

**STRATEGY
RESEARCH
PROJECT**

The views expressed in this paper are those of the author and do not necessarily reflect the views of the Department of Defense or any of its agencies. This document may not be released for open publication until it has been cleared by the appropriate military service or government agency.

**NATIONAL DRUG CONTROL STRATEGY:
A STRATEGIC ANALYSIS**

BY

LIEUTENANT COLONEL DOUGLAS R. BEATY
United States Army

DISTRIBUTION STATEMENT A:

Approved for public release.

Distribution is unlimited

19960529 045

USAWC CLASS OF 1996



U.S. ARMY WAR COLLEGE, CARLISLE BARRACKS, PA 17013-5050

DTC QUALITY INSPECTED 1

USAWC STRATEGY RESEARCH PROJECT

The views expressed in this paper are those of the author and do not necessarily reflect the views of the Department of Defense or any of its agencies. This document may not be released for open publication until it has been cleared by the appropriate military service or government agency.

National Drug Control Strategy: A Strategic Analysis

by

Lieutenant Colonel Douglas R. Beaty
United States Army

COL Steve Hightower
Project Advisor

DISTRIBUTION STATEMENT A: Approved for public release. Distribution is unlimited.

U.S. Army War College
Carlisle Barracks, Pennsylvania 17013

ABSTRACT

AUTHOR: Douglas R. Beaty, (LTC), USA

TITLE: National Drug Control Strategy: A Strategic Analysis

FORMAT: Strategy Research Project

DATE: 15 April 1996 PAGES: 23 CLASSIFICATION: Unclassified

In September 1989, the Bush Administration published the first National Drug Control Strategy, instituting a comprehensive policy that included measures addressing drug abuse and trafficking. Since 1990 the National Drug Control Strategy for Latin America has focused on drug interdiction. This policy had limited success in reducing the flow of drugs into the United States. In response to these changes, the U.S. increased its ability to detect, monitor, and interdict aircraft suspected of carrying illegal drugs. DOD significantly expanded its role in the execution of the national drug control strategy. Resources allocated by the federal government to DOD to support the National Drug Control Policy increased dramatically initially, and then began to decline. This paper will examine DOD's role in implementing the National Drug Control Strategy and conduct an analysis of DOD's effectiveness in performing its drug control mission. Due to the vast scope of the National Drug Control Strategy, this paper will focus on the Andean countries of Columbia, Bolivia, and Peru. Specifically, DOD's role in stopping the flow of cocaine into the United States will be examined and recommendations will be made to improve the current strategy.

INTRODUCTION

In September 1989, the Bush Administration published the first National Drug Control Strategy, thus instituting a comprehensive policy that included measures addressing drug abuse and trafficking. The main goal of the strategy was to disrupt, dismantle, and destroy the illegal drug market affecting the United States.¹ The 1989 National Drug Control Strategy focused on four areas: drug abuse education programs, drug abuse treatment programs, dismantling the international drug cartels, and disrupting the drug trafficking networks.

The National Defense Authorization Act of 1989 assigned three major responsibilities to DOD:

1. Act as the single lead agency for detecting and monitoring the aerial and maritime transit of illegal drugs into the United States.
2. Integrate U.S. command, control, communications and technical intelligence assets that are dedicated to the interdiction of illegal drugs entering the United States into an effective communications network.
3. Approve and fund state governors' plans for using the National Guard to support the operations of drug enforcement agencies.

The basic principle governing DOD counterdrug activities is that military personnel must not perform direct law enforcement activities. This restriction, contained in the Posse Comitatus Act of 1878, generally prohibits service members from conducting

searches, performing seizures, making arrests, or performing similar activities in the United States. In 1981 Congress further clarified the type of activities permitted by the military under Posse Comitatas by amending the Armed Forces Code. The changes were made to allow the military to support counterdrug activities.² Specifically, the changes allow DOD to support counterdrug operations by providing civilian law enforcement officials with “information collected during military operations, use of military equipment and facilities, training and advice in the operation and maintenance of military equipment, and military personnel to operate, maintain, or repair needed equipment.” (10 United States Code)

Disruption of illegal drug trafficking networks is considered the most difficult task in supply-side efforts of the drug war. In 1988, 355 million people entered or reentered the United States, along with more than 100 million vehicles, 220 thousand vessels, 635 thousand aircraft, and eight million cargo containers.³

Since 1990 the National Drug Control Strategy for Latin America has focused on drug interdiction. The strategy focused on the interdiction of aircraft that were traveling along established routes. This policy had very limited success in reducing the flow of drugs into the United States for several reasons. Drug traffickers have been able to adjust their methods of operations to include changing the delivery destinations and evading detection and interdiction by U.S. authorities.


In response to these changes, the U.S. Government increased its ability to detect, monitor, and interdict aircraft suspected of carrying illegal drugs. Specifically, the Department of Defense significantly expanded its role in the execution of the national drug

control strategy. "The Department of Defense is playing an increasingly large role in interdiction and it has been designated by statute as the lead agency for air and maritime detection and monitoring."⁴

As a result of these changes in concepts, drug traffickers again changed the way drugs were transported to the United States. Initially drugs began moving by smaller aircraft using complex delivery systems to avoid U.S. Government sophisticated detection systems. Drug traffickers then shifted their primary delivery means to trucks and ships. Drugs would be flown to Central America and then transferred to trucks or ships. The drugs would be combined with legitimate cargo and then either be driven from Mexico into the U.S. or sent via commercial ship to ports in the U.S. This made virtually every commercial vehicle and vessel that entered the U.S. a potential means to transport drugs. This also had the effect of circumventing the advanced radar the U.S. had installed to detect aircraft.

Resources allocated by the federal government to the Department of Defense to support the National Drug Control Policy increased dramatically initially, and then began to decline. In 1989, when DOD first became the lead agency for detection and interdiction, its share of the budget was \$380.3 million dollars. DOD's counterdrug budget grew steadily through 1992 when it peaked at \$1.248 billion dollars. Resources for DOD then began declining each year until it reached a low of \$815 million in 1994. DOD's counterdrug budget increased slightly to \$852 million in 1995, however the proposed 1996 budget calls for a \$40 million dollar reduction in the DOD counterdrug budget to \$812 million dollars.

National Drug Control Budget



When President Bush first established the National Drug Control Strategy in 1989, resource allocation for counterdrug operations was primarily focused on the supply side. This strategy remained throughout the Bush years with 71 per cent of the drug budget allocated to supply reduction and 29 per cent spent on drug demand reduction. This strategy focused on interdicting drugs before they entered the United States. Once drugs were in the U.S. the policy provided law enforcement agencies resources to arrest and incarcerate drug suppliers.

According to the Drug Enforcement Administration, maritime vessels and airplanes are now responsible for the bulk of the cocaine being moved into Central America and much of the cocaine being smuggled into the United States. The use of ships and boats allows cocaine to be transported in greater bulk so that it can be more easily concealed and increases the difficulty of detecting drugs that are commingled with legitimate cargo.⁵

The 1995 National Security Strategy of Engagement and Enlargement has undertaken a new approach to the global scourge of drug abuse and trafficking that will better integrate domestic and international activities to reduce both the demand and supply of drugs. The U.S. has shifted its strategy from the past emphasis on transit interdiction to

a more evenly balanced effort with source countries to build institutions, destroy trafficking organizations and reduce the supply of illegal drugs that are entering the U.S. The strategy is designed to support and strengthen democratic institutions abroad, destroy drug trafficking organizations, and shift the emphasis on cocaine interdiction operations from the transit zones to the source countries.⁶

Since the release of the first annual drug strategy in September 1989, the Federal Government has spent a total of \$38.5 billion combating the drug epidemic. Unfortunately, these enormous expenditures have not significantly reduced the flow of illegal drugs into the U.S. Although illicit drug use has decreased for casual users, the number of more frequent drug users is not declining. Drug related crime and violence, and the availability of illegal drugs have worsened since the release of the first drug strategy. Although more drugs are interdicted before reaching America, more drugs are now entering America than before the first drug strategy was released.⁷

This paper will examine the Department of Defense's role in implementing the National Drug Control Strategy and conduct an analysis of DOD's effectiveness in performing its drug control mission. Due to the vast scope of the National Drug Control Strategy, this paper will focus on the Andean countries of Columbia, Bolivia, and Peru. Specifically, DOD's role in stopping the flow of cocaine into the United States will be examined and recommendations will be made to improve the current national military strategy.

There are many Federal agencies and departments involved in the implementation of the National Drug Control Strategy. The major Federal organizations include the Department of Justice, the Department of Health and Human Services, the Department of

Defense (DOD), the Department of the Treasury, the Department of Transportation, and the Department of State. This paper will focus on DOD's role in implementing the National Drug Control Strategy.

DOD's strategy includes five elements:

- Increased support to nations demonstrating the political will to combat narcotrafficking.
- Bringing military intelligence capabilities to antidrug efforts, including those of the Drug Enforcement Administration, against the cartels.
- Detecting and monitoring illegal drug transport.
- Supporting domestic law-enforcement agencies, particularly in high-intensity drug-trafficking areas.
- Continuing the military's drug testing and education programs.

The first element involves counterdrug training of the national police and military personnel of drug producing nations. The second element, dismantling the cartels, involves expanded intelligence gathering and sharing, while the third, detecting and monitoring, will see replacement of some of the more expensive use of US military aircraft and ships to find, track, and intercept drug smugglers with such approaches as relocatable over-the-horizon surveillance.⁸ The fourth element includes measures to interdict illegal drugs in areas such as Los Angeles, Miami, New York City, and our southwest border. Drug demand reduction, the fifth element, focuses on methods to reduce drug usage in America through education and testing.

There are many pitfalls in trying to measure the effectiveness of interdiction efforts. What for example, are the indications of a successful interdiction program? Officials often interpret an increase in drug seizures as an increase in the efficiency and effectiveness of law enforcement efforts. This may indeed be the case if the amount of

illegal drugs flowing into the United States is declining or remains steady and law enforcement agencies are capturing a greater percentage of the total drug volume.⁹

It has been estimated that nearly one fifth of the worldwide cocaine production was being seized by U.S. and foreign operations in the early 1990s. Former President Bush Drug Enforcement Administration (DEA) Administrator, Bob Bonner, also proudly speaks of a 300% reduction in the total number of cocaine users, from 5.8 million users in 1985 to 1.3 million users in 1992 under a tough no nonsense approach to fighting drugs.¹⁰

As an alternative to seizure data, illicit drug prices are frequently offered as a potential measure of interdiction success. If drug enforcement efforts are causing a significant reduction in the supply of drugs, we might expect to see an increase in the street prices. Unfortunately, the conventional supply and demand model may not reflect the true behavior of drug traffickers. Retail drug prices may be a misleading measure of the effectiveness of enforcement.¹¹

The fact that the military has only a supporting role in counterdrug operations further complicates analysis of its value. Because military units do not perform independent counterdrug operations, their effectiveness is dependent on the actions of the supported law enforcement agency. The military applies most interdiction support to surveillance and identification, leaving the tasks of pursuit and apprehension to the supported law enforcement agency.¹²

In testimony before Congress, the GAO has stated: "The problem is that the detection and monitoring of suspect ships and planes is not presently the weak link in the interdiction process. The shortfall lies in the endgame, arresting smugglers and seizing their drug loads." The DOD's detection and monitoring results compared to the

apprehension of air smugglers in fiscal year 1990 illustrate the situation. Out of the 6,729 suspected drug-smuggling aircraft that were detected by the DOD, law enforcement agencies pursued only 661. Of the aircraft chased, law enforcement successfully intercepted 49.¹³

Changes to U.S. counter drug policy can also impact on the military's ability to conduct the interdiction mission. A case in point occurred on May 1, 1994, when the U.S. government decided to stop providing U.S. radar data and other intelligence information to Columbia and Peru. Both countries indicated they were going to use, and had used, the intelligence provided by DOD to force down aircraft suspected of transporting illegal drugs. Both countries indicated to the U.S. that they would shoot down aircraft suspected of carrying illegal drugs if they did not land upon demand. The U.S. was concerned about our liability under international law if U.S. intelligence was used to shoot down civilian planes. It took the U.S. six months working with Peru and Columbia to review and make necessary policy changes before DOD could resume intelligence operations with Columbia and Peru.

During the period when intelligence data was withheld from Columbia and Peru, the radars were still operating but the data from the radars just wasn't provided to the two countries. The issue of sharing intelligence with Peru and Columbia was finally resolved. The 1994 Defense Authorization Act enabled DOD to resume intelligence sharing. It could not be determined if the suspension of intelligence sharing resulted in an increase in the drugs shipped from Peru and Columbia into the United States. However, it was determined that during that period traffickers responded with less evasive and less expensive practices that cut costs and thereby reduced their operational risks.¹⁴

Rather than effectiveness, i.e., the significance and impact of military counterdrug activities in terms of the overall drug problem, the Department of Defense tends to use measures of efficiency. i.e., the comparison of internal inputs and outputs without regard to the end purpose of interdiction. Military operations could significantly improve efficiency, for example, by using two soldiers to observe a border area that previously required four soldiers. However, this improvement in efficiency tells us nothing about how that particular task helps to decrease the availability of drugs, nor does it tell us the best way to apportion scarce federal resources between the number of law enforcement agents available to arrest any suspected smugglers that soldiers might spot.¹⁵

The primary assessment tool currently used by the military is essentially a customer satisfaction survey of the law enforcement agencies receiving support. Law enforcement agencies receiving military counterdrug support from the National Guard complete a survey that rates the quality of support in terms of timeliness, cooperation, proper equipment, and flexibility. Law enforcement agencies are also asked to rate, on a scale of one to three, whether or not the counterdrug operation was a success. Active duty units use a similar feedback process, but do not use a standard survey. However, no system has been implemented to use the results of these surveys to establish priorities or shift resources to types of support found to be more successful.¹⁶

On November 3, 1993, President Clinton issued Presidential Decision Directive 14. That directive specified major changes in the approach to the cocaine problem. It includes placing greater emphasis on building and strengthening counternarcotic institutions in source and transit countries; intensifying worldwide investigations and operations to destroy the cocaine kingpins; emphasizing efforts to enlist greater

international support to fight the drug trade, including support from traditional donors and multilateral groups; and developing a more focused and flexible approach to interdiction.¹⁷

Given that cocaine remains widely available in the U.S., it is not realistic to expect Federal drug supply reduction efforts alone to limit significantly the availability of cocaine in the near term. There are, however, a number of goals that coordinated Federal efforts can be expected to achieve, including : disrupting the cocaine cartels, raising the costs of drug trafficking, and denying traffickers their preferred methods and routes, in particular the ability to fly directly into Florida and over the Southwest Border. The Defense Department has contributed to significant successes in these areas. In 1993, DOD support activities lead directly to the seizure of over 100 metric tons of cocaine that would otherwise have ended up on U.S. streets, and thereby denied traffickers associated profits.¹⁸

The 1994 DOD counterdrug policy focused on five strategic elements: 1.) support to cocaine source nations; 2.) intelligence support targeted toward dismantling cartels; 3.) detection and monitoring of the transport of illegal drugs; 4.) support to domestic drug law enforcement agencies; and 5.) demand reduction.

Source Nation Support

DOD has focused its supporting efforts in the Andean countries of Columbia, Bolivia, and Peru. Support is aimed at strengthening the democratic institutions in these nations, encouraging national resolve and regional cooperation, and further developing air sovereignty with the objective of moving these nations toward self-sustaining counterdrug programs. Despite budget cuts in FY 94, the Department of Defense increased its support to source counterdrug efforts, in keeping with the shift of emphasis called for in the

National Strategy. Currently, DOD is providing planning, training, intelligence, operational support, and logistical support to U.S. and Host Nation counterdrug forces.¹⁹

Dismantling the Cartels

Among the most cost effective contribution which DOD can make to cooperative counterdrug efforts is bringing its intelligence capabilities to projects that target trafficking organizations. DOD Tactical Analysis Teams (TAT), operating in U.S. Embassies, are an invaluable link to U.S. national intelligence, providing timely, releasable information to Country Teams. However, currently TAT's ability to release information to organizations outside the embassy varies from country to country. In order to take full advantage of these assets, DOD should coordinate with the Department of State to allow all TATs to share their counterdrug intelligence information with agencies and departments that are involved in the counterdrug mission.

Detection and Monitoring of the Transport of Illegal Drugs

During fiscal year 1994 Airborne Warning and Control System (AWACS) missions for source country support were increased by 50 per cent. Meanwhile plans have continued for construction of a relocatable over-the-horizon radar (ROTHR) in Puerto Rico that will become operational in FY96, providing improved radar coverage of Columbia, Ecuador, Peru, northern Bolivia, and western Brazil. These radars do have limitations, however, and by themselves can not be considered as a direct replacement for AWACS. The use of cost effective technology (such as ROTHRs) in place of some of the more costly ship steaming and flying done in the past, allows DOD to maintain a robust and flexible detection and monitoring capability in the transit zone, while expanding the operations in the source countries.²⁰

The Department of Defense significantly expanded its capability to detect and monitor cocaine smugglers. Funding for DOD's surveillance mission grew from \$212 million in fiscal year 1989 to \$844 million in fiscal year 1993. These substantial increases in funding were made even though planners never established valid measures of effectiveness for the surveillance mission. Consequently, the success or failure of military surveillance cannot be assessed quantitatively. The resources required for military surveillance were not objectively determined. As a result Congress and the executive branch were denied the kinds of objective assessments needed to evaluate alternatives and make policy decisions.²¹

DOD must establish measurable objectives for their detection and monitoring mission. Criterion must be established for each objective so that an assessment can be made to determine if a particular event is successful. For example, an objective could be to detect and monitor the maximum number of aircraft in a specified area that LEA are capable of intercepting. A criterion for measuring the success of this objective may be determined by the number of aircraft intercepted. As was discussed earlier, DOD has significantly more capability to detect and monitor aircraft than LEA has the ability to intercept. It is not cost effective to detect and monitor significantly more aircraft if LEA assets are not available to pursue and arrest illegal drug traffickers.

Direct Support to Domestic Law Enforcement Agencies

DOD continues to support Federal counterdrug law enforcement agencies in addressing multi-agency counterdrug command, control, communications, and technical intelligence problems. The Defense Information Systems Agency (DISA) is responsible for the operation and modernization of the Defense Communications System (DCS) that

supports DOD and selected Law Enforcement Agencies (LEA). DISA also provides technical and operational support for communications and data systems to LEA.

The Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA) provides intelligence support to DOD organizations performing detection and monitoring missions and to LEA conducting interdiction missions. DIA also validates all DOD intelligence collection requirements that require national systems support.

The 1989 Defense Appropriations Act assigned DISA the responsibility to integrate the national communications and information systems master plans for LEA. DISA was also required to develop a National Information Management and Communications Master Plan. DISA developed and submitted the master plan to the Office of National Drug Control Policy in 1992, but the plan has still not been approved. As a result law enforcement agencies continue to individually determine their own information systems requirements without considering interoperability with existing information systems.

Pending final approval of the master plan, DISA should establish a method to validate requirements for the integration of command, control, communications, and intelligence assets for LEA. Even though the master plan is not approved, it can be used by LEA to determine whether proposed information systems will interoperate with information systems in the master plan.

Demand Reduction

DOD's demand reduction programs have been focused within the department. Primarily through drug education and drug testing, DOD has implemented a very effective program for demand reduction within the department. DOD is also continuing the

community outreach demand reduction program directed by the FY 93 Defense Authorization Act. This program targets youth who are at risk for getting involved in either use or distribution of illegal drugs. Reserve and National Guard personnel conduct drug education training to discourage young people from using drugs. This is an area that has tremendous potential to contribute in a cost effective manner to reducing the demand for drugs throughout the U.S. Recent polls taken in the U.S. have consistently identified the U.S. military as the most respected profession in America. We should expand the drug education mission for DOD to include all active forces to help educate and encourage America's youth to stay away from illegal drugs.

According to a 1995 study conducted by the RAND Corporation, for every one percent increase in the price of cocaine, consumption decreases by only one half percentage. The analysis suggested that in order to curb consumption by one percent, a \$250 million increase in expenditures in drug enforcement would be necessary, as opposed to a \$34 million increase in expenditures on treatment programs. Clearly, treatment is far more cost effective than drug enforcement for the same amount of money invested in each program.

ROLE OF THE COMMANDER IN CHIEF

The Department of Defense has divided geographic responsibility for counterdrug operations among the six regional Commanders in Chief (CINC). Nowhere is the counterdrug mission more important than for the CINC, U.S. Southern Command (USSOUTHCOM), who has an area of responsibility that includes Central and South America. "USSOUTHCOM's military and civilian men and women work on a multitude

of critical programs in security assistance, counterdrug training, intelligence, communications, nation assistance, and operational support.²²

The execution of USSOUTHCOM's counterdrug programs is critical to the successful implementation of the National Drug Control Strategy. First, USSOUTHCOM provides support to Latin American countries in several ways. Mobile training teams (MTT) provide much needed skills to military and police organizations to assist them in fighting the illicit drug trade. Joint and combined exercises sponsored by USSOUTHCOM, including the military forces from several Latin American countries, have had a tremendous positive impact towards improving regional security.

USSOUTHCOM coordinates interagency intelligence activities to support detection and monitoring of illegal drug transport. Assets include ground based radar, U.S. Air Force Airborne Warning and Control System (AWACS), other airborne assets, and U.S. Customs Service P-3 aircraft, helicopters, aerostats, and shipborne radar.

In addition to its direct role in counterdrug operations, USSOUTHCOM also plays a key role in training and educating current and future Latin American leaders. The International Military and Education Training (IMET) program is responsible for training both military and civilian leaders of Latin America. "By bringing uniformed and civilian Latin American leaders to our executive-level national security programs, Southern Command provides useful training to military colleagues thereby enhancing cooperative regional security."²³

However, attendance at these IMET schools has been steadily declining. Due to U.S. budget cuts in Latin American security programs over the past five years this program has been cut 75 per cent. These significant program reductions will have a

negative impact on the U.S. ability to influence our national security interests in the area. Although funding for IMET schooling is again increasing, it is still not high enough. Funding for IMET should be returned to the 1990 level so that the U.S. can continue to train over 6,500 students per year.

A key component of our national military strategy is overseas presence. This includes both forces permanently stationed overseas and forces temporarily deployed. In 1999 U.S. forward presence in Central and South America is scheduled to end when USSOUTHCOM completes its move to Miami, Florida. Withdrawal of our forces from the region, without replacement by U.S. governmental agencies to continue the counterdrug mission, will significantly decrease the United States' ability to influence national security interests in the region.

Under President Clinton's 1995 National Drug Control Strategy, there has been a shift toward a more balanced approach. Supply reduction now accounts for 65 per cent and demand reduction has increased to 35 per cent. Over the past five years even though over one third of the cocaine being produced is being interdicted, coca growing has not diminished. The amount of cocaine produced and subsequently smuggled out to the United States and world markets has also remained steady. Both street price and availability of cocaine in the United States have not been demonstrably affected by the extensive U.S. interagency involvement, to include DOD's, in the counterdrug effort in Latin America.²⁴

Resource allocation needs to continue shifting toward an emphasis on reducing the demand for drugs. Even though DOD's share of the federal drug control budget has been declining, the overall federal drug control spending increased steadily between 1989 and

1992. DOD's drug control budget should continue to decline, but it should focus its efforts where it can accomplish the most with the resources. Before DOD can refocus its efforts it must first determine measures of success for each of the elements of its counterdrug strategy.

Strategies prior to 1995 did not address the most difficult of the drug problems; that is the hard-core drug user. If you want to get at the drug problem, you have to do something about the people who are addicted to drugs, and that is the most difficult problem that was not addressed by previous strategies.²⁵

During the first six months of 1994, over 150 tons of cocaine were seized en route to market, a loss of some \$20 billion to the traffickers. One must not lose sight of the fact that, if unchallenged abroad, trafficking organizations will eventually overwhelm U.S. ability to fight the demand for cocaine at home and thwart the most important foreign policy objectives. Interdiction can be expensive. It can be made less effective by increased production and changes in smuggling routes and methods. Therefore, the 1995 strategy shifted some of the interdiction efforts to source countries to hurt the traffickers at a lower cost to the overall budget.²⁶

As the 1995 National Drug Control Strategy indicates, the Federal counterdrug effort should involve multiple agencies cooperating to address the drug issue simultaneously on a variety of fronts. The Defense Department, with its unique assets and capabilities, has a critical, but supporting role to play in that effort. Any assessment of DOD's contributions should be made in this context.²⁷

As stated earlier, DOD divides responsibility for counterdrug operations among the six CINCs. So even though Central and South America are the prime regions for

production and distribution of cocaine and heroin, USSOUTHCOM receives only 22 per cent of the overall DOD drug budget. DOD should refocus its efforts in the drug producing regions of the world and prioritize its budget allocations accordingly.

Total withdrawal of USSOUTHCOM from Latin America should not happen. If another country in the region is not willing to host USSOUTHCOM, then options such as a small forward headquarters should be pursued. In addition to the issue of the headquarters, the departure of our military forces will also negatively impact on our ability to influence counterdrug operations in the Andean region. The mobile training teams (MTT) provide invaluable assistance to Latin American military and police who are responsible for executing their nation's counterdrug policies.

Funds for the International Military and Education Training Program should be reinstated to the 1990 levels. At that time the U.S. was training over 6,500 Latin American military and civilian leaders per year. This program provides the U.S. government with direct access to senior leaders in Latin America. These programs provide a valuable opportunity for the U.S. to influence and educate the leaders who can make a difference in their nations in not only counterdrug operations but also regional security.

CONCLUSION

During each of the first three years of the National Drug Control Strategy, the United States government committed ever increasing resources to the international interdiction effort, particularly through the Department of Defense, which in the beginning was expected to pay a bigger dividend than it did. Drug supplies, most notably cocaine, remained as plentiful as ever. In 1992, Congress decreased the DOD drug interdiction

budget by nearly 15 percent, although it remained \$400 million more than before the first strategy. The key lesson: Boosting the interdiction budget brought little bang for the buck.²⁸

On the international drug front, increased efforts to chase the ever changing routes and tactics of international drug kingpins have not diminished the amount of drugs pouring across U.S. borders. It is time to reassess the wisdom of devoting massive resources to international interdiction efforts and decide whether to reallocate funds from this effort to programs in the United States that have proven records.²⁹

The coca production problem has become so serious in Peru and Bolivia that it cannot be suppressed through enforcement efforts alone. A combined effort of improved law enforcement and intensified efforts to promote sustainable economic and social development are required. Programs that help farmers in or near coca producing areas to produce legitimate crops, and which promote broad based economic growth, have already lead many farmers to participate in voluntary eradication programs. However, such development initiatives must be backed by credible law enforcement measures that provide a disincentive to grow coca.³⁰

There have been a number of U.S. financed bilateral efforts in alternative development in Bolivia, Columbia, and Peru. Agricultural, road and community infrastructure projects in or near the coca producing areas have helped many farmers to move out of coca and into other crops. The United States alone cannot provide the budgetary resources to sustain large scale alternative development programs. In line with the 1995 strategy, multilateral development banks and other international financial

institutions should be strongly encouraged to give higher priority to alternative development assistance.³¹

What have we learned from the lessons of the past that we need to focus on? Policy needs to be based on accurate data. Too often, both supply and demand reduction efforts have been hampered by the lack of such data, and decisions have been made on the basis of guesses and wishes. On the demand side, there still are not adequate data about the national treatment system and effectiveness. Both prevention and supply reduction efforts remain unevaluated.³²

There is always a temptation to assess progress or failure in the fight against drugs by whatever happens to be the latest piece of good or bad news. A strategy designed to fight a national drug problem requires a more systematic evaluation of its progress. It requires that we look beyond reports or piecemeal statistical data such as the number of arrests, the amount of seizures, or the number of people treated. This information is important, but the only real gauge of how we are doing is the numbers of Americans using drugs.³³

Assistant Secretary of State for International Narcotics matters, Secretary Arcos stated that, "probably the most important lesson we have learned in the last 10 years or so of fighting international narcotics trafficking is the effort must be made on a broad front simultaneously. There is no one single magic solution, the success of our strategy depends on both the sustained cooperation and efforts of the producer nations and our commitment to supporting them in the areas of targeting kingpins, interdiction, controlling money laundering, seizing assets, judicial reform, and alternative development."³⁴

Finally, probably the most difficult aspect of the war on drugs is to convince the American public that time and patience are required if we are to win this conflict. The gulf war lasted merely 40 days and the ground war only 100 hours. As former Pentagon drug czar Stephen Duncan said, "I liken the drug war to the cold war-which took 40 years." To be successful in this campaign, the President must remain focused on "the global scourge of drug abuse and trafficking" and keep the American public informed on the progress we are making.

ENDNOTES

-
- ¹ Office of National Drug Control Policy, National Drug Control Strategy, ([Washington, D.C.] Executive Office of the President, September, 1989, 47.
- ² Schnaubelt Christopher M. Schnaubelt, "Can the Military's Effectiveness in the Drug War Be Measured?" Cato Journal, Fall, 1994, 249.
- ³ Office of National Drug Control Policy, National Drug Control Strategy, ([Washington, D.C.] Executive Office of the President, September, 1989, 73.
- ⁴ Office of National Drug Control Policy, National Drug Control Strategy, ([Washington, D.C.] Executive Office of the President, January, 1990), 71.
- ⁵ General Accounting Office, Interdiction Efforts in Central America Have Had Little Impact on the Flow of Drugs, by Benjamin F. Nelson, GAO/T-NSIAD-94-251, ([Washington, D.C.], 4.
- ⁶ Office of National Drug Control Policy, A National Security Strategy of Engagement and Enlargement, ([Washington, D.C.] Executive Office of the President, February, 1995), 11
- ⁷ Congress, Senate Committee on the Judiciary: Hearing before the Committee on the Judiciary, 103rd Cong., 1st Sess., 29 April 1993, 1.
- ⁸ Phil Gunby, "Military's Counterdrug Policy Restructured," JAMA, 1 June 1994, 1641.
- ⁹ Ibid. McCaffrey
- ¹⁰ Ibid., 13.
- ¹¹ Ibid. McCaffrey
- ¹² Cato, 252.
- ¹³ D.C. Morrison, "Police Action," National Journal, February 1, 1992, 270.
- ¹⁴ Ibid., 18.
- ¹⁵ Cato, 255
- ¹⁶ Cato, 255.
- ¹⁷ Ibid., 17.
- ¹⁸ Ibid.
- ¹⁹ Ibid., 45.
- ²⁰ Ibid., 46.
- ²¹ General Accounting Office, Expanded Military Surveillance Not Justified by Measurable Goals or Results, by Louis J. Rodriguez, GAO/T-NSIAD-94-14, ([Washington, D.C.]), 2.
- ²² Robert E. Harmon et al., "Counterdrug Assistance: The Number One Priority," Military Review, March 1993, 26.
- ²³ Ibid., 29 McCaffrey
- ²⁴ Barry R. McCaffrey, "Upbeat Outlook for Southern Neighbors," Defense 95, issue 4, 32.
- ²⁵ Ibid.
- ²⁶ Ibid., 16.
- ²⁷ Ibid., 43.
- ²⁸ Congress, Senate Committee on the Judiciary: Hearing before the Committee on the Judiciary, 103rd Cong., 1st Sess., 29 April 1993, 3.
- ²⁹ Congress, Senate Committee on the Judiciary: Hearing before the Committee on the Judiciary, 103rd Cong., 1st Sess., 29 April 1993, 4.
- ³⁰ Ibid., 41
- ³¹ Ibid.
- ³² Congress, Senate Committee on the Judiciary: Hearing before the Committee on the Judiciary, 103rd Cong., 1st Sess., 29 April 1993, 12.
- ³³ Congress, Senate Committee on the Judiciary: Hearing before the Committee on the Judiciary, 103rd Cong., 1st Sess., 29 April 1993, 64.
- ³⁴ Congress, House Committee on Government Operations, International Narcotics: Hearing before the Committee on Government Operations, 103rd Cong., 2nd Sess., 7 October 1994, 10.

SELECTED BIBLIOGRAPHY

- Gunby, Phil. "Military's Counterdrug Policy Restructured." JAMA, 1 June 1994, 271.
- Harmon, Robert E. , Ramon A. Malave, Charles A. Miller, and William K. Nadolski. "Counterdrug Assistance: The Number One Priority." Military Review, March 1993.
- Lane, Charles. "The Newest War." Newsweek, 6 January 1992.
- McCaffrey, Barry R. "Upbeat Outlook for Southern Neighbors." Defense 95, Issue 4.
- Morrison, David C. "Police Action." National Journal, 1 February 1992
- Schnaubelt, Christopher M. "Can the Military's Effectiveness in the Drug War be Measured." Cato Journal, Fall, 1994.
- Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, National Military Strategy of the United States of America, (Washington, D.C.), 1995.
- The White House, National Drug Control Strategy, (Washington, D.C.), September 1989.
- The White House, National Drug Control Strategy, (Washington, D.C.), January 1990.
- The White House, National Drug Control Strategy, (Washington, D.C.), February 1991.
- The White House, National Drug Control Strategy, (Washington, D.C.), January 1992
- The White House, A National Security Strategy of Engagement and Enlargement. (Washington, D.C.), February 1995.
- The White House, National Drug Control Strategy, (Washington, D.C.), April 1995
- U.S. Congress. Senate. Committee on the Judiciary. America's Drug Strategy: Lessons of the Past . . . Steps Toward the Future: Hearing before the Committee on the Judiciary. 103rd Cong., 1st sess., 29 April 1993.
- U.S. Congress. House. Committee on Government Operations. International Narcotics: Hearing before the Legislation and National Security Subcommittee of the Committee on Government Operations. 103rd Cong., 2nd sess., 7 October 1994.
- U.S. General Accounting Office, Drug Control Interdiction Efforts in Central America Have Had Little Impact on the Flow of Drugs, (Washington, D.C.) August 1994.
- U.S. General Accounting Office, Expanded Military Surveillance not Justified by Measurable Goals or Results, (Washington, D.C.) October 1993.