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UNITED STATES SECURITY ASSISTANCE TRAINING
OF LATIN AMERICAN MILITARIES:
INTENTIONS AND RESULTS.

THESIS

Barry L. Brewer, Captain, USAF

AFIT/GLM/LAL/95S-3

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
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INTENTIONS AND RESULTS*

THESIS

Presented to the Faculty of the Graduate School of Logistics
and Acquisition Management of the Air Force Institute of Technology

Air University

In Partial Fulfillment of the

Requirements for the Degree of

Master of Science in Logistics Management

Barry L. Brewer, B.S.

Captain, USAF

September 1995

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Barry L. Brewer

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Abstract

The United States has used security assistance training in Latin America as an element of foreign policy. This study determines intentions and results of security assistance training in Latin America and analyzes training statistics to evaluate its use as an instrument of foreign policy. This study also assesses the contribution of defense schools where Latin Americans receive security assistance training in their native Spanish language. The overriding purpose behind this research is to determine if security assistance training was intended to be a Cold War instrument of foreign policy or if it is an instrument of a more enduring nature. The study uses the historical research method to collect, analyze, and evaluate research data. This study arrives at four conclusions. First, security assistance training of Latin Americans was not solely intended to meet Cold War requirements, but instead was a foreign policy tool used for various purposes. Second, IMET training statistics show that security assistance training was indeed an element of foreign policy. Third, Spanish language schools were major training vehicles for the security assistance training of Latin Americans. Fourth, the results of security assistance training have contributed significantly to improving the professionalism and competency of Latin American militaries.

UNITED STATES SECURITY ASSISTANCE TRAINING
OF LATIN AMERICAN MILITARIES:
INTENTIONS AND RESULTS

I. Introduction

Chapter Overview

Recent debate in Congress and in the private sector has questioned the results of U.S. training of Latin American militaries. This chapter will introduce the U.S. security assistance training program for Latin America and recent debate concerning this training and will discuss the need to study the security assistance training of Latin American militaries. It will also introduce the specific research area, the objectives of this study, the scope of the study, and the research methodology.

Introduction

Since the end of World War II, the United States has used security assistance as an instrument of foreign policy. Security assistance is the process of providing arms, training, and advisors in the form of grants or sales to friendly foreign states (DISAM, 1994: 667). Several nations have been the beneficiaries of the security assistance program, including Latin America, which received special attention and assistance. The U.S. created special schools, including the School of the Americas and the Inter-American Air Forces Academy, specifically to train Latin American military personnel in their native tongue.

Debate

The U.S. Army School of the Americas (SOA) is a Spanish-language school dedicated to training Latin American armies in the fields of professional military education and military technical skills. Although it is only one element of the security assistance training for Latin Americans, it is an element that typifies the concerns, structures and goals of security assistance training. In a 1994 article in Military Review, Army Lieutenant Colonel Geoffrey Demarest described the purpose of the SOA. "The U.S. Army School of the Americas was created as a Cold War tool to secure solidarity against a common enemy and to maintain friendly flags in a competition over global correlation of forces (Demarest, 1994:43)." This declaration clearly states the purpose for the establishment of the SOA as a tool to contain Soviet aggression directed at U.S. allied nations. If this is indeed the purpose for the creation of the SOA and possibly all security assistance training, then perhaps the need to continue said training no longer exists. If the security assistance training of Latin Americans is no longer required, then the need exists to reevaluate the intentions of security assistance training and to redefine its mission or to eliminate it entirely.

The success or lack thereof with respect to training Latin Americans has also brought into question the continuance of training. In 1993 and 1994, Congressman Joseph P. Kennedy II of Massachusetts called for an amendment to the U.S. House Defense Appropriations bill to stop the funding of the SOA. The reasoning behind this action was that the training taking place at the SOA was producing negative results in Latin American countries. In El Salvador, graduates of the SOA have been identified as

participants in the 1980 murder and rape of three Maryknoll nuns, the 1980 murder of Archbishop Romero, the 1982 El Mozote massacre of 600 civilians, and the 1989 murder of Jesuits. Other SOA graduates were fingered in similar atrocities in Peru, Colombia, Guatemala, Honduras, Argentina, and Bolivia (McCarthy, 1994; Cooper, 1994a; Carrol, 1993). The SOA has also been titled "School of the Dictators" because of the many repressive Latin American heads of state that are graduates of the school. A 1994 article in the Washington Post states that ten graduates of the SOA have become the head of state for their respective governments by nondemocratic means. These include Manuel Noreiga and Omar Torrijos of Panama, and Leopoldo Galtieri of Argentina (Cooper, 1994a; Waller, 1993:34). These atrocities performed by graduates of the SOA and security assistance training further begs the question for the need of this type of training.

In the case of the proposed amendments, Congress rejected each bid to close the SOA. The vote in 1993 was 256 to 174 to reject the amendment and 217 to 175 to reject in 1994. Even with the negative press and the possible loss of purpose for operating the SOA and other security assistance training for Latin America, Congress determined that the SOA was important enough to continue spending three million dollars per year to keep it open (Cooper, 1994b).

Because of the debate concerning the value of training Latin American militaries, this study will evaluate the intentions and results of security assistance training in Latin America. The SOA is not the only element of security assistance training. One element is the Spanish language schools. In addition to the SOA, there are two other schools that train Latin Americans. These schools are the Inter-American Air Forces Academy

(IAAFA) and the Naval Small Craft Instruction and Technical Training School (NAVSCIATTS). Latin Americans can also receive training in Department of Defense (DoD) formal schools for U.S. personnel. This second element allows Latin Americans to receive training in English along side U.S. military personnel. The third element of security assistance training involves sending U.S. teams or personnel to the nation receiving the assistance. These mobile training teams (MTTs) and field training services (FTS) are not part of the permanent military missions or security assistance offices in the specific country. Their formation is only temporary. Mobile training teams provide temporary training that cannot extend beyond 179 days. Training requiring more than one year is provided through FTS. MTTs and FTSs are composed of either military personnel, DoD civilians, contractors or a combination of the three.

Specific Issue

The popular belief among security assistance scholars is that countering the Cold War threat was the primary reason for training. It is important, then, to evaluate the security assistance training of Latin Americans to identify the intentions of training. Furthermore, it is important to verify if training produced the results intended. This research effort will document the intentions and results of military training provided by the U. S. security assistance program to Latin American militaries from World War II to the end of the Cold War. These elements form the training mechanism of security assistance. It is this training that will be the focus of research.

Research Objectives

This research will meet several objectives to document U.S. military training in Latin America. The objectives of determining the intentions for providing training, of documenting training statistics, and of determining training results will resolve the previously stated research problem.

The intentions for training Latin American militaries must be identified. Did the United States initiate training for Latin American militaries to counter the Soviet threat or for some other purpose? Second, to determine the use of training as an instrument of foreign policy, it is necessary to examine security assistance training statistics. Do Latin American security assistance training statistics demonstrate that this training reflects major foreign policy initiatives in the region? Formal schools created by the U.S. which provide security assistance training in Spanish to Latin American military personnel have been instrumental to the training effort. What has been the statistical importance of these Spanish language schools to the security assistance training effort for the region? Finally, the study will attempt to determine how U.S.-provided training has affected Latin American militaries and their respective countries and assess the results of training.

These four research objectives will be examined in detail in the following chapters. Chapter IV will examine the intentions of the training program. Chapter V will examine the statistics of security assistance training and their relationship to foreign policy as well as an evaluation of the importance of the Spanish language schools to the training effort. Chapter VI will discuss the results of security assistance training in the

Latin American region. The discussion in these chapters will form the basis for the conclusions made in Chapter VII.

Methodology

The methodology employed in this study is historical or archival research methodology. This methodology entails acquiring sources that document the aspects of the study, checking the sources for accuracy, and synthesizing the various sources to form a coherent, correct document. Methodology is addressed in greater detail in chapter three.

Scope

The scope of the study is limited to the time frame from the beginning of World War II to the end of the Cold War. For the purpose of this study, the end of the Cold War is defined as the fall of the Berlin Wall in 1989. Although some historical data will be addressed that is external to this time frame, these data have been evaluated for relevance and contribution to understanding the historical elements involved.

Summary

The current debate surrounding the SOA, a training activity that typifies security assistance training of Latin Americans, suggests a need to evaluate the intentions and results of said training. A thorough evaluation will assist to determine if security assistance training of Latin American military serves U.S. national security interests. Furthermore, definition of the issues, research objectives, methodology and scope provides a framework to evaluate security assistance training.

II. Background

Chapter Overview

Understanding the nature of security assistance and U.S. foreign policy towards Latin America is important to comprehend policy and security assistance interactions. This interaction occurs because U.S. foreign policy dictates the application of security assistance. This chapter will examine U.S. foreign policy from the end of World War II to 1989. The chapter will then address the history of the U.S. security assistance program and define key programs under the umbrella of security assistance.

Introduction

This research effort historically documents the intentions and results of training provided to Latin American militaries through the U.S. security assistance program from World War II to the end of the Cold War. The following literature review examines U.S. policy toward Latin America, describes the general programs of security assistance, and addresses the general training programs and policies of security assistance. An understanding of these three subjects will provide the needed base to comprehend the specifics of U.S. security assistance training in Latin America.

United States Policy Toward Latin America

The Monroe Doctrine. The United States made its first major Latin American policy declaration with the Monroe Doctrine in the early 1820's. At this time, most Latin

American states had won independence from the colonial powers of Spain and Portugal. In an effort to limit European involvement in the newly liberated Latin America, President James Monroe issued a declaration on 2 December 1823, directed at the European nations. This declaration contained two important points. First, European nations could not attempt to further colonize the Americas nor transfer Latin American territories among themselves. Second, any European threat directed toward Latin America would be considered a threat toward the U.S. The Monroe doctrine demonstrated the special concern that the U.S. would maintain toward Latin America from the time of that declaration until the present (Molineu 1990:16). The Monroe Doctrine excluded Europe as a major factor in Latin America's early development and established dominant U.S. influence in the region.

Panama Canal. Initially, U.S. involvement in Latin America was very limited. This changed around the turn of the century, as the U.S. began a period of intervention. The Spanish-American War in 1898, resulting in U.S. control of Cuba and Puerto Rico, was the first intervention. In 1903, the U.S. aided rebels in the establishment of the country of Panama. This assistance was quickly followed by U.S. ownership of the Panama Canal (La Feber, 1989:23-31). In a 1904 corollary to the Monroe Doctrine, President Theodore Roosevelt declared the U.S. to be the "international police power" in the region. He further stated that the U.S. would respond to any international problems within the region (Kryzanek, 1990: 42). The corollary, drafted in response to a European threat of force to collect debts from the Dominican Republic, reconfirmed that the U.S.

would manage any international problems that developed (Atkins, 1989:118). Europe would have to go through the United States to settle its problems with Latin America.

Dollar Diplomacy. From 1912 to 1928, the policy of Dollar Diplomacy marked another period of U.S. intervention. Under this policy, the reasons for intervention were not political but rather to protect U.S. private business interests in the region. During the period of Dollar Diplomacy, the U.S. intervened in Cuba, the Dominican Republic, Haiti, Mexico, and Nicaragua. In many cases the interventions were to force payment of outstanding debts (Molineu 1990:47-51).

The Good Neighbor Policy. In the late 1920's, Dollar Diplomacy gave way to the Good Neighbor Policy. Originally established by President Herbert Hoover in 1929, President Franklin Roosevelt expanded it in 1933 shortly after his inauguration (Atkins 1989:120). Under the Good Neighbor Policy, troops were removed and agreements of nonintervention were made (Bemis, 1943: 256-275). Not only did the U.S. agree to stop intervention, but it was, in the words of Molineu, a "return to a just and objective recognition policy, and the establishment of a new Pan Americanism of hemispheric solidarity" (1990:22). The U.S. attempted to change from being the western hemisphere's police force to being friendly to its Latin American neighbors.

Cold War. The onset of the Cold War brought another problem to the forefront of U.S. policy. Countering the Soviet, or communist, threat became the prominent issue on the U.S. agenda. The U.S. enlisted the aid of Latin American nations to stop the spread of communism. This objective was accomplished by the establishment of the

Organization of American States (OAS) and the Inter-American Treaty of Reciprocal Assistance, or the Rio Pact. Signed in 1947, the Rio Pact gave the western hemisphere a joint security agreement that classified an attack against one member as an attack against all members. The signing of the Rio Pact gave the U.S. its first agreement with its Latin American allies to prevent the spread of communism (Kryzanek, 1990: 56). In 1948, the Organization of American States was created. The OAS charter not only reaffirmed the Rio Pact, but it also provided for economic cooperation, human rights, and the importance of representative democracy (Molineu, 1990:27). The OAS provided a forum for the hemisphere's nations to counter communism and to foster democratic principles. An example of countering communism in the OAS was the suspension of Cuba's membership during the missile crisis in 1962 and a call for the dismantling and withdrawal of the missiles (Kryzanek, 1990: 65-66). The Rio Pact and the Organization of American States gave the United States and Latin America a means to combat unfavorable situations when they perceived a threat to hemispheric security.

Arbenz and Castro. The 1950s produced two significant events in Latin America. First, Guatemalan President Jacobo Arbenz fell under scrutiny when communists gained high positions in the Arbenz government. Arbenz also attempted to nationalize land owned by the United Fruit Company. The U.S., seeing its economic interests under attack, directed a covert coup that toppled the Arbenz government and put a U.S.-backed president in power (Atkins 1989:122). The second event, and even more significant, was Fidel Castro's successful coup in Cuba. The 1959 coup became one of the major events

in Latin American history when Castro allied himself with the Soviet Union (Atkins, 1989:123).

Counterinsurgency. In reaction to Cuba's turn to communism, President John F. Kennedy began a new Latin American policy when he announced the Alliance for Progress in 1961. This program gave Latin America \$20 billion in aid over a ten year period (Kryzanek, 1990: 64). It was designed to help those nations that made positive steps toward a democratic system of government. The aid was intended to assist with the creation of infrastructure and to create the economic conditions necessary for political stability (Atkins, 1989:124). If Latin American nations could be stabilized economically, this would tend to create stable democratic systems of government. The 1961 Bay of Pigs operation sent an invasion force of 1,500 Cuban rebels to overthrow Castro (Kryzanek, 1990: 62). Other than this event, Kennedy tried to move further away from direct intervention as an element of policy. Kennedy, and later Johnson, attacked the problem of communist insurgency in Latin America with the use of military advice and assistance. The U.S. military began a special effort to train Latin American militaries in the strategies and tactics necessary to defeat communist insurgents (Molineu, 1990:143). Security assistance training comprised the major portion of this counterinsurgency training effort. This paradigm change to a more aggressive approach to the insurgent problem in Latin America led to success in defeating Che Guevara in Bolivia and would be used again in the 1980s in El Salvador. Kennedy and his successor attempted to help

Latin American states identify the communist threat and then, through aid and advice, give these nations the ability to counter the threat.

Benign Neglect. Under Nixon and Ford, U.S. policy became one of neglect for Latin America. When addressing the OAS in 1969, Nixon announced the end of the Alliance for Progress (Atkins 1989:126). This action and others showed that Latin America was a secondary concern to the U.S. The war in Vietnam and concern for Middle East security dominated U.S. foreign policy issues.

Human Rights. Americans viewed Latin America as one of the hotbeds of human rights violations. Many Latin America nations were under the rule of a dictatorship where individual rights were not a concern. Under Ford, Congress brought to light the issue of human rights. In 1976, Congress amended the Military Sales Act and section 502B of the Foreign Assistance Act to restrain the president's ability to give aid to countries violating human rights (Molineu, 1990:146). In 1961, Congress defined human rights as "freedom from torture or other cruel, inhuman, or degrading treatment or punishment; prolonged detention without charges; disappearances due to abduction or clandestine detention and other flagrant denial of the rights to life, liberty and the security of the person" (DISAM, 1994:653). The issue of human rights abuses in Latin America would be further promoted by President Carter and continue to be an issue through the end of the Cold War in 1989.

The Carter Administration. During the Carter administration, the dilemma of basing policy on human rights became very apparent. The problem with determining

policy and aid on a country's human rights activities was the difficulty in quantifying acceptable and unacceptable behavior. Also, if a country was identified as a violator, did stopping aid hurt the abusive parties or the abused populace?

An example of the possible failure of the human-rights-based policy was in Nicaragua. The president of Nicaragua, Anastasio Somoza, was singled out as an abuser of human rights by the State Department in March of 1977. As a result, aid to the Somoza government was cut. As the Sandinistas were taking control of the Nicaraguan revolutionary movement in 1978, Carter tried to give last-minute aid to save Somoza's regime. The oppressed populace ousted Somoza in July of 1979. To the dismay of the United States, the Sandinistas emerged from the masses and became the controlling political unit in the country (Zarate, 1994: 89-91). The lapse in U.S. military assistance, caused by human rights policies, allowed the Sandinistas to gain control of the Nicaraguan revolution. Their communist rule, and later their willingness to smuggle Soviet weapons to guerrillas in El Salvador during the Reagan administration, showed the possible ineffectiveness of the use of human rights as the dominant issue for deciding foreign policy.

Carter dramatically reduced military aid to Latin America during his tenure as president. Aid dropped from \$233.5 million in 1976 to \$54 million in 1979 (Molineu, 1990:147-54). The results of using human rights as the single criterion for policy and aid were mixed. Although the use of human rights as a criterion for foreign aid resulted in some failure, it probably exerted some pressure for change in several Latin American countries.

The Reagan Administration. The Reagan administration took a different approach to the region. Reagan stated that human rights were obviously important, but our beliefs could not be forced on other nations. He began a successful drive to increase the democratic governments in the region. Peru, El Salvador, Uruguay, Brazil, Bolivia, Argentina, Chile, Guatemala, and Paraguay were all nations that moved to the democratic process and held elections during the 1980s (Atkins, 1989:158; Molineu, 1990:132). It was this push for change to democracy that Reagan used to justify his policies of military aid to El Salvador, Peru, and Bolivia. Although Congress was committed to combating communism, they placed a great deal of pressure on Reagan to use human rights as a qualifier for aid and made aid to El Salvador contingent on the continued improvement of human rights conditions. The 1983 invasion of Grenada and aid to the Nicaraguan Contras and the military of El Salvador also demonstrated Reagan's resolve to stop communism (Atkins, 1989:131).

The Bush Administration. Bush continued this same policy toward Latin America. Free elections and the spread of democracy continued. Stopping the flow of cocaine from the Andean region became a major policy of the Bush administration. Bush initiated the 1989 invasion of Panama and the ousting of General Manuel Noriega (Kryzanek, 1990: 217). This action was the first time an American president had invaded Latin America to remove a non-communist dictator from power. Noriega had violated the individual rights of the people of Panama and had aided the Colombian drug cartels in the transshipment of cocaine. Bush's action to protect human rights and to openly

confront drug traffickers brought these issues to the front of Latin American foreign policy where they remain today.

The end of the Cold War found Latin America with many more democratic institutions than were in place when it began. Cuba continued to maintain its communist political system even under extreme economic hardship. Human rights were still questionable in many of the countries. The communist threat seemed to be reduced, but insurgency continued in several countries. The end of the Cold War left a more stable, though not a trouble-free, Latin America. The U.S. and Latin America were still working to solve the problems in the region.

Security Assistance

Security assistance is an umbrella term used to contain all the various programs and functions that the United States accomplishes to strengthen the security of friendly nations. This section will briefly discuss the development of security assistance and define key programs and terms.

Security Assistance Legislation. After World War II, security assistance began as a specific program to provide military aid to Greece and Turkey to combat communist insurgency in Greece and Soviet political pressure on Turkey. The U.S. Congress created the Greece-Turkey Aid Act of 1947. This was to be the first legislative act to provide military assistance to foreign states during peacetime (DISAM, 1994:14). Security was further developed by additional legislative acts and executive declarations. Before 1961, aid was provided to countries by legislation that specifically provided for that nation.

The Foreign Assistance Act of 1961 established the Military Assistance Program (MAP) which provided a general program for the distribution of defense materiel and services to recipient nations on a grant basis (DISAM, 1994:660). The Foreign Assistance Act (FAA), as amended, still provides the guidance for the International Military Education and Training Program (IMET), Peace Keeping Operations (PKO), and the Economic Support Fund (ESF). As nations were becoming financially independent and able to pay for defense articles, the Foreign Military Sales Act of 1968 was adopted. This Act was further amended by the International Security Assistance and Arms Export Control Act of 1976 (AECA). These pieces of legislation provided for the programs of Foreign Military Sales (FMS) and Foreign Military Financing Program (FMFP) (DISAM, 1994:49). The 1976 Act also placed conditions on arms transfers. It prohibited the transfer of arms to any nation violating internationally recognized human rights standards. Furthermore, it terminated the MAP and Military Assistance Advisory Groups unless future legislation provided these programs for a specific nation (DISAM: 1994:21).

Security Assistance Programs. IMET, ESF, FMS, FMFP, and direct commercial sales make up the major programs of security assistance. Understanding the scope of each program is necessary to grasp security assistance concepts.

The International Military Education and Training Program provides U.S. military training to foreign military personnel and civilians on a grant basis in the U.S. and overseas. This program was first a part of the MAP program. After the ACEA of 1976, IMET received separate funding under the FAA. IMET is a small portion of the security assistance budget, but nonetheless it is considered to be very important. IMET is a grant-

aid program which allows nations to send students for security assistance training without negatively impacting their defense budgets. IMET gives foreign militaries needed technical expertise for maintenance of weapons systems and its defense organizations. Perhaps even more important is the exposure to the U.S. military system and the American way of life that foreign military personnel receive (DISAM, 1994:44). Latin American students receive training from and with U.S. personnel and personnel from other Latin American nations. This contact with U.S. personnel allows Latin Americans to interact with people who hold strong beliefs concerning the importance of democracy, human rights and the American way of life. The exposure to other Latin Americans and U.S. personnel also provides an environment of hemispheric cooperation.

The Economic Support Fund was created to promote economic and political stability. This program, which is available on a loan or grant basis, provided the opportunity to strengthen the political and economic situation of nations where security interests of the United States are being threatened. ESF can be used to meet the balance of payments for previous debt or to better the infrastructure, education, health, agriculture or any other action that improves the stability of the targeted nation (DISAM, 1994:44).

In addition to IMET, which uses grant-aid money to fund training, there are three other programs that can be used to purchase security assistance training. These programs include Foreign Military Sales, Foreign Military Financing, and direct commercial sales. These programs are used heavily in concert with the acquisition of U.S. weapons systems. This training is a necessary portion of the total package approach used for arms transfers.

The purchasing nation receives the training necessary to operate and support the newly acquired military systems.

The Foreign Military Sales program allows eligible foreign states to purchase defense materiel, services, or training. The purchasing nation is responsible for all costs while the U.S. government is the actual source of supply for the materiel, services, or training (DISAM, 1994:41).

The Foreign Military Financing program consists of grants and loans which allow foreign states to purchase defense items, training, and services. These purchases can be made through FMS or direct commercial sales. Loans and grants are appropriated by Congress. Prior to 1985, loans were provided through the Federal Financing Bank and were issued at market rates (DISAM, 1994:41).

Direct commercial sales are sales that are made between the foreign state and the U.S. producer. Oversight is accomplished by the Office of Defense Trade Control in the Department of State (DISAM, 1994:43).

Security Assistance Offices. An important element to the security assistance process is the Security Assistance Office (SAO) located in individual foreign states. These organizations carry out the management of the security assistance program for that particular foreign state (DISAM, 1994:667). Activities range from sales to training management. SAOs form the first line of security assistance support to each nation. Names vary for offices in individual countries, but most functions are similar. Latin America uses five designators for these offices: Military Assistance Advisory Group,

U.S. Military Group, U.S. Military Liaison Office, Office of Defense Cooperation, and U.S. Defense Representative Office (DISAM, 1994: 98).

Security Assistance Training

Security assistance training takes place through the IMET and FMS programs.

IMET training fully covers the cost of training for the foreign student. Travel, per diem, and training costs are paid completely by the IMET Program (Hovey, 1968:172). FMS-funded training is paid for by the foreign state. IMET and FMS training have five objectives:

- To create skills needed for effective operation and maintenance of equipment acquired from the U.S.
- To assist the foreign country in developing expertise and systems needed for effective management of its defense establishment.
- To foster development by the foreign country of its own indigenous training capability.
- To promote U.S. military rapport with the armed forces of the foreign country.
- To promote better understanding of the United States, including its people, political system, and other institutions. (Amos, 1979:v).

These objectives should be pursued simultaneously by U.S. trainers and security assistance personnel.

Training is often linked to the purchase of a weapon system. A country must purchase, receive, or express clear intent to purchase a particular weapon system before any training for that system can proceed (DISAM, 1994:473). IMET funds cannot be used to provide police or related training in accordance with section 660 of the FAA (DISAM, 1994:474).

There are several categories of IMET and FMS training. These include professional military education (PME), flying training, technical proficiency training, on-the-job/qualification training, observer/familiarization training, orientation tours, and exported training. These will now be briefly summarized.

Professional military education is given at the command and staff schools and at the war colleges. Foreign students may participate only after an invitation. Foreign states are to provide only career personnel for PME (DISAM, 1994:474). Security assistance personnel are instructed to be selective when sending personnel for U.S. training. Personnel should be the up-and-coming leaders of the foreign military. The goal is to influence those foreign officers who will eventually lead the military of their native country (Hovey, 1968:174).

Flying training is the most expensive of all training provided to foreign countries. Because of the expense, flying training is not normally provided under IMET programs. Instead, flying training is normally purchased under the FMS program. Flying training includes fixed-wing training, provided by the U.S. Air Force and Navy, and rotary-wing training, provided by the U.S. Army (DISAM, 1994:474)

Technical proficiency training makes up the largest portion of security assistance training. This training is provided to officers and enlisted technicians to teach the support functions for weapons systems or the duties of a specific career field (DISAM, 1994:474).

On-the-job/qualification training follows formal training to provide hands on experience in a field situation. This training allows the student to develop proficiency in

the necessary skills before returning to his country. This training must be specifically requested by individual countries (DISAM, 1994:474).

Observer training occurs when no formal course exists or when international students cannot participate in formal training. An example of this is medical education. Foreign students do not have a license to practice medicine in the U.S. but can learn valuable skills by observing procedures (DISAM, 1994:475).

Orientation tours are provided to distinguished visitors of the grade of chief of staff of the foreign state's various military branches. This training must be preceded by a letter of need from the respective U.S. Ambassador. Tours may also be functionally or operationally oriented (DISAM: 1994:475).

Exported training refers to training that is provided to a foreign state in that same foreign state. Mobile training teams (MTTs) and field training services (FTS) are the two divisions of exported training. Mobile training teams provide temporary training that cannot extend beyond 179 days. MTTs provide training beyond the ability of the SAO and often provide training for defense assets acquired through security assistance. Extended training is provided through FTS, normally over a one year period. FTS can be provided by U.S. military personnel as extended training services specialists or by U.S. civilians under contract field services (DISAM, 1994:475-6).

Summary

The security assistance program and U.S. policy toward Latin America are key elements necessary to understand this research study. Security assistance provides the

framework within which training has been provided to Latin America. U.S. policy has governed the application of security assistance training to Latin America. The specifics of policy and security assistance will clarify the intentions and results of U.S. military training to Latin American Militaries.

III. Methodology

Chapter Overview

This chapter will review the research objectives that must be met to complete the study. Most importantly, this chapter describes the methodology used to collect and analyze research data. The method of historical or archival research forms the basis of this research study.

Research Objectives

This research will meet several objectives to document U.S. military training in Latin America. First, the intentions for training Latin American militaries must be identified. Did the United States initiate training for Latin American militaries to counter the Soviet threat or for some other purpose? Second, to determine if security assistance training was used as an element of foreign policy in Latin America, it is necessary to examine training statistics and their relationship to foreign policy. Do security assistance training statistics show the Latin American training effort to be an element of foreign policy? The U.S. created several formal schools where military training was provided to Latin American personnel in their native Spanish. What has been the statistical importance of these Spanish language schools to the security assistance training effort in the region? Finally, the study will attempt to determine how U.S.-provided training has affected Latin American militaries and will assess the results of training. The objectives of determining the intentions for providing training, of documenting training statistics, and of determining training results will resolve the above stated research problem.

Method

Accomplishment of the stated objectives for this descriptive study requires the use of archival or historical research methodology. Archival research is any research in which a public record is the unit of analysis (Dane, 1990: 169). The use of this method involves collecting information concerning research objectives. This information is normally in the form of historical documents and archival data. Historical research involves the process of collecting relevant historical data and examining their interrelationships. Interrelationships are appraised and, through the process of synthesis, key elements of data are combined into a coherent document that clearly describes past events to meet research objectives (Social Science Research Council, 1954: 157-159).

Data collection is an important step in the research process. The historical method involves searching public record, literature, documents, reports, and any other medium that contributes relevant information (Dane, 1990: 169). Collected data fall into the two categories of primary and secondary sources (Mozden, 1964: 15). Primary sources are original documents, eye witness accounts, and public records. Secondary sources are described by Mozden as “studies done by others as either historical accounts and interpretations or as contemporary views” (1964: 15). Primary sources provide the meat of the historical research, while secondary sources provide understanding of events and possible interpretations of primary sources. As relevant data are collected from historical sources they are recorded and placed with other data on the same subject.

Data was collected from various sources. Primary source material was collected from the archives at the United States Army Military History Institute at Carlisle

Barracks, PA, and from interviews with Russell Ramsey at the United States Army School of the Americas in Fort Benning, Georgia. Additional primary source material includes Congressional documents and documents of the Defense Security Assistance Agency. Secondary source material was obtained from the works of various Latin Americanists, historians, and political scientists.

When the data collection process is complete, the collected data are analyzed for accuracy, importance, and meaning. The data must first be analyzed to determine the historical meaning as intended by the author or documenting organization. Then it must be analyzed to determine how it fits into the historical context of the period during which the data were produced. This analysis is known as internal and external analysis. The researcher attempts to determine how the authors related to their period and the tone or intent which they use to present information. Internal analysis provides research insight toward the true meaning that the author intended to convey (Reitzal, 1982: 184-185). External analysis attempts to build a framework to understand the literature and use of words during the time the information was recorded. The information is compared with other records from that time to ensure the meaning is clearly understood and transferred to the research (Reitzal, 1982: 184-185). The data are compared to ensure that dates, information, and content are compatible, reliable, accurate, and valid. Analysis also involves assessing the importance of collected data to answer research objectives. Data not contributing to the research objective will not be used.

The historical method follows a logical process to create a document that details the events and processes that complete research objectives. Data collection, analysis, and

documentation are the steps that guide the historical process. Completion of research objectives provides a coherent, objective, reliable, and valid description of the past. This study will use historical methodology to meet the objective of describing the intentions and results of U. S. training provided to Latin American militaries.

Summary

This chapter detailed the research objectives of this study. More specifically, it documents the historical research methodology used to document the U.S. security assistance training provided to Latin American militaries. The synthesis of historical data into a coherent document will provide answers to the research objectives of the study.

IV. Intentions of Training

Chapter Overview

This chapter contains an analysis of historical data that attempts to answer the research question concerning the intentions of security assistance training. It addresses the reasons behind the U.S. training of Latin American militaries to determine if it is in response to communism or for other reasons.

Purpose for Training

The popularly accepted beginning of security assistance is 1947, when it was created to respond to Soviet pressure exerted externally on Turkey and internally on Greece through a communist insurgency. The U.S. responded with the Greece-Turkey Aid Act of 1947 (DISAM, 1994:14). This legislation, accepted as the start of security assistance activities, places it in the realm of Cold War resistance to the Soviet threat of communist aggression. With this in mind, it is only natural to turn to U.S. military training activities for Latin American militaries and conclude that these activities also took place to confront the communist threat. This portion of the chapter addresses the first research question. Did the United States initiate training for Latin American militaries to prevent the spread of communism or for some other reason? It is the author's premise that U.S. training of Latin American militaries was not solely a Cold War tool to counter to communism. U.S. training of Latin Americans was initially a response to the Axis Powers of World War II. Since then, the reasons for training have

shifted to respond to the global, political environment and regional contingencies considered a threat to the hemisphere.

World War II. Several events occurred in the buildup to and during the World War II period that would directly impact security assistance training (Brown, 1953: 6). First, when the U.S. enacted its neutrality acts in 1935, 1936, and 1937, Latin America was exempted from the restriction of arms export. During this period, the U.S. began training Latin American soldiers. The second event was the enactment of the Good Will Act of 1938. The third event was the enactment of the Lend-Lease Act of 1941. Fourth, was the creation of Spanish language schools in the Canal Zone. The neutrality acts prevented the export of military assistance to all belligerent ports except Latin America. The Good Will Act allowed Latin Americans to receive training at government institutions and schools in the United States. The Lend-Lease Act made moneys available for training and war materiel to Latin American states. The creation of Spanish language schools founded the largest military training tool exercised by the U.S. for Latin American militaries. The U.S. activities prior to World War II, enacting Lend-Lease, and creating Spanish language schools initiated World War II security assistance training activities and formed a framework for training in the post World War II period.

Neutrality. The neutrality acts regulated all international arms sales and prohibited sales to belligerent countries. The only exceptions to this prohibition were Latin American countries at war with non-American nations. This exception demonstrates the United States' willingness to support the nations of Latin America with

war materials and services while isolating itself from the rest of the world. It is possible to consider this treatment of Latin America as an extension of the Monroe Doctrine. The United States saw it necessary to provide for the defense of the hemisphere but did not want to involve itself in engagements outside the hemisphere. Although actual war materiel transfers were limited, this exemption provided for some U.S. support.

Another effort to increase the U.S. influence in the hemisphere during the pre-World War II period was the creation of U.S. military missions in a majority of Latin American countries. Before 1938, the German and French were the most active military missions in Latin America. These military missions were the most prominent influences on the Latin American militaries at the time. In an effort to reduce the German influence in the hemisphere, the U.S. established 32 military missions in Latin America as of 1938 (Brown, 1953: 7; Baines, 1972: 470). These military missions contained Army, Navy, and Army Air Corps elements. These military missions had the role of assisting the Latin American militaries in their attempts to professionalize and improve their military forces. Professional training was offered to the Latin American countries at less than cost and the training of Latin Americans at U.S. military schools in the Continental United States was increased (Hovey, 1968: 49).

The pilots of SCADTA, a Colombian airline, were Luftwaffe pilots. This situation placed Axis pilots in proximity to the Panama Canal, a strategic resource that could have possibly been bombed. The U.S. exerted its influence on Colombia and was able to remove these pilots from their positions (Ramsey, 1987: 61). The Defense

Supplies Corporation, an organization created to assist Latin America, financed the training of Latin American pilots to replace the Luftwaffe pilots (Brown 1953: 20).

Good Will Act. The U.S. response to replace the Axis influence in Latin America was embodied in two documents: Public Law 710, or the Good Will Act of 24 June 1938, and an Executive Order given on 29 August 1938. These documents allowed attendance at “professional educational institutions and schools maintained and administered by the Government of the United States or by department and agencies thereof” to limited numbers of Latin American students (Air Historical Office, 1947: 2). The purpose for this training was two-fold. First, it was to establish good will towards Latin America from the United States. Second, and most important, it was “to increase United States security both by seeking to eliminate all traces of Axis influence in the air establishment of Latin America and by strengthening air forces of the opponents of fascism throughout the world (Air Historical Office, 1947: 2).” As mentioned previously, Colombia was cited as having Axis pilots in SCADTA, Colombia’s airline. Training was provided to nine Colombian pilots to replace the Axis pilots (Air Historical Office, 1947: Appendix 8). The U.S. was making a strong move toward becoming the only military influence in the hemisphere by having the Latin Americans remove the Axis military missions and Axis pilots, who had been the dominant force in Latin America. Another key reason for the training under this program was to promote defense of the hemisphere by strengthening the air forces of strategic Latin American nations. At that time, Brazil

and, to a limited extent, Mexico were chosen as those strategic nations where air forces could best provide for hemispheric defense (Air Historical Office, 1947: 17).

The Good Will Act became the first major security assistance training effort. Training Latin Americans, although foreigners, was not a difficult stretch for the isolationist-minded Americans. By training Latin Americans, they were protecting and isolating the hemisphere from the rest of the world. Air Historical Office quoted a letter by the Adjutant General in 1939 that explained the goals and purposes of this foreign instruction to the services:

From the viewpoint of military cooperation, it is the purpose of this instruction to bring the United States Army into a contact with those of the other American Republics which will encourage mutual confidence, respect and understanding, will develop a common doctrine and method in the solution of similar problems, and will permit the forces of these Republics to benefit from familiarity with the organization, training, tactics and materiel of our Army.

An equally important objective to be realized as a result of the program and the contacts established thereby is the displacement of the influence of the European and Asiatic powers in the military establishments of the American Republics by that of the United States.

Successful accomplishment of the Army's part of this program also will have definite political as well as military significance. It is to be expected that among the carefully selected trainees enrolled in our schools will be found future Army and Government leaders whose influence will be important in determining their country's policy towards the United States. (Air Historical Office, 1947: 3)

The goal to influence trainees to have good will towards the U.S. as a result of training has permeated security assistance training from its inception to the present.

Training always has the foreign policy objective of creating a loyalty to the United States and making these trained personnel instruments of U.S. foreign policy.

The major type of training that occurred under the Good Will Act was aviation training under direction of the Army Air Corps. Training took place at the Central Flying

Training Command which included a number of airfields in the state of Texas. Of the Latin American countries, only Brazil and Mexico participated actively as belligerents in World War II. In mid-August 1944, Brazil sent a force, including a fighter squadron, to the Mediterranean theater. In mid-January 1945, Mexico sent the 201st Mexican Fighter Squadron to the Pacific theater (Air Historical Office, 1947:21). The status of the Latin American states, as active or passive belligerents, directly affected the training provided to each state. Combat training was provided only to Mexico and Brazil because of their commitment of forces to combat. Training was initially provided in English. As the program matured, all training for Spanish-speaking nations was provided in Spanish. English remained the primary language of training for the Brazilians, but Portuguese-proficient trainers and former Brazilian students were used to improve the quality of training. Training under the Good Will Act was funded by the Defense Supplies Corporation which paid for transportation, tuition, subsistence, housing, medical care, and burials. Before Lend-Lease, the Latin American governments were required to pay for any additional expenses. With the enactment of Lend-Lease in 1941, these additional expenses were covered by Lend-Lease funds (Air Historical Office, 1947: 57-58). For the most part, the expense of training Latin Americans was paid with grant-aid funds.

Table 4-1 provides a look at Latin American Students trained. This table shows numbers of students trained for countries where the number of students was greater than ten. Students listed on the table include pilots and support personnel. Appendix B contains a detailed listing of Latin American aviation students trained under the Good Will Act.

Table 4-1 General Air Training Statistics

Latin American State	Number of Graduates
Argentina	24
Bolivia	46
Brazil	814
Chile	50
Cuba	36
Ecuador	16
Mexico	447
Peru	51
Uruguay	11

(Air Historical Office, 1947: 17)

On 3 October 1939, the Inter-American Conference of Foreign Ministers convened. The major accomplishment of this conference was the Declaration of Panama. This declaration established a zone of security that included all the maritime routes between American states, with the exception of Canada. Belligerent countries were prohibited from participating in any activity in the zone of security. This declaration placed Latin Americans in the neutrality camp of the U.S. The U.S. needed to provide some assistance to Latin America to maintain this alliance and the defense of the hemisphere. Although there existed the imperative to assist these nations, committing the funds for any significant program could not be accomplished. The United States was still recovering financially from the depression and was not in a position to finance Latin American military assistance. Furthermore, the U.S. armed forces were building to meet a possible threat from the Axis Powers. The condition of U.S. forces made it impossible

to materially contribute to the Latin American Forces. This lack of funds and the scarcity of U.S. military hardware limited assistance to the American military missions in each country and to the training of Latin American nationals in the U.S. (Brown, 1953: 16-17). The informal commitments of aid resulting from the Declaration of Panama did not materialize as intended. It was not until Congress enacted the Pittman Act that military assistance became more accessible to those Latin American nations with the ability to purchase weapons.

The Pittman Act of 1940 made U.S. weapons and equipment repairs available to Latin America, but only on a cash basis. This requirement limited U.S. assistance to helping the Latin American nations procure arms from American manufacturers. Later, when Lend-Lease superseded the Pittman Act, Latin American nations were still required to purchase arms on a "cash-reimbursable basis" (Brown, 1953: 17-18). The period of neutrality did not provide significant arms transfers to Latin America. Although, it was during this period that U.S. training of Latin American militaries to counter the Axis threat began.

In 1938, Congress enacted Public Law No. 710, otherwise known as the Good Will Act of 24 June 1938. The Good Will Act was permanent legislation that provided for the continued training of Latin Americans after the war (Estep, 1966: 50). The Good Will Act was permanent in that there was no projected termination date for the law. Unlike the Lend-Lease Act the Good Will Act was not intended to close with the end of World War II. In fact, post-war plans for training under the Good Will Act actually called for increased aviation training for Latin American airmen (Air Historical Office,

1947: 22-23). The Good Will Act opened the door for Latin Americans to receive training at professional institutions and schools operated by the U.S. government, including the U.S. Military and Naval Academies (Estep, 1966: 50).

Lend-Lease. The Lend-Lease Act of 11 March 1941 made the U.S. the “arsenal of democracy” through which war materiel, training, and defense information would be supplied to those nations opposing the Axis Powers (Air Historical Office, 1947: 4) The Lend-Lease Act was a temporary piece of legislation that precluded the expenditure of funds after 30 June 1946 (The President of the United States, 1944: 61). All training funded by Lend-Lease stopped at the conclusion of the war on 30 November 1945. As previously stated, the Lend-Lease Act was used to finance training expenses not covered by the Good Will Act. More importantly, the Lend-Lease Act provided defense items to Latin American nations that would require the continued need for the training of Latin Americans to operate this equipment. The United States made \$305,982,000 in arms transfers and training expenses to Latin American nations during the period of Lend-Lease to 31 December 1945. Over two-thirds of this money went to Brazil (\$220,407,000) and just under one-twelfth went to Mexico (\$24,349,000). Disbursements to the other American republics were much smaller. These countries included Bolivia, Chile, Colombia, Costa Rica, Cuba, Nicaragua, Dominican Republic, Ecuador, El Salvador, Guatemala, Haiti, Honduras, Paraguay, Peru, Uruguay, and Venezuela (International Branch, 1946: 19).

Table 4-2 lists major weapons systems and defense articles transferred to Latin America under Lend-Lease financing. The large numbers of aircraft (2,157), tanks,

combat vehicles, jeeps and trucks would form the building blocks for Latin American defense materiel after World War II. This equipment would further necessitate the training of operators and technicians for its support and operation. The logistics support of this equipment in the post-war era would become a significant strategy to ensure that Latin American nations remained allies to the United States.

Table 4-2 Major Lend-Lease Defense Articles Transferred to Latin America

Defense Article	Number Acquired
Medium Bombers	27
Light Bombers	103
Fighters	227
All Other Aircraft	1,800
Light Tanks	677
Medium and Heavy Tanks	4
Other Combat Vehicles	326
Trucks	7,967
Jeeps	2,988

(International Branch, 1946: 47)

Spanish language schools. The Spanish language schools were another significant development of the World War II era. Reasons for the creation of the Spanish language schools paralleled those for training Latin Americans in the continental United States. The U.S. was trying to fill the void created by the departure of the European military advisors, provide for the defense of the hemisphere, and promote good will between the U.S. and Latin American militaries and among Latin American militaries.

Spanish language schools differed from the schools operated in the United States. Their intent was to train Latin Americans in the technical and professional skills needed to operate each country's military and military equipment. Another significant difference was that instruction from the inception of the schools was intended to be in the student's native tongue. Spanish was the dominant language, with Portuguese being the language of instruction in the case of Brazilian students. The Brazilian presence at the Spanish language schools has been limited. The Brazilians prefer to receive instruction in English at schools in the U.S. Three services created schools for the Latin Americans in the Canal Zone. These schools were the Army's School of the Americas (SOA), the Air Force's Inter-American Air Forces Academy, and the Navy's Naval Small Craft Instruction and Technical Training School (NAVSCIATTS). (NAVSCIATTS was not established until 1961 by a U.S. Coast Guard MTT. The Navy established the school permanently in 1969.) (Ramsey, 1993: 13). These schools would prove to be a major instrument for training Latin Americans.

The Spanish language schools were originally known as the Caribbean Defense Command and Panama Canal Department (CDC-PCD) Schools for Latin Americans. The first school began operations in 1943, when Peru requested training for 20 aircraft mechanics. The U.S. responded, provided the maintenance training, and created what became the Air Force branch of the Spanish language schools that was ultimately known as the Inter-American Air Forces Academy (IAAFA) at Albrook Air Force Base in Panama (Coman, 1970: 1). The Army school currently known as the U.S. Army School of the Americas also began operations during World War II. The SOA was not the

formal institution that exists today. Courses were taught on an as needed basis, specifically for Latin Americans. Other training occurred by attaching Latin American personnel to U.S. units to provide an on-the-job training atmosphere. An example of this type of training took place when five Guatemalan officers were attached to the 295th Infantry for a three month period (July - October 1945) to learn about infantry weapons and jungle tactics (Guatemalan Officers, 1945). For the SOA and IAAFA, it was the training demanded during World War II that created the need for and the establishment of the Spanish language schools.

In a notebook prepared for the visit of Dwight D. Eisenhower to the Canal Zone in August 1946, the structure and operations of the CDC-PCD schools were enumerated. At the time, five programs were in operation including infantry, motor mechanics, medical, coast artillery, and air forces. The courses ranged from a duration of 6-18 weeks for coast artillery to 6 months for medical training. Quotas for the different schools were provided to the chiefs of the military missions in each country, who in turn filled the slots with assistance from that particular country's minister of war. Enlisted men were furnished rations and housing free, while officers were furnished housing but had to pay for their own food. Most significant about this document is the statistics on the number of students trained. According to the document, 442 officers and 555 enlisted men had been trained by August 1946 (Crittenberger, 1946: Tab F). This information places the foundation of these schools well within the period of World War II. The U.S. Army recognizes 1946 as the founding date for the Army branch of the Spanish language schools, even though the CDC-PCD Schools for Latin American students were well into

their operations at that point. This information proves that the security assistance training of Latin Americans at the SOA began before 1946, or during World War II, when the U.S. threat was the Axis Powers. The primary reason for this training effort was to defend the hemisphere against the Axis Powers. After the war, the Soviets became the primary threat with the onset of the Cold War. At that time, the Latin American training system would once again have the purpose to defend the hemisphere against the new threat, the Soviets.

In an address to Latin American students on 17 September 1946, General Crittenberger, the Commander of the CDC, made several comments with respect to the cooperation generated by attendance at the CDC-PCD schools.

The benefits of this association are, in my opinion, of importance because, in solving them satisfactorily, with fairness and justice we are contributing to the security and understanding of the peoples of our hemisphere. . . . But above all else we have consummated relationships that should endure. . . . Your presence among us has given rise to another aspect of life among men that does not vary in a changing world. This is mutual understanding -- another essential is 'Hemispheric Solidarity,' because we have had the privilege of having you live with us, our mutual understanding has improved. You have met and dealt with men of other nationalities. You have made friends with them. And even more than that you have understood them, and they you. There have been two results of this friendship and mutual understanding; first, there is the mutual increase of knowledge and respect for one another. And secondly, having acquired this increase of knowledge and respect, we can now transmit it to others of our associates. (16 Graduate, 1946b)

In this address, Crittenberger highlighted the reasons for training Latin American militaries. The first reason was to promote hemispheric security or defense. The second reason was the development of hemispheric solidarity or mutual understanding and friendship. Once again we see the theme of protecting the hemisphere from external attack or the promotion of hemispheric defense. Crittenberger also emphasized the

importance of developing hemispheric solidarity to build the bond of understanding and friendship necessary to defend and promote peace in the hemisphere.

IAAFA was known as the USAF School for Latin America at the creation of the U.S. Air Force and carried that name until 1966, at which time the name of the school changed to IAAFA (Coman, 1970:1). As of May 1970, IAAFA taught the following courses: thirteen aircraft maintenance courses, five communications and electronics courses, four personnel administration and logistics courses, and one officer course (Coman, 1970: Attch 1). The basic mission of the school was to increase the technical proficiency of Latin American air forces. The curriculum for IAAFA in the 1990s is still of a technical nature, with most courses focusing on training personnel for a specific task or career field. In a proposed speech for General Mather in May 1970, Lt. Colonel Coman, Deputy Commandant for IAAFA, proposed the following statements.

This Academy, in addition to being a technical training institution, is also a meeting place where men from every corner of the hemisphere have the opportunity to meet, fraternize, and learn to know one another better. Cherish those friendships that have been born here -- preserve them. No man -- no country -- has ever had too many friends. Cherish the insight and understanding that has come from months of association with other students of other countries. Even where friendships have failed to blossom, most of you, I suspect, have at least learned to understand and respect one another a bit more. This can be just as meaningful as friendship sometimes, for understanding and mutual respect are extremely important steps toward quieting this seething, restless world of ours. (Coman, 1970: Attch 2, page 4)

Coman's proposed address for Mather describes a common theme carried through all training activities for Latin Americans. That theme is hemispheric solidarity. This idea of bringing students together from different nations to breed friendships and thus

improve hemispheric relations began with training activities in the World War II era and has continued to the present.

IAAFA was moved from the Canal Zone to Homestead AFB, Florida in 1989. The move was prompted by the danger that students were exposed to as a result of Manuel Noriega's activities (Ramsey, 1993: 14) and the Panama Canal Treaty. When Hurricane Andrew destroyed IAAFA in 1992, it was moved to Lackland AFB in San Antonio, Texas where it currently operates.

According to the U.S. Army historical account, the U.S. Army School of the Americas was established at Fort Amador in the Canal Zone in 1946. As previously discussed, the SOA was operating during the period of World War II. This World War II training places SOA's start date somewhat earlier than 1946. Until 1950, it was known as the Latin American Training Center Ground Division. At that time the name was changed to U.S. Army Caribbean School and moved to Fort Gulick, also in the Canal Zone. Prior to 1955, instruction was mixed with some courses being taught in English and others in Spanish. In 1955, Spanish became the official language of instruction. It gained its present name, the U.S. Army School of the Americas, in 1963. Because of the Panama Canal Treaty, the school was forced to move to its current location at Fort Benning, Georgia in 1984 (U.S. Army School of the Americas, 1971: 1; U.S. Army School of the Americas, 1995: vi). Like IAAFA, the SOA also provided training to Latin American army personnel that covered the professional and technical aspects of the military profession.

The NAVSCIATTS, as noted above, was started by the U.S. Coast guard in 1961 and transferred to the Navy in 1969. It was located at Rodman Naval Base in Panama, where it continues operations as of 1995. The training provided by NAVSCIATTS covers all aspects of small craft operations and support (Ramsey, 1993: 13).

The Spanish language schools established a training system uniquely devoted to the training of Latin Americans in military technical and professional skills. This system was established during the World War II period to provide for hemispheric defense and solidarity. These schools played an important role in training Latin American militaries when the main threat was perceived as external, during World War II until the early 1960s, and later when the threat to democracy became internal insurgencies.

Post World War II. The Inter-American Defense Board (IADB) was created in 1942 to jointly approach the issue of hemispheric defense. Following World War II, the U.S. and Latin American nations, through other international agreements, created a system to provide for continued hemispheric defense against communism. The primary vehicles for continued hemispheric security were the 1947 signing of the Rio Pact and the creation of the Organization of American States (OAS) in 1948. The Rio Pact gave the western hemisphere a joint security agreement that classified an attack against one member as an attack against all members. The signing of the Rio Pact gave the U.S. its first agreement with its Latin American allies to prevent the spread of communism (Kryzanek, 1990: 56). In 1948, the Organization of American States was created. The OAS charter not only reaffirmed the Rio Pact, but it also provided for economic

cooperation, human rights, and the importance of representative democracy (Molineu, 1990:27). The OAS provided a forum for the hemisphere's nations to counter communism and to foster democratic principles. Once again the focus was hemispheric defense.

In the 1950s, the U.S. further consummated these security arrangements by drafting bilateral agreements with a number of Latin American countries. The Mutual Security Act of 1951 appropriated \$38.15 million for military assistance to Latin American countries. Recipients had to agree with hemispheric defense plans created by the IADB and military equipment had to be used for purposes related to hemispheric defense. Thirteen countries including Ecuador, Chile, Colombia, Cuba, Peru, Brazil, the Dominican Republic, Uruguay, Nicaragua, Honduras, Haiti, Guatemala, and Bolivia made bilateral agreements with the U.S. to receive the appropriated aid. The U.S. offered three classes of assistance consisting of grants of equipment, U.S. weapons for purchase at low prices, and plans to establish missions of the Air Force, Army and Navy for security assistance training (Baines, 1972: 472-473).

Each military mission to Latin American states was staffed with military advisors from the individual branches of the U.S. armed forces. In an address to the American Society of the United States on 5 January 1970, General George Mather, Commander of U.S. Southern Command, stated the role of U.S. military advisors after World War II. Military advisors were located in 17 countries and managed military advisory and assistance programs. The advisors were assigned to U.S. Southern Command but were under the direction of the U.S. ambassador and served as his advisors. The majority of

these military missions were established after World War II, although some had existed since the 1920s in Peru and Brazil. After World War II, the military advisors helped to fill the vacuum left by the departure of European advisors. (Mather, 1970: 2) He further stated that:

During the 1950's our security interests and objectives concentrated on hemispheric defense, and our advisory and assistance programs emphasized cooperation in developing hemispheric security capabilities in support of the Rio Treaty. Advisors played important roles in advising and assisting Latin American militaries to increase their overall capability. (Mather, 1970: 3)

As was the case during the World War II time frame, security assistance activities were predominantly to promote hemispheric defense.

In 1946, a United States Air Force mission was established at Talara Air Base in Peru to provide training to Peruvian aviators for a period of four years. This was a follow-on to the training that had been offered by the U.S. Marines for the previous four years. Victor Raul Haya de la Torre, leader of Peru's Aprista party, in an address to students stated that the war was far from over and that the Panama Canal was being defended not only in Panama but also in Peru (Inter-American, 1946). Although Haya de la Torre did not clearly define the enemy threatening the Panama Canal, this was a time of great change for international politics. The world just ended a war that was fought on a global basis. All nations were affected in the struggle. Americans and Latin Americans alike were now changing from a paradigm of hemispheric isolation to one of global interplay. Although the Soviet threat was not clearly identified at this time, it was recognized by many as an international wild card that threatened democracy because of the uncertainty of its intentions. Haya de la Torre may have been referring to a possible

Soviet threat or to the fact that the world had changed and that no longer would Latin America be concerned with just the Western Hemisphere.

This example shows that not only Americans but also Latin Americans were echoing the idea of unified hemispheric defense. The deployment of military missions during the post-war era reinforced the idea of hemispheric defense. These missions were in almost every Latin American country. The concept of hemispheric defense at that time revolved around the defense of the Panama Canal (Inter-American, 1946). Inter-American cooperation between the U.S. and its Latin American neighbors was seen as a crucial alliance necessary to provide the needed defense. An unnamed general was quoted by the newspaper the Star & Herald of the Republic of Panama as saying:

This cooperation visualizes each of our nations as maintaining, according to its means, its own armed forces. To be most effective, our armed forces must be equipped with a common military doctrine. Our armament, equipment, and training, our technique and staff procedures should be more or less similar for successful operation should we be called upon to function together as a team. (Inter-American, 1946)

This statement embodies the idea that all forces of the Americas must be interoperable to defend the hemisphere. It also mentioned the need for common equipment. U.S. equipment was the common equipment mentioned in the previous statement. After World War II, the idea for maintaining control and alliances in the Western Hemisphere revolved around the idea of having Latin American nations use U.S. equipment, training, and logistics. The essence of the concept is that if Latin American nations use our equipment, logistics, and training, then they cannot turn to another power for support but must continue to support U.S. policy (Ramsey, 1995a). This tie to the

U.S. system ensured the loyalty to the U.S. for the hemispheric defense against a possible external threat. This was the basis and purpose of security assistance and its associated training in Latin America until the 1960s.

Counterinsurgency. Fidel Castro's successful revolutionary movement in Cuba and his subsequent alliance with Soviet and Eastern Bloc nations created a situation that was new to the U.S. and the Western Hemisphere. This new communist presence in the hemisphere created a turn of policy for the U.S. in Latin America with the conceptualization of the "foco theory" by Che Guevara and Regis Debray. The basic idea behind the theory was that Latin America was ripe for socialist and communist revolutions similar to the successful revolution conducted in Cuba. Che became an active Cuban agent seeking to project these foco insurgencies into Latin American states (Child, 1985: 132-133). These insurgent activities prompted a change in U.S. policy in the region from defending against a possible external communist attack to defending against internal insurgencies in Latin American nations. The security assistance stance switched from a policy of tying Latin American nations to U.S. equipment, logistics system, and training system to training Latin Americans to actively eliminate these communist insurgencies and providing the equipment to do so (Ramsey, 1995a). Che Guevara experienced initial failures in Argentina and Uruguay (Child, 1985: 134). He then turned his efforts to insurgency in Bolivia.

General Mather described some of the activities of advisors in the 1960s. His statements are paraphrased and quoted below. In the 1960s, it became apparent that the threat of external attack on the hemisphere was remote, but that the internal security

threat was growing. This shifted the emphasis to internal security (Mather, 1970: 3).

Advisors ensured the effective use of the military assistance program to give Latin American nations the ability to:

Maintain law and order so that they may advance themselves politically, socially, and economically without being hindered in their efforts by subversion and insurgency. Advisors have assisted in improving management efficiency, decreasing unnecessary military expenditures considerably, and contributing to economic and social development through civic action. (Mather, 1970: 3-4)

The Kennedy administration became an important catalyst in changing the security assistance effort to a more active role in eliminating insurgencies. Training at the SOA and MTTs by the 8th Special Forces Group stationed at Panama responded by creating a curriculum for training the affected nations in the skills needed to properly defeat an insurgency. An excerpt of a briefing from the Albert Smith Jr. papers describes the counterinsurgency training program.

To aid Latin American Republics in repelling outbreaks of communist-inspired insurgency, U.S. Southern Command's Army and Air Force components are conducting training in both the tactical and civic action aspects of counterinsurgency operations.

Within the Canal Zone, the U.S. Army School offers a ten-week course for officers in counterinsurgency conducted by the school's Internal Security Department.

In a number of Latin American countries, Mobile Training Teams (MTT's), comprising U.S. Army Special Forces and Air Commandos of the U.S. Air Force, conduct training in their fields. These MTT's are sent at the request of the host country to instruct friendly military personnel in the military, economic, sociological, and psychological features of counterinsurgency operations.

Latin American aircrews are trained by Air commandos in the techniques of aerial resupply, operations from strange fields and sod strips, low-level navigation, rocketry, skip bombing, napalm dropping, strafing, air infiltration and exfiltration, and aerial reconnaissance. (United States Southern Command, circa 1967: 7)

Military advisors also took a more active role with the problems of counterinsurgency by identifying counterinsurgency training for the military under their responsibility and by providing advice on how to battle the insurgents. In the 1960s, the maximum number of advisors in Latin America was a little over 800. These 800 U.S. advisors compared modestly to the more than 2,000 Soviet advisors in Cuba in 1970 (Mather, 1970: 4). Advisors provided a range of knowledge to their Latin American counterparts from long-range planning and programming for a nation's military to counterinsurgency tactics at company and battalion levels. It was in this environment that counterinsurgency tactics were taught to Guatemala and Bolivia in 1966 and 1967.

Guatemala and Bolivia were two locations in the 1960s where insurgency became a primary concern to each nation's security. The 1963 military assistance plan for Guatemala described the objectives of security assistance at that time.

Specifically, the primary objective of the United States in Guatemala is to promote a democratic government sufficiently strong to defend itself against communist subversion. Planned assistance for the Guatemalan armed forces supports this objective by providing the military during the planned period with an appropriately increasing capability to move, shoot, and communicate in order to maintain internal security. The training proposed will provide selected officers and enlisted men the opportunity to improve their tactical and technical skills to include military intelligence. (U.S. Dept. of Defense, 1963: Plan Objectives Tab)

This quotation states the extent to which military advisors were involved in Guatemalan counterinsurgency efforts. Advisors appeared to be teaching the Guatemalan Army how to shoot, move and communicate. These actions occurred long before the AECA of 1976 that limited the role of security assistance personnel. The advisors were

not the only source of training. Much of the instruction occurred at the Spanish language schools and in combined exercises (U.S. Dept. of Defense, 1963: Plan Objectives Tab).

The Guatemalan efforts were in opposition to subversion of the Partido Guatemalteco de Trabajo (PGT), or the communist party. The PGT had received some insurgency training from Cuba and other Soviet Bloc countries (U.S. Dept. of Defense, 1963: Threat and Capabilities Analysis Tab). Bolivia, on the other hand, was experiencing an insurgency generated by Che Guevara and a small cadre of his guerrillas (Child, 1985: 132).

In opposition to these threats, U.S. Southern Command responded with the instruction of counterinsurgency courses at the SOA and MTTs in Bolivia. In 1967, an MTT from the 8th Special Operations Group trained the 2nd Bolivian Ranger Battalion and nine other companies at La Esperanza, Bolivia. The 2nd Battalion was the unit that killed Che Guevara later that same year (Smith, 1967: 1; Memo for: General Porter, 1968: 4). The death of Guevara ended the insurgency in Bolivia. Guatemalan forces were trained in the Canal Zone by both the SOA and the 8th Special Forces Group. The Guatemalans did not eradicate insurgency from Guatemala. In 1995, Guatemala continues to battle the Guatemalan insurgents on a limited scale.

The significance of the shift to counterinsurgency training from training for a possible external attack is that it changed all training paradigms and made the role of the in-country advisor much more significant. Insurgency is a problem that has had long-lasting effects in Latin America. Its presence in the hemisphere started in the late 1950s and continues in the 1990s. The U.S. Congress' enactment of the Arms Export Control

Act of 1976 made security assistance available only to those nations complying with our requirements for human rights. This legislation would cause the U.S. counterinsurgency training of Latin Americans to become much more focused on the issues of human rights during the 1970s and 1980s.

Human Rights and Democracy. President Carter and his administration are often given credit for implementing the use of human rights as a criterion for security assistance. The only way around the human rights requirement of the AECA was for the President to declare that, by not providing security assistance to a country found to be in violation of the human rights requirements, the national interests of the United States would be violated. As mentioned previously, the real requirement for Latin American countries to observe their citizens' human rights comes from Congress by way of the 1976 AECA. As described in Chapter II, it is possible that the use of human rights as a policy instrument resulted in the Sandinistas gaining control in Nicaragua.

In 1977, General Dennis McAuliffe, the commander of the U.S. Southern Command at the beginning of the Carter administration, gave Ms. Patricia Derian, Coordinator for Human Rights and Humanitarian Affairs, Department of State, a tour of the Spanish language schools. McAuliffe said of Derian, "She appeared to attach considerable value to those education and training programs that put Latin American officers in direct contact with Americans and American objectives and our way of life (McAuliffe, 1977: 1)." According to the commander, Derian was also impressed with the nation building and maintenance courses. They discussed the removal of instructors from Argentina, Brazil and Chile and determined to remove them from their posts at the end of

their tours unless the human rights situation in these countries significantly worsened (McAuliffe, 1977: 3). When discussing the IMET program, Derian and McAuliffe came to the conclusion "that she favors a program of rewards for countries that do well in protecting human rights, with less stress on punitive actions. I [McAuliffe] suggested that the IMET program might be an excellent one in which to develop such rewards -- but making clear that I did not favor the complete elimination of countries from this program because of the long term mutual benefits accruing to the individual student contacts with Americans (McAuliffe, 1977: 4)." This visit by Ms. Derian is an excellent example of the Carter administration's human rights program. Although Carter appeared to be using human rights too much as an assistance criterion, he was only following the law enacted by Congress.

In March 1977, McAuliffe sent a message to the Chief of the Joint Chiefs of Staff describing the reaction of a number of Latin American countries to the congressional examination of their human rights practices. Many Latin American nations renounced Mutual Assistance Agreements or security assistance for fiscal year 1978. In his opinion, many of the renunciations were to prevent the publication of their human rights record and thus take them out of the international spotlight. Chile, Argentina, Uruguay, Brazil, Guatemala, and El Salvador canceled any agreements with the U.S. that were contingent on the adherence to the congressional human rights evaluations (McAuliffe, 1977a: 1-6). Several of these nations were later officially denied military assistance by the U.S. government. The congressional human rights policy was considered a negative by many. This negative reaction was especially apparent in the area of training where the objective

is to influence and improve a nation's military through the training effort. If training is stopped because of human rights violations, the trainer can no longer influence the would be student.

Reagan's tactic was to use the four Ds -- democracy, development, defense, and diplomacy -- as the pillars for policy in Latin America (Child, 1985: 141). His focus was to improve the political environment of the country and to attempt to create democratic institutions for Latin American nations. Reagan saw the subversion in El Salvador, Cuba, and Nicaragua as the real problems in the Latin American region.

El Salvador became an important area of concern under Reagan. Arms smuggling by Cuba and Nicaragua to the Salvadoran rebels cemented the idea that it was another Soviet-sponsored insurgency and must be the top priority for the U.S. in Latin America. Training of the Salvadoran Army was accomplished at the SOA and by MTTs. The SOA trained approximately 600 cadets in Panama and at Fort Benning in order to provide the needed accessions to the Salvadoran officer corps. The U.S. government's self-imposed limit of 55 trainers in El Salvador made training by MTTs difficult to accomplish in that country. The 8th Special Operations Group maintained a significant training force in El Salvador and accomplished some training in Panama. Additionally, the 7th Special Operations Group from Fort Bragg North Carolina set up a Regional Military Training Center near Trujillo, Honduras to train the El Salvadoran army (Scruggs, 1986: 18-28). The U.S. also trained two immediate reaction battalions -- the Atlacatl Battalion trained by an MTT in El Salvador and the Bellosillo Battalion trained at Fort Bragg (Waghelstein, 1985: 49-51). U.S. aid and security assistance were essential to provide an environment

for El Salvador to hold democratic elections and to ultimately involve the rebels in the political process to end the insurgency.

Reagan's Latin American focus was on more than Central America. His pro-democracy policies created an environment that fostered the growth of democratic governments in Latin America. Many long-standing military regimes such as Chile, El Salvador, Bolivia, Guatemala, Honduras, and Argentina, were able to successfully make the jump to democracy.

Cooperation. A recurring theme in Latin American training is the cooperation and influence the training provides to the student. Since the beginning of security assistance training prior to World War II, there has been a great deal of emphasis on students from Latin American countries developing good will for their fellow Latin American students and their respective nations and for the United States. The following statement made in the Air Force's historical account of World War II aviation training bears out this idea of building favorable foreign relationships, referring to training offered during World War II. "The foreign nation profited by having certain of its nationals become familiar with U.S. training processes, airplanes, equipment, and tactical doctrine, while the U.S. hoped to profit from the feeling of familiarity with and friendship for the United States developed in the foreign officers trained (Air Historical Office, 1947: 1)."

In 1972, General Mather commented on the importance of having Latin Americans attend schools in the U.S. (This concept is now a reality for IAAFA and the SOA.)

The importance of exposing these outstanding Latin officers who are very carefully selected to go to our service schools and to Leavenworth and to the Inter-American Defense College, is an importance that is hard to measure but still very real, and that is exposing them to American values, American integrity, the homely American strengths, both military and economic, which they see at first hand is much better than reading about them or seeing them in movies or on television. This is very important to our image down there and this is a question that we have tried to measure. . . .it is very easy to point to the people in key positions in some of the governments down there, and many of them have been at our service schools. (Mather, 1972: 68-69)

This statement reflects the long-standing belief that training Latin Americans in the U.S. will inculcate North American values in the individual student and will improve his understanding of his country's position in cooperating with the remainder of the American nations for their common defense. The speech prepared by Coman for General Mather, previously quoted, stated that the combined training of Latin Americans helped them to "understand and respect one another (Coman, 1970: Atch 2 page 4)." There is an incredible amount of rhetoric that emphasizes the importance of the combined training of Latin Americans by the United States military. This cooperation has always been recognized as one of the significant reasons for the security assistance training of Latin Americans.

Summary

The primary reasons for U.S. security assistance training are hemispheric defense against external attack, internal defense for hemispheric security, and increasing Latin American democracies and cooperation. Training was initially implemented under the threat of external attack by the Axis Powers and continued under the threat of communist attack. Later, the policy evolved to address internal insurgencies, human rights, and the

promotion of democracy. Cooperation between the U.S. and Latin America and among Latin American states has been a continual purpose for training Latin Americans. From these intentions for training we can conclude that security assistance training was not accomplished to simply counter the Soviet threat. The intentions behind security assistance training have evolved over the years to counter perceived threats to the United States and the Western hemisphere and to be an instrument of U.S. policy in Latin America. The intentions of hemispheric defense, internal defense for hemispheric security, improved human rights practices, increased Latin American democracies, and improved cooperation are the primary reasons for U.S. security assistance training. These intentions form the basis for U.S. security assistance training in Latin America.

V. Training Statistics

Chapter Overview

This chapter contains an analysis of historical data that attempts to answer the research questions concerning statistics of security assistance training. It examines the collective statistics of the U.S. training of Latin American military personnel to determine how U.S. security assistance training reflects U.S. foreign policy. These statistics are also examined to determine the contribution of Spanish language schools to the U.S. security assistance training effort in Latin America.

Analysis of Training Statistics

An examination of security assistance training statistics provides insight to the intentions, results, and foreign policy associated with the training. For Latin America, the major source of training funds is the IMET program. This program provides grant-aid training to military personnel of designated countries. It is important to study IMET training statistics to determine how Latin American training programs have been implemented. The first portion of the chapter will address the first statistical research question. Do security assistance training statistics show Latin American security assistance training to be an element of U.S. foreign policy?

The Spanish language schools, SOA, IAAFA, and NAVSCIATTS, have provided a significant portion of security assistance training to Latin American personnel. It is important to examine the contribution of these schools to the training. Statistics of these Spanish language schools will provide information as to their contribution to

security assistance training and their relationship to IMET training. This review of training statistics will attempt to answer the following research question: What has been the statistical importance of these Spanish language schools to the security assistance training effort in the region?

Answering these two research questions are essential to understanding the importance of Spanish language schools and security assistance training to the U.S. and Latin America.

IMET Training. The major portion of all security assistance training in Latin America has been IMET training. IMET training has been a tool of foreign policy used to influence foreign militaries. Fluctuations in IMET training can often be linked to a change in foreign policy.




Figure 5-1 Latin American IMET Students and Expenditures

(DSAA, 1993: 345)

The previous graph presents the composite Latin American IMET expenditures in dollars and the composite number of Latin American students trained. The graph

presents the data by year from 1953 to 1989. There are two prominent features in this graph. First is the peak that occurred in 1962 and second is the valley that hits its low point in 1980. These two outstanding features are the result of significant changes in foreign policy and security assistance training.

Counterinsurgency. The security assistance training program reached an all time high for several years after the introduction of the counterinsurgency program. The 1961 initiation of counterinsurgency training and the emphasis given to Latin America during the Alliance for Progress provided an atmosphere that caused the Latin American training program to surge from 1961 until about 1969 when the training expenditures and students trained became somewhat stable for a period. This extreme peak demonstrates the increased emphasis on training Latin Americans to confront their insurgent problems. After the counterinsurgency training heyday, Latin American training entered a period of stability until 1977 when Carter became president and the 1976 AECA placed human rights conditions on foreign aid.

The Carter Valley. Latin American security assistance training during the Carter administration decreased significantly. This change was due to a Congressional restriction on foreign aid to countries with known human rights abuses and to Carter's promotion of human rights as a primary element of foreign policy. Latin America took a beating with the new human rights policy change. Many Latin American countries voluntarily withdrew from the foreign aid program or were, by law, eliminated from receiving IMET funds.




Figure 5-2 Worldwide and Latin American IMET Expenditures

(DSAA, 1993: 3, 345)

Figure 5-2 illustrates the significance of President Carter’s human rights policies and the AECA’s statutes and how they affected Latin American IMET expenditures in comparison to worldwide expenditures. IMET worldwide expenditures remained relatively flat in comparison to the obvious decrease in Latin American IMET expenditures. These trends show that the Latin American decreases in expenditures during the Carter administration were actually the result of the U.S. human rights policy in Latin America and not a decrease in IMET expenditures generally.

Table 5-1 demonstrates that while Latin American IMET expenditures from 1977 to 1981, the years affected by the Carter administration, were lower than 1976 levels (pre-Carter administration), worldwide IMET expenditures were lower in 1977 and 1980 but higher in 1978, 1979, and 1981. Worldwide expenditures actually increased slightly

during this period. This information demonstrates that Latin America was a major focus of human rights attention during the Carter administration.

Table 5-1 Changes in IMET Expenditures from 1976

Year	Latin American IMET	Worldwide IMET
1977	-\$2,600,000	-\$2,210,000
1978	-\$3,704,000	+\$1,976,000
1979	-\$6,889,000	+\$634,000
1980	-\$7,611,000	-\$1,294,000
1981	-\$6,466,000	+\$1,686,000

Appendix A contains individual country statistics for IMET, SOA, IAAFA, and NAVSCIATTS. An examination of these statistics identifies countries eliminated or withdrawing from the IMET program because of human rights concerns. Argentina, Bolivia, Brazil, Chile, El Salvador, Guatemala, Paraguay, Uruguay, and Venezuela received no IMET aid because of human rights violations for a period during the Carter administration. After the Carter administration, President Reagan increased the IMET military aid to Latin America to nearly the same level that existed prior to the Carter administration. Of the nations where human rights violations caused a stoppage of IMET funding, only El Salvador and Venezuela received renewed funding immediately after the change of administrations. Argentina, because of its dirty war and the Falklands War, did not receive IMET funding until 1988. Chile did not receive IMET funds until after 1989, when General Pinochet stepped down as head of state. Brazil's IMET program was not funded again until 1988 after its return to a democratic government. As shown in the

individual country IMET statistics, many Latin American countries were affected greatly by the loss of IMET funds due to human rights violations. Another aspect that is important to evaluate is the number of IMET students trained at the Spanish language schools and their role in IMET training.

Spanish Language Schools. Spanish language schools, as previously described, play a major role in the training of Latin Americans. These schools were created expressly for the purpose of training Latin Americans in their native language of Spanish. With this intent, these schools have developed courses to provide training that takes the needs of Latin American militaries into consideration. The School of the Americas has by far been the most active of the schools. As of 1989, it trained 42,806 Latin American students (Rodriguez, 1995: 2; SOA, 1990; SOA, 1991; SOA, 1993; SOA, 1994, SOA, 1995). SOA played an important role in introducing counterinsurgency training to Latin America and was a key training element for the conflict in El Salvador. The Inter-American Air Forces Academy has also been a major training school for Latin American air forces, training 26,491 students as of 1989 (De Leon, 1995: 2). IAAFA, with roots in World War II, has played a critical role in filling the need for air force technical training. The Naval Small Craft Instruction and Technical Training School has contributed significantly in training personnel for the small boat navies of many Latin American countries. As of 1989, NAVSCIATTS has trained 2,967 students (NAVSCIATTS: 1992: 2). The following table shows students trained by country for each of the Spanish language schools as of 1989.

Table 5-2 Country Graduates of the Spanish Language Schools.

Country\School	SOA	IAAFA	NAVSCIATTS
Antigua & Barbuda	0	0	18
Argentina	585	365	0
Bahamas	0	0	45
Barbados	1	0	19
Belize	7	11	48
Bolivia	3,100	1,030	153
Brazil	320	244	0
Chile	2,043	1,436	0
Colombia	6,552	4,141	48
Costa Rica	2,260	88	187
Cuba	253	263	0
Dominica	0	0	17
Dominican Republic	1,967	1,075	188
Ecuador	3,105	2,873	54
El Salvador	5,362	1,514	418
Grenada	0	0	22
Guatemala	1,330	951	254
Guyana	0	21	22
Haiti	49	46	12
Honduras	3,127	1,843	548
Jamaica	4	12	0
Mexico	306	453	2
Nicaragua	4,309	811	170
Panama	3,589	1,321	466
Paraguay	1,042	493	97
Peru	3,796	1,204	18
St. Christopher	0	0	22
St. Lucia	0	0	20
St. Vincent and Grenadine	0	0	12
Trinidad and Tobago	0	0	6
Surinam	0	6	0
Uruguay	928	598	22
Venezuela	3,084	2,010	74
Totals	48,678	26,491	2,967

(Rodriguez, 1995: 2; SOA, 1990; SOA, 1991; SOA, 1993; SOA, 1994, SOA, 1995; De Leon, 1995: 2; NAVSCIATTS, 1992: 2)

Although Spanish language schools accomplish more than IMET training (including FMS, FMFP, and Direct Commercial Sales training), almost all of the training conducted at these schools is IMET training. From estimates of the percentage of IMET training accomplished generally at Spanish language schools an attempt was made to roughly determine the dependence of Latin America and its individual states on IMET training conducted at Spanish language schools. Jose Recio, Military Training Coordinator of SOA, estimated that 90 percent of all SOA students were funded under IMET. Stephen Roper, Vice Commander of Air Force Security Assistance Training Squadron estimated that 95 percent of all IAAFA students were IMET funded. Dennis Pete, the U.S. Southern Command Training program Manager for Naval Education and Training Security Assistance Field Activity estimated that all NAVSCIATTS students were funded under the IMET program. All of these estimates were limited to the scope of this study. Applying these percentages directly to training accomplished at Spanish language schools, the percentage of IMET training accomplished was estimated for Latin America and its individual states. These estimates are located in Appendix A. This percentage was calculated by first multiplying the number of students trained for Latin America and its states by the estimated fraction of IMET students for each school and summing the products. This sum was then divided by the number of IMET students for Latin America or the Latin American country under evaluation. Finally it was multiplied by 100 to convert the decimal to a percentage. This percentage is shown in Appendix A at the bottom of each page of statistics as the SLS percentage of IMET.

This approximation estimates that, of the 108,794 Latin American IMET students, 66 percent is trained at Spanish language schools. This estimate is significant because it shows the dependency of the Latin American nations on Spanish language schools. Approximately two thirds of all IMET funded students attended the Spanish language schools, when they could have attended training with their U.S. counterparts in English. Spanish language schools significantly cut the costs of training to Latin American countries because there is no need to teach students English before their training.

Dependency of the individual nations on Spanish Language schools varies greatly. The following discussion applies to the major Latin American nations and excludes some of the Caribbean states.

Argentina and Brazil are the countries least dependent on Spanish language schools with less than 33 percent of IMET students attending. Brazil does not send many students to these schools because its native language is Portuguese, while Argentina does not use them because of sufficient in-country training schools. For Chile, the Dominican Republic, Guatemala, Mexico, Peru, and Uruguay, 33 to 65 percent of their IMET students train in the Spanish language schools. Countries with 66 percent or more of their IMET students training in Spanish language schools include Bolivia, Colombia, Costa Rica, Ecuador, El Salvador, Honduras, Nicaragua, Panama, Paraguay, Venezuela and Cuba (before Fidel Castro's government). This analysis shows a greater dependency by the Central American and Andean nations on Spanish language schools. Guatemala, the only Central American Nation with lower than 66 percent of its IMET students going to Spanish language schools, is only slightly under this mark with 62 percent of its IMET

students attending these schools. This dependency can be attributed to the economics of each region and a country's ability to provide the training in its own training schools.

Summary

General trends of security assistance training statistics demonstrate that the IMET program is directly linked to U.S. foreign policy. Two outstanding events were borne out by the IMET statistics. The first event was President Kennedy's initiative to train the Latin Americans in counterinsurgency doctrine and tactics. The second event was the Carter administration's use of human rights practices as the primary criterion to determine eligibility for military aid and training. Spanish language schools have accomplished a major portion of security assistance training for Latin America. Spanish language schools train approximately 66 percent of all Latin American IMET students. Many of the Central American and Andean nations depend heavily on the training provided at these special schools. This evaluation of security assistance training statistics demonstrates that IMET training reflects U.S. foreign policy and that Latin America uses Spanish language schools for the major portion of their IMET training.

VI. Training Results

Chapter Overview

This chapter contains an analysis of historical data that attempts to answer the research question concerning the results of security assistance training. It is an analysis of training results with the goal of determining the effect that the security assistance training program has had on Latin America and its militaries.

Results of Training

Because security assistance training is an element of foreign policy, its results must be analyzed in the framework of how training has contributed to the results of foreign policy in Latin America. This section will examine five areas of results to determine the success or failure of Latin America in meeting its foreign policy objectives or the intentions of training. How has security assistance training affected Latin American militaries and what are the results of this training? To answer this, the areas to be examined are hemispheric cooperation, counterinsurgency, the Latin American arms race, professionalism and human rights, and democracy versus dictatorships. These are issues that not only shape Latin America, but also its militaries. The evaluation of these areas will provide a suitable measure for the results of training. As with the intentions of training, it is impossible to quantify the results of training and the analysis is limited to a qualitative appraisal of the data collected. Nonetheless, historical analysis evaluates concrete events that reflect the results of training.

Greater Hemispheric Cooperation. A major objective that pervades security assistance training in the hemisphere is the idea of cooperation. Cooperation does not refer solely to U.S. and Latin American cooperation but it also involves cooperation among the Latin American countries. This study evaluates cooperation during World War II, during border disputes, and during the insurgency in El Salvador.

World War II. During World War II, the United States provided substantial amounts of training to Latin American military personnel. This training proved to be a key element for securing Latin American cooperation with the U.S. during the war. Two significant events of cooperation were Brazil's sending its expeditionary force to Italy and Mexico sending its 201st Fighter Squadron to the Philippines (Gil, 1971: 183). U.S. training of these allied forces was necessary to secure their cooperation in actively confronting the Axis Powers. This participation was not the only cooperation resulting from the conflict. Brazil, Mexico, Guatemala, Nicaragua, Costa Rica, El Salvador, Cuba, Ecuador, and Peru allowed the U.S. to set up military bases for hemispheric defense (Gil, 1971: 183; Yeilding, 1983: 55, 81-82, 128-129, President of the United States, 1943: 37). American defense sites were strategically located to protect the Panama Canal because of its economic and military importance to the United States. Brazil used its air forces to conduct antisubmarine patrols and was successful in sinking several German submarines. Brazil and Cuba used Lend-Lease coastal patrol vessels to assist in convoy activities in the Caribbean and South Atlantic (President of the United States, 1943: 37). Latin American nations, except for Argentina who did not sever

relations with the Axis Powers until 1944 (Yielding, 1983: 222), contributed to the war effort as requested by the United States. Although all this activity and cooperation are not attributed to security assistance training, it was the training provided by the U.S. in the majority of cases that permitted Latin American nations to respond. Training was the essential element that allowed Latin Americans to use the war materiel delivered through Lend-Lease aid.

Colombia in Korea. Another example of cooperation occurred during the Korean war. In response to the North Korean invasion of South Korea, Colombia committed one battalion of infantry troops and its premier naval vessel the Almirante Padilla to the United Nations coalition of forces. The Almirante Padilla was refitted for combat in the U.S. and then sailed to assume its duties of coastal patrol in February 1951 (Ramsey, 1967: 546-547). Colombia initially offered to send one battalion to Korea, but it also stated it was willing to send up an entire division. The Colombian battalion served in Korea from May 1951 to July 1953 under the U.S. Army's 24th and later 7th Infantry Divisions. The unit was highly decorated, receiving the U.S. Presidential Unit Citation, 18 U.S. Silver Star Medals, 34 Bronze Stars, and two Legion of Merit awards. The Colombian battalion had 69 missing in action cases and 131 combat deaths. Other Latin American nations demonstrated a willingness to send troops but were denied because General MacArthur decided to not accept units of less than one thousand men (Ramsey, 1967: 547-557). This willingness on the part of Latin American militaries to participate

in a conflict involving communism outside the hemisphere is a good example of the cooperation fostered by military training.

Border Disputes. A problem that has plagued Latin America since its liberation from Spain and Portugal is the conflict resulting from poorly defined or unaccepted borders. Argentina and Chile, Guatemala and Belize, Peru and Ecuador are the most frequent players in border disputes, but they are not the only Latin American nations with problems in this area. One of the intentions of security assistance training in Latin America is to promote cooperation among the Latin American states. The concept behind this objective is that if Latin Americans receive training together they are more likely to meet, understand, and befriend personnel from their neighboring countries. In turn this should result in an increased level of friendship and diplomacy between the neighboring nations.

General Robert W. Porter Jr., U.S. Southern Command Commander from February 1965 to February 1969, described an incident that occurred between Argentina and Chile during his tenure as commander and its relation to security assistance training activities.

I think the School of the Americas was a fine thing. It was not only accepted by the countries, but it had a very ameliorating influence. For example, we kept getting reports of the boundary disputes between Chile and Argentina, and then we had the Beagle Channel situation. I followed these things fairly closely because it seemed to be that Chile and Argentina were special cases, and we needed to deal with these situations, but the historical facts -- the way they were and what they had been were important. Argentina had taken over the southern part of what had been Chile during the war between Peru, Bolivia, and Chile in the latter part of the 19th Century. Argentina moved in on Patagonia, which was a Chilean province, and had taken that over. So the Chileans never really forgave them for that; and there were parts of the boundary that were never agreed. But it

was very interesting. For example, one incident: I was told, before I left Panama by the press and people who were coming to see me and also intelligence cables coming from Washington, that there was going to be a very serious issue over about ten kilometers of frontier between Chile and Argentina. Well, I was going to Argentina and then I was going over to Chile, so I began digging into this as quickly as I got into Argentina. Finally, I had the idea to find out what unit was on the frontier on each side that might get into a fight. I discovered that the battalion commanders on both sides had been through the School of the Americas. Things seemed to be very quiet while I was there. I later found out that there had been an argument and that the chiefs of staff -- the commander of the Chilean Army and the chief of staff of the Argentinean Army had sent units up to the border. They got up there, and the first contact was made. Here were these two men who had been to the School of the Americas together, one on each side. They settled the boundary in about 20 minutes, picking out logical positions, marking them, and then they arranged to have a fishing trip, one command going over to the other country, each side doing this the next day. They traded liaison officers and everything was peaceful and quiet. It just shows what the ability to communicate and having prior relationships with the person before you get into a position of responsibility, can moderate your nationalism and judgments. (Porter, 1981: 468-470)

This incident proves the value of security assistance training in the area of Latin American cooperation. SOA and IAAFA provide an atmosphere where Latin American officers must not only interact but must work together. This forced cooperation allows barriers that traditionally exist to be replaced with greater understanding and acceptance. Although border disputes continue, as seen by the 1995 border war between Peru and Ecuador, a 1992 study by Susan Clark documents that region wide border disputes seem to be declining (Clark, 1992: II-32).

Security assistance training has assisted the U.S. in forming closer ties with Latin American militaries that have resulted in material cooperation during World War II and the Korean War. Security assistance training has also provided Latin American military personnel the opportunity to meet, understand, and befriend other Latin Americans. This interaction has resulted in cooperation among the Latin American militaries.

Counterinsurgency. Counterinsurgency training was first directed at Latin America under the Kennedy Administration. In 1961, the new Attorney General, Robert Kennedy, read Che Guevara's writings and decided that the Alliance for Progress would fail unless it was accompanied by an effective counterinsurgent defense initiative. The vehicles used to train Latin American nations were the School of the Americas and the 8th Special Forces Group. The goal of the program was to develop the ability to defend incipient democracy from communist insurgents. Russell Ramsey, the first counterinsurgency instructor at SOA, stated that the strategy for training the Latin American nations in counterinsurgency tactics and doctrine was to train captains from the individual country's militaries who in turn would train small cadres attached to the specific army units. These small cadres would train their units in counterinsurgency doctrine and tactics (Ramsey, 1995b). The purpose of this counterinsurgency training was to prepare the Latin American nation against the probable insurgent groups that would develop as a result of the Castro regime in Cuba.

Counterinsurgency programs were based on five steps that were necessary to gain popular support for the state and eradicate the insurgent groups. First, the military had to identify insurgents and isolate them from the rest of the population. Second, the military needed to educate the population targeted to join the insurgency to not follow the insurgents. Third, the military, in cooperation with the government, needed to provide significant civic action projects such as roads, wells, and schools to demonstrate the government's concern for their welfare. Fourth, the military needed to inculcate the ideas of democracy into the population so they would be willing to participate in government.

Last, the population needed to be involved in the democratic process (Ramsey, 1995b). This strategy attempted to gain the popular support and involvement of Latin America's poor so they would be loyal to the incipient democracy and thus reject the activities of insurgents.

It was this counterinsurgency training that was provided to Latin American countries to counter the threat of Cuban insurgency. The implementation of counterinsurgency training was successful, mixed with some limited failures and abuses. Counterinsurgency training continued to be of value through 1989 and was used by a number of Latin American countries to defend against insurgency.

Counterinsurgency training was initially successful in several Latin American countries to include Colombia, Ecuador, Peru, Guatemala, Dominican Republic, and Venezuela. This training and doctrine assisted Latin American nations to modernize and gave the military a social role. An example of this success was the Colombian army's success in protecting and assisting Colombian peasants in their struggle with the bandoleros. The Colombian army was successful in procuring popular support from the affected peasants. Counterinsurgency training did not occur without some abuse. Guatemala and Nicaragua were examples of this abuse. Some of the civic actions, supposedly to assist insurgent-targeted population, were actually being used to assist prominent national figures in the name of counterinsurgency civic action (Ramsey, 1995b). In most cases, the counterinsurgency training of Latin Americans successfully defeated or included insurgent groups into the political process.

Bolivia. This counterinsurgency effort was a special case much like El Salvador. While in Cuba, Che Guevara had chosen Bolivia as the location to begin subversive action that would spark a continent-wide insurgency. In November 1966, Guevara entered Bolivia with twenty Cubans and organized his insurgent organization. He was also able to gain the support of 29 Bolivians and three Peruvians (Atkins, 1995: 162). The U.S., as described in Chapter IV, realizing that Che Guevara was the prominent exporter of communism from Cuba, made a special effort to train the Bolivians to eradicate Guevara and his insurgent band. This training effort was two fold in that it involved training at the School of the Americas and on site training in Bolivia by an 8th Special Operations Group MTT. The training effort was successful and Guevara failed to rally the needed support from the Bolivian population. In October 1967, one month after completion of counterinsurgency training by the MTT, the second Ranger Battalion killed Guevara and ended insurgency in Bolivia (Atkins, 1995: 162; Memo for: General Porter, 1968: 4).

El Salvador. Although the insurgency in El Salvador proved to be a more protracted conflict, a great amount of U.S. attention and training proved to be successful in ending the insurgency. During the late 1970s and the 1980s, the Farabundo Marti National Liberation Front (FMLN) waged a fierce insurgency that at times threatened to collapse the government and armed forces of El Salvador. Under Carter, the U.S. almost closed the door entirely on military aid because of human rights violations. For the years of 1978 and 1979, IMET funding was completely eliminated and the major portion of

arms transfers occurred under FMS and commercial export arrangements (DSAA, 1993: 388-389).

In the early 1980s, it appeared that the FMLN would be victorious. President Reagan made El Salvador a top priority and increased grant-aid military assistance of materiel and training. The U.S. objectives for the conflict were “to (1) combat, deter, and/or defeat the FMLN insurgent threat; (2) strengthen democratic principles, institutions, and structures; and (3) achieve broad-based socioeconomic development. (Childress, 1995: 18).” The U.S. embarked on a program of training that included officer, NCO, military tactics, and counterinsurgency doctrine. (This training is described in detail in Chapter IV.) The El Salvadoran armed forces proved to be more adept at combat operations than civic action, but nonetheless they were able to check the FMLN and eventually bring them to the negotiation tables (Childress, 1995: 42). Under the Alfredo Cristiani administration in 1991, the FMLN signed a peace agreement that integrated the FMLN into the democratic processes of El Salvador and ended the insurgency (Zarate, 1994: 118). El Salvador and Bolivia are two examples of the U.S. using a concerted training effort to successfully attack a Latin American insurgency.

Other Insurgencies. A large percentage of Latin American nations has suffered from one or more insurgent groups during the Cold War era. In all cases, the U.S. has willingly trained the targeted nation’s armed forces for counterinsurgency actions. These confrontations have resulted in some failures as well as successes.

Guatemala and Nicaragua are two examples where counterinsurgency efforts failed or failed to eradicate the insurrection. As described previously, Guatemala was

given counterinsurgency training on the same scale and during the same time frame as Bolivia to counter the insurgency of the PGT. This effort has continued from the initial training in the 1960s until the present, 1995. Guatemala has been unable to eradicate the insurgent movement. The 1979 Sandinista takeover of Nicaragua was an example much like Cuba, where the U.S.-trained Nicaraguan national guard was unable or unwilling to put in action the principles of counterinsurgency training. In most cases, the national guardsmen fled the country rather than face the Sandinistas. The toppling of the Somoza regime in 1979 created another "Cuba" in Central America. Like Cuba, Nicaragua became the supporting agent for other revolutions, specifically the revolution of the FMLN of El Salvador. The FMLN used Nicaragua as a base for command, control, and support for its operations in El Salvador (Ramsey, 1995b). Failure to eradicate insurgency in Guatemala has resulted in protracted violence, international scrutiny, and a high expenditure of resources. The loss in Nicaragua resulted in another Soviet ally in Latin America that materially supported the FMLN in El Salvador.

Although some failures have resulted, additional successes in Colombia, Venezuela, and Honduras have shown the positive value of counterinsurgency training. In Colombia, the government has been able to successfully turn three of four insurgent groups from insurgency to involvement in the political process. The fourth group, the Ejercito de Liberacion Nacional, has also negotiated with private oil firms and has agreed to stop bombing oil pipelines. Successful negotiation in Colombia has resulted in reducing the number of insurgents to 1,600 - 2,000 individuals (Sanmiguel, 1995: 68-69).

Venezuela stopped the insurgent activities led by Douglas Bravo during the 1960s and then in the 1980s destroyed the organizational apparatus of the Bandera Roja. These actions effectively eliminated all insurgent activity from Venezuela (Fauriol, 1984: 25). Venezuela was able to take the lessons of U.S. training and eradicate its insurgent forces.

During the 1980s, Honduras was trained extensively in counterinsurgency doctrine and techniques. This training was in part to defend against the Sandinistas in Nicaragua and to counter FMLN activities near El Salvador. Honduras proved to be particularly adept at the soft elements of counterinsurgency or civic action. Honduras successfully used its training to crush insurgents in the departments of Olancho, Atlantida, Yoro, Colon, and La Ceiba (Childress, 1995: 51-53). Honduras utilized its U.S. counterinsurgency training to quickly and effectively eliminate insurgent movements while much concern was directed towards Nicaragua and El Salvador.

An evaluation of the results of counterinsurgency training for Latin America militaries provides striking evidence of its effectiveness. Colombia, Venezuela, Honduras, El Salvador, and Bolivia were successful in eliminating or significantly reducing their insurgent activities. Nicaragua and Guatemala are two examples where counterinsurgency training failed or did not bring significant results. Nonetheless, an overall evaluation of the success of counterinsurgency training reveals a greater number of successes than failures.

Latin American Arms Race. Security assistance and its associated training have often been accused of being a catalyst for arms races. The belief is that U.S. training and

association with U.S. military advisor whets the appetite of Latin American militaries for large quantities of high-tech weapons. This claim has also been a popular charge leveled at the security assistance programs of Latin America. A 1963 examination of the effect of military programs on Latin America by Charles Wolf included the following quotation made by Stanley Meisler in 1960: "In most cases, military aid. . . has tended (1) to force weak nations into devoting huge percentages of their vital capital to armaments; (2) to entrench undemocratic, military governments; and (3) to promote arms races between the governments (Wolf, 1963: 8)." This opinion that security assistance training has caused an arms race in Latin America is oblivious to defense expenditure in the region as compared to defense spending worldwide. Using data from World Military Expenditures and Arms Transfers released in the years of 1974, 1979, 1985, 1990, and 1991, the following charts were developed. These four charts compare defense expenditures as a percentage of the Gross National Product of Latin America to the seven other regions of the world -- Africa, East Asia, Europe, the Middle East, North America, Oceania, and South Asia.




Figure 6-1 Military Expenditures as a Percentage of GNP




Figure 6-2 Military Expenditures as a Percentage of GNP




Figure 6-3 Military Expenditures as a Percentage of GNP




Figure 6-4 Military Expenditures as a Percentage of GNP

In each of the four charts, it is obvious that Latin American arms expenditures as a portion of GNP are lower than all other regions of the world for the time period of 1963 to 1989. These charts contradict the idea of a Latin American arms race. In reality, Latin American defense expenditures have exceeded two percent of its composite GNP only

twice in the period shown. Latin America spends less of its GNP on defense than any region in the world and faces U.S. policies that limit the amount of U.S. military materiel it can purchase.

In 1972, a speech by General George Underwood, commander U.S. Southern Command, described the armament situation in Latin America resulting from a U.S. 100 million dollar FMS ceiling and a restriction on the sale of sophisticated weapons. He states that the ceiling was implemented to prevent the Latin Americans from spending money on armaments that should be spent on social and economic development programs. This has had a dramatic effect on the amount of arms available in Latin America. He stated that, "the number of combat aircraft in Latin America today is less than in 1953 and much less than 1958. Also, Latin America governments are putting an average of only eleven percent of their budgets into armaments compared to our 32 percent. (Underwood, 1972: 19-20)." He further stated that these restrictions forced Latin American countries to turn to Europe for the modern weapons needed for security, even though they would rather purchase U.S. equipment because of its "quality, the assured flow of spare parts and the similarity of our tactical and logistical doctrines (Underwood, 1972: 21)."

In a U.S. Southern Command document prepared for the 1968 Pentagon Forum, the idea of an arms race is rebuffed. "Not only is there no arms race, but Latin Americans spend less on military hardware than any other major area in the world. They spend less than 2% of their combined GNP on arms compared with nearly 4% in Scandinavia, 8.5% in the Warsaw Pact nations, and over 2.5% in Africa, and nearly 8% in NATO (U.S.

Southern Command, 1968: 6).” Furthermore, the document states that reductions in U.S. military aid have placed Latin America in a position where it cannot purchase excessive amounts of weapons.

If these countries purchase military equipment they need the money to come from some place. Practically, funds will be diverted from important social and economic development projects. This could become a vicious cycle for when social and economic development slows down, the problems of internal stability become worse. (U.S. Southern Command, 1968: 7)

The statistics available for Latin America clearly indicate that the region is not involved in an arms race. In fact, because of restrictions on U.S. arms, Latin America must find suppliers other than the U.S. to modernize its weapons for defense. Not only are armament expenditures the lowest in the world, but Latin America is also the only region in the world that is free of weapons of mass destruction. Latin America is the only region entirely free of nuclear, biological, and chemical weapons (Ramsey, 1995b). The information available concerning Latin America gives it the status of being one of the least armed region of the world.

Professionalism and Human Rights. Latin America has popularly been recognized as a region where human rights are nonexistent. The military is seen as a vehicle of repression used by the state to control and abuse its citizens. El Salvador’s armed forces have been linked to the killing of Archbishop Romero, the Maryknoll nuns, El Mozate massacre, and the 1989 murder of Jesuits. Members of the Argentina military have confessed to tossing thousands of “dissident citizens” into the Atlantic Ocean during Argentina’s dirty war of the 1980s. It is virtually impossible to identify a country in

Latin America whose military has not been fingered in some human rights violation.

With the universal nature of human rights violations in Latin America, is it possible to link security assistance training provided by the U.S. to these atrocities? Has security assistance training reduced the amount of human rights violations endemic in the Latin American culture? A military's ability to conduct itself in a professional manner is directly tied to the ability of to obey the law of war, the law of the land, and other internationally recognized standards of conduct. This section will examine examples of the results of security assistance training on the El Salvadoran military's human rights activities and professionalism.

The armed forces of El Salvador probably receive the most notoriety as an abuser of its citizen's human rights. Michael Childress recently completed a study on the effectiveness of U.S. training in El Salvador and Honduras. He contends that human rights abuses no longer exist in the armed forces as an institution, but that human rights abuses are now occurring on the level of the individual soldier (Childress, 1995: 35). This transformation places current human rights abuses on the level of individual criminal activity. This statement does not attempt to conclude that El Salvador has not had a problem with human rights abuses, but rather that the situation has improved significantly. In 1981, 10,000 politically motivated killings were carried out that were the responsibility of the Salvadoran military. By 1990, this number had decreased to 100 killings (Childress, 1991: 35-36). State Department statistics, reported by the Government Accounting Office (GAO) in April 1991, demonstrated this downward trend in politically-motivated killings. In 1980, politically-motivated killings were occurring at

a rate of 750 per month. This number had decreased significantly in 1989 and 1990 at which time the killings were occurring at a rate of 17 and 8 killings per month respectively (Government Accounting Office, 1991: 31).

Starting in 1982, the IMET training of Salvadoran armed forces covered important areas relevant to the guerrilla conflict. Topics included the treatment of captured combatants and civilians according to the Geneva Conventions, the law of land warfare, and civil military relations. Furthermore, 7th Special Operations Group personnel serving as advisors to the Salvadoran armed forces were trained in human rights issues and instructed to include human rights in all of their training efforts. The Salvadoran military also provided training to its officers and enlisted personnel taught by Salvadoran officers and international organizations (GAO, 1991: 29-30). The GAO stated that a United Nations observer, "was told by the FMLN that U.S. military training had markedly improved Salvadoran armed forces' human rights performance (GAO, 1991: 29)."

Perhaps the most significant action showing the affective education of human rights training on Salvadoran personnel occurred after the November 1989 murder of the six Jesuit priests (GAO, 1991: 27). Francisco Elena of the Salvadoran army, a security assistance trained graduate of SOA, took the names of the participants of the Jesuit massacre to the Salvadoran Supreme Court and demanded their trial in a civilian court to prevent a military cover-up (Ramsey, 1995b). Elena's action demonstrated an unknown phenomenon of an El Salvadoran army officer challenging the military organization to see that justice was carried out. The statistics and historical information concerning the

Salvadoran guerrilla war correlate security assistance training with reductions in incidents of human rights abuse. It is the effective training in the law of armed conflict and military tactics that increases the professionalism of the individual soldier and provides him the knowledge of how to proceed in a situation of possible abuse. Without security assistance training to teach the essentials of professionalism, the soldier is left to repeat the errors of those who went before.

Democracy or Dictatorship. Latin America is characterized as a region steeped in the tradition of military coup d'etats and extended military control of the political system. It is true that military dictators have played a large role in the national politics of Latin American nations. Furthermore security assistance activities were often accused of supporting dictatorships that were loyal to the U.S. General Underwood in 1972 stated.

Our assistance, being military, is really stigmatized if it is associated with a military regime. What is not understood is that our assistance is not designed to maintain a particular authoritarian military government, but is directed at giving that country and its people the capability for internal security and nation-building that are imperative prerequisites to social and economic improvement. We are trying to build armed forces that will be instruments for furthering the national good. We cannot wait until a so-called "good" government comes along to create such an instrument for national good. It must be there, ready for use when that "good" government takes over. In keeping with Nixon Doctrine, we should work with the governments of the moment, good or bad, and try to patiently lead them in the right direction. (Underwood, 1972: 18)

This attitude describes the security assistance program until Carter used human rights as his main policy criterion to withhold aid from violating nations. Before Carter U.S. foreign policy was such that dictators or repressive governments did not face significant repercussions for their activities. Military aid was not eliminated because a government was considered corrupt. Carter and the AECA made continued aid

dependent on compliance with internationally accepted human rights standards. This change obviously was advantageous to democratic Latin American countries and disadvantageous to nondemocratic states. Ronald Reagan increased the pressure for change on repressive governments in the region, when he emphasized the creation of democracy in Latin America.

One area of evaluation for security assistance training is to examine to what extent it has influenced national governmental institutions. One intention of security assistance training is to influence Latin American militaries to act in a manner compatible with U.S. civil-military relations, with a civilian head of state as commander in chief. Figure 6-5 shows the governmental institutions for the major Latin American countries from 1945 to 1995, almost the entire duration of the security assistance training program.




Figure 6-5 Latin American Governments During the Cold War

(Ramsey, 1994; Sturgill, 1994: 188)

This chart can be used to identify several trends. The first trend is that, with the exception of Costa Rica and Mexico, all these Latin American countries have experienced some sort of authoritarian government and democracy. The Latin American system has traditionally relied upon the military as the mechanism to maintain order. Brian Loveman, in a 1994 article, described the military's traditional role in Latin American government. "This political concept with the military serving as 'Guarantors' of the institutional order and, by implication, adjudicators of the national common good, permanent interests, and national security requirements, has a long history in Latin America. (Loveman, 1994: 110)." This role of the military required it to be the watch dog for the Latin American state, always ready to step in to correct a problem when elected governments violated national interests. Loveman quotes a statement by former Peruvian officer Victor Villanueva relating to the military's role. "This meant accepting, implicitly, that, apart from the suffrage, sovereignty resided in the Army rather than the people. The latter had the right to elect governments and the army the duty of ousting them when it determined that they violated the constitution (Loveman, 1994: 110)." This active role in governmental issues was often stated in the constitutions of the Latin American state. For example, the Peruvian constitution of 1856 required military intervention if the government disobeyed the laws or the constitution (Loveman, 1994: 110). With this tradition of military intervention in politics, it is not surprising to note that nearly all the Latin American governments suffered some kind of military

intervention resulting in an authoritarian government or that the military actively played a role in maintaining an authoritarian government in power.

The second and more significant trend resulting from training is the current trend toward democracy. Starting as early as the 1950s, Latin American states have made governmental changes to democracies. This change has required a paradigm shift for Latin American militaries. This new paradigm resembled the U.S. model of civil-military relations, with the military subordinate to the civilian chief of state. Security assistance training was essential in this paradigm change through its teaching of democracy and the American governmental system. In his oral history, General James A. Williams echoed the importance of training with respect to Latin American intervention in government.

It is the people that we are trying to reach; and, given the involvement of the military, even in those countries that have democratically elected governments, we need to ensure that there are people there with whom we can have contact, people who have lived at Leavenworth, been to Kansas City, driven to New York, or people who have been at Fort Benning. (Williams, 1991: 142)

This contact between U.S. and Latin American personnel, coupled with training covering the U.S. governmental system, has left lasting impressions on many important Latin American military personnel.

Edwin Corr, Ambassador to Bolivia from 1981 to 1985, described the influence of SOA on General Hugo Banzer, a military head of state from 1971 to 1978 and later a political leader. Banzer's rule as a dictator was known as the *dictablanda* or the soft dictatorship. In 1978, he opened the way for the return of democracy when he resigned

as head of state and held national elections (Corr, 1995: 1). Later, as a political candidate, Banzer maintained a position that ensured continued democracy in Bolivia.

In 1982, Hugo Banzer won a plurality of the national vote for president. The Bolivian Congress, in accord with constitutional procedures, ignored the electoral victory and selected Dr. Victor Paz Estensorro as president. Not only did Banzer accept what to him and his party was an unfair act by Congress, Banzer aborted a well organized and already underway effort by Banzer party supporters and key military commanders to carry out a coup d' etat that would have prevented Paz from taking office and installed Banzer as president. In 1989, Banzer again was a candidate for president and accepted electoral defeat. His party entered into a coalition government with the Congress' choice, Jaime Paz Zamora. Banzer and his party remain major actors in the democratic system that has flourished in Bolivia since 1982. (Corr, 1995: 1)

Banzer is an example of a U.S. trained Latin American military leader that played a major role in bringing democracy to his country and then in preserving that democracy when there was pressure to overthrow it. This influence and paradigm shift concerning civil-military relationships have assisted in making Latin American militaries proponents of democracy. This change has resulted in a more professional force and created an environment where democracies are becoming the permanent form of government. Figure 6-5 shows that all of these nations had become democracies by 1991. Security assistance training has made a major impact on Latin American militaries by teaching their personnel that the military must be subordinate to civil authorities to allow democracy to function.

Summary

For the most part, security assistance training results have been positive. These results have included improved cooperation, successful counterinsurgency efforts, greater

respect for human rights, increased professionalism, military support of democracy, and the only region free of nuclear, biological, and chemical weapons. Latin American cooperation has been significant in World War II, in the Korean War, and in Latin American border disputes. Statistics from the 1980s war in El Salvador show that U.S. training was influential in lowering the number of human rights abuses conducted by the armed forces of El Salvador. Latin American militaries over the course of security assistance training since its inception in World War II have adopted a position of supporting democracy. This change in attitude has permitted every major Latin American nation as of 1995 to assume a democratic form of government. Latin America is not involved in an arms race, but spends the smallest percentage of GNP on defense worldwide. Furthermore it is the only region free of all weapons of mass destruction. Latin American security assistance training has successfully assisted most nations experiencing insurgency to successfully eradicate these revolutions. These results show the positive nature of security assistance training in Latin America.

VII. Conclusions

Chapter Overview

Security assistance scholars popularly accept that security assistance and its related training were initiated in response to the Cold. The end of the Cold War in 1989 brought into question the need to continue this training. If the security assistance training and its associated training system, specifically for Latin America, were nothing more than a Cold War relic, had the associated mission and purpose of this training vanished? It was this problem that generated this study's four research objectives. The first objective was to determine the intentions of Latin American security assistance training to evaluate if its creation was truly to counter the Cold War threat. The second research objective was to determine if security assistance training reflected U.S. foreign policy. The third research objective was to determine the contribution of the Spanish language schools to Latin American security assistance training. The fourth research objective was to determine the results of Latin American security assistance training. Examining the intentions and results of training would lead one to determine if Latin American security assistance training were a Cold War instrument or some other instrument of U.S. foreign policy.

This chapter will review the results of this study with respect to the individual research objectives. The four objectives will be examined individually, followed by a section of final conclusions.

Training Intentions

This study has identified the intentions for security assistance training in Latin America as hemispheric defense from external attack, internal defense for hemispheric security, a foreign policy instrument to improve human rights conditions and increase democracies, and inter-American cooperation. These intentions formed the major reasons for all training activities in Latin America for the scope of this study.

World War II. Countering the idea that security assistance training was a Cold War creation, the first major training effort involving Latin Americans began in the pre-World War II years and continued through to the end of the war. Behind all training taking place during the war years was the idea of hemispheric defense against external attack, specifically an attack by the Axis Powers. Latin Americans were trained in military skills to include aviation, logistics, combat, and others. More than simply initiating security assistance training, it was during World War II that the Spanish language schools were developed. The Inter-American Air Forces Academy and the U.S. Army School of the Americas were both created and active during World War II. These two institutions would prove to be the major training vehicles used for the majority of IMET training for Latin America. From this data, it is possible to determine that neither security assistance training nor its accompanying training system were Cold War creations.

Post World War II. After World War II, the enemy became the Soviet Union and communism. The initial response to this new foe was to continue with the strategy of

external defense. Latin America and the U.S. made several key agreements that would serve as unified defense against the communist threat. The 1947 signing of the Rio Pact and the 1948 creation of the Organization of American States provided a framework within which the U.S. and Latin America agreed to aid each other in the advent of external attack.

Counterinsurgency. In 1961 under the new Kennedy administration, the intentions of training changed with the introduction of counterinsurgency training. The fear of another Castro appearing in another Latin American country caused the change in training intentions. No longer was the threat considered to be a conventional external attack on the hemisphere, but rather insurgency that would threaten the internal security of Latin American nations and the collective security of the region. Counterinsurgency training embodied the new training intention of promoting hemispheric security by giving Latin American nations the tools necessary to defend against internal insurgencies.

Human Rights and Democracy. The counterinsurgency emphasis continued until the late 1970s, when under the Carter administration the principal element of foreign policy became human rights concerns. Carter's policy, in concert with the AECA of 1976, made security assistance activities and training for a particular country dependent upon that country's human rights record. Many Latin American nations rejected or were eliminated by law from receiving IMET training. Although this policy rightfully focused on eliminating human rights abuses, it also resulted in failure when the Sandinistas took control in Nicaragua. The push for improved human rights conditions continued under

Reagan, but he also emphasized countering the Soviet threat, especially in El Salvador and Honduras, and promoting democracy as the preferred form of government. During this period, the primary intention of security assistance training was to teach Latin American soldiers the importance of human rights and the U.S. system of civil-military relations. The goal was to teach students respect for civilian control of the military and human rights. This emphasis on human rights and democracy continued through 1989 and is still emphasized today, in 1995.

Cooperation. The idea of inter-American cooperation has been a reason for training ever since the U.S. began training Latin Americans previous to World War II and has continued through the entire scope of this study. There are two major premises behind the concept of cooperation. First, by exposing Latin Americans to the United States or the American system, it was believed that students would be desirous to emulate a similar system in their nation and would develop strong loyalties to the United States. This cooperation would not only benefit the U.S. through the building of stronger allegiance, but would also serve to improve the militaries' role in Latin American countries. Second, by creating an atmosphere where Latin American students could work together to learn military skills, tactics, and doctrine, students from different countries would develop bonds of friendship and understanding. These bonds would serve to create greater hemispheric cohesion and thus hemispheric defense and security. Probably more important was the desire to create friendships that later might prevent armed conflict between Latin American states.

Because of the creation of the training system and its operation during the World War II period, the purpose for its creation was not to counter the Cold War threat. The intentions for training have evolved overtime to meet existing threats and to facilitate U.S. foreign policy in the case of human rights and democracy. The only intention that endures through the entire scope of the study is the idea of inter-American cooperation. From this assessment it is possible to conclude that Latin American security assistance training was not uniquely an instrument for the Cold War, but that it has been an instrument of U.S. foreign policy that has been ever changing to meet the policy needs of the time. Security assistance statistics further demonstrate security assistance training as an instrument of foreign policy.

Reflection of Foreign Policy

IMET or grant-aid training is the major security assistance training program used by the United States as a foreign policy instrument. IMET funds are allotted to individual Latin American countries for the purpose of providing security assistance training consistent with our foreign policy objectives for each country. Because IMET is a tool of foreign policy, IMET statistics emulate U.S. foreign policy trends and changes for the region. Two major changes in foreign policy, the initiation of counterinsurgency training and basing security assistance on human rights conditions, were demonstrated as a result of this study.

Counterinsurgency. The initiation of the Alliance for Progress in 1961 was directly linked to a change in military policy in the Latin American region. Castro's

takeover in Cuba, combined with the insurgent doctrines of Guevara and Debray, raised concerns for the Kennedy administration that insurgency would be exported from Cuba to the rest of Latin America. In response to this Latin American concern, the School of the Americas and the 8th Special Operations Group initiated a counterinsurgency training program to counter this threat. This high water mark for IMET training (as demonstrated in Chapter V) was the highest point for IMET funding and students trained in the region. From 1961 to 1969, this training surge directly countered the communist-backed insurgent threat.

Human Rights. IMET training statistics demonstrate human rights as the basis for policy to be the other significant change in U.S. foreign policy in the Latin American region. This initiative was based on the AECA of 1976 and the Carter administration's position of making human rights the principle element of foreign policy decisions. From 1977 to 1980, the funding for the IMET program decreased by more than 50 percent. Latin America seemed to be the primary focus of this policy, because worldwide IMET expenditures actually increased over the period of the Carter administration. Many nations withdrew from the IMET program, while others were eliminated by law from IMET participation. The period of the Carter administration pushed IMET training funding to its lowest point since 1957. Although human rights emphasis continued under the Reagan administration, the major emphasis was on countering Soviet-sponsored insurgencies. This new emphasis raised Latin American IMET training back to the pre-Carter levels of funding.

IMET training statistics clearly show the major foreign policy initiative in Latin America for the scope of this study. The high of counterinsurgency policy and low of human rights policy were the major changes in foreign policy that directly affected IMET funding in Latin America. Because IMET statistics are correlated with major foreign policy initiatives, this study concludes that IMET training and other related security assistance training are used as elements of U.S. foreign policy for influencing Latin America.

Contribution of Spanish Language Schools

Spanish language schools, consisting of the Inter-American Air Forces Academy, the School of the Americas and the Naval Small Craft Instruction and Technical Training School, trained approximately 66 percent of Latin American IMET-funded students. Estimates of the contribution of Spanish language schools to IMET not only conclude that Latin America is highly dependent on these schools, but also shows the higher dependency of the Andean and Central American nations. Of these nations, only Guatemala and Peru sent less than 66 percent of their IMET students to these schools, while the other nations sent 69 percent or more. Spanish language schools allowed Latin American countries to send more students because English language instruction need not be accomplished before training. Spanish language schools have made a major contribution to the security assistance training of Latin Americans.

Training Results

Analysis of the results of training is an important portion of this study due to the recent accusations that security assistance training supports dictatorships and human rights abuses. In Chapter VI, this study enumerated many significant results of training as an instrument of foreign policy. Results were examined in the context of their impact on Latin American countries and their militaries. Five major results were evaluated. These included hemispheric cooperation, counterinsurgency, professionalism and human rights, a Latin American arms race, and the growth of democracy in the region. Security assistance training was linked to a substantial number of positive results in these areas. This section will review the results of training from Chapter VI.

Hemispheric Cooperation. The one overriding intention of Latin American security assistance training has been to create an atmosphere of inter-American cooperation. The objective of cooperation had two parts. The first was to create cooperation between the U.S. and Latin American nations. The second was to create cooperation among Latin American states. An evaluation of training results revealed successful creation of both types of cooperation.

Cooperation with the U. S. Latin American cooperation with the U.S. resulting from security assistance training has occurred as early as World War II. This initial cooperation came when Brazil committed forces to the European theater and Mexico committed forces to the Pacific. These forces were U.S.-trained and equipped. Their cooperation demonstrated a willingness to enter into combat activities as U.S.

allies. Other Latin American nations also cooperated through coastal patrols for defense and convoy activities and through permitting the creation of U.S. bases at strategic locations in a number of Latin American states.

During the Korean conflict, Colombia sent one battalion and its premier naval vessel which fought and operated under U.S. control. Colombia's willingness to fight against communism was a significant example of cooperation. The unit was highly decorated as a result of its contributions to the war effort. Colombia was not the only Latin American country willing to cooperate in this conflict, but MacArthur's decision to allow participation only by units of one thousand or more men denied participation by a number of these nations.

Latin American Cooperation. Perhaps even more significant in the area of cooperation was the United States' desire to promote cooperation among Latin American states. One type of conflict that has been prevalent in Latin America was border disputes. The ones most notable are those between Argentina and Chile, Peru and Ecuador, Guatemala and Belize, Chile and Bolivia, and Peru and Chile. Chapter VI detailed a dispute between Argentina and Chile during the late 1960s which was resolved quickly because of previous relationships at the School of the Americas. A 1995 border dispute between Ecuador and Peru demonstrated the ongoing nature of this type of conflict. Nonetheless, a 1992 study by Susan Clark documents the region-wide decline in border disputes (Clark 1992: II-32). Security assistance training, especially at Spanish language schools, has played a key role in the reduction of these disputes. The Spanish language

schools have made it necessary for students from various nations to work and study together, thus bridging differences between the Latin American militaries.

Counterinsurgency. Although results in the area of counterinsurgency have been mixed, the overall results have been positive. The introduction of counterinsurgency training to Latin America has followed two approaches. The first was the general instruction of the doctrine to all Latin American nations. The second was a dedicated effort by the U.S. to eradicate insurgency in Bolivia and El Salvador. Both programs proved to be generally successful with only a few failures.

General Training. General application of counterinsurgency training resulted in giving the military a social role, eradicating several insurgencies, and the failure to end other insurgencies.

Civic action was the instrument taught to Latin American students as the way to win the hearts and minds of insurgent-targeted peasants. This indoctrination was initially successful in Guatemala, Colombia, Peru, Ecuador, the Dominican Republic, and Venezuela. Success was mixed with failure in some cases such as Guatemala and Nicaragua, where some projects were actually improvements for influential citizens and not for the affected peasants. The successful application of civic action assisted in the eradication of several insurgencies.

Venezuela, Colombia, and Honduras were prime examples of insurgency elimination. Venezuela eradicated insurgent groups during the 1960s and 1980s. In the late 1980s and early 1990s, Colombia was able to negotiate with three of four insurgent groups, ending their rebellion and including them in the political process. The fourth

group agreed to limit its insurgent activities with respect to the demolition of oil pipelines. In the 1980s, Honduras was able to crush forming insurgent groups and avoid protracted conflict. These successes demonstrate the effectiveness of U.S. counterinsurgency training.

Success was not without some failure. Nicaragua and Guatemala were two cases where U.S. training failed to eradicate insurgency. In Nicaragua, the result was the rise to power of the Cuba- and Soviet-supported Sandinistas. In Guatemala, insurgents have maintained activities for four consecutive decades, including ongoing activity in the 1990s. The failure to eliminate these insurgencies resulted in increased U.S. expenditures and the Nicaraguan backing of insurgents in El Salvador.

Bolivia and El Salvador. Insurgency in these two nations received major U.S. focus and dedication of resources and training. Che Guevara, one of the exporters of the Cuban revolution, was attempting to emulate Castro's success with his small cadre of insurgents in Bolivia. U.S.-trained Bolivian rangers successfully countered Che's group by ultimately capturing and executing Che and many of his followers. In El Salvador, the armed forces pressured FMLN guerrillas to stop their insurgency and join the political process. In both cases, the U.S. became very involved in the fight against insurgents with in-country advisors closely assisting the armed forces.

Counterinsurgency training in Latin America gave the armed forces the tools necessary to eradicate and reduce the insurgent threat. Latin America's ability to apply the soft (civic action) and hard (combat tactics) elements of counterinsurgency doctrine to their insurgent problems was the result of U.S. security assistance training.

Human Rights and Professionalism. U.S. human rights concerns and the promotion of democracy in Latin America placed increasing emphasis on improving the professionalism of Latin American soldiers. Chapter VI examined human rights and democracy and the role of the military in their implementation. This section will review the result of human rights training and the results of professionalism as evidenced by the human rights improvements and increasing democracies.

Human Rights. El Salvador was the case examined for an example of human rights training. The armed forces were initially responsible for perpetrating thousands of politically-motivated killings in the early 1980s. Realizing the extent of the abuses taking place, the U.S. incorporated human rights training into security assistance training for Salvadorans to improve human rights conditions. By 1990, these killings had been reduced to 100. Human rights conditions had improved remarkably. A Salvadoran officer reported other military members to a civilian court to ensure that justice was achieved for the 1989 Jesuit massacre. Even the FMLN stated that human rights had improved due to U.S. training. Although this is a single example, it clearly shows the effects of human rights training on Latin Americans.

Professionalism. The West measures military professionalism by the ability to obey the law of war and the civil authorities directing its activities. Latin America has not been without its problems in this area. Many human rights abuses as well as military intervention and rule are primary examples of Latin American militaries not meeting Western standards of a professional military. Security assistance training of

Latin Americans has been a major factor in improving the professionalism of these militaries. Improvements in human rights practices, as evidenced by the example of El Salvador, shows Latin Americans' move to respect the law of war that guarantees the rights of noncombatants in war. Perhaps the most prominent example of a change to professionalism in Latin America is the newfound respect for civil authority. All major Latin American countries, with the exception of Cuba (not a recipient of security assistance training since 1959), are currently democracies. The respect of civil authorities has replaced the Latin American militaries' long-standing tradition of intervention. Because of the changes by its militaries, Latin America has achieved a new level of military professionalism. This is directly attributable to security assistance training where Latin American military leaders receive extensive instruction on the issues of respecting human rights and civil authority.

Latin American Arms Race. The accusations that security assistance activities have led to a Latin American arms race have proven to be false. Latin America has trailed all regions of the world in defense spending as a percentage of GNP. Military forces and equipment have been dwindling in the region. Furthermore, Latin America is the only region that can boast of being entirely free of nuclear, biological, and chemical weapons. Because Latin America has no weapons of mass destruction and continues to spend the smallest amount of its GNP on defense, security assistance training and aid have not caused a Latin American arms race.

Democracy. Latin American militaries have traditionally held the position of guarantor of order and the common good of the Latin American state. This traditional role has naturally led to intervention and military rule. Security assistance training has been a key instrument in changing the Latin American military's role. The training and accompanying association with the U.S. system has greatly assisted in teaching the Latin American soldier his role in a democracy. Bolivia's General Banzer is an example of a U.S.-trained dictator that facilitated the return and maintenance of democracy in his country. This role change has engulfed all Latin America, as all major states in the region have a democratic form of government. The military's assumption of the position of a subordinate role to civil authorities relates directly to U.S. training, support, and association.

Final Conclusions

As ascertained by this study, the reasons for security assistance training were first, to promote hemispheric defense against the Axis Powers, then later against the Soviet threat; second, to provide internal security against insurgent groups; third, to promote human rights and democracy; and fourth, to promote inter-American cooperation. Security assistance training for Latin America was not solely a Cold War tool to counter the Soviet threat. The reasons for security assistance training have encompassed the above intentions listed. This training effort has been used by the U.S. as a vehicle to implement its foreign policy objectives and to train Latin Americans with the skills necessary to meet the changing security requirements of the region.

Security Assistance IMET statistics demonstrate significant changes in U.S. foreign policy toward Latin America. President Kennedy's implementation of counterinsurgency training and the use of human rights as a criterion for receiving of military assistance are the two major foreign policy shifts borne out by IMET statistics. IMET training statistics are a useful aid for the determination of past foreign policy objectives in Latin America.

Spanish language schools comprised the major portion of IMET training carried out for Latin Americans. Central American and Andean nations demonstrated a higher dependence on the Spanish language schools than the other major Latin American countries. This study estimates that 66 percent of Latin American IMET training took place at these schools. From their inception during World War II, Spanish language schools have created an excellent training system relevant to the needs of Latin American militaries. These schools have evolved to prepare and train Latin Americans with the skills essential to their defense requirements. They have demonstrated their worth over time as evidenced by Latin America's willingness to send their students to the Spanish language schools instead of the U.S. defense schools where U.S. personnel are trained.

Security assistance training in Latin America has accumulated a number of results that show the value and importance of this training. Inter-American cooperation has improved. Insurgencies have been eliminated. Human rights conditions have improved. Latin American military professionalism now includes respect for human rights and civil authority. Security assistance training has assisted in changing the role of Latin American militaries from political activity to one of submission to civil authorities. The

region spends the smallest percentage of its GNP on defense and is the only region entirely free of weapons of mass destruction. These results demonstrate the impact that security assistance training has had on the region. Security assistance training has helped to create more professional and competent armed forces in Latin America.

These positive results in Latin America demonstrate that security assistance training has not trained military personnel to be dictators or human rights abusers. Although some trained personnel will commit atrocities and acts not acceptable to the United States, they are not condoned or taught by security assistance training activities. The impact of security assistance training on Latin America has been to reduce the problems traditionally associated with Latin American militaries and to influence these militaries to better comply with internationally recognized standards of professionalism and conduct.

Summary

This chapter reviewed the analyzed data from Chapters IV, V, and VI. It makes several conclusions. First, security assistance training of Latin Americans was not solely intended to meet Cold War requirements, but was a foreign policy tool used for various purposes. Second, IMET training statistics show that security assistance training was indeed an element of foreign policy. Third, Spanish language schools were the major training vehicles for the security assistance training of Latin Americans. Fourth, the results of security assistance training have contributed significantly to improving the professionalism and competency of Latin American militaries.

Appendix A. Latin American and Country Composite Statistics

This appendix contains Latin American security assistance training information. This information comes in five categories, IMET funds, IMET students, IAAFA students, SOA students, and NAVSCIATTS students. Student categories list the number students by year for each training source and total the number of students for the scope of the study. IMET funds lists IMET expenditures by year and totals the expenditures for the scope of the study. SOA and IAAFA data were obtained directly from these sources, while NAVSCIATTS data were obtained from a 1992 NAVSCIATTS publication. IMET statistics were obtained from Fiscal Year Series: As of September 30, 1993, a publication of the Department of Defense Security Assistance Agency (345-445).

All IMET data are shown for the formal periods of the Military Assistance Training Program and IMET Program to 1989 (1953-1989). SOA statistics are cumulative from 1946 to 1989. SOA did not have yearly statistics, hence the only SOA statistics are the cumulative totals for each country and Latin America (Rodriguez, 1995: 2; SOA, 1990; SOA, 1991; SOA, 1993; SOA, 1994, SOA, 1995). SOA statistics were obtained by subtracting students trained for the calendar years of 1990, 1991, 1992, 1993, and 1994 from the cumulative figures provided from the Rodriguez facsimile. Current SOA student statistics are under revision. SOA statistics used for this study do not reflect the current activities to revise the SOA's statistics. IAAFA statistics are cumulative for the period of 1943 to 1981 (De Leon, 1995: 2). Starting in 1982 yearly statistics are listed for each country and Latin America. NAVSCIATTS statistics are cumulative from

1963 to 1983 (NAVSCIATTS, 1992: 2). After 1983, yearly statistics are listed for each country and Latin America. Because of the cumulative nature of the IAAFA and NAVSCIATTS statistics, the first entry for each school is contained in the years of 1981 and 1983 respectively.

The smaller Caribbean states' statistics are listed cumulatively on pages A-27, A-28, and A-29. Statistics listed for these nations include IMET and NAVSCIATTS training. St. Christopher only lists NAVSCIATTS training. Barbados has sent one student to SOA that is not listed in these statistics.

For the major Latin American countries a calculation was made to approximate the percentage of IMET students that are trained by Spanish language schools. This estimation is listed as "SLS percentage of IMET." A description of its calculation is located in Chapter V. Mr. Dennis Pete, Mr. Jose Recio, and Colonel Stephen Roper provided estimates for the percentage of IMET funded students at NAVSCIATTS, SOA, and IAAFA respectively. IMET was estimated to encompass 100 percent of training at NAVSCIATTS through 1989. IMET was estimated to include 90 percent of all students trained at the SOA before 1990. IMET was estimated to include 95 percent of students trained at IAAFA before 1990.

All training statistics for the following tables have the same parenthetical documentation as presented above for IMET and the individual schools. For this reason the tables are not documented.

Latin American Composite Statistics					
Year	IMET Funds	IMET Students	SOA Students	IAAFA Students	NAVSCIATTS Students
1953	74				
1954	1101	275			
1955	2175	871			
1956	2724	864			
1957	3625	796			
1958	3249	1206			
1959	5840	606			
1960	4761	1548			
1961	7837	4883			
1962	15117	8975			
1963	8487	5933			
1964	11658	4146			
1965	10000	3665			
1966	10705	4512			
1967	10923	5003			
1968	8882	4704			
1969	7930	4097			
1970	7618	3699			
1971	7936	3914			
1972	8115	3322			
1973	7789	3354			
1974	8098	3320			
1975	8471	3708			
1976	9995	3988			
1977	7395	2630			
1978	6291	1856			
1979	3106	1778			
1980	2384	1671			
1981	3529	2144		19817	
1982	9107	2923		493	
1983	9454	3954		971	1715
1984	9670	2193		1062	189
1985	8547	2744		868	232
1986	8153	2558		976	234
1987	8642	2533		832	213
1988	7978	2376		901	195
1989	8949	2045		571	189
Totals	266315	108794	48,678	26491	2967
SLS percentage of IMET		66			

Argentina's Composite Training Statistics				
Year	IMET Funds	IMET Students	SOA Students	IAAFA Students
1953				
1954				
1955				
1956				
1957				
1958				
1959				
1960	275	29		
1961	1305	368		
1962	1505	475		
1963	427	406		
1964	1408	259		
1965	978	233		
1966	1023	295		
1967	873	251		
1968	523	226		
1969	651	197		
1970	582	201		
1971	378	138		
1972	693	332		
1973	544	237		
1974	426	137		
1975	100	19		
1976	383	139		
1977	721	140		
1978				
1979				
1980				
1981				361
1982				
1983				
1984				
1985				
1986				1
1987				2
1988	33	13		1
1989	146	18		
Totals	12974	4113	585	365
SLS percentage of IMET		21		

Belize's Composite Training Statistics					
Year	IMET Funds	IMET Students	SOA Students	IAAFA Students	NAVSCIATTS Students
1953					
1954					
1955					
1956					
1957					
1958					
1959					
1960					
1961					
1962					
1963					
1964					
1965					
1966					
1967					
1968					
1969					
1970					
1971					
1972					
1973					
1974					
1975					
1976					
1977					
1978					
1979					
1980					
1981					
1982	20	16		2	
1983	48	19			34
1984	50	23		2	
1985	98	79		1	4
1986	72	23		5	
1987	94	21			2
1988	55	17		1	1
1989	107	19			7
Totals	544	217	7	11	48
SLS percentage of IMET		30			

Bolivia's Composite Training Statistics					
Year	IMET Funds	IMET Students	SOA Students	IAAFA Students	NAVSCIATTS Students
1953					
1954					
1955					
1956					
1957					
1958	6				
1959		2			
1960	162	6			
1961	332	136			
1962	1116	290			
1963	1172	386			
1964	1210	333			
1965	747	210			
1966	961	272			
1967	1270	396			
1968	566	220			
1969	710	250			
1970	495	206			
1971	606	290			
1972	540	224			
1973	816	323			
1974	444	152			
1975	595	323			
1976	754	241			
1977	581	183			
1978	628	227			
1979	367	211			
1980	144	36			
1981				898	
1982				3	
1983				0	36
1984	125	29		12	8
1985	349	70		24	6
1986	140	21		6	
1987	184	43		30	21
1988	376	66		27	50
1989	775	95		30	32
Totals	16171	5241	3164	1030	153
SLS percentage of IMET		76			

Brazil's Composite Training Statistics				
Year	IMET Funds	IMET Students	SOA Students	IAAFA Students
1953				
1954	50	13		
1955	250	125		
1956	474	78		
1957	533	124		
1958	244	153		
1959	989	174		
1960	461	306		
1961	1250	1267		
1962	1795	997		
1963	731	247		
1964	740	330		
1965	689	296		
1966	1003	519		
1967	859	520		
1968	875	590		
1969	754	620		
1970	777	555		
1971	686	482		
1972	634	300		
1973	553	279		
1974	662	258		
1975	675	273		
1976	623	220		
1977	46			
1978				
1979				
1980				
1981				244
1982				
1983				
1984				
1985				
1986				
1987				
1988	43	9		
1989	124	15		
Totals	16520	8750	324	244
SLS percentage of IMET			6	

Chile's Composite Training Statistics				
Year	IMET Funds	IMET Students	SOA Students	IAAFA Students
1953				
1954	146	33		
1955	204	51		
1956	479	207		
1957	771	85		
1958	573	184		
1959	850	38		
1960	881	131		
1961	788	316		
1962	1,915	1242		
1963	2	482		
1964	652	216		
1965	762	216		
1966	918	257		
1967	958	279		
1968	1,192	498		
1969	736	310		
1970	852	405		
1971	690	266		
1972	859	309		
1973	889	368		
1974	1,107	459		
1975	624	565		
1976				
1977				
1978				
1979				
1980				
1981				1436
1982				
1983				
1984				
1985				
1986				
1987				
1988				
1989				
Totals	16,848	6917	2,043	1436
SLS percentage of IMET			46	

Colombia's Composite Training Statistics					
Year	IMET Funds	IMET Students	SOA Students	IAAFA Students	NAVSCIATTS Students
1953					
1954	110	68			
1955	559	277			
1956	489	176			
1957	385	136			
1958	329	77			
1959	577	90			
1960	390	147			
1961	535	299			
1962	665	1025			
1963	159	274			
1964	555	139			
1965	626	233			
1966	755	254			
1967	740	275			
1968	775	475			
1969	790	429			
1970	635	282			
1971	604	315			
1972	589	215			
1973	487	364			
1974	539	354			
1975	664	310			
1976	1004	688			
1977	697	350			
1978	1122	257			
1979	455	408			
1980	258	444			
1981	246	539		2,758	
1982	345	642		70	
1983	597	910		273	7
1984	751	665		249	
1985	769	720		188	3
1986	999	813		206	9
1987	1367	855		138	9
1988	1167	889		193	9
1989	1502	781		66	11
Totals	23236	15175	7,021	4,141	48
SLS percentage of IMET		68			

Costa Rica's Composite Training Statistics					
Year	IMET Funds	IMET Students	SOA Students	IAAFA Students	NAVSCIATTS Students
1953					
1954					
1955					
1956					
1957					
1958					
1959					
1960	5	4			
1961	62	48			
1962	111	79			
1963	264	244			
1964	253	175			
1965	86	68			
1966	100	88			
1967	20	5			
1968					
1969					
1970					
1971					
1972					
1973					
1974					
1975					
1976					
1977					
1978					
1979					
1980					
1981	31	37		17	
1982	46	55		8	
1983	123	79		6	74
1984	134	36		7	10
1985	229	71		17	24
1986	213	71		8	32
1987	207	68		8	16
1988	220	70		14	17
1989	207	46		3	14
Totals	2311	1244	2,298	88	187
SLS percentage of IMET		188			

Cuba's Composite Training Statistics				
Year	IMET Funds	IMET Students	SOA Students	IAAFA Students
1953				
1954	219	52		
1955	691	179		
1956	98	15		
1957	110	36		
1958	213	25		
1959	692	30		
1960		79		
1961		30		
1962		77		
1963				
1964				
1965				
1966				
1967				
1968				
1969				
1970				
1971				
1972				
1973				
1974				
1975				
1976				
1977				
1978				
1979				
1980				
1981				263
1982				
1983				
1984				
1985				
1986				
1987				
1988				
1989				
Totals	2,023	523	253	263
SLS percentage of IMET		91		

Dominican Republic Composite Training Statistics					
Year	IMET Funds	IMET Students	SOA Students	IAAFA Students	NAVSCIATTS Students
1953					
1954	28	7			
1955	15	13			
1956	18	13			
1957	97	53			
1958	115	78			
1959	97	19			
1960	94	5			
1961	61	18			
1962	351	214			
1963	1,103	554			
1964	394	334			
1965	565	374			
1966	453	126			
1967	966	192			
1968	387	279			
1969	570	178			
1970	325	142			
1971	577	262			
1972	550	208			
1973	532	208			
1974	485	229			
1975	504	201			
1976	629	235			
1977	527	73			
1978	610	90			
1979	443	113			
1980	239	47			
1981	345	163		735	
1982	430	129		23	
1983	572	153		24	170
1984	678	168		95	4
1985	704	168		56	
1986	685	130		31	4
1987	800	132		43	8
1988	660	83		42	2
1989	682	107		26	
Totals	16,291	5498	2,067	1075	188
SLS percentage of IMET		56			

Ecuador's Composite Training Statistics					
Year	IMET Funds	IMET Students	SOA Students	IAAFA Students	NAVSCIATTS Students
1953					
1954	259	62			
1955	169	64			
1956	225	65			
1957	329	60			
1958	845	288			
1959	805	52			
1960	356	280			
1961	736	470			
1962	1,001	589			
1963	659	354			
1964	970	187			
1965	590	346			
1966	686	307			
1967	877	440			
1968	488	291			
1969	499	252			
1970	483	236			
1971	195	137			
1972					
1973					
1974					
1975	381	153			
1976	467	220			
1977	393	288			
1978	703	421			
1979	453	451			
1980	222	385			
1981	296	217		2,286	
1982	477	252		82	
1983	527	381		158	25
1984	698	146		79	3
1985	676	168		56	6
1986	668	143		46	2
1987	541	156		67	4
1988	676	54		19	4
1989	649	221		80	10
Totals	17,999	8136	3,116	2,873	54
SLS percentage of IMET		69			

El Salvadoran Composite Training Statistics					
Year	IMET Funds	IMET Students	SOA Students	IAAFA Students	NAVSCIATTS Students
1953					
1954					
1955					
1956					
1957					
1958					
1959					
1960	83	7			
1961	217	63			
1962	504	141			
1963	58	110			
1964	320	98			
1965	226	84			
1966	277	74			
1967	159	111			
1968	281	165			
1969	175	106			
1970	224	125			
1971	286	130			
1972	255	93			
1973	492	104			
1974	437	139			
1975	493	158			
1976	794	233			
1977	565	47			
1978					
1979					
1980	244	125			
1981	1,157	256		607	
1982	5,250	736		20	
1983	4,984	1,223		98	187
1984	3,590	104		125	48
1985	1,477	276		135	54
1986	1,444	371		159	29
1987	1,349	311		136	30
1988	1,485	353		149	32
1989	1,430	189		85	38
Totals	28,256	5932	6,008	1514	418
SLS percentage of IMET		122			

Guatemalan Composite Training Statistics					
Year	IMET Funds	IMET Students	SOA Students	IAAFA Students	NAVSCIATTS Students
1953					
1954					
1955					
1956	105	34			
1957	96	28			
1958	9	23			
1959	144	36			
1960	404	46			
1961	73	167			
1962	1,170	391			
1963	95	225			
1964	508	181			
1965	490	118			
1966	270	75			
1967	326	607			
1968	300	152			
1969	226	135			
1970	271	125			
1971	392	196			
1972	251	109			
1973	497	148			
1974	497	164			
1975	399	139			
1976	490	134			
1977	490	127			
1978					
1979					
1980					
1981				698	
1982					
1983					178
1984					
1985	452	123		63	13
1986	357	95		69	26
1987	491	109		60	15
1988	454	68		31	8
1989	404	98		30	14
Totals	9,661	3853	1,351	951	254
SLS percentage of IMET		62			

Guyana's Composite Training Statistics				
Year	IMET Funds	IMET Students	IAAFA Students	NAVSCIATTS Students
1953				
1954				
1955				
1956				
1957				
1958				
1959				
1960				
1961				
1962				
1963				
1964				
1965				
1966				
1967				
1968				
1969				
1970				
1971				
1972				
1973				
1974				
1975				
1976				
1977				
1978				
1979				
1980				
1981		11	11	
1982	14	22	10	
1983	25	10		22
1984				
1985				
1986				
1987				
1988				
1989				
Totals	39	43	21	22
SLS percentage of IMET			98	

Haiti's Composite Training Statistics					
Year	IMET Funds	IMET Students	SOA Students	IAAFA Students	NAVSCIATTS Students
1953					
1954					
1955					
1956	21	7			
1957	10	12			
1958	37	8			
1959	18	9			
1960	182	66			
1961	222	177			
1962	263	181			
1963		113			
1964					
1965					
1966					
1967					
1968					
1969					
1970					
1971					
1972					
1973					
1974					
1975	14	3			
1976	100	13			
1977	93	12			
1978	130	14			
1979	173	17			
1980	116	10			
1981	110	27		38	
1982	212	25			
1983	339	29			12
1984	699	64			
1985	388	45		4	
1986	232	20		4	
1987	254	11			
1988					
1989	100	8			
Totals	3,713	871	49	46	12
SLS percentage of IMET			11		

Honduran Composite Training Statistics					
Year	IMET Funds	IMET Students	SOA Students	IAAFA Students	NAVSCIATTS Students
1953					
1954	6	4			
1955	6	3			
1956	39	22			
1957	62	35			
1958	2	8			
1959	62	18			
1960	148	39			
1961	104	127			
1962	295	177			
1963	510	319			
1964	46	24			
1965	352	129			
1966	400	158			
1967	398	139			
1968	360	151			
1969	234	116			
1970	198	107			
1971	512	245			
1972	526	191			
1973	562	180			
1974	509	194			
1975	801	240			
1976	772	256			
1977	631	116			
1978	692	219			
1979	240	226			
1980	435	166			
1981	537	261		885	
1982	1,223	328		95	
1983	782	332		123	299
1984	910	326		131	39
1985	1,076	321		128	35
1986	1,043	349		151	40
1987	1,162	321		157	45
1988	1,104	357		121	40
1989	1,133	233		52	50
Totals	17,872	6437	3,2767	1843	548
SLS percentage of IMET		82			

Jamaican Composite Training Statistics				
Year	IMET Funds	IMET Students	IAAFA Students	NAVSCIATTS Students
1953				
1954				
1955				
1956				
1957				
1958				
1959				
1960				
1961				
1962				
1963	1	1		
1964	12	10		
1965				
1966				
1967				
1968				
1969				
1970				
1971				
1972				
1973				
1974				
1975				
1976				
1977				
1978				
1979				
1980				
1981	49	8		
1982	73	20		
1983	168	73	4	7
1984	201	60		
1985	278	72		
1986	284	57		
1987	313	63		4
1988	279	60		1
1989	598	53		
Totals	2,256	477	4	12
SLS percentage of IMET			3	

Mexican Composite Training Statistics					
Year	IMET Funds	IMET Students	SOA Students	IAAFA Students	NAVSCIATTS Students
1953					
1954					
1955					
1956					
1957					
1958					
1959					
1960	70				
1961	369	31			
1962	174	144			
1963	142	93			
1964	252	87			
1965	184	58			
1966	251	84			
1967	83	32			
1968	108	50			
1969	87	24			
1970	89	24			
1971	80	28			
1972	106	37			
1973	11	4			
1974	31	15			
1975	110	83			
1976	100	98			
1977	118	37			
1978	115	39			
1979	173	54			
1980	121	43			
1981	101	107		313	
1982	82	63		66	
1983	61	28			2
1984	160	33			
1985	214	76		10	
1986	188	19		8	
1987	257	98		21	
1988	172	71		27	
1989	245	31		8	
Totals	4,254	1591	319	453	2
SLS percentage of IMET		45			

Nicaraguan Composite Training Statistics					
Year	IMET Funds	IMET Students	SOA Students	IAAFA Students	NAVSCIATTS Students
1953					
1954	4	3			
1955	60	50			
1956	129	93			
1957	149	88			
1958	132	84			
1959	115	77			
1960	452	136			
1961	153	439			
1962	1,005	710			
1963	795	714			
1964	965	280			
1965	738	234			
1966	575	211			
1967	591	274			
1968	651	244			
1969	454	181			
1970	541	242			
1971	508	216			
1972	479	197			
1973	263	92			
1974	416	154			
1975	650	260			
1976	708	246			
1977	658	234			
1978	384	275			
1979	7	6			
1980					
1981				811	
1982					
1983					170
1984					
1985					
1986					
1987					
1988					
1989					
Totals	11,582	5740	4309	811	170
SLS percentage of IMET			84		

Panama's Composite Training Statistics					
Year	IMET Funds	IMET Students	SOA Students	IAAFA Students	NAVSCIATTS Students
1953					
1954					
1955					
1956					
1957					
1958					
1959					
1960					
1961	85	105			
1962	250	292			
1963	244	318			
1964	102	275			
1965	151	183			
1966	211	754			
1967	163	433			
1968	85	278			
1969	72	141			
1970	140	129			
1971	289	246			
1972	255	157			
1973	280	252			
1974	257	190			
1975	320	354			
1976	559	316			
1977	456	234			
1978	439	83			
1979	392	219			
1980	270	202			
1981	328	293		898	
1982	359	219		45	
1983	466	301		74	351
1984	453	260		89	35
1985	571	183		88	28
1986	511	166		72	29
1987	556	112		55	23
1988					
1989					
Totals	8,264	6695	3,589	1321	466
SLS percentage of IMET			74		

Paraguayan Composite Training Statistics					
Year	IMET Funds	IMET Students	SOA Students	IAAFA Students	NAVSCIATTS Students
1953					
1954					
1955					
1956					
1957					
1958					
1959					
1960	72	10			
1961	131	81			
1962	256	113			
1963	192	149			
1964	599	102			
1965	520	120			
1966	499	133			
1967	499	112			
1968	379	132			
1969	387	126			
1970	354	137			
1971	384	110			
1972	422	117			
1973	23	8			
1974	183	63			
1975	290	102			
1976	528	196			
1977	359	99			
1978	587	145			
1979					
1980					
1981				454	
1982	8	8		4	
1983	55	14		4	53
1984	75	16		7	8
1985	94	19		6	10
1986	85	19		5	8
1987	105	23		7	9
1988	118	17		6	9
1989	205	5			
Totals	7,409	2176	1,043	493	97
SLS percentage of IMET		69			

Peruvian Composite Training Statistics					
Year	IMET Funds	IMET Students	SOA Students	IAAFA Students	NAVSCIATTS Students
1953	74				
1954	279	33			
1955	221	109			
1956	489	98			
1957	841	84			
1958	682	233			
1959	973	41			
1960	449	234			
1961	799	646			
1962	1,124	1,155			
1963	834	256			
1964	943	348			
1965	783	242			
1966	1,182	371			
1967	938	458			
1968	661	237			
1969	543	277			
1970	555	277			
1971	506	310			
1972	923	472			
1973	684	315			
1974	933	382			
1975	800	247			
1976	1,011	411			
1977	986	677			
1978	779	56			
1979	398	72			
1980	289	195			
1981	278	178		1,048	
1982	453	369		51	
1983	486	284		35	18
1984	685	88		31	
1985	526	161		7	
1986	538	53		16	
1987	143	2		1	
1988	378	43		15	
1989	47	2			
Totals	23,213	9416	3,814	1,204	18
SLS percentage of IMET		49			

Surinam's Composite Training Statistics			
Year	IMET Funds	IMET Students	IAAFA Students
1953			
1954			
1955			
1956			
1957			
1958			
1959			
1960			
1961			
1962			
1963			
1964			
1965			
1966			
1967			
1968			
1969			
1970			
1971			
1972			
1973			
1974			
1975			
1976			
1977			
1978			
1979			
1980	15	5	
1981	18	7	
1982	19	2	6
1983			
1984			
1985	42	3	
1986	34	6	
1987			
1988			
1989			
Totals	128	23	6
SLS percentage of IMET		25	

Uruguayan Composite Training Statistics					
Year	IMET Funds	IMET Students	SOA Students	IAAFA Students	NAVSCIATTS Students
1953					
1954					
1955					
1956	158	56			
1957	242	55			
1958	62	45			
1959	518	20			
1960	275	22			
1961	587	87			
1962	570	428			
1963	165	166			
1964	273	110			
1965	306	123			
1966	196	128			
1967	272	119			
1968	238	132			
1969	224	179			
1970	339	133			
1971	348	187			
1972	332	129			
1973	409	232			
1974	304	150			
1975	384	136			
1976	401	192			
1977					
1978					
1979					
1980					
1981				543	
1982	5	1			
1983	58	15		2	18
1984	98	45		5	
1985	81	18		15	
1986	104	19		5	2
1987	183	19		4	2
1988	165	33		20	
1989	178	17		4	
Totals	7,475	2996	927	598	22
SLS percentage of IMET		48			

Venezuelan Composite Training Statistics					
Year	IMET Funds	IMET Students	SOA Students	IAAFA Students	NAVSCIATTS Students
1953					
1954					
1955					
1956					
1957					
1958					
1959					
1960	2	1			
1961	28	8			
1962	1,047	255			
1963	934	522			
1964	1,457	658			
1965	1,208	398			
1966	944	406			
1967	930	360			
1968	1,012	584			
1969	816	576			
1970	759	373			
1971	896	356			
1972	701	232			
1973	748	240			
1974	868	280			
1975	668	142			
1976	672	150			
1977	73	13			
1978	101	30			
1979					
1980					
1981	8	18		1,837	
1982	23	22		8	
1983	42	52		0	33
1984	45	46		19	8
1985	94	49		18	5
1986	99	61		27	20
1987	153	78		46	
1988	137	75		44	2
1989	115	33		11	6
Totals	14,580	6018	3,109	2,010	74
SLS percentage of IMET		79			

Caribbean States' Composite IMET and NAVSCIATTS Training Statistics									
	Antigua & Barbuda			Bahamas			Barbados		
Year	Funds	Students	NAVSCIATTS	Funds	Students	NAVSCIATTS	Funds	Students	NAVSCIATTS
1953									
1954									
1955									
1956									
1957									
1958									
1959									
1960									
1961									
1962									
1963									
1964									
1965									
1966									
1967									
1968									
1969									
1970									
1971									
1972									
1973									
1974									
1975									
1976									
1977									
1978									
1979							6	1	
1980							30	13	
1981							17	12	
1982							56	10	
1983	14	9	5				52	22	4
1984	30	9	5				70	22	3
1985	45	11	4	44	24	16	69	18	4
1986	42	10	2	42	26	16	69	14	
1987	38	7		46	17	5	68	14	8
1988	44	10	2	51	18	8	84	12	
1989	3			36	19		2		
Totals	216	56	18	219	104	45	523	138	19

Caribbean States' Composite IMET and NAVSCIATTS Training Statistics									
	Dominica			Grenada			St Christopher	St Kitts and Nevis	
Year	Funds	Students	NAVSCIATTS	Funds	Students	NAVSCIATTS	NAVSCIATTS	Funds	Students
1953									
1954									
1955									
1956									
1957									
1958									
1959									
1960									
1961									
1962									
1963									
1964									
1965									
1966									
1967									
1968									
1969									
1970									
1971									
1972									
1973									
1974									
1975									
1976									
1977									
1978									
1979									
1980									
1981	8	7							
1982	4	1							
1983	11	6	5						
1984	43	16	6	60			3	32	10
1985	44	8		63	18	11	3	26	7
1986	46	10		75	18	4		32	8
1987	53	11	4	76	18	3	1	53	10
1988	41	7	2	63	13		8	61	13
1989	45	9		72	15	4		47	8
Totals	295	75	17	409	82	22	15	251	56

Caribbean States' Composite IMET and NAVSCIATTS Training Statistics									
	St Lucia			St Vincent and Grenadine			Trinidad - Tabago		
Year	Funds	Students	NAVSCIATTS	Funds	Students	NAVSCIATTS	Funds	Students	NAVSCIATTS
1953									
1954									
1955									
1956									
1957									
1958									
1959									
1960									
1961									
1962									
1963									
1964									
1965									
1966									
1967									
1968									
1969									
1970									
1971									
1972									
1973									
1974									
1975									
1976									
1977									
1978									
1979									
1980									
1981	2	2			1				
1982	8	3		1					
1983	14	6	5	31	8				
1984	42	15	6	44	12	3			
1985	48	12		51	13	2	39	11	4
1986	48	13	6	51	13	5	50	10	
1987	35	8		49	10	2	65	16	2
1988	19	4		43	8		53	13	
1989	44	9	3	44	8		10	6	
Totals	260	72	20	314	73	12	217	56	6

Appendix B. Public Law 710 and Lend-Lease Aviation Training

This appendix contains statistics for aviation training given under the authority of Public Law 710 and the Lend-Lease Act. Composite statistics are shown by country and for Latin America as a whole. These statistics are divided into the two categories of aircrew training and technical training. All statistics are from a 1947 document of the Air Historical Office, titled Training of Foreign Nationals By the AAF 1939-1945. These statistics are located on pages 128 to 195 of the Air Historical Office document.

	Argentina	Bolivia	Brazil	Chile	Colombia	Costa Rica
<u>Air crew Training</u>						
Single Engine	11	21	151	10		1
Twin Engine	11	24	204	15	8	
4-Engine			8			
Glider			1			
Pilot Instructor			35	1		
AT-7 Transition						
B-25 Transition						
C-60 Transition						
Bombardier			17			
Navigation			18		1	
Gunnery			4			
Combat Crew			54	9		
Sub Totals	22	45	492	35	9	1
<u>Technical Training</u>						
Administrative						
Aircraft Maintenance		1	75	12		
Armament	1		23	1		
Aviation Engineer						
B-25 Factory School			4			
Communications			1			
Intelligence						
Link Trainer			4	1		
Meteorology	1					
Officer			24			
P-47 Factory School			25			
Parachute Rigger						
Photography			19			
Radio			27			
Supply			4	1		
Unit Training			286			
Sub Totals	2	1	492	15	0	0
Grand Totals	24	46	984	50	9	1

	Cuba	Ecuador	Haiti	Honduras	Mexico	Nicaragua
<u>Air crew Training</u>						
Single Engine	13	6	3		132	
Twin Engine	32	7	2	3	4	2
4-Engine						
Glider						
Pilot Instructor	15	3			1	
AT-7 Transition					4	
B-25 Transition	7					
C-60 Transition					4	
Bombardier	10					
Navigation	1					
Gunnery						
Combat Crew					9	
Sub Total	78	16	5	3	154	2
<u>Technical Training</u>						
Administrative					3	
Aircraft Maintenance		2		1	37	
Armament					34	1
Aviation Engineer						
B-25 Factory School						
Communications						
Intelligence					23	
Link Trainer	2	1			6	
Meteorology						
Officer						
P-47 Factory School					63	
Parachute Rigger			2			
Photography	1					
Radio					41	
Supply						
Unit Training					235	
Sub Total	3	3	2	1	442	1
Grand Total	81	19	7	4	596	3

	Panama	Paraguay	Peru	Uruguay	Venezuela	Latin America
<u>Air crew Training</u>						
Single Engine			12			360
Twin Engine		2	8	5	9	336
4-Engine			1			9
Glider						1
Pilot Instructor						55
AT-7 Transition						4
B-25 Transition						7
C-60 Transition						4
Bombardier			1			28
Navigation				1		21
Gunnery				2		6
Combat Crew			4			76
Sub Total	0	2	26	8	9	907
<u>Technical Training</u>						
Administrative						3
Aircraft Maintenance	1		21	1		151
Armament			2			62
Aviation Engineer			1			1
B-25 Factory School						4
Communications						1
Intelligence						23
Link Trainer				2		16
Meteorology						1
Officer						
P-47 Factory School						88
Parachute Rigger			1			3
Photography						20
Radio			4			72
Supply						5
Unit Training						521
Sub Total	1	0	29	3	0	971
Grand Total	1	2	55	11	9	1878

Appendix C. Glossary of Acronyms

AECA	Arms Export Control Act
AAF	U.S. Army Air Force
CDC	Caribbean Defense Command
CDC-PCD	Caribbean Defense Command and Panama Canal Department
DISAM	Defense Institute of Security Assistance Management
DoD	U.S. Department of Defense
DSAA	Defense Security Assistance Agency
ESF	Economic Support Fund
FAA	Foreign Assistance Act
FMFP	Foreign Military Financing Program
FMLN	Farabundo Martin National Liberation Front
FMS	Foreign Military Sales
FTS	Field Training Services
GNP	Gross National Product
IAAFA	Inter-American Air Forces Academy
IADB	Inter-American Defense Board
IMET	International Military Education and Training Program
MAP	Military Assistance Program
MTT	Mobile Training Team
NAVSCIATTS	Naval Small Craft Instruction and Technical Training School
NCO	Noncommissioned Officer
OAS	Organization of American States
PGT	Partido Guatemalteco de Trabajo (Guatemalan Communist Party)
PKO	Peace Keeping Operations
PME	Professional Military Education
SAO	Security Assistance Office
SLS	Spanish Language Schools

SOA
USAF

U.S. Army School of the Americas
U.S. Air Force

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