NAVAL WAR COLLEGE
Newport, R.I.

PSYCHOLOGICAL OPERATIONS
FOR THE OPERATIONAL COMMANDER

by

Carol Pugh

MAJ USAF

A paper submitted to the Faculty of the Naval War College in partial satisfaction of the requirements of the Department of Joint Military Operations.

The contents of the paper reflect my own personal views and are not necessarily endorsed by the Naval War College of the Department of the Navy.

DISTRIBUTION STATEMENT A
Approved for public release
Distribution Unlimited

Signature: Carol Pugh

14 June 1996

Paper directed by
Capt George Jackson
Chairman, Joint Military Operations

David DellaVolpe 6/6/96
Faculty Advisor
Lt Col David DellaVolpe
Psychological Operations for the Operational Commander/Unclassified

PSYOPs, Psychological Operations, C2W, Command and Control Warfare, Operation Desert Shield, Operation Desert Storm, Operation Restore Hope, MOOTW

**Abstract:** Psychological Operations (PSYOPs) are a tool operational commanders need a basic understanding and appreciation of to appropriately and efficiently employ. PSYOPs acts alone, as well as an effective force multiplier with the goal of changing target audience attitudes favorable to US policies. Operations Desert Shield/Storm and Restore Hope provide a solid basis for understanding the use of PSYOPs in war and in military operations other than war (MOOTW). Concerns for the future of PSYOPs include the following: understanding the difference between military PSYOPs and operations with psychological effects, an efficient PSYOPs approval process which includes the commander, the country team and the NCA and the need for timely, effective coordination of PSYOPs plans into the commander’s operational design.
ABSTRACT

Psychological Operations (PSYOPs) are a tool the operational commander can, and should, employ across the spectrum of conflict. Commanders need a basic understanding and appreciation of this powerful tool to appropriately and efficiently employ it. PSYOPs can act alone, as well as an effective force multiplier, with the goal of changing target audience attitudes favorable to US policies. Operations Desert Shield/Storm and Restore Hope provide a solid basis for understanding the use of PSYOPs in war and in military operations other than war (MOOTW). Concerns for the future of PSYOPs include the following: understanding the difference between military PSYOPs and operations with psychological effects, the need for an efficient PSYOPs approval process which includes the commander, the country team and the NCA, and timely coordination of PSYOPs plans into the commander’s operational design.
PSYOPs [are] important adjuncts to combat power, particularly during the early stages of a crisis. ... They can keep an opponent's decision makers guessing as to the actual strengths, locations and composition of US and coalition forces; contribute to deception operations; cause enemy deployment fissures or encourage highly vulnerable enemy concentrations; foment discord, distrust, desertion, defection and eventually, surrender; help discourage outside sources of political, economic or military support—all setting the stage for...a shortened conflict and the saving of US, allied and enemy lives.

--Col Jeffrey Jones, Commander, 4th PSYOPs Group, Fort Bragg, NC.¹

THESIS

PSYOPs are an indispensable tool that gives operational commanders the ability to attack an enemy's decision cycle even before the outbreak of armed conflict. The commander needs to understand and fully incorporate PSYOPs into his operational design, not only as a force multiplier, but as a 'weapon' by itself. It is a powerful yet difficult pillar of Command and Control Warfare (C2W) to employ. Effective employment of PSYOPs requires a clearly defined understanding of what is, and what is not military PSYOPs. Once a definition is understood, commanders will need to streamline the command, control, coordination and approval processes to ensure timely employment of this tool. PSYOPs should be one of the first tools a commander includes in operational planning across the spectrum of conflict -- from peace to war.

INTRODUCTION

C2W is the military strategy that implements the strategic concept of information warfare. Command and Control Warfare is not a new concept, but is rapidly becoming a predominant tool for the Joint Force Commander (JFC) across the spectrum of conflict.

¹ Jones, Jeffrey B., Col, Theater Information Strategies, Military Review, November 1994, p. 49.
This tool is broken down into five integrated pillars: operations security (OPSEC), military deception, psychological operations (PSYOPs), electronic warfare (EW) and physical destruction. Offensive C2W employment (counter-C2) attempts to deny, influence, degrade or destroy adversary C2 capabilities, while defensive C2W (C2-protection) attempts to protect friendly C2 capabilities against such actions. C2W’s objective is to disrupt the enemy’s decision cycle from within and eliminate the enemy commander’s ability to control forces or information. While C2W and PSYOPs seem to be well understood for use in wartime operations, they can also be used effectively in military operations other than war (MOOTW). PSYOPs is becoming a primary tool used in MOOTW as the traditional tools of war often are not appropriate.

To effectively employ PSYOPs across the spectrum of conflict, commanders may need to diverge from the traditional American way of war that is a massive, quick and decisive use of force. PSYOPs are the antithesis of this type of warfare as seen in Operations Desert Shield, Storm and Restore Hope. Although PSYOPs are non-lethal, slow working, and difficult to quantify, they are highly effective when coordinated into the commander’s operational design. As a force multiplier, PSYOPs can minimize the loss of life by enhancing OPSEC and military deception schemes as well as other ‘weapons’ in the commanders arsenal. To realize this tool’s full potential, it is absolutely vital that C2W and PSYOPs are fully integrated into operational plans. This coordination not only has to take place within the confines of C2W, but also within the commander’s full spectrum of military, political and domestic tools. When coordinated throughout operational planning from the strategic (starting from the NCA with every Presidential speech) through the
tactical levels, PSYOPs effect is drastically increased. With the wide assortment of agencies providing PSYOPs capabilities, a commander’s job can be very difficult especially in employing this unfamiliar tool.

**PSYCHOLOGICAL OPERATIONS -- PSYOPs**

The joint staff defines PSYOPs as operations used “to convey selected information and indicators to foreign audiences to influence their emotions, motives, objective reasoning, and ultimately the behavior of foreign government, organizations, groups, and individuals.”

PSYOPs objectives are to induce or reinforce the attitudes and behavior of the target audience favorable to US objectives. This is a workable ‘definition’ for joint training, but how does the commander translate it into action?

In the counter-C2 role, military PSYOPs includes using loud speakers, radio and TV broadcasts, and leaflet drops to broadcast information. Counter-C2 PSYOPs are not only aimed at large audiences, but at individuals as well. Enemy leadership is targeted primarily through political and diplomatic communiqués or through covert methods. In the C2-protection role, PSYOPs are often used to counter an adversary’s friendly force propaganda. PSYOPs teams were used effectively in Somalia to counter anti-US propaganda. When a local warlord broadcast that US forces were exploiting Somalia’s natural resources, PSYOPs teams broadcast stories describing the true nature of UN

---


engineering efforts. Ambassador Oakley, commenting on the PSYOPs publication *Rajo* (hope) said,

> We are using *Rajo* to get the correct information into the hands of the Somali population and to correct distortions. . . . The faction leaders, I know, read it very, very carefully. Every once in a while Aideed or Ali Mahdi. . . . draws my attention to something that appeared in the newspaper. So they're very, very sensitive to it and they know its power.⁴

PSYOPs capabilities are found in a variety of agencies. The Army has over 24 PSYOPs teams—mainly in the 4th Psychological Operations Group and Reserve components. They cover all forms of PSYOPs from printing propaganda leaflets and conducting loudspeaker operations to providing current intelligence and command assessment for PSYOPs planning. They also have specially trained units to support enemy prisoner of war (EPW) missions. The Air Force provides the EC-130, Commando Solo (the Pennsylvania Air National Guard’s primary mission) for radio and television transmission capabilities. F-16s, B-52s, Unmanned Aerial Vehicles (UAVs), balloons, and the Army’s 155mm leaflet rounds are other platforms used to deliver PSYOPs messages. The Navy has capabilities, both ashore and afloat, to produce a myriad of audiovisual products and they maintain various film libraries. The Marines can execute PSYOPs through loudspeaker shore broadcasts as well as combat camera documentation. The CIA’s Directorate of Operations also has deployable teams trained for propaganda and political influence. While the CIA is primarily used for covert actions, they also support overt US operations.

PSYOPS IN WAR -- DESERT SHIELD/STORM

Commanders need only look at Desert Shield and Storm for an excellent case study of the effectiveness of PSYOPS in a wartime setting. PSYOPS teams were in the Gulf months prior to the ‘Storm’ to prepare and deliver messages to Iraqis. They also remained for months after hostilities ceased. Nearly 29 million leaflets were delivered by traditional methods and some were smuggled into Baghdad by special PSYOPS teams. PSYOPS messages included Iraqi surrender procedures and the kind of treatment they could expect to receive under US care. They were also sent to warn Iraqi troops of imminent bombings enabling them time to surrender or retreat. Additionally, messages informed the population of true Allied purposes in the Gulf. A listing of US PSYOPS in the Gulf War is found in Appendix A.

PSYOPS message traffic was also part of successfully deceiving Iraq that the main thrust of US forces would come from inside Kuwait. This deception worked because all the forces were synchronized with a single objective in mind. Air superiority and electronic warfare prevented Iraq from ‘seeing’ the actual coalition troop movement to the West. The deception was so successful that the USCENTCOM commander canceled combat missions because the Iraqis moved forces away from where US forces actually were. As a result, PSYOPS significantly helped to reduce the number of casualties (both friendly and enemy) and gave the commander broader operational freedom of movement.

As Col Jeffrey B. Jones, 4th PSYOPS Group Commander relates,

Psychological operations [PSYOPS] did not win the Gulf War, but...they played a significant part. By encouraging coalition solidarity, reducing enemy combat power and deceiving the enemy about allied intentions, PSYOPS contributed to the success of coalition operations and saved tens of thousands of lives on both
sides. . .PSYOPs messages persuaded approximately 44 percent of the Iraqi army to desert, more than 17,000 to defect, and more than 87,000 to surrender.  

Gen. Norman Schwarzkopf also recognized PSYOPs contribution in his recommendation for the 4th PSYOPs Group's Meritorious Unit Citation, "...the group conducted the largest and most successful psychological-operations campaign in US military history. During the 7 1/2 months in the Gulf, PSYOPs accomplished its mission as an effective combat multiplier for an entire unified theater, saving thousands of lives on both sides of the war."  

While Iraqi troop movement and the massive surrender of enemy forces are certainly quantifiable events, they are difficult to directly link to PSYOPs. Without specific 'measures of effectiveness' there will be a continuing problem keeping PSYOPs as a viable option for commanders. Unfortunately, PSYOPs will probably never have specific measures of effectiveness due to the very nature of its objective--to change peoples' attitudes. It is, therefore, incumbent upon experts in military psychological operations to ensure commanders see results of successful PSYOPs through all means available. Retired Col. Thomas A. Timmes, assigned to the Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Special Operations and Low-Intensity Conflict as the assistant for PSYOPs and Public Diplomacy Policy and Programs, expressed concerns for future PSYOPs capabilities. He believes that to maintain a viable PSYOPs program, the military needs a clear, active "program of peacetime psychological operations as an integral

---

6 Ibid., p. 29.
component of the emerging defense strategy of the 1990s.” Without a concerted effort, PSYOPs can easily be put on the back burner and forgotten.

**PSYOPS IN MOOTW — OPERATION RESTORE HOPE**

In MOOTW, PSYOPs have to play a primary role in the commander’s operational design. Normal ‘war time’ tools may not be appropriate to achieve operational objectives. Today PSYOPs usage in friendly, non-combative situations is on the increase and this trend will continue. Operation Restore Hope in Somalia clearly shows the applicability of PSYOPs in MOOTW. It proved remarkably effective in Somalia to pave the way for coalition military operations.

From the beginning of the Somalia operations, PSYOPs were integrated into all planning and execution phases of the operation. LtGen Robert Johnston, the Unified Task Force (UNITAF) commander, clearly knew that PSYOPs could only be effectively employed if coordinated from the beginning of the operation. He stated that, “Having understood the potential impact of PSYOPs, I was extremely interested in having PSYOPs up front for this operation because I thought the most useful part of PSYOPs would be that it would prevent armed conflict.” In order to ensure a coordinated PSYOPs policy, a Joint PSYOPs task force was created which worked directly for LtGen Johnston. This task force provided a solid framework for the PSYOPs team to work within. They produced coordinated plans that were effectively incorporated into the Somalia Operation.

---

8 Borchini and Borstelmann, p. 2.
PSYOPs staff planners from Fort Bragg, NC were among the first deployed to assist USCENTCOM in planning. During the initial stages, PSYOPs planning focused on facilitating the flow of information between the Somalis and the Non-governmental Organizations (NGOs) responsible for the humanitarian effort in Somalia. The PSYOPs team produced all printed products distributed in Somalia: more than seven million leaflets, more than a dozen different handbills and posters, and 116 editions of a Somali-language newspaper. They also produced radio broadcasts (transmitted twice daily) for AM, FM and short-wave programming, and finally ‘face-to-face’ techniques were used to collect and distribute PSYOPs-relevant information. The newspaper and radio messages promoted US and UN strategic goals. They clearly defined the fairness and impartiality of UNITAF rules of engagement. The messages emphasized the need for Somalis to resolve Somali’s problems and the corresponding inability of UNITAF and relief agencies to do more than assist Somalia. As the operation progressed, agreements made by the faction leaders and consequences of violations were disseminated to the local population. The cumulative effect of these operations was the reduction of tensions faced by military forces in the local region. This, in turn, gave military forces an increased freedom of movement.

The face-to-face ‘tactical PSYOPs teams’ employed within Somalia were especially effective at communicating US intentions and reducing the frequency and intensity of local conflict. Direct communication with village elders and religious leaders facilitated information flow to the Somalis. Additionally it provided an opportunity to accurately assess the security situation and assist sector commanders in understanding the perceptions, attitudes and concerns of the people they were ultimately trying to help.
These tactical PSYOPs teams also provided advice to the US special envoy, Ambassador Robert Oakley, and his staff. Deployed teams (8 total) secured relief convoys and helped promote stability throughout central and southern Somalia by preparing and broadcasting surrender appeals, procedures for weapons sweeps and feeding site crowd control messages. MajGen Charles E. Wilhelm, commander of US Marine Forces in Somalia, described the tactical PSYOPs teams as "a combat subtractor...they reduced the amount of unnecessary bloodshed by convincing Somali gunmen to surrender rather than fight."⁹

PSYOPs preceded the initial landing of Marines in Somalia just as they had in the Gulf War. The arrival of military forces in any area can produce fear and public uprising unless the purpose of that military force is understood. In a wartime scenario, favorable local opinion may not be a requirement, but in MOOTW it becomes mandatory to maintain peaceful conditions. In Somalia, approximately 220,000 leaflets were dropped to announce the arrival of US forces. These leaflets were dropped two or three days prior to UNITAF force arrival in each town and helped reduce local population negative interaction. For a more detailed list of PSYOPs in Somalia see Appendix B.

PSYOPs can also be used effectively at the end of operations to help break the cycle of dependence, encourage self-sufficiency, and aid in the smooth transition between military force and NGOs or local government control. In effect, PSYOPs facilitates the transition between the use of force to ‘demand’ compliance, and the agencies and activities surrounding nation building at the end of military operations. Clearly, PSYOPs have to be incorporated from beginning to end in MOOTW for most effective results. To

---

⁹ Ibid., p. 3.
illustrate PSYOPs continuity throughout any operations, Col Devlin, current director of
the Joint Staff PSYOPs and Civil Affairs branch, uses the timeline found in Appendix C.\textsuperscript{10}

PSYOPs employed in MOOTW, significantly contributes to successful military
operations. The more military actions are understood by the local population, the more
cooperative they will be. This alone will reduce loss of life, as well as increase the
commander’s freedom of operations in the region. The results in Somalia are clear, and as
LtGen Johnston stated, “PSYOPs really worked well to convince [Somalis] that we were
there with the military capability to take care of the factions, and that we were going to
provide support and safety. I think that was the [unique] dimension of PSYOPs.”\textsuperscript{11}

WHAT IS MILITARY PSYOPs?

Today, the lines between information warfare, diplomacy and military PSYOPs are
blurring. Where exactly do we draw the line between military PSYOPs and activities
producing psychological effects?\textsuperscript{12} While the Joint Chiefs have attempted to clearly
define PSYOPs, most literature and common understanding of the tool shows no
consistent belief in what is, and what is not military PSYOPs. Col (Ret) Timmes
expressed his concerns stating,

\ldots we do not clearly understand the difference between the conduct of military
PSYOPs as a unique operation and other activities that have a PSYOPs effect
whether intended or not. As things now stand, almost anything can be called a
psychological operation. In policy documents, articles and conversation, there is
a lack of distinction between military psychological operations which are planned
and conducted for their PSYOPs effect and other operations which have a non-
PSYOPs purpose but also have a psychological effect.\textsuperscript{13}

\textsuperscript{10} Devlin.
\textsuperscript{11} Borchini and Borstelmann, p. 9.
\textsuperscript{12} Timmes, p. 20.
\textsuperscript{13} Ibid., p. 19.
Without an understanding of what exactly military PSYOPs are, it is very difficult for a commander to integrate this tool in operational planning or employment. Does the commander believe the impression left by PSYOPs publications that, as Timmes says, “often leave an impression that such activities as troop reductions, ship port visits, air shows, freedom-of-navigation operations and official visits are psychological operations.” While all actions taken by the United States do send a message to the listener, all actions do not comprise military PSYOPs. Col Dan Devlin agrees, stating that all over the world, US forces are showing presence and maintaining forces, in part, to display to our allies our resolve for world peace. These are actions that influence other nations to do what is in our best interest, but is not part of a military PSYOPs. To be most effective, all actions undertaken by the US should be integrated into an overall operational design for both peace and conflict. Yet only by restricting the focus of military PSYOPs does the operational commander have an employable tool.

Only operations conducted under the authority of the governing PSYOPs DoD directive as part of a CINC’s annual program and approved by SECDEF are military PSYOPs programs. All others are programs with psychological effects. PSYOPs should be viewed as an active partner in the international information arena, but only as a unique and independent military tool.

---

14 Ibid., p. 20.
15 Devlin.
PSYOPs APPROVAL PROCEDURES

Because of the strategic/national effect that PSYOPs can project, it is the most difficult of the five C2W pillars to actually execute. The final approval of PSYOPs rests with the Under Secretary of Defense for Policy during peacetime and with the CINC or JFC in war.\(^\text{16}\) Additionally, there are international laws prohibiting the use of radio or television waves to broadcast messages inside sovereign territory. Col Devlin adds ‘the CNN factor’ to this picture. Today we are more reactive than in the past due to the media. The messages sent in today’s environment, while promoting the United States and democracy in many third world countries, absolutely has to be right the first time.\(^\text{17}\) All these factors combined require a significant amount of lead time to integrate PSYOPs properly within the framework of C2W as well as the commander’s overall operational design. Geographic commanders will have to seek approval and participation from their host-nations, as well as creating a close liaison with the US country teams. Cultural and language expertise, often found in the country teams, is a requirement for creating effective and useful PSYOPs plans.

While Desert Storm showed effective use of PSYOPs, it also clearly identified the problems of timely integration of the plan. While the plan was ready for approval within one month of the Kuwait invasion, it was then forwarded to Washington for final approval. This approval was delayed until the end of December -- just before the air war started. To alleviate this problem, a generic, non-theater-specific PSYOPs plan must be developed and endorsed by the senior geographic military commander and the US


\(^{17}\) Devlin.
ambassador. This should prevent some of the authorization delays experienced in the Gulf. A clear policy defining military PSYOPs roles, developed before crisis arise, is critical for all future operations.

**PSYOPs CONTROL AND COORDINATION**

For PSYOPs to be effective in future operations, its full integration at the highest levels of operational planning is required. Without an immediate and completely integrated plan, PSYOPs will negatively impact operations. True synergy and interoperability, with all agencies is vital to effectively employ PSYOPs under the C2W umbrella. The Joint Chiefs stated that “The key to successful C2W is its integration throughout the planning, execution and termination phases of all operations.”\(^{18}\)

Desert Storm showed us the power of PSYOPs yet, behind the scenes, the PSYOPs team had an extremely difficult time getting its programs underway. It took a request for PSYOPs support from the Saudi government to make this tool a priority for the regional commander to employ.\(^{19}\) Prior to this request, the PSYOPs team were hampered by a lack of authority to integrate PSYOPs planning into the overall operational design. This prevented them from obtaining timely support to employ their plan.

While it is still the prerogative of the CINC or JFC to determine how C2W will be incorporated into the overall command and control structure, Joint Pub 3-13 specifies that the C2W officer’s duties will primarily be limited to coordination.\(^{20}\) This appears to be

\(^{18}\) Memorandum of Policy No. 30 (MOP30), p. 1.
\(^{19}\) Psychological Operations in Desert Shield, Desert Storm and Urban Freedom, p. 24.
how staffs are set up today, but it leaves the C2W officer with responsibilities not equal to that officer’s authority. This officer cannot compel forces to support the PSYOPs plan. To effectively accomplish C2W planning and operation, C2W officers need to have power commensurate to a JFACC. With this authority, the C2W officer will be able to effectively coordinate assets throughout DoD.

Even more important than the ability to control assets is the authority to compel agreement. Without this authority, C2W effectiveness will be hampered in a large operation or crisis planning. In Desert Storm the lack of airlift delayed the deployment of PSYOPs forces despite the small amount of required airlift and the fact that early deployment and employment of PSYOPs are critical to deterrence. PSYOPs are a major means of shaping the battlefield during the deterrence phase of any operation. Allowing the C2W officer to compel forces and increasing PSYOPs priority with the commander would help alleviate this problem. As Lt Col Norman Hutcherson, former Joint Staff Liaison Officer to USEUCOM responsible for effective C2W support stated, this increase over current authority is necessary because “it is service control of assets and resources that makes it difficult to make C2W a realistic, reliable strategy.”

In addition to coordination of PSYOPs at the operational level, there is a need for coordination with the strategic goals of the US. Effective communication between the JFC staff and the NCA implementing aspects of information warfare is required to ensure synergistic operations. Col Jones emphasized this when he stated, “Effective, coordinated, combined multi-theater PSYOPs requires planning, effort, patience, communications and

---

21 Hutcherson, Norman B., Command and Control Warfare: Putting Another Tool in the War-Fighter’s Data Bank, Maxwell AFB, AL: Airpower Research Institute, September 1994, p. 8.
command endorsement. Much can [and should be] be done in peacetime to increase the probability of success in a crisis or in war."22

CONCLUSION

Col Timmes relates that, "PSYOPs [are] a military treasure that has earned its right to continue. Memories, however, are short. We need to continually demonstrate our value to the defense establishment through professionalism and meaningful service."23 PSYOPs produced numerous operational level successes during Desert Shield/Storm and Operation Restore Hope, but it is not easily measured, nor is it as glamorous and news worthy as many of the other tools in the commander's kit. The future of PSYOPs planning and employment is incumbent on the commander's understanding of what its capabilities actually are and how to fully integrate it into operational planning. With true integration and early PSYOPs plans approval, the commander will be able to "get inside of the enemy's decision cycle." By giving commensurate authority with the responsibility of a single officer in charge of C2W, the full potential of this weapon can be realized. In the broad picture, the goal of any conflict is to win. PSYOPs provides the operational commander an extremely versatile force multiplier which, if properly employed, will significantly increase the chances for victory with minimum loss of life.

22 Psychological Operations in Desert Shield, Desert Storm and Urban Freedom, p. 28.
23 Timmes, p. 21.
APPENDIX A

Following is a partial list of the unclassified Psychological Operations used in Desert Shield and Storm as reported by Col Jones in the July 1994, Vol 7, Number 3 edition of Special Warfare.

- 342,000 leaflets disseminated by balloon, waterborne and manpack operations.
- 18.7 million leaflets disseminated by high-altitude MC-130 aircraft.
- 3.3 million leaflets disseminated by F-16s on 36 missions, and 2.2 million leaflets disseminated by B-52s on 20 missions, both using M-129A1 leaflet bombs.
- 1.1 million leaflets, public-service posters and handbills disseminated in Kuwait City.
- A videotape, “Nations of the World Take a Stand,” was distributed in multiple languages to each regional capital in the Middle East and Southwest Asia. Two hundred copies were disseminated in Baghdad.
- An audiotape, “Iraq the Betrayed,” designed to foment anti-Saddam sentiment, was broadcast from EC-130 Volant Solos, and copies were also smuggled into Baghdad.
- The radio program “Voice of the Gulf” broadcast 18 hours a day for 40 days from two ground stations and an aerial platform over Saudi Arabia and from two additional ground stations and a Volant Solo aerial platform over Turkey. A combined Saudi, US, Egyptian, Kuwaiti and British propaganda-development cell developed the tapes and scripts. Broadcasting included 3,250 news items, 13 Iraqi EPW interviews, 40 press releases and interviews, and 189 PSYOPs messages.
- PSYOPs soldiers supported EPW operations at two EPW camps, three corps collection points and numerous divisional collection points.
- Individual and combined loudspeaker operations persuaded thousands of Iraqi soldiers to surrender without friendly forces having to fire a shot or maneuver into harm’s way.
- The development of a downed flier “pointy-talky,” a multilingual blood chit displaying an American flag and promising a reward to anyone who assisted the bearer. This was used by all US pilots.

---

APPENDIX B

Following is a partial list of the unclassified Psychological Operations used in Operation Restore Hope as reported by Lt. Col. Charles P. Borchini and Mark Borstelmann in the October 1994, Vol 7, Number 4 edition of Special Warfare.24

- Produced and disseminated large numbers of more than a dozen different handbills and posters.
- Issued 116 editions of a Somali-language newspaper, Rajo, publishing more than 27,000 copies daily.
- Transmitted a 45 minute radio broadcast twice daily on the task force’ established station, Radio Rajo.
- Produced 37 different leaflet topics.
- Produced and disseminated more than seven million leaflets.
- Deployed tactical PSYOPs teams with the coalition forces.
- Provided advice to the US special envoy, Ambassador Robert Oakley and his staff.
- PSYOPs teams accompanied the initial Marine landing at Mogadishu.
- Eight tactical PSYOPs teams accompanied UNITAF ground forces throughout central and southern Somalia and used loudspeakers to broadcast numerous messages.
- Face-to-face communication gathered and disseminated information to Somali’s.
- Ensured crowd control at feeding sites by disseminating messages as well as several innovative methods such as initiating games with Somali children.
- 220,000 leaflets dropped from a US Marine CH-53 preceding Marine landing at Mogadishu.
- ‘Handshake leaflets’ were dropped two or three days prior to the arrival of UNITAF forces in each new town.
- Leaflets, handbills and posters supporting several engineering projects.

24 Borchini and Borstelmann, p. 2-9.
APPENDIX C

Col Devlin's example of a typical PSYOPs operational timeline.25

25 Devlin.
BIBLIOGRAPHY


Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, Command and Control Warfare, Memorandum of Policy No. 30, Revision 1 (Washington: 8 March 1993)


Joint Chiefs of Staff, Department of Defense Dictionary of Military and Associated Terms, JP 1-02 (Washington: 1 December 1989)

Joint Chiefs of Staff, Doctrine for Joint Operations, JP 3-0 (Washington: 9 September 1993)


Locke, Jeffrey S.  *Command and Control Warfare: Promise and Challenge for the Operational Commander*, NWC 11 Nov 95.

Mathews, Michael P., and Jones, Jeffrey B., *PSYOPs (psychological operations) and the Warfighting CINC (commander in chief)*, Joint Force Quarterly, No 8, Summer 1995.


National Defense University, *Armed Forces Staff College, Joint Command and Control Warfare Staff Officer Course (Student Text)*. (Norfolk, VA: April 1993).

Plucker, Ron C.  *Command and Control Warfare -- A New Concept for the Joint Operational Commander*. NWC, 18 Jun 93.

Sexton, Joanne  *A Combatant Commander's Organizational View of Information Warfare and Command and Control Warfare*, NWC 16 Jun 95.


