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ACCOUNTABILITY - THE PILLAR OF SUCCESSFUL COMMAND

BY

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ACCOUNTABILITY - THE PILLAR OF SUCCESSFUL COMMAND

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ABSTRACT

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This research project explores the principle of accountability and its relationship to successful command in the military. Recent events in the Air Force have highlighted the need for increased accountability for misdeeds and errors. Air Force senior leadership has tackled the problem head-on by emphasizing the importance of accountability and creating personnel policies that lead to increased accountability. This paper suggests there are several layers of accountability that impact overall unit performance. New Air Force guidance on this issue is addressing only individual accountability and there is a wider spectrum that needs attention. This paper also suggests that the Air Force guidance, while beneficial in some respects, may have an undesired impact on overall performance.
INTRODUCTION

"The fault is entirely my own." General Robert E. Lee, July 3, 1863, Gettysburg, Pennsylvania.¹

As commander of the Confederate Army of Northern Virginia, General Lee understood perfectly the concept of accountability. Squarely accepting the responsibilities of command, he picked his subordinate commanders, organized the army, directed its training and equipage, and managed the Army's campaign and battle plans. When the realization that Pickett's charge on the last day of the Gettysburg campaign had met with monumental disaster, General Lee knew that he, and he alone, was responsible for this failure. He made this clear to his men and subsequently to the political leadership in Richmond, Virginia.² This form of honest, self-inspecting, fully accountable leadership has become rare, and needs to be revived.

The purpose of this research project is to explore the principle of accountability and its relationship to successful command. Accountability is a key ethic for all members of the Armed Forces. Being honest with ourselves concerning our true abilities, and being willing to accept fault for errors, are paramount to success. The inability to assess accountability can have serious consequences. We learn from our errors, and if we are unwilling to hold people accountable for failures, we may be doomed to repeat those same failings.

Recent events in the Air Force have brought increased attention to the concept of accountability. A B-52 crash highlighted poor leadership of a reckless pilot.³ A shooting spree by a deranged airman revealed poor supervision.⁴ A
shootdown of two unarmed U.S. Army Blackhawk helicopters by F-15s displayed significant command and control deficiencies. These and other incidents such as poor aircraft maintenance and using aircraft for personal convenience, all share a common theme according to an editorial in a prominent national newspaper. "In virtually all cases, the service has failed to hold its senior officers accountable."  

The problem may be an image of what society is experiencing in the "don't blame me" mentality we see in some of today's legal defenses. Since the military is truly a reflection of society, we may be facing one of our biggest challenges.

Is there truly a crisis in our midst? There are plenty of recent examples to support this theory, such as commander's being relieved for cause, lack of accountability for sexual harassment, and flagrant violations of regulations. As a result the senior leadership of the Air Force has moved swiftly to ensure all are held accountable.

But over time, will improved accountability make a difference? History provides some great examples to support the importance of accountability, such as the Yamashita incident in World War II, the Beirut disaster, and the Shuttle Challenger explosion. From analysis of historical events and current trends, it is clear that accountability is critical and is not just about individual integrity. Accountability encompasses three different forms to include individual, command and team accountability.
But do Air Force actions at this juncture go far enough in educating all Air Force personnel on all the concepts of accountability, or do they fall short of what is needed? Or worse yet, do these formal actions go too far and will they have a negative impact on productivity and morale?

CURRENT AIR FORCE GUIDANCE ON ACCOUNTABILITY

In response to what the Chief of Staff of the Air Force regards as a serious matter, General Fogleman produced a video tape addressing Air Force Standards and Accountability. In the video tape, General Fogleman emphasizes the importance of "holding ourselves accountable and others accountable for their actions." He goes on to say that it is our "responsibility to hold people involved accountable for their actions and respond appropriately." The key is to "respond appropriately." Don't brush at-fault incidents under the table. Determine what, if anything needs to be done, and do it. The Chief again focussed on this theme and its inherent tie to integrity when he gave a speech at the Air Force Academy. He said "In the end, integrity means having the courage to take responsibility for your actions and those of your subordinates." It is important to note that General Fogleman clearly lays out the premise that commanders will be held accountable for the actions of the men and women under their command.

As a result of the Chief's concerns, a new policy has been implemented affecting personnel records. The "changes in personnel policy provide specific guidelines to commanders that
link disciplinary and personnel actions." The new policy guarantees officers failing to meet Air Force standards are held fully accountable throughout the spectrum of personnel decisions to include officer performance reports (OPRs), promotion recommendation forms (PRFs), assignments and medals. The policy directs that when an officer receives adverse actions like a court martial conviction, an Article 15 or a letter of reprimand, it will be reviewed by the commander prior to completing OPRs. A major change from previous policy is that these three forms of punishment will be entered into an individual's Unfavorable Information File (UIF) without exception and will remain in the UIF for at least four years, or a permanent change of station (PCS) move plus one year, whichever occurs first. This is a significant change, because an individual with items in his UIF will PCS with the knowledge that his new commander will immediately know of prior misdeeds. In the past, certain documents could be removed prior to a PCS. The focus of this new policy is to appropriately link follow-on actions to disciplinary problems. This new policy only addresses individual integrity and accountability, but there are other accountability areas that are just as important.

ACCOUNTABILITY IS NOT JUST AN INDIVIDUAL CONCERN

In any organization, there are three levels of accountability at work that will have a bearing on success. These three levels are achieved in successive order. The first level is individual accountability. The willingness of any
individual in the unit to be held accountable for his personal actions is vital. This level of accountability is receiving most of the current emphasis because, more than anything else, it is an integrity issue.

The second level is command accountability. This is purely the purview of the commander. With the realization that commanders will and should be held accountable for all unit actions, good and bad, successful command can ensue.

The final level of accountability within a unit is team accountability. Seldom achieved in units, it should be a desired goal. When all members of an organization realize they are accountable for their personal actions as well as the overall performance of the unit and of their peers, team accountability is achieved. It is an ideal state when no single individual is blamed because the full team realizes their involvement. While it is important within an organization to understand that accountability is not just an individual issue, it is imperative to understand exactly what accountability means.

**DEFINITION - ACCOUNTABILITY DOES NOT MEAN FAULT**

"I want some accountability" was the headline of a recent Air Force Times article. The story was referring to a shooting at an Air Force base by a mentally disturbed airman. Five were killed and one of the widows could not understand why someone, anyone, was not held accountable. To be sure, there was a well documented history of violent and disturbing behavior on the part of the airman and maybe someone could be blamed for not
foreseeing this incident. But there is a distinct difference between holding someone accountable and assessing blame, and too often this difference is not understood.

Accountability is the "state of being accountable, liable, or responsible."¹⁶ To be held accountable means you must be able justify your actions and explain, or "account for" the results.¹⁷ There is no mention of blame or fault in the definition of accountability. Sometimes one leads to the other, but it is not mandatory.

INDIVIDUAL ACCOUNTABILITY

Unfortunately, recent trends in society tend to completely divorce accountability from fault. The "don't blame me" attitude that periodically surfaces in our courts has become a constant reminder that everyone seems to have an excuse for their misdeeds.

An elderly lady buys a cup of coffee at a fast-food establishment and accidently spills it, resulting in burns to her legs. She accepts no accountability in this event and instead sues the fast-food restaurant for making the coffee too hot.¹⁸ Doesn't she share in the blame? The abused person syndrome is another classic case of deflecting accountability. Two infants are strapped in their car seat and rolled into a lake to die. The mother admits her deed, but claims it was not her fault because she was abused as a child.¹⁹ The mere suggestion that she should not shoulder the blame for the death of her own children because of her professed abuse as a child is ludicrous.
These two characteristic examples of the "not my fault" mentality are typical of what is seen in many court cases throughout the land today. Unfortunately, this excuse for negligent actions has been appearing more and more regularly in the military.

A squadron commander was relieved of command for displaying "poor leadership and judgement" leading to a unit with "terrible morale problems." Performance indicators in the unit had rapidly and steadily declined since the commander took over. Rather than accepting accountability for her actions, the squadron commander attempted to pass the blame onto others and claimed her commanders were racially and sexually discriminating against her. While the commander acknowledged the problems in her squadron, she admitted no personal fault for them.

In Europe, court-martial proceedings have begun against two aircraft mechanics for allegedly improperly installing flight controls on an F-15 that later crashed. While admitting they did the work, and did not follow technical orders, they claim there were mitigating circumstances and they should not be blamed.

During the Blackhawk shootdown incident, the senior director aboard the Airborne Warning and Control System (AWACS) aircraft was the only person to be held officially responsible for the results. He claimed he "was unable to act because he did not have complete radar information" on the situation. If that was
the case, then why didn't he get it? Rather than make excuses for what happened, the senior director should have held himself accountable for what he knew was wrong before a disaster occurred.

Recently an Air Force C-141 crew flew an off-station training mission that involved landing away from their home base. The mission was approved by superiors, but an investigation was conducted after a crewmember casually remarked the real reason for the trip was to attend a couple of professional basketball games. During the investigation, other problems surfaced. The crew carried with them (in the C-141) an Air Force vehicle for use on the trip. By regulation the vehicle could be used only for transportation for meals and lodging but the crew used the vehicle to attend the games. In addition, the investigation determined that the senior crewmember was not qualified to conduct some of the training events practiced during the flight and was in violation of flight regulations. The crew claimed they did not plan the trip for the primary purpose of attending the games, and the Air Force investigation did bear this out, even though two weeks before the trip a member of the crew purchased basketball tickets. The investigation showed that the C-141 mission was properly authorized, but the misuse of the government vehicle and the actions of the senior crewmember required attention. Eleven officers and men were held accountable and found at fault.

Not satisfied with the investigation process, the senior
crewmember employed civilian lawyers and a communications consulting firm to help justify his actions and publicize his innocence. His self-promotion outside of the Air Force again highlights the problem. He admitted no fault and launched a very public counterattack against his commanders and the Air Force. The individual did this prior to working within the Air Force to address his concerns. He felt the Air Force was overreacting in its effort to guarantee accountability for wrongdoing. The individual admitted to prior incidents where he received an Article 15 for making false statements and falsifying official records, but claimed that had no bearing on this particular incident. This type of self promotion is a prime of example of deteriorating professional ethics and shows that even some experienced officers do not fully comprehend accountability.

The Air Force is vigorously tackling individual accountability concerns and may be turning the tide on understanding this ethic. But based on the C-141 crewmember's actions, not everyone is willing to accept the changes. In the Chief's new policy, the mandatory records reviews and documentation on performance reports of significant misdeeds or individual misjudgments will insure that acts or omissions of this magnitude remain highlighted. In other words, don't brush significant errors under the table. Hold individuals accountable in the future.

But there is a difficult "fine line" that must be walked to capture the spirit of accountability. By ensuring all errors are
documented in a way to affect careers, commanders may have little flexibility to distinguish minor errors of judgement, from those blatant crimes. In addition, individual accountability may be in its finest form when an individual admits fault, before the results are known or a mistake is discovered. If there is no distinction between self-admittance of errors, and discovering them after-the-fact, then very few may come forward. There must be a way of lessening the punishment of those who come forward with their misdeeds, and not grouping them with the deceitful who hope not to be discovered.

COMMAND ACCOUNTABILITY

Commanders should be taught that within their ethical domain, they must go beyond simply being held accountable for their personal actions. In addition they must comprehend they will be held accountable for the performance of their organizations and the people under their command. The authority to train, praise, punish, fire and to a certain degree hire, are all tools a commander has to ensure his men and women know the expected level of performance. There should be no doubt that with the tools available, a commander is accountable for the outcome.

According to a review of military law on this issue "a commander is to a great extent responsible for the behavior of troops under his command. In short, it is the commander who is in the public eye, [who] even if not in court, must take the blame, the rap for his men."31 While there is nothing specific
in the Uniform Code of Military Justice dealing with accountability as a stand-alone principle, commanders can be held accountable for dereliction of duty for failing to properly command their troops. An article written on command principles may have said it best. "Resolution of the issue of criminal responsibility by a legal forum does not, however, resolve the issue of command responsibility....The absolute responsibility mandated by [regulations] necessarily imposes a stricter standard of accountability than the lawyer's reasonable doubt."\(^{32}\)

One of the most classic cases of this failure involved Japanese General Yamashita, the commander of all Japanese forces in the Philippines during the closing days of World War II. After the war, General MacArthur elected to try him as a war criminal for atrocities Japanese troops committed during the final days.\(^{33}\) There is little doubt that during the chaos of those final days of occupation General Yamashita had little control over what was happening, but he nevertheless was clearly the commander. He was tried, sentenced and executed. Accountability had been unclouded to the prosecutors, and blame had been assessed. It has been argued that there were politics at play in this particular case, that General MacArthur wanted to "hang" someone for morale purposes and Yamashita was the target.\(^{34}\) But nevertheless, the justification for the guilty verdict was dereliction of duty and the avenue for prosecution was command accountability. The lesson is straightforward. While today you can't legally be held responsible for the
criminal misdeeds of your subordinates, you can be legally faulted for not being a competent commander.

A more recent incident reflecting the premise of command accountability occurred in Beirut, Lebanon on October 23, 1983. On that day a terrorist suicide bomber managed to penetrate the defenses of the U.S. Marine encampment resulting in the deaths of 241 Marines.\textsuperscript{35} An investigation by the Long Commission placed significant blame on the Marine commander, the Department of Defense and the White House.\textsuperscript{36} The Long Commission recommended strong disciplinary action be taken for the myriad of poor decisions that led to the success of the suicide bomber.\textsuperscript{37} It was expected that punishment would be forthcoming. However, the President stepped in and assumed the "blame" for the Marine tragedy, thereby shielding the military officers in command. It is important to understand in this case, accountability was clearly articulated. People were named, causes were discussed, and punishment was recommended. The Marine commander in Beirut even made it clear that as the commander in charge on the scene, he was to blame. It is unfortunate that the assessment of accountability did not result in the appropriate next step. It is quite often too easy for a higher command authority to accept full blame (in this case the White House), saving lower commanders from disciplinary action. If lower commanders are also culpable for their actions, or inactions, they also need to be disciplined.

When a B-52 crashed while participating in a practice sortie
for an upcoming airshow, killing all aboard, a subsequent investigation uncovered several problems.\textsuperscript{38} The probe revealed the pilot had a long history of behavior inconsistent with the flight discipline required of a person in his position. Many officers within the chain of command were challenged to explain why the pilot had not been sufficiently counseled or punished for earlier misdeeds, which might have prevented the fatal crash. The operations group commander was eventually charged with dereliction of duty, and court martialed. He simply failed to exercise sufficient leadership or supervision.\textsuperscript{39} But in a commentary to Air Force Times, it was postulated the group commander should not have been held accountable because of numerous other mitigating incidents. Rapid and frequent changes of command, minimal time in the job, poor documentation of earlier discipline problems, all were cited as reasons not to court martial the group commander.\textsuperscript{40} Such logic goes against the principles of command. Regardless of "mitigating" circumstances, as a commander you are accountable. If your punishment is lessened because of circumstances beyond your control, then that may be an appropriate option. The message, however, is obvious. If you are in command, you will answer for the actions of the people under you. What happened to this commander has been perceived as a "wake-up call to all commanders."\textsuperscript{41}

During the Blackhawk shootdown incident, positive command accountability was at work, at least for one. The overall Air Force commander of the operation said he expected to be court
martialled for the incident, and fully realized he was accountable. He offered to resign his commission three times.\textsuperscript{42} This commander understood his role, and the importance of accountability. This is the way it should work.

The Air Force is not the only service with command accountability concerns. The 1991 Tailhook scandal, while in itself a crime because it demonstrated extreme poor judgement in the area of sexual harassment, also raised a secondary issue of who to hold accountable.\textsuperscript{43} Officers and civilian leadership in the Navy were asked to explain their activities in relation to Tailhook events and were told that if they participated, punishment would be forthcoming. In other words, individual accountability was being assessed. In addition, command accountability was also actively pursued. Several distinguished Naval officers were called on the carpet for having knowledge of the events. They had the opportunity to prevent the actions, stop them or at least report them, but elected not to. Some of these officer's careers are now tarnished forever and at least one is fighting what he perceives as an injustice.\textsuperscript{44} Although he attended Tailhook, he was not directly involved in the sexual harassment activities, therefore he felt he should not be punished. But a letter to the editor of a prominent magazine puts the punishment in its proper perspective. The letter says the officer was not "found guilty by association...but found guilty by omission."\textsuperscript{45} The letter goes on to ask "Where was (the) leadership to see where things were going and follow policies on
such activities? If...senior officers had exercised leadership, the Tailhook incident would not have occurred."46 Commanders must not turn their back on crimes being committed. It is their duty to stand up and exercise the leadership for which they have been entrusted.

Maybe General Bruce Clarke, one of the great commanders during World War II, knew exactly where to look when events go badly. He wrote, "When things go wrong in your command, start searching for the reason in increasingly larger concentric circles around your own desk."47

TEAM ACCOUNTABILITY

One of the best examples of team accountability was realized in the aftermath of the space shuttle Challenger disaster in 1986.48 National Air & Space Administration (NASA) managers and engineers, as well as key contractors for shuttle hardware had always participated as a team when questions arose about launch decisions. It was no different before this launch when concerns were expressed about low outside air temperatures expected at launch time and the possible adverse effect these low temperatures could have on some critical rocket components. The team of NASA and contractor managers and engineers eventually reached a decision that it was OK to launch, although some engineers objected. The resultant catastrophe put accountability and eventually blame on the entire team.

Some members of the team attempted to deflect blame for the launch decision but Judson Lovingood, Shuttle Deputy Project

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Manager said it best. In an interview ten years after the incident he said, "I think people should hold us collectively responsible as a group. Every person in that meeting...before the launch shared in the blame." In this case, some engineers did not agree with the launch decision, but eventually "rolled-over." Even they were held accountable. The team concept was fully in-place, team accountability was achieved, and there is an important lesson here. If you disagree strongly enough with the direction your team is taking, speak up or accept the consequences.

An excellent example of a group of professionals not supporting the concept of team accountability revolves around the Blackhawk shutdown incident in 1994. Obviously errors occurred that resulted in 26 friendly fire deaths, and cries for accountability and punishment were made loud and clear. The Air Force launched initial investigations to determine if any individuals should be formally charged for the errors. Seven people were investigated but surprisingly only one was formally charged with dereliction of duty and faced a court martial, which later found him not guilty. While individually no one was found guilty of a crime, it was a compilation of individual errors that resulted in the disaster. They were a team. The AWACS crew, the F-15 pilots, even the Blackhawk crew, all committed errors that resulted in a tragedy. The "team" failed and the team should have been held accountable. A commentary written by a widow of one of the victims said it well. The "individuals who were
derelict or negligent" should be all held accountable, or "something like this will surely happen again." Without a full accounting and thorough investigation, the same mistakes can happen again.

General Fogleman realized this when he elected to take separate and non-judicial punitive actions against the seven officers, effectively putting a stop to their careers in the Air Force. The team of seven failed to work as such. They failed to identify shortfalls in training, preparedness and procedures that contributed to the shootdown. Therefore, as a team, they were held accountable and punished. While a court of law may not have the leverage to interpret the importance of accountability, we as commanders do. The bottom line is that everyone on a team is accountable not only for his actions, but also for the actions of those around him. On the AWACS crew, just one person speaking up could have prevented the disaster.

WHERE ARE WE TODAY?

The Air Force is addressing individual accountability problems with sweeping reforms and public speeches. These reforms will make accountability a permanent part of life, but the latest guidance may go too far. An environment of fear about making a single mistake and jeopardizing your career is prevalent. There is a very distinct difference between intentional wrongdoing, and poor judgement. Making and learning from errors is to a great extent a form of education, and honest mistakes need to be separated from clear crimes. Commanders may
feel their hands are tied because of the overwhelming pressure to ensure accountability and may damage careers unnecessarily. Assurances by senior leaders that the Air Force is not a "one mistake Air Force" are being made, but many officers and enlisted personnel are skeptical.\(^5^4\)

While individuals remain concerned about their own accountability, command accountability is even more critical in today's environment. A recent situation at a fighter unit typifies the current environment. A commander was relieved of command for not stopping sexual harassment in his unit.\(^5^5\) The commander was fired, not for his direct actions, but for the actions of his subordinates. Other senior supervisors in the unit were also punished for "tacitly" approving, or paying no attention to the activities.\(^5^6\) Members of the unit rallied around the fired commander and felt the actions taken against their boss were unfounded.\(^5^7\) Although embracing the concept of a team, none in the unit recognized they could have, and should have stopped the problems that led to their boss's firing. They did not realize they were equally at fault for what happened. As a result of these actions, the whole unit was grounded for a period and a new commander brought in from the outside.\(^5^8\)

The firing has reinforced the premise that commanders will be held to task for the actions of members of the unit. The commander doing the firing said "the message is accountability. There were people [under] their command behaving way outside the bounds of acceptable conduct for Air Force Officers. [The
commander] did nothing to stop it and that is a leadership issue."⁵⁹

It is clear that command accountability is the crucial element of organizational excellence. One of the best historical examples of the concept of command accountability that needs to be reinforced in today's environment, occurred the night that General Eisenhower made the "go" decision for the invasion of Normandy on June 6, 1944. Fearing a possible debacle the next day, General Eisenhower wrote out a press release that ended with the following sentence. "If any blame or fault attaches to the attempt, it is mine alone."⁶⁰ Integrity and the willingness to accept accountability for this monumental decision were important to the General's philosophy of command. The fact that he spelled out his accountability in advance (for what he feared might be a terrible disaster) demonstrates the importance of this ethic for all commanders. All commanders, by the very act of accepting command, accept accountability before the fact, not just after.

CONCLUSION

This paper has presented numerous examples, recent and historical, showing the importance and application of accountability. The quantity of recent examples might leave some to believe we are truly in a crisis. It is my belief this is not the case. Scrutiny of Air Force operations has increased during this time of budget and force structure reductions. Accountability ensures that the limited resources left to accomplish our mission are not wasted. So when significant
errors like the Blackhawk shootdown occur, accountability is required by ourselves, and by the public, to preserve confidence in the Air Force.

The media, the public and the politicians, however, may believe there is a crisis, and so the Air Force must continue to tackle it head on. Since the Air Force is dependent on the public for its funding and support, we can not afford to sweep accountability under the table, or to keep it hidden from view. To counter the perception of a crisis, the service must highlight accountability, publicize it and apply it equally. The path that General Fogleman has put us on is the correct one. Accountability is being assessed, but there are concerns that commander's may overreact and permanently damage careers needlessly for minor errors in judgement.

As commanders, we are tasked to ensure accountability is fully embedded in our unit's mindset. From individual through team accountability, all personnel need to know they can make a difference, and their actions affect not only themselves, but their peers, subordinates and superiors. Team accountability is with us every day and certainly recent events have highlighted where it should have been more evident.

Of the three levels of accountability, command accountability remains the key. It is the pillar of successful command and leads to improved integrity and accountability throughout the unit. There are plenty of recent cases proving that at least some commanders do not fully accept or understand
their accountability. Therefore it needs to be taught at all commander schools and in professional military education courses, from an ethical and legal perspective. Commanders must set the example and assume greater responsibilities if we are to make further progress on this issue.
NOTES

1Shelby Foote, Stars In Their Courses (New York: The Modern Library, 1994), 242. On what was to become the last day of the Gettysburg battle, General Lee ordered a frontal assault into the Union line along Cemetery Ridge. The assault was led by General Pickett's division, which suffered incredible losses. Although advised against this tactic by several of his commanders, Lee nevertheless felt this was the best option. Upon witnessing the failure of the assault, General Lee made this statement.


3Pat Johnson, "The Ticket Punching Must Stop," Air Force Times, March 27, 1995, 29. A B-52 crashed while practicing for an airshow killing the crew. The investigation revealed the pilot had a history of poor flight discipline and many knew about it, including his commanders.

4Julie Bird, "I Want Some Accountability," Air Force Times, December 11, 1995, 14. A mentally disturbed airman entered a clinic building at his base and began shooting. Several were killed and wounded. An investigation showed that throughout the airman's career in the Air Force he had been evaluated several times for mental disorders with several recommendations for dismissal, but it was never done.

5Jerry Cox, "This Was A Lesson In What Not To Do," Air Force Times, November 20, 1995, 29. On April 14, 1994 two F-15s fired heat-seeking missiles at two U.S. Army UH-60 Blackhawk helicopters, shooting down both and killing 15 Americans and 11 foreign nationals. The incident occurred in northern Iraq where the F-15s were enforcing an Iraqi no-fly zone. The helicopters were transporting personnel in support of humanitarian efforts for the Kurdish refugees.


9Ibid.

10Ibid.

11Ronald R. Fogleman, "Integrity," Air Force Magazine,
February, 1996, 91.

12Fogleman, Accountability and the Personnel Policy Review.

13A court martial conviction is the most serious form of punishment involving a trial by peers. An Article 15 is the next most serious form of punishment where a commander determines blame and assesses punishment. If the accused disagrees with the Article 15, he can request a court martial. A letter of reprimand is less serious and officially documents an incident, states the facts and can assess blame. There are other methods to document substandard behavior, but these three are the most common and visible.

14A UIF is a personnel record established for an individual when he/she receives unfavorable information. It is the single source place to document an individual's unacceptable behavior and could be referred to at a later date for making personnel decisions such as promotions and assignments.


16Webster's This New International Dictionary (Springfield: Merriam-Webster Inc., 1993), s.v. "accountability."

17Ibid., s.v. "accountable."


19Ibid


22The AWACS is an airborne platform called the E-3 Sentry, equipped with a sophisticated radar system. Its function is to provide a radar picture to aircraft and provide command and control guidance.


25Compant, "Basketball Flight Nets 11."

26Ibid.

27Ibid.


Fogleman, Accountability and the Personnel Policy Review.


Ibid., 235.


Ibid., 135. The Long Commission was formed by Congress to investigate the incident. This was an independent investigation that laid blame for the disaster at several levels to include the White House, the Department of Defense, and the Marine Corps leadership.

Ibid., 139.

Johnson, 29.


Johnson, 29.


David North, "Navy Should Protect Its Own," Aviation Week and Space Technology, January 22, 1996, 70. In 1991 the Tailhook Association (comprised of Naval Aviators) had their annual convention in Las Vegas, NV. At the convention women were verbally and physically harassed. The behavior of many officers at the convention was called into question during investigations after some of the harassed women came forward with the story.
Ibid. This was an editorial written about a Navy Commander denied a promotion for his participation at the 1991 Tailhook convention. The editorial states the Commander was not present during sexual harassment events, and yet he was being unfairly punished.


Ibid.

Charles Westhoff, Military Air Power (Maxwell Air Force Base: Air University Press, 1990), 151. General Bruce Clark was a commander of armored divisions during the war and later was the Chief of USAREUR and CENTAG from 1960 to 1962.

Paul Hoversten and Patricia Edmonds, "Debate Raged Night Before Doomed Launch," USA Today, January 22, 1996, 2A. On January 28, 1986, the shuttle Challenger exploded after liftoff killing the entire crew and setting NASA's manned spaceflight program back several years. The cause of the explosion was a faulty O-ring that failed in the cold weather. The O-ring seals the joints on the solid-fuel booster.

Ibid.


Ibid.


Ibid.

"Colonel Loses Appeal," Air Force Times, December 25, 1995, 16. The commander of a fighter group was relieved of command after allegations surfaced that male members of the unit had discriminated against a female fighter pilot.


Ibid.

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