Annotated Bibliography: Open Sources on Africa

LaVerle Berry, Kate Bullard, Rita Byrnes, Eunice Charles, Steven Cranton, Nancy Drexler, William Eaton, Naomi Greer, Robert Handloff, Mary Louis Harmon, Greta Holtz, Linda Lau, T. Robert Lenaghan, Kenneth Libeinstein, Moses Pinkston, Patricia Riggsbee, Rachel Warner

Federal Research Division
Library of Congress
Washington, DC 20540-4840

N/A

Prepared under an Interagency Agreement

Approved for public release; distribution unlimited.

An annotated bibliography of open sources received. Entries on strategic military, political, and economic topics are included. Published monthly until September 1984 and quarterly thereafter.
ANNOTATED BIBLIOGRAPHY - OPEN SOURCES ON AFRICA

September 1986

Prepared by the Federal Research Division of the Library of Congress under an interagency agreement
PREFACE

This bibliography is culled primarily from books and scholarly journals received during the previous quarter, although significant periodical articles are also cited. Some sources, dependent on surface mails and convoluted routing, are dated slightly. Their entry herein is contingent solely on date of receipt. The array of political, military, strategic, and other materials cited is derived from general, regional, and some national publications published yearly, quarterly, monthly, weekly, or erratically. Hence, sources differ from quarter to quarter. The intent of the bibliographers is to provide a good sampling of regional-related sources to aid the researcher in maintaining awareness of developments. No presumption of comprehensiveness is made.

Analysts contributing to this bibliography are LaVerle Berry, Robert Handloff, T. Robert Lenaghan, Moses Pinkston, and Rachel Warner.

This book offers a balanced analysis of the history of the two superpowers' African policies. According to the author, the 1975 Angolan crisis marks a distinct turning point for each superpower in Africa. Before that time, the competition between the United States and the Soviet Union on the African continent had few repercussions on the world stage. After the 1975 crisis in Angola, however, both superpowers attached a greater significance to Africa and troubles there began to color the global relationship between Moscow and Washington. Generally, Laidi perceives the United State's policy as being guided by classical precepts, except for a short interlude during the Carter era, when regionalist policymakers enjoyed greater favor. He goes on to note that the major strength of American policy in Africa is its ability to use economic aid as an effective carrot. Soviet policy, on the other hand, is hampered by Moscow's inability to compete with the United States as an aid donor. The Soviets have turned, therefore, to military aid as their preferred "policy tool" in Africa. The book includes a short section examining the Cuban-Soviet relationship, which concludes that the decision to send Cuban troops to Angola was Castro's alone, but that he obviously could not have done it had not the Soviets agreed to provide material support.


This book was originally a collection of papers presented at a conference on US policy toward Africa organized by the nonpartisan Washington Institute for Values in Public Policy. The contributors, representing both the left and right, include well-known academics, and also administrators from private voluntary organizations and the government. The collection first examines US interests in Africa, and then discusses US policy on a range of issues, including political and social conflict, refugees and immigrants, and economic problems. There is also a separate section on the conflict in South Africa. The collection attempts to recreate the give-and-take of a conference by following each major paper with a rebuttal and a short discussion. The papers develop four closely related themes. The first holds that Africa is not very important to the US foreign policy establishment, and as a result policy toward Africa has been inconsistent, incoherent, and divorced from any understanding of sub-Saharan realities. Whatever has passed for policy, i.e., constructive engagement, has not succeeded. Secondly, it is conjectured that United States intervention usually offers military responses to social and economic problems, with disappointing results. The third theme notes that US policymakers appear preoccupied, if not obsessed, with a Soviet or Communist presence that is either nonexistent, unimportant, or that represents an expedient if unattractive choice by African leaders. Implied is the notion that Western support for liberation movements and subsequent development projects would be far more attractive to the leaders of Africa's
fledgling states than any aid the Soviets could give. The problem is
that such aid from the West is rarely forthcoming when the potential
recipients are labeled as Marxists. Thus, by tolerating white rule in
South Africa, out of fear that a black ruled state would adopt a
Communist ideology, the West implicitly underestimates the vastly
greater appeal of its own as opposed to Soviet ideology. Those
Africans who have turned to the East have done so, the editor argues,
mainly because the West seems to have deserted them. The last theme
offered in the book is a plea for an "Afrocentric" foreign policy
that is coherent, consistent, and based on an understanding of
Africa's problems.

Zartman, I. William. *Ripe for Resolution: Conflict and Intervention in

Zartman, a noted Africanist, looks at the process of conflict
resolution in Africa by examining events in four separate crisis
areas—the Western Sahara, the Horn, Zaire, and Namibia. He presents
the unsurprising thesis that, at certain specific points in time,
escalations in the level of violence in ongoing conflicts create the
conditions necessary for the resolution of those conflicts. However,
the chief merit of this book is not to be found in the author's
theory of conflict resolution, which in reality is nothing more than
the realization that as events unfold, positions change and
previously stalled negotiations can open up. Rather, the main
strength of Zartman's work is in the four coherent, well-researched
and well-written case studies. The chapter on the Western Sahara is
a particularly good source of information about this rarely addressed
conflict.

**Angola**

Smith, Wayne S. "A Trap in Angola." *Foreign Policy*, no. 62 (Spring

The author, strongly critical of US support of Jonas Savimbi and the
National Union for the Total Independence of Angola (UNITA), argues
that the Reagan administration's claim that the purpose of this
support is to force the Angolan Government to be more forthcoming in
negotiations is wrong on two counts. First, since US aid to Savimbi
would only add to the considerable amount of support he already
receives from South Africa, most African states would perceive the
enterprise as a case of United States/South Africa cooperation. This
would have damaging repercussions for US policy in black Africa for
years to come. Secondly, US aid to Savimbi will not bring about the
withdrawal of Cuban troops. If anything, it is probably the best way
of making certain they remain. The article continues with an
in-depth critical discussion of the Ford administration's policy in
1975 when Angola first gained independence. He concludes that the
1975 US policy resulted in the introduction of 30,000 Cuban soldiers
into Angola and that a decision in 1986 to aid Savimbi would insure
that they remain.

The author examines the interrelationship between the "tributary" governments of the Horn and the two dominant superpowers. His thesis is that war, famine, and other failed policies of Horn governments are due in part to superpower rivalry as well as to the inept, aggressive, and foolish decisions made by government leaders. The "tributary" states of Sudan, Ethiopia, and Somalia have each tried to use a superpower backer for their own ends, but Shepherd says the governments of these states have been coopted by the designs, arms, and technology of their superpower backers. According to the author, this explains their penchant for displays of military power and aggression, seemingly wasteful acts for such poor states. The Horn governments' fundamental unconcern with the basic welfare of their people has already sparked internal discontent, which will continue to grow until these governments are overthrown. The author, perhaps naively, foresees the possibility that new revolutionary regimes will emerge in the Horn, that they will reject ties to the superpowers, and that they will dedicate themselves to the advancement of their respective peoples.


The authors examine the economic, ethnic, and social causes of the abortive coup attempt in Kenya on 1 August 1982. The short-lived "People's Redemption Council," led by noncommissioned officers of the Kenyan Air Force (KAF) received extensive popular support in Nairobi, Mombasa, and western Kenya, before it was defeated by forces loyal to the government. The mass support for the insurrection was the result of a worsening economic crisis, regional-ethnic tensions, open struggles over land allocation, and deteriorating relations between the government and the University of Nairobi. The article contains information about the leadership in the Kenyan Government, the armed forces and educated elite. The authors point out that without an indigenous support base, the postcolonial state is inherently unstable and vulnerable to powerful local interest groups, among which the military are particularly prominent. Among the grievances expressed by members of the KAF in 1982 were low salaries, neglect of servicemen by senior ranks, opposition to the one-party state, and the preventive detention of suspected dissidents. The analysis of the coup attempt and its underlying causes helps the reader understand the continuing political tension in Kenya and the repressive actions currently being taken by Presidents Moi's government. The authors speculate that dissident groups, again centered around the University of Nairobi, will re-emerge as opponents of Moi's rule, and that widespread conflict is likely to re-appear as it has in the Mwakenya Movement.
Mozambique


In this partisan piece by the Heritage Foundation, it is argued that the United States should help the Mozambique National Resistance Movement (RENAMO) replace the Marxist-Leninist government with a noncommunist alternative. After a review of the Marxist-Leninist nature of the government, the economic problems facing Mozambique, and the escalation of government military operations against RENAMO, the article goes on to characterize Zimbabwe's military aid to Mozambique as a kind of "socialist solidarity." The article also points out that RENAMO has become stronger since the 1984 signing of the Nkomati Accord between Mozambique and South Africa, and that the United States finds itself with a policy that seems calculated to undermine the efforts of an anticommmunist, popularly-supported resistance struggling to rid itself of a repressive Marxist-Leninist dictatorship. The paper concludes that the Reagan administration should downgrade relations with the Machel regime by withdrawing the US ambassador, stop all US aid to the Machel government, and provide moral support and humanitarian assistance to RENAMO.

Namibia


In this lengthy article, the author argues that the political and military struggles for Namibia's independence have a legal dimension which should not be ignored. He then proceeds to discuss how, during the long period that Namibia has been on the agenda of the international community, there developed a legal consensus that is unequivocally on the side of Namibian independence. Faundez also addresses the contemporary relevance of Namibia's legal status as well as the importance it will have should an independent Namibia decide to seek compensation for the crimes committed against its people and territory. He concludes with an outline of the United Nations plan for Namibia's independence and by explaining how South Africa and its allies have tried, so far unsuccessfully, to undermine the legal consensus in current negotiations.

Nigeria


The author defends Nigeria's relatively high levels of defense expenditure on its naval forces by examining three factors: the breadth of its maritime interests and commitments, the threats to those interests, and the potential cost of maintaining a navy. Under the first category of maritime interests, Sheehan lists oil, liquid
natural gas, fishing grounds, and dredged sand and aggregate for construction. Historically, the threat to efficient exploitation of those resources has been from within. However, Nigeria's recently articulated foreign policy aspirations on the continent have increased the potential for low-intensity conflict with South Africa. Sheehan concludes that to protect its resources and fulfill its strategic objectives, Nigeria will have to bear the burden of becoming what he calls a "medium maritime power."

South Africa


In this detailed analysis of the racial conflict which has existed for 300 years in South Africa, but which has recently escalated into virtual civil war, the author focuses on several key issues. The first part of the article looks at the provisions of the September 1983 constitution, including the granting of widespread powers to the state president, and the resulting reactions from an increasingly violent African National Congress (ANC) and a rapidly expanding United Democratic Front (UDF). The second part of the article examines the underlying causes of the increasing unrest. Vollenhoven identifies these causes as black exclusion from politics, dissatisfaction with the education system, and unemployment. She concludes that fundamental political change, to be distinguished from the government's attempts thus far to disguise apartheid, cannot be achieved unless the government introduces a model for a future South Africa with black leadership that does have credibility. However, the white minority government has given clear indications that this is highly unlikely.

Southern Africa


The author bases this article on the theory that the black countries of southern Africa can only escape from their dependency on the industrialized world by fostering regional economic integration. Such a strategy is doubly important for the states of southern Africa, for not only would economic integration offer hope for ending their state of dependency on the developed world, but it also would allow them to break the present stranglehold that South Africa has on their economies. However, while countries like Angola, Mozambique, and Tanzania can make a vigorous attempt to bargain, there are other countries that are landlocked and/or too poor to make their voices heard. They accept the status quo more out of hopelessness than choice. Lesotho, Swaziland, and to some extent Botswana, fall into this category. Hence the need for a community approach, which would help these economically weaker states overcome their exceptional
dependence on South Africa. One such economic community in southern Africa is the Southern African Development Coordination Conference (SADCC), made up of Angola, Botswana, Lesotho, Malawi, Mozambique, Swaziland, Tanzania, Zambia, and Zimbabwe. SADCC's main purpose is to reduce its members' dependency on South African transportation outlets. However, the author points out that southern African markets are plagued by vast economic and ideological differences and that in order for integration to work, member states must adopt common economic strategies. Similarly, they must demonstrate the will and ability to confront and minimize regional distribution problems. Both these requirements imply agreement on such key issues as the nature and causes of underdevelopment and the effects of different economic systems on social relations. The author realizes that such high levels of cooperation are extremely unlikely; therefore the immediate prospects for economic integration are quite dim.


This article addresses three principal questions about Soviet policy in southern Africa. First, the author seeks to answer the question of whether or not the role of ideology in shaping Soviet policy is declining in importance. Secondly, Su examines how Soviet policy has been affected by the erosion of ideological support for orthodox Marxism in Africa. Finally, the author attempts to discern how variations in official Soviet ideology have influenced Soviet policy on the ground in southern Africa. Su discusses the changes in Soviet perceptions of its place in the world over the past few decades, starting from the early Soviet perception of itself as the only revolutionary power in a hostile environment to its later role in expanding the "world socialist system" in a struggle against "capitalist encirclement." Finally, this two-camp worldview has been blurred by the existence of China, Western Europe, and the Third World, although in the two-camp perspective, Africa is analyzed in either-or terms. Thus the newly independent African countries are viewed as either friendly and cooperative with the Soviet Union, or as extensions of the capitalist West. The author argues that the Soviets have had many problems dealing with southern African countries because these countries lack both a proletarian base and a landless peasantry—leaving them with no revolutionary masses in the classic Marxist sense. As a result, while the Soviets have made significant inroads in southern Africa, they have shown restraint in recent years as their analysis of the situation becomes increasingly sophisticated—thus paving the way for a more flexible policy. In conclusion, the author warns that this newly emerging Soviet policy is far more dangerous to the West than the former "shotgun" approach.

Sudan

In this concise article, the author focuses on recent developments in the continuing struggle over the integration of the southern Sudan with the rest of the country. Lesch gives the greatest attention to how Numeri and the Transitional Military Council (TMC) regimes went about trying to solve the Sudan's "southern problem." She describes the cultural, social, and economic differences between the South and the rest of the country, as well as the ethnic divisions within the South, which are responsible for such things as the conflict between the Dinka-dominated Sudanese People's Liberation Army (SPLA) and Nuer Anya Anya II guerrilla faction. Lesch argues that, because of various Khartoum governments' unwillingness to tackle the basic problems of unity in a multicultural nation, the SPLA has built up a firm base of support and is in a position to keep on fighting indefinitely, even without the current levels of support it receives from Ethiopia.