**REPORT DOCUMENTATION PAGE**

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1. AGENCY USE ONLY (Leave Blank)
2. REPORT DATE
   March 1986
3. REPORT TYPE AND DATES COVERED
   Final

4. TITLE AND SUBTITLE
   Annotated Bibliography: Open Sources on Africa

6. AUTHOR(S)
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7. PERFORMING ORGANIZATION NAME(S) AND ADDRESS(ES)
   Federal Research Division
   Library of Congress
   Washington, DC 20540-4840

9. SPONSORING/MONITORING AGENCY NAME(S) AND ADDRESS(ES)
   N/A

12a. DISTRIBUTION/AVAILABILITY STATEMENT
    Approved for public release; distribution unlimited.

13. ABSTRACT (Maximum 200 words)
    An annotated bibliography of open sources received. Entries on strategic military, political, and economic topics are included. Published monthly until September 1984 and quarterly thereafter.

14. SUBJECT TERMS
   Africa--Sub-Saharan
   Military affairs
   Economy
   Government
   Politics

17. SECURITY CLASSIFICATION OF REPORT
   UNCLASSIFIED

18. SECURITY CLASSIFICATION OF THIS PAGE
   UNCLASSIFIED

19. SECURITY CLASSIFICATION OF ABSTRACT
   UNCLASSIFIED

20. LIMITATION OF ABSTRACT
   SAR

NSN 7540-01-260-5500

19960827 065
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ANNOTATED BIBLIOGRAPHY - OPEN SOURCES ON AFRICA

March 1986

Prepared by the Federal Research Division of the Library of Congress under an interagency agreement
PREFACE

This bibliography is culled primarily from books and scholarly journals received during the previous quarter, although significant periodical articles are also cited. Some sources, dependent on surface mails and convoluted routing, are dated slightly. Their entry herein is contingent solely on date of receipt. The array of political, military, strategic, and other materials cited is derived from general, regional, and some national publications published yearly, quarterly, monthly, weekly, or erratically. Hence, sources differ from quarter to quarter. The intent of the bibliographers is to provide a good sampling of regional-related sources to aid the researcher in maintaining awareness of developments. No presumption of comprehensiveness is made.

Analysts contributing to this bibliography are LaVerle Berry, Robert Handloff, Mary Louise Harmon, T. Robert Lenaghan, Kenneth Liberstein, and Rachel Warner.
ANOTATED BIBLIOGRAPHY -- OPEN SOURCES ON AFRICA
March 1986

Africa General


This disjointed book suffers from an unfortunate tendency to combine questionable assertions presented as fact with long digressions into irrelevant detail. To give a single example, Benchenane characterizes the Ankrah coup d'etat in Ghana, which overthrew Nkrumah in 1966, as the result of "bourgeois" manipulation of the army. This tendentious assertion is supposed to be supported by the fact that the military government which came to power in 1966 eventually ceded power to Dr. Kofi Busia, a believer in the free market. The author does not explain why, if this was so, did it take the military government years to hand over authority to Busia; nor why it was necessary to purge Ankrah before Busia came to head the nation. While important events such as this are glossed over in a superficial manner, we are treated to endless lists of cabinet members in military regimes with little analysis to render any of this intelligible. Insofar as there is a unifying theme to this book it seems to be that "petit bourgeois" cliques in Africa use or control the armies in order to advance their own interests. However, there is little cogent analysis presented to uphold this viewpoint.


Edited by two noted Africanists, this book contains six chapters of discussion and analysis plus a concluding summary chapter. Written by well-qualified Africanists, each chapter deals with a selected theme or topic. As a whole, the book provides the reader with both data and insights but offers little in the way of integrated analysis. The book begins with a treatment of great power interest in Africa over the centuries and an attempt to assess the roles or positions that the continent has occupied in global politics. Two chapters discuss Soviet and French military relations with Africa—the two major external players in African military affairs in the 1980s. The ever-growing role and capabilities of Africa's armed forces, as well as their weaknesses and limitations, are themes other authors develop. In the concluding chapter Foltz emphasizes the wisdom of keeping military supplies under control and warns of the danger of unbridled military expansion. The book contains little about military operations, military government, or military coups. It does, however, give new information on external sources of military supplies, conflicts in Africa, and on the behavior and capabilities of Africa's armed forces in the 1980s.


This article analyses the rise of antigovernment insurgencies in Marxist states in the Third World. In Africa, these movements exist
...and Ethiopia. Following brief discussions on individual guerrilla movements, the authors conclude that the simultaneous emergence of anti-Communist guerrilla movements in three regions signifies that the Soviet Union as a colonial power is under assault by some of the same forces which accelerated the destruction of the old European colonial empires it replaced.


Concentrating on Asia, the Caribbean, the Near East, and especially Africa, Horowitz sets out to explore five issues: the importance of ethnic affiliations, sources of ethnic conflict, ethnicity in party politics, ethnicity in the military, and mechanisms for reducing interethnic conflict. The military section discusses colonial recruiting practices in the officer corps and other ranks, ethnic changes after independence, ethnicity in civil-military affairs, and ethnic loyalty of officers. Horowitz uses Sierra Leone as a case study to illustrate the above points, devoting less attention to such countries as Togo, Congo, and Nigeria. He also explores the role of ethnicity in military intervention and coup prevention. The author's analyses are objective and insightful and, with 1,500 footnotes, his book constitutes an exhaustive reference work on the subject.


A rather polemical piece which offers the thesis that France's actions in Africa are meant to further its own national interests. While undisputably correct, the author expands this truism into a nearly hysterical tirade about France's "neocolonial strategy" for preserving the African status quo. Martin sees the French hand behind practically every regime change in francophone Africa. Thus, the coups which overthrew Hamani Dori in Niger (1974), Modibo Keita in Mali (1976), Marien Ngouabi in the Congo (1977) and Moktar Ould Daddah in Mauritania (1978) are alleged to be the result of French covert actions against regimes which were threatening French interests—a doubtful proposition at best. The article also misrepresents certain facets of France's economic relations with Africa. For instance, the CFA franc is portrayed as a neocolonial tool for giving the French control of African states' economic policies. What Martin ignores is that supporting the CFA franc costs the French treasury a considerable amount of money and makes available to members of the Franc Zone a stable, hard currency which allows them access to imports not found in such "monetarily independent" states as Nigeria and Ghana. The author also overstates France's dependence on crucial African minerals, which rather than objective fact is more the result of the lower tariffs given to African raw materials within the framework of the European Economic Community. In sum, this article misrepresents numerous facts, offers a surprising number of questionable generalizations, and ignores the...
Whether the large amount of French economic aid given to nations like the Ivory Coast and Senegal allows many in those countries to enjoy a higher standard of living than would otherwise be possible, and is the real source of French influence in Africa.


Silvey argues that Western conceptions of civil-military relations are all too often based on ethnocentric assumptions. This approach fails to recognize that the military, save in Europe and North America, plays a central role in decisionmaking. The norm, then, is for military participation in politics--especially in countries undergoing rapid industrialization. For a more informed global analysis of civil-military relations, researchers must examine local perceptions of authority and political legitimacy, the historic role of force in social change, the relative prestige of different occupations including soldiering, the intensity of ascriptive (ethnicity, caste, language) and class differences as well as the adaptability of local political institutions. It is also important to note that civilian control is neither absolute nor foreordained for states that are industrialized and "Western," although it is far more likely under such conditions.


Wolpe, the current chair of the House Subcommittee on Africa, catalogs the shortcomings of the globalist--as opposed to regionalist--perspective in US foreign policy toward sub-Saharan Africa. Globalism, and its more sophisticated partner "liberal globalism," define American interests in Africa as primarily anti-Soviet, and differ only in the degree to which they tolerate undisguised authoritarian (albeit anti-Soviet) regimes. Insofar as globalism sees political change in Africa as a consequence of East-West conflict and views African states as easily manipulated, it is implicitly racist and paternalistic. Also, globalism tends to be entirely reactive and self-fulfilling, i.e., confrontation can lead only to conflict. It also allows US policymakers to be manipulated by corrupt and repressive regimes masquerading as anti-Soviet. Wolpe concludes that internal factors such as political repression are far more likely to threaten American long-term interests in Africa than is Soviet intervention.

Angola

Analyzing US policy toward Angola, Marcum notes that the case for intervention in Angola is grounded in a set of three assumptions: that the Soviets and Cubans illegitimately imposed their dominant influence in the country and continue to perpetuate it by force, that the Soviet client, Angola threatens the security of its neighbors, and that the Soviet/Cuban dominance in Angola can be reversed by means of US assistance to the National Union for the Total Independence of Angola (UNITA). Marcum examines these assumptions through a discussion of Angola's history, limits on Soviet and Cuban leverage, relations with neighboring states, Soviet and Cuban motives and behavior, and the gains and risks of US intervention. He argues that diplomatically, the cost to the United States would be too great in the international community because of perceptions of a US/South African alliance. Politically, such a perceived alliance would invite domestic racial discord and endanger domestic peace. He concludes that although there may be some circumstances in which US assistance to antigovernment insurgents could be justified, it should never become a substitute for diplomacy. In the case of Angola, though peace negotiations are frustratingly slow, they represent the most prudent and promising course for US policy.


This paper points out that while Angolan government troops, backed by Cuban forces and directed by Soviet commanders, have been escalating their military campaign against the National Union for the Total Independence of Angola (UNITA), a different battle has been raging in Washington--over the issue of US aid for UNITA. After outlining the historical dimensions of Angolan politics, Pascoe lists US policy options, including humanitarian aid, economic sanctions, the declaration of Angola as a Communist state along with covert and overt military aid. The author then presents four arguments that critics offer against providing aid to UNITA and proceeds to refute each one, concluding that Congress is gaining increasing support from Democrats and Republicans alike for the application of the Reagan Doctrine in Angola, and that only the administration--particularly the State Department--stands in the way.

Angola/Ethiopia/Mozambique

Ethiopia


This short study is one in a series of Rand Corporation papers concerning Socialist Ethiopia. In this volume the author examines the nature and stability of the military government of Ethiopia. He finds no evidence that Soviet-style socialism has taken root outside a small group of believers in the government and military. He goes on to assert that ruthless repression and Soviet arms--rather than popular support--have kept the regime in power. He finds the regime isolated and its hold on the country tenuous. He also argues that the present pro-Soviet course is bankrupt and cannot solve Ethiopia's economic problems. Modification of present policies, therefore, is inevitable. Henze's arguments are well taken, although sometimes asserted too confidently.

Senegal


The purpose of this book is to assess the likelihood for an "Iranian style" Islamic revolution in Senegal. To do this the author, a
African extraction, takes care to distinguish the first strand of Senegalese Islam. The first such strand, the "traditional brotherhoods," principally the Tijanis. Magassouba doubts that this group has any potential given its cozy relationship with the leadership of the country. The second group, that of the middle class, seems equally uninterested in revolutionary Islam. Its members see adherence to Islam as a means of their African cultural identity, but are not eager to purify their political or economic lives according to a strict interpretation. Only the third Islamic current in Senegal, that of the "integrationists" who seek to promote conformity to worldwide fundamentalism, has the potential and desire to work for an Islamic revolution. Magassouba says that the leaders of this group are explicitly inspired by Khomeini's Iran and provides them with financial support. Nevertheless, despite the revolutionary bent of this faction, the author feels that they represent a relatively isolated stream of thought within Senegalese Islam and that their agenda is so far out of the political mainstream that they have little real clout. He concludes that any fundamentalist revolution in Senegal would need to unite the three strands, which, given their divergent economic interests, is not a very likely occurrence.

South Africa


This paper explores the problems that apartheid has caused for US policy toward South Africa. The author notes that South Africa has long been a trading partner with the United States and the object of extensive US investment. These interests have complicated the US response to apartheid—making the United States reluctant to abandon its ties and influence by striking out blindly without knowing what would follow. Rotberg examines recent events in South Africa, the effects of South African activities in neighboring countries, and the policies formulated by both the Carter and Reagan administrations toward South Africa. He suggests that it is in the self-interest of US administrations to devise a new policy which will reward positive trends and withhold rewards for negative ones. These rewards would include a carefully calibrated series of incentives to which the South African Government could be expected to respond and which, ultimately, would bring about major policy shifts. Rotberg concludes that a policy of carrots without sticks has been shown to be unworkable, that a policy of sticks alone will achieve nothing, and that only some combination of the two is likely to produce positive results.
We argue that President Reagan's imposition of limited economic sanctions against the South African regime in September was not an admission that his policy of constructive engagement had failed. But, the authors contend, the sanctions do not represent a substantial change in American policy toward South Africa, nor do they contend or promote a meaningful evolution in the South African political system. In fact, the new American policy relies almost entirely on white-led change, as designed and defined by a regime becoming more embattled by the day, and ignores the needs of the South African black majority. Thus, they claim, the policy will continue to fail. Following a lengthy description of the policy of constructive engagement and its application over the past few years, the authors suggest that the US Government and private business interests devise new methods that might hurt the pride and prestige of the white South African Government without inflicting undue economic damage on black South Africans. Several suggestions are advanced, including the reduction of South Africa's privileged diplomatic status in the United States, a restriction on the flow of new American technology to South Africa, the restriction or suspension of intelligence cooperation with the South African Government, and the opening of dialogue with the African National Congress and other black organizations. In sum, the authors conclude, courageous efforts must be made to convince black South Africans that Americans identify with their plight and are willing to help.

Southern Africa


This paper surveys the recent events in southern Africa which have raised questions about the continued viability of the US policy of constructive engagement. The adequacy of the policy with respect to South Africa is particularly questionable in view of that country's renewal of armed interventions in neighboring states. The goal of regional stabilization has also been cast into doubt in view of the increased conflict in Angola. Some critics of the policy favor additional pressures on South Africa to force it to end its regional interventions. Others believe that US interests would best be protected by assistance to anti-Marxist guerrillas in Angola and Mozambique. A third view is that the United States has little ability to influence events in southern Africa and would be well advised to take a less active role there. Supporters of constructive engagement, however, reject all of these approaches and advocate continued pursuit of the objectives of constructive engagement as the best long-term approach to protecting US interests with reasonably limited costs and risks.
Zaire


In yet another recounting of the cold, hard, and still gruesome facts, Young traces US involvement in Zaire from the American-sponsored removal of Patrice Lumumba in 1960 to 1983. The tale, even in its brief retelling by this noted expert on Zaire, remains sordid. Mobutu has plundered the Zairian economy, manipulated US foreign policy in the guise of anti-Sovietism, purposefully weakened the Zairian armed forces, and purged political rivals in order to eliminate potential opponents, all the while amassing one of the largest private fortunes in the world. Young concedes that the United States has responsibilities in Zaire, but despairs of devising a formula for constructively fulfilling them as long as Mobutu remains in office. Mobutu, echoing Louis XIV's warning of "apres moi, le deluge," continues to extract reluctant, limited, but sufficient backing whenever he cries wolf, and the crisis continues.