**Annotated Bibliography: Open Sources on Africa**

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ANNOTATED BIBLIOGRAPHY - OPEN SOURCES ON AFRICA

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PREFACE

This bibliography is culled primarily from books and scholarly journals received during the previous quarter, although significant periodical articles are also cited. Some sources, dependent on surface mails and convoluted routing, are dated slightly. Their entry herein is contingent solely on date of receipt. The array of political, military, strategic, and other materials cited is derived from general, regional, and some national publications published yearly, quarterly, monthly, weekly, or erratically. Hence, sources differ from quarter to quarter. The intent of the bibliographers is to provide a good sampling of regional-related sources to aid the researcher in maintaining awareness of developments. No presumption of comprehensiveness is made.

Analysts contributing to this bibliography are LaVerle Berry, Robert Handloff, T. Robert Lenaghan, Moses Pinkston, and Rachel Warner.

This extremely well written and researched book presents a scholarly history of Western and Eastern bloc involvement in Africa since the close of World War II to 1983. What distinguishes this book from numerous other studies of Africa's role in the East-West conflict is its commitment to analyzing this topic on the "alliance" level. Thus the interests and policies of Western and Eastern countries are not only considered for their effect on the global balance of power, but also for their effect on the alliances to which they belong. The author, therefore, devotes a considerable amount of space to the development of the NATO alliance's African policy guidelines and the competing interests of some of the NATO members. France, for instance, sought a much more active role for NATO in North Africa during the 1950s with the hope that the alliance would help it hold on to its colonies there. Besides focusing on the strategic significance of Africa, Coker also details the economic importance of the continent. He includes an especially informative section on the little addressed topic of East Bloc economic interests in Africa. Geographically, the book focuses mainly on southern Africa, where both NATO and Warsaw Pact intervention has been the greatest.


In this short essay the author touches on several questions confronting the role of the military in Africa. A primary issue confronting sub-Saharan African—if not all—states is the absence of a rational program for military support that realistically appraises both potential threats and the financial resources necessary to meet them. Since most African countries lack such an integrated program, the direction of military expansion more often than not fits the needs of European suppliers rather than those of the African recipients. With little thought given to the true needs of the military, technical training remains a serious problem, waste is endemic, and military forces stagnate in a low state of readiness. At the same time, Copley points out that several African armies, especially those of Angola, Tanzania, and Zimbabwe, have compartmented themselves well in combat. Unfortunately, he concludes that African armies have had much less success when they have tried their hands at governing. But since the army is often the only group able to hold the nation together, it is important for the military to recognize its new responsibility and acquire additional expertise in civil administration.

Duignan begins his short essay with the untestable conclusion that since the United States and the Soviets share global interests, Africa can only be viewed from a globalist point of view. Once this thesis is accepted, all African states perforce become either allies of the United States or puppets of the Soviets. Duignan subsequently attributes discord on the continent, and especially in South Africa, to Soviet expansionism. He insists that black nationalist movements in southern Africa are illegitimate, Soviet inspired rebellions against governments which are friendly to the West. Finally, the author concludes that larger strategic concerns require the United States to subordinate African interests, legitimate or otherwise, to the struggle against world communism.


In this article Foltz foresees little likelihood for a demilitarization of African political systems. This is true mainly, he believes, because few African leaders would say that their security needs are diminishing. Hence they feel the need to expand their military machines in a manner common to leaders all throughout the world. Ideally, Africa's security needs would be best met by some sort of pan-African security force and by substituting developmental programs for military ones. However, both prospects are highly unlikely. Military spending by individual states will continue to rise. Foltz recognizes that while it makes sense for some African governments to modernize their military equipment, they should limit their purchases to materiel that is easy to operate and requires little maintenance. In catering to the African market, US policy makers should underscore the importance of securing low-cost, low-maintenance equipment even if this requires purchasing materiel from other Third World producers. However, instead of emphasizing arms, the United States should concentrate on providing technical and managerial training for African officers. Foltz closes with a plea for recognizing that globalist-inspired policies often have regional consequences that are inimical to US interests and provide the Soviet Union with opportunities for military intervention.


Foltz is a regionalist who assigns to Africa a raison d'être independent of outside powers. Nevertheless, he begins with a historical summation of Africa's importance, judged by globalist strategic criteria. In this context, he mentions Africa's roles as an obstacle or buffer, a launch pad, a source of raw materials, and as a protector of sea lanes. What role Africa plays in the world system at any given point in time is determined both by the course of events
outside and within the continent. Examples of the former include the state of relations between the great powers and Africa's geographical proximity to other political and economic "hot spots." Internal factors which influence Africa's global significance include the level of political activity on the continent and changes in military and industrial technology. In his discussion of these points Foltz makes a number of observations. Specifically, he notes that the Soviet presence in sub-Saharan Africa has reflected African pull rather than Soviet push, that a genuine threat to sources of strategic minerals would arise from the collapse of the economic and social order, that attempts by the Soviet Union to interdict resources would involve costs never before incurred so far from its borders, that African governments and liberation movements have ingratiatingly dispatched outsiders whose services are no longer wanted, and that African states are neither puppets nor dependent neocolonies. A more likely danger than a Soviet takeover of this or that African state would be that the superpowers would find themselves drawn into a major confrontation by desperate regimes or factions on a disordered corner of the continent. In such a situation, both Africa and the great powers would be losers.


Mr. Thom suggests that African armies will grow and that they will purchase heavier and more sophisticated arms (which will result in continued dependence on Western technicians). Furthermore, as they strengthen their capabilities, Thom predicts that they will become sufficiently competent to undertake conventional warfare. The author goes on to take the controversial position that the increase in African military capabilities, because it is likely to accentuate military imbalances between states, will be matched by an increase in the incidence of protracted military conflicts. Such a trend is unlikely because, apart from whatever military stocks they may have built up, few African states possess the financial resources or the basic infrastructure needed to sustain a conventional modern army in the field for any length of time. As for the question of foreign intervention, in general he believes that direct foreign intervention will diminish as African armies show that they can hold their own against white combatants. However, the superpowers will continue to be drawn into African conflicts in a less direct manner by providing arms and seeking to influence the African participants.

Burkina Faso


This article is principally concerned with mapping out the Sankara regime's economic goals and how various social groups within Burkina
are likely to respond to his initiatives. Labazee, a French academic authority on Burkina, believes that the economic strategy of Sankara represents a major break with the past that, if carried out effectively, could lead to a new pattern in the distribution of wealth and provoke conflict between various Burkinabe social groups. In particular, Sankara's desire to improve the lot of the rural population threatens the position of the heretofore privileged urban groups, who have traditionally dominated Burkinabe politics. Interestingly enough, the author notes that though Sankara is widely perceived as a radical with unfavorable views of the capitalist West, his economic policies have set him on a collision course with the Marxist-left in Burkina, whose adherents are to be found mainly among the urban public sector employees—an area where Sankara wishes to make cuts. Though Labazee may be guilty of overstating the coherence of Sankara's policies, this article does offer a useful look into the shadowy world of Burkinabe socio-political alliances.

Ethiopia


The author, formerly with the US Embassy in Addis Ababa, offers an assessment of the current situation in Ethiopia, or more particularly, of the regime's Socialist orientation. He is highly critical of the government and its policies, faulting them for the precarious situation in which Ethiopia finds itself at the moment. Despite the trials of the past decade, Henze asserts that the concept of a unified Ethiopian state is still valid. He emphasizes the wide gap which separates almost all Ethiopians from the personalities and policies of the small group of military officers who form the heart of the government. Ethiopia's ideological and strategic relationship with the Soviet Union has cost the country dearly in terms of economic development and output. Socialism, which has struck only shallow roots, offers no solutions to the economic, military, and demographic problems which Ethiopia confronts.

Lesotho


In the introduction Bardill and Cobbe outline the features that make Lesotho unique. They trace its history and discuss the peculiar structure of its labor reserve economy. They give particular attention to the effects this latter characteristic has had on development, politics, society, and culture. They examine Lesotho's fascinating mixture of socio-cultural unity and diversity, its problems with rapid social change, the autocratic nature of its government, and the sources of political cleavage and constraints on political change. Bardill and Cobbe conclude that despite strong support from the international community since independence, the
country has been unable to do much to promote development, reduce independence on South Africa, or quell internal dissent. In closing, the authors look at Lesotho's complex international relations, which are still dominated by South Africa, and survey the country's prospects for the future.

**Nigeria**


The recent police riot at Ahmadu Bello University (ABU) in Zaria which resulted in the deaths of 17 university students recalls vividly a similar example of police misconduct at ABU in 1978. This earlier incident, which resulted in the deaths of a number of students, bystanders, university staff, and villagers, is described here by Igbinovia. Apparently little has changed. Igbinovia focus on two areas of police misconduct: corruption and violence. He traces police violence to the historical origin of the Nigerian Police Force (NPF) as a paramilitary organization during the colonial era. It was at this time, presumably, that the policeman's "working personality" emerged. According to Igbinovia this typical personality is characterized by suspicion, ethnic chauvinism, fear, insecurity, and pressure to perform. Overall, too, violence has become an effective method of problem solving for the NPF. As for the causes of police corruption, Igbinovia cites the predilection within the classes from which police recruits are drawn for valuing personal gain above national interests, the opportunities open to police in a society lacking a firm ethic against corruption, a silence code among officers, and the ambivalence surrounding vice-related criminal behavior. Igbinovia offers several solutions for policing the police. However as long as others in the government, from heads of state on down, treat the state administration as an economic resource to be mined, there is little probability that many members of the NPF will cease behaving like licensed criminals.

**South Africa**


Starting from the assumption that the recent upheavals in South Africa almost certainly mark the beginning of the end of white rule, the authors conjecture that Azania, a name used in this article to distinguish between the current minority-ruled government and a future majority-ruled one, will soon replace South Africa. The authors believe this could happen perhaps within the next decade. Two routes to the emergence of Azania are presented. The first, widely held to be the most probable one, is based on sustained white intransigence with a long and bitter cycle of violence and repression causing massive economic damage, the eventual defeat of white rule,
the imposition of an extremist black government, and the driving out of other races. However, an alternative route may be adopted, one that rests on the assumption that Azania, like Zimbabwe, will emerge with an eleventh hour political deal to avoid a full-scale civil war. The article goes on to expound on the kind of deal which might be struck and its implications for the rest of Africa. The authors conclude that Western governments should use their economic leverage to steer all parties away from civil war and toward the peaceful Azanian solution.


The authors contend that contemporary South African politics seems to confirm the saying that history repeats itself. The domestic and international difficulties presently besetting the country bear a striking resemblance, they claim, to those experienced less than a decade ago. More specifically, South Africa under President P. W. Botha looks very much like South Africa under Prime Minister B. J. Vorster. Defining a crisis as an extraordinary or abnormal situation, characterized by acute tension, suspicion, intense threat perceptions, great uncertainty, and a feeling that the nation's vital interests are at stake, the authors make the general observation that South Africa in the periods from 1976 to 1978 and from 1984 to 1985 faced a double crisis involving both domestic and foreign relations. The article discusses the nature of the crises, disillusionment in Afrikaner circles with Vorster's and Botha's leadership, and the two leaders' styles of decisionmaking. The authors conclude that if political history is indeed repeating itself, Botha's political career is likely to come to the same ignominious end as his predecessor's.


Beginning with the premise that the 1960 Sharpeville massacre marked a watershed point from which significant processes of change began, the author suggests that Sharpeville set into motion the expansion and progressive sophistication of South Africa's now extensive security apparatus. The county has acquired a more-than-adequate deterrent against a conventional threat which its government believes is linked to Soviet strategy in southern Africa. South Africa also maintains the ability to destroy guerrilla bases and headquarters in neighboring countries. The author continues on to examine South Africa's relations with Mozambique since the signing in March 1984 of the Nkomati Accord, the military engagement in Angola, and the situation in Namibia. Gutteridge concludes that the wave of black unrest which swept the country by mid-1986 led the government to identify black internal opposition as the real security threat to its...
existence. This diminished the perception of the threats posed by hostile neighbors and the Soviet Union.