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PEACEKEEPING: A MISSION FOR THE STRATEGIC RESERVE COMPONENTS

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PEACEKEEPING:
A MISSION FOR THE STRATEGIC RESERVE COMPONENTS

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ABSTRACT

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A quantitative rise in Operations Other Than War (OOTW), now gaining recognition as Other Military Operations (OMO), coupled with the downsizing of military forces has placed the Army in a position where it is becoming increasingly difficult to fulfill its primary mission of "fighting and winning the nation's wars". This study proposes using Reserve Components in peacekeeping operations as an alternative to assist the Army in meeting its worldwide commitments. It argues that, with proper shaping of the peacekeeping environment, Reserve Components are readily able to undertake the tasks and competencies of peacekeeping operations noted in current Army doctrine. It relies on the experience of the composite battalion deployed to the Multinational Force and Observers (MFO) in 1995 to develop a model for a Strategic Reserve Force.
Introduction. Peace operations comprise a significant portion of total military operations conducted by United States Armed Forces. As President Clinton stated in his 1994 National Security strategy, "In addition to preparing for major regional contingencies, we must prepare our forces for peace operations to support democracy or conflict resolution." The Army itself has engaged in peace operations numerous times in the recent past. Prominent among these are the 1958 venture into Lebanon as part of the United Nations Truce Supervisory Organization in the Middle East, the Dominican Republic (1965), and participation as part of the Multinational Force and Observers (MFO) in the Sinai since 1982. More recently, peace operations in Northern Iraq, Somalia, and the continued presence of Army personnel in Haiti have strained already diminishing resources. As this paper is being written, the debate on sending some 20,000 soldiers into Bosnia for peacekeeping operations with NATO allies captures the nation's attention. With great foresight, the Army's basic manual and capstone document on peace operations, FM 100-23, emphasized that the distinguishing feature of peace operations today is not so much qualitative as quantitative. "What's new is the number, pace, scope, and complexity of recent operations."

The Army's dilemma in preparing for a quantitative rise in peace operations results from the very real possibility that such preparation would adversely impact its "...primary mission....to deter, and, if necessary, to fight and win conflicts in which our most important interests are threatened." A dilemma made more acute by force downsizing and budgetary constraints, and the
likelihood of seeing more in the future. This paper proposes one possible alternative to assist the Army in meeting its increasing commitments to peace operations around the world while maintaining sufficient force structure to "fight and win" the nation's wars. This alternative is to use Reserve Components (U.S. Army Reserve and Army National Guard) rather than Active Component forces as the strategic force of choice in selected peace operations.

In discussing the viability of using Reserve Component forces as the strategic force of choice in selected peace operations, this paper will look at current Army doctrine on peace operations, especially that of peacekeeping. It will compare Army doctrine with that of other competent authorities in order to shape a peacekeeping environment conducive to Reserve Component employment. After establishing the environment for employment, the paper will look at the tasks and competencies required of the peacekeeping force and, finally, propose a model for the Reserve Component force strategically deployed on such a mission. It will do this by examining the major issues confronting the composite battalion deployed to the Sinai as part of the MFO from January-July 1995, and developing a model based upon resolution of these issues.
Peacekeeping: Shaping the strategic environment for Reserve Component employment. The lexicon of peace operations today contains a number of terms within its pages. Peacekeeping and peace enforcement are recognized in FM 100-23 as the two predominantly military activities complementing activities with a predominantly diplomatic lead (preventive diplomacy, peacebuilding, peacemaking). Humanitarian assistance operations appear to fall somewhere between the two. Definitions of these terms abound. Each writer, each agency, defines these terms with remarkable similarity, but at the same time adds to, or changes some component element so that a definition rarely reads the same or conveys a common understanding. This paper focuses on only one of these terms, peacekeeping, and looks at the environment in which it exists. In doing so, relevant definitions of peacekeeping and the peacekeeping environment will be examined to provide insights leading to a common and comprehensive definition of peacekeeping and, thus, to distinguish a strategic environment conducive to Reserve Component employment.

There may be little that we can do to influence the quantitative (number, pace) nature of future peace operations. However, within the qualitative (scope, complexity) nature of peace operations, one factor must be clearly defined and, if necessary, shaped, if the United States is to provide a coherent force to undertake a peacekeeping mission within the penumbra of peace operations. That factor is the environment within which peace operations occur.
If the mistakes of Somalia are not to be duplicated in Bosnia, the US Armed Forces, either unilaterally or as part of a multinational force, must not enter into peace operations without clear knowledge of, and confidence in, the operational environment. Clear and confident knowledge of the operational environment is crucial to determining the composition of the force and the capabilities required of it. One author, referring to the debacle in Mogadishu, puts it this way, "The possibility of peace enforcement in peacekeeping operations requires credible combat power to deter attack and halt an advance, if needed."4

The obvious concerns for force protection and mission accomplishment are apparent if a force, planned and composed for a non-hostile environment, finds itself confronted by hostile forces after entry. Equally detrimental, at least to mission accomplishment, would be a force armed to the teeth for any eventuality and wholly intimidating to the parties and peoples involved.

Current definitions of peacekeeping range from the extreme to the sublime. Major General Robert L. Ord III, Commanding General, 25th Infantry Division, writes, "In simple terms peacekeeping operations can be seen as a war fought with a different set of rules of engagement. We must not be fooled into believing that peacekeeping is anything other than war because the word peace appears in the name,"5
Donald M. Snow takes a slightly different approach from that of MG Ord in presenting a more sublime perspective. He indicates that peacekeeping is a role engaged in by the United Nations for years, that it is relatively straightforward and comparatively easy despite some difficulties. "Peacekeeping involves monitoring and enforcing a cease fire agreed to by two or more combatants. It proceeds in an atmosphere where peace exists and where the combatants minimally prefer peace to continued war."\textsuperscript{6} Somewhere between "war by another name" and "a straightforward and comparatively easy role" lies the essence and difficulty of defining peacekeeping. The Pentagon recognized this difficulty and reconciled it by splitting peacekeeping into two distinct areas, traditional peacekeeping and aggravated peacekeeping. Traditional peacekeeping would have the consent of all parties, troops would conduct only noncombat operations, again with the consent of all, and there would be an existing truce agreement in support of diplomatic efforts to reach a political settlement to the dispute. Aggravated peacekeeping would appear qualitatively more dangerous. Only nominal consent of all major parties is obtained with at least one party complicating settlement by its intransigence, belligerents have poor command and control, and the use of force is permitted in both self-defense and in defense of assigned missions.\textsuperscript{7} To further narrow the scope of the environment into which a Reserve Component force may be employed, peacekeeping will be considered only in the traditional sense.

Competent authorities discuss traditional peacekeeping by
distinguishing its environmental characteristics and emphasizing those competencies and tasks in which traditional peacekeepers must be skilled. According to the Army's operational doctrine manual, FM 100-5, "Peacekeeping operations... require the consent of all parties involved in the dispute... (and) often involves ambiguous situations requiring the peacekeeping force to deal with extreme tension and violence without becoming a participant. These operations follow diplomatic negotiations that establish the mandate for the peacekeeping force. The mandate describes the scope of the peacekeeping operation." FM 100-5 goes on to describe the contents of the mandate necessary to a peacekeeping operation. It specifies size and type of force from each nation contributing peacekeepers as well as the terms and conditions imposed on the peacekeeping force by the host nation(s). It also clearly specifies the functions which the peacekeeping force is to perform. Using FM 100-5 as a baseline for the traditional peacekeeping environment, the following characteristics are noted: 

1. Consent of all parties to the dispute required.
2. Ambiguous situations often occur.
3. Diplomatic negotiations precede, and
4. Establish a mandate which among other things determines:
   a. scope of the operation
   b. size, type and nationality of the force
   c. clearly states force functions
   d. specifies the terms or conditions imposed on the force by the host nation(s).
Does FM 100-5 provide adequate information on the peacekeeping environment to strategically deploy a Reserve Component or any other US force? Probably not, if peacekeeping were nothing more than war with a different set of rules of engagement. Peacekeeping, especially in the traditional sense, requires greater clarification of the environment than war if both peacekeepers and their hosts are to be secure, and the peacekeeping mission is to succeed.

Conrad K. Harper, Legal Advisor to the Secretary of State, distinguishes an important feature of the peacekeeping environment by indicating "consent" of the parties need not be as comprehensive as FM 100-5 states. He refers to peacekeeping operations as "...operations carried out with the consent of the states or other significant parties involved;".\(^9\) FM 100-23, not unexpectedly, addresses "consent" quite simply by stating that "all parties agree".\(^10\) The difference between Department of State and Army doctrine on "consent" is subtle but noteworthy. If, as Army doctrine indicates, the consent of all parties is a precondition to a peacekeeping operation, it may prove difficult to obtain in disputes involving numerous and conflicting elements both internal and external to the parties. On the other hand, a concept which involves only "significant parties" in consent leads to serious concerns for force protection unless a more restrictive characteristic is required. To ameliorate the concern of SecState to keep diplomatic processes moving, and Army concerns for force protection, the consent of "significant
parties" should be changed to include "all parties using deadly force, or credible threat thereof, to achieve their ends". "Consent" would then encompass the state(s) involved and all parties using deadly force, or credible threat thereof, to achieve their ends in the dispute.

Another desirable characteristic of the peacekeeping environment, though not addressed in FM 100-5 or 100-23, is the "intent" of the parties. Do the parties indicate their preference and show an intent or receptiveness to the peaceful political settlement of their differences. Is there a climate where peace exists, and "...where the combatants minimally prefer peace to continued war."

Absent such peaceful preference or intent of the consenting parties, the possibility of renewed violence resulting from the most minute disturbances or violations of the established mandate is increased. This leads directly into force protection concerns and the possibility that the peacekeeping force, especially if a Reserve Component, may be required to assume a peace enforcing role for which it is ill-trained and neither configured nor equipped.

Diplomatic efforts and negotiations should not only precede the peacekeeping operation but should be on-going and continuous until a settlement of the dispute is recognized and agreed upon by all parties. FM 100-23 characterizes this as,

"Peace operations are designed to create or sustain the conditions in which political and diplomatic activities may proceed."
In speaking of the standards advanced by the United States for peace operations, the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Strategy and Requirements, Dr. Edward L. Warner, indicates that one such standard is an "existing and integrated politico-military strategy to achieve objectives". The State Department's Legal Advisor, Conrad K. Harper, views peacekeeping operations as "...normally undertaken to monitor and facilitate implementation of an existing truce arrangement and in support of diplomatic efforts to achieve a political settlement of the dispute." Without on-going diplomatic efforts leading to settlement of the dispute, peacekeeping operations remain open-ended at considerable cost to budget and force structure for contributing nations. A corollary to continuing diplomatic efforts must necessarily be found in the mandate established between the consenting states and parties. The mandate must clearly identify the likely duration of the peacekeeping force and those conditions prompting exit. Additionally, lacking means to settlement ensures longevity to the dispute and increased opportunity for renewed violence between the parties or violence directed at the peacekeeping force.

One final aspect of the environment must be considered if the peacekeeping mission and the peacekeepers are to be given the greatest opportunity to succeed. The peacekeepers, themselves, must be perceived as an "impartial" force by the parties and peoples involved. Impartiality is frequently seen as a competency or task of peacekeepers rather than a part of the
peacekeeping environment entered. It seems reasonable that it is
easier to achieve such competency and succeed in such task if the
peacekeeping force is perceived as impartial by the parties and
peoples involved. Put another way, the peacekeeping force must
not have undertaken acts of partiality, particularly forceful
acts evidencing partiality, prior to assuming their peacekeeping
role. Only by entering an environment where they are perceived
as impartial will the peacekeeping force be afforded a real
opportunity to remain impartial.

Taken together, the foregoing discussion provides a more
comprehensive, albeit restrictive, environment for traditional
peacekeeping operations. The characteristics following would
appear to reconcile the military's concern for force protection
while providing both the military and the diplomat an environment
conducive to settlement of the dispute. The traditional
peacekeeping environment might now appear:

1. Consent of the state(s) involved and all parties
using deadly force, or the credible threat thereof, to achieve
their ends in the dispute.

2. Ambiguous situations often occur.

3. All consenting states and parties prefer peace to
continued violence or war, and exhibit intentions for continued
peaceful resolution of the dispute.

4. Diplomatic efforts not only precede but continue
on-going to achieve a settlement of the dispute. Moreover,
diplomatic and military efforts are integrated into achieving a

10
settlement.

5. A mandate is established by and between the consenting states, parties, and nations contributing peacekeeping forces, and the peacekeeping force itself, which clearly specifies:
   a. scope of the operation
   b. size, type and nationality of the force
   c. force functions
   d. terms and conditions imposed on the force by the host nation(s)
   e. conditions signifying duration and exit of the force and/or national components thereof

6. The peacekeeping force must be perceived as impartial by the parties and peoples involved in the dispute.

Using the characteristics noted above will provide a common framework for political and military leaders in defining the environment of peacekeeping and planning for force composition and capabilities. If all characteristics are met in a given peace operation, then the force may be composed and equipped at the minimum necessary level with due regard for force protection and mission accomplishment. This, in turn, impacts on reducing budgetary and overall force structure concerns. If, on the other hand, any of these characteristics are uncertain or non-existent, then the force must be considered as engaged in a peace enforcement mission and structured, equipped to meet any credible contingency. Force protection must in this instance take
priority over any concerns that intimidation of the parties and peoples would adversely affect mission accomplishment. Adherence to the definition and descriptive environment of peacekeeping, as provided above, in the current negotiations over a Bosnian peacekeeping force would provide a common ground of understanding for both political and military leaders. Bosnia becomes a peace enforcement and not a peacekeeping operation. It would also provide an environment where strategic employment of a Reserve Component force becomes viable. Specifically, a peacekeeping environment as described above would minimize force protection concerns as well as any requirements for a force to possess comprehensive collective battle skills.

**Peacekeeping: Tasks and competencies for a Reserve Component force.** Once an environment for peacekeeping within the traditional sense is shaped and established, the specified tasks promulgated in the mandate are identified. Implied tasks necessary to achieving the specified tasks need also be identified. Authorities generally agree on the tasks performed, or likely to be performed, by a peacekeeping force. FM 100-23 indicates the following tasks as likely to be performed within a peacekeeping environment:

1. Observation and monitoring of truces and cease fires.

2. Supervision of activities of a humanitarian nature.

3. Supervision of truces. (Ability to insist on compliance being a distinguishing feature.)\(^{17}\)
FM 100-5 adds,

4. Supervisory and assistance role. (Not explained, but presumably this would indicate active involvement in humanitarian operations or activities identified in the mandate.)

Within the State Department's definition of peacekeeping is an admonition against combat-type operations except those for the purpose of self defense. This warrants including the following task:

5. Force protection.

Mindful that future peacekeeping operations will most likely be conducted in conjunction with forces from other countries, BG Morris J. Boyd posits an additional task:

6. Joint and/or multinational coalition peace operations.

Several other tasks come immediately to mind which are neglected in the writings examined, but appear obvious to one used to frequent military deployments. These are:

7. Deployment/redeployment of the force.
8. Establishing lodgements.
9. Sustaining the force.

The discussion of tasks illustrates that the traditional peacekeeping force, in the words of one author, "...is closer to police doctrine than military doctrine. A police force does not expect to eliminate crime altogether, but instead seeks to hold crime to an acceptable level. So, too, a peacekeeping force
seeks to enforce an acceptable level of compliance by
belligerents to agreed-on rules."²¹ By looking at the
competencies of the peacekeeping force, a better understanding of
their applicability to both Active and Reserve Components may be
seen.

A list of competencies for peacekeeping is found in FM 100-
23.²² They range from the routine of patrolling, map reading and
checkpoint operations to negotiating skills and media
interrelationships. In many respects they reflect nontraditional
skills and competencies, and, except for 'mine and booby trap'
training (related to force protection), are nonoffensive,
noncombative in nature. Moreover, they are not skills found only
in the Active Component. They are more within the realm of
individual and team skills found within both the Active and
Reserve Components. On closer examination, it may even appear
that these skills are more akin to "neighborhood watch" functions
with neither component having a proprietary interest.

That peacekeeping competencies are common to both components
becomes even more apparent when the principles of peacekeeping,
falling under the military penumbra of OOTW (Operations Other
Than War), are compared to the long-standing principles of war.
Within OOTW, a new set of principles is established. Three of
the principles are new, and two of these, perserverence and
restraint, apply directly to the competencies required within the
peacekeeping environment.²³ One other competency is recognized
as critical to succeeding in the role of a peacekeeper and
relates to the principle of 'legitimacy'. Peacekeepers must be perceived as, and remain, impartial.\textsuperscript{24} These are competencies which do not lend themselves to systematic military training but are more appropriately a reflection of leadership and education. Such competencies are neither a facet of traditional force training nor reserved solely to the Active Component.

The foregoing discussion of tasks and competencies found within the peacekeeping environment, particularly in the traditional sense of that environment, suggests that Reserve Components are as equally capable of assuming a strategic role in US peace operations as the Active Component. These peace operations would be limited to specific situations falling within the newly defined environment of peacekeeping, an environment previously identified with 'traditional' peacekeeping and encompassing tasks and competencies related to both components. The strategic use of Reserve Component forces in these situations would result in a savings to active force structure and permit the Active Component to continue its concentration on "fighting and winning the nation's wars" and peace enforcement operations.

**Peacekeeping: A model for the Strategic Reserve Force.** In a letter to Congress on 25 August 1995, the Secretary of Defense, William Perry, agreed that "the use of U.S. military forces for 'Operations Other Than War' (OOTW) should be limited. ....And, when possible, the missions should be given to reserve troops rather than active-duty ones."\textsuperscript{25} Peacekeeping is one mission within the umbrella of OOTW which immediately lends itself to
Reserve Component employment when defined and shaped within the meaning of traditional peacekeeping. Thus far, we have shaped U.S. doctrine for the peacekeeping environment to one more closely resembling traditional peacekeeping and noted that the tasks and competencies required of the peacekeeping force are well within the capabilities of the Reserve Components. It remains to propose a model for the Reserve Force strategically deployed on such a mission.

The foundation of our model has already been established in the formation of the 4-505 PIR. This battalion was activated in mid-1994 from a composite group of Army Reservists, National Guardsmen, and soldiers from the active component to undertake a peacekeeping mission as part of the Multinational Force and Observers (MFO) in the Sinai. The actual deployment extended some six months between January and July 1995 with the prior six months in the latter half of 1994 used for administration, activation, personnel fill, and training. A brief period of several weeks was used after re-deployment to deactivate and complete final administrative requirements while speedily returning personnel to their reserve components or, in the case of active duty soldiers and those reserve component soldiers retained on active duty, to their next duty station. The observations, facts, and conclusions drawn from the 4-505's experience are within the personal knowledge of this writer. As a staff officer within the 82D Airborne Division, and survivor of two previous tours with the MFO in the Sinai, the most recent
completed in June, 1994, I was asked to observe and advise on 4-505 train-up and undertake a series of battalion surveys before, during, and after completion of the mission. Additionally, my recent experience with the MFO provided a unique opportunity to speak personally with Major General David Ferguson (Australia), MFO Commanding General, and COL Jerry Dillon (USA), MFO Chief of Staff, about the battalion's performance while deployed. The final form of the model proposed as a Strategic Reserve Force for deployment on a peacekeeping mission is, then, a compilation of those things which worked, and those that didn't work, for the mission and the soldiers/families of the 4-505 PIR.

The outstanding achievement of the 4-505 was its successful accomplishment of the mission in all respects. A success made most notable by its lack of distinction from the success of Regular Army battalions previously assigned to the MFO since 1982. Mission train-up for the 4-505 paralleled that of previous units in both duration and substance. Although most of the battalion's leadership were integrated into the battalion by October, 1994, the majority of lower ranks arrived immediately prior to commencement of mission train-up in early October. The training plan and mission certification evaluation were mirror images of previous battalion programs, relying heavily on those competencies and tasks found in FM 100-23 and mission unique tasks such as identification of Arabic numerals, license plates, military uniforms, aircraft, and Egyptian/Israeli rank markings. The significance of the training, particularly with respect to
mission unique tasks, was that the 4-505 achieved competency in them in the same time as previously allocated to active component battalions. In brief, the 4-505 was not prepared to undertake combat operations above those minimally for self defense, but it was fully prepared to undertake its peacekeeping mission. The first consideration, therefore, in preparing a strategic reserve force for a peacekeeping mission is not to treat it as a "reserve" force, but as a "peacekeeping" force of competent and capable professionals. Training plans and assessments as well as the time allocated for preparation should be based on mission requirements rather than mobilization experience.

In its organizational structure, the 4-505 was loosely modeled along the lines of a light infantry battalion. Exceptions were indirect weapons sections, maintenance, and mess sections which in the former instance were prohibited by the mandate, and in the latter two, provided by the MFO. The key units were a headquarters company (HHC) of 161 personnel which included the battalion's rear detachment, and four rifle companies of 392 personnel.

The HHC was augmented with a platoon (-) of military police as well as a legal section, linguist team, and mental health personnel per MFO mission guidance. Infantry battalions in the past, drawn from the airborne, air assault, or light divisions, routinely organized along these same lines basically keeping their current structure intact. It's not surprising that the 4-505 was organized in a similar manner despite knowing ahead of
time the specific mission and personnel requirements. It was the only organization structure admitting of experience, it was a structure commonly known and understood by members of the active and reserve components, and, it worked.

The organization of the 4-505 was a victim of prior success and an unwillingness to step 'out of a box' proven successful. The model proposed for future deployments of strategic reserve forces on peacekeeping missions must break this paradigm. The reserve force should be structured on the basis of situational and mission requirements in order to make the most efficient and economical use of personnel and resources.

For example, the MFO sets a maximum number of 529 personnel for deployment by the U.S. battalion and further defines minimum personnel requirements at primary observation locations (12 sector sites). There are no MFO requirements for company or platoon headquarters, only for supervisory elements located at three Sector Control Centers (SAC) which are also included within the 12 sector sites. By organizing the force to the mission, a substantial savings in personnel, mostly in company and platoon headquarters' sections, could be realized. Additional savings in personnel can be achieved by manning sector sites to the MFO required level rather than striving to keep squads and teams intact even when an excess manning level exists.

Maintaining unit integrity is a necessity for warfighters but for peacekeepers it only serves to increase support and administrative burdens. A second consideration used in forming
the strategic reserve force for peacekeeping is to "step out of the box". Organize the force to the unique peacekeeping situation and mission requirements, not to preconceived notions of structure founded in combat operations.

The remaining considerations on forming a strategic reserve force for peacekeeping operations are derived from the peacekeepers of the 4-505 themselves. A series of three surveys were conducted at intervals on the battalion between November 1994, and July, 1995. The purpose of these surveys was to provide immediate feedback to the battalion's leadership on problem identification and reinforce those things perceived by the soldiers as "going well". Specific areas surveyed within the questionnaires were:

1. Administrative
2. Caring
3. Leading
4. Training
5. Maintaining
6. Reserve/National Guard Specific

Each survey consisted of approximately 60 questions devised to discern soldier perceptions in the above areas. Individual questions were largely repeated throughout each survey with slight changes in tense and substance to reflect survey timing, i.e. pre-deployment, mid-tour, and post-tour. This provided initial perceptions and any changes in these perceptions as the mission progressed.

All surveys reflected responses of Army Reservists, National Guardsmen, and members of the Active Component. For the most part, due to the integrated nature of the composite battalion,
responses in the "Administrative" area paralleled its make-up which was heavily weighted with National Guard (68%), and with lesser numbers of Army Reserve (10%) and Active Component (22%). Total survey responses ranged from a high of 82% on pre-deployment, to 60% at mid-tour and 54% post-tour. An initial goal of minimum 50% responses was seen as indicative of a validated survey and achieved in each instance. Discussion of the responses following will focus on generic considerations for a strategic reserve peacekeeping force rather than those deemed MFO unique.

Within the area of "Caring", 33% of respondents on the pre-deployment survey indicated their satisfaction with billeting conditions. A large group of 49% expressed dissatisfaction.\textsuperscript{26} This was a reflection of the old, open-bay billets provided to the battalion at Fort Bragg. As billeting quarters were at a premium on Fort Bragg, the billets provided were the best available. However, the majority of lower enlisted ranks were required to live in these substandard billets for some three months prior to deployment. To assuage initial morale problems, consideration must be given to providing adequate living quarters for the reserve force, including siting the force where adequate billets exist and/or reducing the amount of time spent in inadequate billets. After deployment, this concern disappeared as the soldiers moved into established quarters and remote sites in the Sinai. Subsequent surveys found an average 76% expressing satisfaction with their living conditions.\textsuperscript{27}
Mail delivery appeared a consistent source of discontent. While mail delivery to/from the Sinai had a lengthy delivery time of 10 to 12 days, it was at least anticipated. Hence, the 65% noting dissatisfaction in the mid-tour and post-tour survey was not unexpected. There was ample room for improvement prior to deployment, however, with 62% of respondents indicating problems with mail delivery while still in the United States. Resolution of this concern requires command and staff emphasis to ensure soldiers are briefed prior to activation on their forwarding address and the mail handling system at the pre-deployment site is focussed on the reserve force.

An extended deployment presents a ripe opportunity for alcohol abuse. Throughout the 4-505's deployment, the percent of soldiers identifying alcohol as a problem within the unit increased markedly. From a low of 27% during pre-deployment, subsequent surveys indicated 41% and then 59% viewing alcohol as a problem. The very nature of the peacekeeping environment shaped for the strategic reserve force lends itself to prolonged periods of inactivity and boredom. Both directly affect alcohol consumption. Absent strict prohibition, the reserve force must be prepared to deal proactively with the problem.

Timely pay and timely resolution of pay problems continually improved during the battalion's existence. Of concern to the model proposed for future peacekeeping operations is the 25% of soldiers indicating no resolution of their pay problems on the pre-deployment survey. Again, subsequent surveys reduced this
percentage to 12% and 9% respectively. \(^{32}\) But, even at 9% on the 
after redeployment survey, this would indicate that at least 26 
soldiers returned home with pay problems unresolved. In any 
model proposed for future peacekeeping operations, procedures and 
systems for eliminating or minimizing pay problems in the 
transition from reserve to active status must be emphasized.

Unit morale followed a logical trend during the surveys. 
Initially, 51% of respondents agreed that unit morale was high. \(^{33}\) 
At mid-tour, only 35% felt unit morale was high. \(^{34}\) And, at 
tour's end, 59% indicated high morale in the unit. \(^{35}\) Resolving 
the issues discussed above, and following below, will serve to 
enhance morale of the model force. It appears inevitable that 
the reserve force model will experience a downswing in soldier 
morale consistent with extended deployments. Leadership must be 
aware of this anomaly and plan to cope with it.

In the area of "Leading", positive perceptions were 
consistently identified throughout train-up and the mission. 
Soldiers overwhelmingly perceived themselves as successful in 
accomplishing the MFO mission (86%) and believed volunteering for 
the Sinai was a good idea (63%). \(^{36}\) Although not a consideration 
in developing a force model, the perceptions in this area provide 
credibility for the basic rationale of a strategic reserve force. 
Reserve component soldiers want to serve, have eminent capability 
to succeed, and proved themselves successful in the Sinai.

The areas of "Training" and "Maintaining" were also 
perceived positively. Notable were the perceptions that the
soldiers, themselves, felt they were individually prepared to accomplish the mission (90%) and, as a unit, were as equally prepared (92%). This was a result not only of having great leaders and trainers, but of having a mission training plan tested over numerous rotations to the Sinai and focussing on those tasks unique to the mission. The area of "Maintaining" is not commented upon due to the unique situation whereby the MFO provided all maintenance support.

In the area of "Reservist/National Guard Specific" questions, the pre-deployment survey provided a clear indication of 'why' reserve component soldiers volunteered for the mission. In order of preference, responses were:

1. Adventure 48%
2. Career Enhanced 23%
3. Patriotism 17%
4. Money 11%
5. Medical Care 01%

A consideration garnered from soldier expectations must be integrated into the model and appropriate plans made to fulfill such expectations to the degree feasible. Dispelled at the same time were notions that volunteers from the Reserve Component would consist largely of the unemployed. Approximately 93% responded that they were employed at the time they volunteered for the mission. Overwhelmingly, these soldiers did not perceive their civilian jobs as being at risk during the mission, however, 21% felt that they would lose something, i.e. promotion, pay raise, seniority. Of greater concern was the percentage of Reserve Component soldiers expressing negative perceptions of
being accepted by Active Component soldiers. During pre-deployment only 10% indicated they were not accepted.\textsuperscript{41} This increased to 31% and 32% respectively during subsequent surveys.\textsuperscript{42}

Another consideration for the model strategic reserve force is one which encompasses many of the issues previously discussed as problem areas and offers the best opportunity for their resolution. It is simply that the strategic reserve force deployed on a peacekeeping mission should be a reserve force and not a composite force. The dichotomy between the reserve component and the active component provides imagined inconsistencies which can be dismissed by organizing the model solely through the use of reserve components. The 4-505 PIR was a composite battalion of predominantly reserve components, however, the Battalion Commander and Command Sergeant Major were from the active component. And, although leadership slots were evenly divided throughout the battalion, all active component soldiers were in the grade of E-5 or above and all occupied leadership positions. The model for the strategic reserve force should be organized solely from the reserve components. Fills from the active component would be considered only when necessary to meet mission requirements.

A final consideration in developing the force model concerns "rotational" planning. Depending upon anticipated duration of the peacekeeping mission, plans must be developed early-on for a force rotational program. Whether rotation is individual or unit
oriented, advantages and disadvantages accrue. For the longer term, individual rotation would appear the most cost effective in dollars, personnel turbulence, and training resources. Once the Strategic Reserve Force has deployed under this scenario, it would be sited at its mission location and personnel rotated on a schedule optimizing Army and Reserve Component needs. Replacement personnel would be trained in mission unique tasks by cadre teams within the force and further trained on-site by personnel within their assigned teams.
Conclusion. Having carefully shaped the peacekeeping environment for a Strategic Reserve Force and noted that the tasks and competencies for a peacekeeping force in such an environment are wholly within the capabilities of the Reserve Components, it remains to outline those considerations upon which a model force is organized. From discussion immediately above, an outline of considerations for a model Strategic Reserve Force would appear:

1. Plan, organize, train, and treat the force as a "peacekeeping force" and not as a "reserve" force.

2. Base force structure on situation and mission requirements rather than "notional" current unit structure.

3. Include the following planning considerations to enhance morale and force performance:
   a. Provide adequate billeting during train-up or reduce time in inadequate billeting to a minimum.
   b. Focus on mail delivery at both individual and site level.
   c. Plan for dealing with alcohol consumption and related problems.
   d. Emphasize timely resolution of pay problems. Plan transition into and out of force to minimize such problems.
   e. Expect a morale downswing. Plan activities to focus soldier attention.
   f. Determine soldier expectations and plan to fulfill them. Tell soldiers upfront when and why expectations
can't be met.

4. Organize the Strategic Reserve Force from the reserve components. Fill with active component soldiers only when necessary to meet mission requirements.

5. Plan a rotation program based on anticipated mission duration. For extended deployments, consider siting the unit at the mission location and training individual replacements on-site.

As always, success in any mission, peacekeeping or other operations, depends in large part on the soldiers and leaders performing the mission. Reserve Component soldiers and leaders have proven in Somalia, Haiti, and Bosnia that they are eminently capable of accomplishing peace operations. In the downsized Army of the future, given the increasing number of peace operations, Reserve Components will be tasked to undertake some part of these operations. Hopefully, this paper has provided insights into the nature of these peace operations and the force designed to accomplish them.
ENDNOTES


10. FM 100-23, 12.

11. Donald M. Snow, 4,22.

12. FM 100-23, 5.


15. American Society of International Law, 816.


17. FM 100-23, 4,5.

18. FM 100-5, 13-7.


22. FM 100-23, 87.


24. FM 100-5, 13-7.


26. Headquarters 82D Airborne Division, "4-505TH Pre-Deployment Sensing Survey", (Office of the Inspector General, 19 December 1994), B-1. Future references to this survey will be noted as "Pre-Tour".

27. Headquarters 82D Airborne Division, "4-505Th Mid-Tour Sensing Survey", (Office of the Inspector General, 10 May 1995), C-1. Future references to this survey will be noted as "Mid-Tour". Headquarters 82D Airborne Division, "4-505TH Post-Tour Sensing Survey", (Office of the Inspector General, 30 September 1995), C-2. Future references to this survey will be noted as "Post-Tour".


29. Pre-Tour, B-2.


31. Pre-Tour, B-3.

32. Mid-Tour, C-2. Post-Tour, C-5.

33. Pre-Tour, B-2.

34. Mid-Tour, C-3.

35. Post-Tour, C-9.

36. Post-Tour, C-11, 15.
37. Post-Tour, C-16,17.

38. Pre-Tour, B-5.

39. Pre-Tour, B-5.

40. Post-Tour, C-31.

41. Pre-Tour, B-5.

42. Mid-Tour, C-12.
   Post-Tour, C-29.
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