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PEACEKEEPING: A COLD WAR SOLUTION, A COLD WAR DILEMMA

BY

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"PEACEKEEPING: A COLD WAR SOLUTION, A POST-COLD WAR DILEMMA"

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ABSTRACT

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During the Cold War, the UN was unable to operate, according to the precept of its Charter, as an effective instrument of global collective security. A positive result of this situation was the birth of successful peacekeeping operations. The end of the Cold War and the rise of local crises have pushed the UN to move beyond peacekeeping and into peace enforcement. The UN is urged to organize more and more complex operations, making use of the whole range of military operations. This study explores the present validity of the concept of peacekeeping, through its evolution and through the analysis of the doctrinal contribution of some leading military nations. The paper examines the new nature of peacekeeping in the light of the UN Charter's assumptions, of the basic defining criteria, and of the attitude of the member states to help the UN to maintain international peace and security.
INTRODUCTION

During the Cold War strategies for the use of force in war were prepared. In the post-Cold War, we are preparing strategies for the use of force in a background of peace. The term Constabulary Forces has become fashionable again: armed forces performing tasks of international public order, necessarily different in quality and goals from the traditional military aim of winning a war.

Peacekeeping is closely connected with the world situation. Since the term was coined, peacekeeping has changed its basic concepts. At present, it is completely different from the way it was in 1956, when it entered the common speech of international relationships. The concept of peacekeeping is closely related to the model of international society that was established in 1945 after WWII and the birth of the UN.

Contemporary historiography dates to 1956, the beginning of this kind of military peacekeeping operations, with a prologue of minor missions (the first in the Balkans) since 1947. The most outstanding experiences in such interventions have been reached by the UN, the oldest and most important international organization. Its framework, its operational philosophy, and its juridical rules are strongly affected by the political, institutional, and military history of the USA, UK and Commonwealth, with minor contributions from USSR and France. Such structure dates back to the days immediately preceding and following WWII and is still valid. This is the key to understanding certain shifts and procedures, which
may be unclear in the heat of an emergency or crisis. The purpose of this paper is to demonstrate the continued validity of the peacekeeping concept and why it poses problems for decisionmaking in the Post-Cold War era.

PEACEKEEPING

The first peacekeeping operations that can be considered in a broad sense were performed in the years following WWII. They are not well known, and the UN itself is somewhat perplexed in considering them in its history. The international organization did not yet have its own definite framework and philosophy. Moreover, there were political-ideological reasons: some operations were being developed in geographical and political nodal points of the East-West bipolarism that were beginning in those years.

A. UNITED NATIONS CHARTER

One of the main objectives reported by the article 1 of the United Nations Charter is the maintenance of international peace and security. The authors gave the Organization two instruments to protect the world against any possible danger of international crisis: Chapter VI, "Pacific Settlement Of Disputes", and Chapter VII, "Action With Respect to Threats to the Peace, Breaches of the Peace, and Acts of Aggression". With these, the Charter focused on the pillars of pacific settlement and collective security as surrogates for balance of power. Its architects failed to perceive the spectrum of activity that lay between the two. This gap in the Charter became apparent with the realization that the great powers
were not as immune as hoped from the temptation of placing political objectives before peace. The start of the Cold War and the Communist victory over the Chinese Nationalists, prevented the five permanent members of the Security Council from finding the kind of unanimity upon which the logic of the Charter was based. It was this inability to fulfil the Charter's original enforcement objectives, as analysts have noted, that "led to the development of peacekeeping, something short of collective coercion that could still be utilized when states, having resorted to violence rather than pacific means to settle their disputes, subsequently decide to set aside their arms."¹

In any case, Chapter VI and Chapter VII represent the two limits of the wide range of peace operations that go from pacific settlement to peace enforcement. Unlike the allusions to combined international enforcement actions in Chapter VII (Article 45), the term peacekeeping is not specifically mentioned in the Charter. Former UN Secretary-General Dag Hammarskjold, however, recognized that the improvised type of UN Cold War security operations lay somewhere between these two extremes and labeled UN peacekeeping operations as "Chapter Six and a Half" to characterize this somewhat tenuous legitimacy under the Charter².

**B. THE FIRST PHASE**

The first phase in the evolution of the peacekeeping (PKO) concept consisted of minor missions with the participation of the winners of WWII assisted by a few neutral countries. At the beginning, the peacekeeping operations were made up mainly of
military rather than civilians or diplomats. In fact, the military organization and the military culture best met the requirements of particularly difficult situations. "Peacekeeping is not a job for soldiers", Hammarskjold once noted, "but only a soldier can do it". For example, the two civilian commissions for Palestine (UNCP) and India-Pakistan (UNCIP), after the escalation of local crises, were replaced by the first two missions of military observers, UN Truce Supervision Organization (UNTSO) and UN Military Observer Group in India and Pakistan (UNMOGIP), which are at present the longest-lived. Since that time, other missions and commissions have been activated. Several, such as the Consular Mission for Indonesia, had the task of controlling the cease-fire between the local rebels and the Dutch forces. The task of others was surveillance of boundaries. For example, the two commissions for the Balkans which were created after infiltrations into Greece from neighboring countries.

Among the missions we should mention is the case of an ex Italian colony, Somalia. The task of preparing the conditions for independence was entrusted to Italy itself (at the time a defeated nation, not yet in the UN) which carried it out successfully. The international organization, on that occasion, accomplished jobs of control and supervision, with civilian officials.

The first phase of the development of the peace keeping ended without the employment of the "blue helmets". UN forces at that time were engaged in a peace enforcement operation in Korea (1950), where they drove back the aggression of N. Korea against S. Korea.
C. THE SECOND PHASE

In 1956, the development of real PKO started when the disruptive danger of the Suez Crisis forced the UN to establish a large-sized military operation. It was then that some of the normative, operational, and functional principles were outlined that are still in use today.

There were rather rigorous limits both to the nations providing the contingents and to the forces engaged on the field. Such limits were so severe that, in the opinion of many, the traditional idea of military operation was altered. Actually, a completely innovative principle was established: the forces had to behave in a rigorously neutral way; they could be deployed only with the consensus of the involved parties; they could use their weapons only for self-defence; the contingents themselves had to consist mainly of light infantry units to prevent undue provocation.⁴

The UN tried in any event to avoid the employment of contingents coming from NATO or Warsaw Pact nations. For in this historical phase, characterized by the confrontation between East and West, peacekeeping assumed a secondary role: the UN was allowed to operate where the primary interests of the Big Powers were not at stake. Consequently, there were very few interventions in comparison with the numerous local crises in the Third World between 1950 and 1989.

There were times during the second phase that the UN could assert itself against the Great Powers and could play a leading
role, as in the crisis of the ex-Belgian Congo (Zaire) between 1960 and 1964. The complex situation of that country suggested that the UN send a large contingent of troops (ONUC) and permit them to employ arms. In this instance, the UN mission passed from a neutral to an active role. Later on, however, the UN itself reverted to the traditional passive form of peacekeeping, because of the problems caused by the two Superpowers.\(^5\) And in reaction to the slippage into peace enforcement in ONUC, there was a gap of many years before the UN attempted even traditional PKO. As a result, between the 1960's and the end of the Cold War, peacekeeping played a minor role in comparison with the dynamics of that struggle's bipolarism, in spite of some occasions, such as Cyprus and the Middle East, when the presence of the "blue helmets" prevented worse crises.

In 1986, there were the first signals of a change of course from the USSR. Previously, as after the Congo crisis, the USSR had refused to share in the financing of peacekeeping. Now, with the Red Army stuck in Afghanistan and Soviet military assistance around the globe draining its treasury, Moscow came to the conclusion that UN conflict management was not so bad after all. Concrete proof of a shifting came in 1986, with the announcement that the USSR would pay its assessment for United Nations Interim Force in Lebanon (UNIFIL).\(^6\)

In those years, the UN was successful on several occasions: the supervision of the withdrawal of the Soviet troops from Afghanistan and the Cubans from Angola; the control of the cease-fire between Iran and Iraq; the assistance in the transition of
Namibia towards independence, in the supporting of the democratic process in Nicaragua, and in the control of the Cambodian conflict. These changes in the international scenario also allowed the UN to return to a major peace enforcement action in the Second Gulf conflict -- all reminiscent of the Korean War. The Security Council adopted twelve resolutions against Iraq. In the face of the Iraqis' intransigence to withdraw from Kuwait (Resolution 660), the Council adopted the Resolution 678 of November 29, 1990, which allowed the Member States to use "...all means necessary" to apply Resolution 660, and called for a peace enforcement action.  

The experience of the Gulf crisis strengthened the UN role as a key player in the global scenario of the post-Cold War. With the help of credible means of coercion, the UN had demonstrated the potential of legitimate collective action. The stage was set, it was generally believed, for successful UN peace operations in the post-Cold War era.

THE POST-COLD WAR ERA

During the Cold War, the freedom of movement granted to the countries of either alliance of the bipolar world was rather limited and was affected by precise scenarios. That changed with the end of the Cold War which has brought about a proliferation of local crises. Such instability is testified by the increasingly massive presence of UN soldiers in every corner of the earth. This marks a profound change in collective security missions since the Cold War, considering that from less than 10,000 in 1987, the "blue
helmets" scattered around the globe numbered about 90,000 in 1994 and are currently about 60,000. The cost of these operations increased exponentially, from $700 million in 1991 to a budget in excess of $3.5 billion by the end of 1995.\(^8\)

Numerous and heavily armed UN contingents have been added to these new peacekeeping missions for operations that previously consisted only of observers. Moreover, the military component itself has had increased help from police forces and an increase of civilian, administrative and control "in the field" functions. This happened with the UN Transitional Authority in Cambodia (UNTAC), in which these kinds of forces watched over respect for human rights, the regularity of the various phases of the electoral procedure, and the control of the neutrality of civilian administration in the regions under the sovereignty of the various factions in the field.\(^9\) In a similar manner, the UN Central America Observer Group (ONUCA) combined a number of elements: on-site verification of the cessation of aid to irregular forces with the supervision of the demobilization and repatriation of those forces.\(^10\) In the same region, the UN Mission in El Salvador (ONUSAL) supervised the demobilization of the guerrillas, the creation of a smaller, "purified" army, and the complete restructuring of the Salvadoran security apparatus. This included the creation of a National Civil Police that would relieve the armed forces of all responsibility for internal security.\(^11\)

A. LIMITS OF THE PEACEKEEPING

Peacekeeping is affected by a variety of political situations,
and operational developments. In this last respect, the distinction between peacekeeping and various enforcement activities has become increasingly blurred. This has had the adverse effect of occasionally placing peacekeeping-sized forces in a peace enforcement environment. UN efforts, in Bosnia, for example, exposed the organization to accusations of weakness and of failing to protect fundamental human rights.\textsuperscript{12}

Today as in Cold War times, the international system has been founded on the principle of the sovereignty of States. Therefore, the UN, essentially a diplomatic and functional organization, cannot be an independent actor. The negative effects of such limitation can result in the malfunction of the organization itself and inevitably affect the management of both peacekeeping and peace enforcement. In terms of the latter, for example, articles 43 (availability to the Security Council of the member-states' forces and facilities), 46 (planning for the application of the armed forces) and 47 (establishment of a Military Staff Committee) of Chapter VII of the UN Charter have never been practically applied. The Great Powers have always been somewhat hesitant about strengthening the institutions to which those articles refer. This confirms the difficulty in delegating sovereignty to the UN when it conflicts with the problem of member state security. For these reasons, in every intervention, the UN is obliged to negotiate with each nation on all matters concerning the operations including the size of the forces provided. As a result,

UN enforcement operations have always been hastily improvised, much like peacekeeping missions. The UN
operation in Korea 1950-53 was conducted under purposefully vague Security Council and General Assembly resolutions, generally without specific reference to UN Charter provisions. The Gulf War, and UNITAF (Operation Restore Hope) and UNOSOM II in Somalia, are the only operations for which the Security Council cited Chapter Seven authority to permit the use of coercive force in carrying out its resolutions.¹³

To avoid these problems, the UN Secretary General has requested that all nations prepare contingents for peace operations to include both PKO and PE interventions. These forces are to be placed in case of emergency under the control of the UN. This would allow that organization to select the kind of units to be employed in relation to the peculiarities of the contingent scenario. Sir Brian Urquhart, who served in the office of the UN Secretary General between 1949 and 1986 and under whose direction UN peacekeeping was developed, was foremost in the search for a better instrument. He argued that impartially constituted and controlled rapid reaction forces could address some of the current weaknesses in the UN's approach to peacekeeping. His plea drew wide support; but overwhelming practical reasons were given as to why major powers would not allow his concept for stand-by forces to become a reality. The significance of Urquhart's argument, however, lay in the fact that with great authority it focused public attention on the need to deal with a doctrinal gap in the UN's response options.¹⁴

Despite its limitations in the post-Cold War Era, the UN is under increasing pressure to broaden its missions. The UN is urged to organize more and more complex operations, making use of the whole range of military operations. But some of these operations
are extremely complex; and some of the weaknesses of the current situation are due to the requirements for a staff at the UN to manage a large number of human and other resources. For example, the little results sometimes reported in PKO (as in the case of the second UN mission in Somalia) are due to the functional weaknesses of an international organization which keeps acting as if the original political situation was unchanged. Therefore, a program of rearrangement of the operational instruments in the peacekeeping area is to be hoped for. An international staff for the PKO, for instance, could manage the various sub-categories in a more effective way. The combination of military and non-military activities and the political-diplomatic sensitivities of the peacekeeping operations, together with the managerial inadequacy of the main international organizations, make the command and control (C2) organization a critical factor in such operations. In case of intervention under NATO control, the problem could be solved by resorting to the already established procedures within the Alliance. At present, the UN does not seem to be able to perform with an effective C2. This is a problem when operations develop where the consensus is not absolute. Contributing countries impose bonds and limitations about political-military commitment, and about the will to check both the development of the situation and the technical employment of forces in the field. Moreover, multinational composition of the contingent alliance could impose strong limitations on UN operations. Each time, there is a need for a careful preventive assessment of both suitability of the forces
available for the mission and their mutual compatibility, considering that the standardization and interoperability levels among the units of different nations are always very low.

Peacekeeping has undergone over time a process of enlargement of both structure and task. For example, the employment of armor in the recent operations in Somalia and Bosnia-Herzegovina. Modern armies have changed. Light infantry units move only by armored means, equipped with anti-tank missiles and mortars. This is testimony to the worsening international situation and the obscuration of the boundary between Chapter VI and Chapter VII of the Charter. The level of mortality of any battlefield, even of the low intensity conflict kind, has risen remarkably, and the idea of a peacekeeping force shooting to kill is to some extent a contradiction in terms. There is danger that a peacekeeping force may become part of the problem instead of part of the solution.

Brian Urquhart's basic interconnected criteria for peacekeeping have measured, over the years, the success or the failure of any peacekeeping mission. These principles are: the consent of the parties involved in the conflict to the establishment of the operation, to its mandate, to its composition and to its appointed commanding officer; the continuing and strong support of the operation by the mandating authority, the Security Council; a clear and practicable mandate; the non-use of force except in the last resort in self-defence—self-defence, however, including resistance to attempts by forceful means to prevent the peace-keepers from discharging their duties; the
willingness of troop-contributing countries to provide adequate numbers of capable military personnel and to accept the degree of risk which the mandate and the situation demand; (less often noted) the willingness of the member states, and specially the permanent members of the Security Council, to make available the necessary financial and logistical support.\textsuperscript{15}

Today, the effectiveness of these principles is being questioned. The reason is the difference between today's reality and the situation which led to their formulation. In the earlier reality, the UN, "as a neutral organization, ... could sometimes help to bring smaller conflicts to an end, keep them from flaring anew, and keep them from leading to a direct and potentially catastrophic clash of US and Soviet arms. Thus, the UN came to be associated over the years with more modest but, under the circumstances, more realistic objectives"\textsuperscript{16}.

The concept of peacekeeping that was successful during the Cold War is now being used in contingencies for which it was not designed. The UN has started a new phase of military assignments with no idea how to address the variables. The UN now deals with insurgent forces that have different characteristics from the relatively accountable parties of the past. For instance, few of the insurgent leaders of Somalia and Cambodia, who participated in negotiations, had any concept of statesmanship or the rule of law\textsuperscript{17}. Therefore, between Chapter VI and Chapter VII, that is to say between pacific settlement and peace enforcement, peacekeeping is only a subset of a wider spectrum of operations that the UN might
undertake to sustain or restore peace and security under the terms of its Charter²⁸.

B. SECOND GENERATION OF UN OPERATIONS

The typology of the operations of this continuum can be determined, in any case, by the different levels of applicability of the Urquhart's criteria, recently restated by his successor, Marrack Goulding: Peace Support Operations should: be organized and authorized by the UN; be deployed with the consent of the parties involved; act impartially; be provided with sufficient military assets and finances by member-states; only use of force in self-defence¹⁹. The basic indicator on this scale of UN interventions is always the consent, either at the strategic, operational, or tactical level. Consent is the key element upon which the success of the UN mission depends. The consent among all the parties is strictly interconnected and decisively affected by the impartiality of the intervention force and the legitimacy of the mission. The diminution of consent may originate from the use of force for purposes other than self-defence and by the contingent size of the intervention force. Furthermore, the ambiguity of the mandate and its practicability act sometimes as causes of failures.

The attempts to lead military nations and organizations to fill the gap between Chapter VI and Chapter VII have created a new generation of military contingencies and the production of various field manuals or doctrines. Such contributions from United Kingdom, United States, France, Holland, Spain, Australia, Italy and NATO, usually derive from practical experiences. A list of second
generation operations, published by the Watson Institute research project in 1992, served as a prototype for the development of further expanded versions. The list includes: Observer missions; Peacekeeping; Preventive Deployment; Internal Conflict Resolution Measures; Assistance to Interim Civil Authorities; Protection of Humanitarian Relief; Guarantee/Deny Movement; Sanctions; High-Intensity Operations.

These research initiatives comprise four main areas of activity: traditional peacekeeping; military actions to stabilize civil violence; humanitarian support missions; and, at the highest level of intensity, the deployment of a large multinational task force to guarantee and police tougher mandates.

This assessment focuses on the United States, United Kingdom, Italy and NATO manuals. The use of force is the apparent difference between the US and NATO doctrine on the one hand, and the British and Italian doctrine on the other.

1. US AND NATO DOCTRINE

US field manual "FM 100-23" states that peace operations encompass three types of activities: support to diplomacy, peacekeeping, and peace enforcement. Level of consent, level of force and degree of impartiality determine the nature of the peace operation. While the level of consent and the degree of impartiality are interconnected and become low in peace enforcement, the use of force requires some clarification. The use of force is considered low in support of diplomatic operations (peace making) and low "plus" in peacekeeping operations, where its
The aim is either self-defense or defense of the mandate from interference\textsuperscript{22}. Furthermore, the manual states that

in PK, commanders should regard force as a last resort; in PE, commanders should exercise restraint in employing force. In either case, sufficient force must be available to: achieve objectives rapidly through simultaneous application of combat power; protect the force. In peace operations, as in all military operations, the inherent right of self defense applies.\textsuperscript{23}

John Mackinlay, commenting on this, writes that "Seniors US Army staff have indicated that, despite the tenets of their pamphlet 'FM 100-23', they are intuitively uncomfortable with being subordinated to a mission that cannot rely on the use of overwhelming force to achieve its ultimate success."\textsuperscript{24}. This is a reminder of the so called "Weinberger Doctrine" and its criteria to determine the conditions under which the use of military force is warranted: in particular, the need for vital national interests before the commitment of US forces to combat overseas, and the clear intention of winning.\textsuperscript{25} Consequently, US doctrine may be considered peace enforcement oriented; and its natural attitude to commit large levels of force consistent with that orientation is at odds with other types of operations, particularly in case of pure peacekeeping missions. This trend is reaffirmed by the Joint Pub 3-07, "Joint Doctrine for Military Operations Other Than War", which in fact includes peacekeeping in terms of both "noncombatant" and "combatant" military operations. Peace enforcement operations and diplomatic peace activities such as preventive diplomacy, peacemaking and peacebuilding are the other peace operations included in the Joint Doctrine.
In a similar manner, NATO doctrine describes peace support operations as a wider range of activities which include conflict prevention, peacemaking, peacekeeping, humanitarian aid, peace enforcement and peace building. Peace enforcement, in particular, unlike the other types of peace support operations, will usually employ whatever military means are necessary to accomplish the mission, consistent with a war fighting doctrine. Furthermore, "within the context of the other peace support operations, the use of force may be required at a local level to accomplish tasks necessary for the achievement of the overall mandate."26. Therefore, the principle of the use of force is here sufficiently emphasized to understand that even the concept of peacekeeping has lost its traditional meaning. The overarching principles are used to guide planning and execution, and to accomplish the aims of the alliance. The advantage of NATO is the opportunity to count on a reliable Command, Control and Communications structure.

2. **BRITISH AND ITALIAN DOCTRINE**

The apparent attempt of British doctrine to fill the gap between Chapter VI and Chapter VII has resulted in a specific manual focused on the so called "wider peacekeeping". In addition, another manual deals with "peacekeeping operations" and yet another will deal with "peace enforcement operations". This demonstrates that doctrine writers give a precise meaning to traditional peacekeeping, that is to say to all the missions usually considered short of those under Chapter VII. Furthermore, the writers have treated peace enforcement operations, namely operations clearly
under Chapter VII, as independent missions. Wider peacekeeping is
tactical level manual. However, the experience of the UK in
counter insurgency, counter terrorism and peacekeeping, has allowed
the writer of the doctrine to provide commanders and staff with
guidelines for the conduct of wider peacekeeping operations. The
manual "explains where Wider Peacekeeping sits in Peace Support
Operations as a whole but it is not concerned with the conduct of
Peace Enforcement .... It explains how to conduct Wider
Peacekeeping and, crucially, how to avoid being drawn into Peace
Enforcement unwittingly or unwillingly.""^ Wider peacekeeping
includes: conflict prevention; demobilization operations; military
assistance; humanitarian relief; guarantee and denial of movement.

The spectrum of tasks in the British manual relies, according
to the cases, on the legitimacy of Chapter VI or Chapter VII. In
wider peacekeeping the consent may be "general" or "highly
volatile" and the operations related are likely to occur in
environments that bear the characteristics of civil war or
insurgency. As Charles Dobbie, the author of the manual, says, "the
identification of the critical consent divide allows the use of
force to be addressed in a way that takes full account of its wider
connotations. The need to preserve consent does not foreclose the
use of force by peacekeepers. Indeed, consent may serve to
marginalize opposition and render it vulnerable to the use of
force.""^ The "wider peacekeeping" approach to the problem of
filling the void between Chapter VI and Chapter VII seems to be
effective, at least at the tactical level. Minimal use of force and
maintenance of consent underline a positive attitude toward peacekeeping rather than peace enforcement. It can be achieved through adequate directives and a specific training.

Italian doctrine focuses exclusively on peacekeeping and humanitarian aid operations and, like NATO, considers them as parts of the Peace Support Operations, which include also conflict prevention, peace making, peace enforcement, and peace building. The manual highlights the importance of consent to any intervention by all parties concerned and of impartiality by the intervening forces. Impartiality is the prerequisite for consent, but it is not sufficient to insure consent. To keep consent, it is essential to follow guidelines founded on the strictest impartiality. This allows the commitment of limited forces and a minimal use of force. Impartiality must be perceived by all parties involved, and in such a situation, looking impartial is still more important than being impartial. Whenever the force surrenders impartiality, it takes the risk of inheriting situations of peace enforcement which call for completely different employment procedures, force levels and, above all, mental attitude. This policy is supported by a set of hypotheses of rules of engagement detailed at each level of command and related to different likely situations. The rules of engagement, however, are authorized by the Italian Government, that defines in any case the limits and the circumstances in which a contingent can start or continue to fight. Therefore, beyond the theoretical classification of the operations between Chapter VI and VII, the manual can represent only a
reference point for commanders and staff for training and for planning the peacekeeping missions more specifically related to Chapter VI assumptions.

3. **DOCTRINAL SUMMING UP**

The approach of the manuals is similar. However, as John Mackinlay points out,

none ... is more than a manual for individual and unit survival, explaining how to endure, but not how to succeed. Collectively they focus on tactical military problems. The solutions, however, may involve civilian agencies that play a vital part in the restoration of the collapsed state. The manuals do not suggest a mechanism for how the disparate elements of the force can act together to achieve a single long-term objective. But the problems of coordination are crucial to success because the UN forces are multifunctional, comprising the military, humanitarian relief agencies, civil administrators, human-rights officials and a panoply of unaccountable private relief organizations.30

In short, the above analysis indicates that the confusion experienced by peacekeepers is deeply embedded in the conflicting doctrinal approaches to peace operations. The attempts to fill the gap between Chapter VI and Chapter VII can be considered useful for educational purposes. This is not the kind of help, however, that the UN expects from the member states.

**CONCLUSIONS**

Today Brian Urquhart's criteria for PKO are deteriorating. This may be proof that the architects of the UN Charter were right when they did not state, specifically, that Chapter VI would mean peacekeeping. However peacekeeping cannot be considered only as one of the more effective results of the Cold War Era. Boutros-
Ghali's own report "An Agenda for Peace" blurs the distinctions between peacekeeping and peace enforcement. It concludes that "there may not be a dividing line between peacemaking (in which it includes peace enforcement) and peacekeeping." On the other hand, The Secretary General attempts to recommend a clear distinction between peacekeeping troops and peace enforcement troops and suggests that the UN Military Staff Committee's role should be seen in the context of Chapter VII, and not that of the planning or conduct of peacekeeping operations. Boutros-Ghali's report offers several recommendations relating to military force and peace enforcement. In particular he advocates the creation of armed forces under Article 43 of the Charter which would be available to the UN on a permanent basis as a means of deterring breaches of the peace. However, almost 120 countries in the General Assembly are developing countries - the so called Third World. This large group has generally voted and acted in concert. Because of their numbers they tend to dictate the agenda of the General Assembly, the character of the debates, and the nature of that body's decision. For many developing countries, the UN is the collective source of a good deal of diplomatic influence. As a matter of fact, as John Mackinlay has pointed out, "many developing countries fear that a more powerful and effective UN 'flying squad' might one day beat on their own doors to intervene in their ugly, but essential, private internal disputes."

Without any doubt, the UN faces an uncertain future. In contrast to its third party role relative to the Superpower rivalry
for almost 50 years, the organization will increasingly be called upon for moral leadership and authority in the future. However, the present tendency to broaden the UN's capacity to intervene in the internal affairs of sovereign states inevitably weakens the "consent of the parties" principle. Accepted principles and rules are essential both for fighting factions and for the peacekeeping forces involved. And it is still by no means certain whether Security Council members actually wish to take the initiative in a systematic way in matters affecting international peace and security. Peace is always much cheaper than war or the preparation for war. But a system to maintain peace and security will require genuine consensus, eternal vigilance and sustained effort and support.\textsuperscript{34} All this, as Ambassador Edward W. Gnehm, Jr., Deputy US Permanent Representative to the UN, indicated in his 9 October 1995 address to the US Army War College, will not be easy:

"I would not mislead you by telling you the UN is doing everything better and there is only sunshine ahead. It is a troubled, burdened organization with internal contradictions and external pressures of major significance. ... The UN is trying to adjust to the new world, meeting new challenges with a structural framework and a conceptual basis ill suited for a new realities. ... It does exactly what the member states allow it to do, by authorization and by resourcing."\textsuperscript{35}

In the past, Cold War paralysis prevented the UN from creating any force other than peacekeeping. All that is changing. Peacekeeping has become a dilemma, but it is still, in Brian Urquhart's words, "a useful and highly visible element of the efforts of the United Nations to maintain international peace and order."\textsuperscript{36} However, in the post-Cold War era, the UN's credibility

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is even more at stake, and the organization has to claim the consent of the member states to continue pursuing its institutional purposes. Considering the current inability of peacekeeping to occupy a stable position somewhere between Chapter VI and Chapter VII, there is a need to return to an emphasis on a time-honored process of diplomatic peace activities, both preventive diplomacy and peace making. Some of these activities can be instituted under the auspices of the UN. But diplomacy, as the recent Dayton Accords illustrate, depends ultimately on the relationships between the sovereign states that represent the body of the United Nations.
ENDNOTES


4. The starting point in examining characteristics of peacekeeping as they have developed in practice is the accepted principles in the UNEF II guidelines. Sir Brian Urquhart, the father of the peacekeeping, simplified these guidelines in the so called Urquhart’s criteria. Weiss & Chopra, United Nations Peacekeeping, Part one, Par. B. Urquhart, p. 198.


8. Hillen III, p. 27.


15. Urquhart, p. 198.


17. Mackinlay, pp. 149-150.

18. Durch, p. 4.

19. Mackinlay, p. 150.

20. Ibid., p. 155.

21. Ibid.


23. Ibid., p. 34.


34. Urquhart, p. 203 and p. 205.


36. Urquhart, p. 205.
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