**Annotated Bibliography: Open Sources on Africa**

**Author(s):** LaVerle Berry, Kate Bullard, Rita Bymes, Eunice Charles, Steven Cranton, Nancy Drexler, William Eaton, Naomi Greer, Robert Handloff, Mary Louis Harmon, Greta Holtz, Linda Lau, T. Robert Lenaghan, Kenneth Liberstein, Moses Pinkston, Patricia Riggsbee, Rachel Warner

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PREFACE

This bibliography is culled primarily from books and scholarly journals received during the previous quarter, although significant periodical articles are also cited. Some sources, dependent on surface mails and convoluted routing, are dated slightly. Their entry herein is contingent solely on date of receipt. The array of political, military, strategic, and other materials cited is derived from general, regional, and some national publications published yearly, quarterly, monthly, weekly, or erratically. Hence, sources differ from quarter to quarter. The intent of the bibliographers is to provide a good sampling of regional-related sources to aid the researcher in maintaining awareness of developments. No presumption of comprehensiveness is made.

Analysts contributing to this bibliography are LaVerle Berry, Kate Bullard, Rita Byrnes, Robert Handloff, and Rachel Warner.

Although written in uneven English, this article is a good introduction to the strengths and weaknesses of African security agreements, or, in the author's terms, "alignments," examining the sociopolitical context of security pacts and their possible impact on the institution of an African High Command. This straightforward compilation of security information distinguishes among internal, inter-state, and extra-systemic security threats, and then examines patterns of security cooperation in response to specific threats. Bukarambe concludes that although these security agreements have enjoyed a certain amount of success, this success decreases as the number of states involved increases. He predicts that as a result, most regional security agreements will continue to be bilateral or limited multilateral arrangements. This implies that their operational effectiveness will be limited, and that the extension of regional cooperation to the formation of an African High Command is unlikely. An interesting aside in this article is Bukarambe's view that African states have not yet developed a viable self-image, contributing to the perceived need to maintain numerous alliances with non-African states. The author might have examined the proposal to establish an African High Command, questioning whether it is useful or relevant to these countries at this stage of development.


This well-written article presents an up-to-date and realistic view of Cuban military involvement in Africa. The author contends that Cuban military assistance to African countries—which has been very costly in economic terms, in lives lost, and in terms of rising discontent in Cuba--has not yet tipped the scales in Africa irrevocably toward the Soviet bloc. Nevertheless, Cuban military involvement in Africa provides a strategic link between Cuba and those African states in which Cuban soldiers are fighting in the frontlines, and a foothold on the continent for the Soviet Union. Falk points out that Africa has strategic importance for Cuba, both politically and economically. The main attraction is Angola's minerals, which are vital to industry, energy programs, and modern weaponry. In addition, she points out that although Cuban and Soviet motives in Africa are compatible, it is likely that Cuban-initiated military programs are larger than those of the Soviets, and Cuba, as a Third World nation, is the more acceptable presence in Africa. Falk describes a complex situation in which a number of key international players--Cuba, the Soviet Union, South Africa, and the United States--are vying for influence in Angolan policymaking, while that government has been contending with an insurgency that has ruined its economy and required enormous military expenditures.

This article critiques the minor role of African women in contemporary law enforcement by using US-based studies on women in law enforcement as a model. The author notes that few African countries even employ police women, who make up less than 10 percent of the force in all countries cited. He argues, with some documentation, that women can be at least as effective as men in this role and concludes with the advice that more women should be recruited for police work. A significant methodological problem with this study is the lack of African data to support the author's thesis, an omission made more evident by reference to Africa-specific cultural, economic, and social obstacles to increasing women's participation in law enforcement. Despite uneven empirical data, this study is useful in presenting questions for further research, and it suggests parallel questions that might be raised about expanding the role of women in other security areas, including the military.


This well written chapter explores French policies on African political crises since the end of the Mitterrand era. It illustrates in detail the belief that, despite an overall idealistic perspective, realism and globalism hold forth in policy implementation. In addition, this chapter demonstrates the wide gulf between rhetoric and policy in French involvement in Africa and illustrates France's changing status in Africa, as it becomes only one--albeit an important one--of many actors on the continent. The chapter also analyzes France's position vis-a-vis the interests of the Soviet Union and the United States in Africa, concluding that French policies have been affected by the changing interests and policies of the two superpowers.


In this somewhat standard review of Soviet relations with sub-Saharan Africa, Legum begins with several hackneyed judgments, which are probably, nonetheless, correct—that Soviet policy in this region can only be understood in terms of its own global interests and priorities, that very few Third World governments can be characterized simply as pro-West or pro-Soviet, and that Soviet African policies are pragmatic responses to developments in the region. Legum also points out that while the East-West conflict is important in analyzing superpower policies in the Third world, it
would be a mistake to disregard local interests. African leaders skillfully exploit the Soviet-Western rivalry to enhance their own interests, forming alliances with either side, generally transitory in nature. The Soviet failure to make more than a few tenuous inroads is measured by the absence of Communist parties in most African countries. Legum proceeds with a discussion of Soviet relations with Ethiopia, where a vanguard party, the Workers’ Party of Ethiopia, represents the Soviet Union’s most notable gain in sub-Saharan Africa. He concludes that Moscow now faces its biggest challenge in southern Africa, where a developing violent crisis will undoubtedly lead the frontline states to seek the military and economic support of reliable allies.

Horn of Africa


The authors examine six northeast African countries—Egypt, Sudan, Ethiopia, Djibouti, Somalia, and Kenya—and their response to Saudi Arabia’s attempts to influence regional policies. In all but one case—Ethiopia—they conclude that the Saudis have been fairly successful in using their oil wealth as a bargaining tool for dealing with their less-affluent African neighbors. The Saudis have also been able to influence foreign policy orientations while at the same time enhancing their own security and promoting the spread of Islam at the expense of the Soviet Union. Although this article is a relatively brief introduction to the subject, it is, nonetheless, a well-argued and documented presentation on a little-discussed topic. It offers a good example of an oil-rich state’s use of its wealth to advance its foreign policy and religious goals on a regional basis—an effort that, in this case, coincides with Western interests. It also invites comparison with attempts by South Africa and Nigeria to influence regional politics, based on mineral and oil wealth, respectively.

Ethiopia


The author takes issue with the oft-made assertion that without extensive military and financial backing from several Middle Eastern states, the Eritrean resistance would collapse. He surveys relations between the two main resistance groups, the Eritrean Liberation Front (ELF) and the Eritrean People’s Liberation Front (EPLF), and Middle Eastern states including Sudan, Saudi Arabia, Iraq, Syria, Libya, and South Yemen. Assessing this network of ties, Pateman concludes that
such aid has been considerably overstated, and that the Eritrean resistance movements, particularly the EPLF, are self-reliant to a remarkable degree. Of all the external aid received, perhaps the most consistently valuable has been that rendered by Sudan in terms of sanctuary for both fighters and refugees. At present, Pateman observes, the EPLF is the most active and viable liberation movement in the field, having handily survived the recent drought with its support from the local nomad and peasant populations. Pateman’s analysis is distinctly pro-Eritrean, and many of his sources are Eritrean publications. He argues clearly yet somewhat unconvincingly, appearing to rely on these sources for their perception of Eritrean self-sufficiency. Nonetheless, this article is worth reading for an understanding of Eritrean resistance movements over the last 25 years and their determination to remain independent of outside interference.

Kenya


The author examines Kenya’s foreign policy direction since independence in 1963, summarizing relations with its neighbors, the West (primarily Britain and the United States), the Soviet bloc, and China, and finding that Kenyan foreign policy is based on pragmatism. He concludes that there are a number of continuities between the policies of the Kenyatta and Moi eras, but also several significant discontinuities. Among the latter are closer economic and political links with Tanzania and Uganda under President Moi, a distinct tilt towards the United States, closer ties with China, and a president more actively involved in the foreign policy process. This article is straightforward and descriptive; it offers little insight or analysis and is essentially an introduction to this subject. A more fruitful line of inquiry might have been an examination of the motives and personalities of Kenyatta and Moi as factors in foreign policy decision making since 1963.

Southern Africa

Angola


Following a careful review of the events leading up to the Portuguese withdrawal from Angola in 1975 and the consequent power struggle which brought the MPLA to power, the author seeks to explain the circumstances leading to Angola’s dependence on both the military power of the Soviet Union and Cuba and the economic and technological
power of the United States and western Europe. His analysis is based on the disputable premise that of all the nationalist movements that led sub-Saharan colonies into independence, the Popular Movement for the Liberation of Angola (MPLA) had the deepest Marxist roots. He discusses ideologues like Lucio Lara, Mario de Andrade, and Viriato da Cruz, who were the principal founders of the MPLA, but omits any comparison with others such as Eduardo Mondlane and Samora Machel, who formed the Front for the Liberation of Mozambique (FRELIMO). Marcum reflects the mixed signals within Angola’s official ideology in his inconclusive assessment of Angola’s future. Rather, he discusses the political, cultural, and social factors that might lead to either a Soviet-style or a more open form of government. He also weighs the impact of steps taken by the United States, such as military support to the National Union for the Total Independence of Angola (UNITA) insurgency.

Mozambique


Although the March 1984 Nkomati Accord between South Africa and Mozambique has suffered serious setbacks, Lowenkopf suggests, the Accord endures because of its underlying premises rather than its content. The two nations agreed to prohibit the use of their territories by external agents threatening the security of the other, and to restore economic links which had existed before 1975. In doing so, South Africa was gambling that it could coexist and do business with a Marxist neighbor. Mozambique, in turn, was acknowledging that the region’s black states could not survive South African enmity, and that trusting South Africa and accepting Western economic aid were preferable to continued conflict and greater reliance on the Soviet Union. Lowenkopf’s statement that the Accord may be the most significant political event of the 1980s in southern Africa, although exaggerated, may prove to be correct, even though South Africa continues to support the Mozambique National Resistance Movement (RENAMO). Much of the article is devoted to a discussion of the responses of concerned parties—the frontline states, the Soviet Union, and the United States—to the Accord, to RENAMO, and to the economic crisis facing the regime. While it is probable that Mozambique will accept a greater Western role in its economy, Lowenkopf’s conclusion that Mozambique is likely to accept substantial South African influence, as well, is doubtful in view of the resistance from all the frontline states.

South Africa

Presenting portions of a scenario for achieving peace in post-apartheid South Africa, the author argues that blacks must be allowed to design their own sociopolitical system, rather than being absorbed into the present one. This cannot be done, in his view, until the level of black education is raised, so blacks can bring greater understanding to discussions of governmental legitimacy. Simply stated, a change from white minority rule to a black oligarchy will not bring lasting peace. A number of features distract from the author’s basic argument in favor of the inclusion of legitimate black leaders in the transition to a democratic state—the article contains grammatical errors, unnecessary revolutionary jargon, and unexpanded acronyms. However, Campbell’s warning that jailed black political leaders hold the power to scuttle negotiations to end apartheid is important, and the difficulty of establishing governmental legitimacy without extending educational opportunities to blacks is likely to become obvious as attempts at powersharing proceed over the next decade.


In this speculative and thought-provoking article examining the possible relationship between a future majority-ruled South Africa and its neighbors, the author postulates that this relationship will depend on the new government’s perception of itself as a regional power, rather than the ideology or political tone of that government. Hanlon suggests that regardless of political orientation, the new regime will inherit the present government’s claim to dominance over the region. He bases this prediction in part on signals from existing South African liberation movements, which exhibit insular and demeaning attitudes toward neighboring states. The history of the region also demonstrates the tendency of liberation movements to forget the friends who supported them once they achieve power—e.g., what Hanlon terms Zimbabwe’s current arrogant and dismissive attitude toward Mozambique. He also predicts that the manner in which power is handed over to the majority will be a key factor in determining future regional relationships. If majority rule is achieved through a process resembling the Lancaster House negotiations, the existing economic links between South Africa and its neighbors will probably remain intact. A long and bitter revolution, on the other hand, would more likely result in a break in normal relations. Assuming the adoption of some internationally accepted means of accomplishing this transfer of power, he speculates that economic cooperation between this hypothetical government and the Southern African Development Coordination Conference (SADCC) will be hampered by five factors—the demobilization of white puppet groups and reparations for damage inflicted by them, migrant labor, the demands of South Africa’s four smallest neighboring states, inadequate water resources, and the possibility of nationalizing much of the private sector.

The author, a lecturer in political science at the University of Zimbabwe, presents a scenario for the transition to majority rule in South Africa via Zimbabwe-style powersharing. He assumes that National Party (NP) leaders see the fallacy of arguments in favor of racial superiority and are preparing, deliberately but slowly, for majority rule. Based on the Rhodesia-Zimbabwe experience, he emphasizes the need for including representatives of guerrilla organizations in negotiating and enforcing any peace agreement. He also emphasizes the importance of an unbiased interim authority to coordinate the transition to majority rule (possibly the United States or western contact group), and allowing time within the process for the cultivation of mutual trust among former adversaries. In particular, he warns against negotiating with those not recognized as legitimate leaders of any group. He does not think one-person, one-vote is an important first step, but it must be the eventual goal of the transition. Sithole’s recollections of the Rhodesian experience are interesting for their detailed knowledge of the Lancaster House peace process, but he overestimates the willingness of NP leaders to pursue majority rule even in the long term. He is also overly-optimistic about the extent of awareness within the NP that apartheid cannot endure.


The author explains some of the reasoning behind his abrupt resignation from South Africa’s all-white House of Assembly in 1986 and outlines his view of the nation’s future. Although generally opposed to revolution as a political solution, he sees the locus of its alternative--incremental change within the parliamentary system--as futile under an extremely repressive regime. In fact, attempting to avoid revolutionary change extends the life of a repressive regime, in his view, allowing the government time to consolidate support among those who may be hurt by reform. Slabbert presents a view of the 1984 constitution that differs sharply from that of the government--it not only coopted Asians and coloreds through a tricameral parliament, but also created an executive presidency with control of a strengthened security machine and allowed him to use security measures in place of legislation to quell dissent. In effect, the 1984 constitution "put one over" on South Africans and the United States, by creating a legal basis for executive action which would be sure to provoke violent opposition, and the resulting violence, in turn, could be used to justify further security measures to bolster the regime. Slabbert’s analysis of the effects of the 1984 constitution cannot be disputed, but his apparent belief that the National Party (NP) was able to foresee these effects gives the NP undue credit.