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ANNOTATED BIBLIOGRAPHY - OPEN SOURCES ON AFRICA

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PREFACE

This bibliography is culled primarily from books and scholarly journals received during the previous quarter, although significant periodical articles are also cited. Some sources, dependent on surface mails and convoluted routing, are dated slightly. Their entry herein is contingent solely on date of receipt. The array of political, military, strategic, and other materials cited is derived from general, regional, and some national publications published yearly, quarterly, monthly, weekly, or erratically. Hence, sources differ from quarter to quarter. The intent of the bibliographers is to provide a good sampling of regional-related sources to aid the researcher in maintaining awareness of developments. No presumption of comprehensiveness is made.

Analysts contributing to this bibliography are LaVerle Berry and Robert Handloff.
East/Central Africa

Central African Republic


This is another volume in the "Profiles" series on contemporary nations of Africa from Westview Press. It provides a general survey of the geography, history, society, economy, politics, and foreign relations of the Central African Republic and is one of the few available sources on the CAR in English. The author finds that the country's inconsistencies in its foreign policies have reflected a constant search for revenue and assistance from external sources. The Republic maintains a closer relationship with France than with any other major power, which is not likely to change in the near future. In his generally sober assessment, O'Toole foresees little chance for meaningful social and political development in this poor, dependent country.

Ethiopia


This article is a rather superficial analysis of the premise that US military aid produces favorable political attitudes and orientations in the recipient nation. The author examines the Mutual Defense Assistance Agreement of 1953 between Ethiopia and the United States in light of the military takeover in 1974 and the course of the Ethiopian Revolution over the next 3 years. He considers some of the major steps by which the defense agreement unravelled and concludes that the Ethiopian case calls into question the premise of US military aid stated above. While this article merits reading, it is not based upon a thorough understanding of the total United States-Ethiopian relationship or even of the military situation, let alone of the complexities of the Ethiopian revolutionary scene of the 1970s. The author overemphasizes Ethiopian "reactions" to US "actions," he ignores the fact that much sentiment favorable to the United States existed and probably is yet found in the ranks of the Ethiopian military, and he gives insufficient attention to the reluctance with which the United States surrendered its deep and long-standing relationship with Ethiopia in the 1970s.

Southern Africa

South Africa

Baker, Pauline H. "Facing Up to Apartheid." *Foreign Policy*, vol. 64, no. 1 (Fall 1986), pp. 37-62
In her criticism of the Reagan administration's policy toward South Africa, Pauline Baker suggests that constructive engagement may have held some promise for achieving US objectives were it properly implemented. In fact, she says, the US administration failed to keep abreast of events in South Africa and, in particular, the changing nature and scale of black protest. Consequently, Washington established no deadlines, applied no pressure, and devised no process for change, all the while appearing to express empathy for the difficult dilemma confronting whites. As evidence of a new approach, Washington should focus on apartheid in South Africa and not on peripheral issues like Namibia or Angola; dissociate itself from Pretoria's discredited strategy of reform; commit itself to democracy by presenting a plan for comprehensive political change that would include a timetable for negotiations and the release of political prisoners; show itself willing to apply pressure; demonstrate good faith to blacks, as current negotiations with ANC leaders are beginning to do; and make the policy shift clear to Pretoria. Such a program would conform to the growing body of opinion in South Africa, shared by whites and blacks, that interested third parties should get serious or get out.


In this unofficial report of the Commonwealth's Eminent Persons Group (EPG), its co-chairs restate the group's conclusions on South Africa and suggest measures which must be undertaken by the West to avert what they predict might become the "worst bloodbath since World War II." Following its 6 months of meetings with government officials and blacks in South Africa, in the course of which South Africa attacked three neighboring countries and imposed draconian security measures, the EPG stated unequivocally that the government is not ready to, nor has it any intention of, negotiating in good faith. South Africa's intransigence on the primacy of group over individual rights and on the permanence of the homelands will inevitably and inexorably lead to an increasing spiral of violence followed by the emergence of an anti-Western, radical regime. Measures which might pressure the Pretoria regime include: removing consular facilities, cutting airlinks, tightening restrictions in banking and finance, and imposing sanctions, if only as a symbolic gesture (although the authors see them as effective). If they are less than sanguine on the prospects of forcing change, the authors emphasize that time is short and constructive engagement and its variants has failed. Once the guerrilla war begins, it will be almost impossible to stop it and return to negotiations.


It seems clear that the role of the military in South Africa is destined to grow in proportion to growing white fears about their security. Dr. Grundy documents the expansion of the military and its
role in government decision-making since the latter half of the 1970s. The author concludes that soldiers, like much of the leadership of which they form a part, are ambivalent toward reform. On foreign policy, the attitude of the military is more clearly defined: keeping neighboring states on a close rein while resisting any sort of settlement of the Namibian question that does not meet South African approval.


The author argues convincingly that focusing on communism and the links between the South African Communist Party (SACP) and the African National Congress (ANC) fosters a serious misunderstanding of the nature of the ANC, which he believes is significantly less concerned with class interests than with civil and political rights. While the ANC has welcomed supporters regardless of color or political stripe, the participation and influence of SACP members in particular has seemingly assumed the mythical proportions of religious dogma among some US conservatives. In the author's commentary, communists come across as cleverer and more influential than anybody else, while blacks appear incapable of managing their own affairs. Meanwhile, Karis insists that ANC thinking has reflected a deeply rooted strain of African exclusiveness, self-reliance, and national pride while steadfastly maintaining its suspicions of non-African ideologies, leftist or otherwise, espoused by privileged non-blacks thought to have conflicting allegiances. In concluding, Karis suggests that Americans who view South Africa and the ANC through ideological blinders will mistakenly urge support of unpopular moderates against the ANC, and thus undermine long-term US interests.


In the author's opinion, the African National Congress (ANC) constitutes the principal and perhaps decisive element in the anti-apartheid struggle, notwithstanding attempts by the government of South Africa to affix to it the terrorist label. Uhlig briefly examines the history of the ANC, underscoring the fact that early on the East Bloc (including China) willingly assisted the ANC with what at the time was token aid, while the West virtually ignored it. At the same time, the author is careful to minimize the long-term significance of Soviet aid and accuses US conservatives of exaggerating its import. In focusing on the current situation, he also suggests that the stepped up level of violence against civilians (for which, he believes, the blacks are not responsible) as well as the establishment of the Congress of South African Trade Unions (COSATU) and the United Democratic Front (UDF) all enhance the stature of the ANC. Finally, the author warns that many youthful
protesters already believe that the ANC has outlived its usefulness and that much future violence will be beyond ANC control.


The book, an anthology, contains contributions from South Africans in politics and letters—P.W. Botha, Desmond Tutu, Nelson Mandela, Nadine Gordimer, Andries P. Treurnicht, Gatsha Buthelezi—together with those of Western journalists, political scientists, and economists, all of whom are students of the region. It presents an overview of apartheid as a social and political issue and then in separate sections examines white politics, black politics, the South African economy, and South Africa's relations with the United States and the other states of southern Africa. Of special interest to US planners are the two foreign policy chapters and the one on the economy by Michael Gavin, now of the Federal Reserve Board of Governors, entitled "The High Cost of Reform." Gavin offers the pessimistic conclusion that although outside economic factors may make life more difficult for both blacks and whites, the costs to whites of sufficient economic and political reforms to satisfy the demands of even moderate black groups would be so catastrophic as to preclude peaceful change. The foreign policy chapter by Sanford Ungar and Peter Vale explains the failure of constructive engagement, while the essay by David Martin and Phyllis Johnson analyses South Africa's policy of destabilizing the region to coerce its neighbors into a dependency relationship.

West Africa

*Burkina Faso; Ivory Coast*

Faure, Y.A. "Ouaga et Abidjan: divorce a l'Africaine?" *Politique Africaine*, vol. 20 (December 1985), pp. 78-86

With the rise to power of Captain Thomas Sankara, came promises of a revolutionary internal reorganization coupled with a so-called "anti-imperialist and non-aligned" foreign policy. It was expected that Burkina's relations with Abidjan would deteriorate markedly as Ouagadougou improved its ties with such progressive states as Libya, Algeria, Cuba, and Ghana; however, as the author points out with numerous examples, that has not been the case. In fact, there are rumors of direct Ivorian subsidies to the Burkinabe budget. To explain these contradictions, the author points first to the constraints on both sides imposed by the approximately 2 million Burkinabe citizens living in Ivory Coast; and second, to the persistent inconsistencies between domestic and foreign policies, which in this case reflect bureaucratic inertia, local modalities of diplomacy, and internal coalition building. These factors underscore the futility of attempting a simplistic, geostrategic analysis.
Nigeria


Nigeria has shown that it cannot live under authoritarian rule and yet it has twice failed in its experiment with democracy. Drawing on the successes and failures of Nigeria's previous governments, the author concocts a remedy for success that he hopes will eliminate the deleterious effects of polarizing ethnic and/or regional conflict, corruption in the electoral process, and the absence of integrity in government. He suggests continued federalism coupled with zoning or aggregating states and/or ethnic groups for distributing power and resources when it is impossible to mandate representation for each state, and a system of checks and balances to allow democratic institutions to take root and flourish. Key to ensuring compliance would be an ethnically balanced, apolitical oversight committee drawn from associations of doctors, lawyers, academics, labor leaders, manufacturers, and journalists. However, if it becomes imperative to oversee the overseers, as has been the case in the past, then the current debate on Nigeria's constitutional future will again turn out to be sterile.