Overcoming The "Ad Hoc" Nature of the Joint and Combined Task Force Headquarters (W)

MAS Thomas H. Barth, USA

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ABSTRACT

OVERCOMING THE "AD HOC" NATURE OF THE JOINT AND COMBINED TASK FORCE HEADQUARTERS

This monograph discusses progress made toward overcoming inherit difficulties of the joint or combined task force headquarters. Since the end of the Second World War the United States Armed Forces have increasingly used either joint or combined task forces to accomplish military missions. Although most of these joint and combined endeavors achieve their objectives, a lack of interoperability between the services has often overshadowed mission accomplishment.

The Goldwater-Nichols Defense Reorganization Act of 1986 is the latest legislative attempt, by the United States Government, to unified the action of its armed forces and achieve a greater interoperability between the services. This monograph examines the impact of Goldwater-Nichols on the ability of the United States Armed Forces to overcome the difficulties previously encountered in the quickly assembled joint or combined task force headquarters.

An examination of Operations, JUST CAUSE, PROVIDE COMFORT, and RESTORE HOPE shows the impact of Goldwater-Nichols. This examination reveals that although much has improved since the passage of Goldwater-Nichols much more improvement is still required to fully overcome the "ad hoc" nature of the joint and combined task force headquarters.
OVERCOMING THE "AD HOC" NATURE OF THE JOINT OR COMBINED TASK FORCE HEADQUARTERS

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I. Introduction.

Joint Publication 1, Joint Warfare of the U.S. Armed Forces, describes the conduct of warfare in the modern era as a multi-Service or joint team endeavor. Five characteristics of warfare shape this view and define the essence of modern military operations. These five characteristics include the environment in which the Armed Forces will operate, the rapid evolution of technology, the speed of communications and the increased pace of events that they cause, the diversity of people and their equally diverse cultures that U.S. forces will encounter, and finally, the impact that friction, chance, and uncertainty will continue to have on military operations.

Joint Publication 1 also explains that properly trained, equipped, and competent multi-Service or joint teams will best meet the challenges of warfare in the modern era. Joint Publication 2, Unified Action Armed Forces (UNAAF) establishes the principles and doctrines that govern the employment of these joint teams.¹

The UNAAF describes the chain of command for U.S. Armed Forces from the President through the Secretary of Defense to the Commanders of the established Unified Commands.² Commanders of Unified Commands, or CINCs, exercise combatant command (COCOM) which "is the command authority over assigned forces vested" to them "by title 10, United States Code, section 164." This authority is not transferable to subordinate commanders.³

The UNAAF provides various command relationships the CINCs may use and command structures they may create for exercising their COCOM authority. Currently the UNAAF describes six different command structures available to the CINC for
organization and control of assigned forces. This study focuses on the JTF as a means through which the CINC exercises COCOM.4

II. Problem.

The performance of joint task forces from 1958 to 1983 highlights concerns identified with the joint task force (JTF) method of command. During this period most of the JTF operations achieved their strategic purpose. Unfortunately, a lack of interoperability between the services often overshadowed mission accomplishment. The following operations all displayed an inability to integrate joint force capabilities: Operation BLUEBIRD, the 1958 intervention into Lebanon; Operation POWER PACK, the 1965 intervention into the Dominican Republic; the recovery of the S.S. Mayaguez and her crew in 1975; the Iranian hostage rescue attempt in 1980; and Operation URGENT FURY, the 1983 intervention into the island of Grenada.

Analysts studying this inability or failure of the JTF headquarters to integrate joint force capabilities attribute the shortcomings to the failure of the headquarters to accomplish five key tasks. These faults included failure to integrate and then disseminate the intelligence picture to all operational components, failure to identify or address communication interoperability issues, poor staff coordination of available air assets; failure to orchestrate the actions of all deployed ground forces, and finally, failure to incorporate special operations activities into the complete mission concept.5

The "ad hoc" or transient nature of the JTF headquarters staff frequently contributes to these failures. Compounding the difficulties of the "ad hoc" structure, there
is a doctrinal void in joint, tactics, techniques, and procedures. The lack of challenging and realistic joint training further reduces joint effectiveness. Service parochialism also continues to impede true joint functionality. Of these deficiencies, overcoming the "ad hoc" nature of the JTF headquarters staff requires greater attention. Changes in the United States strategic situation will place a greater demand not only for joint JTF competence, but combined task force (CTF) operations as well.

The collapse of the Soviet Union and the end of the Cold War changed the United States strategic posture. No longer is the focus on confrontation with the Soviet Union. Both Presidents Bush and Clinton have endorsed strategies that involve U.S. Forces in a much broader spectrum of operations. Not only has the change in strategy increased the likelihood of involvement, but the form of involvement will often require very rapid response by U.S. Forces, usually organized into joint task forces.

From October 1983 to October 1993, the armed forces conducted thirty-three (twenty-four since 1990), joint or combined task force missions across the spectrum of military operations in every theater. These contingency operations normally required a specially tailored joint force team. Success in these operations required flexibility, imaginative leadership, thorough planning, and decentralized execution. However, the "ad hoc" JTF or CTF headquarters has not always provided the commander with a staff possessing the necessary skills or experience to accomplish the mission. Recommended solutions to the JTF headquarters problem have generally fallen into two distinct categories.

The first category encompasses recommendations that eliminate the "ad hoc"
nature of the JTF headquarters staff by creating permanently staffed joint headquarters. Advocates of this solution point to the success enjoyed by the Joint Special Operations Command (JSOC). JSOC is a permanently staffed joint headquarters. It was formed because of recommendations made to Congress following the failed Iranian hostage rescue attempt in 1979. JSOC's span of operations is limited to counter-terrorist and special operations direct-action missions. By creating functionally oriented, standing JTF headquarters like JSOC, the formation of cohesive, trained, and experienced headquarters teams occurs before employment in a contingency operation.10

However, the creation of standing JTF headquarters provides a limited solution to the problem for two reasons. The formation of standing JTF headquarters would not negate the requirement for comprehensive joint doctrine, tactics, techniques, or procedures. Second, the ability of the U.S. to form the necessary number of standing JTF headquarters to meet the requirements of its new strategic situation is highly questionable.

The Rapid Deployment Joint Task Force (RDJTF), established in 1980 to respond to worldwide contingencies, identified the absence of joint doctrine as a major limitation when integrating joint force capabilities. Thomas A. Fabyanic, United States Air Force, made this observation covering joint doctrine and the RDJTF:

Each service relies on a doctrine of employment (although it may not be promulgated as such) for the operation of its forces under a variety of conditions. When two or more services are required to link their forces to achieve a common objective, then joint doctrine becomes necessary. Poorly defined joint doctrine, or indeed the absence of it, would adversely affect both the planning and execution of joint military operations. At present, some formal joint doctrine exists, but it is far from what is required for proper employment of the RDJTF.11
Even assuming a greater degree of joint interoperability, the ability to form the required number of standing JTF headquarters is doubtful.

Creating one or more standing JTF headquarters would require a major review and restructuring of the armed forces. Despite these challenges, this issue has received consideration by the unified commands. Their experience to date however, does not favor the creation of permanent JTF headquarters. Experienced officers serving in the United States European Command (EUCOM) have recently provided insights into the usefulness of forming permanent JTF headquarters:

Naturally, the practice of selecting and augmenting an existing staff was compared with other alternatives for forming the JTF headquarters. The most obvious alternative was having standing JTFs, ..., the merits of EUCOM's decision to stand up JTFs as needed rather than forming permanent JTF elements have become increasingly clear. USEUCOM's expected missions are too broad, the theater too diverse and manpower too sparse to justify standing JTFs.\textsuperscript{12}

The other category of recommended solutions to the JTF headquarters problem addresses the perceived sources of the lack of interoperability. This category embraces and attempts to improve the state of joint doctrine, tactics, techniques, and procedures. It also supports improvements in joint education and training programs. Proponents factor their requirements of the new strategic situation and limited resources are factored into its recommendations. This category of solutions is the course adopted thus far by the United States. Its means are found in Public Law 99-433.

Public Law 99-433, better known as the Goldwater-Nichols Defense Reorganization Act (or Goldwater-Nichols), profoundly changed the structure, authority, and responsibilities within the Department of Defense. Some of these changes included strengthening the position of the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff (CJCS) and his ability to provide military advice to the President. It also made the Joint Staff and the CINCs responsible (As opposed to the service Chiefs) for the formulation of military strategy. Goldwater-Nichols also gave the Chairman the responsibility to develop doctrine for the joint employment of the armed forces.\textsuperscript{13}

The Department of Defense (DOD) Directive 5100.1, signed in April 1987, reemphasized the CJCS responsibility for development and promulgation of joint doctrine for the U.S. Armed Forces. Joint Publication 2 further expanded the CJCS' responsibility by assigning three specific functions. These functions are 1) to coordinate joint doctrine with both the Services and with the CINCs; 2) to approve all joint doctrine; and 3) to publish joint doctrine, tactics, techniques, and procedures.\textsuperscript{14} Other implementing instructions of Goldwater-Nichols vested both the CJCS and the CINCs with joint training requirements consistent with their responsibilities to prepare plans and employ forces.\textsuperscript{15}

Goldwater-Nichols constitutes the path taken by the United States to improve the execution of all joint undertakings, including combined task force operations. Since its passage, several joint and combined task force operations have demonstrated its impact. Two recent and well-documented operations available for study are Operation JUST CAUSE, the 1989 intervention into Panama, and Operation PROVIDE COMFORT, the
1991 humanitarian effort in northern Iraq. Although not as well documented as the other two, the 1992-1993 famine relief effort in Somalia, Operation RESTORE HOPE, provides some observations. By examining these three operations, the impact of Goldwater-Nichols and insights concerning methods for overcoming the "ad hoc" nature of the joint and combined task force headquarters become apparent.

Methodology

Operations JUST CAUSE and PROVIDE COMFORT contain many contrasting facets affecting a JTF or CTF headquarters. These two operations permit the study of long versus short mission preparation periods, staffs built around an existing headquarters versus staffs created by taking individuals from several headquarters, and combat versus noncombat operations. Examining the performance of these two headquarters in four key areas reveals the impact of Goldwater-Nichols and suggests methods for overcoming the "ad hoc" nature of the organization. These four areas of examination are: 1) the state of joint doctrine CINC guidance or procedures for forming the headquarters; 2) the availability of directives or standard operating procedures for operating a JTF or CTF headquarters; 3) the level of joint education or experience of the headquarters staff; 4) the impact of previously conducted training programs. The results of this examination, along with a similar examination of emerging reports from Operation RESTORE HOPE, show that while much has improved, more must be done to overcome the "ad hoc" nature of the JTF or CTF headquarters.
III. Operation JUST CAUSE.

A study of the military activities surrounding the United States' 1989 intervention into the Republic of Panama leads to an examination of two different joint task force headquarters. These two headquarters, JTF PANAMA and its successor, JTF SOUTH, were both established for controlling U.S. forces in Panama. To understand joint operations in Panama, it is necessary to examine both JTF headquarters.

JTF PANAMA

The chain of events that culminated in Operation JUST CAUSE began in June 1987. That summer, Panamanian dictator General Manuel Noriega dismissed Colonel Roberto Diaz Herrera, who many believed was Noriega's heir apparent. Herrera retaliated against Noriega by accusing him of drug trafficking, election fraud, and murder. Anti-Noriega demonstrations and nation-wide strikes rocked Panama City after Herrera's accusations became public. Noriega opponents used the confusion created by the civil unrest in an attempt to depose the dictator. This effort to depose Noriega eventually failed. However, to quell the civil unrest and remain in power, Noriega and his supporters reverted to armed repression against the Panamanian people. Additionally, Noriega intensified his efforts to fan anti-American sentiment as he sought a scapegoat for his problems.

These events changed the relationship between Washington and the leadership of Panama. Congress, the State Department, and other federal agencies initiated various efforts to force Noriega out of power. In February 1988, even as conditions worsened in
Panama from economic sanctions, two federal grand juries in Florida indicted Noriega on drug-related charges.

By late February of 1988, a series of confrontations between U.S. forces in Panama and the Panamanian Defense Force (PDF) pushed relations to the breaking point. These events prompted the United States Southern Command (USSOUTHCOM or SOUTHCOM) to begin contingency planning. While updating old plans for the defense of the Panama Canal against the PDF, now a real possibility, the planners revalidated the requirement for a JTF headquarters to control defensive or offensive operations.

General Fred F. Woerner, CINC SOUTHCOM, delayed the activation of the JTF until 9 April 1988. General Woerner initially was concerned that the activation of the JTF would provide the spark needed to ignite hostilities between the PDF and U.S. forces. A temporary easing of tensions, the demands of contingency planning, and the growing need for tactical command and control over the increasing number of U.S. forces in Panama finally convinced General Woerner to establish JTF PANAMA.16

Major General Bernard Loeffke, then Commanding General of United States Army Southern Command (USARSO), assumed command of JTF PANAMA. There is little evidence to suggest that Major General Loeffke had the benefit of guidance or assistance from General Woerner, the SOUTHCOM staff, SOUTHCOM policies or directives, previous plans, or even joint doctrine to help him in deciding the composition or manning of JTF PANAMA's headquarters. According to Dr. Lawrence A. Yates, who examined the formation and actions of JTF Panama:

At Loeffke's instance, it was (JTF PANAMA) a trim organization, based on a
manning document of 80 to 121 slots. USARSO staff, donning a second hat out of necessity, filled most of these positions, thus imparting a distinctly greenish (Army) hue to a purple (joint) canvas.17

Staff composition and manning was only one aspect of JTF Panama's problems. In April of 1988 there were no joint publications that provided guidance on JTF operations. The only joint doctrine available to JTF Panama concerning JTF operations were the deliberate and crisis action planning documents. Although the crisis action planning information was useful for JTF Panama's mission, joint doctrine had not changed much since Goldwater-Nichols.18

It would not take long before events in Panama highlighted problems concerning JTF Panama's unity of command. After a fire fight on 12 April 1988 between elements of a U.S. Marine infantry company guarding the Anaigan Tank Farm, a fuel storage area north of Howard Air Force Base, and twenty to fifty intruders, Major General Loeffke discovered that he did not have operational control (OPCON) of the Marine company. The company was OPCON to a Navy Captain who reported to the U.S. Atlantic Command. General Woerner quickly corrected this problem by placing the Marine company OPCON to JTF Panama's Marine component commander.19

Unfortunately, a similar incident west of Howard Air Force Base on 20 April 1988 between an unknown number of armed Panamanians and a Special Forces team, highlighted again that JTF PANAMA did not have OPCON of all forces operating in Panama. In this incident, the lack of unity of command resulted in poor coordination between the engaged Special Forces team and the reaction force from the 193d Infantry Brigade. Unlike the Marine incident, JTF PANAMA did not receive OPCON of special
operation forces in Panama after the incident. The commander of Special Operation Forces in SOUTHCOM (SOC SOUTH) eventually provided liaison officers to JTF PANAMA that helped mitigate some of these problems, but this arrangement never completely satisfied Major General Loeffke. The cause of Major General Loeffke's dissatisfaction was the close and sometimes overlapping areas of operations between his conventional forces and SOC SOUTH's special operation forces.

A review of joint publications available during this period reveals the absence of literature addressing the interaction of conventional and special operating forces. However, the 1986 version of the UNAAF clearly discusses the importance of unity of effort and centralized direction of forces:

Sound command organization should provide for unity of effort, centralized direction, decentralized execution, common doctrine, and interoperability. Unity of effort is necessary for effectiveness and efficiency; centralized direction is essential for controlling and coordinating the efforts of the forces.

Major General Loeffke also realized that his headquarters and assigned forces lacked a sense of "jointness." To overcome this shortcoming he initiated a joint training program. This training program had two significant aspects. First, a joint training event was scheduled once every two weeks. Additionally, the JTF staff combined previously scheduled training of one component with that if another whenever possible. The intent of this effort was to improve the joint warfare experience of both his staff and his assigned forces.

The most important result of this training program for the JTF PANAMA headquarters was the creation of an atmosphere of team work where mission
accomplishment prevailed. Major General Loeffke considered this sense of teamwork not only key to JTF PANAMA's success but its most important contribution to Operation JUST CAUSE.\textsuperscript{24} Despite JTF PANAMA's progress toward its development as a cohesive joint headquarters, its role in the Panama crisis would ultimately change.

As detailed contingency planning and JCS review of those plans evolved, many issues surfaced and lead to the designation of another JTF headquarters for the crisis in Panama. Clearly, JTF PANAMA lacked both the expertise and certain assets, like signal and logistic units, which were essential for continued planning and execution of any contingency plans.\textsuperscript{25} The solution to the inherent deficiencies of JTF PANAMA was to designate XVIII Airborne Corps, at Fort Bragg, North Carolina, as both the executive agent for planning and the operational headquarters for contingency operations in Panama.

\textbf{JTF SOUTH}

The designation of XVIII Airborne Corps as the executive agent for planning and the operational headquarters for contingency operations did not occur without opposition from Major General Loeffke and General Woerner. Major General Loeffke believed that JTF PANAMA, if given the necessary personnel and units from XVIII Airborne Corps, could plan and execute contingency operations in Panama. However, the idea of dismantling an existing and proven headquarters to form a new and untested headquarters did not seem practical to Lieutenant General Kelly, the JCS J3. Eventually arguments made by Brigadier General Cisneros, the SOUTHCOM J3, and pressure by the JCS convinced General Woerner to accept XVIII Airborne Corps.\textsuperscript{26} These decisions did not
end the existence of JTF PANAMA, but its role in Panama changed considerably.

JTF PANAMA's new role entailed its continued control of all forward deployed forces in Panama, except special operation forces. It maintained this role until the initiation of SOUTHCOM's contingency plans. Once the operation commenced, XVIII Airborne Corps would become JTF SOUTH, and JTF PANAMA would inactivate. JTF SOUTH would absorb the JTF PANAMA staff. This new role for JTF PANAMA enabled it to make significant contributions to the success of JTF SOUTH and Operation JUST CAUSE.

These contributions included the control of various exercises in Panama that served as rehearsals for contingency planning conducted at Fort Bragg. JTF PANAMA controlled Operation NIMROD DANCER, the additional build up of U.S. forces in Panama after Noriega nullified the 7 May 1989 elections. In this operation, JTF PANAMA created three subordinate Task Forces to exercise operational control. This command structure executed the PURPLE STORM and SAND FLEA joint training exercises in the late summer and fall of 1989. Major General Cisneros (The former SOUTHCOM J3 and new commander of USARSO and JTF PANAMA) designed PURPLE STORM and later SAND FLEA. He explained:

SAND FLEA was to sort of be an irritant and cause them (PDF) to react so we could judge their reaction plan . . . It also provided a tremendous base for us to, number one, exercise our contingency plans, but also to do joint operations with the headquarters that were there.  

The success of these subordinate headquarters during the PURPLE STORM and SAND FLEA exercises resulted in their formal adoption into the JTF SOUTH contingency

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plans. JTF PANAMA made several other important contributions to the general success of JTF SOUTH. First, the planned absorption of JTF PANAMA by JTF SOUTH provided the JTF SOUTH staff with an experienced joint (although mainly an army) staff augmentation. This joint staff augmentation provided valuable knowledge, experience and expertise on conditions, operations, and intelligence in Panama. The value of this staff augmentation was evident after the 2 October 1989 failed coup against Noriega.

The major reason for the coups' failure was the quick deployment of the 7th PDF company, from Rio Hato, and the Battalion 2000, from Fort Cimmaron. Both organizations were loyal to Noriega and enabled him to defeat the PDF forces supporting the coup. JTF PANAMA's assessment of these events influenced the planners at Fort Bragg to modify their contingency plans. Units of the 75th Ranger Regiment now targeted the 7th PDF company and planned to secure the airfield at Rio Hato. Planners accelerated the deployment of the 82d Airborne Division ahead of the 7th Infantry Division. This was done to allow the faster deploying 82d elements to conduct an air attack against Fort Cimmaron and Battalion 2000.

Other contributions instrumental to JTF SOUTH's success involved changes in leadership. When General Thurman replaced General Woerner as CINC SOUTH, he quickly eliminated much of the confusion concerning operational control of the forces involved in the contingency planning. This was most obvious when General Thurman decided to place all special operation forces under JTF SOUTH's operational control. Lieutenant General Stiner, the XVIII Airborne Corps Commander, had extensive Special
Operations experience. His last assignment with special forces was as the commander of the JSOC. This was an important factor in General Thurman's decision to give Lieutenant General Stiner operational control of the special forces. The result of General Thurman's decision was unity of effort and centralized direction of the forces executing contingency operations in Panama.

JTF SOUTH and SOUTHCOM also benefitted from the leadership of General Powell and the newly acquired authority of the CJCS stemming from Goldwater-Nichols. General Powell's influence was evident in his role as the primary military advisor to the president. As the situation in Panama deteriorated in early 1989, General Powell, the newly appointed CJCS, had the military contingencies for Panama reexamined. With General Thurman, they oversaw the creation of a new series of contingency plans. General Powell insured that these new plans were both politically acceptable and militarily feasible. The resulting campaign plan featured a rapid buildup of forces, as opposed to the gradual buildup envisioned by General Woerner.

To have the necessary combat power in Panama to achieve the desired goals and objectives, General Powell accelerated the prepositioning of additional forces in Panama under the cover of exercise NIMROD DANCER. General Powell used his authority as the CJCS to prevent inter-Service rivalry in the selection of units and their proposed employment by CINC SOUTHCOM. Units were selected based upon the mission and capabilities.

The desire of the Bush administration and pressure from Congress to resolve the crisis in Panama led to additional efforts that contributed to JTF SOUTH's success. This
increased priority allowed XVIII Airborne Corps to conduct a series of CONUS-based SAND FLEA exercises. Neither the JCS nor DOD had supported previous attempts by XVIII Airborne Corps to organize training and rehearsal exercises. This all changed as the likelihood of intervention increased.37

The SAND FLEA series of exercises conducted by XVIII Airborne Corps with the 12th Air Force were joint training exercises. Their intent was to provide training in the Crisis Action System for the Contingency Joint Task Force. CONUS-based units identified for deployment to Panama as part of contingency plans participated in the exercises. The corps made these exercises as realistic as possible. Exercises commenced without warning. Keeping the headquarters staff unaware of an upcoming exercise achieved realism in the training events. Training standards required the staff to function under the compressed time constraints called for in the contingency planning.38 After the first exercise, Major Michael L. Henchen, a G3 planner from XVIII Airborne Corps and member of the JTF SOUTH staff participating in the exercises, made this observation:

The formation and subsequent execution of command and control activities of the JTF formed for this exercise proved to be somewhat confusing at the outset. With few documented techniques and procedures available to guide them, members of the JTF staff found themselves floundering to not only define their roles but also to determine separate service capabilities.39

The design of subsequent SAND FLEA exercises built on lessons learned while increasing the scope and difficulty of the training event. Unfortunately, the disruption caused by personnel turnover limited the level of proficiency the staff could achieve.

The normal but constant rotation of personnel at both XVIII Airborne Corps and
the 12th Air Force required a continuous basic training program for the JTF SOUTH staff. The requirement to train new staff members in the basic techniques and procedures prevented the refinement of those methods.\textsuperscript{40} Despite a continuous uphill learning curve for the contingency JTF headquarters, the exercises contributed considerably to the staff's experience in joint operations.

The development of joint experience was essential, since most of the JTF SOUTH staff members did not have previous joint experience. Another benefit from the joint training was the atmosphere of teamwork and cooperation these training events fostered in the headquarters. As Major Henchen explained:

Most important of all, personnel from the diverse range of units were afforded the opportunity to become familiar not only with each other but also with the capabilities of all participating units. As a result, when the personnel met in December 1989 to execute JUST CAUSE, the proverbial "mating dance" had been accomplished and the staff focused entirely on the mission at hand.\textsuperscript{41}

**Execution**

JUST CAUSE achieved the political objectives outlined by President Bush for protecting U.S. citizens in Panama, supporting democratic institutions in Panama, ensuring safe operation of the Panama Canal, and apprehending Manuel Noriega.\textsuperscript{42} The only objective not achieved in the manner envisioned by the planners was the rapid capture of Noriega. In his after-action comments Lieutenant General Stiner claimed that the operation's success was a result of training, education, weapon systems fielded since the Vietnam War, and the use of AirLand doctrine.

Although no military operation is ever perfect in execution, comments from
unclassified Joint Universal Lessons Learned System (JULLS) reports revealed several areas that needed improvement. Improvements in these areas would not only have enhanced JTF SOUTH's performance as a JTF headquarters, but would also have helped overcome the "ad hoc" nature of future JTF headquarters. The areas needing improvement included joint doctrine, techniques, and procedures.

The JULLS reports state that the planners from XVIII Airborne Corps and the 12th Air Force created and air operations center (AOC) to monitor and control air operations during the operation. The planners rolled the personnel, equipment, procedures, and responsibilities of the Tactical Air Control System (TACS), Army Air Ground System (AAGS), and the 24th Composite Wings Operation Center (WOC) into one organization—the AOC. Since an AOC was not a doctrinal concept, this resulted in many subordinate TACS/AAGS users' initial confusion because they did not understand the AOC's role. Avoiding this confusion would have been possible if the users had been a part of the planning process, or if the AOC had been a valid joint technique for contingency air coordination.43

JULLS reports also showed that dissemination of perishable intelligence needed improvement. Perishable information discovered by Joint Special Operation Task Force (JSOTF) elements was not given to conventional forces. There was no procedure that allowed for the sharing of this valuable information. Some of this information could have helped the operations of the conventional forces. The JSOTF was more interested in maintaining the security surrounding its elements than it was in participating in the total collection effort.44
Finally, JULLS reports also suggest that the lack of standardized procedures hindered communications. Although some accounts describe a fully interoperable communication structure, the JULLS reports describe a communication structure below the JTF and component commands that was essentially a service "free-for-all." With forces from each service bringing and establishing their own communication structure, interoperability fell apart below the component and Task Force level.  

Summary

The impact of Goldwater-Nichols on JTF PANAMA and JTF SOUTH is a mixture of achievements and disappointments. The ability of General Powell to serve as the primary, military advisor to the president and link policy goals with campaign objectives was a desired outcome of the legislation.

This new authority for the CICS mitigated the "ad hoc" nature of the JTF SOUTH headquarters by fostering inter-Service cooperation. Closer examination of this cooperation at the highest levels of command suggests that it may have resulted from the fact that JUST CAUSE was primarily and Army operation and General Powell's willingness to exercise his authority to overrule inter-Service rivalry. However, the JTF headquarters developed trust and confidence between the services. The evidence of this lies in the results of the joint training exercises.

The training exercises had two significant and crucial effects on the JTF headquarters personnel. The first result was to overcome the lack of joint warfare experience and joint staff operating procedures. The other result was the forming of
cohesive joint staffs. General Powell may have had to suppress inter-Service rivalry in the Pentagon, but overcoming inter-Service rivalry at the JTF level was the result of the joint training exercises. The exercises provided the JTF staff officers the opportunity to learn and understand the capabilities and limitations of the other services forces. The experiences gained from the exercises also enabled the formation of a functional headquarters without useful joint publications.

The state of joint publications was not yet at the level envisioned by Goldwater-Nichols. The JTF headquarters was established without benefit of any joint publication, CINC directive, or standard operating procedures. The JTF filled this void with practical experience gained through constant exercises.

Sixteen months after Operation JUST CAUSE, another JTF operation, Operation PROVIDE COMFORT, began in northern Iraq. This new operation would quickly become a Combined Task Force (CTF) operation. The combined aspects of this operation, the lack of preparation time, the type of mission, and the headquarters formed to execute the operation all created a different environment in which the CTF headquarters operated.

IV. Operation PROVIDE COMFORT.

Like Panama, fully understanding the experiences of CTF PROVIDE COMFORT requires an examination of the contributions made by an earlier JTF headquarters. This earlier headquarters was JTF PROVEN FORCE.
JTF PROVEN FORCE

JTF PROVEN FORCE was part of EUCOM's effort to support the United States Central Command's (CENTCOM) Operations DESERT SHIELD and DESERT STORM campaigns against Iraq's invasion of Kuwait. Air Force Major General James L. Jamerson commanded JTF PROVEN FORCE. JTF PROVEN FORCE's air units conducted operations against Iraq from Incirlik, Turkey. Special Operation Forces, under the command of Army Brigadier General Potter, provided combat search and air rescue support to the air operations.46 Army Patriot units defended the Incirlik air base, and psychological operation units conducted psychological missions against the Iraqi military from their Turkish bases.47

While conducting combat operations, the JTF headquarters staff learned many valuable lessons concerning joint operations. One of these lessons was the importance of staff interaction and cooperation. Interaction and cooperation enabled the staff to identify a weakness in one service component's capabilities and compensate for that weakness with the capabilities of another service component. This allowed JTF PROVEN FORCE to integrate its joint force capabilities. Another outcome of this interaction and cooperation was the creation of an attitude of trust and confidence among the joint staff members.48 The result was a cohesive and experienced joint staff.

JTF PROVEN FORCE completed operations in support of CENTCOM in late February 1991 and began redeployment of its forces to their home stations. However, events developing in northern Iraq would soon bring the members of JTF PROVEN FORCE back together again.
JTF/CTF PROVIDE COMFORT

As Operation DESERT STORM's combat operations were ending in late February 1991, a Kurdish rebellion erupted in northern Iraq. By 28 March 1991, the Kurds had taken control of a wide area of northern Iraq. Saddam Hussein, the Iraqi dictator, ordered his military forces to attack the Kurds. The Kurds were quickly overwhelmed by the Iraqi army's superior combat power and fled from their homelands. The Kurds took sanctuary in the inhospitable mountains of northern Iraq and southern Turkey. Operation PROVIDE COMFORT began on 5 April 1991 when President Bush ordered the U.S. Armed Forces to provide humanitarian relief to the fleeing Kurdish civilians.49

Operation PROVIDE COMFORT began as a unilateral U.S. effort. The U.S. European Command (EUCOM) formed the JTF on 6 April 1991 and began airdropping critically needed supplies into the many mountain enclaves where the Kurds had sought safety. These airdrops commenced on 7 April, only thirty-six hours after the President's order. The commander of JTF PROVIDE COMFORT was Major General Jamerson. JTF PROVIDE COMFORT used essentially the same force and headquarters that had just completed Operation PROVEN FORCE.

Even as JTF PROVIDE COMFORT was organizing for its airdrop missions, the call for international support for the relief of the Kurds had already gone out.50 Eventually, over thirty nations provided military forces, relief supplies, or both to the operation. Besides the military forces and supplies, fifty-one different civilian relief agencies also contributed to the humanitarian effort.51

Beyond the growing effort provided by both the coalition forces and the civilian
relief agencies, an expanding mission increased the complexity of the operation. As early as 9 April, Brigadier General Potter’s special operation forces began to assist with the airdrops and to organize the Kurdish refugee camps. Organizing the camps entailed supervising the distribution of food and water, improving sanitation, and providing medical care. Organizing and running the refugee camps was only one aspect of the growing complexity of the operation.

Coalition concern over a potentially unlimited task to provide humanitarian relief led to a plan to return the Kurds to their homes. Since the Kurds were afraid of Iraqi reprisals, the coalition plan called for the establishment of a security zone in northern Iraq. Coalition leaders believed that the sanctuary provided by a coalition security zone would convince the Kurds to return home. These new mission requirements, coupled with the size of the coalition and civilian relief agency effort, prompted General Gavin, the EUCOM commander, to redesignate JTF PROVIDE COMFORT as Combined Task Force (CTF) PROVIDE COMFORT. The CINC also expanded the CTF’s capabilities in light of these new mission requirements. Major General Jamerson became the CTF’s deputy commanding officer. Lieutenant General Shalikashvili, deputy commander of U.S. Army Europe, assumed command of the new CTF. As JTF PROVIDE COMFORT expanded to CTF PROVIDE COMFORT, the new headquarters had to rely on the existing JTF staff and EUCOM directives. These two items helped the new organization meet the challenge of formation even as the operation was in progress.

The change over from a JTF to a CTF required the addition of many new staff
officers with varying skills and experiences. New skills and additional people were essential to controlling the increasingly complex mission. The experience of the former JTF headquarters staff provided a nucleus for this expanding combined staff. The new CTF staff adopted procedures and techniques developed by the JTF PROVEN FORCE and PROVIDE COMFORT staffs. JTF PROVEN FORCE and PROVIDE COMFORT's knowledge of the terrain, Turkish customs, and knowledge of the existing infrastructure also benefitted the new CTF staff. Guiding the composition and manning of the new CTF headquarters were directives promulgated by EUCOM for such emergencies.

Although no joint publication yet formalized the composition of a JTF or CTF headquarters, CTF PROVIDE COMFORT had the benefit of EUCOM Directive 55-11. This directive was a manning document for a joint task force headquarters. Directive 55-11 proved to be a good starting point for the staff formation. Unfortunately, it had its limitations as well. These limitations are evident in some after action reports available in JULLS. These reports focus on activation and manning of a joint and combined staff, joint skill requirements, integration of coalition members into the staff, and orchestration of battlefield operating systems.

Although the initial PROVIDE COMFORT staff formed on 6 April evolved into a CTF operation by 17 April, it did not have a Plans and Programs staff section (C5) until 20 April. Administrative support for the C5 did not arrive at the CTF headquarters until 30 April. Additionally, the C5 and his deputy were from the EUCOM staff, while the other C5 members came from U.S. Army, Europe. Not only were these individuals all from the Army, none of them had any formal training in planning, nor had any of them
ever worked together before their assignment to the CTF headquarters. 56

The lack of joint skills was most evident in the shortage of people with expertise with the World Wide Military Command and Control System (WWMCCS). There were not enough experienced WWMCCS operators in EUCOM to support the CTF headquarters requirements without degrading EUCOM's own capabilities. This hindered the CTF's ability to use the system and communicate to EUCOM, other supporting CINC's, and its own subordinate component commands. 57

EUCOM Directive 55-11 did not address issues concerning the large coalition participation in Operation PROVIDE COMFORT. As a result, only one principal staff officer, the C3, was from a coalition nation. There was no coalition representation in the command structure. The Commanding General, Deputy Commanding General, and the subordinate task force commanders were American. 58 There were no coalition members assigned to the C5 staff section. 59 Coalition representation in the C3 and C5 staff sections would have improved interoperability between the CTF's forces and enhanced its ability to efficiently achieve its mission.

Additional combat forces provided to CTF PROVIDE COMFORT to establish and maintain a security zone in northern Iraq revealed another problem with the composition of the headquarters staff. These forces brought with them many fire support assets. These assets included British, U.S. Marine, and U.S. Army artillery, mortars, and attack helicopters. Additionally, U.S. Marine, U.S. Navy, and U.S. Air Force assets were available to provide fire support if required. Unfortunately, the CTF headquarters did not have a Fire Support Element (FSE) that could integrate these assets. 60
Lieutenant General Cushman, U.S. Army Retired, addressed this issue during his interviews with responsible commanders and staff officers shortly after the operation ended. He asked them if the team would have held together if placed under the stress of combat. Specifically, he wanted to know if the requirement for precise coordination of combined arms and tactical air was within the capabilities of the ad hoc organization. The answer he received was that the organization was capable of meeting the challenges Lieutenant General (R) Cushman had described. The commanders and staff officers said that solid team work attitudes were firmly in place. They examined plausible contingencies and planned responses to each on a daily basis.61 These same attitudes enabled the headquarters to overcome other shortcomings.

JULLS reports covering Operation PROVIDE COMFORT also discuss a lack of staff officer knowledge. Staff officers with a more in-depth understanding of the capabilities and limitations of the units provided by their respective service would have served the CTF headquarters better. Some of these JULLS reports suggest that the Air Force personnel assigned to the CTF headquarters did not understand the limitations of the E3 AWACS aircraft. As a result the CTF headquarters initially expected too much from the aircraft.62

Other JULLS reports show a similar problem with the employment of engineer units. All the services provided engineer units with different capabilities. The primitive conditions in which the force was operating demanded the construction of base camps, refugee camps, airfields, and roads. The planners assigning engineering tasks did not know that Air Force engineer units were more capable at quickly placing, developing, and
supporting comfortable base camps than the other service's engineer units. This lack of service expertise resulted in poor utilization of engineer assets until the planners became aware of the particular unit capabilities.  

Major General Garner, the commander of CTF-B during Operation PROVIDE COMFORT, also noted the lack of properly educated staff officers. On his after action briefing charts he described his lack of knowledge in terms of joint and combined operations. Contingency operations require a homogeneous staff, deployed early and well versed in joint and combined operations... and this among many other necessary components of joint force readiness was lacking.  

Operation PROVIDE COMFORT identified an area not yet extensively covered by joint doctrine or joint tactics, techniques, and procedures. Doctrine now refers to this area as "Operations Other Than War." The absences of doctrine, tactics, techniques, and procedures for humanitarian operations left the PROVIDE COMFORT leaders and planners to blaze their own trail during this operation.  

Summary

Operation PROVIDE COMFORT, like Operation JUST CAUSE, showed a mixture of achievements and disappointments in overcoming the "ad hoc" nature of the JTF and CTF headquarters. Achievements included the spirit of cooperation and teamwork exhibited during the operation. Disappointments included problems in headquarters composition and staff officer knowledge and expertise. A vital element in PROVIDE COMFORT was a shared spirit of cooperation and
teamwork. The attitudes of the former JTF PROVEN FORCE staff and the willingness of the CTF PROVIDE COMFORT commanders and staff officers to cooperate in daily combat operation planning displayed that spirit. This spirit enabled CTF PROVIDE COMFORT to overcome some of the friction inherent in JTF or CTF operations.

Despite EUCOM's examination of joint doctrine, directive 55-11 did not address the need for an FSE. This is not surprising considering that the available joint publications also failed to address the integration of joint fires. Additionally, experiences from Operations URGENT FURY and JUST CAUSE notwithstanding, joint literature still did not address the composition and manning of a JTF headquarters.66

Another disappointment revealed by JULLS reports was the lack of staff officer expertise. The lack of service expertise suggested by the JULLS reports illuminates a shortcoming in an essential element of joint operations. This element requires that an effective joint staff officer first be knowledgeable on his own service's capabilities and limitations. Identified shortcomings suggest possible deficiencies in service and joint education programs. The JULLS reports also suggest a possible shortcoming in the manner in which individuals are selected for service on either a CTF or JTF headquarters. This may require that selection be predicated on the individual's knowledge, experience as reflected by his or her rank, years of service, education level, special skills, and previous experience.
V. Recent Operations, Operation RESTORE HOPE.

Since the end of humanitarian efforts in Operation PROVIDE COMFORT, U.S. Forces have been involved in several JTF and CTF operations. Information concerning these operations is just now becoming available in JULLS. Initial reports from Operation RESTORE HOPE and JTF SOMALIA indicate that efforts to overcome the "ad hoc" nature of the JTF headquarters are developing slowly. Lessons learned in one theater are not necessarily adopted in another.

Operation RESTORE HOPE highlighted again the lack of joint and service doctrine for "Peace Making Operations." Service and joint doctrine still had not addressed this deficiency, initially identified after Operation DESERT STORM. In December 1994 the Army published FM 100-23, Peace Operations, but joint doctrine is still under development. Besides the slow development of joint doctrine, the development of joint tactics, techniques, and procedures lags behind requirements.

JULLS reports from Operation RESTORE HOPE show continuing problems with communication interoperability. Reports describe a lack of clear, precise rules and regulations for the administration and management of joint COMSEC accounts, frequency management, and use of new switching equipment. Forces continue to use their own service procedures much like they did during Operation JUST CAUSE. Operation RESTORE HOPE also identified continued weaknesses in joint education and training. Problems identified with the Joint Force Air Component Command (JFACC) and the use of both WWMCCS and the Joint Operation Planning and Execution System (JOPES) illustrate some continuing education and training problems.
Operation RESTORE HOPE required the quick formation of a JFACC staff.

Since the JFACC was not built around an existing organization, personnel assigned to the JFACC required training and experience in JFACC functions and procedures.

Unfortunately most of the individuals drawn from supporting organizations to form the JFACC had no previous JFACC experience. 69

Insufficient numbers of trained WWMCCS and JOPES individuals hindered JTF SOMALIA's ability to communicate with its subordinate organizations, the CINC, and supporting CINC headquarters. This was especially true of communications with United States Transportation Command (USTRANSCOM). 70 As in PROVIDE COMFORT, the CENTCOM staff could not afford to provide JTF SOMALIA headquarters with sufficient WWMCCS/JOPES qualified personnel without degrading their own capability.

Identification of qualified WWMCCS/JOPES personnel in the force structure was hindered by a lack of an automated joint skill identification code in personnel files. 71

VI. Synthesis and Analysis.

Joint Doctrine, Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures

The state of joint publications, as shown by Operations JUST CAUSE and PROVIDE COMFORT, had not shown much improvement since the passage of Goldwater-Nichols or its implementing directives. No joint publication was available that addressed the composition and manning of either joint or combined force headquarters. EUCOM's Directive 55-11, although an effort to fill the void in joint literature, suffered from obsolescence and limited applicability. Other joint publications addressing the
integration of joint force capabilities were lacking. JTF SOUTH did not have procedures for the integration of intelligence collected from the joint force. CTF PROVIDE COMFORT did not have a reliable means of integrating the fires of its joint or combined forces had combat operations erupted. However, a blanket indictment against the joint publication system might be premature, given current developments.

Currently in EUCOM, where the experiences of PROVIDE COMFORT and later JTF/CTF operations have had an impact, the view of joint doctrine is more positive.

Joint Doctrine and procedures are proving their worth. In our operations and exercises so far, a recurring finding is that while joint doctrine, tactics, techniques and procedures are a usable basis for defining how to conduct operations planning, the doctrine is far from definitive. Related USEUCOM documents translating doctrine to local policies are now in and accelerated update cycle.72

The apparent problem with the joint publication system is the amount of time it takes a joint publication to reach the field. In 1993, six years after the signing of the joint publication implementing directives, one-third of the identified required joint publication manuals were still under development. Another third of those publications previously published were under revision.73 The absence of doctrine for "Peace Making Operations" identified again during Operation RESTORE HOPE, two years after the requirement was first identified, also underscores the long time joint doctrine takes to reach the field. The continuing problems in achieving joint communications interoperability illustrate almost a lack of progress in joint publications for certain key aspects of joint operations. Carrying out the current National Security Strategy will require a more responsive joint publication system to support future joint teams.
Joint Officer Education

Understanding the lack of joint officer experience, as shown in both Operations JUST CAUSE and PROVIDE COMFORT, requires an examination of the state of joint officer education. Major changes in joint officer education programs did not begin immediately after the passage of Goldwater-Nichols.

The first board formed to examine the professional education system, known as the Dougherty Board, made its recommendations to the CJCS in May 1987. Unfortunately, the board's conclusions were not considered very progressive. Its recommendations reminded some in Congress of the lackluster attitude toward joint warfighting that made Goldwater-Nichols necessary. Two reports submitted in March 1989 provided a more progressive approach to professional military education.

Recommendations from both the Skelton Panel and Long Committee were incorporated into the current joint education program. As with the availability of joint publications for the JTF staff, the joint education program had not yet provided the joint staff officer envisioned by Goldwater-Nichols by the time Operations JUST CAUSE and PROVIDE COMFORT were executed. However, the issues raised in Operation RESTORE HOPE's JULLS reports concerning a lack of experienced personnel for manning the JFACC and operating both WWMCCS and JOPES indicate current joint education efforts may require review.
Joint Staff Training

The evolution of JTF SOUTH clearly shows the value of joint training. This joint training, made possible in part by the long mission preparation time, fostered the formation of a trained and cohesive joint staff. The joint exercises provided the opportunity to overcome the lack of formal joint procedures and techniques. Although CTF PROVIDE COMFORT headquarters did not have a similar opportunity to conduct training before executing its mission, it could, like JTF SOUTH, build upon an experienced joint staff augmentation.

Although some debate the impact of JTF PANAMA on the development of a cohesive JTF SOUTH staff, the joint staff nucleus provided by the former members of JTF PROVIDE COMFORT was crucial. This staff nucleus allowed the new CTF headquarters to expand even as humanitarian relief operations were on going. What no one will debate is the valuable information concerning the terrain, enemy forces, general situation, and infrastructure both JTF PANAMA and JTF PROVIDE COMFORT provided their successor headquarters.

Joint staff augmentation, as demonstrated by JTF PANAMA and JTF PROVIDE COMFORT, showed the usefulness of a method now in practice among several of the regional unified commands. It is these advantages that have caused three of the five regional unified commands to form a joint staff augmentation cell. EUCOM, ACOM, and PACOM's cells are slightly different, but they all have the same purpose. The cell provides an experienced team of joint staff officers that help "jump start" the designated organization's transition to a JTF or CTF headquarters and execution of its mission. This
method eliminates some of the "ad hoc" nature of a newly formed JTF headquarters. Regular training ensures a smooth transition between the augmentation cell and the headquarters designated by the CINC as JTF. Despite the experiences of these three unified commands, CENTCOM did not employ a similar staff augmentation cell to "jump start" I MEF's transition to JTF SOMALIA.

The limited information currently available concerning Operation RESTORE HOPE and JTF SOMALIA will only allow speculation as to whether a joint staff augmentation cell would have improved JTF SOMALIA's performance. However, it is disconcerting to see the experiences of three of the unified commands are either not shared or are simply ignored by the other two unified commands. (SOUTHCOM also does not have a similar staff augmentation cell)75 This lack of standardization among the unified commands makes it difficult for a headquarters like XVIII Airborne Corps to train when it can realistically expect to be a JTF headquarters in CENTCOM, SOUTHCOM, and ACOM. Whether ACOM, with its new responsibility to train joint teams, can alleviate or correct this problem is still to be determined.

**The Spirit of "Jointness"**

The desired effect of Goldwater-Nichols and its implementing directives was to foster a spirit of joint operations. Elements of this spirit were evident in both Operations JUST CAUSE and PROVIDE COMFORT. JTF PANAMA and JTF SOUTH developed this spirit through their joint training exercises. These joint endeavors showed the value of continuing similar efforts while improving the sense of "jointness" in the armed forces.
Operation PROVIDE COMFORT revealed that this sense of "jointness" has evolved further, despite the inadequacies in joint publications, education, and training.

CTF PROVIDE COMFORT did not have the luxury of a long mission preparation time in which to conduct joint or combined training exercises. This paper discusses several problems exhibited during the operation. Nevertheless, the combined joint force accomplished its mission. It accomplished its mission, according to Lieutenant General (R) Cushman because

... task-force components shed their service identities as they became caught up in the drive toward their overarching goal: to accomplish the mission.  

Lieutenant General (R) Cushman believes Goldwater-Nichols has been instrumental in fostering these attitudes in joint operations. Goldwater-Nichols is spurring not only important changes in doctrine and organization, but more important, new service attitudes toward joint operations.  

Available information from Operation RESTORE HOPE does not provide conclusive evidence to either the presences or absences of the spirit of "jointness." JULLS reports by their very nature do not provide good insights to the state of cooperation, teamwork, trust, or confidence between the services. Only as the military community analyzes Operation RESTORE HOPE will we draw more definitive conclusions regarding "jointness."
VII. Conclusions and Recommendations.

The progress made toward overcoming the "ad hoc" nature of the JTF and CTF headquarters since the passage of Goldwater-Nichols is not impressive in easily measured terms. The slow nature of joint publication development, results from joint officer professional development, the formulation of CINC directives or procedures to link doctrine and application, and the advancement of methods to overcome the "ad hoc" nature of the headquarters reveal an evolutionary rather than revolutionary methods of change. This evolutionary pace of change is not necessarily bad and eventually may be the correct course of action. Since what Lieutenant General (R) Cushman calls the spirit of "jointness" continues to grow, this intangible impact of Goldwater-Nichols is still the most important ingredient in overcoming the "ad hoc" nature of the JTF and CTF headquarters. However, some changes could enhance not only the pace and quality of this evolutionary change but the spirit of "jointness" as well.

Joint Publications

We need to improve the manner in which joint publications are written. Today, most joint publications are, in effect, "subcontracted" out to the services to write. Some publications, especially those where one service provides the predominance of the capability, are best written by a single service and reviewed by the joint staff and the CINCs. However, the JCS or some joint center similar in function to the Army's Training and Doctrine Command should write the majority of publications. This is especially true of the joint capstone documents.
For example, the Army drafts its capstone manual, FM 100-5 Operations, at the Combined Arms Center at Fort Leavenworth. The Training and Doctrine Command at Fort Monroe then reviews it. When this review is completed, the entire Army is invited to critique the new manual. This system allows the document to rise above the parochial concerns of the branches and achieve a broader application to the entire Army. Currently the Joint Doctrine Center only reviews recommendations for joint doctrine, acting more like a clearing house then a center for the development of doctrine. For capstone manuals the Joint Doctrine Center should formulate the doctrine, have the Joint Staff review it, and then allow the joint community to critique the new publication.

**Joint Education**

A better balance between the effort given to service and joint warfare issues will allow the armed forces to continue their evolution in the practice of joint warfare. Achieving this balance is difficult since the execution of joint warfare usually occurs at a lower level than the CINC's headquarters. In the Army this means that the corps, and sometimes the division, are practicing joint warfare. Most staff officers in these headquarters have only completed Joint Professional Military Education phase one. Any increase in joint education and training conducted in phase one would adversely affect service education and training.

One solution to this problem of balance in the education system would be to increase the joint aspects of the second year courses taught at the Army, Air Force, and Marine staff colleges, and create a similar program at the Naval War college. The current
Army Corps, MEF, numbered Air Forces, and Fleets' tactical planners are often the planners for JTF and CTF headquarters. With their service focused education completed in the first year of training, the second year could emphasize joint warfighting from a land, sea, air, and expeditionary force perspective. A requirement in this approach would be a first year program that completely satisfies service education requirements. This would provide the organizations that most often operate as JTF or CTF headquarters with a small nucleus of staff officers educated in joint operational issues.

**Joint Staff Training**

Reinforcement of the improvements in the education system must come from realistic and challenging joint staff training exercises. For the potential JTF or CTF staff, this includes both service and JCS-sponsored training exercises. Training not only allows for the practice and testing of doctrine and operational processes; in the joint environment it provides an opportunity to see and work with other services. The building of teamwork, trust, and confidence in the joint force begins with exercises and training events.

The goal of this training should be to improve the effectiveness and efficiency of the "ad hoc" JTF or CTF headquarters. Observations from PACOM reveal that there is room for improvement in current joint staff training exercises:

There is not a standard training program for a potential COMJTF/JTF Staff to go through to ensure combat readiness. Resources are wasted for each organization to invent one. Theater specific training is essential however, and a joint training program should be developed in concert with both the CINCs and services to provide a common core JTF training program.81
For such a program to succeed, a headquarters responsible for managing joint training must be designated. USACOM may assume this responsibility, but until then joint training will lack strong management and will suffer from inefficiencies.

The challenges inherent in the "ad hoc" nature of either a JTF or CTF headquarters can be overcome. Improvements in joint publications, education, and training programs will provide long term and more immediate solutions. However, making improvements in these areas will require constant review and willingness to adapt to changes in warfare.
ENDNOTES


3. UNAAF, p. 3-9.

4. UNAAF, p. 3-13. A complete listing of the methods in which a CINC may exercise his COCOM authority is provided in Appendix 1. The UNAAF does not specifically mention command of a combined joint task force. The current National Security Strategy's desire to incorporate allies and recent events have made this command structure a realistic possibility.


8. This information was found in the *Joint Force Quarterly*, Winter 93/94 issue pp. 36-37. The original source is Adam B. Siegel and Scott M. Fabbri, "Overview of Selected Joint Task Forces, 1960-1993," (Alexandria, Virginia: Center for Naval Analysis, September 1993).


14. The functions given to the CJCS by both DOD directive 5100.1 and Joint Pub 2 were paraphrased from Tiberi, Moberly, and Murphy, pp. 14-15.


to the Joint Staff, the ability to create doctrine, tactics, techniques, and procedures where little or none had previously existed in such a large and bureaucratic organization only seventeen months since Goldwater-Nichols became public law was very difficult.


21. As a result of reviewing both Joint Pubs 2 and 1-01.1.

22. 1986 edition of the UNAAF, p. 3-2.

23. Yates, pp. 63-64.

24. Yates, pp. 63-64.


27. Yates, p. 69.

28. Donnelly, Roth, and Baker, p. 49.

29. Ibid, pp. 81-83.

30. The contributions of JTF Panama to JTF South were taken from Sterling's monograph, p. 14. Sterling's source was an interview he conducted with Dr. Lawrence Yates at Fort Leavenworth.

31. Donnelly, Roth, and Baker, pp. 72-74.


33. Ibid, pp. 59-60.

34. Yates, p. 69 and Donnelly, Roth, and Baker, pp. 55-59.

35. Tiberi, Moberly, and Murphy, pp. 75-76.

36. Donnelly, Roth, and Baker, pp. 399-400.

37. Donnelly, Roth, and Baker, pp. 91-92 and Henchen, pp. 22-23.

38. Henchen, p. 34.

39. Ibid, p. 34.
40. Ibid, p. 36.


42. Dennis Steele, "Operation Just Cause", Army, (February 1990), p. 35.


44. JULLS Report No. 12983-90389, Sharing of Intelligence Data, (UNCLASS).


48. The importance and impact of this trust and confidence can be found in Cavanaugh, pp. 5 to 6.


53. Cavanaugh, p. 10 and EUCOM AAR, p. 3.

54. Cavanaugh, pp. 5-6.

55. EUCOM AAR, p. 12 and JULLS No. 91055-06088, Force Offering and Staffing the JTF Headquarters, Operation Provide Comfort, (UNCLAS).


64. Cushman, p. 85.


74. Results of the various panels and committees formed to examine the ability of the professional military education to meet the requirements of Goldwater-Nichols was taken from Vincent K. Brooks, Knowledge is the Key: Educating, Training, and Developing Operational Artists for the 21st Century, (Fort Leavenworth, Kansas: School of Advanced Military Studies, United States Army Command and General Staff College, 1992), pp. 6-14.

75. This information was taken from COL K. Meyer of the United States Army's Combined Arms Command Force Design Directorate at Fort Leavenworth, Kansas. COL Meyer presented a lecture to the School of Advanced Military Studies titled Force Projection Army. During his discussion COL Meyer presented the methods that ATOM, EUCOM, and PACOM have developed to assist their designated JTF headquarters candidates transition to a joint headquarters. COL Meyer's research allowed him to visit all of the unified commands. This research effort enable him to present the different methods and lack of methods employed by the various unified commands.

76. Cushman, p. 79.

77. Ibid, p. 79.


80. The concept of a program like the School of Advanced Military Studies, United States Army Command and General Staff College, having a curriculum that focuses on joint warfare from a land component perspective as a possible solution to the requirement to balance the education system was taken from comments made by COL Fontenot, Director of the School of Advanced Military Studies, during lectures and seminar discussions during the 94/95 academic year.

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