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A paper submitted to the Faculty of the Naval War College in partial satisfaction of the requirements of the Department of Joint Military Operations.

The Contents of this paper reflect my own personal views and are not necessarily endorsed by the Naval War College or the Department of the Navy.

14 June 1996

Paper directed by Captain D. Watson, USN
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Abstract: In the wake of the Cold War, the United States is reexamining the roles and missions of the armed services. Doctrine published by the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff (CJCS) establishes different missions by the responsibilities and procedures necessary to conduct joint operations. Unfortunately, current U.S. doctrine for countering air and missile threats is disjointed because the armed services:

- do not share the same vision on how theater air defense should be conducted,
- do not trust how the doctrine will be implemented, and
- do not have impartial representation on the Joint Force Air Component Commander's (JFACC) staff.

Charges of parochialism have plagued joint doctrine since its inception. Under the Goldwater-Nichols Act of 1986, CJCS selected services to act as "lead agents" in developing the various joint publications. CJCS should abolish the "lead agent" concept and establish a joint command to forge a central vision for multiservice operations. The unified commander-in-chiefs can assist in promoting trust in joint counterair operations by establishing a theater JFACC staff. This joint staff will ensure impartial service representation, and ease inter-theater cooperation and training. With the decline of the military budget, joint defense offers the best solution for providing the U.S. with the decisive combat power it needs to defeat future air and missile threats.
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Introduction.

Ten years after Congress adopted the Goldwater-Nichols Department of Defense Reorganization Act of 1986 to improve interoperability, theater counterair doctrine remains disjointed. Countering modern air and missile threats requires synchronization and integration of joint counterair systems. "Proliferation of missile technology and the development of inexpensive, unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs) allows even the poorest countries to acquire a flexible, survivable and highly lethal air and missile attack capability."¹ Joint doctrine expresses unity of effort and "synchronization of military operations in time, space, and purpose."² Integration of all counterair capabilities produces decisive combat force. Currently, the armed forces do not share the same vision on the roles, responsibilities and procedures conveyed in theater counterair doctrine. The following is an examination of why the doctrine is disjointed and what can be done to develop a central vision in joint air and missile defense.

Evolution of Joint Counterair Doctrine.

The Cold War counterair doctrine of the 1970s emphasized stopping a massive Soviet fixed-wing attack in Europe by using a mobile defense to give ground and gain time.³ In the 1980s, the Air Force and Army cooperated in developing the "AirLand Battle" doctrine and


planned to use their combined strengths to take the offensive at the start of hostilities. The
Goldwater-Nichols Act sought to further capitalize on joint warfighting by compelling the
Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff (CJCS) to develop and implement joint doctrine.
However, Congress failed to furnish the Chairman with the resources or staff necessary to
produce joint doctrine. The writing of most doctrine was subcontracted to the services.4
CJCS designated the Air Force as lead agent for developing theater counterair doctrine.

Written in 1986, joint counterair doctrine was extensively employed in the 1991 Gulf
War. The Joint Force Air Component Commander (JFACC) synchronized the Coalition's
offensive counterair operations with great effect to neutralize Iraq's integrated air defense
systems. The Air Force based the JFACC concept on a single commander with centralized
planning and direction authority for theater-level air war.

This doctrine was anathema to the Navy, which had its own painfully developed
procedures for waging air war. It successfully resisted this doctrine during
Korea, Vietnam, and through the 1980s. The Navy only reluctantly bought into
the Air Force vision in Desert Storm because it was offered Hobson's choice:
either play by these rules, or don't play.5

As this century draws to an end, history closes the chapter on the Cold War; theater
ballistic missiles (TBM) are replacing fixed-wing aircraft as the primary theater threat; and
Congress pursues a smaller, more efficient military. In 1994, Congress chartered the
Commission on Roles and Missions of the Armed Forces to look at ways to improve
efficiency by restructuring the military. The commission closely examined theater air

4Robert B. Adolph and others, "Why Goldwater-Nichols Didn't Go Far Enough," Joint
Forces Quarterly, no. 7, Spring 1995, 49.

5Thomas A. Parker, "The Navy Got It--Desert Storm's Wake-Up Call," U.S. Naval
defense because the Navy, Air Force and Army were all developing anti-TBM weapons. John White, director of Harvard University's Center for Business and Government, chaired the independent 10-member commission. Instead of restructuring theater air defense to improve efficiency, White's committee recommended improving interservice cooperation. The commission found the services "individually superb" but that they did not function as a team. They attributed this to a lack of "central vision," which causes the services to perceive their mission as the most critical--supported by the other services. The armed forces impart their vision in joint doctrine; its development and use are crucial to the success of multiservice operations.

**Joint Doctrine for Countering Air and Missile Threats.**

The essence of joint doctrine for countering air and missile threats is to clarify force and component commander responsibilities at the operational level of war. Because the unified commanders-in-chief (CINCs) are in charge of multiservice theater operations, it is primarily written for them. Joint publications also provide standardized tactics, techniques and procedures (TTP) for the tactical level of war. Interservice friction occurs when there is a difference in interpretation of joint doctrine or service procedures clash. After two U.S. Army Blackhawk helicopters were shot down over northern Iraq in 1994, General Shalikashvili, CJCS, took a strong stance on the application of joint doctrine. He directed

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6 John White is now assistant secretary of defense and was also assistant secretary of defense in the Carter administration.

that the prefaces of all joint publications include the following: "The guidance in this publication is authoritative; as such, this doctrine will be followed except when, in the judgement of the commander, exceptional circumstances dictate otherwise. (Emphasis supplied.)"8 The shoot down tragedy highlighted not only the importance of codifying responsibilities and procedures for theater counterair operations in joint publications, but also the implementation of them.

JCS Pub 3-01.2, Theater Counterair Operations (from Overseas Land Areas), is the cornerstone document for countering air and missile threats.9 The keys to synchronizing and integrating theater counterair operations are found in JCS Pub 3-01.2's guidance on: command relationships, apportionment and allocation of resources, and airspace control. The delegation of these responsibilities and functions makes up the commander's intent and concept of operations. Joint doctrine provides the joint force commander (JFC) with guidance on whom to assign counterair responsibilities. It states, "The JFC will normally assign JFACC responsibilities to the component commander having the preponderance of air assets and the capability to plan, task, and control joint air operations."10 It goes on to explain that the JFACC is typically the supported commander for counterair operations. Normally, the JFACC also serves as the area air defense commander and the airspace control authority because these duties are closely interrelated.11 The concept of the JFACC as a

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8 John H. Cushman, 47-49.
9 JCS Pub 3-01.2 is scheduled to be replaced by Joint Doctrine for Countering Air and Missile Threats, JCS Pub 3-01.
supported commander with authority over all theater-level air defense systems and air assets
is a controversial topic among the military. The Air Force was the "lead agent" for
development of these joint concepts and Air Force ideology mirrors them. A discussion
follows on how Army, Navy and Marine Corps counterair philosophies differ from those of
the Air Force and joint doctrine.

**Army Perspective.** Army doctrine presents counterair operations as a subset of theater air
defense operations. The other subset is theater missile defense (TMD), which is defense
from all types of ballistic, cruise, and subsurface-to-surface missiles. Theater counterair
operations are defined by the Army as protecting the force from manned fixed- and rotary-
ing aircraft and UAVs. Using joint doctrine, the Air Force has developed a counter
argument to the Army's proposal of separating TMD from theater counterair operations. The
USAF JFACC Primer states: "Air and missile threats have theater range; defeating enemy air
and missile threats with limited resources requires theater-level organization, planning and
control. Currently theater air and missile defense operations fall within established AF roles
and missions; missile defense is a part of counterair."\(^{12}\)

Congress' Commission on Roles and Missions stirred up the debate on how the Air Force
and Army view theater air and missile defense. The Air Force asserted "equipment and
training differences make it difficult for a joint force commander to integrate a near leak-

\(^{11}\)Ibid., II-3.

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proof theater missile defense without risking fratricide."13 Consolidating all theater counterair assets under one service, the Air Force proposed, would standardize training and equipment, and eliminate redundant systems. The Army perceived that the Air Force wanted control of TMD to maintain its freedom to maneuver in the air at the expense of the land component commander's ability to maneuver and defend soldiers.14 If decisive victory is achieved on land, the Army argued, it must control the land battle and have the weapons to protect its soldiers.15 This controversy, over roles and missions for theater air defense, strengthens the assessment that without a central vision the armed forces will continue to surmise theirs is the supported mission.

Navy and Marine Corps Perspective. Strike and Anti-air warfare (AAW) are Navy terms for offensive and defensive counterair, respectively.16 Naval counterair doctrine, based on the Composite Warfare Commander (CWC) concept, has a unique lexicon and service-specific procedures. The conflict between naval and joint doctrine is the interpretation of the JFACC's authority. The JFACC is a functional component commander. The Air Force defines a functional component by the medium in which the forces operate--air, land or sea. Both the Navy and Marine Corps define a functional component by its assigned mission or


14 Ibid.

15In its final report, the commission recommended retaining the mission of ground-based area air defense with the Army.

warfare area. For the Navy and Marine Corps, the JFACC is analogous to the mission of the CWC's air resources element coordinator. As a coordinator, the JFACC's mission would be to manage joint air resources for the Strike and AAW commanders. As the supported commander for counterair operations, the Air Force advocates operational control (OPCON) over all theater air assets for the JFACC to execute seamless air operations. To accomplish their missions and protect their forces, the Marine Corps and Navy maintain that they must retain OPCON of service air assets for direct support sorties.

Current doctrine is a compromise between the Navy and Marine Corps' concept of the JFACC as a coordinator, and the Air Force's total theater air OPCON desires. Under joint doctrine, the JFC is the only one who can reallocate a service's direct support sorties for joint air operations. Services retain OPCON of direct support sorties, but must make available excess sorties for JFACC control. The JFACC uses those air assets to execute the JFC's theater-wide objectives. The use of the term "excess sorties" is questionable for the Navy and Marine Corps. The Marine Air-Ground Task Force (MAGTF) is a light expeditionary force that does not contain excess by design. Navy carrier battle groups and MAGTFs train and work as combined, tightly integrated forces; any change in the force structure could disrupt or lessen their warfighting capabilities.

The air apportionment guidance in JFACC doctrine is too vague for the Navy and Marine Corps. They are also unsure that a JFACC from another service could understand the

unique direct air support requirements of a MAGTF or carrier battle group. Many Navy and Marine Corps concerns about apportionment and command are not dependent on joint doctrine but on the JFC's concept of operations (CONOPS). The JFC combines unique theater and operational requirements with his intent to form the CONOPS. The following section, on field exercises, shows the importance of the JFC's CONOPS and joint doctrine in deciding the outcome of multiservice operations.

Field Training Exercises, Theory Meets Practice.

Joint field training exercises (FTXs) help to build a joint service culture. Overwhelmingly, the participants laud the exercises for improving their understanding of the other branches of the military. They also provide a forum to test joint operational theory and to evaluate how the services interact to defeat a threat on a mock battlefield. The lessons learned from FTXs are invaluable for improving joint operations. Ocean Venture (OV) and Roving Sands are two joint FTXs that have provided significant lessons learned from joint counterair operations. A primary objective of OV 92 was to explore the roles and responsibilities of the JFACC. In OV 93, the Commander in Chief Atlantic (CINCLANT) looked at ways to improve the coordination between the JFACC and the service component commanders. Roving Sands, billed as the largest joint integrated air defense systems (IADS) exercise in America, continually stressed counterair operations as essential to IADS. The

exercise tested interservice communication and theater coordination with the goal of achieving a joint IADS.

**Ocean Venture, Working Within the System.** A primary objective of OV 92 was to evaluate CINCLANT's JFACC CONOPS policy. CINCLANT required all components participating in the exercise to staff the JFACC with officers that had formal joint air operations training. Commander Twelfth Air Force was "double-hatted," acting as the commander of Air Force forces (AFFOR) and the JFACC. CINCLANT's JFACC policy specified a joint organization be involved in planning air operations. However, CINCLANT did not specify the procedures to plan those operations. The result was that Air Force procedures were used.

An Air Force-heavy organization, OV 92's JFACC had an existing staff infrastructure that regularly trained together. Other service augmentees had to figure out how to fit into the staff. Navy and Marine Corps augmentees were far fewer in numbers and lower in rank to the Air Force officers on the AFFOR/JFACC staff. The JFACC message system confused the other services because AFFOR issued the messages. One example is that "AFFOR did not submit target nominations to the JFACC as the other services were required to do."19 This erroneously implied to the other services that Air Force targets were the foundation for the joint integrated prioritized target list. The following is the Center of Naval Analyses' summary of OV 92:

Ocean Venture demonstrated, as did Operation Desert Storm, that whenever guidance--be it joint doctrine or a theater-specific concept of operations--is too

vague, it is susceptible to invention. And the invention will be that of the service acting as the JFACC: that service component commander acting as the JFACC probably will implement service-specific procedures to compensate for a lack of guidance. This leaves the joint force at a disadvantage because the other services are unfamiliar with and lack training in those service-specific procedures.\textsuperscript{20}

OV 93 took a different approach to the CINCLANT's JFACC CONOPS. In OV 93, the JFACC was an independent commander instead of a "double-hatted" service component commander. The JFACC exercised tactical, not operational, control of air assets offered by the service component commanders for non-direct support sorties.\textsuperscript{21} Commanded by a rear admiral, the JFACC staff was ad hoc. Theater service components filled specific JFACC staff billets to ensure equal representation of all theater air defense assets. OV 93's alternative approach allowed the JFACC to "operate in an evenhanded way with respect to the service component commanders."\textsuperscript{22} This innovative approach accentuated joint, not parochial, counterair operations. Navy participants suggested the following to improve future JFACC operations:

- designating a cadre of trained JFACC experts for JTF operations,
- assigning only qualified pilots or flight officers as JFACC, and
- developing procedures to transfer the afloat JFACC from ship to shore should it become necessary.

The first two comments reflect the principle of the JFACC as a highly trained staff familiar with aviation operations. Another strong advocate of this idea is the Air Force; staff

\textsuperscript{20}Ibid., 26.

\textsuperscript{21}"Non-direct support sorties" was the term used by the OV 93 JFACC instead of "excess sorties."

\textsuperscript{22}Center for Naval Analyses, \textit{Analysis of Joint Force Air Component Commander and Joint Targeting in Exercise Ocean Venture 93}, CRM 94-104 (Alexandria, VA: June 1995), 59.
qualifications are an important consideration when the JFC uses a JFACC. The last comment is evidence that Navy's air defense doctrine does not contain organizational relationships and TTP for joint operations. Correcting this deficiency should be a priority action item for the Naval Doctrine Command.

**Roving Sands, Practical Implications of a Disjointed Doctrine.** Roving Sands (RS) post-exercise lessons learned underscore the problems with joint counterair doctrine. Two recurring problems in RS 92 and 93 were: joint terms were not frequently used by exercise participants; and when joint doctrine conflicted with service doctrine, the operators followed service doctrine.

"Service unique terminology and acronyms caused confusion and delayed coordination and communications between RS 92 participants." As the author noted in this observation, a common language is essential to communication. Integrated air defense systems cannot defeat an air or missile threat without rapid communications. Joint terminology bridges service and joint procedures. It provides a common reference to ease the understanding of complex ideas and principles. Because joint terms have not replaced service terminology, the use of joint terms adds an additional language and sometimes contributes to the confusion. The services need to employ joint terminology, whenever possible, in their publications.

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"Due to differences in doctrine, efforts between Army, Marine, and Air Force Air Defense periodically lacked coordination. The resulting confusion detracted from the overall Integrated Air Defense System (IADS)."\textsuperscript{24} This quote by an RS 93 participant points to two deficiencies: a central vision at the operational level, and joint training at the tactical level. In RS 93, these problems manifested themselves from pilots arguing with their ground controllers to misunderstandings on how to employ the other services' air defense assets. The military needs to establish a set of unified procedures and establish them in both joint and service doctrine. The other RS's message is the need for more joint training to prepare the services to fight as a joint force.

**Conclusions and Recommendations.**

U.S. doctrine for countering air and missile threats is disjointed because:

- the services do not share the same vision on how theater air defense should be conducted;
- the armed forces do not trust how joint doctrine will be implemented; and
- the wording leads to the JFC "double-hatting" a service component commander as the JFACC, which may exclude equal participation from the other branches on the JFACC staff.

These factors undermine the operational principle of unity of effort--synchronization and integration--which degrades the combat potential of the joint force.

The Roles and Missions debate over control of theater air defense systems, and the differences in doctrine are evidence that the armed forces do not share the same central

vision. John White's commission answered this problem by recommending an increased emphasis on joint doctrine and training, and "the establishment of a new unified command to oversee joint training and command forces within the continental United States."25

Established in 1993, the U.S. Atlantic Command's charter is to train forces within the continental United States in joint doctrine and joint TTP for "deployment anywhere in the world."26

To enhance trust, CJCS needs to distance joint doctrine from service parochialism by getting rid of the "lead agent" concept. CJCS should identify a joint agency to forge a central vision and to develop all joint doctrine. The Joint Warfighting Center in Norfolk, VA is an ideal agency. Developing joint doctrine is already part of its charter and all of the services' doctrine commands are co-located in Norfolk-Hampton Roads area (except for the Marine Corps).

By doctrine, the JFACC is normally the supported commander for theater counterair operations; therefore, it is important that the JFACC staff have equal service representation. To accomplish this, the theater CINC's should:

- create a theater JFACC staff, using personnel identified by billet from component staffs;
- ensure service components staff JFACC billets with personnel that have air defense experience and training in joint operations;

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• train the JFACC staff as a team annually during theater FTXs and command post exercises;

• rotate service responsibility for JFACC during exercises to develop theater expertise and to expose the JFACC staff to a variety of leadership styles; and

• promote the use of liaison officers during joint exercises to further strengthen interservice coordination.

A joint JFACC staff assures integration of all air defense capabilities and liaison officers ensure communications between the staffs. These ideas represent positive changes to the JFACC concept to promote interservice trust in theater counterair operations.

With the decline of the military budget, joint defense offers the best solution for providing the United States with the decisive combat power it needs to defeat future air and missile threats. The 1994 shootdown of the two Blackhawks was a harsh lesson on the importance of implementing a joint doctrine for theater counterair operations. Ten years of discord between the services on theater air and missile defense is too long and mandates change.