

**CONFERENCE REPORT**

**International Workshop  
on the U.S.-ROK Alliance**

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Rapporteur and Editor**

**March 11, 1996**

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## **FOREWORD**

For nearly half a century, the security alliance between the Republic of Korea and the United States has deterred aggression and helped assure stability in Northeast Asia. The alliance has stood firm through war and tumultuous political, economic, and social change. Much of the change in Northeast Asia has been positive and the Republic of Korea is now one of the advanced democratic industrial countries of the world. The countries of Northeast Asia, along with the United States, with its deep ties of history and interest in the area, now look ahead to a region which will progress rapidly as the Cold War recedes and the few remaining communist states undergo inevitable transformation.

In October 1995, scholars, military officers, diplomats, journalists, public figures, and concerned private citizens of the two alliance partners and regional states gathered in Seoul, Korea, to assess the impact of these changes and to seek new directions for the alliance. This workshop brought forth a wealth of innovative, thought-provoking ideas. This conference report summarizes the deliberations of the participants.

The Strategic Studies Institute is pleased to have co-hosted this international workshop on the U.S.-ROK Alliance in collaboration with the Institute for Far Eastern Studies of Kyungnam University and in partnership with The Korea Society and the Defense Nuclear Agency. We hope that the ideas presented herein will lead to a strengthening of the ROK-U.S. partnership and thereby enhance the peace and stability of Northeast Asia.

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## **BIOGRAPHICAL SKETCH OF THE EDITOR/RAPPORTEUR**

DONALD W. BOOSE, JR. served in the United States Army as an Infantry officer and Northeast Asia Foreign Area Officer from 1962 until 1992. He has a degree in anthropology from Cornell University, a master's degree in Asian studies from the University of Hawaii, and is a graduate of the U.S. Army War College. From 1981 to 1984, Colonel Boose served on the Joint Staff as Politico-Military Planner for Korea. He served for 6 years with the United Nations Command Component of the Military Armistice Commission (UNCMAC) in Korea, including 3 years as UNCMAC Secretary; was Assistant Chief of Staff J-5 (Director for Strategic Plans and Policy) of U.S. Forces Japan from 1987 to 1990; and was the Director of Asian Studies at the U.S. Army War College from 1990 to 1992. He is currently a self-employed teacher, writer, and consultant and a contract faculty instructor at the U.S. Army War College. He is the co-author of *Great Battles of Antiquity* as well as a number of articles and review essays on Asia-Pacific security issues.

## SUMMARY

The international workshop on the U.S.-ROK Alliance was held in Seoul, Korea, October 5-7, 1995. The workshop was organized by the Institute for Far Eastern Studies (IFES) of Kyungnam University and the Strategic Studies Institute (SSI) of the U.S. Army War College in partnership with the Defense Nuclear Agency and The Korea Society.

In their welcoming addresses, *Dr. Kwak Tae-Hwan* (Director of the Institute for Far Eastern Studies, Kyungnam University), *Dr. Park Jae Kyu* (President of Kyungnam University), *Colonel John R. O'Shea* (Director of the SSI Strategic Outreach Program Office), and *Dr. David I. Steinberg* (The Korea Society and The Asia Foundation) stressed the longevity and strength of the alliance and set the conference agenda: to discuss problems and suggest future directions to strengthen the alliance so that it may continue to promote peace and security. In his keynote address, *Lieutenant General Richard F. Timmons* (Commanding General, Eighth U.S. Army and Chief of Staff, ROK-U.S. Combined Forces Command, United Nations Command, and U.S. Forces Korea) reminded the workshop participants of the preponderance of North Korean military force but noted the Republic of Korea's economic prowess and qualitative military edge. General Timmons characterized the ROK-U.S. Combined Forces Command as the most effective alliance in the world. He noted that North Korea is increasingly isolated and its former military allies now have much closer diplomatic and economic ties with a Republic of Korea which is deeply engaged in the global network of advanced nations.

During the first session, *Prof. Lho Kyongsoo* (Seoul National University) traced the changes which have occurred since the inception of the alliance. He sees the alliance dealing in the future with such issues as arms control and suggested that, even after reunification, geostrategic factors of location and size will provide a basis for a continued security partnership. *Dr. John Merrill* (U.S. Department of State) stressed the way in which the partnership has adapted to change, benefitting both partners. He suggested that the current approach of engagement with the North is both a necessary adaptation and consistent with the policies both alliance partners have pursued over the past decade. *Dr. Peter Hayes* (Nautilus Institute) suggested that the concept of extended nuclear deterrence may no longer be relevant to Korea, particularly in light of the current U.S. capability to respond with conventional means. He also suggested that replacement of the Armistice Agreement with another security mechanism is essential to progress in engagement with the North.

In the second session, *Prof. Wang Fei-ling* (Georgia Institute of Technology) provided a plausible speculation on the attitudes of the Chinese leaders, suggesting that they find a divided, but stable Korea with a U.S. military force presence to be consistent with their interests. But a continued troop presence in a unified Korea would be so threatening to Chinese leaders that they would work to prevent such an outcome. *Prof. Tsuchiyama Jitsuo* (Aoyama Gakuin University) discussed the intellectual under-pinnings of the concept of alliance and concluded that the Japan-U.S. and ROK-U.S. Alliances are likely to endure because

of the shared interests of the alliance partners; the institutionalization of the alliance relationships; the reassurance that the alliances bring to both the security partners and the regional neighbors; and because the alliances are cost effective. *Dr. Nikolai A. Geronin* (ITAR-TASS Seoul Bureau) raised the possibility that, with the great changes that have taken place in the world, the alliance might now be seen as an obstacle to reunification and thus to the very peace and security it professes to protect. He also expressed concern that two of the great powers of the region--China and Russia--are not more involved in the Korea dialogue.

During the third session, *Prof. Han Yong-Sup* (Korean National Defense University) examined the combined U.S.-ROK approach to the North Korean nuclear issue. He pointed out that, in the process of achieving the accords, the alliance underwent some strains, particularly since the South-North dialogue has not yet been reestablished. In spite of the problems he identified, Prof. Han suggested that the two allies have demonstrated that they can, together, cope with the most complex, challenging, and highly politicized of problems and still secure a positive outcome. *Prof. Takesada Hideshi* (Japanese National Institute for Defense Studies) traced the negotiations leading to the U.S.-DPRK nuclear Agreed Framework and speculated on North Korea's motives in pursuing a nuclear program. He expressed concern about some aspects of the nuclear Agreed Framework and suggested a future policy which includes both incentives and sanctions. *Dr. Larry Nicksch* (U.S. Congressional Research Service) argued that the Clinton administration strategy is based on several assumptions, including a belief in the near-term collapse of the DPRK. He warned that delays in implementing the Agreed Framework may boost the cost of providing North Korea with light water reactors (LWR) and increase congressional criticism. He also suggested that the Korean Peninsula Energy Development Organization (KEDO) may provide a useful and effective model for U.S.-ROK-Japan cooperation in addressing the problems posed by North Korea. *Mr. Selig S. Harrison* (Carnegie Endowment for International Peace) reported on his recent talks with North Korean officials, who proposed replacement of the current Armistice Agreement with a two-track security dialogue beginning with U.S.-DPRK military talks. Mr. Harrison argued that North-South dialogue must begin simultaneously with any U.S.-DPRK talks, and that true tension reduction is a precondition to dissolution of the United Nations Command. Nonetheless, he considered the North Korean proposal to be worthy of serious consideration.

During the fourth session, *Prof. Kim Woo Sang* (Sookmyung Women's University) proposed a "limited no first use" regime, in which nuclear powers would renounce the use of nuclear weapons against non-nuclear states. Prof. Kim also provided a persuasive argument as to why post-reunification Korea should be neither nuclear nor neutral and introduced the concept of Korea as a "pivotal power." *Prof. William T. Pendley* (U.S. Air War College) proposed a U.S. strategy which supports enduring American interests in a time of dynamic change. He argued for a continued U.S. force presence as essential to regional security, but stressed that capabilities and commitment, rather than some specific number of military personnel, are key to security and stability. *Prof. William E. Berry* (U.S. Air Force Academy) traced the history and impact of the institutional tension between the American executive and

legislative branches on U.S. Korea policy. He noted that, at present, the two branches are in general agreement about the U.S. force presence in Korea and suggested that this is because the North Korean nuclear issue has taken center stage in the policy debate.

In the final session, *Dr. Edward A. Olsen* (U.S. Naval Postgraduate School) reviewed the historical, institutional, and other factors impeding resolution of the Korean issue. He argued that the United States should be more proactive and suggested several bold approaches, including a proposal for a multilateral summit in which regional powers would demonstrate commitment to Korean reunification while leaving the actual reunification process in the hands of the two Koreas. *Colonel William Drennan* (Institute of National Strategic Studies, National Defense University) argued for a "peace system" based on existing agreements and emphasizing measures to improve transparency, reduce the dangers of accidental war, and create a more stable, defense-oriented force relationship. *Dr. Lee Choon Kun* (Sejong Institute) suggested that Korea has already experienced a measure of arms control through U.S. measures to inhibit ROK military development. Noting that the ROK now has the capability to wage an arms race on its own, he suggested that the United States use its newly-established links to influence North Korea while maintaining its alliance commitment to the ROK.

The discussants, with the enthusiastic participation from the larger workshop community, helped fine-tune the proposals made by the presenters and identified the concerns felt by many as the alliance navigates through new waters. Clearly there are problems. The growing symmetry of the relationship has led to a weighing of the benefits to each partner and an increased emphasis on economic and trade considerations. The process of engaging the North has revealed schisms within the alliance due to differing perspectives and objectives.

None of these problems is new, however. Over the past half-century, the alliance has weathered mutual suspicion, misperceptions, and debate over allocation of resources, strategic concepts, and objectives. If it endures, it will be because the two partners share a community of values and interests and the strength that comes from a long-standing, institutionalized relationship.

## CONFERENCE REPORT

### **International Workshop on the U.S.-ROK Alliance**

The international workshop on the U.S.-ROK Alliance was held in Seoul, Korea, October 5-7, 1995. The workshop was organized by the Institute for Far Eastern Studies (IFES) of Kyungnam University and the Strategic Studies Institute (SSI) of the U.S. Army War College in partnership with the Defense Nuclear Agency and The Korea Society.

#### **Opening Session.**

**Opening Remarks.** *Dr. Kwak Tae-Hwan* (Director of the Institute for Far Eastern Studies, Kyungnam University) welcomed the workshop participants. He pointed out that the U.S.-ROK Alliance has deterred aggression and provided stability in Northeast Asia. Noting that momentous events are changing the alliance, he stated that the purpose of the workshop was to discuss the problems resulting from those changes and suggest new directions in order to assure continued peace and security in the region. He expressed the hope that this workshop will make a substantive contribution to U.S.-Korean relations.

**Welcoming Remarks.** *Dr. Park Jae Kyu* (President of Kyungnam University) suggested that the recent dedication of the Korean War memorial in Washington, DC, is a manifestation of the strength of the 45-year old alliance. While not without its problems, the relationship has been strong and mutually supportive. Stressing the value of dialogue to improve understanding, he expressed the hope that this workshop would define changes and identify problems in the relationship and that its work would be rewarding and productive.

*Colonel John R. O'Shea* (Director of the SSI Strategic Outreach Program Office) brought greetings from U.S. Army War College Commandant, Major General Richard A. Chilcoat. Noting the Army War College's motto, "Not to prepare for war, but to preserve peace," he said he hoped that the U.S.-ROK Alliance will continue to provide peace and security in a troubled world.

*Dr. David I. Steinberg* (The Korea Society and The Asia Foundation) noted that U.S. and ROK interests are mutually complementary and that the security aspect of the relationship is critical. He stressed that there are many differences between the new and the older Korean generations in attitudes toward the United States and the security relationship which must be taken into account as the work of this conference proceeds.

**Keynote Speech.** *Lieutenant General Richard F. Timmons* (Commanding General, Eighth U.S. Army, Chief of Staff, ROK-U.S. Combined Forces Command, United Nations Command, and U.S. Forces Korea) noted that Korea is at the geopolitical hub of Northeast Asia, a region of great dynamism, economic strength, and potential. It is a region with a long and troubled history which requires long-term stability to assure peace and prosperity. The ROK-U.S. Alliance has been essential

to that stability and the United States brings important capabilities to the alliance.

The factors that tend toward instability include the arms race on the Korean peninsula, North Korea's nuclear development, residual distrust among regional neighbors, and the fast pace of economic and political change. While North Korea has a much smaller population and weaker economy than the South, it has made a staggering investment in its military over the past 15 years, increasing its military by about 230,000 and deploying some 65 percent of its forces close to the demilitarized zone. North Korean air and naval forces are rather small and of limited capability, but their ground force is large and well equipped with long-range artillery and rocket launchers, special operations forces, and ballistic missiles. Although Kim Jong Il appears to have assumed power, the North could still experience a succession crisis, economic collapse, or loss of confidence leading to popular uprising. Alternatively, it might take an explosive path of provocative actions and war. The most desirable outcome is a "soft landing," or peaceful transition. The combined ROK/U.S. force, by deterring aggression, improves the likelihood of this outcome.

General Timmons explained the relationship among the United Nations Command (UNC), ROK/U.S. Combined Forces Command (CFC), and U.S. Forces Korea. The role of the UNC is Armistice maintenance, while the role of the CFC is deterrence and, if deterrence fails, defense. He noted that the CFC is probably the most effective alliance in the world. For 45 years of military tensions, ROK and U.S. soldiers have served side-by-side in Korea, Vietnam, Desert Storm, and Somalia.

The U.S. power projection strategy makes early warning and a successful defense north of Seoul essential, drives early decisions for force commitment, requires clear warning and political courage, and requires maximum flexibility of deterrent options. Two major warfighting concerns are the uncertainties associated with the North Korean nuclear issue and the need to counter the large, forward-deployed, fully equipped, and well-prepared North Korean unconventional force. General Timmons concluded that it is essential to stay strong militarily; that, while time is on our side, patience is required; that the nuclear issue appears to be under control; and that, given current data, we are on the right azimuth.

### **Session 1. "The U.S.-ROK Alliance: Who Benefited? Who Benefits?"**

*Prof. Koo Youngnok* (Seoul National University) chaired the session and introduced the presenters, whose papers are summarized below.

**"The Korean Perspective,"** by *Prof. Lho Kyongsoo*, Seoul National University. Prof. Lho noted that over the past 45 years American attitudes toward their country's international role have changed; there have been seismic changes in the world situation; and Korea has changed from a confused, destitute state to a modern nation with a vibrant economy. The alliance itself has also changed. At the beginning, the partnership was asymmetrical, not only in relative power, but also in values and institutions. Today, the Republic of Korea has narrowed the

gap in terms of regional military power and also more closely resembles the United States in its values and institutions. Now the two countries can legitimately call each other allies.

As North Korea becomes less a threat, however, the alliance has to prepare for the day when it "runs out of enemies." The alliance partners have to be prepared to engage North Korea in arms control negotiations and, once such discussions begin, it will be difficult to continue to think of North Korea as the "enemy." The alliance partners must also consider the impact of eventual Korean unification. Prof. Lho believes that, because of its size and location, a reunified Korea will be faced with a strategic dilemma requiring a continued partnership with the United States. He sees the United States as pursuing a classic balance of power strategy with the alliance being held together by the U.S.'s perceived need. The issue for Korea is to determine Korea's intrinsic value as an alliance partner to the United States.

**"The U.S. Perspective,"** by *Dr. John Merrill*, U.S. Department of State. Dr. Merrill argued that the alliance is now moving from a focus on deterrence and defense to a sustained effort to engage North Korea. The alliance has demonstrated the ability to adapt successfully to changed circumstances. The current policy of engagement, including the nuclear Agreed Framework, is the logical successor to both the Reagan-era *Modest Initiatives* approach to North Korea and President Rho Tae Woo's *Nordpolitik*.

Dr. Merrill noted that most Americans take the alliance for granted, with criticism and questioning coming from the Korean side, largely due to trade frictions and a perception that ROK interests were subordinated during the U.S.-DPRK nuclear talks. A policy of engagement is more complex and, at any one time, may seem to provide more benefits to one alliance partner than to another, but it is essential to engage. An alliance based solely on deterrence can be undone once an enemy disappears, but an alliance which transitions to engagement is more likely to endure. Now, with the ROK at the negotiating table as a key member of the Korean Peninsula Energy Development Organization (KEDO) and with some south-north dialogue resulting from the rice talks, the criticism of the Agreed Framework talks is somewhat muted. The allies are engaged in the kind of serious and difficult diplomacy which is only possible with the trust and confidence built up over the years. The key question is not the longevity of the alliance, but its ability to adapt. In this regard, Dr. Merrill sees signs of health and vitality, although there are still dangers ahead: North Korea is still a serious threat; the collapse of the northern regime could be accompanied by violence; and the United States still bears a disproportionate cost in holding up its half of the alliance. This is to be expected when a global power is aligned with a regional power, but as the alliance takes on greater responsibilities, the benefits will be more evenly divided.

**"An Impartial View,"** by *Dr. Peter Hayes*, Nautilus Institute. Dr. Hayes noted that the glue binding the alliance together has been the North Korean threat. The basis for the relationship is the capabilities each partner brings to the alliance. The unique ROK contribution is its massive ground force. The unique U.S. capability is its ability to project

power, including a nuclear threat. Noting that U.S. nuclear weapons have now been removed from Korea, that U. S. nuclear retaliation was always problematic, and that the United States now has the capability to retaliate adequately with conventional forces, he argued that there is no justification for the pretense that the United States extends a nuclear umbrella over Korea. It would be better to move ahead, putting the emphasis on conventional deterrence and preventive--or coercive--diplomacy to influence North Korea.

Dr. Hayes suggested that the "game has changed" in Korea: the key issue is no longer how to get North Korea to engage with the ROK, but how to get North Korea access to South Korea via Washington. It is conceivable that North Korea and the United States could have a satisfactory security relationship within 5 years in spite of continuing south-north Korean political antagonism. With the Agreed Framework being the main buttress against North Korean nuclear weapons, Dr. Hayes sees the United States and ROK diverging in the future over the issue of whether the emphasis should be on ROK-DPRK dialogue or on multilateral approaches. He also sees the U.S. insistence on continuing the Armistice Agreement and Military Armistice Commission mechanism as an obstacle: the Agreed Framework might unravel if no serious progress is made on North Korean demands to replace the Armistice with a new mechanism. He also questioned whether the ROK-U.S. Alliance will hinder or facilitate reunification, but suggested that in the event of a relatively peaceful reunification, Korea would be a power to be reckoned with and the most important goal of the alliance might be keeping the peninsula--and, therefore, Japan--non-nuclear. In any event, he suggests that, because of its superior position, it is up to the Republic of Korea to articulate a vision of Northeast Asian organization and engagement.

**Discussion.** *Prof. Lee Chae-Jin* (Claremont McKenna University) agreed with Prof. Lho that, if the United States normalizes its relationship with North Korea, the concept of "enemy" changes, but he noted that the United States had normal relations with the USSR and East Germany while considering them potential enemies. He acknowledged that it may be useful for post-reunification Korea to maintain the alliance, but noted that there are other options and in a future international environment the benefits of the alliance may not be even. Noting Dr. Hayes's derogation of the concept of extended deterrence, Prof. Lee suggested that a breakdown in extended deterrence would have serious consequences for Japan and Germany and that if the ROK sees the alliance as inoperable in that regard, it will have a motivation to go nuclear itself.

*Prof. Ryoo Jae-Kap* (Kyunggi University) noted that, while the benefits of the alliance were asymmetrical until the 1980s, with the ROK as the greatest beneficiary, in the post-Cold War era ROK capabilities and contributions to regional stability may make it a more desirable alliance partner. He saw the Agreed Framework as threatening the alliance because of U.S. security guarantees to North Korea, which he sees as strengthening North Korea's position on U.S. troop withdrawal.

*Prof. Hyun In Taek* (Korea University) noted that, while the ROK has benefited greatly from the alliance, South Korea has provided moral

and psychological support to the United States. Since the 1980s, American economic decline has caused the United States to move toward an economic exchange relationship and demand greater financial contributions by the ROK. While South Koreans recognize they have to do more, they still tend to see the alliance as a social-psychological relationship and react negatively to these U.S. economic pressures. Meanwhile, the United States sometimes *assumes* full psychological and moral support from the ROK. Prof. Hyun recommended that the ROK look more positively at Host Nation Support (HNS) and that the United States fully support ROK efforts toward peaceful reunification; trust the rationality of ROK decisionmaking in crises and so support ROK arms purchases and sales; and not allow North Korea to destroy the Armistice mechanism without proof that it has abandoned its long-standing hostile strategy.

*Dr. Nikolai A. Geronin* (ITAR-TASS Seoul Bureau) noted that tensions have emerged within the ROK-U.S. Alliance. In dialogue with North Korea, the United States is the decisionmaker and Seoul has as yet no tools with which to challenge this relationship. He then noted that, to the extent that it becomes engaged with other countries, North Korea's irrational actions will decrease. He also suggested that Dr. Hayes's comment that China might provide support to the North seems to contradict his view that Russia-PRC rapprochement has reduced North Korea's capability to play off the two powers against each other.

*Prof. Takesada Hideshi* (Japanese National Institute for Defense Studies) suggested to Dr. Merrill that the DPRK has benefited the most from the U.S.-ROK Alliance because the alliance maintains the status quo and provides the threat which is the rationale for Kim Jong Il's power.

**Responses.** *Dr. Merrill* reiterated the proven adaptability of the alliance; noted that there seems to be a shift in North Korea's attitude toward the presence of U.S. forces (although it is unclear if they really mean it); and suggested that, while a cautious North Korean opening is the preferred path, it is not inevitable. The United States and ROK can only facilitate that approach; they cannot enforce it.

*Prof. Lho* responded to Prof. Lee that it is a condition that North Korea change before normalization could take place. He said that neutrality is not a real option for Korea: neither its geography nor its size will permit it.

*Dr. Hayes* suggested that extended deterrence is cheap currency, since the United States is unlikely to respond in kind to a North Korean nuclear attack. The real issue is the credibility of the ROK-U.S. *conventional* military capability. He also said he does not believe that North Korea is a fragile state. Its military might be fragile, but its political control is still strong.

## **Session 2. "The Alliance and Northeast Asian Security"**

*Prof. Rhee Sang Woo* (Sogang University) chaired the session and introduced the presenters, whose papers are summarized below.

**"Chinese Perceptions of the U.S.-ROK Alliance,"** by *Prof. Wang Fei-ling*, Georgia Institute of Technology. Prof. Wang suggested that China is currently preoccupied by its domestic agenda and pursuing a relatively conservative foreign policy--seeking to maintain the status quo in the belief that time is on its side and it has nothing to gain by change and innovation in international affairs. A divided, stable, friendly Korea is better for China than a united Korea. A U.S. military presence is desirable if it buttresses stability and inhibits the rise of Japan, but the American emphasis on human rights and the enlargement of democracy threaten Chinese domestic security. China is also concerned about Taiwan, since a successful Taiwan independence movement would threaten China's very legitimacy at a time when it is ideologically bankrupt and nationalism is its one remaining source of legitimacy. The South China Sea is the one place where China is not prepared to play a waiting game. It considers that it has historic claims and fears that it will lose if it does not take some action to assure those claims.

China's acquiescence to the U.S. military presence in Korea is conditional. China tacitly accepts the presence but does not find it politically desirable to make a public acknowledgment to that effect. Further, a U.S. presence is only acceptable in a divided Korea. A reunified Korea still militarily allied to the United States would pose a threat to China, and China would work to prevent such an outcome. Thus, a divided, stable Korea with a U.S. military presence is most desirable from the Chinese perspective. A reunited Korea with a gradual withdrawal of U.S. forces would be less desirable, but acceptable. A military withdrawal without unification would be even less desirable. Rapid Korean reunification with consequent refugee flow into China plus a strong Korean-U.S. alliance would be unacceptable. If such an outcome seems likely, China will shift its policy toward more active support to North Korea to resist reunification.

**"Japanese Perceptions,"** by *Prof. Tsuchiyama Jitsuo*, Aoyama Gakuin University. Prof. Tsuchiyama examined the relevance and likelihood of survival of the U.S.-Japan and U.S.-ROK alliances in light of the collapse of the Soviet Union--which provided the alliances' *raison d'etre*. After discussing the theoretical concept of "alliance" in light of three schools of international relations--realist, liberal-institutionalist, and "domestic policy"--he explored the two alliances from the perspectives of each of these schools. Prof. Tsuchiyama concluded that the U.S.-Japan alliance will endure. It is in the interests of both nations, even in the absence of a specific threat. Japan and the United States share economic interests and their economies are inextricably bound together in spite of the sometimes serious trade frictions between them. The alliance is cost-effective for both parties and tends to reassure both partners, as well as Japan's East Asian neighbors. These factors also apply to the U.S.-ROK Alliance. Prof. Tsuchiyama concluded that any alliance must be seen as having value to both parties; and so these alliances will endure so long as--and only so long as--the rationale for their existence remains persuasive both to the decisionmaking elites and to the publics of the nations concerned.

**"Russian Perceptions,"** by *Dr. Nikolai A. Geronin*, ITAR-TASS Seoul Bureau. Dr. Geronin noted that the U.S.-ROK Alliance is presented as a shield and deterrent, but the tension on the peninsula results from the division of the country. Reunification is the precondition to peace and stability. Thus, the alliance may, by inhibiting reunification, be an obstacle to the very peace and security which it is alleged to maintain.

After the death of Kim Il Sung, North Korea showed signs of wanting to have contact with the outside world. The implementation of the U.S.-DPRK Framework Agreement and resultant provision of light water reactors (LWR), end of the North Korean nuclear program, and exchange of liaison officers are likely to increase that contact, leading inevitably to changes in the make-up of the DPRK. Mr. Geronin suggested that it is in South Korea's own interest to reduce obstacles to U.S.-DPRK contact, and even to facilitate such contacts.

Mr. Geronin noted that China and Russia were not included in the Framework Agreement talks and he expressed concern about the current arrangement in which the United States, the ROK, and Japan confront the DPRK. Russia has friendly relations with both sides, has ended the military provisions of its treaty with North Korea, and can play a positive role in the region. It is up to the ROK and the United States to decide the future of the alliance and the continued presence of U.S. forces, but from the Russian perspective, as the ROK-DPRK relationship expands, the ROK-U.S. Alliance decreases in importance and the U.S. military presence may be hindering reunification.

**Discussion.** *Prof. Yoo Se Hee* (Hanyang University) asked what China's reaction would be if U.S. dialogue with North Korea interfered with China's influence over the North. If an alliance assumes common enemies, against whom is the U.S.-Japan alliance postured? What is the purpose of that alliance? Prof. Yoo questioned Japan's commitment to peace and "nonhegemony," noting that Japanese youngsters seem more nationalistic than their elders. Finally, he asked what Russia's role will be in North-South Korean rapprochement.

*Prof. Rhee Sang Woo* (Sogang University) noted that, based on the presenters' comments, if Korea wants to please China, it should stay divided and keep the U.S. presence in the South; but, if it wants to please Russia, it must reunite and expel the Americans. In fact, to survive, Korea must maintain its relationship with the "most benign hegemon," which is the United States.

*Prof. Ha Young-Sun* (Seoul National University) asked what China's view is of the potential change in the role of U.S. forces from one of peninsular deterrence to one of regional stability. He asked for Prof. Wang's view of alleged Chinese statements that the DPRK demand for a peace treaty is unworkable. He then asked for Prof. Tsuchiyama's own view of the future of the U.S.-Japan alliance.

*Prof. Baik Chong Chun* (Sejong Institute) asked for Prof. Wang's views on China's apparent support for North Korea even though North Korea's attempt to end the Armistice is destabilizing. He also asked what China's view is likely to be on the possible replacement of the Armistice

with a "2+2" arrangement in which South and North Korea negotiate and the United States and China support and guarantee security. He noted that Dr. Geronin's view seemed to be based largely on political issues, while the actual situation seems to be influenced more by military factors. He asked how stable the situation would be without the U.S.-ROK Alliance.

*Dr. Larry Niksch* (U.S. Congressional Research Service) noted that North Korea's economic situation has declined precipitously over the past 3 months and China's aid to North Korea has also declined. Is this a kind of Chinese pressure for economic reform? He speculated that China might want stability in Northeast Asia so that it can pursue destabilizing actions in Southeast Asia. In closing, he asked if the Chinese understand the dynamics of Taiwanese nationalism.

*Dr. Thomas L. Wilborn* (Strategic Studies Institute, U.S. Army War College) noted that the traditional American view of its two Northeast Asia alliances was that they maintained stability by deterring North Korea and Russia. Now they may provide stability by giving the East Asian nations assurance that other East Asian states, such as China or Japan, will not become threatening.

*Prof. Liou To-Hai* (National Chengchi University) suggested that, rather than being conservative, China may be trying to build a China-dominated East Asian system. China's military build-up, nuclear tests, and posture vis-a-vis Taiwan and the Spratlys are all consistent with this approach. He questioned whether China's trade with North Korea is profitable, noting that, while China maintains a favorable trade balance on paper, this is largely because it forgives much of the North Korean bill as a form of aid. Prof. Liou argued that the PRC sees the United States as its current major military threat and Japan as a future threat, and he suggested that the value to China of a U.S. troop presence in the ROK is that it prevents attack by *either* side and hinders progress toward unification.

*A questioner from the floor* asked if, in the event of a North Korean attack, China might see the benefits of supporting North Korea as outweighing the costs, since the result of the ensuing war is likely to be a reunified Korea with a continued U.S. troop presence.

**Responses.** *Prof. Tsuchiyama* acknowledged that the threat which used to provide the basis for the U.S.-Japan alliance has diminished, but noted that institutionalized relationships can continue, so long as they have domestic support. There is another possible model in which the alliance remains on paper but gradually fades away over time. In such a case, the challenge is to develop a new basis for the alliance for, if it is to survive, it has to provide more substantial diplomatic cooperation. Regarding the ROK-U.S. Alliance, he said that, in the end, ROK domestic politics will determine the future of the alliance. Regarding Okinawa, he said that it is hard to imagine the U.S.-Japan alliance as viable without a U.S. force presence, but suggested that the alliance would be better off with a smaller presence in Okinawa, especially Marines.

*Dr. Geronin* said that Russia is grappling with a larger and positive role, but it is wrong to say that China and Russia are excluded from Northeast Asia diplomacy. China prefers to operate in the shadows while Russia is not yet willing to look at ways to cooperate with the United States, lacks economic resources to exert influence, and still has security ties with North Korea, although it has renounced the military element of that treaty. This does not leave it many options.

*Prof. Wang* said that China is well beyond economic liberalization, but is concerned about the imposition of U.S. values on China. China likes the idea of a U.S. military presence in Northeast Asia to maintain the current situation, but would feel threatened if the United States were to send troops to *change* the current situation. The Chinese probably view a U.S.-DPRK peace treaty as infeasible, but they probably do not care either way, so long as the result is neither rapid unification nor United States withdrawal. He speculated that China might join a "2+2" (ROK and DPRK plus the United States and China) peace regime, but would be very cautious about disturbing the status quo and would probably not play an active role. He did not know why China's support to North Korea is declining, although it might be because China is tired of North Korean reluctance to engage in economic reform. He argued that the Chinese are "aggressive" in the China Sea only to the extent that they have long-standing claims in the area. He noted that Taiwan independence is a threat the PRC regime cannot ignore because it jeopardizes the very legitimacy of a regime that is bankrupt in every area except nationalism. To Prof. Liou he noted that the United States is an ideological threat, but Japan is a potential physical threat.

*Prof. Rhee* suggested that Japan would not accept a Sino-centric order, while China would not accept Japanese regional domination. He also suggested that the ROK can survive either by being a military porcupine, which is beyond its realistic capabilities, or by keeping a good relationship with the United States to balance the two regional giants.

### **Session 3. "The U.S.-DPRK Nuclear Agreement and the U.S.-ROK Alliance"**

*Prof. Kwak Tae-Hwan* (IFES) chaired the third panel and introduced the presenters, whose papers are summarized below.

**"The View From Seoul,"** by *Prof. Han Yong-Sup*, Korean National Defense University. Prof. Han reviewed the circumstances leading to the inter-Korean Basic Agreement [Agreement on Reconciliation, Nonaggression, and Exchanges and Cooperation Between the South and the North, February 19, 1992], the Denuclearization Agreement [Joint Declaration of the Denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula, February 19, 1992], and the October 1994 U.S.-DPRK nuclear Framework Agreement. On balance, the benefits of the Geneva Accord outweigh the problems, but the United States and ROK now need to expand their joint efforts. Prof. Han suggested that the United States acknowledge South Korea's willingness to accept the burden of the costs of constructing the LWR and lessen South Korea's conventional burden-sharing accordingly. He said the allies should replace the ad hoc policy process used to date with a tight policy coordinating process, including a joint strategic team

that meets on a regular basis and institution-building between the two countries. He noted that North Korea has not changed its antagonistic policy toward South Korea and is very clever in playing on the differences between Seoul and Washington. He suggested that the United States avoid a long series of conventional arms control talks, not give any more unilateral concessions to North Korea, and link any concessions with tangible changes in North Korean conventional as well as nuclear policy. Finally, he argued that the concessions made to solve the nuclear crisis tend to degrade the combined defense, so efforts are needed to improve South Korea's security and ability to deal with the conventional threat. U.S. participation should be through South Korea instead of through direct talks with North Korea and the two allies should design a conventional arms control strategy to be carried out in tandem with the implementation of the Geneva Accord.

**"A View from Japan,"** by *Prof. Takesada Hideshi*, Japanese National Institute for Defense Studies. Prof. Takesada noted that the Framework Agreement contains a number of positive points, but also some negatives. North Korea can continue to have graphite-moderated reactors for the duration of the agreement; there is no guarantee of special inspections; the amount of alternative energy to be provided to the North is twice as much as its actual needs; and the United States seems to be prepared to establish relations with the North without verifying North Korean compliance with specific requirements of the agreement. Thus, North Korea seems to have gained more than the United States in the negotiations and residual suspicions of North Korea's motives have not been alleviated.

North Korea probably began its nuclear program in order to develop technology for export, sustain its overall military advantage, increase military loyalty to the Kim dynasty, use the threat of nuclear weapons as a psychological or other military application, reduce Chinese and Russian military influence over North Korea, and achieve diplomatic benefits and concessions. Some believe that, in spite of these potential benefits, North Korea would run serious risks if it continued with its nuclear program. Prof. Takesada dismissed these views and offered a number of policy suggestions. He said it is desirable to pursue a policy of both carrots and sticks: the United States should insist that North Korea abide by the Missile Technology Control Regime (MTCR) guidelines; North Korea should be asked to send observers to military exercises in the south; South-North dialogue should proceed in parallel with the LWR program, and North Korea should be asked to provide such basic military information as the level of its defense spending, total number of military personnel, the objectives of its defense policy, and basic data on its major weapon systems. In addition, the United States should continue to extend its nuclear umbrella and maintain its bilateral security relationships. The United States, Japan, and South Korea should exchange views on strategic issues. In particular, the ROK and Japan should not compete, but should develop a coordinated approach toward the North.

**"A View From Washington,"** by *Dr. Larry Niksch*, U.S. Congressional Research Service. Dr. Niksch noted that the freeze on North Korea's nuclear program is holding, but lethargy is settling into the

implementation of the LWR contract with three potential results: to stretch the implementation timetable; to increase the costs of the project substantially; and to delay triggering North Korea's obligations regarding inspections and removal of reactor fuel rods. The Clinton administration appears to view the prospect of these delays as acceptable, so long as the nuclear freeze holds, an attitude which reflects certain assumptions. One assumption emphasizes the defensive motives behind North Korean actions. Another concerns the likelihood that North Korea will begin so-called "Chinese-style" economic reforms. The third assumption is that North Korea faces a near-term and nearly inevitable collapse and, therefore, some of the problems will become moot or less significant. Events in North Korea over the past few months tend to strengthen this view, which also seems to be widely held in Seoul.

Critics of the Clinton administration question both the impact of the economic benefits to North Korea and the "inevitable collapse" theory. They stress the need for the United States to do more to promote South-North negotiations and to develop more active diplomacy toward North Korea. The critics have not altered the administration's approach, but may have succeeded in making the administration more sensitive to South Korea's role in the LWR project. The big issue, however, may be money. Delay in implementing the LWR project is likely to increase congressional reluctance to approve substantial money and benefits for North Korea. This could produce a financial crisis over the issue of oil shipments to the North unless a "volunteer," such as Kuwait or Brunei, steps forward to provide oil at no charge.

The Clinton administration has two choices. It can continue the present strategy focused on preserving the nuclear freeze and avoiding both nuclear confrontation and active diplomacy on the non-nuclear issues, thus staying the course but risking a crisis caused by insufficient funding unless North Korea *does* collapse or the oil countries volunteer oil for the future. The second choice is to adopt a different and more comprehensive diplomatic strategy on non-nuclear issues. This would help to close the gap with the critics but would carry some risks of its own and require the expenditure of more time and diplomatic resources than the administration currently wishes to spend on this issue.

**"The View from Pyongyang,"** by *Mr. Selig S. Harrison*, Carnegie Endowment for International Peace. Mr. Harrison reported on his 19-26 September 1995 discussions in North Korea. He noted that the North Koreans are bitterly disappointed with the nuclear freeze agreement, particularly with the failure of the United States to honor the pledge to remove economic sanctions. He believes the North Koreans have been trying to figure out how to get the attention of the United States, get rid of the rogue state image, and convince American and ROK public opinion that they should no longer be regarded as an enemy. They made a number of statements to him signalling acceptance of the U.S. force presence in the South. Lieutenant General Rhee Chang-bok, representative of the Korean People's Army (KPA) at Panmunjom, insisted that replacing the Armistice and the UN Command is a precondition for normalization and proposed a two-track peacekeeping system. First the establishment by the U.S. and North Korean armed forces of a "new

peace mechanism," followed "at the earliest possible date" by implementation of the North-South Joint Military Commission.

Mr. Harrison thinks the North Koreans have four motives: they want to draw the United States into a commitment to the security and survival of the North Korean regime; persuade the United States to relax economic sanctions; reassure South Korea that the North is ready for coexistence; and may also want to signal a nationalist message to Seoul that they share with South Korea a common desire to offset Japanese, Chinese, and Russian power in Northeast Asia with U.S. forces as a buffer.

Mr. Harrison suggested that it would be a mistake to simply say North Korea should talk to South Korea first. He suggested the United States say, "We will talk with you at the level of general, which you are demanding, at Panmunjom wearing our UNC hats and asserting our status as representatives of the UN Command. Making that clear, and with your acknowledgment that that is the status with which we are talking to you, we will acknowledge that these talks can consider how the Armistice could be replaced given certain preconditions." Then, Mr. Harrison suggested, the United States should use this dialogue to put forward its conditions: a genuinely two-track process in which the North-South Commission would come into force simultaneously and tension reduction measures of a serious nature coincident with the dissolution of the UN Command. He suggested that the objective of finding a way, consistent with U.S. obligations to the South, to move to a new role as a stabilizer and balancer and security guarantor is a desirable objective consistent with South Korean interests.

**Discussion.** *Prof. Baek Kwang Il* (Inha University) suggested that Mr. Harrison's view that it would be in U.S. interests to normalize political and economic relations with North Korea, even if there were no nuclear freeze, is contrary to the Geneva Accord which includes an annex to the effect that accomplishment of the accord is related to North-South dialogue. He noted that critics of the Agreed Framework argue that, while being outside the nuclear talks, the ROK is expected to pay the bill. Prof. Baek argued in favor of trilateral, rather than bilateral talks.

*Prof. Jeon Kyong Mann* (Korea Institute for Defense Analysis) argued that only South-North talks can promise peace and security. The ROK was mostly excluded from the October 1994 agreement, but felt reassured by the provisions that North Korea would take steps to resume the South-North dialogue. Those steps have not been taken. The United States must now act as a mediator and balancer between its long-time friend and its long-time adversary, and, in ROK eyes, the United States has not made sufficient effort to promote the South-North talks.

*Dr. Kim Tae Woo* (Research Institute of Peace Studies) noted that internationalist conservatives, such as the bureaucrats in the Seoul Government, emphasize international collaboration but always follow the U.S. policy line, while nationalist conservatives respect the ROK-U.S. Alliance but pursue ROK interests. The nationalists ask whether there is a strategic gap between the North and South because the United States has closed its eyes to past North Korean actions. They note that the ROK is the only country to unilaterally abandon reprocessing and enrichment,

both legal under the NPT and economically justifiable. They are concerned about the serious missile gap resulting from ROK promises not to pursue missiles with greater than 180 km range. They note Japan's substantial nuclear reprocessing and space programs and ask why the ROK should go "barehanded" when surrounded by nuclear powers. He said the South Korean people are tired of seeing ROK diplomacy delegated to the United States.

*Prof. Wang Fei-ling* (Georgia Institute of Technology) asked Prof. Takesada if it would be possible for a more assertive Japan to normalize its relations with the DPRK before the United States does so. He asked Dr. Nicksch how much difference exists between Congress and the White House on the ways to deal with North Korea. He asked Mr. Harrison if the North Koreans are ready to undertake serious economic reform, once a security arrangement is made with the United States and they feel safe.

*Dr. Peter Hayes* (Nautilus Institute) questioned the extent to which critics had affected the U.S.-DPRK negotiations and argued that the United States has agreed only to minor changes and has remained steadfast--it was North Korea that blinked on every major issue. He denied Prof. Han's claim that the United States has provided security "assurances" to North Korea. All that the North Koreans have is the prospect that, when they come into full compliance, and after the issue of the discrepancy between their declared report and the IAEA analysis of how much plutonium they have reprocessed is resolved, *then* they will get the same assurance that any other party in compliance with the NPT gets, with the caveat that this assurance does not apply in the case of aggression when allied with a nuclear-armed state. He also contested Prof. Takesada's claim that the amount of heavy oil being provided to North Korea is too much, since it is less than one percent of their total energy supply and North Korea will pay for the oil. Dr. Hayes then made a general comment to the effect that, while it is understandable that we focus on the narrow military concepts of security, in the long run, such issues as integrated coastal zone management and management of the East Sea (commitments already undertaken by every government in the region in the context of the Northwest Pacific Action Plan) will be of greater consequence.

*Dr. Kil Jeong Woo* (The Jong-ang Daily News) noted that the message of the North Korean leadership conveyed by Mr. Harrison should be considered seriously, regardless of North Korea's sincerity. He then suggested it would be wrong to base policy on the assumption that the North Korean *system* will collapse and expressed skepticism about how U.S. policy is being made. He pointed out that a future new government in Seoul is likely to have greater popular support and to be more nationalistic than the current regime. It may be a regime that can say "no" to the United States. In the course of improving the relationship between the United States and North Korea, the United States should be more sensitive to the state of the U.S.-ROK Alliance and consider ways to deal with such issues as the Status of Forces Agreement (SOFA) and how to give the ROK some leverage in developing its own missile technology.

**Questions from the Floor.** *Dr. Edward A. Olsen* (U.S. Naval Postgraduate School) asked why, if they are really serious, the North

Koreans did not raise their proposal through the channel they have now established for communicating with the United States. *General (Ret) Baik Jong Chun* (Sejong Institute) asked Mr. Harrison if he noted any differences of opinion among the North Koreans and if he ever transmitted the views of South Korean scholars and officials to the North. *Prof. Park Tong Whan* (Northwestern University) asked Prof. Takesada what he thought Japan's response would be if the ROK exercised the nuclear option. *Dr. Merrill* noted that, although it is emotionally satisfying to attempt to link the Agreed Framework to new performance by North Korea, North Korea can make new linkages of its own. It is better to let the Agreed Framework be implemented and keep it buffered from new demands. He took sharp exception to the claims that South Korean officials are "internationalists" who simply toe the U.S. line. He suggested that too strong a "nationalist conservative" position will, over time, undercut the alliance. *Colonel William Drennan* (Institute of National Strategic Studies, National Defense University) asked what the younger, more assertive, more nationalistic critics of the Agreed Framework would like to see as an alternative. *Dr. Kim Chang Su* (Korea Institute of Defense Analysis), noting that peace and security require political will on the part of North Korea, suggested that, because tension is the most important power source of the North Korean leadership, such political will is unlikely. (*Unknown speaker*) said that the U.S. strategy in the Korean peninsula has three characteristics: non-proliferation, war deterrence at minimum cost, and an ambiguous position toward ROK unification policy. Since the Agreed Framework was signed in Geneva, the character of the U.S.-ROK Alliance has seriously changed. The United States now negotiates with the enemy without the participation of the ROK, causing growing anti-Americanism and nationalism in South Korea. It means that Washington and Seoul have different national goals in the Korean peninsula. This is a turning point and crisis in the partnership. The ambiguous U.S. policy toward the Korean peninsula makes the Korean people very distrustful.

**Responses.** *Mr. Harrison* pointed out that the United States has been paying the bills and risking American lives for 45 years, so he is not upset to see the ROK pay some of the bills for a nuclear agreement that is a bargain in terms of ROK peace and security. He said he does not think that North Korea is serious about internal Chinese-style reforms but wants a very contained and localized opening to get foreign technology and consumer goods. He speculated that North Korea made its overture through him instead of through the existing channel because the United States insists on adhering to a UNC approach and North Korea doesn't want that. He assured the workshop participants that he does present ROK views to the North as well as presenting DPRK views to the South. He acknowledged that it is worth asking if North Korea is generating tension to buttress its position, but said that *at present* the North Korean leadership does not appear to be fomenting tension to stay in power.

*Dr. Nicksch* stated that the quality of U.S.-ROK policy coordination will determine the impact of the Agreed Framework and other negotiations on the U.S.-ROK Alliance. He does not think the policy coordination is good at present and much needs to be done from both sides. In the future, a tripartite approach with Japanese participation

has the most promise. The KEDO structure might provide an example to be used in future initiatives. He said the differences between the Clinton administration and Congress go quite deep, but Congress, by its nature, has difficulty in developing coherent alternative policy initiatives. He defended his position that the critics have influenced policy, pointing to shifts to a more substantial ROK negotiating role in KEDO.

*Prof. Han* said that, in dealing with North Korea, the United States must be consistent and sensitive to spill-over effects of the Geneva Agreement. The ROK has been willing to bear part of the defense burden, but the United States should recognize and take into account Korea's LWR contribution and adjust conventional burden-sharing accordingly. He recommended the ROK National Assembly pass a resolution preventing further cost sharing in KEDO in order to send a message to Pyongyang that it cannot manipulate the United States to make South Korea pay the burden.

*Prof. Takesada* said that Japan has no intention to acquire strategic nuclear weapons and noted Japan's strong civilian control, its "three non-nuclear" policy, recent public opinion, and lack of local sources of uranium. Japan might normalize its relations with the DPRK, but only after the resolution of the nuclear issue, after South-North talks have been reestablished, and after the establishment of U.S. and DPRK liaison offices. He also noted that, while the United States may hold all the cards, North Korea still has its ballistic missile program, chemical and biological weapons, and missile exports to the Middle East.

#### **Session 4. "ROK and U.S. Strategies in the Post-Cold War Era"**

*Prof. Hahn Bae Ho* (Sejong Institute) chaired the session and introduced the presenters, whose papers are summarized below.

**"Korea's Security Strategy for the 21st Century,"** by *Prof. Kim Woo Sang*, Sookmyung Women's University. Prof. Kim pointed out that, even after Korea is unified, it will be surrounded by great, nuclear-capable powers. In order to survive, it must either maintain its ties with the United States or develop its own nuclear capability. Effective nuclear deterrence would be enormously costly and so Prof. Kim proposed a "limited no-first-use" regime under which nuclear-capable states would agree not to use nuclear weapons against any non-nuclear state, even if the non-nuclear state attacks with conventional weapons. A nuclear-capable state could continue to exercise flexible response options if it were attacked by a nuclear capable state. If such a regime were established, a non-nuclear unified Korea could protect itself against its neighbors, even in the absence of the U.S. nuclear umbrella. In order for the limited no-first-use regime to be acceptable, a unified Korea must have sufficient conventional capabilities to defend against conventional attack.

Prof. Kim suggested that a unified Korea should maintain a bilateral alliance, not with any contiguous countries, but with one far away from the Korean peninsula which has strong interests in the region and possesses sufficient power projection capability to be able to intervene in a timely and effective manner in case of conflict. At present,

the United States is the only power satisfying these criteria. Such a post-unification alliance would assure the security of Korea, which has too small a resource base to contend unilaterally with neighboring great powers. The only way in which Korea should become involved in a security relationship with neighboring powers is through a loose multilateral security regime.

Prof. Kim also introduced the concept of Korea as a "pivotal power" which, though having limited resources, maintains sufficient economic, military, and political power to exert a disproportionate influence in the region. Korea holds an important geopolitical position. If it increases its economic and military capabilities and seeks an active role in the region, Korea is well placed to perform the "pivotal power" role.

**"U.S. East Asian Strategy for the Future,"** by *Prof. William T. Pendley*, U.S. Air War College. Prof. Pendley said he sees three major changes in Asia which would have happened whether or not the Soviet Union had ceased to exist and whether or not the Cold War ended. The first is the rise of Japan and China, which is disquieting in light of the consequences when the international system has failed to adjust peacefully to the rise of great powers and the collapse of old empires in the past. The second is the failure of the North Korean economic and political systems. The third is a new orientation among the small and middle powers of Southeast Asia and Australia. While Asia is changing, U.S. interests have been consistent: to maintain access to the region; maintain freedom of navigation through and within the region; and oppose domination of the region by any single power. U.S. interests are best served by a regional stability that does not equate to "status quo," but encourages economic growth and positive political change.

This dynamic stability requires a broadened alliance with Japan, comprehensive engagement with China, and maintenance of deterrence in Korea while trying to work toward the so-called "soft landing" in North Korea. U.S. policy should balance three fundamental roles: reassurance to allies and friends, deterrence in North Korea, and a nonthreatening stance toward China. The U.S. military force size, posture, and basing structure should not be static, but must be consistent with the three elements of the equation. In Japan, there may be further consolidation of the base structure, but the current force and command structure are appropriate so long as North Korea poses a threat. A Theater Missile Defense (TMD) system would be appropriate in light of the North Korean and other future missile threats and Japan's defensive orientation. As the ROK improves its military defense capability, the United States should continue to move from a leading to a supporting role in the alliance. Elsewhere in the region, the United States should expand its presence and engagement in Southeast Asia and the Pacific Islands.

Overall, the United States must continue to be prepared to respond flexibly to changes in the dynamic Asia-Pacific region and avoid temptations to freeze the status quo or to withdraw. This requires leadership determined to remain a power in Asia and capable of convincing the American people that they have a high stake economically and politically in the success of a U.S. strategy designed to foster

stability in the region and to shape the future regional security environment.

**"The Political and Military Roles of U.S. Forces in Korea,"** by Prof. William E. Berry, U.S. Air Force Academy. Prof. Berry examined the impact on the ROK-U.S. Alliance of U.S. domestic politics, particularly the institutional tension between the President's role as Commander-in-Chief and the congressional role in appropriating funds and ratifying treaties. During the Nixon administration, with the Vietnam War at its height, Congress took the lead in opposing an American role as international policeman and reducing defense spending. One way to deal with both issues was to withdraw some U.S. forces from overseas. Such a move also fit President Nixon's strategic goal of reducing the confrontation with China. Thus, it was not a completely antagonistic relationship although, in Prof. Berry's view, without congressional pressure, the President would not have withdrawn the 7th Infantry Division from Korea when he did.

President Carter, elected in 1976, had his own reasons for wanting to move forward with the withdrawal of the last of the American ground combat presence in Korea. In this instance, Congress played a quite different role by attempting to impede and eventually stop the Carter withdrawal program. The main reason was concern about American credibility in light of both the loss of Vietnam and the U.S. withdrawal from Taiwan, incidental to the rapprochement with China. A 1979 intelligence reassessment indicating a substantially increased North Korean threat provided a rationale for halting the withdrawal.

Presidents Reagan and Bush concentrated on rebuilding the ROK-U.S. relationship in the wake of the turbulence of the Vietnam era and the forestalled Carter withdrawals. Further troop withdrawals were not a matter of significant concern, although the Congress raised the issue from time to time due to budget constraints and changing threat perceptions as the Cold War drew to a close. President Clinton has consistently followed a policy of retaining the U.S. military presence in Korea.

Today, there is general unanimity between the two branches on the question of U.S. forces in Korea. Prof. Berry suggested that this is because attention has shifted to the North Korean nuclear issue. Most current congressional criticism is focused on the effectiveness of the Clinton administration's counterproliferation policy vis-a-vis North Korea rather than on the troop issue. Prof. Berry was relatively sanguine that the U.S. force presence in Korea will not be a contentious issue over the next few years in spite of the changes which have taken place in the international system.

**Discussion.** Dr. Merrill questioned Prof. Kim's assumption of successful near-term Korean reunification; asked for clarification of Prof. Kim's "limited no-first-use" regime; and suggested there may be a contradiction between the "pivotal power" role Prof. Kim lays out for Korea and the continuation of the alliance. He told Prof. Pendley that "oppose the rise of regional hegemony" seems much like a "balance of power" approach, which is difficult to define and not a particularly good guide to specific policies. He disagreed that issues with North Korea can

be resolved *only* through North-South negotiations; the United States could be helpful in facilitating North-South engagement. He suggested that North Korea may be pursuing a phased policy. Recognizing South Korea's superior strength, North Korea might want to even things up a bit by improving its own relations with the United States and Japan before re-engaging with the ROK. He then asked Prof. Berry whether the issue of the U.S. presence has gone away in U.S. domestic politics, or is just temporarily overshadowed by the proliferation issue.

*Dr. Kim Chang Su* (Korea Institute for Defense Analysis) applauded Dr. Kim Woo Sang's rejection of a neutral role for a reunified Korea. Some young people and some nationalists seem to believe that after the North Korean threat fades, the relationship with the United States will change and Korea could opt for an independent, neutral status. This is unrealistic. He then questioned Korea's ability to preserve the traditional security alliance while adopting a multilateral approach. Dr. Kim also questioned Prof. Pendley's vision of a continuing military presence in Japan with little change in the structure in Korea, while seeing North Korea as doomed to fail. This seems just as "static" an approach as that of the Clinton administration which Prof. Pendley criticised. In fact, Dr. Kim argued, the current U.S. strategy, while appearing static, also tries to look to the future: dynamism is a matter of degree. He thought the idea of deactivating, but not ending, the UN Command was a good idea which raised the possibility of using the UNC for other purposes. He commended Prof. Berry for a good historical resume, but said he would like to know more about the current post-Cold War period and projections for the next few years.

*Dr. Olsen* asked Prof. Kim what would happen if unification resulted in a weak, united Korea and what adversary to the United States is likely to arise in Asia which would make Korea a necessary ally? Noting that, in his paper, Prof. Pendley said China exhibited 19th century ideas about national sovereignty, Dr. Olsen argued that many Americans seem to hold similar ideas. He also noted that the United States and the former Soviet Union were responsible for the division of Korea and that continued division is an inadvertent by-product of U.S. support for the ROK. He also suggested that merely encouraging Japan to do more in nonmilitary areas means that the United States will do the heavy lifting while Japan does the easier parts. He concluded by saying that a stronger case needs to be made to the U.S. people as to why the United States should be engaged in Asia. It is possible that a new administration reflecting a different set of assumptions might move the United States to a strategy in which all overseas-deployed U.S. forces are brought home.

*Prof. Tsuchiyama* noted that Prof. Kim heavily emphasized the military side and asked about Korean thinking on other--political and economic--aspects of security. He also asked if nuclear deterrence has really worked well, since it can't be proved that there was ever a specific case in which China or the Soviet Union contemplated an attack on Korea and was deterred by the U.S. nuclear umbrella. He then asked Prof. Pendley if China would not take countermeasures if TMD is deployed in Japan. He also asked if withdrawal from Okinawa would be a good policy for the United States and Japan.

**Responses.** *Prof. Kim Woo Sang* responded that he agreed that Korean unification is a big assumption, but argued that his paper's conclusions are valid even without reunification. The "limited no-first-use" policy might help in the current situation with North Korea, while the alliance with the United States is important to induce a smooth unification process. He agreed that the "limited no-first-use" regime might be just declaratory, since there is no supranational authority to enforce it, but it is still worth trying. It would be well-received by world opinion and would be more suitable than the more costly alternatives. Regarding the concept of a "pivotal power," he said it will be necessary for Korea to increase its economic prowess and strengthen its conventional weapons capability to avoid becoming a pawn. Until such time as Korea attains sufficient power to be a pivotal power, it must maintain its alliance with the United States

*Prof. Pendley* stressed that trying to prevent any one power from controlling a region is not the same as trying to maintain a "balance of power." He said the United States should play a facilitating role but not be seen as being out in front on every issue. He expressed concern about the "zero sum" attitude on the part of many Koreans, noting that the ROK is now strong enough to ignore minor annoyances from the North and move ahead on a broad front. He agreed with Dr. Olsen that some segments of the U.S. population are going through some agony in the adjustment to global engagement and some politicians play to that pain. But he does not see this as comparable to China in terms of 19th century visions: Americans recognize that they live in an interdependent world today and the country has to be deeply integrated in the global system. He agreed that the United States was responsible for the division of Korea in 1945 but was also responsible for its liberation. The issue now is the continuing division of Korea and, if the United States does not change its policy, it will be seen as responsible for that continuing division, which would be tragic for the long-term relationship. He argued that it would be a serious mistake to encourage Japan to increase its military role and that the American people can be brought to understand this. He agreed that different assumptions lead to different outcomes, but stressed that a reversion to a CONUS (Continental United States)-based strategy would be a serious mistake. He acknowledged that China might try to take countermeasures to a TMD system, but said this would be excessively costly in light of the nonthreatening nature of TMD. *Prof. Pendley* said the most important aspect of Okinawa is as a support base which gives the United States the capability to fulfill its commitments in the region. Nonetheless, the United States could consolidate facilities in Japan, reducing the pressures relative to the continuing U.S. presence.

*Prof. Berry* responded to Dr. Merrill that the current executive-legislative agreement on the U.S. force presence in Korea is probably a temporary phenomenon, in part because of Korean nationalism (any presence of foreign forces necessarily involves some loss of sovereignty). Costs incidental to implementing the Agreed Framework might also cause executive-legislative tensions.

**Questions from the Floor.** *Mr. Harrison* suggested that, since Japan has a civilian nuclear and space program, the Chinese see TMD as

a shield, behind which Japan could prepare for a first strike capability. TMD, in certain forms, would also conflict with the ABM (Anti-Ballistic Missile) Treaty and undercut nuclear arms control with Russia. *Dr. Niksch* asked *Prof. Pendley* what the substance of "engagement" is. He also asked if engagement and containment must always be separate and mutually exclusive in U.S. policy toward China and North Korea. He noted that, when the United States dealt with the Soviet Union during the Cold War, there was always an attempt to integrate engagement and containment, and in some cases pressure. *Prof. Han Yong-Sup*, noting that the United States down-sized its forces in the early 1990s due to economic considerations, asked if the United States needed less deterrence than now, or if U.S. economic problems are no longer a factor. He also suggested that the proposed changes in command structure would improve the ROK negotiating position vis-a-vis the North. *Major Tim Cory* (ROK-U.S. Combined Forces Command) asked the panel's views concerning the future role of Russia in Korea and East Asia. In light of Russia's relationship with the United States, the ROK, and the DPRK, it seems that Russia could be of great assistance in dealing with South-North Korean issues. *Mr. Steve Bradner* (U.S. Forces Korea) asked about the impact of UNC deactivation on base rights in Japan and noted that the problems of transitioning from peace to war are great enough without the additional complexity of changing command relationships and responsibilities on the first day of hostilities. He then asked what China's "rightful place" is in the region? With regard to the "zero sum" issue, he suggested that, while it may be possible to work out a mid-term solution which is not "zero sum," the final result may still be zero sum in terms of the survival of one of the regimes on the Korean peninsula. Finally, he suggested that the logical result of all the moves from leading to supporting set forth in the U.S. Department of Defense East Asia Strategic Initiative (EASI) paper would be the dissolution of the alliance. Perhaps there has been an undue emphasis on the North Korean nuclear issue as the rationale for freezing the EASI initiatives whereas the real reason for doing it was the still very threatening North Korean conventional force overhang. The nuclear issue may have just provided a cover to do what the United States should have done in any case: stop the EASI initiatives.

**Responses.** *Prof. Pendley* noted that China wants to maintain its own first strike capability against an undefended Japan and stressed the value of defensive systems in a proliferating world which we seem unable to control. He told *Dr. Niksch* that such issues as transparency, broader strategic exchange on visions of the future of the region, and the Taiwan issue are all important topics of discussion as a part of engagement. He agreed that engagement and containment can be pursued simultaneously, but noted that when you talk about "containment," you send a message to the Chinese that you are unwilling to accept China as a major power. This would be a serious strategic mistake. We may have to adopt a containment policy in the future, but that would represent a failure of policy. To *Prof. Han* he said the fundamental issue for the United States is to maintain significant *capabilities* and some troops on the ground as an assurance of commitment. He acknowledged that command structure changes can facilitate South-North negotiations and would reflect the reality that South Korea provides the majority of ground combat power in the alliance. He told *Major Cory* that he is pessimistic

about Russia's future role. He feared that Russia will try to reassert itself in ways that may not be a positive factor in terms of overall stability. To Mr. Bradner he suggested that, because Japan has its own strong interests in supporting alliance efforts in the event of war in Korea, the "UNC base" issue is not critical. Transition to war is important, but ROK commanders are fully competent to manage the defense of their own country. As the force balance changes and more U.S. forces come to bear, there could be a transition to a U.S. commander. Regarding China's "rightful place," all the regional powers need to help China develop that definition. Regarding "zero sum," the important point to remember is that one of the things the Germans did well was to never allow the gap to become so great that it could not be bridged when the opportune moment came. That is the problem with taking a "zero sum" approach and why the ROK has to get away from that approach. Finally, while agreeing with the significance of the North Korean threat, he said we should get away from focusing on the number of U.S. soldiers on the peninsula. The key issue is capabilities.

**Further Discussion.** *Dr. Olsen* argued that Russia can play a positive role and that cash does not necessarily provide influence, as the cases of Japan and Taiwan demonstrate. *Dr. Nicksch* noted that Russia made the decision not to join KEDO, although it has a lot to offer in terms of knowledge of North Korea's infrastructure and energy needs. It still has the opportunity to play a positive role. *Dr. Wilborn* noted that there are two classes of KEDO members and Russia is not willing to take a position as a junior partner. *Dr. Geronin* agreed with that assessment. *Dr. Merrill* said he thinks there will be some evolution in the structure of KEDO, at which time Russia's participation will be useful.

## **Session 5. "The United States and a Unified Korea in the 21st Century"**

*Dr. Thomas L. Wilborn* (Strategic Studies Institute, U.S. Army War College) chaired the session and introduced the presenters, whose papers are summarized below.

**"The United States Policy Toward A Unifying Korea,"** by *Dr. Edward A. Olsen*, U.S. Naval Postgraduate School. *Dr. Olsen* noted that the long-standing U.S. security commitment to the ROK has become a conditioning factor which influences, and often distorts, U.S. policy priorities regarding Korean unification. Similarly, U.S. economic policy in Asia, which supports South Korea and excludes North Korea, does not encourage unification. Further, the remaining post-Cold War power centers are hyper-cautious about tinkering with the system which keeps a divided Korea in rough equilibrium. This predisposition toward continuity is reinforced by the American sensitivity to Japanese and Chinese ambiguity about Korean reunification and by American officials, whose careers are partially predicated on perpetuating a divided Korea. This inertia is also partly due to the U.S. psychological and moral commitment to South Korea, which remains frozen in a 1950s vintage Cold War atmosphere. It is important that Americans not sanction Korea becoming the last outpost of the Cold War; nor can either Korean state afford to be left behind by history as a Cold War relic. There needs to be

a basic meeting of the minds about the desirability and feasibility of progress in Korea.

The United States can help achieve this convergence through multilateral summitry. Such a big picture approach would clarify the desires of the major powers to resolve the Korean problem, while avoiding the suggestion that they are micromanaging Korean affairs. There is a need for greater urgency by all concerned, particularly for the United States, to create an agenda for Korean unification and for wider recognition of the likely consequences. Furthermore, all the major powers should begin to make contingency plans for the day when they must deal with one Korea again. Dr. Olsen urged bipartisan congressional support for the Agreed Framework as an initial step, less because of its counter-proliferation value than for its value as a step toward solving the inter-Korean problem. Once that crucial, but relatively short-term issue is resolved, Americans have to consider a range of contingencies. A case can be made that Korea's size, location, and probable military clout will make it a useful counterweight for the United States in any American effort to preserve a balance of power between China and Japan. But one can also describe Korea's juxtaposition amid China and Japan in any future regional balance of power as the sort of entangling web which Americans might want to avoid at all costs. The key would be the geopolitical perspective which guides U.S. foreign policy at that future time: strategic globalism or strategic autonomy.

**"Koreapolitik,"** by *Colonel William Drennan*, Institute of National Strategic Studies, National Defense University. Colonel Drennan extended warm greetings from *Ambassador James E. Goodby* (Carnegie Mellon University), the co-author of the paper, who could not be present because he was engaged in arms control work in Moscow on behalf of the Department of State. He then pointed out that, while the critical dimension of a peaceful solution to long-standing Korean security issues is a fruitful North-South dialogue, the dialogue is now stalled. Experience with confidence building elsewhere in the world, while not wholly relevant to Northeast Asia, may offer some insights and analogies useful to Korea.

The term *Nordpolitik* has been used to describe the successful diplomatic efforts of the previous South Korean government to establish relations with North Korea's communist allies. Just as *Ostpolitik* in the German context was accompanied by a *Deutschlandpolitik*, to signify an inter-German relationship, so there should be a place for a clearly-defined *Koreapolitik*. An essential element of *Koreapolitik* would be a restructuring of conventional force postures preceded by measures of transparency and constraints in order to reduce the dangers of war through miscalculation and to create a more stable, defensively oriented force relationship. This could be what Koreans on both sides of the DMZ have called a "peace system." Mechanisms established to oversee and monitor these new arrangements might replace or revise the institutional arrangements set up by the 1953 Korean Armistice Agreement. The United States should strongly support the ROK government if it chooses to adopt such a position as an element in its *Koreapolitik*.

The 1992 inter-Korean Basic Agreement could serve as the conceptual foundation on which to build. Colonel Drennan argued that negotiated measures to avoid miscalculation, to enhance warning time, and to enhance crisis management capabilities could be combined with follow-on arms limitation measures, such as reductions in North-South military personnel; reductions in levels and types of equipment; and changes in deployment patterns, especially near the DMZ, to enhance stability. These could be the heart of the "peace system" of which both sides have spoken. Seoul has laid the proper foundation if and when Pyongyang gets past its ideologically-driven positions. Seoul's pragmatic, step-by-step building block approach, in which a degree of political confidence is raised while military tensions are reduced, is the proper course: one that can be sustained in domestic and international public opinion and which can be effective if there is a serious negotiating partner across the table. Opportunities may now exist that were not present when North Korea's economic outlook was brighter and it had powerful support from the USSR and PRC. It should be a matter of considerable interest in Pyongyang if it is found that in the course of putting some arms control arrangements in place, it could obtain assurances from the United States and China that its equities in a peace system would be a matter of direct concern to these two powers.

**"The Alliance Role in Arms Control on the Korean Peninsula,"** by *Dr. Lee Choon Kun*, Sejong Institute. Prof. Lee noted that, while arms control is not a formally stated purpose of the ROK-U.S. Alliance, the alliance has already achieved arms control, as well as deterrence, in the Korean peninsula. In the early 1960s, when North Korea began to develop its military industry, the United States responded passively to South Korea requests for more arms. One Korean scholar explained this as a conscious U.S. policy: the United States provided South Korea with equipment somewhat inferior to that of North Korea to contain the independent action of South Korea. In the late 1960s and early 1970s, South Koreans, worried about the American will to defend Korea, began to think about independent national defense but the United States discouraged and limited the Korean arms industry. So, while it is true that Korea is very militarized because of the ROK-U.S. Alliance, in another sense the militarization has been controlled by the United States.

The alliance will continue to be very important for stabilizing the Korean peninsula in the future. Even though the United States no longer has a real enemy comparable to the Soviet Union, stability in the Korean peninsula still has a grave impact on the security of the United States. In this new world order, East Asia and the Korean peninsula become more valuable. Moreover, South Korea now has the basic technology and enough money to wage an arms race against North Korea, although it remains to be seen if it has the political will to do so. It is likely to engage in such a program only if it perceives that the ROK-U.S. Alliance will not function well in the future. In the past, the United States could control arms only in South Korea. Now North Korea has come to realize the value of a closer relationship with the United States and so the United States is in a position to influence arms in both North and South Korea. The United States can persuade North Korea and assure North Korea's survival by diplomatic and other measures. Maintenance of the ROK-U.S.

Alliance is the best way to achieve this purpose. By maintaining its troops in Korea and maintaining the alliance, the United States can achieve its goal of stability in the new world order.

**Discussion.** *Prof. Park Tong Whan* (Northwestern University) noted that the underlying assumption of all three papers is that unification will come in the form of a formal merger, probably through disintegration in the North. But de facto unification would be a viable option if North Korea were to choose a developmental dictatorship model followed by some economic growth, limited opening, and eventually liberalization and democratization, following in the footsteps of the ROK. As the two systems converge, the result will be de facto unification with "one nation-two states." Depending on which kind of unification one envisions, the approaches will differ. If it is a formal merger, the road to unification may be violent and military CBMs (confidence-building measures) will be difficult. In the case of de facto unification, some of the doctrines of "non-offensive defense" may be applicable. If both sides have to feel secure before they pursue nonmilitary cooperation, then military CBMs or even arms reduction may have to be foregone. Prof. Park asked Dr. Olsen if a Korea-focused major power summit is realistically possible. It may be in the interests of the four major powers in Northeast Asia, but the two Koreas would only accept such an arrangement if they are a party to it. He asked Colonel Drennan if the United States would seriously support South Korean *Koreapolitik*, considering that the United States would lose some of its leverage in the process. He suggested that North Korea is unlikely to accept an ROK *Koreapolitik* since the North's position seems to be that if it normalizes relations with the United States, South Korea will have to tag along.

*Dr. Cha Young-gu* (ROK Ministry of National Defense) noted that Dr. Olsen stressed the positive aspects of a Korea-focused summit but did not address the negative side. He questioned the feasibility, desirability, and acceptability of such a summit and noted that it conflicted with the ROK policy that unification is to be decided by Koreans themselves. He asked Colonel Drennan if the European model is really applicable to Korea unless both Koreas give up the objective of reunification. He asked for Colonel Drennan's opinion of the recent DPRK proposal and asked why, since an unrealized South-North agreement already exists, another agreement is necessary. Finally, he asked why North Korea needs new security guarantees beyond that already provided by the United States as part of the Framework Agreement.

*Prof. Kim Chae Han* (Hallym University) suggested to Dr. Olsen that North Korea is unlikely to accept capitalism as compatible with their system. He also argued that a "Camp David-style" summit might be portrayed in North Korean propaganda as proof that the ROK is a puppet of the United States and that a "4+2" (the United States, China, Russia, and Japan plus ROK and DPRK) formula will not change the basic situation. To Dr. Lee he suggested that North Korea is unlikely to accept the United States in the role of an impartial power.

*Dr. Ok Tae Hwan* (Research Institute for National Unification) noted that, while there are many proposals on the table, no progress is being made. He blamed this situation on North Korea's attitude. Noting

that North Korea desperately wants a peace treaty with the United States, he suggested that this might provide the United States some leverage with which to move North Korea in the right direction. He then criticized the various "mathematical" approaches to diplomacy: the "2+2" (ROK and DPRK plus the United States and China) option is not realizable because U.S.-China relations are currently poor and "2+4" (ROK and DPRK plus the United States, China, Russia, and Japan) brings too many foreign countries with incompatible interests into the Korean issue. Noting that collapse of the Kim Il Sung system does not necessarily mean collapse of North Korea as a state, he expressed pessimism over the likelihood of unification in the near future. On the other hand, the Agreed Framework has held up so far and, unlike the situation in the late 1940s, there are now many specialists studying the issue of potential unification and there is much closer consultation between the United States and the ROK: all favorable to a satisfactory resolution of the Korea question.

*Mr. Harrison* suggested that timing is the real issue in Dr. Olsen's proposals. North Korea does not yet believe that the United States is capable of playing a mediating role. Only after the United States changes its economic policy toward the North will the atmosphere allow such an option. North Korea's position is changing based on its realization that real merger is not likely in the near future. If the assumption is that unification is a long way off, then the United States should consider the approach of supporting confederation. This would make arms control, structural interchange, and other measures possible. He told Colonel Drennan that North Korea is not interested in a trilateral, but in a two-track approach. He also said he believes the concept of thinning out forces along the DMZ is an important element of confidence-building. Mr. Harrison said that Dr. Lee's paper was useful, but did not take into consideration that there have been arms control proposals in the context of South-North dialogue, including proposals for mutual force reductions. He believes that mutual force reductions are essential to North Korea if it is to stay afloat economically. His impression is that one group in the North's leadership supports it, but that the military opposes it. He thought that if the ROK proposed force reductions, it would be well received by the North. He also argued that the North Korean proposal is not camouflaged. It is a very frank peace proposal based on a belief that they must have U.S. and Japanese economic support before they can deal with the South: they want a more level playing field.

**Responses.** *Dr. Olsen* said that the summit would not micro-manage Korean issues, but would signal major power support for unification and defuse Korean claims that the major powers secretly want a divided Korea. Although North Korea might not accept, the approach is worth a try. It is true that North Korea might make propaganda of a Camp David summit, but that does not mean it is a bad idea. He acknowledged that North Korea has more to lose by being flexible, but asked which state has the greater power and status which allow it to be magnanimous: clearly, South Korea. He stressed that in his proposal the United States would not be the ringmaster, just an interested party bringing the two Koreas together in a public forum. Neither Korean side would be coerced. Regarding timing, he said that the

point is not to cause unification, or to shape or dictate the outcome, but to be a catalyst.

*Colonel Drennan* acknowledged that the United States would lose some leverage under the Goodby-Drennan proposal, that North Korea would only accept it if it was willing to accept the ROK as a negotiating partner, and that European approaches may not be directly applicable to Korea. But the proposal transmitted via Selig Harrison may be an indication that North Korea recognizes that it no longer has outside support. He stressed that his proposal was not intended to alter, but only to flesh out, the existing inter-Korean agreement. He suggested that North Korea does not need new security guarantees, but, just like South Korea, may need continual reassurance of the applicability of the existing one.

*Dr. Lee* stressed the importance of convincing the U.S. Congress and public of the intensity of U.S. interest in Korea. An isolationist policy in the United States would cause great problems for East Asia: Chinese, Japanese, and Korean insecurity; a potential arms race; and instability--all damaging to U.S. interests. To Prof. Kim he responded that he doubted the United States could play a role as an "impartial great power." Great powers have their own national interests which can be inimicable to smaller powers. Korea is surrounded by great powers and has to choose its own partner. Every regional great power but the United States has territorial ambitions. The United States is more benign. Regarding the value of U.S. forces, he quoted the adage that "One U.S. battalion in Tongduchon [near the DMZ] is worth more than a whole U.S. division south of Pusan."

**Comments from the Floor.** *Dr. Cha Young-gu* said that the U.S. presence in the ROK is not North Korea's business and argued that their proposal is camouflaged because their real goal is to destroy the ROK-U.S. Alliance and portray South Korea as a U.S. puppet. *Prof. Pendley* noted that North Korea has been on a dual-track approach for some time and uses either track when it is to its advantage. Even the statement that they accept U.S. forces in Korea is not a new item. The question is: what end result do they want, and is their desired end result in our interests? We need to be careful about believing that there are great new initiatives out there. *Dr. Niksch* noted that the two-track approach is similar to the previous tripartite approach. There are also similarities in the agenda: it is heavily loaded on the side of U.S.-DPRK talks but with a limited role for inter-Korean talks. He suggested that the jury is still out on the validity of North Korean claims to accept the presence of U.S. forces in Korea. Nonetheless, the two-track approach is likely to be appealing to the U.S. public. So long as the ROK continues to reject tripartite talks, it runs the risk of losing out in this environment. *Prof. Takesada* noted that in 1972 Kim Il Sung proposed normalization talks with Japan, including acceptance of the concept of two treaties: one with Japan and one with the ROK.

### **Closing Session.**

*Prof. Kwak Tae-Hwan* noted that three main topics had emerged from the workshop: the new DPRK peace proposal transmitted by Mr.

Selig Harrison, the presence of U.S. forces in a unified Korea, and the issue of whether improvements in the South-North relationship and the normalization of U.S.-DPRK relations will strengthen or weaken the alliance. Prof. Kwak expressed his belief that the DPRK proposal is significant and, if formally proposed by the North Korean government, will have to be given serious consideration. Prof. Kwak has previously argued that North Korea no longer seeks a withdrawal of U.S. forces, so he saw Mr. Harrison's report as a positive sign. While the U.S. force presence is a bilateral ROK-U.S. issue, it is also related to the peace process. North Korea offers a two-track approach, but the basic problem in implementing South-North dialogue is that North Korea is unwilling to come to the negotiating table with the Republic of Korea. The key issue, therefore, is finding a way to bring the DPRK to the table. With regard to the future of the alliance, Prof. Kwak expressed his belief that the "2+2" formula is a realistic proposal. He suggested that a peace agreement between the ROK and China and, eventually, a U.S.-DPRK peace agreement are both necessary. Meanwhile, the two Koreas have to implement their existing nonaggression agreement.

*Mr. No Chang-son* (Yonsei University), noting the various "mathematical formulas" for peace agreements, said that the easiest solution would be for the three main parties (ROK, DPRK, and United States) to sit down and work out a peace treaty. This being politically impossible, he suggested a "2 and 2" approach. There is already a South-North peace treaty in the Basic Agreement. Now the United States and DPRK should work out their own peace treaty, resulting in the "2 and 2" arrangement. He also expressed the view that the United States should pay reparations to Korea because the United States was responsible for the division of the peninsula.

*Dr. Ok Tae Hwan* said that a "2+2" arrangement is not bad, but is not realistic at the present stage, particularly since North Korea has excluded China from the Military Armistice Commission. He noted that, as presented, the North Korean proposal seems to suggest that in a tripartite forum the United States and DPRK would discuss substantive security issues while the ROK and DPRK would simply agree to a nonaggression pact. This is not acceptable to the ROK; therefore, it is necessary to lead North Korea to discussions on more realistic terms.

*Dr. Geronin* noted that when the U.S.-ROK Alliance was formulated, there was one South Korea. Now there is a new and different South Korea: democratic and economically strong. In the future, there will be yet another South Korea: economically powerful, pursuing globalization, and en route to becoming one of the advanced countries of the world. The U.S.-ROK Alliance will inevitably change in response, just as the U.S.-Japan Alliance has changed, with the ROK playing a more important role as an alliance partner.

*Ambassador Park* (Ministry of Foreign Affairs) warned that the modalities of a two track approach have to be considered. If the United States and DPRK discuss nuclear issues, United States aid to North Korea, or normalization of relations, the ROK would have no objection. But U.S.-DPRK bilateral discussions on the terms of the U.S.-ROK Alliance or on the issue of replacing the Armistice Agreement would be unacceptable to the ROK. He said that the North Koreans seem to want

to have a sort of Security Consultative Meeting with the United States as a preliminary to a peace treaty. But the convening of a Security Consultative Meeting is itself tantamount to a peace treaty, so he questioned the North's motive in suggesting such a meeting as a step toward a peace treaty.

*Dr. Cha Young-gu* noted that, while it is worthwhile to discuss proposals for a peace mechanism, in fact, Korea is not divided and in tension because of a lack of good ideas, but because of such other factors as a lack of domestic consensus and a lack of political will. If North Korea needs a peace treaty with the United States, the ROK also needs a peace treaty with China. Dr. Cha also noted that the United States and North Korea already have forums in which to discuss issues.

*Dr. Peter Hayes* argued that regime survival is the primary concern of the North Korean leadership. The situation is changing fast with the obliteration of the Cold War dictatorships. Only Seoul is in a position to ride these waves and be in advance of the changes. There is a range of options for dealing with the North, but if the ROK Government does not communicate to the North that it will be allowed to survive, the North will fight.

*Mr. Selig Harrison* said that the North Korean proposal should be viewed as the start of a process. The ROK should insist on two simultaneous tracks and make an approach to replace the Armistice Agreement and Military Armistice Commission. As a start, the United States should go to Panmunjom to see what kind of process and arms control we can get North Korea to accept. He said the latest North Korean proposal is the most promising one he has seen for some time.

*Mr. Steven Bradner* suggested that, while it is natural that we get preoccupied with structure, the problem goes beyond a lack of structure, mechanisms, and the ability to reach agreements. The problem lies more with the conventional military disparity [which favors North Korea] and the economic disparity [which greatly favors South Korea]. With regard to the claim that North Korea no longer wants U.S. forces to leave the peninsula, Mr. Bradner asked under which scenario North Korea's great conventional force overhang, which they have sacrificed so much to achieve, provides greater leverage: with or without a U.S. force presence? He suggested that a "zero sum" outcome is not dictated by ROK and U.S. policy, but by the asymmetry between the military and economic situations of the two Koreas.

**Final Remarks.** *Dr. Thomas L. Wilborn* thanked all the participants and expressed a special thanks to Colonel John R. O'Shea, who put together the financial package which made the workshop possible. He then thanked Prof. Kwak Tae-Hwan for his tireless work in orchestrating the conference.

*Prof. Kwak Tae-Hwan* thanked all the sponsors and supporters who made the three-day-long workshop possible. In particular, he thanked Dr. Thomas L. Wilborn and the Army War College Strategic Studies Institute team, whose support was essential to the success of the conference. He then expressed thanks to Commander Chris Thomas,

representing the Defense Nuclear Agency, Ambassador Don Gregg and The Korea Society in New York and in Seoul, The Asia Foundation, and others who made the workshop possible. He offered special thanks to Lieutenant General Timmons, the keynote speaker, and, on the Korean side, Major General Park Yong Ok. All the participants of the workshop applauded the splendid work of the able and talented staff of the Kyungnam University Institute of Far Eastern Studies, who worked so hard during the three-day workshop. Prof. Kwak recognized the behind-the-scenes work of the IFES Director of Planning, Dr. Yoon Dae-Kyu, and the very visible work of Dr. Lee Su-Hoon, who acted as a master of ceremonies throughout the workshop.

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