JOINT INTELLIGENCE IN SUPPORT OF PEACE OPERATIONS

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A paper submitted to the Faculty of the Naval War College in partial satisfaction of the requirements of the Department of Joint Military Operations.

The contents of this paper reflect my own personal views and are not necessarily endorsed by the Naval War College or the Department of the Navy.

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14 June 1996

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Abstract of

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These eight differences and the planning imperatives distilled from them must be recognized not only as a set of lessons learned but also incorporated with emphasis in joint peace operations doctrine; incorporated in joint peace operations tactics, techniques, and procedures; and instructed in related military and civilian peace operations programs. Further, they serve as a valuable framework in which ongoing and future peace operations intelligence support should be reviewed and assessed.
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JOINT INTELLIGENCE IN SUPPORT OF PEACE OPERATIONS

The U.S. joint military intelligence (MI) community has in recent years made substantial advances toward assembling a more responsive and cohesive intelligence support system for the operational commander. Individual service parochialism and the "stovepipes" it engendered continue to be mitigated through common systems as well as increasingly joint tactics, techniques, and procedures. Spearheaded by a technology revolution that permits it and austere budgets which force it, these efforts are applying the lessons of Operations DESERT SHIELD and DESERT STORM with vigor toward an objective joint MI system that can quickly focus on a threat situation and provide the joint force commander with sufficient battlespace awareness to win decisive military victory. However, it remains a system largely focused on complex but conventional scenarios where the military tasks are clear, the threat is relatively homogenous, and where technology is the predominant means of resolving ambiguity. It is largely a system designed against an opponent whose intent is either known or can readily be presumed by virtue of its formations and patterns which high-technology sensors are designed to detect.¹

Since Operation DESERT STORM, however, those situations have been few as peace operations have dominated the use of U.S. forces. Among the many lessons learned from recent peace operations is that joint MI support is far more complex in that environment than it is in the realm of conventional combat operations for which its systems have been designed. Monitored forces are far more ambiguous. Military objectives are far more enmeshed with political and economic agendas, the synchronization of which has proved to be enormously difficult. Belligerents' intentions are volatile, reflected in part by the positioning and activity of military and para-military forces but rarely to be sufficiently defined by them. Successful intelligence support depends not as much on the application of high-technology means to locate and assess targets but rather more on the balance and application of all means--some very simplistic--to correlate actions of belligerents with their an-
nounced intent and to protect all parties—peace forces as well as belligerents—from the threat of renewed conflict. In all peace operations from Somalia to the Balkans, joint MI efforts have required major modifications to the offensive- and target-oriented model validated in part by DESERT STORM and still required for combat support to potential mid-intensity scenarios.

While peace operations conducted to date have been very different from each other in purpose and scope, joint MI efforts in support of them contain a number of commonalities—operational threads—which appear to be lessons that future peace operations commanders and intelligence officers should recognize and heed. Joint and individual service doctrine consists largely of useful but generic guidance and planning considerations that do not adequately emphasize the differences and complexities of intelligence support to peace operations. Nor does it sufficiently reflect the key lessons learned over the course of recent operations. *There is a more clearly defined and practical set of intelligence planning principles and realities for peace operations than those currently found in operational doctrine and which future peace operations commanders cannot ignore.* The purpose of this effort is to identify and assemble this set in a framework for use in future peace operations planning and execution by joint task force and component commanders.²

**An Operational Intelligence Planning Framework**

Analysis of joint MI support to peace operations in Somalia, Haiti, and the Balkans yields *eight key differences* between peace operations and conventional combat support operations. They are common threads—constant planning and execution themes—that tie those operations together and which may be extrapolated to future peace operations as well. Together, they serve as a set of operational realities which combine to form a framework for future planning. These realities are listed individually with brief descriptions in the fol-
ollowing section. Four of these realities which have been the most overriding in past and present operations are distilled into future planning imperatives.

**Intelligence Realities in Peace Operations**

(1) Peace operations have been and will continue to be human intelligence-(HUMINT) intensive. HUMINT operations inherently form the core of all joint MI efforts because they most ably and accurately target the intentions of belligerents. HUMINT dominates both actions taken to establish and maintain peace conditions as well as the substantial efforts required to ensure the protection of peace forces. The peace operations commander must plan to implement a broad, multi-echeloned observation and reporting network that potentially involves every member of the command in the peace operations area.

(2) High-technology intelligence systems are very capable and necessary but are more limited in their application to peace operations. Sophisticated sensors and systems are best utilized in support of specific fact-finding needs, to verify quantifiable conditions advertised by belligerent parties, to amplify or verify indicators provided by HUMINT, and to provide indications and warning to peace forces. On balance, the best peace operations intelligence collectors are the eyes and ears—educated and trained eyes and ears—of the peace force, supplemented with high-technology help.

(3) Peace operations expand the threat focus enormously, bringing to bear political, economic, religious, and cultural factors for which joint MI systems—machinery as well as personnel—are neither designed nor trained in depth to accommodate. Modifications to operational support architectures must be considered and often implemented to accommodate the complexities of this expanded focus and to include mechanisms for introducing and analyzing these non-military factors.
(4) Peace operations intelligence efforts critically involve the integration of allied operational and strategic intelligence capabilities and needs as well as those of involved non-military organizations, all of whom usually need but are to widely varying degrees cautious about participating in them. Peace operations commanders must identify these capabilities and needs as early as possible, recommend information sharing tolerances to political leaders, and prepare to securely extend the joint MI network into allied operational headquarters, consistent with those tolerances as approved.

(5) A significant amount of intelligence capabilities must be directly and constantly applied to the inward force protection mission, frequently at the expense of more outward-oriented collection. Force protection intelligence requirements have dominated and will continue to dominate collection planning as well as the analytical and dissemination energy of the joint MI system. Unlike the practical experiences of more conventional combat support operations where scarce MI resources are usually offensive-oriented, there is a consistent and close struggle between the allocation of those resources for defensive-oriented force protection and offensive-oriented reconnaissance and surveillance in depth.

(6) The military, political, and cultural complexities of a peace operations environment make establishing priority intelligence requirements exceedingly difficult but mandate their importance far beyond their application to conventional military operations. In short, the more complex the intelligence situation, the more simple and focused the priority intelligence requirements must become in order to effectively apply collection and analytical resources.

(7) The intelligence support architecture must be kept simple, understandable, and under firm control if it is to properly ingest and digest the mass and diversity of informational bits and pieces given to it. Clear, unambiguous paths of information flow throughout the architecture and clearly defined, traceable inputs are essential to producing intelligence within the proper situational contexts. Simplicity also facilitates the extension of the architecture to military allies and the contributions to it by non-military organizations.
Commanders and intelligence officers must plan to invest greater resources in the foundation for and practice of predictive intelligence. Cultural, religious, ethnic, and socio-economic slants, none of which are readily ingested or digested by automated intelligence analysis systems, determine belligerent’s intentions and serve as the most useful grounds for predicting next moves. The supporting intelligence system must be quickly resourced, expanded, and educated to perform predictive intelligence in these complex, non-military depths.

**Operational Intelligence Planning Imperatives**

All of these peace operations intelligence realities are significant departures from the joint MI community’s more conventional combat support focus. Even within this framework, certain realities dominate more than others. From the lessons of Somalia, Haiti, and Bosnia, the following future operations planning imperatives can be distilled:

**Imperative One - Intelligence support to force protection is the foremost priority.**

Given the caution and even reluctance of the nation to commit American forces to peace operations in general and the inherently fragile nature of the peace to be created and/or sustained, operational commanders enter into them with a heightened mandate to prevent casualties. Force protection in peace operations receives an emphasis far beyond that associated with combat operations—and normal force protection planning associated with them—because it directly and immediately impacts on the force’s political and popular support. As a case in point, the J-2 of Atlantic Command’s Joint Task Force 180 noted that his most critical task—stated, not implied—during Operation UPHOLD DEMOCRACY was to develop a level of situational awareness that would essentially prevent friendly casu-
alties from any threats short of accidents . . . a zero-casualty mission in an environment where the potential for casualties lay inside many Port-au-Prince doorways and alleys.

What are the implications for the operational commander and intelligence officer given this mandate? First, they must plan in advance to directly allocate intelligence resources to the force protection mission and to aggressively employ them to that specific end. Force protection intelligence must not be, as it tends to be in conventional combat operations, a secondary effort or the by-product of intelligence geared to traditional fire- and maneuver-type concerns or prioritized along close, deep, and rear operational lines. Force protection requirements most closely resemble those associated with “rear operations,” those operations to which the fewest intelligence resources and focus are conventionally given. The commander and J-2 must immediately reverse that convention in the face of a peace operations mission.

The intelligence collection effort must first and foremost begin with the headquarters and staging bases of peace forces and then extend outward along their patrol routes and bases into the zone(s) of separation (ZOS) between belligerents. This requires an increasing commitment of intelligence resources—sensors as well as analysis and dissemination means—until a steady state is achieved within and around the ZOS. At that point, however, the commander and J-2 must continue to devote that level of resources to the force protection mission. Success at this point is a tempting but dangerous opportunity to re-direct limited, high-demand intelligence resources away from secured areas to greater depths beyond the ZOS. The joint intelligence system’s coverage, then, must form an expanding threat indications and warning “bubble” around the elements of the peace force as they distribute themselves throughout their assigned operating areas and then maintain it with vigilance. This is increasingly harder to do as massed brigades and battalions disperse to companies, platoons, and squads at isolated checkpoints and small observation bases where the potential for casualties is highest and where any small incident may easily have significant political consequences.
What successive peace operations commanders and J-2’s have learned in this regard is that while they fully recognized the importance of force protection, they tended to underestimate the enormous demand it placed on the intelligence systems and support architecture as well as the peace forces themselves. A notable example is the level of effort required to locate and characterize the millions of anti-vehicle and anti-personnel mines in Bosnia. As threats, each mine is inherently a matter for force protection intelligence and as such must occupy the time of hundreds to thousands of information collectors as well as dozens of intelligence analysts and reporters. This requires an enormous investment in resources whose capabilities and time must be shared with others concerned with the belligerents’ more visible military and less visible political capabilities and intentions as well as the very likely need to support an expanded, combined joint MI architecture. Another equally important example is the extraordinary time and effort required to develop what Major Ralph Peters has all but coined “urban intelligence,” information ferreted from the domain of Mogadishu, Port au Prince, and Tuzla and Sarajevo—locales that conventional combat operations and their intelligence support would quickly bypass.9

Sensors of all kinds must be oriented and synchronized around peace force positions as operational-level targets, much in the same manner that sensors were positioned or scheduled to routinely check the areas around garrisons and remote fire bases in Viet Nam. In this regard the intelligence preparation of the battlefield (IPB) process is applied with the same methodology as in conventional combat operations, but it must be performed through the lens of potential aggressors whose tools will largely be unconventional.10 Zones of protection, i.e., the security “bubbles” noted earlier, must be designed to account for all facets of potential threats, established, and consistently monitored. All higher level collectors that are to any degree terrain-oriented, e.g., imagery collectors, must split their tasks between monitoring friendly and belligerent positions, routes of movement, and headquarters and staging areas. These are not simply tactical concerns. They are operational-level problems, given the heightened impact of force protection incidents on the peace mission.
Imperative Two - HUMINT is paramount.

Existing and emerging peace operations doctrine notes the importance of HUMINT to varying degrees, but none assign to it the overwhelming importance that commanders and J-2’s continue to learn from one operation to another.\textsuperscript{11} This is perhaps the easiest of the imperatives to understand but possibly the most difficult to implement because it runs counter to the grain of a technology-based, DESERT STORM-influenced joint operations and MI culture. Successive peace operations clearly reflect the necessity to establish a full-spectrum HUMINT network throughout the operational area as well as the reality that poor HUMINT simultaneously risks overall mission failure and protection of the peace force itself. To date, all peace operations commanders and J-2’s have reiterated the fact that HUMINT was and is by far their most important intelligence resource.

The purpose here is not to recommend any specific application of a very complex intelligence collection effort but rather to point out very directly that several common shortfalls occur in HUMINT support to peace operations. The first is that HUMINT is, especially during early planning stages, easily equated by MI planners to the products of MI organizations capable of producing it (interrogators, counterintelligence teams, and long-range surveillance units). More than one peace operations J-2 has at least initially planned and organized so-called HUMINT operations in those terms alone. In an era where “sensors” are commonly equated to systems organic to MI organizations, the fact that every individual soldier, sailor, airman, and civilian in the mission area is an information provider and potential human intelligence collector is easily suppressed.\textsuperscript{12} Counterintelligence (CI) teams are essentially force protection assets, highly skilled resources trained to look inward through the lens of an adversary. Interrogator teams are trained to elicit HUMINT from persons and documents that have come under the control of friendly forces but who inherently introduce some question in terms of credibility and reliability. Together, CI and inter-
rogator teams do provide critical HUMINT functions, but their limited capabilities can and
must be complemented by the eyes and ears of non-MI personnel throughout the peace
force. That lesson was learned in both Somalia and Haiti and is being learned once more
and with even greater effect in Bosnia as MI and non-MI personnel alike re-discover and
apply the fundamentals of human reconnaissance, surveillance, and liaison.\textsuperscript{13}

Peace operations not only lend themselves to but they require the broad application
and management of human collectors to collect the many fragments of localized, low-level,
but often factual information that technology-based sensors can neither ferret out nor proc-
ess within the full context of highly charged situational dynamics. Infantrymen, engineers,
civil affairs officers at work among the populace, drivers, air crew members flying over
road networks and towns, special operations teams, medical personnel, and staff officers
conducting liaison with factional representatives are all valid information collectors; and
there are dozens more. They must be led to see themselves as such, trained to observe and
report, and constantly educated about what information is important within the context of a
very dynamic, multi-faceted military and political environment.

The commander must instill this sense of purpose, and the J-2 must establish a
network in which it can successfully operate. That network involves a mechanism for dis-
seminating collection requirements to the lowest observer levels and then reporting observ-
ations upward to the highest levels where a single report may serve as the critically needed
piece of intelligence that guides a key military or even a political decision. The network
must also contain appropriate filters to place informational needs in the right local context,
direct them to the right collectors as they move downward, and then similarly ensure that
collected information is validated and placed in the right context as it moves upward. And
it must be equipped with the ability to function in the native language, a reality that has con-
sistently been re-learned in the face of severely underestimated interpreter requirements.\textsuperscript{14}
Commanders and J-2's must quickly make critical decisions--particularly in the early op-
erational stages--over the effective placement of reliable, mission-educated interpreters and
constantly review them as language capabilities are developed and the number of interpreters is expanded over time.

This is an enormous effort for which modern commanders and intelligence officers have largely become unprepared. It is an effort that requires the re-development of World War II-vintage reconnaissance, surveillance, and liaison skills; the assembly and understanding of thousands of small pieces of diverse information, all of which has a very human slant; and personally manipulating a broad, human network in which automation can help organize and collate information but rarely interpret what it means.

Finally, commanders and J-2’s must recognize that beyond the roles of MI-trained teams as well as the eyes and ears of every individual in the force, there are HUMINT assets trained to perform the classic role of developing and managing intelligence sources within the belligerent parties. Whether from the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) or the Defense HUMINT Service (DHS), these capabilities have critical roles to play in operations where ambiguity abounds. These assets are unlikely to be made directly available to them. Commanders and J-2’s should, however, make operational-level HUMINT requirements as well as the scope and products of internal HUMINT efforts known through their supporting National Intelligence Support Team (NIST) to enable tactical, operational, and strategic HUMINT actions to support each other. This is particularly critical in an environment where HUMINT developed at a low level can have very pronounced operational and strategic impacts.

**Imperative Three - Apply technology judiciously and surgically.**

Technology remains a force multiplier in peace operations, but it is, on balance, more limited there than in conventional combat operations. Major technology-based intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance (ISR) systems are designed to quickly map out a conventional, standardized threat whose capabilities and intentions can largely be presumed
by the visible nature of its formations and orientations. Their use against a small number of mortars or artillery pieces hidden in the debris of Bosnia’s urban areas or its rugged terrain is certainly limited. Their use in determining whether Haitian police forces would support the existing government or that which we were trying to install was similarly bounded. And their use in the chaos of Somalia where separation of factional “better” and “worse” was nearly impossible and where the threat consisted largely of individuals with small arms was simply not to be.

This is not to say that high-technology systems—national and theater optical and synthetic aperture radar imagery systems, unmanned aerial vehicles, multi-mode signals intelligence platforms, and the sophisticated processors and information fusion systems that they feed should not be planned for or used in peace operations. They should be used, and their capabilities should be continuously available in some form. They provide significant advantage when their capabilities can be closely matched to specific information requirements. It is to say, however, that commanders and J-2’s must, as their predecessors have discovered, carefully understand how the peace environment as well as the traditional limitations of weather and terrain governs their capabilities and limitations. The Joint Surveillance Target Attack Radar System (J-STARS), for example, has proved useful in Bosnia under conditions that have limited its application more than originally expected. Its introduction to the JOINT ENDEAVOR area of operations was accompanied by DESERT STORM-induced prospects for success that were immediately limited by the severity of Bosnian terrain and the radar shadowing it introduces. Counterparts to the long convoy lines and massed formations of the Iraqi Republican Guards are not to be found in Bosnia. J-STARS’ successes have largely been in monitoring the evacuation of belligerent forces from the ZOS where formations of equipment were assembled at a known point and time and departed in some organized fashion that could be tracked. Elsewhere the system has been more difficult to apply because of typically small force movements, the inevitable mixing of belligerent military equipment with civilian traffic, the concentration of belliger-
ent equipment in and around the radar clutter of urban areas, or the simple lack of movement at all.

Imagery systems have proved similarly useful and similarly limited. Imagery can be (and has been) used with great effect to verify compliance of troop and equipment withdrawals around the ZOS, the integrity of equipment holding areas, and general conditions in areas of interest. That is, imagery in support of peace operations is best applied to surveil areas where some known condition has been established and from which changes can be measured. Where it has proved least successful is in the general search mode where the same limits described above for J-STARS commonly prevail. It can be used with similar effect to update or refine mapping and geodesy information in areas where precision geography is required for political negotiation and military enforcement but is lacking.

High-capacity information processors and analysis tools to which sophisticated sensors are designed to feed are limited in application, principally because the bulk of information that MI personnel must ultimately deal with (predominantly HUMINT) must be placed in non-technical context—characterization of intent being the foremost—that does not easily lend itself to machine-formatted reports or their terse data fields. The sensor-processor combinations from which joint intelligence architectures are built and the tactics, techniques, and procedures associated with them—the set of operational norms developed in training—are largely designed to quickly and accurately find visible, key threat entities and from them develop targets. Those capabilities to acquire, collate, and correlate information can and should be applied in peace operations but with the clear understanding that their inherently target-focused processes and products must all be tempered within a human judgement framework that mechanical systems cannot provide. J-2’s have consistently discovered that the intelligence architectures they bring to bear on a peace operation must be modified and trained to incorporate some assessment of political as well as military context with every analysis, adding a very important human dimension to very powerful but limited technology-based systems.
Imperative Four - Keep the architecture as simple as possible.

The intelligence architecture must be robust, flexible, and governed as much as possible by the principles of interoperability and commonality. That being said, however, several realities should be understood and planned for. The architecture brought to bear by U.S. peace forces will usually dominate those of allies in terms of capabilities—particularly sophisticated sensors, processors and automated analysis tools, and supporting dissemination systems—and must be extended to and shared with them. It should be able to effectively and efficiently accommodate inputs from them, understanding that they can easily bring intelligence talents, perspectives, and capabilities to complement and even fill gaps in our own capabilities. This has proved to be particularly true in the HUMINT arena where allies have, in fact, been stronger, better prepared, and more experienced because their more limited high-technology means often force them to develop compensating HUMINT expertise.

The intelligence architecture must also be prepared to interact with information gathering capabilities of non-government organizations (NGO) and private volunteer organizations (PVO), all of which are extremely sensitive to the negative connotations of “military intelligence” and are habitually (frequently by charter or politics) reluctant if not overtly opposed to being involved with it. They are nevertheless superb sources of facts, impressions, and context if their own politics and policies can be respected, accommodated, and protected. Future peace operations commanders and J-2’s will likely see a greater ability to work in this regard with the United Nations, which is being cautiously pressed to overcome its institutional unwillingness to deal with “intelligence” in the wake of information-sharing disasters in Somalia and lesser but still significant problems in the Balkans. Until substantial changes are made, however, commanders must plan early and with great politi-
cal care to interact with allied MI organizations as well as to develop information sharing relationships with NGO's and PVO's.

Similarly, the intelligence architecture must be shaped in large part by its capacity to accept, process, and effectively deal with HUMINT in general. The complex information handling subsystems--pre-processors, processors, automated collection management tools, and displays--are effectively designed to deal with facts and things, not the context in which they exist. They conventionally support a "sensor-to-shooter" process that is to be avoided here altogether or applied very surgically and under firm operational- and possibly even strategic-level control. In such an architecture it is difficult to inject the context of information in an increasingly automated analytical process which accepts information, applies logical algorithms to it, and then produces an artificial intelligence-based result at the end. *Sensor-to-shooter mechanisms must be retained, particularly for force protection, but they must also be re-trained to accept a constant inflow of slower, context-based HUMINT and operate under the most positive degree of control.*

All of this seemingly diverse argument points to a central need to keep the intelligence architecture as simple and as understandable as possible. Allies cannot be expected to trust the U.S. architecture and make rational decisions with regard to modifying their own intelligence practices and policies to link with it if they cannot understand it. U.S. intelligence liaison teams that are increasingly being extended to allied commands cannot deliver products to or submit requirements from them if they cannot understand its mechanisms or if they are overwhelmed or confused by a constantly changing architecture. U.S. decision makers cannot address the dissemination of critical information to allies and especially to NGO's and PVO's if the architecture is so complex that they cannot be assured of reliable control mechanisms. And most important, the system must be as clear and simple as possible to enable its U.S. users to know precisely where and how the thousands of informational bits and pieces, most of which are low-level and very localized, enter it, are processed, and are compiled to create a broad variety of intelligence. The application of
high-technology means to the architecture must not be measured in quantity but rather in terms of overall simplicity. This lesson was learned the hard way in Somalia where numerous analysis and dissemination problems resulted from an ineffective kluge of intelligence systems and processes. It was applied with more positive effect in Haiti, where the architecture was centered around a HUMINT effort and technology was applied to support it in a simple but effective manner. It is being re-learned now in Bosnia, where the joint MI architecture is stressed with a broader array of military and non-military players and where the complexity of the mission environment is much greater than in previous peace operations. The lesson for the future is quite clear: the more complex and dynamic the peace situation is, the more simple and clear the supporting intelligence architecture must be for it to effectively serve its users. Complicated architectures may be impressive and appear to promise much. They may appear to serve as convenient proving grounds for even more complex improvements, and the less threatening environment of peace operations tends to encourage that experimentation. But there is greater promise of mission effectiveness in the elegance of simplicity. Technology must, then, be applied to simplify and streamline joint MI processes. Commanders must constantly ask how it is being applied to that end. J-2's must extend that outlook further and constantly measure the operational value of technologies against the complexity those technologies inherently add to the architecture.

Recommendations and Conclusion

U.S. forces bring to bear a superb joint MI potential against peace operations requirements, but planners must recognize that those capabilities have been neither designed nor trained for the unique requirements that peace operations impose. Peace operations inherently slow down an offensive-and target-oriented joint MI system, broaden the scope of its responsibilities immensely, and introduce subtleties in the collection and analysis of in-
formation on which mission success depends. Low-level intelligence, the realm of the tactical commander in conventional combat operations, quickly leaps into the realm of the operational-level commander who must be concerned with any potential threat to peace conditions. At the operational level the supporting joint MI system must (a) physically expand to collect, process, and report information in more complex depth; (b) gear itself down to accommodate a slower, more deliberate, and more thorough pace; and (c) enable itself to resolve ambiguities that are very human-based and do not easily lend themselves to clarification through high-technology means.

The eight planning realities for peace operations intelligence support described here have been constant themes throughout past missions and are presently being reinforced in the Balkans. Few, however, are to be found at all and none are to be found with sufficient emphasis in the most authoritative guides, e.g., U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff doctrinal manuals for military operations other than war and peacekeeping handbooks, to which a future peace operations commander and J-2 will quickly turn. All combine to form a set of practical guiding principles and a future planning framework that has been defined by the lessons of Somalia and Haiti, confirmed and strengthened by ongoing lessons in the Balkans, and which must be viewed as applicable to peace operations that may yet occur. From this framework, four planning imperatives are extrapolated and are proposed as vital to planning joint MI support to future peace operations. They not only dominate as planning realities, but their successful practice also dictates whether those remaining realities can be implemented at all. In short, joint MI support to peace operations must focus foremost on force protection, it must be centered around an in-depth HUMINT core, it must judiciously apply technology to supporting that HUMINT core, and its architecture must be designed for simplicity of operations and understanding.

These eight realities and the four imperatives distilled from them form a set of intelligence planning and implementation guidelines that should be emphasized in peace operations doctrine; incorporated in joint tactics, techniques, and procedures; and taught in
related military and civilian peace operations programs. Further, they serve as a practical framework in which ongoing and future peace operations intelligence support should be reviewed and assessed.
NOTES


2. No distinction between the various types of peace operations—peacemaking, peacekeeping, peace monitoring, and peace enforcement—will be made because they are largely unnecessary within the scope of this paper. Joint MI operations conducted in support of any subset of “peace operations” will involve similar planning considerations and execution methodologies which may be expanded or contracted to fit the circumstances of a particular peace mission. The lessons evident in previous as well as ongoing missions and the framework to be extrapolated from them apply to the entire spectrum of peace operations.

3. Human intelligence includes all information derived through human sources. It is associated both tactically and operationally with interrogation of prisoners of war and civilian detainees, translation of captured documents, long-range surveillance operations, patrols, observation posts, liaison with local military or paramilitary forces and the local populace, and reports from friendly troops. At the strategic and to a lesser extent at the operational level it is associated with behind-the-lines sources who may be positioned to target plans and intentions, deliberations and decisions, research and development, doctrine, leadership, training, and morale. See Army Field Manual 34-1, Intelligence and Electronic Warfare Operations, for more detail.

4. The term “belligerent” is used here to identify parties which are the subject of the peace operation. No distinction is made between those parties which have been previously engaged in hostilities with each other and are now separated by the peace force and those which may still be engaged in hostilities to some degree and which the peace force is attempting to separate and manage.


11. HUMINT is noted as a planning consideration in all current JCS and Army doctrinal publications that address peace operations. None address the enormous workload that widespread HUMINT operations, usually manifested in hundreds of observer reports per day, place on standard joint MI collection management and analysis systems.


17. Rababy, 42.


22. Shelton, 37.

23. See Note 7.
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