POWER PROJECTION OPERATIONS IN THE POST COLD WAR ERA

BY

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United States Army

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USAWC STRATEGY RESEARCH PROJECT

POWER PROJECTION OPERATIONS IN THE
POST COLD WAR ERA

by

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service or government agency.
The National Military Strategy requires the Army to be able to project power rapidly to any region where the vital interest of the United States are challenged. In the post cold war era, power projection operations can be defined in three phases; movement from home station to air/seaports of embarkation, deployment from air/seaports of embarkation to air/seaports of debarkation, and movement from air/seaports of debarkation to tactical assembly areas. This study looks at each phase and discusses improvements that are underway or necessary to conduct power projection operations in the most efficient manner.
INTRODUCTION

Following the collapse of the former Soviet Union, Americans demanded their peace dividend, resulting in massive force structure cuts and much less permanent stationing of forces overseas. The east-west confrontation gave way to the Major Regional Contingencies concept as the threat which would drive National Security and National Military Strategies. The Clinton Administration published National Security Strategy postulates that the United States’ focus is to assist in maintaining regional stability. Should that fail, the United States will deter and, if necessary, fight and defeat regional aggression. The National Security Strategy is based on the requirement that the U.S. will have rapidly deployable forces capable of acting unilaterally if necessary to stop aggressive action in two nearly simultaneous major regional conflicts.

The National Military Strategy points out the new linchpin for executing U.S. strategy.

"Power projection is essential for performing the required tasks of all components of the strategy, however, it is most critical in the deterrence and conflict prevention and warfighting portions of our Military Strategy."¹

This study will review the component parts of power projection operations. Specific focus will be on whether or not sufficient active component Transportation Corps force structure exists to carry out the requirements of the National Security and National Military Strategies.

OVERVIEW

There has been much debate over the validity of the NSS and NMS of the Clinton Administration. The two Secretaries of Defense in the Administration have made
conflicting statements on this issue. In a speech to the National Defense University in June of 1993, Secretary Les Aspin suggested that the Bottom-Up Review would be based on a conventional force structure necessary to execute two MRC's with a win-hold-win strategy. The next week during an address at Andrews Air Force Base, Secretary Aspin called for a conventional force which could execute the two nearly simultaneous MRC's. Describing the dilemma, the Heritage Foundation reports:

"A comparison of the conventional force structure required to execute the win-hold-win strategy and the Option B force structure, which Aspin's analysis indicates is all the Clinton budget can buy, reveals the scope of the Administration's problem. Aspin's subsequent assertion that the Armed Forces should execute a win-win strategy implies the need for an even larger force than required by the original win-hold-win strategy. Thus, Aspin's new strategy only enlarges the Administration's affordability gap."2

Secretary Perry also has conflicting views about the strategy. In a briefing with defense writers in January 1996, Secretary Perry stated.

"If we had to make a major cut in force structure, one of the first things that would have to go would be the military strategy that supports two MRC's . . . I don't want to cut force structure [but] that would be my first point to give. I will not go back on my priority for readiness."3

However, in the Deputy Secretary of Defense's approved draft of the Annual Report to the President and the Congress dated 29 January 1996, the language clearly supports the requirement for forces to be able to handle two nearly simultaneous MRC's. It goes on to say "U.S. forces today meet these requirements."4

The argument over whether U.S. forces meet these requirements is debatable throughout the Department of Defense. Studies by the General Accounting Office
suggest that for combat support and combat service support units the current force structure is inadequate to accomplish even one major regional contingency. A better understanding of what is meant by power projection is necessary before trying to assess the basis force structure requirements to carry out the policies detailed in the National Security Strategy and the National Military Strategy.

POWER PROJECTION

Exactly what is meant by the term power projection? Is it the same today as it was during the U.S.-Soviet confrontation? For most military minds, the term power projection means exactly what it did for the many years preceding the fall of the Soviet Union. Power projection then was really the strategic mobility triad which would be used to reinforce Europe after Soviet, attack the components of the triad being Strategic Airlift, Strategic Sealift and Pre-positioning of Material configured to Unit Sets (POMCUS). Because the focus of effort was primarily on reinforcing Europe, the Department of Defense was able to select trade-offs in which element of the triad provided the best cost benefit returns. In this case, decisions for large pre-positioning of equipment kept requirements for strategic air and sealift at an acceptable risk. Forward deployed forces, plus a robust host nation support program, coupled with a modern infrastructure to support onward movement and integration, made this an acceptable course of action.

A statement by General Bernard W. Rogers, Chief of Staff, U.S. Army in his 1978 message to Congress reveals a more detailed view of power projection.

"The credibility of our conventional deterrence hangs on our ability to deploy and sustain our forces worldwide. As the largest users of this Nation's strategic lift, we in the Army view strategic deployment from a total systems perspective. That
is, one segment has as much importance as any other. And the systems are complex, embracing men, facilities, trucks, trains, airplanes, ships and ports. Ships and planes alone will not do the job. We also need facilities to receive equipment and personnel once deployed and speed their movement to the battle area. A breakdown anywhere ripples throughout the entire system."5

General Rogers' statement shows that he viewed power projection, even during the cold war, as a complex system which encompassed much more that the strategic mobility triad. This understanding was not viable to many other leaders of the day because the requirements for power projections were being supported by a robust NATO structure and host nation support agreements. It is General Rogers' view from the past that connects us to the realities of power projection operations in the major regional contingency environment. The view of power projection for today's Army must incorporate a home station to foxhole approach. The first of our opportunities to participate in a major regional conflict, Desert Shield/Desert Storm exposed us to the realities of General Rogers' complex system. To understand the total system of power projection for today's Army, it is necessary to break it down into its component parts.

POWER PROJECTION OPERATIONS

In the wake of the Victory of Desert Shield and Desert Storm, the Army leadership desired to capture the lessons learned and to provide doctrinal manuals to bridge shortcomings. One such shortcoming led to the writing of Field Manual 100-17 Mobilization, Deployment, Re-deployment, Demobilization. In FM 100-17, Power Projection is defined as:

"the ability of the United States to apply all or some of the elements of National Power (political, economic, informational and
Credible power projection rests among other things, on our ability to deploy rapidly forces to perform missions spanning the continuum of military operations. This tells us, then that we must be able to mobilize, deploy, operate and sustain, re-deploy and reconstitute our forces. This study will analyze the requirements to:

1. Deploy from home station to Air and Sea ports of Embarkation (A/SPOE);
2. Deploy from A/SPOE to Air and Sea ports of Debarkation (A/SPOD); and
3. Deploy from A/SPOD to Tactical Assembly Areas.

Remembering General Rogers' view that this is a total system with each segment being as important as the other, each segment must be analyzed to check physical infrastructure, equipment requirements, manpower requirements and political considerations. Each segment has its own critical needs to make it operate in concert with the other segments, and must be interlocked to optimize the capabilities of each.

**HOME STATION TO A/SPOE**

In the deployment of forces from home station to Air/Sea ports of Embarkation, physical infrastructure and equipment requirements play critical roles. The Army Strategic Mobility Plan was developed to look at the critical issues in these segments. In the area of infrastructure within the continental United States, several areas of concern were identified. These include installation infrastructure improvements, a requirement for a West Coast Ammunition port, a requirement for the purchase of heavy duty rail cars and continued congressional support for the Defense Transportation System through the Mobility Enhancement Fund.
The study identified key installations where infrastructure enhancements were necessary to ensure that the forces would be able to deploy rapidly to their designated sea ports of embarkation. An example of such an improvement would be upgrading the installations' railway system. These installations included Fort Hood, Texas, Fort Benning, Georgia, Fort Stewart, Georgia and Fort Campbell, Kentucky. The chart below shows the estimated cost needed for these installations to meet their deployment requirements.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Installation</th>
<th>$ Requirements in Millions</th>
<th>Allocated</th>
<th>Shortfall</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Fort Hood, Texas</td>
<td>74.5</td>
<td>74.5</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Fort Benning, Georgia</td>
<td>26.9</td>
<td>15.1</td>
<td>11.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Fort Stewart, Georgia</td>
<td>39.4</td>
<td>22.8</td>
<td>16.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Fort Campbell, Kentucky</td>
<td>31.7</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>31.7</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

While these installations are not the only ones identified in the study, they do represent the challenge ahead. In fact, the current infrastructure improvements program between FY96 and FY01, shows that the Army is projecting funding at approximately 65% of the requirement. As the out year funding picture is projected to get worse, it can only be assumed that this funding level will decrease. Full funding of the program is critical to building deployment capability.

The other infrastructure requirement identified by the ASMP was the necessity for a West Coast Ammunition Port. This port was necessary to meet 80% of the containerized ammunition requirement as identified in the Mobility Requirements Study of the Bottom up Review. The current capability to ship containerized ammunition through the West Coast is 258 containers per day with the requirement being 724 containers of ammunition per day. The significance is highlighted by showing that the
transit time of ammunition shipped from the West Coast to a MRC in the Pacific region is sixteen (16) days, versus the 31 days required to ship ammunition from the east coast. The upgrade to Naval Weapons Station, Concord, California, is currently underfunded by 7 Million Dollars in FY97 and 4.5 Million Dollars in FY98.

The equipment requirements identified in the ASMP for this segment were primarily oriented toward the purchase of rail cars which would be dedicated to the Army's use in deployment operations. The study identified a fleet requirement of 1,945 rail cars and recommended stationing of the rail cars at installations for immediate access by the deploying lead brigades. Due to fiscal constraints, the Army has proposed an alternative rail car strategy which cuts the requirement from 1,945 to 1,370 rail cars. The Army's strategy calls for more reliance on the commercial industry and calls for recycling of rail cars as well as highway convoys of some equipment to the SPOE.

A critical issue in this segment is continued congressional support for improvements to the Defense Transportation System through funding the Mobility Enhancement Fund (MEF). The MEF which is controlled by U.S. TRANSCOM is money which the Army can compete for to continue to upgrade facilities and infrastructure. The Army received 16 Million Dollars in FY95 for numerous project upgrades. This money has funded projects that may not have competed favorably for dollars within the priorities of the Department of the Army, but are necessary to keep the Defense Transportation System viable to support home station to SPOE deployment operations.

This segment of the power projection system is oriented on the infrastructure at home installations, the supporting transportation infrastructure, and the commercial industrial base that supports them (highway, rail and port). The Military Traffic Management Command provides the active component units that support operations in this segment and are augmented by competent reserve component units for large deployments.
Much of the actual labor at the seaports of embarkation, is accomplished by contracted labor and, therefore, minimal force structure concerns exist in this segment. To maximize the capabilities of this segment we need to continue the improvements underway. A failure in this segment of power projection operations delays the ability to deploy forces rapidly. This encourages potential adversaries to act quickly before the United States can respond.

A/SPOE TO A/SPOD

This segment of the power projection system is the most understood because it is the segment that uses the equipment of the strategic mobility triad to accomplish the movement of forces. Therefore, this section will be focused on Strategic Airlift, Strategic Sealift and pre-positioning of equipment. The critical aspect in this segment is designing the strategic mobility triad so as to have the most efficient mix of capability to respond to a crisis. A number of studies have been conducted to evaluate what the mix should be. As noted earlier, the cold war mix was weighted in favor of pre-positioning equipment in Europe. This required fewer strategic air and maritime assets to close the force. The shift to major regional contingencies as a strategy required the mix to be re-evaluated and this was done in the 1991 Mobility Requirements Study and a subsequent analysis in the Bottom Up Review. While there has been considerable criticism of the Study's findings, there have been decisions made which will shape the strategic mobility triads capacity well into the next century.

STRATEGIC AIRLIFT

Determining the right number may be based as much on intuition as science. A historical look at previous deployments does help to define what the requirements should
be. Desert Shield/Desert Storm followed the traditional pattern of 90% of cargo, including sustainment, moving by sea with 10% moving by air. The 10% that moves by air, however, is critical to the ability to conduct the full scope of power projection operations. The personnel and early arriving equipment coming by airlift allows for security and the establishment of the theater infrastructure.

The airlift segment of the triad is composed of active and reserve component Air Force units in Air Mobility Command as well as the commercial assets participating in the Civil Reserve Air Fleet (CRAF) programs, which can be activated in three (3) stages depending on the severity of the crisis. It is necessary to have the President or Congress declare a national emergency prior to activation of stage III of CRAF, because of the economic impact to the participating airlines.

Capacity in the airlift segment is measured in millions of ton·miles. In fiscal year 1996, the airlift system was capable of achieving 48.9 million ton·miles per day at full mobilization. Recent decisions to purchase 120 C-17 aircraft to replace the aged C-141 fleet will leave that capability reasonably unchanged through 2006, with capacity estimated at 49.4 million ton·miles per day.

**STRATEGIC SEALIFT**

The lessons of the Desert Shield/Desert Storm deployment revealed that there were serious inadequacies in the strategic sealift capability. The Military Sealift Command (MSC), a subordinate of USTRANSCOM, is responsible for providing required surge sealift for power projections. To accomplish this, MSC activates the shipping under their control. If additional assets are required, MSC coordinates with the Maritime Administration, a Department of Transportation component for activation of the National Defense Reserve Fleet. While the systems worked reasonably well in terms of activating the ships of the Ready Reserve Fleet, it was a slow process which often did
not keep up with the demand. Secondly, it became apparent that commercial shipping would have to be contracted to augment the military fleet. The commercial maritime industry's swing to container shipping in past years made militarily useful ships few in numbers.

The Mobility Requirements Study (MRS) recognized that military strategic sealift was inadequate to meet the surge requirements necessary for CONUS based power projection operations. The Study called for acquisition of 20 large, medium speed roll on - roll off ships. The method of acquisition would be through either new construction or conversion of already existing ships. The MRS originally called for the 20 ships to be delivered by 1998. The ships were expected to have speeds of 24 knots and a range of 12,000 nautical miles.

The actual design of the new construction resulted in a larger useable square footage and the number of ships was reduced to 19. Delays in the original timeline have pushed back the expected delivery dates into Fiscal Year 2001. The 19 ships will be split between afloat pre-positioning assets and surge sealift assets. The chart below shows the current status.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>FY</th>
<th>93</th>
<th>94</th>
<th>95</th>
<th>96</th>
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<th>98</th>
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<td>2</td>
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<td>3</td>
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<tr>
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<td>289M</td>
<td>546M</td>
<td>596M</td>
<td>604M</td>
<td>681M</td>
<td>591M</td>
<td>12</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

* Contract not yet awarded.
There have been delays associated with the delivery of these ships, but they remain critical to future power projection operations capability as stated in the National Military Strategy. The addition of these ships will more than double (from 4.1 million square feet to 9.3 million square feet) the equipment and sustainment sealift capability that exist today.

**PRE-POSITIONING**

The shift from cold war confrontation (forward deployed) to CONUS based power projection strategy also required a change in the pre-positioning of equipment concept. The threat area now is not necessarily static as it was. The strategy calls for the ability to project power to different regions of the world. The long timelines associated with the Desert Shield deployment led to decisions to preposition unit sets in the CENTCOM area. The political considerations associated with U.S. Forces being present in this area slowed the progress and required the Army to look for other solutions. Borrowing from the Marine Corps' Maritime Pre-positioning Ships (MPS), the Army decided to preposition some equipment afloat. The program, called Army War Reserve Forces (AWR-3), is designed to position an Army Heavy Brigade afloat, together with its and support equipment and port opening package, so that it is rapidly transportable to a region during a crisis. This capability was tested in Operation Vigilant Warrior in Saudi Arabia in response to Iraqi troop movements near the Kuwait border. The rapid response provides the National Command Authority with an additional flexible deterrent option in such crisis. Coupled with continued land based pre-positioning in critical theaters, the AWR-3 program provides the quick jump start to power projection operations.
A/SPOD TO TACTICAL ASSEMBLY AREAS
(Reception, Staging, Onward Movement and Integration)

If the strategic mobility triad is the most understood of the segments of power projection, this segment is the most complex and misunderstood. It involves the tying together of the host nation infrastructure, equipment requirements, units or manpower requirements and political considerations in the theater. The National Military Strategy states that "we continue to build on the lessons learned in Operation Desert Storm to strengthen our power projection capabilities". Many lessons from Desert Storm were in fact learned. The studies which led to CONUS Infrastructure upgrades, the C-17 purchase, large-medium speed roll on - roll off shipping purchase and the Army War Reserve Forces (AWR-3) pre-positioning program are all valid examples of applying the lessons learned. The current challenge to power projection operations is reception, staging, onward movement and integration. There are numerous lessons learned from Desert Storm that can be applied if the basics of RSO&I are understood and applied according to the variables in any given regional contingency. What is RSO & I and how can it be improved? To better understand this final segment of power projection operations, a brief discussion of the component parts is necessary.

RECEPTION

Reception begins at the air/sea ports of debarkation. It is the point where the theater CINC receives his personnel and equipment. The accountability of personnel and equipment, both unit and theater stocks, is established. Additionally, support functions must be provided for personnel transiting the reception areas. There are several areas to be considered in the Reception phase of RSO&I. A CINC's J-4 (Logistician) should have the most current information on the infrastructure of the country or countries where
operations will take place. Specific areas of interest should focus on the existing Transportation infrastructure, and host nation support capabilities.

The availability of seaports is key to the ability of a CINC to project power and sustain the force once deployed. How many seaports are available and what is their capacity both in terms of berths and draft, are questions to which the J-4 must also know the answers. The J-4 must know the availability of and capacity of airfields near the seaports, as well as airports throughout the rest of the theater. Is there an adequate road network? What will be the Main Supply Routes out of the ports? What is the capacity of those routes? Is there a rail network, what is its capacity? Are there any inland waterways which can be used? What is the weather and sea state in the region? If necessary, can Logistics over the shore operations be conducted?

Each of these facilities must also be analyzed to answer questions for equipment and manpower availability. At seaports, the J-4 needs to know the capability of the equipment and if it will be made available for his use. What kinds of heavy lift cranes are available? Is there a container terminal with overhead gantry cranes to assist in rapid discharge of containers? What storage facilities will be made available? Are there tugboats to assist in berthing operations? At airports, what maintenance capability exist? What cargo handling equipment is available and is the necessary ground handling and support equipment available for use? What is the refueling capability at the airport? For rail and highway systems, what equipment is available? The number and types of rail cars and what types of and quantities of tie down material available are important considerations. Additionally, the numbers and types of trucks available and when they are available is important. Is there an immediate availability of heavy equipment transporters or container carriers?

What is the availability of a host nation work force capable of operating the systems and equipment noted above? What is the reliability of the work force? Will the work force perform in a hostile environment or only in benign conditions? Can the host
nation provide the life support (meals, billeting, showers, and toilets), or do U.S. support units need to deploy early to provide this support?

There also are political questions that the CINC or J-4 should seek to have answered as early as possible. The impact of providing the U.S. military prime seaport and airport facilities on local commerce will be significant. What share of the facilities can the CINC count on to throughput the force? Who can grant clearance for the storage of ammunition and allocate real estate for the establishment of ammunition supply points? Does the plan require overflight rights and basing rights in other countries and are they approved?

The J-4 must be able to assimilate all of the information available, and assess the risk of using host nation support versus U.S. military units providing the support. He then must be able to provide the CINC with recommendations on prioritization of the time phased force deployment data list to ensure that the theater reception operations can be established and maximize the ability to throughput the force.

**STAGING**

Staging is the joining of units' personnel and equipment in a controlled area. During this phase units are prepared for onward movement, prioritized and scheduled for movement. Again, life support functions must be provided in the staging areas. Many of the same considerations as noted previously in the Reception areas apply in Staging areas as well. During Desert Shield, the average unit spent nine (9) days in the staging areas. This requires a precise real estate management program as well as a flexible TPFDD to adjust for space problems. The J-4 must ensure that staging areas are properly located so that ready access to the transportation network is available. Units occupying the staging area will be preparing equipment to move forward, uploading class V, ammunition, and completing other supply upload. It is important that a robust life support system be
provided so that units can maximize the effort of preparing for onward movement. Host
nation support here can reduce the early deployment requirements for logistic units and
provide more rapid build up of combat units.

**ONWARD MOVEMENT**

Onward movement is the use of the existing transportation network (air, ground,
inland waterway and rail) to move units and equipment to forward positions. It is in
conjunction with CINC’s priorities and is concerned with movement control, reporting
procedures, security and optimizing the transportation network. The J-4 must have
control over the transportation network for the onward movement to maximize the
capacity of the network. Units must be disciplined to follow the directions for movement
by mode and route, as well as for the following of reporting procedures. The J-4 must
review the plan and be prepared to respond to actions by the enemy which might
interdict or close one or more of the modes of transportation. For example, security at
critical bridges or tunnels is essential for maintaining full control over the capabilities of
the transportation network. This requires security forces allocated to support the
movement routes and a robust communications net for reporting.

**INTEGRATION**

Integration occurs when combat ready units flow into their tactical assembly areas
and transition to the tactical commander. It requires movement control with intransit
visibility to ensure the seamless transition of these units to the tactical commander. The
J-4 is concerned here with the reporting that the unit has completed movement and is
released to the tactical commander for operations. Additionally, the J-4 is concerned that
all common user transportation assets used in completing the move be returned to the
system. This would include rail cars, heavy equipment transporters, trucks, containers and other assets that will be needed to continue to build combat power in the theater.

This final segment of Power Projection Operations, Movement from A/SPOD's to the foxhole has been the most neglected in the shift from the cold war to the Major Regional Contingency Strategy. In every case of deployment, including Desert Shield, Restore Hope, Vigilant Warrior, and Uphold Democracy, the RSO&I process has been reactive rather than proactive. After action reports all cite the same lessons learned. Part of the problem is that the Army does not have a doctrinal publication which provides CINC's, Joint Task Force Commanders, and J-4's with the baseline concepts of how this segment should be conducted. Another factor is that the Army has not done as good a job in learning lessons as they have in the other segments of power projection.

CONCLUSION

What actions need to be taken to enhance the capability of the United States to project power to respond to major regional contingencies? In the first and second segments of the system, the military is responding to noted shortfalls. The infrastructure improvements at CONUS installations will improve the capability and the swiftness with which lead organizations will be able to respond and report to Air/Sea ports of embarkation.

Likewise, continued vigilance in maintaining the strategic air fleet both with Air Mobility Command's aircraft and increased participation in the commercial airlines' contributions to the Civil Reserve Airfleet Program seems to be on track. Our essential quick lift of equipment and unit personnel must continue to provide the ability to create a lodgment to build the theater.

Sealift programs for both afloat pre-positioning and surge sealift requirements will provide adequate lift to move combat forces and sustain a theater of operations.
Army War Reserve ships, once committed and downloaded, can be reconstituted and readied for a second major or lesser regional contingency.

Remembering the words of General Rogers is important when discussing the third segment of power projection.

"... ships and planes alone will not do the job. We also need facilities to receive equipment and personnel once deployed and speed their movement to the battle area. A breakdown anywhere ripples throughout the entire system."  

The breakdown in power projections operations is in the movement from A/SPOD to the Tactical Assembly areas. The development of doctrine for reception, staging onward movement, and integration operations is a must if we are to make any headway in solving this problem. The doctrine must be joint in its focus and consider the role U.S. forces will play in supporting coalition partners in any major regional contingency. Because power projection is a responsibility of the CINCUSTRANSCOM, he should take the lead role in the development of RSO&I doctrine. The CINCTRANS could appoint executive agents for developing the specifics within the segments.

Once the framework of the doctrine is under development, a major review of the organizational structure required to execute RSO&I must be conducted. Current Army practices in the Total Army Analysis model are flawed in assessing structure requirements for echelon above corps units and should be corrected to ensure accurate requirements are stated. The Total Army Analysis begins with allocation rules that drive the process. One of these rules is that units in the force structure are manned and equipped at the authorized level of organization (ALO) 1. This means that units are capable of achieving 100% of the mission requirements stated in their Table of Organization and Equipment (TO&E). Echelon above corps units are usually organized at ALO 2 or 3, which results in corresponding reductions in ability to perform mission
requirements. Without accounting for actual capability or capacity, a false picture showing more force structure capability than actually exists is portrayed.

An additional situation exists which compounds the problem. Mr. Joe A. Fortner, a management analyst in the Force Development and Evaluation Directorate of the Army Combined Arms Support Command at Fort Lee, Virginia, conducted an analysis of the cargo carrying capacities of both the echelon above corps medium truck company, as well as the corps level medium truck company. The study compares actual capacity versus the capacity as stated in the current Tables of Organization and Equipment. The current TO&E of the echelon above corps medium truck company overstates actual capacity by a factor of 2.14. The corps level medium truck company TO&E overstates actual capacity by a factor of 2.15.8 The significance of this study is paramount to the Total Army Analysis process because Army leaders are making force structure decisions using TO&E capability. This study suggests that we need more than twice the current medium truck unit force structure at corps and echelon above corps just to do what we thought we were capable of accomplishing.

The Army conducted the Bottom-Up Review to determine force structure requirements for the National Military Strategy. The approach used to determine requirements for force closure and logistic units is highlighted in the General Accounting Office Report on the Army's Bottom-Up Review assumptions. The approach is characterized by words such as: national, simulate and assumed. The GAO Report states:

"The bottom-up review did not analyze the specific types and quantities of Army support units needed to execute the two-conflict strategy. In modeling force and strategy options, DOD used notional numbers to simulate the support forces that would typically deploy to support our Army division. It assumed that the Army would deploy with all of the specific support units needed to support its combat forces. According to DOD officials,
they did not thoroughly analyze support requirements, because of the short time frame to complete the bottom-up review.  

This approach to determining support requirements is clearly out of sync with the concept of power projection being the linchpin to the success of the strategy. The study goes on to point out that there is a requirement for 238 additional Combat Support and Combat Service support units to execute even one major regional contingency, while 654 of these units are tasked to participate in two conflicts. For transportation specific units, the study shows a shortfall of 72 units for a two major regional contingency operation.

The Army must address these issues if it is going to maximize the ability to conduct power projection operations. There are many on-going studies using computer models and simulations that if tied together would provide a clearer picture for the Army leadership in assessing minimum acceptable force structure. These issues must be addressed seriously by the leadership so that the Army is capable of conducting effective power projection operations from the air/sea ports of debarkation to the tactical assembly areas. Failure to do so renders much of the capital investment expenditures in the other two segments less effective. The force structure requirement will continue to exceed the budgeting capability to match them for the foreseeable future. Before the leadership can make informed decisions on the risk that they are willing to accept, they must understand power projection operations as a complex and interrelated system.


7 Joint Chiefs of Staff, ES-1.

8 Joe A. Fortner, "How Many Truck Companies Do We Need?" Army Logistician, (September - October 1995), 14-17.

9 General Accounting Office, Bottom-Up Review, Analysis of Key DOD Assumptions 1995, p. 27.
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