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Department of Defense Security Institute, Richmond, Virginia
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Good Security Does Make A Difference

The case of Randy Miles Jeffries and the Acme Reporting Company

According to the Greek philosopher Plato, simple truths can be tested by extreme examples. A simple truth which security professionals argue constantly is that the strict observance of security policies and regulations—however mundane and nit-picky they appear to some cleared employees—directly affects national security. Far-fetched? Simply too hypothetical? We will ask the reader to judge from the following account. The credibility of the argument for sound security is held up against this extreme example: a “worst possible case” that resulted in the loss of highly classified information to Soviet intelligence. Much more could have been lost had it not been for the active intervention of the FBI at an early stage.

Far from the scene

A bitter and dejected Randy Miles Jeffries can barely see the forested Adirondacks through the heavily barred windows. The former messenger, now in his fourth year of a nine-year sentence, is assigned to the Federal correction facility at Ray Brook, New York—a far cry from the hustle of downtown Washington D.C., from his wife and three children, and from the scene of his crime.

Jeffries’ crime was to betray his country through espionage, and although there is reason to believe that he did not fully comprehend the implications of his own behavior, most of us would agree that this is an act which cannot be excused or left unpunished. Perhaps the larger question is, “How did this happen in spite of counter-measures and security safeguards designed to prevent it?”

The story really begins some years before Jeffries was hired by the Acme Reporting Company which provided stenographic reporting services for various Federal agencies and congressional committees. (By 1985 Acme had built up a three and a half million dollar business from a lucrative GSA contract.) Official reports state that Jeffries, after a period of employment with the FBI (1978-1980) as a clerk, fell into drug use, was convicted for possession of heroin in 1983, and later spent four months at St. Elizabeth’s psychiatric hospital in a rehabilitation program. The drug conviction resulted in a one year suspended sentence.

After his return home in late 1985, Jeffries needed a job. He was referred to the Acme Reporting Company by a social service worker. He applied to Acme (which asked for a police check) and somewhat to his own surprise was accepted for immediate employment. Jeffries was to remain at Acme Reporting for two months. Lacking a valid driver’s license he was at first tasked with tying up bundles of transcripts and assisting the company driver to make deliveries of completed work.

A climate for disaster

But in a few days other duties were assigned to the new employee. Much of the material produced by Acme had to be photocopied. A large proportion of the transcripts for copying came from Federal agencies such as the National Labor Relations Board and the Security Exchange Commission. Some, however, originated from congressional hearings and bore classification markings such as Secret and Top Secret. Many of these hearings were transcribed by Acme employees and contained classified testimony on defense matters. For this reason Acme held a facility clearance and employed a few recorders who held security clearances. Only these selected recorders were called upon to cover closed hearings.

Within Acme’s distribution department, however, access to classified material was not so carefully restricted. “Jim” did most of the classified photocopying, but sometimes others did it like Jeffries or “Ken.” Or Jim would do it while Jeffries tied it into bundles. One of the employees joked about taking some documents to the Soviet embassy to “make some money.” Jeffries in fact remembered numerous instances of handling, reproducing and binding materials marked Secret and Top Secret; he of course, held no clearance whatsoever. As it turned out later, neither did Jim.

After his arrest Jeffries was asked to describe how classified waste or
excess copies were destroyed. As he related, all copied material (including Top Secret) other than the final transcripts were thrown in a regular trash barrel with a plastic liner. Later these were carried back to the dumpster.

The Events of December 14th, 1985

Was it the flippant remark in the photocopy room about making some money off the Soviets, or was it an idea which Jeffries had hatched in his mind earlier? We may never know the truth. But somehow a scheme emerged to make some "big money." The former messenger would like us to believe that his original intention was to engage the Russians in a con game—not really to sell secrets.

Although some of the information is contradictory, investigative reports indicate that Jeffries and Ken were called in to work on Saturday, December 14th. According to their statements, the security officer instructed them to destroy classified transcripts by tearing them into four pieces and throwing them in the trash can. When Ken was called out to deliver a package, Jeffries was left to work alone and unsupervised.

At this point Ray Brook prison’s now lonely inmate made his fateful move: he set aside three of the classified transcripts from the pile and hid them away in a storage room to be retrieved later in the day. Two were marked Secret and one Top Secret. It appears that by the end of the afternoon when Ken returned from his delivery run, Jeffries told him that he had stashed away some of the documents in another area. Together they retrieved the documents which came to a stack of transcripts several hundred pages thick. Jeffries commented that now he needed to find a Russian to sell them to.

To continue the story, it is useful to turn to the facts presented in the government’s Criminal Complaint issued to the U. S. District Court for the District of Columbia on December 23rd, 1985.

According to that memorandum, shortly after 4 p.m. on that same day, a telephone call was made from an individual identifying himself as “Dano” to the Soviet Military Office located on Belmont Road in Northwest Washington. The individual offered to sell one Top Secret and two Secret documents and read one of the titles:

U.S. House of Representatives, Department of Defense Command Control Communication and Intelligence Programs, C³I

Closed Session, Subcommittee on Armed Services, Washington, D.C.

The caller stated that he was leaving immediately for the Soviet office. The document was in fact Top Secret and had been recorded and transcribed under contract by the Acme Reporting Company.

At approximately 4:45 p.m. a man answering to Jeffries’ description and carrying a briefcase arrived by taxicab at the Soviet Military Office, entered, and remained inside for over half an hour. The driver of the taxi was questioned by U.S. agents who determined that the rider had been picked up within a block of Jeffries’ residence. At this first meeting with the Soviets, Jeffries later stated that he gave them 13 sample pages of three documents in his possession. The Soviets instructed him to wait for a contact.

But Jeffries needed an immediate response. Urged on by a couple of dubious "friends" whose advice he had sought, he made a second (distinctly unwelcome) visit to the Soviet establishment on December 17th. He was almost denied entry. At this second visit the Acme messenger provided another 15 pages of the classified transcripts and asked about his request for money. He was given $60 and told to wait until April for a contact.

Rising to the Bait

On Friday, December 20th, 1985 an undercover agent of the FBI posing as a Soviet official called Jeffries at his home. The agent identified himself as connected with the Soviet Military Office. Jeffries admitted his visit to the Soviet Military Office and that he was in fact "Dano." He agreed to meet with the agent at the Holiday Inn on 14th and Massachusetts Avenue that evening.

During the meeting Jeffries reminded the agent that he had seen the Soviets twice at their office and had provided at least 40 pages of samples. He said he had not yet been paid and demanded $5000 for full copies of all three transcripts. One document he described as being over 200 pages long. The complete copies, he claimed, were being held in safekeeping by a friend, and could be retrieved in a few minutes. He also declared that he could get other Secret and Top Secret documents which were ripped up, but could be put back together.

The arrest was made the same evening as Jeffries was leaving the hotel allegedly to pick up the classified material which he had hoped to sell. He was held without bond pending formal arraignment. On January 14th, 1986, Randy Miles Jeffries was indicted on one count of delivering and attempting to deliver national defense documents to Soviet agents and on another count of attempting to deliver national defense documents to a person not entitled to receive them. The trial date was set for March.

At the Scene of the Crime

On the Monday following Jeffries’ arrest, a systematic facility inspection of Acme Reporting Company turned up a litany of alarming facts. The following are only a few of the deficiencies noted in the final report submitted by representatives of the Defense Investigative Service:

Security Awareness Bulletin
It concluded that these failures were directly attributable to the gross negligence of the Facility Security Officer (FSO) as well as the President of the company who remained ultimately responsible for the actions of his employees.

Lying to the U.S. Government

The fact is that the FSO had repeatedly made false and misleading statements to representatives of the Defense Investigative Service and later to the Federal Bureau of Investigation. This included the falsification of records. Industrial Security inspections had been conducted twice in 1984 and twice in 1985 before Jeffries' arrest. The most recent had been on December 9, 1985. In each instance the security officer advised DIS inspectors that in accordance with established procedures, Top Secret material was handled only at customer locations and never returned to Acme premises, and that no classified destruction took place.

Nevertheless evidence uncovered in the course of the espionage investigation showed beyond doubt that Top Secret material had been on the premises since at least February 1985 and that employees had been simply trashing classified materials of all types. In addition, unsecured boxes of classified transcripts had been found in at least two storage rooms.

The final deception:

What DIS representatives found at Acme on their first follow-up inspection was a massive assortment of files and envelopes which had to be fully inspected for possible classified content. The review of materials and storage areas, and interviews with officers and employees took several days. Prior to their departure on the afternoon of December 31st, the DIS team instructed the company's officers to ensure that no material of any type be removed from the facility or otherwise be tampered with until their return the following week.

On January 2, a thorough examination of the basement storage room was conducted. It was immediately obvious to inspectors that virtually every envelope that contained material from House or Senate hearings had been opened and resealed with staples or cellophane tape. In some cases envelopes had not been resealed at all. They made an educated guess that classified materials had been removed to avoid further embarrassment and that there was a good chance that these papers had been discarded in (what was for Acme) the normal fashion.

A few inquiries to the building manager were sufficient to locate the dumpsters in the service alley and to find out that, due to the New Year's holiday, no pick-up of refuse had taken place since the previous Friday. Any material in the dumpsters would have been placed there on the 1st or 2nd of January. An examination of the
contents of the dumpsters revealed several large plastic trash bags from several companies. One large green bag was found to contain waste paper associated with Acme—paper envelopes, and postal wrappings as well as printed materials.

Many of the items were marked with classification markings, including notes taken in hand by individuals employed as reporters by Acme. A closer look at the contents resulted in the identification of seven sets of notes relating to closed congressional hearings known to have involved classified information. There can be no escaping the fact that on top of all of the deceptions and obvious security violations that had made it easy for Jeffries to walk off with classified materials, company officials had deliberately attempted to destroy incriminating evidence that might have led to their own conviction for criminal negligence.

Bring in the real culprits

On January 23rd, 1986, Randy Miles Jeffries unexpectedly entered a plea of guilty to the charge of passing national defense documents to a person not entitled to receive them. This was the lesser of the two counts on which he had been indicted and carries a maximum penalty of 10 years in prison and a $10,000 fine. The more serious charge was dropped by Federal prosecutors.

Prior to sentencing on March 13, Federal Court Judge Gerhard A. Gesell expressed his frustration in not seeing before the bench officers of the company whose security had been so lax as to literally invite the theft of classified materials. In the judge’s own words:

“Well, now, where is the Acme Reporting Company? A nationwide company with lush contracts in the federal government. I don’t see them before me and that organization is primarily responsible for this offense. Where are they?”

After being assured that the firm was under investigation, his honor responded with:

“Well, there’s nothing to investigate. You have all the facts. You know they spewed these confidential documents all over for everybody to take. They laid them out. They allowed people to go around the halls talking about how they were going to sell them to the Russians. And you haven’t done anything about them.”

The judge went on to state that Jeffries deserved and would receive a substantial sentence, but deplored the fact that Acme Reporting was still allowed to do business with the Federal government (although denied classified work). In less than a year, however, Acme Reporting would cease to exist as a corporate entity.

In the face of Jeffries claim that his acts were the work of a desperate man contending with drug addiction, Judge Gesell flatly stated that what Jeffries did could not be excused on the basis of drugs. He pronounced a sentence of from three to nine years in a Federal penitentiary. However, the former messenger’s assignment to the Ray Brook facility in New York was by no means arbitrary. This prison has a drug treatment program as well as educational facilities for learning a trade.

Potential Damage to the United States

With this and in similar cases, the bottom line is always, “how much damage resulted from this act of espionage?” And here it’s fair enough to ask the question, “how much damage could have occurred if Jeffries had not been detected early in the game?” Damage assessment is difficult to discuss in an unclassified case study; however, the reader will benefit from some idea of the importance of the information that was lost. (See also the Bulletin for July 1998, #3-88 on damage assessment.)

A careful piece of investigative reporting by Washington Post writers Ruth Marcus and Fred Hiatt, gives us a clear picture of the substance of the information in the three transcripts stolen by Jeffries. According
to Marcus and Hiatt, who published their report in December 1985, although it would be difficult to identify which pages Jeffries passed as "samples" to the Soviets, declassified versions of these same transcripts issued by the House Armed Services Committee included discussions of U.S. Nuclear strategy, the location of Trident submarines in the Pacific, and the vulnerability of U.S. computer and communication systems to Soviet eavesdropping.

One of these three documents, with numerous sections deleted, dealt with some of the Defense Department's most sensitive plans and programs. This transcript (Top Secret before being "sanitized") includes testimony by Donald C. Latham, Assistant Secretary of Defense for Command Control Communications and Intelligence (commonly known as C3I). Latham testified before a House sub-committee in closed session on the vulnerability of military satellites, the capability of U.S. coastal radar to track Soviet cruise missiles, and the comparative nuclear strengths of the United States and the Soviet Union.

As described in the Post article, much of the text surrounding the deletions concerns systems now being developed that would improve our ability to communicate with nuclear submarines, missile launch sites, and bombers after a Soviet nuclear first strike. Undeleted discussions remained about the use of "blue-green lasers," that would make it possible for satellites to communicate with submarines by sending pulses of light from space through the ocean.

While we cannot validate reports from unofficial sources point by point, the Post article does provide us with at least a general sense of the damage which took place. If Jeffries had been able to sell the complete package, unquestionably this would have been an extremely serious loss in terms of national security and our ability to defend ourselves.

Epilogue: The demise of Acme Reporting

Regrettably, corporate officials of Acme were not brought to court to answer for their conduct. However, in light of the circumstances surrounding Jeffries' conviction for espionage, the firm's facility clearance was revoked by the Director, Defense Investigative Service on February 11, 1986. And Acme faced legal problems from another quarter: A few weeks later, authorities launched a second criminal investigation involving the firm. Allegations had been made that a high-ranking official of Acme bribed a contract specialist with the National Labor Relations Board. At the time the NLRB had a substantial contract with Acme and it was up for renewal. Although the charge was never proven, the company was barred from future business with NLRB. Possibly as a result of these setbacks and the unpleasant notoriety of the Jeffries case, the firm was sold in January 1987 and incorporated under a new name and new management.

Lessons Learned: DIS's Response

Although it was Randy Jeffries who stole the classified documents and pleaded guilty to espionage, the original culprits were Acme and its corporate officers who ignored DoD's security regulations, lied during DIS's facility inspections, and who allowed daily security violations and compromise of classified materials. What could be done to prevent further occurrences of this type of misconduct?

There were many lessons to be learned from this case which were not lost on the Defense Investigative Service. In general, DIS decided to be proactive and less reactive to security violations. Its initial response was to establish Project Insight in March of 1986. The Project Insight team, composed of one special agent and two industrial security representatives, analyzed current industrial security inspection practices and policies; interviewed knowledgeable individuals in both the government and private sector; and devised and tested new inspection techniques. They also created a new handbook to be used by Industrial Security Representatives.

The purpose of the new inspection techniques and guidance is to provide the DIS representative with supporting information that will validate facts which are routinely provided by the contractor. These changes have since been incorporated in the facility inspection procedure to give the Industrial Security Representative conducting an inspection a clearer understanding of the classified work a facility performs, who its customers are, and the amount and level of classified holdings it should have on the premises.

DIS now conducts pre-inspection research by talking with the facility's customers to learn the status of a contract, the level of access required, where access to classified material takes place, how classified material is handled, and if there have been any security problems or violations associated with a contract.

When DIS Representatives arrive at the contractor facility, an entrance briefing is conducted with upper level management officials. This allows the agency to establish rapport with management before the facility inspection begins and enables DIS to assess the contractor's support for the program. And to help ensure the objectiveness of information being collected, inspecting officials also conduct unaccompanied interviews (without the security officer) with both cleared and uncleared contractor employees.

Much of this fact-finding process is now being incorporated into the more recently introduced concept of "Programmatic Inspections." In this new approach by DIS, an accurate assessment of a firm's overall security posture can be gained from tracking the flow of classified
material from start to finish on one or two contracts or projects. It's a lot like checking an audit trail of work in progress without attempting to inspect an entire location in which the work is being done. According to DIS Director Jack Donnelly, if any flaw is found while they are doing this inspection, DIS representatives will work with the security people to fix it right then and there and that will be the end of it. According to Donnelly, “Our job is to help educate people in industry with regard to the industrial security regulations, and not to play ‘gotcha’.”

It's quite clear from this statement that changes in facility inspection procedures since 1985 do not alter the government’s goal of cooperation with and support for industry. In fact, as a result of the reforms stemming from the Acme disaster and of later innovations, DIS’s ability to advise and assist contractors on maintaining a sound security program have been significantly enhanced. As a result, our power to assure the protection of this Nation’s secrets in the custody of private industry has been reinforced.

Lessons Learned for the Facility Security Officer

Admittedly, the situation described at Acme Reporting Company was an extreme example of corporate negligence and duplicity. But, should one draw the conclusion that things really have to get that bad before someone is tempted to commit espionage? Nothing could be further from the truth. In fact, in several other espionage cases, damage of this type occurred in spite of what was considered at the time to be satisfactory or even exemplary compliance with security regulations by the firm. In the cases of Thomas Cavanagh (1984) and that of Arthur Walker (1985), for example, security controls enforced by the company prevented an even greater loss than what did occur.

In the case of Randy Miles Jeffries and Acme Reporting, however, it is clear that espionage was virtually invited by a breakdown of control at the top of the firm. As an unclesred employee, Jeffries’ access to any classified material even under close supervision was totally unwarranted. The regulations were there, but not enforced. Nor was there any apparent attempt to carry out an effective security awareness program for cleared employees who lived in ignorance of the rules for transmission, storage, and destruction of classified materials.

The most obvious lesson drawn from this disaster is that the security officer in industry or in government is the keystone of the whole system. If this stone fails, damage will occur sooner or later. Much rests on the integrity of that one person and on that individual’s ability to act in the national interest, to enforce approved policy and regulations, and to educate others on the need to protect classified information.
A Message for Security Educators:

Follow-up on Continuing Evaluation

Our February 1989 issue on Continuing Evaluation generated a lot of interest. It was, of course, an attempt to promote a positive image and a clear rationale for these programs in government and industry. Continuing Evaluation is defined as the process by which employees are evaluated (during and after the granting of an initial clearance) for suitability to have access to classified information. Its success as a preventative measure for compromise depends on the timely input of relevant information from each employee and from his or her coworkers, supervisor, and security officer. Reported information is not necessarily derogatory—it could simply indicate that an individual is or will be faced with a higher degree of vulnerability. Obviously, knowing what to report in confidence to a security professional and what follow-up actions are called for are the keys to an effective program in support of personnel security.

This all points to the need for Continuing Evaluation training as one important aspect of Security Awareness. In fact, it’s got to be an essential element in all briefings as we remind cleared employees about their special responsibilities that come with a clearance. CE training can be accomplished in other ways as well—video products, poster, handouts, and (of course) the printed word such as the Bulletin.

But, are our personnel actually getting the message and are our security professionals attempting to get the message across? And are we in government and industry developing the right training products to promote this effort? PERSEC recently launched a major research effort to answer these questions. Their initial report which will be out in a few weeks is based on data from 63 component units in the Department of Defense and several additional defense contractor facilities.

Included in this issue of the Bulletin is a method by which you might assess the CE program in your own organization. On the next two pages is a short questionnaire—actually a quiz for cleared employees on the subject of Continuing Evaluation. Consider reproducing this quiz in quantity and asking your employees to fill it out. Tally the results and, if possible, share the response distributions with us. If you need some advice about how to administer this questionnaire to large numbers of employees, give us a call at Autovon 695-3824 or Commercial (804) 275-3824.

For valid results, promise anonymity to all responding personnel. This exercise has two objectives. First, it will give you some idea of the success of the continuing evaluation program in your organization both in terms of understanding and motivation, and secondly, the quiz itself is a training technique. It should stir up interest and get people thinking about their security obligations in a way that a briefing or video might not. We will leave it to you to decide what the correct answers are in terms of your own regulations and official guidance.

*The Department of Defense Personnel Security Research and Education Center in Monterey, California.
How much do you know about CONTINUING EVALUATION?

A quiz for cleared personnel in government and Industry

Select the one best response from among the choices offered:

1. What statement best describes Continuing Evaluation?
   a. It is a method of measuring on-the-job productivity.
   b. It should ensure continuing suitability to hold a clearance.
   c. It is intended to replace the old procedure of background investigations.
   d. It requires that all cleared employees be under constant surveillance.

2. What is the reason why Continuing Evaluation for suitability to hold a clearance is necessary?
   a. Background Investigations are inherently unreliable.
   b. People and their behaviors change over time with new conditions.
   c. The nature of the hostile intelligence threat changes over time.
   d. Periodic reinvestigations are being phased out as an economy measure.

3. Under current regulations and policy, when should a person, holding a secret clearance, report intended foreign travel for personal reasons?
   a. All foreign travel must be reported in advance.
   b. Only travel to designated countries must be reported.
   c. With only a Secret clearance, no prior reporting is required.
   d. All foreign travel except to neighboring countries must be reported.

4. If you see a co-worker taking away classified material at the end of a work-day what should you say or do, if anything?
   a. If that person has an appropriate clearance you shouldn’t question his or her actions.
   b. Confront the individual immediately and demand an explanation.
   c. Report your concern in confidence to your security officer immediately.
   d. Make sure that the material is not something that is personally accountable to you in case it is lost.

5. An employee who gets into financial difficulties and is subject to a garnishment of pay to cover debts:
   a. will have his or her clearance suspended until all debts are paid.
   b. is automatically considered a security risk.
   c. is required to submit to a polygraph examination.
   d. is potentially more vulnerable to a recruitment attempt for espionage.
6. You have seen a cleared co-worker use an illegal drug at a social occasion and you make this fact known to a security officer. Under the best possible conditions, what should happen?
   a. The co-worker’s clearance will be suspended immediately.
   b. Nothing will happen unless drug addiction affects the individual’s job performance.
   c. An employee assistance program comes into effect; the clearance may be temporarily suspended based on other factors and information.
   d. The co-worker will be given an initial warning and be required to report for regular drug testing.

7. You have had the bad judgment to drive home after a cocktail party and get involved in a minor traffic accident. You are charged with a DWI and your license is suspended. How is this likely to affect your clearance status:
   a. You can expect to lose your clearance the next morning.
   b. Nothing will happen.
   c. Nothing will happen if you decide not to report the incident to security.
   d. It will depend on your personal history and all of the information on record pertinent to your continued suitability to hold a clearance.

8. Boris Ivanovich introduces himself to you at a contractors convention as a Bulgarian commercial representative and suggests that you get together sometime soon for a business chat. You have no professional interest in a meeting of this type, so what should you do?
   a. Politely decline and don’t report the incident since you did not agree to meet him.
   b. Politely decline and report this contact immediately to your security officer.
   c. Agree to meet with him and see how things develop.
   d. Agree to meet with him and report the contact to your security officer.

9. Which of the following do you not need to report about yourself to the security officer:
   a. Intent to travel to Romania
   b. Marriage to a foreign national
   c. Personal bankruptcy
   d. Resignation due to a better offer from another firm or agency
   e. all of the above

10. Based on information reported in the media in the past ten years, what appears to be the most common motivation for involvement in espionage?
   a. financial—a craving for money
   b. revenge against a system or organization
   c. fear of disclosure of lifestyle or illegal activities
   d. ideology or confused national loyalty
# You Can Host These Courses On-site at Your Facility

(Industry or Government)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Train-the-Trainer Course (TTT) 5220.13A, 4.5 days</th>
<th>Security Briefers Course (SBC) 5220.13, 2.5 days</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Purpose: To train you to teach the SBC. This workshop, conducted on the 2 days before a scheduled SBC, prepares you to be an instructor for the SBC. You will receive instruction by DoDSI staff on how to:</td>
<td>Purpose: To improve your effectiveness as a security education briefer. You will receive instruction on how to:</td>
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<tr>
<td>- use the SBC materials;</td>
<td>- prepare a briefing plan;</td>
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<tr>
<td>- present selected lessons in the SBC;</td>
<td>- design and use briefing aids;</td>
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<tr>
<td>- facilitate the preparation of briefings;</td>
<td>- present your briefings in a clear and interesting manner; and</td>
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<tr>
<td>- conduct practice briefing sessions; and</td>
<td>- evaluate live briefings.</td>
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<tr>
<td>- evaluate live briefings.</td>
<td>As the “Security” in the course title suggests, the briefings must address security requirements, but this is not the emphasis of the course. The course emphasis is on accomplishing the objectives listed above so that you become more skilled and more comfortable at speaking in front of others.</td>
</tr>
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</table>

Under DoDSI supervision, you will then spend the next 2.5 days teaching your first SBC.

If you are considering participating in the TTT, it is suggested that you: Be responsible for your organization’s security briefing program; be an experienced security briefer or a graduate of the SBC; have a need to train others to prepare and present security briefings; and have a working knowledge of security requirements. If you want to learn how to brief—choose the SBC.

To host the courses described above, please call Linda Braxton or Gussie Scardina, DoDSI, at (804) 279-6076/6076/5308 or DSN 695-6076/5308.

These courses are held in succession. The TTT precedes the SBC.

To host the SBC, you must be able to provide:
- one main classroom for 24 students
- 3 breakout rooms for 6 students each
- A-V equipment for all 4 rooms
  - (Overhead projectors, screens, and writing surfaces for each room)
- At least two of the instructors and preferably more for the TTT.
- An on-site coordinator
- Invitations to other security organizations in your area in order to fill a class of 24.

The Department of Defense Security Institute (DoDSI) will:
- Provide the lead instructor and assume responsibility for the teaching success of the course.
- If necessary, provide security personnel from other organizations to help teach the course.
- Provide two full days of training for the instructors prior to starting the course.
- Provide the instructional materials in sufficient quantities for 24 students.
- Help the trainers teach the Security Briefers Course.

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*Security Awareness Bulletin 10  Number 2-90*
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☐ DELIVER! Easy-to-follow pamphlet on how to transmit and transport your classified materials. Written specifically for the Department of Defense employee.

☐ Terminator VIII Requirements for destruction of classified materials. Contains questions and answers for some common problems and also detailed information on various destruction methods. Written specifically for the Department of Defense employee.

☐ STU-III Handbook for Industry. To assist FSOs of cleared defense contractors who require the STU-III, Type 1 unit. Covers step-by-step what you need to know and do to make the STU-III a valuable addition to your facility's operations.

☐ Survival Handbook, the basic security procedures necessary for keeping you out of trouble. Written specifically for the Department of Defense employee.

☐ Layman's Guide to Security, the basic security procedures that you should be aware of when handling classified materials in your work environment.

☐ Acronyms and Abbreviations, 12 pages of security-related acronyms and abbreviations and basic security forms.

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☐ The Case of Randy Miles Jeffries (2-90) Jan 90
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