUCOM," Military Review, (May 1994), p. 16.

10. 99th Congress, 2d Session, Report 99-824, Goldwater-Nichols Department of Defense Reorganization Act of 1986, sections 164(b) and (c).

11. Lt. Gen John H. Cushman, USA (Ret.), "The Planning, Command, and Conduct of Military Operations: An Assessment of DOD Performance, 1986-1988," James A. Blackwell and Barry M. Blechman, editors, Making Defense Reform Work. (Washington, D.C., Brassey's (U.S.), Inc., 1990), p. 110.

12. Goldwater-Nichols Department of Defense Reorganization Act of 1986, chapter 5, paragraph 153.

JPME encompasses an officer's knowledge of the use of land, sea, and air forces to achieve a military objective. It also includes different aspects of strategic operations and planning, command and control of combat operations under a combined command, communications, intelligence, and campaign planning. Joint education emphasizes the study of

these areas and others from the perspectives of the Army, Navy, Air Force and Marine Corps services.

A JSO is an officer educated and experienced in the formulation of strategy and combined military operations to achieve national security objectives. U.S. General Accounting Office, Air Force Status of Recommendations on Officer's Professional Military Education, (Washington, D.C., 13 March 1991), p. 43.

13. Robert B. Kupiszewski, "Joint Education for the 21st Century." JFQ (Spring 1995), p. 73. and Cushman, p. 111.

14. Maj. General William M. Steele, USA, and Robert B. Kupiszewski, "Joint Education: Where Do We Go From Here?" JFQ (Winter 1993-94), p. 64.

The Panel on Military Education of the House Armed Services Committee, also known as the Skelton Panel, assessed the capability of the PME system to produce officers competent in both their own service and joint matters-- JSOs. The panel recommended a two-phase PME. This recommendation was later mandated by Congress in 1989.

15. Joint Chiefs of Staff, Roles, Missions, and Functions of the Armed Forces of the United States, (Washington, D.C., National Defense University Press, February 1993), p. II-19.

ISS is generally the third level of an officer's formal PME. At the intermediate level, the focus is on several branches of the same service as well as on the operations of other services. An officer is usually at the major or lieutenant commander rank when he attends this course.

SSS is the fourth level of an officer's formal PME. The focus at this course is at the strategic level. An officer is usually at the lieutenant colonel, colonel, commander, or Navy captain rank when he attends this course. Air Force Status of Recommendations on Officer's Professional Military Education, pps. 43, 44.

16. The panel established the level of learning required for each phase of JPME. The application level is above that required for Phase I training, the knowledge level--the ability to recall facts, terms and definitions. The application level, the ability to employ knowledge and principles to a particular situation, is the requirement for the Phase II level of JPME. Steele, pps. 64-67.

17. Capstone is a course in NSS and NMS taught primarily by ten individuals who are retired four-star generals and admirals who once served as CINCs, Service Chiefs, or major combined commanders. GNA made attendance mandatory for all newly selected general and flag officers. Between 32 to 35 officers attend each six-week course taught four times/year at the National Defense University, 128 to 140 officers annually. U.S. General Accounting Office, Military Education Actions on Recommendations Involving Institute for National Strategic studies and Capstone, (Washington, D.C., 16 September 1992), pps. 1, 2, 6-8.

18. "Avoiding Future Unreadiness." Defense. (Issue 4 in 1994), p. 19.

19. A CAX is a medium overhead, medium cost exercise in which the forces are simulated and can be held at the unit's installation or via electronic means between participating headquarters. Department of the Army, Field Manual 25-100, Training the Force, (Washington, D.C.: Headquarters U.S. Army, November 1988), p. Glossary-4.
20. US General Accounting Office, Operation Desert Storm War Offers Important Insights Into Army and Marine Corps Training Needs, (Washington, D.C. 25 August 1992), pps. 3-4.
21. The Defense Science Board Readiness Task Force established by Secretary of Defense Les Aspin in May 1993 to provide advice, recommendations and supporting rationale in readiness-related areas. It was headed by former Army Chief of Staff, General "Shy" Myer. John Boatman, "Spreading the Word," Jane's Defense Weekly, (10 December 1994), p. 20.
22. Between 1993 and 1997 the Army expects to spend \$750 million to acquire simulators and another \$400 million on simulator research and development. The plan is to send all division and corps commanders and battle staffs through BCTP's CAXs replicating the execution of battle plans and orders. US General Accounting Office, Army Training Commanders Lack Guidance and Training for Effective Use of Simulations, (Washington, D.C. 23 August 1993), pps. 1-2.
23. John Boatman, "The Jane's Interview (with General John M. Shalikashvili), Jane's Defense Weekly, (10 December 1994), p. 32.
24. Joint Chiefs of Staff, Joint Pub 0-2, Unified Action Armed Forces (UNAAF), (Washington, D.C.: National Defense University Press, 1995), p. xv.
25. "Roles and Missions Steps toward Jointness," Defense (Issue 2 in 1993), p. 17.
26. The definition and requirements for a JTF came from the following documents: Joint Chiefs of Staff, Joint Pub 0-2, Unified Action Armed Forces (UNAAF), (Washington, D.C.: National Defense University Press, 1995), pps. xiii, xvi, IV-1, IV-9. Joint Chiefs of Staff, Joint Pub 5-00.2, Joint Task Force Planning Guidance and Procedures, (Washington, D.C.: National Defense University Press, 1990), p. II-3. Department of the Army, Field Manual 100-5, Operations, (Washington, D.C.: Headquarters U.S. Army, 14 June 1993), p. 4-4.
27. John H. Cushman, Command and Control of Theater Forces: Adequacy, (Washington, D.C., AFCEA International Press, 1985), pps. 62-63.
28. Information for this Table came from the following sources: Robert P. Haffa, Planning U.S. Forces, (National Defense University, Washington, D.C., 1988), p. 86. Cushman, Command and Control of Theater Forces: Adequacy, (Washington, D.C., AFCEA International Press, 1985), p. 63-64. "Roles and Missions Steps toward Jointness," p. 23. Roles, Missions, and Functions of the Armed Forces of the United States, pps. xi-xii.

29. Cushman, Command and Control of Theater Forces: Adequacy, p. 63. Roles, Missions, and Functions of the Armed Forces of the United States, p. xi.
30. Text from President Carter's "State of the Union Address," 23 January 1980. Thomas A. Fabyanic, "Conceptual Planning and the Rapid Deployment Joint Task Force," Armed Forces and Society (Spring 1981), p. 343, 351.
31. Cushman, Command and Control of Theater Forces: Adequacy, p. 63-65. Haffa, p. 84. Record, Beyond Military Reform, p. 30. Jeffery Record, Revising U.S. Military Strategy, (New York, New York, Pergamon-Brassey's, 1984), p. 37.
32. The USN and US Marine Corps forces would be changed to the operational control of CENTCOM in the event of a contingency operation in Southwest Asia. Roles, Missions, and Functions of the Armed Forces of the United States, pps. xii, III-4. Joel J. Sokolsky, Canada. Getting it Right This Time: The 1994 Defense White Paper, (U.S. Army War College, Carlisle Barracks, PA, Strategic Studies Institute, 31 May 1995), p. 19. Miller, p. 42. "USACOM" DTIC.Mil/defenseink/factfile/chapter1/usacom (internet).
33. "USACOM" DTIC.Mil/defenseink/factfile/chapter1/usacom (internet). John R. Ballard, "JTF Operational Synchronization," Military Review (March-April 1995), p. 98. Morgan, pps. 120, 122.
34. Samuel C. Sarkesian, Combat Effectiveness: Cohesion, Stress, and the Volunteer Military. (Beverly Hills, CA, Sage Publications, Inc., 1980), p. 11.
35. Joint Chiefs of Staff, Joint Pub 1, Joint Warfare of the US Armed Forces, (Washington, D.C.: National Defense University Press, 1991), p. 15.
36. Ardant du Picq, Colonel French Army, translated by Col. John N. Greely, USA, and Maj. Robert C. Cotton, USA, Battle Studies. (Harrisburg, PA, Military Service Publishing Co, 1946), p. 96.
37. GAO, Joint Military Operations. DOD's Renewed Emphasis on Interoperability Is Important but Not Adequate, p. 4.
38. Robert W. RisCassi, "Doctrine for Joint Operations in a Combined Environment a Necessity," Military Review (June 1993), p. 28.
39. Department of the Navy, Naval Doctrine Publication 1, Naval Warfare, (Washington, D.C.: Office of the Chief of Naval Operations and Headquarters US Marine Corps, 28 March 1994), p. 25.
40. Joint Pub 0-2, p. IV-13. Joint Pub 5-00.2, pps. IV-1 to IV-4.

41. The list of agencies for the JTF to include on its staff includes: Department of State, US Information Agency for International Development, Defense Security Assistance Agency, Joint Staff, Combatant Commands, Security Assistance Organization, US diplomatic mission, Defense Logistics Agency, Defense Mapping Agency, National Security Agency, Central Intelligence Agency, Department of Transportation, US Coast Guard, and federal Emergency Management Agency. Joint Chiefs of Staff, Joint Pub 3-07, Doctrine for Joint Operations in Low Intensity Conflict, (TEST PUB) (Washington, D.C.: National Defense University Press, 1990), pps. II-4 to II-6. Joint Chiefs of Staff, Joint Pub 5-02.1, Joint Operation Planning System Volume 1 (Deliberate Planning Procedures), (Washington, D.C.: National Defense University Press, 1988), p. iv.
42. Joint Pub 5-00.2, p. IV-4.
43. Joint Pub 0-2, pps. IV-10, IV-12. Joint Pub 5-00.2, pps. II-8, IV-1.
44. Operation Restore Hope Lessons Learned Report, (Fort Leavenworth, Kansas, US Combined Arms Command, 15 November 1993), p. Introduction. Joint Pub 3-0, p. V-15.
45. International Committee of the Red Cross Annual Report, (1992), pps. 14, 46.
46. Kenneth Allard, Somalia Operations: Lessons Learned, (Washington, D.C., National Defense University, 1995), p. 14, 107. The lessons learned in this book were principally based on operational reports compiled through the Joint Universal Lessons Learned System (JULLS). This system, a fixture since the mid 1980s, was created in response to repeated GAO criticism of the lack of an automated system to evaluate joint training exercises. JULLS is administered by the JCS J-7 directorate.
47. CINCCENTCOM staff had created a broad concept of the plan for the operation long before the NCA ordered the CINC to prepare for intervention in Somalia. However this did not give the JTF planners enough information or time to develop its own OPLAN. Plan 1200-90 called for only a 120 member headquarters staff, not including a joint communications support element of 31 personnel. Marine Fleet Exercise 92-2, recently accomplished by I MEF, called for only 335 personnel on the headquarters staff. This was artificially small due to a large proportion of augmentees that were not able to attend the exercise. The JTF commander was not the ultimate authority in determining the personnel makeup of his staff. The NCA and the CINC both had inputs into the forces required for this operation. This resulted in a force composition too robust for the mission. Operation Restore Hope Lessons Learned Report, pps. IV-1, IV-3. Allard, Somalia Operations: Lessons Learned, p. 23. David J. Zvijac and Katherine A. McGrady, "Operation Restore Hope: Summary Report," (Alexandria, VA, Center for Naval Analyses, March 1994), pps. 1, 5, 11, 13. Katherine A. McGrady, "The Joint Task Force in Operation Restore Hope," (Alexandria, VA, Center for Naval Analyses, March 1994), pps. 4, 102, 103, 104.

48. Approximately one-fourth of the headquarters personnel were deemed unnecessary by 17 December 1992, after only two weeks into the operation. The commander was now in the AOR and had a clearer picture of the situation, thus allowing him to reduce the size of his staff. Zvijac and McGrady, pps. 5, 11.
49. McGrady, pps. 104, 105.
50. Allard, Somalia Operations: Lessons Learned, p. 22.
51. Operation Restore Hope Lessons Learned Report, pps. 10, 11, IV-1. Zvijac and McGrady, p. 34. McGrady, pps. 140-141.
52. Zvijac and McGrady, p. 18. McGrady, p. 135.
53. Chapter VI of the UN Charter only allows for peaceful settlement of disputes between parties. This chapter restricts US forces from using any force, except in self-defense. Bringing a large force to the theater would violate the intent of the UN Charter, and thus places a constraint on US forces. The other chapter humanitarian relief missions fall under is Chapter VII. Chapter VII allows the United Nations, or nations assigned to its operations, to "take such action . . . as may be necessary to maintain or restore international peace and security. This removes most restrictions on the use of force. But the United Nations still controls what force is allowed and when it must be reduced. Operating under Chapter VII allows the United States to bring its superior combat forces to the theater to help end the crisis. Leleand M. Goodrich and Edward Hambro, Charter of the United Nations, (Boston, Massachusetts, World Peace Foundation, 1949), pps. 237-259, 276-278.
54. William J. Perry, Annual Report to the President and the Congress, February 1995, p. 293.
55. Lt. General Daniel Schroeder, USA, Commander JTF Support Hope, "Lessons of Rwanda Joint Warfighting Doctrine Works in Operations Other Than War," Armed Forces Journal, (December 1994), p. 33.
56. Ibid., pps. 5, 36, 45.
57. Center for Army Lessons Learned, Operation Support Hope Lessons Learned DRAFT Report, (Fort Leavenworth, Kansas: U.S. Combined Arms Command, 1995), pps. 3, 21, 22.
58. Ibid., 22.
59. Operation Support Hope Lessons Learned DRAFT Report, p. 52. Steven Metz and James Kievit, "Learning from Rwanda," JFQ (Spring 1995), p. 108.
60. Operation Support Hope Lessons Learned DRAFT Report, pps. 1-1, 1-2, 7-1.

61. Center for Army Lessons Learned, Operation Uphold Democracy Initial Impressions, (Fort Leavenworth, Kansas: U.S. Combined Arms Command, December 1994), pps. i, ii.
62. Ibid., pps. ii., 11. Center for Army Lessons Learned, Operation Uphold Democracy Initial Impressions Volume II, (Fort Leavenworth, Kansas: U.S. Combined Arms Command, April 1995), p. 31.
63. Ballard, p. 101.
64. Operation Uphold Democracy Initial Impressions, p. xvi.
65. Ibid., p. 23.
66. Operation Uphold Democracy Initial Impressions Volume II, p. 45.
67. Operation Uphold Democracy Initial Impressions, p. 50.
68. FM 100-5, pps. 4-5.
69. Ellertson and Kloecker, pps. 17, 22.
70. Operation Restore Hope Lessons Learned Report, p. IV-5. Ellertson and Kloecker, pps. 17, 23. Colonel Ellertson is the director, Army Planning, Department of Military Strategy, Planning and Operations, US Army War College and has served as the chief, Exercise Division, Operations directorate, Headquarters, USEUCOM. LTC Kloecker, US Army, Retired, is a member of the Advisory Staff, Computer Science Corporation and assisted in the development of the Command's Joint Task Force Training Program at Headquarters, USEUCOM. Operation Desert Storm War Offers Important Insights Into Army and Marine Corps Training Needs, p. 17.
71. Miller, p. 42. McGrady, p. 132. Rosemary B. Mariner, "Recent Operations and Exercises," JFQ, (Spring 1995), p. 116.
72. Operation Desert Storm War Offers Important Insights Into Army and Marine Corps Training Needs, p. 31.
73. Eliot A. Cohen and John Gooch, Military Misfortunes The Anatomy of Failure in War, (New York, New York, The Free Press, 1990), p. 21. John D. Rossenberger, "The Key to Joint Readiness," Proceedings, (September 1995), pps. 60. Frederick R. Strain, "Joint Warfare," JFQ, (Autumn 1993), pps. 23-24.
74. Joint Chiefs of Staff, Joint Pub 3-00.1, Joint Doctrine for Contingency Operations, (Washington, D.C.: National Defense University Press, 1991), p. IV-1.

75. Richard A. Gabriel, Military Incompetence: Why the American Military Doesn't Win, (New York, New York, Hill and Wang, 1985), p. 11.
76. The CJTF is likely to operate with agencies representing other US instruments of power, NGOs, PVOs, etc., so it is difficult to build a staff when the commander can not be sure what will be the next mission. Joint Pub 3-0, p. I-8. Ballard, p. 99.
77. General Mundy, Marine Corps Commandant stated his combat training was underfunded by \$7.8 million. Also with the reduced number of Marines available to deploy he now had about 30% of his people overseas versus the normal 22% kept there during the Cold War. General Sullivan, US Army Chief of Staff, said that during Fys 1985-90 the Army spent \$83 million annually to support Army participation in joint exercises. This has now been cut to \$61 million in FY 1994. General McPeak, USAF Chief of Staff, stated USAF exercise funding had dropped to 78% of the unified CINC's requests in FY 1994 and beyond. John McCain, Going Hollow: The Warnings of Our Chiefs of Staff, July 1993, p. 2, 3, 4, 12, 14.
78. Department of Defense, The Bottom-Up Review: Forces for a New Era, (Washington, D.C.: 1 September 1993), slide 38.
79. Richard K. Betts, Surprise Attack, (Washington, D.C., The Brookings Institute, 1982), p. 23. Ellertson and Kloecker, p. 15. John T. Correll, "Roles and Missions Ride Again," Air Force Magazine, (February 1995), p. 10.
80. Kent A. Leonhardt, "Focus on Capability," Marine Corps Gazette, (October 1994), p. 22.
81. Steven L. Canby, "Roles, Missions, and JTFs: Unintended Consequences," JFQ, (Autumn/Winter 1994-95), p. 69.
82. Quote from a presentation at the National Defense University, 18 August 1995. Ervin J. Rokke, "Military Education for the New Age," JFQ, (Autumn 1995), p. 21.
83. Joint Pub 3-00.1, p. II-4.
84. Betts, p. 4.
85. Ballard, p. 98.
86. Ellertson and Kloecker, p. 22.
87. The Joint Advanced Warfare School would include Phase II JSO training to those officers just completing Phase I JPME in residence. The course size would be between 25 to 50 students per year. Its curriculum would include history, analyses of the operational level of war, extensive practical exercises, and an introduction to national policy and strategy. Steele and Kupiszewski, p. 68. Robert A. Doughty, "Reforming the Joint Doctrine Process," Parameters, (Autumn 1992), pps. 50-51.

88. The JWFC was tasked by the CJCS to broaden service understanding of joint doctrine. It was formed in 1993 from the former Joint Doctrine Center and Joint Warfighting Centers to help regional CINCs prepare for joint exercises, support joint training and develop, assess, and revise joint doctrine. The JWFC focuses on computer modeling and simulators to support joint training, particularly at the JTF level and is responsible to the CJCS through the J-7 Directorate. Boatman, "Spreading the Word," pps. 19-20. Edward C. Ferriter, "Which Way Joint Doctrine?" JFQ, (Summer 1995), p. 118. Ike Skelton, "Taking Stock of the New Joint Era," JFQ, (Winter 1993-94), p. 47.

89. Information in this appendix came from the following sources: U.S. General Accounting Office, Air Force Status of Recommendations on Officer's Professional Military Education, (Washington, D.C. 13 March 1991), pps. 16-17, 20-22. U.S. General Accounting Office, Army Status of Recommendations on Officer's Professional Military Education, (Washington, D.C. 21 March 1991), pps. 18-19, 22-23. U.S. General Accounting Office, Marine Status of Recommendations on Officer's Professional Military Education, (Washington, D.C. 12 February 1991), pps. 13, 16-17. U.S. General Accounting Office, Navy Status of Recommendations on Officer's Professional Military Education, (Washington, D.C. 25 March 1991), pps. 15, 18-19.

90. Information for this appendix came from the following source: Morgan, pps, 120-123.

91. The JTASC falls under the J-7 Directorate of ACOM. It conducts CAX joint exercises and training programs to evaluate joint doctrine, tactics, and procedures. "USACOM" DTIC.Mil/defenseink/factfile/chapter1/usacom (internet)

92. Center for Army Lessons Learned, U.S. Army Operations in Support of UNOSOM II, (Fort Leavenworth, Kansas: U.S. Combined Arms Command, 1994), pps. D-3 and D-4.

93. Data for this section came from the following sources: Zvijac and McGrady, pps. 34, 35, 36. Allard, pps. 6-14. Operation Restore Hope Lessons Learned Report, pps. i, 1, 5, I-11.

94. Data for this section came from the following source: Operation Support Hope Lessons Learned DRAFT Report, pps. 16-19, 12-1, 12-2.

95. Data for this section came from the following source: Operation Uphold Democracy Initial Impressions, pps. xiii-xviii.

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