CENTERS OF GRAVITY OF UNITED NATIONS
OPERATION SOMALIA II

A thesis presented to the Faculty of the U.S. Army
Command and General Staff College in partial
fulfillment of the requirements for the
degree

MASTER OF MILITARY ART AND SCIENCE

by

THOMAS J. DAZE, LTC, USA
B.S. United States Military Academy, West Point, New York, 1973

Fort Leavenworth, Kansas
1995

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Centers of Gravity of United Nations Operation, Somalia II (UNOSOM II)

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This thesis identifies the operational and strategic centers of gravity of United Nation Operations, Somalia II (UNOSOM II). The research demonstrates that UNOSOM II failed to correctly identify its own strategic center of gravity. This failure left both its strategic and operational centers of gravity vulnerable to attack and exploitation by hostile militia forces. Center of gravity analysis must be completed by the military planner prior to participation in peace enforcement operations or in traditional peacekeeping operations where hostilities are possible. Centers of gravity of the main belligerents must be identified should neutralization of their combat capability be required. At the same time the strategic and operational centers of gravity of the peacekeeping force must be identified and appropriate security measures implemented to protect these from attack. Failure to do so cannot only endanger the force but threaten the success of the peace operation.
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ABSTRACT

CENTERS OF GRAVITY OF UNITED NATIONS OPERATION, SOMALIA II
by LTC Thomas J. Daze, USA, 166 pages

This thesis identifies the operational and strategic centers of gravity of United Nation Operations, Somalia II (UNOSOM II). The research demonstrates that UNOSOM II failed to correctly identify its own strategic center of gravity. This failure left both its strategic and operational centers of gravity vulnerable to attack and exploitation by hostile militia forces.

Center of gravity analysis must be completed by the military planner prior to participation in peace enforcement operations or in traditional peacekeeping operations where hostilities are possible. Centers of gravity of the main belligerents must be identified should neutralization of their combat capability be required. At the same time, the strategic and operational centers of gravity of the peacekeeping force must be identified and appropriate security measures implemented to protect these from attack. Failure to do so can not only endanger the force but threaten the success of the peace operation.
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CHAPTER ONE

INTRODUCTION

Introduction

On 3 December 1992, the United Nations took an unprecedented step to resolve the problems of starvation, famine, and lawlessness in Somalia. It was significant in two regards. It was the first attempt by the international community to deal with a new post-Cold War phenomenon referred to as the "failed nation state." It has further significance in that the United Nations expanded its traditional role of Chapter VI peacekeeping operations to a more ambitious Chapter VII peace enforcement intervention authorizing participating states of the coalition to use "all necessary means" to execute the parameters of Security Council mandates.

Executive Summary, U.S. Forces, Somalia, After Action Report

By the Spring of 1993, what had begun as a humanitarian aid mission was quickly evolving into one of nation building. However, the operation would undergo a major transformation in its structure and organization prior to taking on these new and substantially greater responsibilities. On 4 May 1993, the United States (U.S.)-led Unified Task Force (UNITAF) transferred civilian as well as military control of the Somalia operation to the United Nations (U.N.). This transition was more than a change in leadership, for it marked a planned turning point in the scope of the mission.

At transition, the new mandate of U.N. Security Council Resolution (UNSCR) 814 came into effect. The narrowly focused mission of UNITAF as executed by the Bush Administration under UNSCR 794 provided security for humanitarian relief efforts in order that these endeavors could continue uninterrupted and rescue a starving population. United Nations Operation in Somalia II's (UNOSOM II) stated mission, as modified/clarified in the new UNSCR 814, was to not only provide a secure environment for the continuation of humanitarian relief operations, but it further directed that a secure environment be provided to allow the achievement of national reconciliation with the
establishment of a transitional government and provide for the advancement of economic rehabilitation. Significant tasks included disarmament of the factions and the return of hundreds of thousands of refugees. These objectives and tasks implied a distinctly different end state from that of UNITAF with very different implications for the military forces committed in Somalia. UNITAF's relatively short-term mission ended with the successful delivery of humanitarian aid. UNOSOM II would end with the reestablishment of a functioning government.¹

By its very nature, it was a mission which could place U.N. forces in direct opposition to one or more of the belligerent clans who had been at war with each other for nearly two years. In particular, it would clash with Mohamed Farrah Hassan Aideed, a prominent clan leader who had his own political ambition for the end state of the nation, one that would establish himself as head of the new government. Within a week following the transition of the mission to the U.N., Aideed's militia skirmished with U.N. forces near the coastal city of Kismayo. Three weeks later, his militia initiated a deliberate ambush against U.N. forces resulting in the deaths of over thirty peacekeepers in the capital city of Mogadishu. This attack embroiled the U.N. in a protracted conflict that would ultimately end with the withdrawal of western nation coalition forces from Somalia.

The purpose of this thesis is to examine UNOSOM II in order to discern its centers of gravity. The research will demonstrate how UNOSOM may have failed to correctly identify its own friendly centers of gravity and, in so doing, left them vulnerable to attack and exploitation by hostile militia forces. This study can provide lessons for current and future U.N. peace enforcement operations by demonstrating a methodology to assist in the identification of friendly centers of gravity and tracking these during the course of the mission.

The UNOSOM II mission was a test case for future ventures by the U.N., and it had great importance for U.S. foreign policy. America's national military strategy was evolving under the Clinton Administration. National Security Adviser Anthony Lake articulated the new strategy as one of "enlargement" of the free market democracies replacing the Cold War strategy of "containment."² This strategy by its
very nature was proactive and implied new responsibilities and undertakings for the United States in its role as the preeminent world power.

The Clinton Administration realized that a complementary strategy for collective security must be developed as it attempted to balance this new foreign policy with the reality of reductions in its domestic budget and related reductions in U.S. military capabilities. By empowering the U.N., the Administration hoped to solve this problem of a strategic ends and means mismatch.³ In his address to the U.N. General Assembly in September 1993, at the height of U.S. involvement of Somalia (Task Force Ranger had deployed and was operational), President Clinton gave emphasis to this new foreign policy. He stated that an "expanded community of market democracies not only serves our own security interests, it also advances the goals enshrined in this body's [U.N.'s] charter . . . [for] democracies rarely wage war on one another. They make more reliable partners in trade, diplomacy, and in the stewardship of our global environment."⁴

He went on to state that U.N. peacekeeping holds the promise to resolve conflicts that threaten the development of entire regions. U.S. support to such missions not only strengthens its own security and interests, but it promotes the sharing of the costs and efforts of such operations among all nations pursuing peace. Peacekeeping cannot be a total substitute for the national defense efforts of the United States, but it can strongly supplement them. At the same time, U.N. missions must be adequately and fairly funded. To this end, the Clinton Administration would pursue a policy to reduce the U.S. budget assessment in order that other nations whose economies have been on the rise could now bear more of the financial burden of peace operations.⁵

As put forth by the Clinton Administration, it is in U.S. national interests to support the U.N. and eventually use it as a primary vehicle for burden sharing. Further, if successful in Somalia, the U.N. could lead in more difficult security missions. This would ultimately provide sufficient latitude for the United States to limit its participation only to those crises where its important national interests are affected.
Understanding why the U.N. effort in Somalia failed is important for military planners for we find the U.N. and U.S. being continually tested as in Rwanda and Haiti. The UNOSOM II experience will be examined using U.S. Joint and Army doctrine as a basis for investigation. This doctrine will assist the military planner to correctly identify friendly centers of gravity. The historical discussion of UNOSOM II events will reveal how these centers of gravity were successfully attacked and exploited by hostile clan forces in Somalia causing the major western powers to withdraw from the mission.

Research Question

What were the centers of gravity for the United Nations Operation in Somalia II (UNOSOM II)? The first step in answering this question is to have a clear understanding of the term center of gravity. U.S. Army Field Manual 100-5, Operations, defines the center of gravity as "the hub of all power and movement upon which everything depends. It is the characteristic, capability, or location from which enemy and friendly forces derive their freedom of action, physical strength, or will to fight." This concept is derived from the Prussian strategist Carl von Clausewitz's concept outlined in his work On War and is further exemplified in U.S. joint doctrine as well. Joint Publication 1 states:

Finding and attacking enemy centers of gravity is a singularly important concept. Rather than attack peripheral enemy vulnerabilities, attacking centers of gravity means concentrating against capabilities whose destruction or overthrow will yield military success. Though providing an essential focus for all efforts, attacking centers of gravity is often not easy. "Peeling the onion" that is, progressively first defeating enemy measures taken to defend centers of gravity, may be required to expose those centers of gravity to attack, both at the strategic and operational levels.

This "peeling of the onion" may be required because the center of gravity may not always be accessible. Being the hub of the enemy's power, it may be unassailable to an inferior opposing force. In such an instance, other avenues must be found to strike at the center of gravity. These avenues are referred to in Army Doctrine as decisive points, a concept first developed by the Napoleonic French General Antoine Jomini. Decisive points "provide a marked advantage over the
enemy and greatly influence the outcome of an action."8 The decisive point can be looked upon as a door that provides access to the center of gravity. A strategic decisive point is one "which is capable of exercising a marked influence either upon the result of the campaign or upon a single enterprise."9 Unlike Clausewitz's center of gravity, the decisive point is not necessarily the source of the enemy's or one's own power, but it may be a vulnerability. This concept supports the strategy of the indirect approach espoused by B. H. Liddell Hart, an approach which promises to produce a marked advantage over the enemy or one's own forces but at a lower cost.10

A strategic decisive point like a center of gravity is often abstract such as the morale or will of the fighting force. However, it can also be well defined which Jomini referred to as objective points. Objective points can be physical features such as key terrain or spatial in nature such as a point of maneuver where one's army exercises a clear advantage over the enemy's forces based on respective positions on the battlefield.11 In searching for the centers of gravity of UNOSOM II, it is necessary to identify decisive points and then link these to the operational and strategic centers of gravity.

Definition of Terms

This part of the chapter will define key terms used throughout the essay. A definition of the types of peace operations is provided in order to understand doctrinal and operational references. This section also defines and explains how the United Nations is organized to execute peace operations. This is essential to understanding of the events and communications affecting UNOSOM II operations. To further assist in understanding the events that took place in UNOSOM II, the basic organization of the U.N. civilian and military structure in theater at the time is explained. Several charts depicting the command and control of UNOSOM II and U.S. Forces, Somalia (USFORCOSM) are included to illustrate these relationships. Finally, a brief description of key Somali clans and political organizations is provided as they pertain to events described in this thesis. Readers familiar with peace operations
and/or the organization of the United Nations and major clans in Somalia during the UNOSOM II period should proceed to the literature review.

**Peace Operations**

"Peace operations" is a comprehensive term encompassing military support to diplomacy, observers and monitors, traditional peacekeeping, preventive deployment, security assistance to a civil authority, protection and delivery of humanitarian relief, guaranteeing rights of passage, imposing sanctions, peace enforcement, and any other military, paramilitary, or nonmilitary action taken in support of diplomatic peacemaking operations. There are varying definitions on peace operations terminology. For purposes of this thesis, definitions were obtained from the recently published U.S Army Field Manual 100-23, *Peace Operations*.

Peace operations thus encompass three types of activities: support to diplomacy (including preventive diplomacy, peacemaking and peace building); peacekeeping or the observing and supervising of terms of an existing peace, truce or cease-fire; and peace enforcement which is the application of limited military force.\(^{12}\)

**Preventive Diplomacy.** Preventive diplomacy involves diplomatic actions taken in advance of a predictable crisis, aimed at removing the sources of conflict before violence erupts, or limiting the spread of violence when it occurs. Military support to diplomacy may, for example, take the form of preventive deployments, a show of force, or increased states of readiness.\(^{13}\)

**Peacemaking.** Peacemaking is a process of arranging an end to disputes, and resolving issues that led to conflict, primarily through diplomacy, mediation, negotiation, or other forms of peaceful settlement that may include military peace operations. Military activities that support peacemaking include military to military relations and security assistance operations. Peacetime deployments and show of force may also enhance the diplomatic process by demonstrating national support and commitment to the operation. These military activities serve to
influence important groups in the region of conflict and thereby promote a stable environment necessary for the success of diplomacy.\textsuperscript{14}

**Peace Building.** Peace building operations consist of post-conflict actions, primarily diplomatic that strengthen and/or rebuild the civil infrastructure and institutions in order to prevent a return to conflict. Military support to such operations include assistance in selected areas such as demobilization of former belligerents.\textsuperscript{15}

**Peacekeeping.** Peacekeeping, a component of peace operations, is frequently used to describe the entire broad range of peace operations. But, as the terms for an entire range of peace operations have developed, it is now inappropriate to do so. Peacekeeping (PK) involves noncombat military operations (exclusive of self-defense) that are undertaken by outside forces with the consent of all major belligerent parties. They are designed to monitor and facilitate implementation of an existing truce agreement in support of diplomatic efforts to reach a political settlement to the dispute.\textsuperscript{16}

**Peace Enforcement.** Peace enforcement (PE) involves the application of armed force or the threat of armed force, normally pursuant to an international mandate authorizing the coercive use of military power, to compel compliance with international sanctions or resolutions—the primary purpose of which is the maintenance or restoration of peace under conditions broadly defined by the international community. Peace enforcement operations may involve combat. Forces conducting peace enforcement operations may be involved in the forcible separation of belligerents, and may, at different times, be engaged in combat with one or all parties to the conflict.\textsuperscript{17}

The difference between peacekeeping and peace enforcement can be a source of confusion. Because both are part of peace operations, it is thought they are part of the peace continuum. There is a broad demarcation between these operations as they take place under vastly different circumstances involving consent, force, and impartiality. A force developed for peacekeeping may lack sufficient combat power for peace enforcement. Since these operations are different, any change in
mandate requires a careful review of the force to determine if it is properly tailored for the change in mission. 18

Operations Other Than War (OCTW). The primary focus of joint forces is to fight and win the nation's war. However, these forces find themselves in environments that may not involve combat. Joint forces have and continue to participate in operations other than war in support of national interests. Peace operations are one aspect of such operations. Operations other than war include, but are not limited to, the following activities: noncombatant evacuation, arms control, support to domestic civil authorities, humanitarian assistance and disaster relief, security assistance, nation assistance, support to counterdrug operations, combatting terrorism, support to insurgency and counterinsurgency, show of force, and attacks and raids. 19 Military operations other than war (MOOTW) is the joint term for these operations. 20 The terms will be used interchangeably in this thesis.

Low Intensity Conflict (LIC). Low intensity conflict is a politico-military confrontation between contending states or groups and above the routine, peacetime competition. It can involve protracted struggles of competing principles and ideologies. It ranges from subversion to the use of armed force. It is waged by employing a variety of means using political, economic, informational, and military instruments of power. As such, these conflicts are often localized usually in the Third World, but they can contain regional and global security implication. 21 Military operations in low intensity conflict are usually joint and are divided into four operational categories: support for insurgency and counterinsurgency, combatting terrorism, peace operations, and peace time contingency operations, such as counterdrug operations, attacks and raids. 22 Examples of low intensity conflict which use centers of gravity as a intrinsic part of the planning process are relevant to this thesis since this doctrine was the forerunner to that of operations other than war.

Stability Operations. Prior to the development of low intensity conflict doctrine, the U.S. Army had a doctrine for stability
operations. Stability operations is that type of internal defense or development operations and assistance provided by the Armed Forces to maintain, restore, or establish a climate of order within which responsible government can function effectively and without which no significant progress can be achieved by the nation or country. Examples of stability operations that use centers of gravity as a intrinsic part of the planning process are relevant to this thesis since this doctrine was the precursor for that of low intensity conflict and eventually operations other than war.

United Nations Charter and Peace Operations

Because peace operations are conducted frequently under a mandate of the Security Council of the United Nations, one must understand the origin of terms such as peacekeeping and peace enforcement and their relationship to such a mandate.

Chapters VI and VII of the U.N. Charter are the basis for mandates authorizing peace operations. While the terms peacekeeping and peace enforcement are frequently used with respect to U.N. authorized operations, neither term appears in the U.N. Charter. As a consequence, these terms have been applied retroactively to U.N. operations in a manner that can lead to confusion.

Traditional peacekeeping operations, with high levels of consent and strict impartiality, have normally been authorized through mandates invoking the provisions of Chapter VI of the charter, which discusses the pacific settlement of disputes. They are therefore often referred to as Chapter VI operations.

As the nature of conflict has changed, many operations exceeding the scope of traditional peacekeeping have been authorized. These operations are normally authorized by mandates citing Chapter VII of the Charter, entitled "Action with respect to threats to the peace, breaches of the peace and acts of aggression." Chapter VII operations are frequently referred to collectively as peace enforcement operations. The use of the term in this manner merits caution.

Because Chapter VII is so broad, including action with respect to acts of aggression, some operations authorized under its criteria, such
as the U.N. operations in Korea (1950-1953) and in Kuwait (1990-1991), are often and misleadingly referred to as peace enforcement operations when in fact they were "wars." Due to the essentially unrestricted nature of those operations, and the principles that governed them, they clearly fall outside the scope of the definition. The term peace enforcement has utility for military professionals only if it is recognized that although force may be used to compel, the use of that force is restrained and settlement, not victory, remains the objective.27

The U.N. Security Council

The Security Council is vested with the authority from the U.N. Charter to investigate any situation or conflict that threatens international peace and security. The Security Council will usually task the Secretary General to prepare a plan to deal with the crisis and will be the approving authority for that plan. The Security Council may either decide to take action or refer the matter to the U.N. General Assembly for consideration. Decisions of the Security Council are theoretically binding on all member states of the U.N.28

The U.N. Secretary General

The U.N. Secretary General is responsible to the Security Council for the organization, conduct and direction of U.N. peacekeeping operations. The office is, in effect, the Commander in Chief, responsible for conducting negotiations with the host nations, belligerents and contributing states; and for preparing the operational plan and presenting it to the Security Council for approval.29

The U.N. General Assembly

The General Assembly may consider any matter referred to it by the Security Council or may consider any other situation or conflict it feels impairs the general welfare or friendly relations among nations. The recommendations of the General Assembly are not binding on the Secretary General, the Security Council, or on its own members. Its powers in conflict resolution are not well defined. Although the fifteen members of the Security Council are also members of the General
Assembly, the other members do not vote on U.N. Security Council Resolutions (UNSCRs). Their support is solicited in the execution of resolutions and oftentimes nations will be polled prior to a Security Council vote to forecast supportability of a peace mission (funds and troops). Once support is received from General Assembly members, there is no formal process to maintain consensus during mission execution.\textsuperscript{30}

The U.N. Secretariat

The U.N. Secretariat is headed by the Secretary General and is the permanent organization responsible for the establishment, coordination, and administration of peace operations. Several departments of the secretariat are involved in peace operations and may interface directly with the Secretary General's Special Representative.

The Under-Secretary Generals are responsible to the Secretary General for policy concerns with respect to peacekeeping operations. The Under-Secretary General for Political Affairs is the political arm for matters involving the maintenance of peace and security and the control and resolution of conflicts within states. It advises on policy in those regions and is responsible for political research and analysis. It has the executive responsibility for preventive diplomacy and peacemaking to include negotiations.\textsuperscript{31}

The Under Secretary General for Peacekeeping Operations is responsible to the Secretary General for the day-to-day operational matters affecting peace operations. Under the Under-Secretary General for Peacekeeping Operations is the Military Advisor to the Secretary General as well as the Director, Field Operations Division who is responsible for logistical support of peace operations.\textsuperscript{32}

The Special Representative for the Secretary General (SRSG) is his political agent on the ground in theater. He will head the political mission and lead negotiations between the belligerents. The head of mission for the peace operation can either be the Special Representative or the designated Force Commander.\textsuperscript{33}

U.N. Security Council Resolution (UNSCR)

To intervene in a conflict, the Security Council directs the
Secretary General to investigate the crisis and to prepare a plan that deals with the conflict by creating a peace operation. The Security Council will normally pass an initial resolution calling for a cease fire and may appoint a special representative, an ambassador, and/or a mediator to be sent to the conflict area to report on the crisis. The Secretary General will then be responsible for informal negotiations and the preparation of a final mandate. Mandates are typically for a six-month period, causing the mission to be reviewed at time of expiration by the Security Council. The mandate is either renewed or ended based on mission progress.34

U.N. Mandates

Based on the direction the Secretary General receives from the Security Council, informal negotiations will commence. The Secretary General will approach the belligerents and draft a mutually acceptable and enforceable mandate which will also be acceptable to contributing members. The final product of these negotiations should be a viable mandate. From this mandate will be derived the role, mission, and tasks of the operation.

The Secretary General will submit a plan for the peace operation and a proposed mandate for approval by the Security Council. If the Security Council approves the plan and the mandate, it will formalize the mandate through passage of a Security Council resolution, and the Secretary General will then commence formal preparations. The mandate in the formal resolution provides the international legal authority for the operation. Accompanying the mandate is the budget plan that must also be accepted to ensure funding is provided for the operation.35

In conventional war, mandates given to military commanders are typically specific in goals and means. In peace operations, the nature and breadth of the mandate may vary substantially. The mandate may be quite narrow and specific in goals and means, or it may be quite vague. When the mandate is restrictive, the commander's freedom of action is reduced; when the mandate is broad, the commander has substantial freedom of action. Commanders must perform a careful mission analysis in order to interpret the mandate and develop a strategic concept.
United Task Force (UNITAF)

UNITAF was a U.S. led coalition consisting of a U.S. Joint Task Force (JTF) made up of Army, Navy, Marine and Air Force units, and forces from nineteen other nations. The countries contributing forces to UNITAF included: Australia, Botswana, Belgium, Canada, Egypt, France, Great Britain, Italy, Kuwait, Morocco, New Zealand, Nigeria, Pakistan, Saudi Arabia, Sweden, Tunisia, Turkey, United Arab Emirates, and Zimbabwe. The United States comprised the bulk of the forces (28,000 of UNITAF's 37,000 man force) and provided a homogeneous U.S. headquarters staff for UNITAF.

UNITAF possessed very potent command and control, communications, operations, and logistics capabilities. The U.S. Joint Task Force staff served as the theater level headquarters for the conduct of UNITAF operations in Somalia. The UNITAF command and control was enhanced by the composition of forces in the Humanitarian Relief Sectors (HRSs). With the exception of Morocco, the forces operating in the nine HRSs were either U.S. forces or nations with whom U.S. forces have long been allied with in NATO. The only humanitarian relief sector not occupied by a homogeneous force was Mogadishu, where a U.S. Marine headquarters had operational control of a number of small coalition units. As a result, a standard of uniformity existed throughout most of the UNITAF area of responsibility with respect to the conduct of military operations.36

United Nations Operation in Somalia, II (UNOSOM II)

At its peak in November 1993, UNOSOM II was a coalition force consisting of 29,732 soldiers from twenty-nine nations. The nations making up the coalition consisted of Australia (staff only), Bangladesh, Belgium, Botswana, Canada (staff only), Egypt, France, Germany, Greece, India, Ireland, Italy, Korea, Kuwait, Malaysia, Morocco, Nepal, New Zealand (staff only), Nigeria, Norway (Headquarters support only), Pakistan, Rumania, Saudi Arabia, Sweden, Turkey, Tunisia, United Arab Emirates, the United States, and Zimbabwe. The largest force contributors were India (approximately 5000), Pakistan (approximately 4500), the United States (approximately 4200, 1100 of which made up the
Quick Reaction Force) and Italy (approximately 2600). However, when UNOSOM II assumed control of the Somalia theater of operations on 4 May 1993, it was a coalition of only twenty-one nations with an approximate strength of 17,200 personnel.\textsuperscript{37}

**The United Nations Chain of Command for UNOSOM II**

United Nations-sponsored operations normally employ a force under a single Force Commander. The Force Commander is appointed by the Secretary General with the approval of the Security Council. The Force commander reports either to the Special Representative to the Secretary General or directly to the Secretary General (See Figure 1).\textsuperscript{38} Strategic level command and control for UNOSOM II extended from the Secretary General through the Special Representative to the Force Commander. The UNOSOM II Force Commander established operational and tactical control as the working command relationships for forces in Somalia.\textsuperscript{39} All national contingents were under the operational control of the Force Commander. He intended to exercise operational control authority of contingent forces through the brigade commanders in each area of responsibility (AOR). In practice, these command relationships and the UNOSOM II command and control structure proved ineffective. Some national contingents would simply not serve under the operational control of other contingent commanders. Instead, they would prefer to work "in coordination with" or "in cooperation with" other contingent forces.\textsuperscript{40}

The multinational character of United Nations peace operations warrant particular attention. National interests and organizational influence may compete with doctrine and efficiency as well as the objective for the mission. Consensus building is difficult and continuous, and solutions are often national in character. Commanders can expect contributing nations to adhere to national policies and priorities, which at times, can complicate the multinational effort.\textsuperscript{41}

The command relationship between UNOSOM II and the U.S. Quick Reaction Force (QRF) was prescribed by the Commander in Chief, U.S. Central Command (CINCCENT) and outlined in the Terms of Reference (TOR) for U.S. Forces in Somalia. The Quick Reaction Force, located in Somalia, was under
Figure 1. The United Nations Chain of Command for UNOSOM II. Source: General Montgomery, "U.S. Forces Somalia," Lecture delivered to the U.S. Army War College, 18 May 1994.

the operational control (OPCON) of CINCCENT. Tactical Control (TACON) of the Quick Reaction Force was delegated to Commander, USFOROSOM (Deputy Force Commander) for "normal training exercises within Somalia, ... and in situations within Somalia that exceed the capability of UNOSOM II forces and required the emergency employment of immediate combat power for a limited period or show of force operations."42 Any tasking for the QRF outside of these guidelines required explicit USCINCCENT approval. The terms of reference provided adequate flexibility for the UNOSOM II Deputy Force Commander to employ the QRF in emergency
situations. However, to conduct critical, yet non-emergency, combat operations which exceeded the capability of UNOSOM II forces, the terms of reference would prove to be quite inflexible.43

Other United Nations Organizations

The United Nations High Commission for Refugees (UNHCR) plays a major role in coordinating the aid to refugees, returnees, and displaced persons.44 In Somalia, the agency was charged with attempting to relocate the hundreds of thousands of Somali refugees who had displaced into neighboring African nations during the civil war. While coordination with UNOSOM was vital to the success of this operation, UNHCR was not accountable to the Special Representative of the Secretary General.

The United Nations Development Program (UNDP) promotes the incorporation of disaster mitigation in development planning and funds technical assistance for all aspects of disaster management. The agency's work is long range because many of its programs focus investment at the re-establishment of critical infrastructure.45 In Somalia, UNDP was charged with port repair as well as repair of key government buildings. Again, though United Nations Development Program success was tied to coordination with UNOSOM, it acted independent from the control of the Special Representative of the Secretary General.

The World Food Program (WFP) is a relief agency that provides targeted food aid and supports rehabilitation and reconstruction of agricultural systems in starvation plagued nations.46 In Somalia, this was one of many agencies attempting to bring relief to the starving masses. While the agency coordinated for security support with UNOSOM II, it acted independently from the Special Representative of the Secretary General in providing aid to the nation.

Independent Aid Agencies

Private voluntary organizations (PVO) and nongovernment organizations (NGO) can be found in a theater where relief operations are needed. There are hundreds of such agencies capable of conducting humanitarian relief operations. While their support can provide legitimacy to the peace operation, these agencies act independently from
the United Nations effort. Therefore, it is unlikely that interaction between agencies will occur within the nation that needs assistance unless it is to the mutual benefit of both parties.47

U.S. Forces Somalia

The mission of U.S. Forces Somalia (USFORSOM) was defined by the Terms of Reference (TOR) for U.S. Forces Somalia, dated April 1993, and Central Command Operations Order (CENTCOM OPORD) Serial 001 (Operations

![U.S. Forces Somalia Structure Diagram](image)


CONTINUE HOPE). The CENTCOM OPORD directed COMUSFORCOSOM to support UNOSOM II in implementing the provisions of UNSCR 814, in accordance
with the U.S. and U.N. Terms of Reference. USFORSOM was to provide a Deputy Force Commander, selected headquarters staff personnel, limited combat support, service support, intelligence, and a quick reaction force. The Terms of Reference constituted an agreement between the Commander in Chief, U.S. Central Command (USCENTCOM) and the Commander, United Nations Operation in Somalia (UNOSOM II) for staffing, organization, and operation of U.S. Forces, Somalia. Under the Terms of Reference, USFORSOM was to perform duties as assigned by USCENTCOM and Commander, UNOSOM II, pursuant to UNSCR 814.

Logistics Support Command (LSC) and the CENTCOM Intelligence Support Element (CISE) provided the backbone of UNOSOM II's logistics and intelligence capability respectively until they departed theater in January and March 1994 (See Figure 2). The Logistics Support Command served as the theater level general support unit for UNOSOM II and assumed an additional mission to provide direct support for the many national contingents which deployed to Somalia without organic logistics support assets. U.S. transportation units provided UNOSOM II both its long haul and local transportation capability. Until the arrival of the Irish Truck Company in August 1993, Logistics Support Command was the only source of transportation assets in theater. The same was true for engineer capability. The engineer company assigned to Logistics Support Command was the only engineer force in theater available to maintain UNOSOM II's vital lines of communications and outlying airfields until the arrival of the Korean Engineer Squadron (company) in July 1993. The U.N. Logistics Support Command staff was also the pocket staff for USFORSOM. However, because many members did not arrive in theater until after hostilities commenced, tactical operations involving the U.S. Quick Reaction Force were handled directly between the brigade staff and UNOSOM U3, a U.S. Colonel and his UNOSOM U3 planning staff composed primarily of U.S. officers.

The CENTCOM Intelligence Support Element provided the only source for intelligence collection management and production in the theater of operations. It was in direct support to USFORSOM and, unlike Logistics Support Command, whose functions have been completely assumed by civilian contractors, a small residual cell remained in theater with
the U.S. Liaison Office and UNOSOM II after withdrawal of U.S. forces in March 1994.51

The Quick Reaction Force (See Figure 2) provided U.S. combat capability for rapid response in support of the Commander, UNOSOM II to counter specific threats that exceeded the capability of UNOSOM II units. The unique capabilities of this force made it an essential part of most operations conducted by UNOSOM II forces in Mogadishu. While the ground force usually was held in reserve, except when the mission was otherwise approved by CINCENT, U.N. forces came to rely heavily on QRF attack aviation assets. The Quick Reaction Force's attack helicopters provided an instant force multiplier to all coalition ground operations. In effect, the existence of the U.S. Quick Reaction Force served to give the coalition confidence.52

Somalia Clan and Political Organizations
United Somali Congress/Somali National Alliance (USC/SNA)

The USC/SNA is one of the most powerful factions in Somalia. Situated predominantly in the Central region of Somalia, it retained influence over seventy percent of Mogadishu (concentrated in the southern and western areas of the city). Strength estimates of militia ranged from 5,000 to 10,000 personnel throughout the USC/SNA area of influence (about 1500 in the Mogadishu area). Weapons systems available to the USC/SNA included mortars, recoilless rifles, and possibly artillery and armored vehicles. During the initial intervention by international forces under the control of UNITAF, USC/SNA elements may have been involved in hostile fire situations with UNITAF troops. (This is based on the locations of the incidents and the dominance of the faction in the area.)

From March 1993 to May 1993, the USC/SNA did not commit to the peace agreements reached in Addis Ababa. Although the USC/SNA agreed to the voluntary cantonment of heavy weapons, it never submitted any figures to either UNITAF or UNOSOM II for verification. As a result of the ambush of U.N. peacekeepers in Mogadishu on 5 June 1993, the USC/SNA became involved in combat operations against United Nations forces in Somalia. The Habr Gedir Clan is the primary clan aligned with the
USC/SNA. The political parties were often aligned along clan lines and the association of USC/SNA and the Haber Gedir clan is significant. Mr. Aideed was not only head of the USC/SNA but he was nominally head of the Habr Gedir clan from which he derived his militia power base.53

Key figures in the USC/SNA:

Mohamed Farrah Hassan Aideed. Aideed is the Chairman of the political arm and certainly served as its sole militia leader. Aideed had directed militia operations since the civil war with Siad Barre. He was considered anti-U.N. and is an extremely proficient political and media manipulator. He consistently emphasized the same political agenda after the introduction of U.N. troops in August 1992. His ultimate goal was to force the withdrawal of U.N. forces and position himself as the dominant leader in Somalia.54

Osman Hassan Ali Atto. Atto was considered the second most powerful and influential man in the USC/SNA. He had acted as Aideed's personal envoy and was considered one of the prime candidates to eventually succeed Aideed in the position of Chairman. A wealthy man, Atto had bankrolled the militia for Aideed for some time. During the period March through May 1993, Atto was believed to be financing the militia and bandits in the Kismayo area, where Aideed was attempting to regain lost influence. Following the ambush of the Pakistanis on 5 June 1993, U.S. forces, in support of UNOSOM II Force Command, conducted an attack against Atto's garage in South Mogadishu. The attack resulted in many secondary explosions and fires, confirming the presence of large quantities of munitions on the property and providing further evidence of Atto's role as an SNA arms supplier. During a security operation conducted in September 1993, Atto was captured by members of U.S. Task Force Ranger.55

Somali Patriotic Movement/Somali National Alliance (SPM/SNA)

The SPM/SNA is a political faction closely aligned with the USC/SNA. Primarily operating in the Lower Juba area in the southern part of Somalia with a strength of approximately 2000, the SPM/SNA had been involved in every major inter-clan/faction conflict occurring in the Kismayo area. During the UNITAF period, the SPM/SNA controlled the
town and immediate area around the port city of Kismayo. After the initial Addis Ababa conferences in January 1993, fighting erupted in the Kismayo area between the SPM/SNA and elements associated with SPM (Gabio), led by General Morgan. This fighting continued intermittently until mid-March, when an assault on the town resulted in the SPM/SNA losing its foothold in the Kismayo area and being forced north towards Jilib and the entrance to the Lower Juba River Valley. The primary clan aligned with the SPM/SNA is the Ogadeni subclan of the Darod.

Key figure in the SPM/SNA: Ahmed Omar Jess. Omar Jess served as the field commander of the SPM/SNA and the Chairman of the political arm of the faction. He suffered a major setback when the SPM/SNA lost control of Kismayo to his long-time rival Morgan. Jess had been considered anti-UNOSOM II and remained a destabilizing influence in the Lower Juba area. Jess also openly supported Aideed during combat operations in Mogadishu in the June to October 1993 timeframe.56

Somali Patriotic Movement-Gabio (SPM-Gabio). SPM-Gabio is one of three splinter groups which comprise SPM. Primarily located in the southern areas of Somalia, SPM is affiliated with the former government of Siad Barre. Notably, its leadership includes Mohamed Siad Hersi "Morgan," the former dictator's son-in-law. SPM-Gabio activities appeared to concentrate around Kismayo, and were primarily oriented on maintaining control of the Lower Juba's critical economic infrastructure. SPM-Gabio, through the activities of Morgan, did not appear directed against UNOSOM II. However, the militia actions seemed to be an attempt to leverage UN force disposition and policy. Primarily Ogadeni in make-up, SPM-Gabio was a threat to regional stability in the south.

Key figure in SPM-Gabio:

Mohamed Siad Hersi Morgan. Morgan is a charismatic leader of the SPM who is an arch-rival of the other SPM principal military leader, Omar Jess. Having held major command in the former Somali National Army, Morgan is most remembered for his infamous assault on Hargeisa in the 80's. Pro-western in personal and professional style, Morgan attempted to leverage UN troops and to position forces in the southern regions to benefit his faction. In early 1993, Morgan
conducted assaults against Jess's positions in Kismayo, ultimately forcing Jess to evacuate to the Jilib area. During combat operations in Mogadishu between USC/SNA and UNOSOM II, Morgan made limited forays into Jilib and the Lower Juba Valley to consolidate his position in Kismayo.57

**Literature Review**

Prior to examining potential centers of gravity, it is necessary to fully understand the doctrine pertaining to peace operations and the principles which govern them. The principles will provide insight to potential abstract decisive points and/or centers of gravity. The review of literature will further demonstrate the requirement for a peace operations force to identify its friendly centers of gravity in the planning process and establish measures to secure them.

The USFORSAM After Action Report (AAR) has an appendix on the respective centers of gravity of both UNOSOM II and the hostile militia forces. However, the after action report does not provide a thorough examination of the cause and effect of hostile actions on UNOSOM II; nor does it review the policy decisions at governmental levels and at U.N. headquarters New York that impacted on the operational and strategic centers of gravity.58 The after action report does describe what Force Command initially articulated as being its own friendly center of gravity during the campaign. This is a doctrinal requirement in campaign planning. A commander must identify and protect his own center of gravity from attack while attempting to defeat his foe's. This published UNOSOM II center of gravity will be examined for validity. Should UNOSOM II's assessment be correct, then its failure to protect this designated center of gravity will be investigated.

The U.S. doctrine for peace operations is contained in several manuals. The importance of developing and defending centers of gravity, however, begins with both the Joint and Army keystone manuals on operations.

U.S. Joint Publication 1, *Joint Warfare of the United States Armed Forces*, states that the joint campaign supports the national strategic goals and serves as the unifying focus of the conduct of the
war. To be successful, the joint campaign orients on the enemy's strategic and operational centers of gravity. However, knowledge of self is also required for effective joint operations. The first priority is to have a full and frank appreciation for the capabilities and limitations of all friendly forces. While the concept for a center of gravity assists the joint force commander and staffs in focusing their resources against the enemy it prompts the staff to also identify friendly centers of gravity and apply appropriate resources to protect these from enemy assault.

U.S. Army Field Manual (FM) 100-5, Operations, also recognizes this requirement to protect one's own friendly center of gravity for the center of gravity is the:

Characteristic, capability, or location from which enemy and friendly forces derive their freedom of action, physical strength, or will to fight...the concept of a center of gravity is useful as an analytical tool to cause the joint commander and his staff to think about their own and the enemy's sources of strength as they design their campaign and determine objectives.

FM 100-5 also recognizes the requirement to conduct operations other than war to include peace operations. To assist in the identification of decisive points and/or centers of gravity, the military planner should be familiar with the principles for operations other than war. The FM 100-5 outlines these principles:

Objective guides every military operation toward a clearly defined, decisive, and attainable objective. Leaders must understand the strategic aims, set appropriate objectives, and ensure they contribute to the unity of effort with other agencies.

Unity of effort must be sought for every objective. It is similar to the principle of war, unity of command. However, in operations other than war, other agencies or organizations may have the lead. Command arrangements may be loosely defined, causing commanders to seek an atmosphere of cooperation rather than command authority to achieve objectives by unity of effort.

Legitimacy sustains the willing acceptance by the people of the right of the government to govern or of a group or agency to make and execute decisions. It derives from the perception that constituted
authority is both genuine and effective and employs appropriate means for reasonable purposes.

**Perseverance** prepares for the measured, protracted application of military capability in support of strategic aims. Operations other than war are often of long duration and may undergo a number of shifts in direction during the course. Commanders must balance their aim to attain objectives quickly with the sensitivity for the long term strategic goals of the operation.

**Restraint** is the application of appropriate military capability prudently. Rules of engagement will be more restrictive, detailed, and sensitive to political considerations than those of war.

**Security** never permits hostile factions to acquire an unexpected advantage. Commanders must protect their forces at all times. They should never be lulled into believing that the non-hostile intent of their mission does not put their forces at risk. The intrinsic right of self-defense always applies.

The key is to protect the force and yet maintain legitimacy. Levels of restraint in retaliation for an attack on one’s force has to be measured carefully. While one may not necessarily pursue a belligerent’s center of gravity following an attack, the commander must continually protect his own.

FM 100-5 cautions that “for those operations other than war that involve our forces in direct combat, the principles of war apply.” Included in this is the consideration for centers of gravity. There are also other principles which guide our actions in these type operations:

The U.S. Army FM 100-23, *Peace Operations*, applies the principles found in FM 100-5 to peace operations. A clearly defined and attainable **objective** with definitions for success and failure is required for military commanders in peace operations. A mandate normally sets forth the objective and is approved by a competent authorizing organization like the United Nations or the U.S. Government. The mandate should express the political objective and the desired end state. Military commanders with unclear mandates should take the initiative to redefine, refine, or restate the mandate for consideration by higher authority.
Unity of effort is sought in peace operations with a wide range of national and international organizations. It must be understood that other governmental or civilian agencies may have the lead. While commanders will retain unity of command within their contingents, they may answer to another coalition commander, a civilian chief, or themselves employ the resources of civilian agencies. Inherent to success, commanders must ensure their activities are coherent with other agencies involved. Whenever possible, they should attempt to establish a civil-military operations center that accounts for and provides coherence to the activities of all elements in the area of operations.

Legitimacy requires a need to sustain acceptance of the operation and of the host government over the course of the operation. In operations where a government does not exist, care must be taken to avoid the inadvertent legitimization of a group or organization until a host government is formed. In peacekeeping, impartiality is critical to success. Belligerents may insist that the peace force contain elements from nations that are mutually acceptable and geographically balanced in terms of regional and political affiliation. In peace enforcement, impartiality and legitimacy may be harder to obtain and sustain, and the balance of the peace force may be less critical.

Perseverance requires a long term commitment that involves more than military effort. Underlying causes for conflict rarely have a decisive resolution and require patience and a need to define success in untraditional terms. An information strategy is needed that clearly explains the goals and desired end states and links them with U.S. interests and concerns. Long term commitment must be emphasized without giving the impression of permanency.

Restraint applies appropriate military capability prudently in accordance with prescribed rules of engagement. In peacekeeping, force will be used only in self-defense or in defense of the mandate from interference. In peace enforcement, the use of force may be used to coerce. The use of force should be clear and unambiguous in the mandate. In peace enforcement, the goal is to produce conditions conducive to peace and not the destruction of an enemy. The enemy is
conflict itself. However, should force be used, it should be precise and overwhelming to minimize friendly and noncombatant casualties.

**Security** deals with force protection as a dynamic of combat power against any person or hostile element. Commanders should be ready to prevent or preempt any action that could bring harm to units or jeopardize mission accomplishment. Security can be enhanced when linked to force legitimacy and impartiality. Effective public affairs and psychological operations and civil-military programs can assist in this effort. Security often extends beyond one's own forces to civil agencies and nongovernmental agencies as well.

FM 100-23 differentiates between the types of peace operations and provides cautions for the use of force in each. In peace enforcement operations, armed action may escalate tensions and embroil the peacekeepers in a long-term conflict that is in opposition to its original aims and objectives. Commanders should seek to de-escalate an incident or crisis and use mediation and negotiation as a means for de-escalation at the lowest levels. FM 100-23 suggests that development of a campaign plan is essential for linking the mission to the end state. Peace operations tend to unfold incrementally, and planners should lay out a definable path to the end state. The manual prescribes planning guidelines in preparation to commitment of forces, among these is the identification of friendly and belligerent parties' centers of gravity. This may be attributed to the emphasis the doctrine places on disengagement. It cautions that peace enforcement forces should plan to exit the area when the mission transitions to peacekeeping for the application of force will most certainly prejudice the acceptability of the peace enforcement forces.66

U.S. Joint Publication 3-07.3, *Joint Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures for Peacekeeping Operations*, does not specify the need to identify centers of gravity. However, it does stress intelligence and counterintelligence operations as a principal means for force protection. Threat capabilities are usually the primary consideration in determining information requirements. Much of the information gathering effort must be directed toward civilian populations, sympathizers, and terrorist groups and their supporters. The
intelligence effort must decide what specific information is required in order to avoid surprise and the execution of offensive actions against the peacekeeping force.67

As a precursor to peace operations doctrine, the Army's doctrine on low-intensity conflict served an umbrella for all operations short of war. FM 100-20, Military Operations in Low Intensity Conflict, describes peacemaking (enforcement) as a part of peacetime contingency operations. Such operations involve three principles:68

**Coordination** is military force cooperation with other government and private agencies to manage sensitive situations.

**Balance** requires the military commander to equalize the need for specialized training of its forces with the political awareness of the chain of command. The military commander must insist on clearly stated military objectives and operational framework in order to balance military operations and force security with the political goals of the mission. Constraints must be clearly defined, which is typically found in the rules of engagement.

**Planning for uncertainty** is the requirement for detailed but flexible planning, incorporating the principles of coordination and balance. This concept stresses the importance of a thorough logistics and intelligence estimate.

FM 100-20 outlines operational planning considerations for low-intensity conflict. The military planner's first step is to determine the desired end state or goal of the campaign. What does the nation want accomplished and what conditions constitute success? It is quickly followed by the second question: What is the enemy's/insurgent's objective and how can it be countered; what is his center of gravity? Identifying insurgent or belligerent objectives is addressed in a later annex on how to analyze an insurgency or counterinsurgency. The manual does not discuss how to identify the foe's center of gravity in order that the elements of national power and allied cooperation can be synchronized against it. FM 100-20 discusses requirements for force protection and emphasizes the need for leadership to take positive actions in this regard. But it does not mention a requirement to identify one's own center of gravity and safeguard it from attack.69
In addition to U.S. Joint and Army doctrine, there are several works that signify the need for the identification of centers of gravity in operations other than war. Some of the references also provide clues to the identification of friendly centers of gravity. In their article "Small Wars and Insurgencies," Max G. Manwaring and John T. Fishel review over 43 post-World War II conflicts and identified common factors (involving either the U.S. or other Western powers) that appear to provide a direction for ensuring a reasonable chance of success in controlling insurgencies. These factors provide the conceptual framework or principles from which future doctrine, strategy or tactics might be formulated. Their analysis incorporates considerations for centers of gravity. In the case of friendly centers of gravity, data indicates that the principle or dimension of legitimacy is one of "the most important internal dimensions of war against subversion. . . . Legitimacy for the incumbent regime is the primary target-the center of gravity-as far as the insurgent is concerned." Other key principles mentioned that can assist in the identification of friendly centers of gravity were those of unity of effort, objective, and consistency of support to the government by intervening or allied nations. The principles of unity of effort and objective relate to the Clausewitz theory where all effort must be focused on a single, common goal. In an insurgency, the incumbent government must focus its resources on survival, thereby focusing effort against those who would bring down the nation by extra-legal means. The incumbent government must develop unity of effort in its internal agencies to resolve the score of problems (economic, sociological, psychological, and military) endemic to an insurgency. Manwaring and Fishel caution that when military power is introduced it should be done overwhelmingly. Their analysis of past conflicts indicates that piecemeal employment of force in reaction to political or previous military failures proves ineffective. Support to the incumbent government from intervening powers must be consistent. If the government has outlined and enforced unity of effort internally, then economic, political, military or psychological support provided by intervening nations must be applied to see the
effort through. The authors' analysis demonstrates that when withdrawal or inconsistent application of needed support occurs, the chances of success in counterinsurgency are greatly reduced.\textsuperscript{73}

Murl D. Munger and William W. Mendel also call for the need to identify centers of gravity and decisive points in their work \textit{Campaign Planning and the Drug War}. This work appears to be an extension of Mendel's earlier study on campaign planning, but he now applies the same principles to operations other than war. The purpose of the campaign plan is to translate strategic intent into an operational focus, to include a vision of the end state desired. Both the strategic and operational campaign plans must focus on the enemy's center of gravity to put him at a disadvantage and take away his ability or will to continue his own operations.\textsuperscript{74} In addition to identifying the correct centers of gravity or decisive points, the campaign plan is vital in its ability to synchronize the efforts of all agencies involved to achieve a "synergistic effect in attacking the center of gravity . . . such synchronization enjoins unity of effort, the prerequisite for success."\textsuperscript{75}

The relevance of identifying and attacking centers of gravity in low intensity conflict is further illustrated by Harry G. Summers, Jr. in his book \textit{On Strategy, A Critical Analysis of the Vietnam War}. In his analysis of the Vietnam conflict, Summers reviews Clausewitz's concept on the center of gravity and ascribes to the operational process for identifying the campaign objective. Relevancy for using the center of gravity in operations that span the range of low-to-mid-intensity conflict are developed in his analysis. In his analysis of stability operations, Summers postulates that the U.S. Army, at the time, treated guerrilla warfare as an adjunct to normal conventional war. As such, guerrilla warfare could be dealt with using conventional principles of war to include the concept of attacking the enemy's center of gravity and protecting one's own.\textsuperscript{76}

\textbf{Summary of Literature Review}

Peace enforcement operations by their very nature have the tendency to escalate into low-intensity operations should the legitimacy of the peace force be challenged by one of the belligerents. It then
becomes necessary to review the validity and consensus for the peace operation. Should it be determined that the mission is still required and fully supported by the contributing nations, then serious consideration must be given to the centers of gravity of the hostile belligerents and the peace force. After this analysis is completed, a decision to escalate or de-escalate the use of force must be made. Protection of one's own center of gravity is required regardless of the decision.

**Methodology**

"Theory should cast a steady light on all phenomena so that we can more easily recognize and eliminate the weeds that always spring from ignorance; it should show how one thing is related to another and keep the important and unimportant separate." This thesis will identify decisive points and show how these are inter-related to reveal the centers of gravity of UNOSOM II.

Although examples are given, a formal identification process for a center of gravity is not addressed in our doctrine. No template or checklist is provided to the operational planner. The procedure appears to be more the art than the science of war. The identification of a strategic or operational center of gravity is quite difficult and the military staff officer is often guided by intuition.

If a true center of gravity is to be identified, logic should guide the planner's analysis on the critical "relationships between the concept of operational art and the application of the military element of power for strategic purposes." In their article, "Operational Logic: Selecting the Center of Gravity," William W. Mendel and Lamar Tooke emphasize that planning must be top down driven beginning at the strategic level. At the strategic level, the political, economic, and military goals as well as other national aims and objectives are defined. The skillful translation of political direction into achievable strategic military goals is the basis for determination of the enemy's strategic center of gravity. Once identified, the national military strategy sets the fundamental conditions for the campaign by setting goals, applying resources, and imposing constraints."
Strategic and operational centers of gravity do not exist in isolation from the national and military strategic aims established for the conduct of a war. While they are dynamic and may change over the course of the campaign, they remain linked to the political aims of the nation or alliance. Understanding this relationship will allow the development of a selection process that can be used by the strategic planner. The process is based on two principles:

1. Centers of gravity are derivatives of the aims and objectives established at the level for which you are planning.

2. Aims/objectives established at the operational and tactical levels should contribute to one's ability to impose one's will over the center of gravity at the next higher level of war.

In application of this methodology, each potential center of gravity must be tested against the following criteria: Will imposition of power over this potential center of gravity create a cascading, deteriorating effect on the morale, cohesion and will to fight that prevents the enemy from achieving his aims and allows the achievement of one's own? If the action will accomplish this end, then are the means available to impose sufficient power against that center of gravity (See Figure 3)?

If the proposed center of gravity does not pass this first test; then the military planner should consider other potential strengths of the enemy until one is found that meets the criteria. Lacking the force to impose one's will over the center of gravity requires an adjustment of the strategy or its aims. In adjusting the strategy, decisive points may have to be attacked that will eventually make the center of gravity vulnerable to attack. If decisive points are not assailable, then the strategic aims of the campaign must be adjusted with ones that are feasible - ends must be aligned with the means. Figure 3 diagrams this selection process.

In Somalia, the power of the belligerents was insufficient to directly maneuver against and attack the coalition of United Nations forces. As the history of the campaign is reviewed, it will be seen that militia leaders attacked decisive points that eventually led to a weakening of UNOSOM II's centers of gravity.
To assist in the identification of decisive points and ultimately the centers of gravity of past campaigns, Walter Vanderbeek developed,

- Deteriorating Effect
- Prevent Foe's achievement of Aims
- Allows own success

![Operational Logic](image)


in his 1988 monograph, a four-point process which identifies fundamental characteristics that can aid the planner in his search. He concluded:

1. Decisive points are highly diversified and dynamic in nature - the point can either be abstract or objective and it can change over the course of the campaign;
2. Decisive points are theoretically and operationally linked to the opponent's center of gravity, for when they are controlled and exploited by friendly forces they offer the opportunity to
disrupt, damage, or destroy the opponent's center of gravity;
3. Geographic decisive points will appear more frequently than
those of maneuver since points of maneuver are more difficult to
predict and exploit due to their transitory nature;
4. The most effective decisive points are ones that
incorporate features of both geography and maneuver.81

Once decisive points are identified, the planner must then
determine the best means to attack the points in order to produce the
desired results. He must also determine the priority in which to attack
them. Historical examples provided in the monograph suggest that the
best effects were achieved when forces composing the friendly center of
gravity (friendly force's center of strength) were employed against the
opposing force's vulnerability. That is to attack the enemy's weakness
with your strength.82

To discover UNOSOM II's centers of gravity, this thesis will
"peel the onion" back and in so doing review key military engagements
between opposing forces as they occurred in the theater of operations.
This thesis will focus on actions taken by the hostile militia during
their campaign against UNOSOM II. It will review these actions to
determine if these meet the characteristics of a decisive point.
Determination will be dependent on the effects each confrontation had on
U.N. forces. Other elements of power will also be examined as they
pertain to the campaign to discern if these impacted on the decisive
points.

In order to link the decisive points to centers of gravity, a
matrix will be developed to conduct a layered analysis similar to the
technique outlined by Eliot A. Cohen and John Gooch in their work
Military Misfortunes which critiqued military failures. Cohen and Gooch
link outcomes with critical tasks across the different levels of
organization to determine the cause of failure.83 Their matrix can be
adapted to an examination of decisive points. Outcomes of the military
encounters will be examined against the different levels of UNOSOM II's
organization and command structure. An attack of decisive points can
have varying effects on the different echelons of the organization, and
tactical engagements can have effects at the strategic level. Once a
decisive point has been identified, linkage to the center of gravity
will be made using Mendel's model.
The final procedure will:

1. Describe the action (attack of a decisive point);
2. Identify the level(s) of organization and command affected;
3. Verify the characteristics of the target as being a decisive point;
4. List possible operational and strategic centers of gravity based on these affects;
5. Analyze the degree that the action deteriorated the morale, cohesion, will to fight or ability of UNOSOM to achieve its aims;
6. Identify a trend that indicates the actual centers of gravity, both operational and strategic; and
7. Test the result using the Mendel/Tooke model.

**Thesis Limitations**

The thesis will limit its search and analysis to the effects or reactions military engagements had upon UNOSOM II forces. Since interviews with the military leadership of the hostile clan forces are unavailable, only documented effects of the attacks on U.N. forces will be reviewed without further knowledge of the clan's aim and/or objective for each attack. By reviewing the effects of the clan attacks, this thesis will identify the engagement of decisive points and in turn link these to common centers of gravity. Offensive attacks by U.N. forces will also be examined to study the reaction of the hostile clan forces. Centers of gravity must be attainable. However, when an enemy is clearly superior, as in the case of UNOSOM II forces, then decisive points must be engaged where the enemy is most vulnerable. This holds true for offensive and defensive operations. Clan defensive reactions to UNOSOM II operations may reveal additional decisive points through which UNOSOM II's centers of gravity could be attacked.

**Thesis Delimitations**

There is no attempt in this thesis to criticize or second guess the decisions of commanders in the field. The analysis in this thesis benefits from "looking in hindsight," and many situations that occurred can only be understood after the fact. The sole aim of the thesis is to
discover the friendly centers of gravity in order that future endeavors may be successful.

**Summary**

This thesis cannot equip the mind with formulas for solving problems, nor can it mark the narrow path on which sole solution is supposed to lie by planting a hedge of principles on either side. But it can give the mind insight into the great mass of phenomena and their relationships, then leave it free to rise into the higher realms of action... to seize on what is "right" and "true" as though this were a single idea formed by their concentrated pressure.\(^{84}\)

With this in mind, this thesis will now attempt to "peel the onion."
Endnotes


3Ibid., vi.


5Ibid., 652.


10Walter A. Vanderbeek, "The Decisive Point: The Key to Victory" (Monograph, School of Advanced Military Studies, U.S Army Command and General Staff College, 1988), 8.


13Ibid., 2.

14Ibid.

15Ibid.

16Ibid., 4.

17Ibid., 6.
18Ibid., 12.


26Ibid., 75.


29Ibid., 61 to 62.

30Ibid., 62.

31Ibid., 62 to 63.

32Ibid., 63.

33Ibid., 64.

34Ibid.

35Ibid.

37Ibid.


39Operational Control was interpreted at the time as having the authority to perform those functions of command over subordinate forces involving organizing and employing commands and forces, assigning tasks, designating objectives, and giving authoritative direction necessary to accomplish the mission. Task organization was required of battalion or smaller sized units under coalition brigade headquarters in the Humanitarian Relief Sectors. This was accomplished in theater, or diplomatically after submitting a formal request to the host government through U.N. Headquarters in New York. The Moroccan Contingent Commander agreed to OPCON of his battalion to the French Brigade Headquarters only after the Headquarters was renamed the Baidoa Brigade for obvious political reasons. Brigade headquarters were likewise OPCON to UNOSOM II Force Headquarters. Tactical control was never released by the host governments over their forces even for a limited time or duration. Tactical control is the detailed and usually local direction and control of movements or maneuvers necessary to accomplish assigned missions or tasks. U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff, Joint Publication 0-2, Unified Action Armed Forces (UNAARP) (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1994), III-10 to III-12.


42Terms of Reference (TOR) for U.S. Forces Somalia, dated April 1993.

43Ibid.


45Ibid., 83.

46Ibid.

47Ibid., 83 to 84.

48Terms of Reference (TOR) for U.S. Forces Somalia, dated April 1993.


Ibid., 18 to 19.

Ibid., 2-6.

Ibid., 2-6 to 2-7.

Ibid., 2-7.

Ibid.

Ibid., 2-9.


Ibid., 32.

Ibid., 34.


Ibid., 13-3.


Ibid., 33 and 98.


69Ibid., 1-9.


71Ibid., 285.

72Ibid. 286 to 287.

73Ibid., 285.


75Ibid.; 53.

76Ibid., 111.


79Ibid.

80Ibid., 5.


82Ibid., 37.


CHAPTER TWO

REVIEW AND ANALYSIS OF UNOSOM II OPERATIONS - PART ONE

**General**

The purpose of this section is to document and analyze events that affected U.N. operations in order to identify potential decisive points. It will review the effects of the clan attacks and thus identify the engagement of decisive points. In Chapter 5, this thesis will link these engagements of decisive points to common centers of gravity. Centers of gravity must be attainable. However, when an enemy is clearly superior, as in the case of UNOSOM II forces, then decisive points must be engaged where the enemy is most vulnerable. This holds true for offensive and defensive operations. The analysis will, therefore, examine offensive attacks by U.N. forces in order to study the reaction of the hostile clan forces. Clan defensive reactions to UNOSOM II operations may reveal additional decisive points through which UNOSOM II's centers of gravity were attacked. The span of events examined is limited. This thesis will only examine events that occurred from May through October 1993 (the time of transition between UNITAF and UNOSOM II until the decision to withdraw was made by the major western powers participating in the coalition of forces).

The USFORSOM After Action Report categorized its operations into five periods (See Figure 4). This thesis will use the same periods in which to categorize the key events that affect decisive points. The five periods are:


2. Reception and Consolidation. Events during the first thirty days of UNOSOM II's mission ending with the 5 June ambush of UNOSOM II peacekeepers by hostile militia forces.

3. Combat Operations. Events from 6 June through the arrival of
the U.S. Army Task Force Ranger in August 1993.

4. The Search for Aideed. The August through October 1993 period, including the Task Force Ranger assault on the Olympic Hotel on 3 October.

![U.N. Force Command in Review](image)


5. Strategic Reset. A period covering the cessation of combat operations in October 1993 to the departure of the first Force Commander on 20 January 1994.1

**Transition (February - May 1993)**

Though there were no attacks during this period (See Figure 4), it is important to understand certain planning considerations in place.
at the time of transition. Understanding the environment leading to transition will provide a better understanding of the effect hostilities had on UNOSOM II.

The Force Commander and Deputy Force Commander arrived in Mogadishu on 8 and 9 March 1993 respectively. During Lieutenant General Bir's earlier visit on 22 February, there were a series of violent riots in Mogadishu as a result of the defeat of forces belonging to Omar Jess (a lieutenant of Aideed) in Kismayo. No UNITAF casualties resulted, but the magnitude and violence of the crowds gave warning that a strong force in Mogadishu would be required following the departure of UNITAF.²

During the first month in theater, the Force Commander identified several concerns to the Special Representative to the Secretary General
(SRSG). One of the primary concerns was the degree to which UNOSOM II could maintain pressure on the warlords to continue the political reconciliation process. To that end, the Force Commander and his staff wanted to establish a seamless transition with UNITAF and be well postured to handle any testing which might occur after UNOSOM II's assumption of the mission.3

As Force Command entered into April, certain planning imperatives were recognized and formed the basis of transition planning. These imperatives included: a seamless transition; establishing the transition from UNITAF as a blueprint for Chapter VII operations; developing plans for worse case scenarios; maintaining the same degree of pressure on militia as had UNITAF; employing the force in theater to support future operations; keeping disarmament and ceasefire operations as a priority; identifying force multipliers and requesting them from U.N. New York.4

The end state desired by Force Command leadership was a coordinated turnover of mission responsibility from UNITAF that was event driven versus calendar driven.5 It was felt that if planning could be accomplished in parallel with the civilian agencies of UNOSOM II, then a blueprint for future Chapter VII operations could be realized. Further, a seamless transition would ultimately achieve the requisite secure environment which would allow UNOSOM II to begin expanding to fulfill its mandate.

UNITAF and UNOSOM II transition planning focused priority on transferring control of the Humanitarian Relief Sectors (HRSs) from UNITAF forces to UNOSOM II. Operational concerns during these discussions were the time lines involved with transitioning operational control (OPCON) of forces to the U.N. and the posturing of the force for future operations (expansion). Command intent was to change command simultaneously (Force Command Headquarters and all HRSs). At this time, the anticipated changeover date was between 7 and 15 May 1993.6

The changeover and redeployment time lines were linked to several factors not controlled by the two commands. First, UNOSOM II could not assume control of the mission until it had a fully functional staff, capable of complete command and control within the theater of operations. Manning the headquarters was completely dependent on the
timely passing of a U.N. resolution which provided both the mandate and authority to expend resources, including additional staff. This did not occur until 26 March 1993. Secondly, resourcing UNOSOM II in terms of personnel and equipment was totally dependent on U.N. New York's ability to accelerate a burdensome bureaucratic administrative element in Field Operations Division in U.N. Headquarters. In a cable to U.N. New York, the Force Commander requested as early as 18 March 1993, to be released "from the bureaucratic sluggishness" which significantly impairs all our attempts at initiative and which impeded his ability to effectively establish and support his headquarters. He identified people and equipment as priority issues. He also stated a need for command latitude to develop aggressive, effective UNOSOM II military operations.

The delay in staffing the UNOSOM II headquarters can be attributed to a number of factors. The most significant were the process used by the United Nations to build its military contingent, having monies obligated to resource the staff and the running debate over disarmament. Without a resolution, money could not be spent nor a UNOSOM II staff resourced and formed. This delay significantly impeded the deployment and funding of the staff and the units for UNOSOM II, thus limiting its operational and logistics capability.

The disagreement on disarmament was the most significant factor in the delay in drafting UNSCR 814. The disagreement arose over the difference between the Secretary General's position on disarmament vice that of the United States. The Secretary General believed that the success of the United Nations in securing a long term peace in Somalia was directly tied to disarming the warlords and political factions. Along these lines he also wanted to demine the country. The differences centered on who was to do it. The United States believed this task to be well outside of the humanitarian mandate of UNSCR 794. Boutros Boutros Ghali viewed disarmament as a key task to be performed under UNITAF, clearly the more capable of the two forces. The broad mission assigned to UNITAF in UNSCR 794, to "use all necessary means to establish as soon as possible, a secure environment for humanitarian relief operations" left the point open to interpretation. This desire
was expressed by the Secretary General as early as December, in a letter addressed to President Bush. At a 22 December meeting with the Secretary General, Secretary of State Eagleburger re-emphasized the U.S. position of a limited mission in Somalia. Any new tasks would only lengthen the stay of U.S. forces and delay handover to UNOSOM II. One concession was made to the Secretary General in that the U.S. would consider requests for logistical support when the handover took place.\textsuperscript{10}

The Clinton Administration entered office determined to concentrate on domestic policies, and in its early days, the new administration echoed the Bush call for a rapid handover to UNOSOM II although some officials pushed for a substantial U.S. logistical presence to remain in the near term. With the continued desire of the Secretary General to expand the mandate to one of nation building, there was also much disagreement on what UNOSOM II should look like. The Secretariat envisioned a traditional, small-scale U.N. peacekeeping operation while Department of Defense officials thought a much more robust force was required. This dispute was a clash between the Chapter VI civilian culture in the U.N. and the military culture of the Pentagon. With the outbreak of Somali interclan fighting in February on the streets of Mogadishu, some U.S. officials believed an even larger American contingent needed to remain in country to assist the U.N. in its initial stages of transition.\textsuperscript{11}

The first indication of a major adjustment in the U.S. position came on 26 March when the Security Council adopted Resolution 814. Any ambiguity would be cleared up in the new resolution, which outlined in more detail the mission and tasks of UNOSOM II, to include disarmament and nation building. "The new U.S. Permanent Representative to the United Nations, Madeleine K. Albright said unequivocally, 'With this resolution, we will embark on an unprecedented enterprise aimed at nothing less than the restoration of an entire country as a proud, functioning and viable member of the community of nations.'"\textsuperscript{12} This endorsement of the new resolution marked a deliberate turn in direction toward an emerging foreign policy known as "assertive multilateralism." "Assertive multilateralism" called for a move toward greater democratization and development of free market economies by the world
community. It is a cooperative approach that attempts to control world situations by the collective action of the more dominant powers through the auspices of the U.N. Security Council. Over time, that body would establish the appropriate tools to impose its decisions on member states.13

There is nothing new about multilateralism in U.S. foreign policy. During the Cold War, U.S. policy was used to summon as much international support as possible and spread the cost or burden of action to as many partners as possible. This procedure was evident in the first major action after the Cold War in Operation DESERT SHIELD/DESERT STORM. The U.S. relied on strong allies to pull their fair share of security requirements in that engagement. "Assertive multilateralism," however, depends on looser groupings of nations and does not necessarily deal with the traditional alliance partners of the United States. This may include nations who do not necessarily share close, common interests with the U.S. Such an indiscriminate grouping of nations can even work against U.S. foreign policy in that it may advocate the pursuit of common international interests rather than narrower, national ones. Assertive multilateralism may work in instances where nations are willing to subordinate their national interests to internationally derived goals as in purely humanitarian missions. However, there is a greater concern and less chance for success when the undertaking may involve significant conflict.14 With the increase in violence as witnessed in Mogadishu in February 1993, some U.S. officials were still skeptical that the United Nations was up to the tasks outlined in the Resolution 814.15 One lesson learned from the Somalia experience is that assertive multilateralism does not work when a relatively benign humanitarian action turns violent.

The delay in passing UNSCR 814 had another detrimental effect on UNOSOM II in that it slowed requests for funds and force contributions from the international community. By mid-April, Force Command was requesting from the Special Representative to the Secretary General priority information regarding force deployments from U.N. New York. In order to effectively coordinate with UNITAF and complete its own planning, Force Command required accurate information regarding
positions/decisions taken by member nations regarding movement of forces into the theater. As a matter of reality, Force Command planned to assume the mission with only four of its five required brigades on the ground. The fifth brigade identified for expansion operations was the Indian Brigade. In a memorandum to the Special Representative to the Secretary General, Force Command deemed the timely deployment of this organization into theater to be "critical." In fact, Force Command wanted the Indian Brigade Headquarters and one battalion in theater by 15 May 1993. Anything less would degrade the effectiveness of operations. Force Command's intent was to replace the Canadian contingent in the Belet Uen area with this Indian advance party by 31 May 1993.16

However, the Indian Brigade would not arrive until September 1993. While not having an effect on transition, this delay would upset strategic and operational timelines, prevent expansion into the Central Region, and limit Force Command to maintaining security for political reconciliation and development only within the original UNITAF area of responsibility. More importantly the delay caused UNOSOM II to accept risk in Mogadishu by thinning the force levels there in order to cover Belet Uen.

Resolution of on-going force requirements was not limited to battalion-sized units. Ensuring subordinate commands were adequately staffed was essential as well. On 22 April, Force Command notified U.N. New York that the Belgian Brigade in Kismayo would require staff augmentation in order to effectively command and control the Botswana Battalion, for which it would be responsible. Reinforcements for the Egyptians, to ensure they were prepared for security operations at the airport, were also requested.17

In April, it became apparent that there were additional problems with contingent deployments. Most national contingents would arrive in theater unprepared to execute their mission. The Pakistani Brigade deployed with insufficient transport to accomplish what was, by design and necessity, a motorized mission in the city. The UNITAF forces they were replacing had more organic transport in their organizations than the Pakistanis did. This required UNOSOM to go back to U.N. New York to
secure prepositioned stock support from the United States forces in Europe.\textsuperscript{18} However, this trend of units arriving in theater without following the "Guidelines To Contributing Nations" continued to hamper the establishment of proper force capabilities. Much of the force did not have the requisite of logistics support capability and initial life support systems. Not only would this place almost overwhelming demands on what would prove to be a limited logistics capability, but would severely limit Force Command's flexibility in deploying incoming forces in the theater.

As the month of May approached, there was some concern in U.N. New York as to when Force Command would assume theater responsibility, and if it was premature to establish the command. All parties involved in the transition process had a position on the subject. UNITAF, seeing its mission as completed, wanted the transition to occur as expeditiously as possible.\textsuperscript{19} It was the Force Commander's belief that UNITAF was "extremely aggressive in their insistence on a 1 May 1993 deadline for transition."\textsuperscript{20} The UNITAF staff did not share an understanding of the constraints of the U.N. in terms of resource procurement.\textsuperscript{21} UNOSOM II's position was that the transition should occur based on the capabilities of Force Command to assume the mission and effect (what was agreed upon by the respective commanders) a seamless transition.

There was also the threat situation to consider. Both commanders, UNITAP and UNOSOM II, assessed the worst case scenario as street riots. As such, Force Command believed the transition should occur after the Pakistani Brigade was operational in the city. With the time line for their deployment and initial train up in theater expected to be complete the first week in May, LtGen Bir believed an appropriate turnover might occur then. The imperative would remain that the turnover would not occur if it presented an unacceptable risk to mission performance.\textsuperscript{22}

U.N. New York, after hearing of the Force Command's tentative window in early May, wanted assurances from the Special Representative to the Secretary General regarding the Force Command's ability to accept the mission. In a cable sent on 22 April 1993, the Under Secretary
General for Peacekeeping Operations asked if the Pakistani Brigade would be mission capable in the first days of May. Further, he wanted an assessment as to any operational impact which might exist if the Indian deployment in theater did not occur by the transition date. Third, U.N. New York wanted re assurance that Force Command, with the reduced manning of the headquarters, could effectively command and control the force. Lastly, U.N. New York wanted an assessment as to the logistics arrangements in theater and the effectiveness of those arrangements.23

In response to the questions posed by U.N. New York, Force Command assessed the time line of the Pakistani Brigade to be supportive of an early May turnover. He also stated that with the equipment augmentation received from the U.S. POMCUS stocks, the Pakistani Brigade would be more than adequately prepared for their mission. He stated he did not believe that a delay in the arrival of the Indian Brigade would adversely affect the turnover but it would hamper any expansion plans into the other regions of the country. With regard to the manning issue and logistics assessments, the Force Commander believed both issues were being addressed by U.N. New York and the mission Chief Administrative Officer (CAO) as expeditiously as possible. Therefore they did not pose a constraint to turnover. Finally, U.N. New York was notified that it was Force Command’s intention to assume theater responsibility from UNITAF on 4 May 1993.24

Reception and Consolidation (4 May - 5 June 1993)

As the transition date approached, Force Command received indications that certain elements within the factions were looking to test the resolve of UNOSOM II at the first opportunity. This test would apparently gauge UNOSOM II’s strength and willingness to act militarily to threats. The Somalis’ previous experience with a U.N. force was that with UNOSOM I, a smaller force with a restrictive Chapter VI charter, and it had not proved positive for the peacekeepers. Indeed, the formation and intervention of UNITAF was a direct result of the ineffectiveness of UNOSOM I. Therefore, one of the first actions taken by the UNOSOM II leadership was to reissue punitive restraint letters originally issued by the UNITAF commander to General Morgan and Omar
These letters were developed in response to a Morgan attack on Kismayo in March 1993. To further restrict the militia activities in the Lower Juba, UNOSOM II also issued letters of restriction to the principal lieutenants of Morgan and to Ali Osman "Atto," Mohamed Farrah Aiddeed's lieutenant in the USC/SNA. He had long been suspected in bankrolling the SPM/SNA activities in the Kismayo area. The letters restricted these individuals from entering the city of Kismayo (See Figure 6), or approaching any closer than 90 kilometers from the town.25

In order to present a clear picture of U.N. resolve, the Force Commander directed a show of force in and around Mogadishu by UNOSOM II forces to include fly overs by the U.S. Quick Reaction Force (QRF) and patrols in North and South Mogadishu by armored elements of the Italian Force. Concurrently, each area of responsibility (AOR) commander was initiating similar operations throughout the UNOSOM II area of operations. These operations were planned through 9 May. The intent of these operations, as described by the Force Commander, was to clearly show that a seamless transition had occurred between UNITAF and UNOSOM II. Additionally, it was to demonstrate to the Somali people that the security for humanitarian relief and political reconciliation would continue and grow under UNOSOM II. These operations included an expanded public information campaign designed to emphasize the mission, resolve and ability of UNOSOM and the world community to help rebuild a safe and secure country.26

The affect of this show of force on the populace was uncertain. Less than seventy-two hours after the assumption of command from UNITAF, and in the middle of the show of force, UNOSOM II faced its first major confrontation by militia forces. It occurred not in Mogadishu where it was most expected, but in Kismayo, the southern port city and seat of the resource-rich Lower Juba River Valley (See Figures 5 and 6).

During the late evening hours of 6 May and extending into the morning hours of 7 May 1993, a band of approximately 150 armed men attacked the city of Kismayo where they engaged elements of the Belgian Parachute Battalion. During the engagement, one Belgian officer was wounded and as estimated forty Somalis of the attacking force were either killed or wounded.27
Immediately following the attack and after consultation with the Special Representative to the Secretary General, Force Command, dispatched a Ceasefire Investigation Team to Kismayo. The team consisted of two Ceasefire and Disarmament Division officers, two international military staff officers and three Somali Ceasefire Committee members representing Somali factions not involved in the incident. After conducting a two day field visit, the team reported that the SPM/SNA had attacked the town in an apparent attempt to drive the pro-Morgan SPM out of the city. The report would be referred to the Somali Ceasefire and Disarmament Committee for further action.²⁸

While this matter was being arbitrated, the Belgian commander stated that he had insufficient forces to adequately patrol his vast AOR and prevent a similar attack from re-occurring. He requested reinforcement from Force Command. In response, Force Command deployed
the Quick Reaction Force to the Belgian AOR in order to expand the AOR Commander's capabilities. The Belgian Commander desired to use the QRF to patrol the area around Jilib where the rebel militia had staged. However, the Memorandum of Agreement for employment of the QRF allowed only for emergency reinforcement of committed U.N. forces. QRF forces could deploy to the area, but they could not lead the reconnaissance into Jilib. Therefore, when QRF forces deployed, they were given the mission to relieve Belgian forces from their routine security missions in the city of Kismayo in order that the Belgian forces could conduct the required reconnaissance into Jilib. Permission from CENTCOM, though, was received for the Quick Reaction Force to conduct air assault training missions in areas beyond Jilib that would complement the Belgian effort.29

Belgian forces executed the reconnaissance, but they conducted only a hasty, ineffective search for weapons in the hamlet and then left. No plans were made to leave a peacekeeping force in the town, not even for a short duration. The Belgian commander was hesitant to expand his control outside Kismayo without the permanent assignment of additional forces. Force Command's assessment was that he had sufficient forces for limited expansion up to and including Jilib. Despite the fact that Belgian forces had soundly defeated the hostile militia forces, it appeared to Force Command that the Belgian commander was unwilling to risk further casualties to his force. Actions by the Belgian Commander prompted Force Command to remind the Belgian Commander that UNOSOM II, while operating under Chapter VII, found itself in the role of a peacemaker, and "the intent is to aggressively establish and maintain a secure environment by force of arms, should the situation in your AOR become unstable."30

By not attacking what appeared to be UNOSOM II's strength (forces in Mogadishu), it appears that SNA militia had directed their first attack against a possible UNOSOM II decisive point - the town of Kismayo. This was an area where Aideed desired to re-establish his influence, an area he had lost to General Morgan during the early days of UNITAFAF intervention. While unsuccessful in regaining control of the town, SNA militia did succeed in negating the effectiveness of UNOSOM II
forces in the area outside the town; effectively cutting off the area's land lines of communications to Mogadishu. Aideed had also succeeded in keeping UNOSOM II momentarily focused on Southern Somalia diverting or delaying any plans from expansion into the Central Region which was his basis of power for militia and arms reinforcement.

A Coordinated Strategy

In May, Force Command was focused on the reception of incoming forces. The intent of the military planners was to build required combat power and offset what was perceived to be a tenuous force strength in the Southern Region. Additionally, a debate started within the various U.N. agencies as to where the priority of effort should be with force deployments.

Early in May, the UNOSOM II political staff forwarded a paper to Force Command which outlined what they perceived to be an opportunity for early commitment of forces into the Central Region. This paper, titled "Galcayo as Keystone," offered an assessment of multiple factions eagerly awaiting UNOSOM II deployment into the Central Region. These factions (the SSDF, USC/SNA and SNF) represented both a challenge and an opportunity, according to the author, to place a permanent UNOSOM II force stationed in the town of Galcayo to ensure its demilitarized status. 31

Upon initial inspection, this proposal appeared to be in accordance with the military strategy which planned to consolidate operations in the current area influenced by UNOSOM II; and once consolidation had been achieved, a gradual build-up could occur into the area around Galcayo. Expansion was based on the requirement that the fifth brigade deploy into theater and/or that disarmament and re-establishment of local police forces progressed sufficiently in the current area that forces could be freed up for expansion. 32

Rather than being an "azimuth check" for all agencies, the document became an implementation policy for the political staff and for the Special Representative to the Secretary General. Plans for a methodical, controlled build up of forces (capabilities) gave way to guidance to determine how soon a deployment could be made into the
Central region. Expansion was becoming a time or opportunity-driven process rather than being driven by capabilities and events.

Another shortfall in the establishment of a coordinated strategy was the lack of humanitarian relief policy. Feeding sites were scheduled to be closed at the end of the month. In May, funds and a plan for investment of funds required to rejuvenate the Somali economy were lacking. To be successful, the U.N. needed a coordinated military, political, and economic strategy. A secure environment needed to be established in order that local political structures could be re-established. These political structures (police, judiciary, schools, and public administration) required initial economic support. Once basic government services were restored, local economies could develop and become self-sustaining; ending the need for major humanitarian assistance. A coordinated strategy was never developed. Efforts were made to correct this situation in the late summer but never materialized. The political and economic elements of power would become dependent on the military strategy for dealing with hostile militia forces. Complementary strategies were never developed to deal with the hostile clans nor was there ever a coordinated strategy developed to capitalize on those areas where peaceful reconciliation was progressing. There would be limited success at establishment of district and regional political councils but there was little success at re-establishment of basic government services.

The Galcayo Peace Conference

There had been a series of peace conferences promoted by the U.N to promote national reconciliation among the warring factions. Negotiations were first held in Addis Abbe, Ethiopia, on 4 January 1993. These negotiations immediately ran into difficulty when Aideed refused to accept any representatives from factions associated with the former dictator Siad Barre regime or who had not opposed the Barre regime during the civil war. This gesture was primarily targeted against Mohamed Siad Hersi (Morgan), a son-in-law of the former ruler. Morgan was currently head of militia forces fighting to take control of the southern port city of Kismayo from Aideed's militia. These exclusions
were eventually overcome but Aideed had succeeded in his aim to have the warlords and not the U.N. control the agenda for the upcoming reconciliation conference held on 15 January.

At the first conference, the Somali factions agreed to surrender all heavy weapons to the UNITAF/U.N. ceasefire monitoring group, to place the political movements' militias in encampments, to disarm all bandits, and to return all unlawfully seized properties taken during the civil war. This plan met with only moderate success under UNITAF for interclan clashes occurred frequently when one or another of the Somali political parties felt his interest threatened. The primary outcome of the 15 January 1993 meeting, however, was an agreement by the warlords to meet again.

The second national reconciliation conference held in Addis Ababa in March 1993 was chaired by the newly arrived Deputy Special Representative to the Secretary General, Ambassador Lansana Kouyaté. Ambassador Kouyaté had been the Guinean Permanent Representative to the United Nations, and was a close friend of the Secretary General’s. Much of the second conference was held in private behind closed doors. U.S. Liaison Office diplomats on the ground in Mogadishu, hoped that modest goals would be agreed upon, believing true political reconciliation could only be achieved through the establishment of local bodies throughout the country before the creation of a national council. It was further hoped that local groups and individuals, not currently members of the Somali political parties (women, intellectuals, professionals), would be allowed a voice in the new political process. The U.N. did not want to dictate such terms on the Somali people. However, it could indirectly encourage reform by sponsoring and protecting public gatherings that would be required to form the many local councils.

At the end of this second (March 1993) Addis Ababa conference, the warlords agreed to a modest empowerment of regional political organizations and to continue to advance the peace process. This result was quite different from the United Nations' expectations and was rejected by the U.N. following signing of an agreement by the warlords. The initial reaction by the warlords was to leave in protest over this
supposed outside intervention. They agreed to return after U.N. concessions that would effectively give them control of any future transitional national council. Each warlord was guaranteed a seat on that future body which would ensure their dominance of any national council. At the time of these final negotiations, a conference of aid donors was also in progress in Addis Abba. A group of Somali women attending the aid conference, demonstrated outside the conference with the warlords. This demonstration produced an agreement by the warlords to guarantee one-third of the seats in the transitional national council to be set aside for women. However, there was no agreement on how the remaining unencumbered seats were to be apportioned.\textsuperscript{36}

The final events that led to eventual conflict between Aideed and UNOSOM II began on 13 May, barely a week after transition with UNITAF. On this day, Aideed requested U.N. support for a peace conference that would disengage militia forces in the Central Region. The aim of the conference was to settle the political differences between Aideed's Haber Gedir clan and the Mijertain clan which controlled substantial parts of the northeast regions of Somalia. This was an attractive initiative for the UNOSOM II political division. A political settlement could hasten the reconciliation process for the rest of the country. Establishment of cantonment sites would impose control over the largest collection of heavy weapons outside UNOSOM II's current area of responsibility. Voluntary disarmament of the region could permit UNOSOM II expansion into the northeast as far as Bossasso with minimum commitment of peacekeepers. Because the offer pursued a policy accommodating the warlords, reflecting its Chapter VI habits, UNOSOM II hastened to reply affirmatively to Aideed's offer.\textsuperscript{37}

According to his initial proposal, Aideed would sponsor the conference while the U.N. would agree to pay transportation and hotel costs for the participants. The principal parties were the SNA and the SSDF. Aideed's interests appeared to be an attempt to neutralize the threat presented by his persistent enemy the SSDF in the Central Region. This would allow him to bring back into Mogadishu the militia and military equipment he had sent there for safekeeping prior to the arrival of UNITAF. Being faced with Somali radio attacks against its
mission and despite the fact that such a conference could enhance the stature and capability of Aideed, UNOSOM II agreed to the proposal except sponsorship would be a U.N. responsibility. Sponsorship, though, could be a double edged sword. If the conference failed, then UNOSOM II would be blamed for the lack of reconciliation. Should it prove successful, then UNOSOM II could claim major political progress which would reduce rather than enhance Aideed's influence in the national reconciliation process.

During the Galcayo Peace Conference, there were near continuous conflicts between Aideed and UNOSOM II ranging on issues from agenda, and conference location to security and the number and types of participants. When it became apparent to Aideed that he was being opposed at every turn by the U.N., he held separate meetings with aligned leaders. But these meetings failed to meet his political goals. In the end, the Galcayo Conference did little to aid the reconciliation process in the Central Region, but it left the SNA and Aideed extremely frustrated over their inability to control the political process in Somalia.

These awkward missteps by the political division of UNOSOM II indicated that UNOSOM II had no definitive plan for dealing with the warlords. Aideed held the political initiative in Mogadishu and continually kept UNOSOM II off balance. Even after much public disagreement on the handling the preparations for the Galcayo conference, the Special Representative to the Secretary General paid a personal visit to Aideed's headquarters on 22 May in an apparent attempt to reach accommodation and thus salvage the upcoming conference. Aideed believed it was not to his advantage to cooperate with the U.N., and he saw any attempt to accommodate him as weakness.38

Within the UNOSOM II coalition, there were mixed political feelings on the effectiveness with which the conference was being administered. At a May 1993 meeting between the Force Commander and the Italian Ambassador to Somalia, concerns were raised in that it appeared UNOSOM II was going to extremes to marginalize Aideed and that these UNOSOM II measures might be hindering rather than promoting the Somali reconciliation process. At the meeting, a point was raised concerning
Italian participation at UNOSOM headquarters. Italy, being a major contributing nation, did not have sufficient representation in the Force Command headquarters nor on the political staff of UNOSOM II. This disagreement on UNOSOM II political policy by the Italian government would become a greater problem for UNOSOM II in the days ahead and will be discussed later in this thesis.\(^{39}\)

Events of 5 June 1993

As the Galcayo Peace Conference was winding down, another event was emerging that would signal the first major shift in UNOSOM II Force Command operations in Somalia. As the events of May were occurring, Aiddeed's USC/SNA began to escalate its use of the radio station complex in Mogadishu to transmit anti-UNOSOM II messages throughout the country. Force Command and the civilian leadership began to view these messages as a threat to both humanitarian development operations and to the deployed military force.\(^{40}\) Concurrent with the increase in propaganda came reports from human intelligence sources confirmed by aircraft overflights that there was much activity in Aiddeed's authorized weapons storage sites (AWSS).

Under UNITAF, both Aiddeed and Ali-Mahdi had arranged to canton their heavy weapons and technicals. This was agreed to for several reasons. First, the weapons policy of UNITAF placed the weapons at risk if not cantoned. Secondly, by participating in the weapons control program, the local warlords were legitimizing themselves by demonstrating compliance with the March Addis Ababa agreements on disarmament. Aiddeed's USC/SNA established five independent sites. These sites were located at former Somali National Army compounds along 21 October Road (Sites 1 and 3), at a former Somali Air Force ammunition storage site along the Afgoye Road just outside of Afgoye (Site 9) and the facilities of Radio Mogadishu (now referred to as Radio "Aiddeed") (Sites 4 and 5). Ali-Mahdi established two sites at former hotel complexes in North Mogadishu.\(^{41}\)

The USC/SNA ammunition and weapons storage sites were controlled by clan militia but these ammunition and weapons storage sites had been inspected a number of times since their establishment by UNITAF. These
inspections had, on occasion, been conducted on a short notice basis. Recent intelligence reports noted that weapons and technicals were being withdrawn from these cantonment sites. Withdrawal without prior coordination with or approval by the U.N. would constitute a violation of the disarmament agreement outlined at Addis Ababa. A decision was reached within Force Command to inspect the sites and confirm the intelligence sightings. If discrepancies were found, then the matter would be referred to the Somali Disarmament Council for resolution. It was also necessary to verify whether some of the sites were actual

Figure 7. Key Areas in Mogadishu.

weapons storage facilities. UNOSOM II believed that Aideed had declared the national radio broadcast site as an AWSS only to ensure his exclusive use of that facility. If this were the case, UNOSOM II
would be able to recommend the disestablishment of the site and open the facility to other factions for use.42

The Italian and the Pakistani Brigades were directed to prepare plans to support the inspection of sites in their respective AORs. The Disarmament Division of Force Command would act solely as a U.N. monitoring agency and their verification teams would accompany forces to each site. If any disagreement arose between the militia and U.N. forces over validity of the inspections, the Disarmament Division would participate as a disinterested element of the inspection. The Force Command plan was to inspect the ammunition and weapons storage sites of both Aideed and Ali-Mahdi concurrently. Once inspections were completed, U.N. forces would withdraw, and no weapons were to be seized.43

The Pakistani Brigade was responsible for the five sites in South Mogadishu controlled by the USC/SNA. As planning continued, it was anticipated that the force could be resisted, but the worst case scenario anticipated only street rioting. While not expecting violence, the Pakistani commander reinforced his supporting forces by providing one company at each inventory site, by directing each battalion involved to form an internal reserve, and by establishing a brigade reserve. The brigade internally task organized to ensure their limited number of armored personnel carriers were distributed to support each ammunition and weapons storage site inspection. Scout and Attack helicopter teams were made available from the U.S. Quick Reaction Force to provide airborne observation and fire support, if required. Additionally, the U.S. Quick Reaction Force ready company was to act as the Force Command reserve.44

On 2 June 1993, the Special Representative to the Secretary General was briefed on the Force Command plan to inspect the weapons sites. One concern of the political and military leadership was the issue of notification prior to inspection. The Force Command staff in coordination with the Pakistani brigade commander recommended that advanced notice of 24 hours could be given without compromising the inspection process. The Special Representative to the Secretary General
concurring with the time notification and the requirement to inspect the sites.45

During a final briefing of the operation conducted on 2 June 1993, the Italian Brigade notified Force Command that the Ali-Mahdi sites had been disestablished in March 1993. The decision to disestablish the sites had been made by the area of responsibility commander with the weapons either confiscated or destroyed. Apparently, UNITAF had not been informed. UNOSOM II made the decision to continue with the inspection of the USC/SNA ammunition and weapons storage sites especially now it was known that the ammunition and weapons storage sites of one significant Somali warlord had been neutralized without resistance.46

On 4 June 1993, notification letters were delivered to a designated senior member of the USC/SNA. A total of six letters were prepared. One letter announced the intention of UNOSOM II to conduct periodic weapons site inventories in line with the Addis Ababa Agreements of January 1993. The remaining five letters were to serve as formal notification that the site identified in each letter would be inspected on 5 June 1993. They also invited the militia Site Commander to accompany the team during the inspection to assist or answer any questions that might arise. UNOSOM II representatives assured the USC/SNA official that the intent of the inspections was to catalog weapon quantities and indicated that they expected the USC/SNA would continue to support the peace process and be cooperative in its dealings with the U.N.47

All units reached their sites at or before the designated time of 0700 and access was gained without force. At about 0830, UNOSOM II began to experience its first periods of resistance. At ammunition and weapons storage site 5, the main offices of Radio Mogadishu/Aideed, a very vocal crowd started to form. The crowd responded to the agitation of two individuals who claimed to be members of "Aideed's government." Pakistani soldiers, responding to the crowd's attempt to push into the compound, reacted with warning shots in the air. After almost clearing the compound, the Somali agitators moved more women into position between the Pakistanis and the exit gates. This was the first
experience of the USC/SNA using women or children as "shields." At approximately 0930, after having one of its members hit by a rock, the UNOSOM II inspection team departed the site.

Having completed the inspection by 1030, the majority of the security company at ammunition and weapons storage site 3 (situated just North of the city - See Figure 7) initiated movement from the site back to their barracks. While enroute, the convoy was ambushed along 21 October Road near an abandoned cigarette factory by Somalis firing automatic and antitank weapons. At least two vehicles were struck immediately. The balance of the company (a platoon) was called forward from Site 3 to reinforce the ambushed element. The platoon suffered heavy causalities and only part of the company was able to escape the ambush kill zone.

Following the ambush along 21 October Road, it became apparent to Force Command that Aideed was attempting to bloody UNOSOM II as much as he could. At Feeding Site 20 in the interior of Mogadishu a Pakistani platoon was overwhelmed by a crowd of women and children supported by militia in over watching positions. During this engagement, the Somalis used crowds to press in on the soldiers until they were in personal striking distance. Once they succeeded in hemming in the soldiers, the women and children grabbed at the weapons, preventing the soldiers from reacting in self-defense. They were then struck down with knives and swords. Vehicle drivers were struck by snipers at the outset to prevent vehicular escape.

By using a series of well planned ambushes and vicious close-in combat methods, coupled with placing women and children in front of fighting militia, Aideed was able to kill twenty-three Pakistanis, and wound over seventy-five other U.N. soldiers. The methods of assault and the trauma of large numbers of soldiers killed, coupled with selective mutilations of remains, would ultimately adversely affect the Pakistani forces.48

5 June would mark the neutralization of Pakistani peacekeepers. Though there would be later actions involving the Pakistani forces, their command had to be prodded into conducting routine patroling and vehicle inspections at strong points. This did not become apparent to
UNOSOM II Force Command until later in the summer. Lack of aggressiveness on the part of the Pakistanis eventually culminated in the relief of the brigade commander. At a meeting in August 1993 between the Force Commander and the Pakistani brigade commander, it was mentioned that Pakistani national authorities had directed their brigade commander to minimize future casualties to Pakistani forces. The brigade commander appeared to interpret this guidance as taking almost no action at all. His forces eventually were not making even routine checks at road check points to inspect for contraband items.

This lack of aggressive action was communicated through the Special Representative to the United Nations Headquarters in New York and the Pakistani representative there. A similar communication was made directly by UNOSOM II Force Command to the Chief of Staff of the Pakistani Army in several telephone conversations and on a visit by the Pakistan Chief of Staff to Somalia in September.

The solution taken by Pakistan was the replacement of the brigade commander. However, even with a new commander in place, Pakistani forces continued to demonstrate a bunker mentality in the streets of Mogadishu. Aideed had struck at another possible decisive point, neutralizing one of the main peacekeeping forces in South Mogadishu.
Endnotes


3UNOSOM II Memorandum from the Special Representative to the Secretary General to UNOSOM II Division Heads. Senior Interdivisional Group Meeting on Strategy, 21 April 1993, 3 to 4.

4UNOSOM II Fax from the Special Representative to the Secretary General to Under Secretary General for Peacekeeping Operations, Subject: "Transition Support for Force Command," 12 April 1993 and UNOSOM II Memorandum from Force Command to the Special Representative to the Secretary General, "Follow-up on 9 April Command Briefing," 12 April 1993.

5UNOSOM II Memorandum from Force Command to the Special Representative to the Secretary General, "Follow-up on 9 April Command Briefing," 12 April 1993.

6UNOSOM II Memorandum from Force Command to the Special Representative to the Secretary General, Subject: "UNOSOM Transition Process," 18 April 1993, 4.


8Ibid.

9Ibid., 1 & 2.

10John R. Bolton, "Wrong Turn In Somalia," (*Foreign Affairs*, January/February, 1994), 61

11Ibid., 61-62.

12Ibid.


16UNOSOM II Fax from Force Command to the Special Representative to the Secretary General, info: Under Secretary General for Peacekeeping Operations, Subject: "Transition UNITAF/UNOSOM," 22 April 1993, 1; and UNOSOM II Fax from Force Command to Under Secretary General for Peacekeeping Operations, Subject: "Immediate Force Requirements for UNOSOM II," 22 April 1993, 1.

17UNOSOM II Fax from Force Command to Under Secretary General for Peacekeeping Operations, Subject: "Immediate Force Requirements for UNOSOM II," 22 April 1993, 1.

18UNOSOM II Fax from Force Command to the Special Representative to the Secretary General, info: Under Secretary General for Peacekeeping Operations, Subject: "Transition UNITAF/UNOSOM," 22 April 1993, 1.


20UNOSOM II Memorandum from Force Command to the Special Representative to the Secretary General, Subject: "UNOSOM Transition Process," 18 April 1993, 4.

21Ibid.

22UNOSOM II Fax from Force Command to the Special Representative to the Secretary General, Info: Under Secretary General for Peacekeeping Operations, Subject: "Transition UNITAF/UNOSOM," 22 April 1993, 1.

23U.N New York Code Cable from the Under Secretary of Peacekeeping Operations to the Special Representative to the Secretary General, Number MSC 675, 22 April 1993.

24UNOSOM II Fax from Force Command to the Special Representative to the Secretary General, Info: Under Secretary General for Peacekeeping Operations, Subject: "Transition UNITAF/UNOSOM," 22 April 1993, 1 to 4.


26Ibid, 4-9.

27UNOSOM II Fax from Commander Belgian Brigade to the Force Commander, Subject: "Situation in Kismayo," 7 May 1993.

28UNOSOM II Fax from the Special Representative to the Secretary General to the Under Secretary General for Peacekeeping Operations, Subject: Special Situation Report Kismayo, 7 May 1993; and U.S. Forces Somalia After Action Report, Volume 1 (Carlisle Barracks, PA: U.S. Army Peacekeeping Institute, 1994), 4-9 to 4-10.

29UNOSOM II Fax from Force Command to Commander Belgian Brigade, Subject: "Current Operation Within AOR Kismayo," 11 May 1993, 1 to 2.
30Ibid., 1.


32UNOSOM II Fax from Force Command to the Under Secretary General for Peacekeeping Operations, Info: Special Representative to the Secretary General, Subject: Force Commander's Operational Concept, 1 May 1993, 1 to 4.


35Ibid., 50.

36Ibid., 51.

37Ibid., 52.

38Ibid., 53.

39UNOSOM II Memorandum from Force Command to the Special Representative to the Secretary General, Subject: Trip Report to Italian Brigade, 27 May 1993, 2.


42Ibid., 4-12 to 4-13.

43Ibid.

44Ibid., 4-14.

45Ibid.

46Ibid., 4-14 to 4-15.

47Ibid.

Personal Field Notes, I was present at the meeting with the two commanders on this occasion. I witnessed many meetings at Force Command headquarters with the Pakistani brigade commander present and the lack of aggressive action on the part of Pakistani forces was the main topic of concern.

A number of Faxes to New York throughout the summer indicate this displeasure: UNOSOM II Fax from Force Command to the U.N. Military Advisor to the Under Secretary General for Peacekeeping Operations, Subject: Delay in Deployment of UNOSOM II Forces, 3 July 1993, 1; UNOSOM II Fax from Force Command to the Under Secretary General for Peacekeeping Operations, Subject: Security Situation in Mogadishu, 6 July 1993, 1.

Personal field notes. I was present when the phone calls were made. I was backed briefed on the results of Chief of Staff's visit.
CHAPTER THREE

REVIEW AND ANALYSIS OF UNOSOM II OPERATIONS - PART TWO

Combat Operations (5 June - 29 August 1993)

General Background

This period of UNOSOM II operations was marked by intense open combat between U.N. Forces and the USC/SNA militia (See Figure 8). The United Nations Security Council adopted UNSCR 837 on 6 June 1993. This resolution set a new direction for UNOSOM II. The resolution:

1. Strongly condemns the unprovoked attack against the personnel of UNOSOM II on 5 June 1993, which appear to be a calculated and pre-mediated series of ceasefire violations to prevent by intimidation UNOSOM II from carrying out its mandate as provided for in resolution 814;
2. Condemns strongly the use of radio broadcasts, in particular by USC/SNA, to incite attacks against United Nations personnel;
3. Reaffirms that the Secretary General is authorized under resolution 814 to take all necessary measures against all those responsible for the armed attacks . . . including against those responsible for publicly inciting such attacks, to establish the effective authority of UNOSOM II throughout Somalia, including to secure the investigation of their actions and their arrest and detention for prosecution, trial, and punishment;
4. Re-emphasized the crucial importance of early implementation of the disarmament of all Somali parties, including movements and factions . . . of neutralizing radio broadcast systems that contribute to the violence and attacks directed against UNOSOM II.1

The resolution was written and passed on a weekend. It should be reemphasized that Security Council resolutions are approved only by members of the Security Council, but are supposedly binding on all members of the United Nations. However, there is no requirement to gain consensus with members of the General Assembly. Nor is there a requirement to gain consensus on resolutions with the nations contributing peacekeeping forces to particular peace missions. Such was the case with UNSCR 837. At American urging, the U.N. Security Council rushed through the resolution in order to demonstrate, "as one senior
administration official put it, that the United Nations, engaged in a major multi-national peacekeeping mission, could not be 'pushed around by some renegade warlord.'"²


Security Council passage of UNSCR 837 sharply changed the military mission for UNOSOM II, but no consensus building was done with the national authorities whose forces were on the ground in Somalia. Disagreements over the interpretation of Chapter VII authority would occur in UNOSOM II later that summer; disagreements which might have been avoided had consensus on the new mandate been gained in June. The United Nations would soon discover that the new game in town, one of
fighting an urban guerilla war, was not one that many nations had come to play. This discord will be illustrated later in the chapter.

There was another issue involving review and passage of resolutions dealing with Somalia that was directly related to the U.S. government inter-agency process. After transition to UNOSOM II, the operation appeared to drop in priority within the U.S. government, and it was deemed appropriate for the government to reduce the resources devoted to Somalia. As noted by several U.S. officials, Washington paid little attention to the operation once it transitioned to U.N. control. Occupied with other, seemingly more urgent international crises, the Clinton Administration essentially "put Somalia in the out basket."

When the 5 June attacks occurred, government officials were surprised by the intensity and savagery of Aideed militia's attacks. Following the attacks, no high level review of the situation was made by U.S. officials who could provide advice and recommend alternative options, a full range of options that considered both the military and political implications of the various, possible courses of action. Instead, the U.S. government endorsed passage of the hastily drafted Security Council resolution without the benefit of a complete review by appropriate agencies. No one disputed the basic premise of taking action against the perpetrators of the attack, but a full range of options to include integration of political as well military responses was not developed.

With the adoption of UNSCR 837, UNOSOM II Forces assumed an offensive approach to operations in Mogadishu. In so doing, Force Command fully recognized Mogadishu's importance from both a strategic and operational perspective. The Force Commander clearly made this point in a 3 July cable to the U.N. Military Adviser to the Under Secretary General for Peacekeeping Operations:

We view Mogadishu as our center of gravity, we must control it to be successful.

At the strategic level, success of UNOSOM II in Somalia appeared to be defined, by the international community, as success in Mogadishu. News coverage of Somalia riveted the attention of the world on the fighting in Mogadishu, rather than on the successes that were being
achieved throughout the rest of southern and northeast Somalia. The importance of Mogadishu at the operational level centered on its air and sea ports. They were the only facilities in the country capable of meeting the military and humanitarian requirements of UNOSOM II. This continued to be the situation through early January 1994, as funding had not been made available to upgrade the sea and air ports at Kismayo or Bossasso.

12-17 June Operations

Following the passage of UNSCR 837, Force Command initiated offensive actions to restore order and security in Mogadishu. The aim of the operations conducted in Mogadishu from 6 June through 31 August were to re-establish a secure environment in Mogadishu (to include control of key facilities and supply routes) and to neutralize the USC/SNA militia and Radio Aideed.

Operations were to be carried out in three phases. The first phase focused on the deployment of additional forces from outlying AORs to the city, as well as initiating appropriate actions to strengthen UNOSOM II facilities to protect the force. Phase two was a series of strikes against militia command and control nodes, weapons and ammunition caches, and assembly areas. The final phase was to be an aggressive cordon and search of the city to disarm all factions within Mogadishu.8

It was clear the U.N. Forces had to regain control of the city. This was important for two reasons. First, the adverse effects on morale that the 5 June ambush had on the peacekeeping force had to be negated. Secondly, the U.N. civilian staff, many nongovernment organizations, and U.N. relief agencies had departed the country after the 5 June attack and would not return until a secure environment was restored.

To enhance force capabilities in Mogadishu, Force Command directed French and Moroccan armored forces deploy to the city. However, the issue of command relationships would limit the ability of Force Command to employ combat forces to meet the tactical situation. Both the French and Moroccan governments authorized the employment of
armored forces in support of Pakistani operations in South Mogadishu only if they remained OPCON to Force Command. This placed the theater headquarters in a position where it had to manage both the operational employment of forces in theater as well as direct tactical operations in Mogadishu. The Force Command expressed this concern formally to the Special Representative to the Secretary General in a 16 June memorandum, SUBJECT: Force Command Concerns for Future Planning. This memorandum stated that the Force Commander "must have full authority over contingent forces and not be limited by requests for approval from national authorities before execution of military operations." This situation would not be resolved and Moroccan forces reached Mogadishu on 7 June and the French on 9 June, both OPCON to Force headquarters.

Force Command began detailed planning for Phase II, attacks on selected targets within Mogadishu. The intent was to secure key UNOSOM II facilities and lines of communication. In addition, Force Command wanted to take decisive offensive action to assure control of the city, neutralize the USC/SNA militia and Radio Aideed, arrest and/or detain hostile militia leadership, and destroy authorized weapons storage sites as well as other major caches around the city that belonged to hostile militia. The concept called for a series of ground and air attacks directed at the ammunition weapons storage sites and militia strongholds in what was known as the Aideed Enclave (residences and key storage areas of USC/SNA leaders located a few hundred meters from UNOSOM headquarters (See Figure 7)."

Between 7 and 12 June, Pakistani forces, assisted by Moroccan and Italian armored forces conducted clearing operations along 21 October Road and other key supply routes. These operations were conducted almost simultaneously over the same ground but controlled and directed by Force Command and not by the Pakistani brigade headquarters.

On the morning of 12 June 1993, AC-130 gunships and the U.S. Quick Reaction Force attacked the ammunition weapons storage sites in the immediate vicinity of Mogadishu to include ammunition weapons storage site 5 (Radio Aideed). AC-130 gunships also attacked and significantly damaged a structure known as the Cigarette Factory (site of the 5 June ambush along 21 October Road). These strikes were
designed to limit collateral damage while achieving the military objective. Deliberate warnings were planned and given prior to the attacks in order to allow non-combatants to evacuate the target areas.\textsuperscript{12}

In preparation for the 17 June ground assault to search and clear the Aideed Enclave, AC-130 gunships conducted strikes on 13 and 14 June against known illegal arms and ammunition caches in the Enclave. The targets were Atto's Garage on 13 June and Aideed's Garage on 14 June. Following deliberate warnings, the targets were struck with precision munitions. However, numerous secondary explosions followed, indicating that the intelligence produced on the targets had been correct.\textsuperscript{13}

The assault into the Aideed Enclave proved to be a major test for the UNOSOM II coalition to discharge its duties under Chapter VII. During the planning for the attack on the Aideed Enclave, some coalition contingent commanders were reluctant to take offensive action, fearing the impact casualties would have in their national capitals. Others were completely opposed to the operation, preferring to follow Chapter VI guidelines and wanted UNOSCM II to negotiate a return to a level of peaceful co-existence with the USC/SNA. However, after much negotiation among the commanders, the coalition commanders accepted the intended operation to clear the enclave.\textsuperscript{14}

The objective of the coalition assault was to severely damage local militia command and control and drive the militia leadership from its base of operations. The assault would capitalize on the success of the 12-14 June operations by maintaining pressure on the USC/SNA militia. The attack was conducted in two phases.

In Phase I, AC-130 gunships conducted strikes against selected weapons caches and militia concentrations. Following deliberate warnings, the gunships began engagement of the targets at approximately 0130 and ended at 0445. During this phase, snipers were placed on key high ground around the enclave to ensure that armed personnel did not enter or leave the area.

Phase II began at 0514 with Moroccan and Italian forces moving to establish a inner cordon around the enclave. French Forces established an outer screen along 21 October Road, and Pakistani forces began the clearing operation of the enclave.\textsuperscript{15} Both the Italians and the
Moroccans met limited resistance moving into position. With the cordon set, the Pakistani forces began clearing operations at 0637. However, both Moroccan and Italian forces were soon approached by unarmed crowds of up to 500 and 300 Somalis respectively. Authorization to dispense riot control agents on the crowds was approved, and by 0653 the crowds were dispersed. During this time, French forces reported contact near the Cigarette Factory and they killed four snipers.16

Pakistani clearing operations went smoothly with little opposition. Contrary to the intent of the Force Command plan, Pakistani forces ended their clearing operations and began to withdraw without securing and establishing a strong point in the enclave. Establishment of a strong point was essential to deny future use of the area to the militia.17 The Pakistani Commander later commented that he felt that he had insufficient forces to secure the area fearing units would become isolated and attacked piecemeal (similar to the Pakistani unit attacked at the feeding site on 5 June). This was another indicator that Pakistani forces had been effectively neutralized by the 5 June ambush.

As the clearing operations progressed, crowds again approached Moroccan forces at approximately 0930. This time armed militia accompanied the crowd. The militia employed a tactic similar to that used against the Pakistani forces on 5 June. With women and children in front, the militia closed on the Moroccan vehicles and began throwing hand grenades onto the Moroccan forces. Women were also reported to be carrying and throwing hand grenades. The Moroccans then received heavy sniper fire from the Digfer Hospital (a complex dominating the area from the northeast). Heavy fighting continued in the Moroccan sector and along 21 October Road for the next four hours. Fighting around the Moroccans was so close that attack helicopters could not be used to provide fire support. Therefore, at approximately 1100, French forces were directed to relieve pressure on the Moroccans. The French fought their way down from 21 October Road, taking anti-tank fire from the Digfer hospital which was being directed by the militia. Italian forces were repositioned along Lenin Road to the east to protect the French flank. Prior to withdrawal, French forces cleared and searched the Digfer Hospital complex. U.N. casualties for the operation were 46
wounded and 5 killed. The Moroccan forces bore the brunt of the fighting and suffered 41 wounded and 4 killed, one of the fatalities being their battalion commander. Initial unconfirmed reports indicated that over 150 Somalis had been killed in the fighting.\textsuperscript{18}

The UNOSOM II situation report (SITREP) on 18 June indicated that the operation had accomplished its military objective to seize weapons and munitions caches and drive the militia from its base of operations. The future near-term plan was to avoid further direct military confrontation, while continuing disarmament operations through aggressive searches and checkpoint operations. In addition, Force Command sought to quickly restart humanitarian activities in the city.\textsuperscript{19}

While a tactical victory was attained by the 17 June offensive operation, its positive results were short-lived. The counterattack against Moroccan forces precipitated their withdrawal from the city and denial by their national authorities for future employment of their forces in Mogadishu.\textsuperscript{20} The failure to secure a strong point in the enclave would also allow militia infiltration back into the area. French forces were asked but were reluctant to retake the ground previously fought over and their government ordered them back to Baidoa. The French Chief of Defense in Paris made the French position in a 14 June letter to Force Command. The letter emphasized that original authorization for the out of AOR deployment of French forces was for a specific mission and limited period of time. It also stipulated that the French wished to avoid future out of AOR missions.\textsuperscript{21} Italian forces, who had reluctantly participated in the operation, were not prepared to do so again.

What appeared to be an example of successful coalition cooperation was in fact a point of departure for future coalition disparity. Coalition partners were re-evaluating their definitions of Chapter VII operations or their willingness to support Chapter VII operations, along with the impact of associated violence in Somalia. What had been a mission to provide security for humanitarian relief operations and nation building appeared to be gravitating towards an increasingly violent, urban guerilla conflict. The USC/SNA had successfully targeted and neutralized Moroccan forces, another possible
decisive point. Though not a target of the militia, French forces also served notice of their withdrawal from the city. With the attack on the enclave complete, further use of French forces within Mogadishu was not permitted.

Follow-on Operations

Following the 17 June operation, UNOSOM II forces conducted limited raids on weapons caches throughout Mogadishu and the surrounding area. On 18 June, Italian forces conducted a raid against a site in Villa Somalia, a complex of buildings near the city’s new seaport.22 On 19 June, the U.S. Quick Reaction Force destroyed more than 19 serviceable mortar and artillery tubes located outside of Mogadishu.23 Pakistani forces conducted limited raids against weapons sites on 21, 23, 24, and 28 June. In addition, Force Command, seeking to limit the USC/SNA militia’s access to additional weapons and munitions, destroyed weapons and munitions at three outlying ammunition and weapons storage sites, one in Afgoye and two in the vicinity of Belet Uen.24

The USC/SNA, however, was not idle. Hostile militia began to escalate their activity against UNOSOM II forces and installations. On 22 June, they began what would become nightly harassment of UNOSOM II installations with small arms and rocket propelled grenade (RPG) fire.25 Weekly anti-UNOSOM II demonstrations were held at the Stadium on Lenin Road. Somalis began erecting road blocks in the militia controlled areas along Lenin Road, National Street, Armed Forces Street and 21 October Road. It was initially thought that the roadblocks were intended for harassment and as acts of protest. However, on 27 June their tactical significance was realized when Pakistani forces accompanied by U.S. engineers were ambushed while clearing a road block on 21 October Road.26 Over the next few months, this new escalation of violence by USC/SNA militia forces became increasingly more frequent. These ambushes would further fuel the reluctance of units within the city to get out on the streets in lightly armored vehicles or on foot. In its 28 June SITREP, Force Command emphasized the need for additional armored personnel carriers, as well as the urgent need to expedite the deployment of the mechanized Indian Brigade.27 With the arrival of this
fifth brigade, Force Command anticipated that a complete disarmament operation could be conducted in the city. Until then, UNOSOM II forces limited operations to small scale raids and cordon and search operations.

It was at this juncture that UNOSOM II recognized the need to isolate the Aideed-led USC/SNA militia from the rest of the Haber Gedir clan. An information campaign supported by Force Command was initiated. Leaflets emphasizing UNOSOM II's desire to work with the Haber Gedir in the political process were distributed. These leaflets further stated that it was Aideed who was to be excluded from the political reconciliation process, not the USC/SNA or the Haber Gedir clan.28

The end of June did welcome the arrival of forces from Zimbabwe, Malaysia, and Egypt. The Malaysians and Egyptians were used to bolster forces in the city. The Malaysian battalion served as an armored reserve under Force Command and its elements augmented Pakistani and Italian patrols in Mogadishu. The increased Egyptian force (battalion) assumed full responsibility for airfield security, releasing an additional Pakistani company for employment elsewhere in the city.29

2 July

The month of July started off as violently as the preceding month. On 2 July, Italian forces were attacked by USC/SNA militia near the Pasta Factory (a business complex that dominated the UNOSOM II main supply routes (MSRs) to Balad/Belet Uen and the Central Region). An Italian mechanized battalion, reinforced with tanks, had just completed a joint search operation with Somali Police when it encountered a road block and began receiving heavy fire from the Pasta Factory at 0945 hours (See Figure 7). Heavy fighting ensued and the Italian brigade commander called for U.S. Quick Reaction Force assistance. The U.S. Quick Reaction Company began movement to assist on the ground while Quick Reaction Force attack helicopters were immediately dispatched by air. Quick Reaction Force attack helicopters and Italian tanks began to engage enemy forces in the Pasta Factory. However, just after counter fires began, the Italian brigade commander asked for a ceasefire so he could withdraw his forces. The fight was over by 1330 hours.
The ambush had been costly both in terms of life and the resolve of Italian forces to conduct Chapter VII operations. Italian forces suffered casualties of 30 wounded and 3 killed, and they abandoned Strong Points 42 and 19, key strong points protecting the Balad/Belet Uen main supply routes. The Italians negotiated with the local elders in the area (USC/SNA elders) in order to re-occupy these strong points at the end of the month. In effect, UNOSOM II forces were only allowed to operate in that portion of North Mogadishu with the permission and at the discretion of the USC/SNA.

USC/SNA militia had attacked another possible decisive point, in effect neutralizing the second UNOSOM II brigade size force in Mogadishu. Following the 2 July attack, the Italian force commander virtually reverted his forces to a Chapter VI status. In so doing, cordon and search operations and aggressive checks at strong points stopped. This is evidenced in Force Command's 6 July cable to the Under Secretary General for Peacekeeping Operations:

National authorities and local commanders feel free to ignore direction and urging for aggressive action. On the one hand, [one national contingent] is reluctant to operate until further reinforced with tanks and additional APCs. On the other, the [another national contingent] is insistent on further negotiations with faction elders who have no actual influence on the USC/SNA militia.

This concern was also highlighted in the 7 July UNOSOM Force Command Situation Report (SITREP).

[National] military officials have forbidden them [their national forces] to conduct indiscriminate violent reprisals against Aideed's forces. This prohibition places [their Brigade Commander] in a difficult position because he is required to negotiate before engaging in military operations against Aideed. [Another national contingent] is hesitant to take any new action to disrupt militia activity until the arrival of tanks.

This willingness on the part of the Italians to negotiate directly with local hostile militia forces had deeper affect on the coalition operations. Many coalition partners were hesitant to share operational and intelligence data with the Italian forces fearing such matters would be compromised. Even within the headquarters, the UNOSOM
II chief intelligence officer, an Italian officer, was excluded from the planning process on numerous UNOSOM II directed operations.

By U.N. forces allowing the USC/SNA militia to dominate the Balad/Belet Uen road, Aideed ensured access to the Central Region - his power base prior to the Somalia civil war. As long as this situation continued, unrestricted reinforcements (militia and arms) could flow into Mogadishu.

As UNOSOM II forces became more timid in their operations, the militia activity dramatically increased. Road blocks and small scale ambushes and attacks (both daylight and night) became almost a daily occurrence in July. For example, 4 July saw two daylight attacks on U.N. convoys. On 7 July, six U.N. Somali employees were killed in a vehicle ambush. On 8 July, U.S. and Pakistani units were ambushed on 21 October Road and Lenin Road respectively. On 9 July, U.S. vehicles were again ambushed on 21 October Road. Night attacks on U.N. facilities also increased, targeting U.S. facilities more frequently.

On 9 July another escalatory step was taken by the militia. Mortars were fired into the Embassy Compound. This was significant in that it was the first time that mortars were used. It appeared that these were not aimed against any particular military coalition. However, through the indiscriminate use of this weapon against the Embassy Compound, U.N. civilian agencies and other humanitarian aid workers who lived and worked out of the Embassy felt threatened. One result of these attacks was evacuation of nonessential civilian employees in the compound. This reduced manning level of U.N. civilian staffs directly affected the staff's ability to fully execute the humanitarian as well as political requirements of the mandate. In addition, nongovernment organizations who had returned since the opening of hostilities in June left again and other nongovernment organizations, who were considering a return to the country, postponed their return indefinitely. This was another possible decisive point. By keeping nongovernment organizations and U.N. humanitarian efforts at minimum levels, the USC/SNA could discredit UNOSOM II thus affecting its legitimacy. The primary emphasis of the UNOSOM I, UNITAF, and now UNOSOM II mandates had been to provide a secure environment for
operations in any fashion discredited the current U.N. leadership with the Somali population.

These attacks also succeeded in reducing manning levels of the U.N. political staff. Since the Galcayo Peace Conference, Aideed had lost the initiative in the Somali reconciliation process. The U.N. had forged ahead and was making progress with the establishment of district and regional councils in the outlying areas of Somalia. Should the USC/SNA neutralize or force the withdrawal of the U.N. forces, Aideed would be seen as the dominant military power in the Southern Region. However, military dominance would only ensure his ability to survive another civil conflict. Aideed must have realized that he had to regain the political initiative among the clans if he were to win control of the country. To this end, he had to slow and eventually halt the U.N. sponsored political reconciliation process.

12 July - Abdi House

UNOSOM II forces regained the initiative against the militia with a decisive attack on a key USC/SNA command and control center on 12 July. The precision attack on the Abdi House dealt Aideed a significant setback. Ground and air elements of the U.S. Quick Reaction Force conducted the raid which destroyed the militia command and communications center and much of the SNA's hard core anti-UNOSOM II leadership who, according to intelligence, had planned and controlled the attacks on UNOSOM II.\(^{39}\) This operation had been executed exclusively by U.S. forces. This was partly due to the reluctance of coalition partners to take aggressive action and partly due to the operational security concerns with some members of the coalition. The mission further had to be approved by CENTCOM for it was clearly outside the Terms of Reference for employment of the Quick Reaction Force.

While a tactical success, the Abdi house had strategic implications that prevented UNOSOM II from capitalizing on its success. Following the attack crowds gathered outside the house and rioted. In the process they killed several international press reporters.\(^{40}\) That afternoon, truck loads of dead and wounded women and children were transported over to the international press hotel and a Somali,
identified as the USC/SNA public affairs spokesman, declared that UNOSOM II had deliberately killed innocent civilians. While these claims were refuted by UNOSOM II in later press conferences, USC/SNA had exploited another possible decisive point - the media. The media campaign was being won by the militia. And again the intent of the media announcements was to discredit the legitimacy of UNOSOM II.

The violent, sudden, and unilateral nature of the attack also disturbed some coalition national authorities, many of whom saw the attack as likely to bring on USC/SNA reprisals against UNOSOM II forces. Attacking the command center without warning was perceived by some as too provocative an act and an escalation of the violence. The unilateral attack on the Abdi House implicated the coalition partners by association. Without prior consultation, their governments were ill-prepared to respond to press and public criticisms received from this operation. Italy vehemently denounced the airborne attack, and the Italian Defense Minister called for a "cooling off" period with a halt to military operations in order to produce a calmer atmosphere for negotiations on reconciling the rival Somali factions and renewing efforts at peaceful disarmament. The French, who had previously strongly supported the military operations in Mogadishu, now too demonstrated anxiety over this latest attack. The French defense minister announced his nation was going to withdraw its forces from Somalia stating France's mandate to participate in the mission was not "open-ended."

However, while the French continued to actively enforce security and disarmament in their area of responsibility, Italian forces remained restricted by their National Command Authority from conducting offensive operations, to include cordon and searches. The situation was further complicated by reports from reliable sources that Italian officials were conducting unauthorized negotiations with Aidedd and other USC/SNA leaders. The restriction on Italian force operations had a negative effect on coalition operations. North Mogadishu was rapidly becoming a de facto sanctuary for USC/SNA militia. Pakistani forces became even more reluctant to conduct offensive operations and aggressive patrolling in the city. The lack of heavy armor (tanks) and the appearance that
they would be the only force conducting operations against the militia in Mogadishu significantly contributed to their reluctance. In a cable to the Under Secretary General for Peacekeeping Operations on 18 July 1993, the Special Representative to the Secretary General advised U.N. New York of Force Command's concerns regarding the "passive presence" of the Italian forces and the negative impact of a virtual Italian sanctuary for Aideed in Somalia. Consequently, instead of exploiting the advantages gained from 12 July, UNOSOM II forces assumed a defensive posture. This permitted the militia to increase its hit and run mortar and RPG strikes against U.N. installations.

The 12 July operation would significantly impair future employment of the U.S. combat forces. Concerns regarding the high profile of U.S. Forces in offensive operations in Mogadishu led to a layered decision making process in the United States. The concept of operation for the Abdi raid had to be briefed and approved in Washington before execution. Following this operation, it would become quite difficult to get concepts for employment of U.S. aviation assets approved for anything beyond force protection; and U.S. ground forces would be limited to search operations in areas adjacent to U.S. facilities. This policy was in keeping with the original command intent to maintain a low signature in order that U.S. combat forces could revert to an "over the horizon" mission by the end of the summer. This policy for withholding of U.S. troops would negatively impact the coalition forces and their own willingness to place soldiers at risk. The Pakistani Foreign Ministry stated that without U.S. air strikes there would be "chaos in the country." Attempting to prod coalition forces into action without continued use of U.S. forces, especially attack helicopter assets, slowed any UNOSOM II follow-on action and effectively lost any initiative gained by the raid. This U.S. policy (with the exception of Task Force Ranger and its special mission) would not change for the duration of the mission, despite the fact that the levels of violence would increase and success for the U.N. mission was significantly more at risk since the policy was first developed in May.
Targeting U.S. Forces

The arrival of tanks for Pakistani forces on 18 July gave UNOSOM II a slight reprieve from operational inertia. This arrival of tanks combined with the operational status of the Malaysian forces served as a catalyst for more actions in South Mogadishu. By 23 July, situation reports (SITREPS) were indicating a decrease in the attacks by the militia as a result of the increased patrolling. SITREPS on 24 and 25 July indicated that the extensive use of aviation assets at night to attack militia forces to include suspected mortar positions had reduced militia activities at night.

The relative calm in Mogadishu that existed at the end of July continued into August. However, the militia continued its "shoot and scoot" tactic of firing a few mortar or RPG rounds into a U.N. installation and then quickly escaping before UNOSOM II forces could react. The UNOSOM SITREPS on 15 August and 18 August stated that the quiet experienced in Mogadishu during this period could be attributed to a number of factors. These included the newly initiated patrolling and searches, the fighting in July, which resulted in depleting militia ammunition stocks and the effects of attacks on Haber Gedir leadership which hampered its near-term ability to mount offensive operations. UNOSOM II forces continued to conduct searches in selected areas of Mogadishu and outlying AORs throughout the month of August.

However, on 4 August the USC/SNA militia escalated violence against another UNOSOM II coalition member—U.S. forces. This began with the introduction of mine warfare. Clearly, the militia was trying to regain the initiative it was losing to UNOSOM II. Mines along major roads used by the U.N. caused indiscriminate injuries to both civilian and military personnel alike. The indiscriminate use of these devices was soon refined. The militia introduced the use of command detonated mines as a means of attacking specific contingents. Four U.S. military police were killed by the first command detonated mine on 8 August while they conducted a routine patrol in South Mogadishu. When U.S. vehicles were hit by command detonated mines on 19 and 22 August, there was little doubt that the U.S. contingent was being targeted. This new development caused Logistics Support Command to construct a bypass.
road around the city in order to reduce the threat to logistic convoys. The route was secured by the U.S. Quick Reaction Force as part of its force protection mission. The combination of the mine incidents, the continuing mortar attacks, and the growing threat of ambushes on 21 October Road strengthened COMUSFORSON's concern for force protection. These factors contributed to his request through U.S. National Authorities for heavy forces to enhance U.S. force protection.

In addition to the mine threat, militia forces were becoming more aggressive in their attempt to shoot down U.S. Quick Reaction Force helicopters. Attack helicopters had proved to be a significant deterrent to militia operations and, therefore, became a high priority target for the militia. On 9 August, the first Quick Reaction Force helicopter was hit by small arms fire. USC/SNA militia forces continued to refine their techniques for surface to air engagements, and began using RPGs as well as small arms. A Quick Reaction Force aircraft was hit by an RPG for the first time on 25 August but the aircraft suffered only slight damage. U.N. forces had been relying on attack helicopters to quickly respond against hostile mortar firing positions. This tactic would be used against UNOSOM II by militia in another successful engagement of a Quick Reaction Force helicopter by ground fire on 2 September. A review of the incident revealed that the militia had used a mortar position to draw the helicopter into an ambush site covered by interlocking ground fire. Again on the morning of 25 September, the first Quick Reaction Force helicopter was shot down by RPG fire while investigating a similar mortar firing incident near the new sea port.

While these mine and aircraft attacks did not neutralize the effectiveness of U.S. forces, they were significant in that U.S. Congressional debate was initiated and ranking Congressional officials openly questioned further U.S. support for the humanitarian effort in Somalia.

Another Attempt at an Integrated Strategy

The escalation of guerrilla warfare and violence in Mogadishu underscored the fact that the military component alone could not solve
the problems in Mogadishu and Somalia. Force Command attempted to integrate all divisions of UNOSOM (political, military and developmental (economic) elements of power) into a common strategy. With limited resources on the civilian side, a focused strategy was essential if UNOSOM II was to be successful in countering further hostile militia success. On 7 August, the Force Command planning staff presented a concept to the Special Representative to the Secretary General for voluntary disarmament in Mogadishu. It proposed the establishment of district councils in areas of the city controlled by UNOSOM II. Each district council was to serve as the political body with which UNOSOM II would work through to focus development resources, police training, and other programs for restoring a full social structure and order for the area. These district councils would be the catalyst for the disarmament program by promoting voluntary disarmament among the clans in their district. As councils and disarmament programs were established, the limited humanitarian dollars would be funneled to these districts as well. One aspect of this plan was to further divide the Haber Gedir. Force Command's plan sought to convince clan leaders that continued support of Aideed would result in their exclusion from political and economic processes. The key to its success would be visible signs of progress.57

To implement this plan, the Security and Reconstruction Committee (SARC) was formed. This committee consisted of staff representatives from the political, humanitarian, justice, disarmament and military divisions of UNOSOM II as well as nongovernment organizations. This committee performed the detailed work necessary to formulate an integrated plan for the various districts within Mogadishu. It marked the first time UNOSOM II successfully integrated the civil and military staffs in a common organization with a common agenda and objective.58 It further marked a major reversal of emphasis in UNOSOM II away from the military to political and development efforts. The military began to take on a supporting role in Mogadishu rather than the lead. Finally, the UNOSOM II political division came to realize that there were sufficient areas within Mogadishu and its vicinity to begin to set
up district councils (Mogadishu had been avoided because of the continuing violence).

The most difficult obstacle to overcome in the staff integration process was any appearance that the humanitarian effort was linked to a military strategy. The nongovernment organizations and stovepipe U.N. agencies insisted on maintaining their neutral status and did not want to be perceived as supporters of a UNOSOM II political or military agenda. Maintenance of their apolitical status was paramount for their continued operations in Somalia, and they did not want to be perceived as a pawn or a tool for political reconciliation. However, by the end of September and early October a common ground had been reached and there was some integration.

The reality of divergent agendas among the organizations whose charters were to assist Somalia exposed one of the major weaknesses in the organization and structure of the U.N. civil staff in this operation. There was no unity of effort. When it came to directing the humanitarian relief effort or refugee repatriation, the Special Representative to the Secretary General and his Humanitarian Division had little or no authority over supporting agencies. The nongovernment organizations were in no way bound to support the UNOSOM II effort, as they were operating under the sole authority of their own organization. UNOSOM II had little to no influence on their operations and could only expel them from the country if there was overwhelming evidence of subversion. The same applied to U.N. agencies such as the United Nations Development Program (UNDP) and the United Nations High Commission for Refugees (UNHCR). While theoretically the Special Representative to the Secretary General was in charge, these and other U.N. agencies working in Somalia and the surrounding countries in reality took instructions from their home offices rather than the Special Representative to the Secretary General. Consequently, the Special Representative to the Secretary General and his staff could not readily use the resources and assets available in humanitarian and development agencies to support the United Nations overall strategy for Somalia without exhausting much effort on consensus building.59
As a result of this effort, limited progress was made in Mogadishu. Several district councils were established in Mogadishu in those areas not controlled by USC/SNA. Pakistani forces once again began integrating Somali Police into their checkpoint operations. By 20 August, 31 feeding sites of the original 35 were operating three times per week. A new self-help program, "Food for Trash Program," to clean up the city was being implemented. On 25 August, Force Command launched "Operation Pothole" which employed local Somalis in a food for work program to repair the major roads in Mogadishu. Materials were purchased by the Chief Administrative Officer (CAO), equipment and engineer supervision provided by Logistics Support Command, security provided by Pakistanis, and laborers provided by the local community.60

This period came to a close at the end of August with the arrival of Task Force Ranger. Bangladesh forces had closed into theater and taken over the K4 area (a key intersection connecting the air and sea ports) from the Pakistanis by 23 August,61 and the advance party for the Indian Brigade arrived on 30 August.62

Search for Aideed (31 August - 3 October)

General Background

August brought an increased dedication of resources to capture Aideed and his senior advisors. A U.S. ranger task force was introduced into theater for this mission. The Special Representative to the Secretary General had requested additional forces from the United States for this effort. He either saw the lack of initiative by the coalition or understood that there was currently no properly configured force in theater that could execute the mission to arrest, detain and bring to trial those responsible for the armed attacks against U.N. Forces. It was at this point a U.S. official noted that the Pentagon argued "'if it is us against Aideed, we might as well try to actually get Aideed' . . . Howe. . . . wanted more force and said 'you have approved the U.N. resolution to go after [Aideed] and you have to provide the forces to do it.'"63

However, at the same time U.S. rangers were deploying to Somalia, an alternative strategy divergent from this "snatch and grab option" was
being developed in Washington. In July, David Shinn, the State
Department Coordinator for Somalia had headed an interagency assessment
team to the theater to review the U.N. mission. A result of this visit
was a new call by the U.S. government for the United Nations to pursue
political initiatives instead of relying solely on a military solution
in an attempt to end the hostilities in South Mogadishu. On August 27,
Defense Secretary Aspin articulated this new policy:

The President's decision to deploy an additional 400 U.S.
troops to Somalia has focused renewed attention on the security
aspect... of what is happening there. That focus is much too
narrow... If there is to be a solution to Somalia's problems,
it must be much more than a military solution... The United
Nations and the Organization of African Unity should act now to
bring the parties back together on the peace track.64

In September, the State Department urged the United Nations to
try to bring the warring factions in Somalia together by working with
the Horn of Africa committee.65 President Clinton personally reinforced
this message in his 27 September speech to the General Assembly where he
outlined stricter criteria for U.N. as well as U.S. engagement in peace
operations. By pressing for this change in direction, however, the
administration was following a "two track" policy. Continuing the hunt
for Aideed while simultaneously articulating the pursuit for political
reconciliation initiatives would lead to damaging results for the UNOSOM
II mission.

The first of these was the rejection for the deployment of force
protection units (armored forces) endorsed by U.S. Central Command.
The request was not acted upon and thus denied by Defense Secretary
the request because he got conflicting advice and saw 'no great sense
of urgency.'" Secretary Aspin also thought this might have been
viewed as an escalation of the military track at a time when the U.S.
was pushing the United Nations to investigate and pursue new political
solutions.67 The second failure of the policy would leave the
President unprepared for the consequences of the 3 October raid
against the Olympic Hotel as will be discussed later in this chapter.68
The problem with the administration's new "two track" policy for
Somalia would appear not to be one of execution, but one of formulation.69

North Mogadishu Turnover

While a new political strategy was being developed in Washington, some U.N. political staffers on the ground in Mogadishu were pursuing back-channel initiatives with USC/SNA representatives. While not meeting directly with Aideed, they met with several of his principles to include Osman Atto. The USC/SNA representatives were hesitant to turn against Aideed personally, but they were also displeased with continued violence. As some progress in the negotiations was being made, the U.S. announcement to deploy the ranger element caused a postponement for several days. Meetings resumed again on 3 September, and appeared to again be making headway with certain members of the SNA delegation requesting a cessation of all military activity as a first step. These discussions were relayed to the Special Representative to the Secretary General and to senior U.N. military commanders. On 4 September, U.N. officials met with the SNA to discuss details of a ceasefire proposal. However, the initiative was aborted following the ambush of Nigerian soldiers the next day.70

These negotiations under the auspices of the UNOSOM II headquarters were sanctioned by the United Nations. However, the earlier uncoordinated and unauthorized Italian negotiations with the USC/SNA caused the Under Secretary for Peacekeeping Operations to intervene at his level and he announced the removal of the Italian brigade commander from theater.71 The Under Secretary stated that the Italian general had refused to carry out orders in the increasing offensive action against hostile factions and that an "unhealthy" distrust had developed between the Italian commander and other commanders in the coalition.72 The removal of the Italian contingent from Mogadishu and the removal of the Italian brigade commander who was seen as a proponent for continued dealings with the militia was necessary to ensure future success.73 In Rome the Italian National Authorities were incensed and the Defense Minister stated that "this is a very singular way to avoid the real problem."74 Italy wanted a review
of the mission and argued the operation was degenerating into open conflict with one warlord. The United Nations was losing sight of the humanitarian mission.\textsuperscript{75} The U.S government intervened to settle the rift between the U.N. and Italy. Officially the U.S. announced that UNOSOM had suffered from some lapses of political coordination and from disagreements on command and control. Given the unprecedented nature of the operation itself, this should not be surprising. \textellipsis . UNOSOM and the Secretary General are working with the support of the United States and other troop-contributing nations to refine UNOSOM’s internal coordination arrangements.\textsuperscript{76}

Italian National Authorities eventually agreed to the withdrawal of their forces from the city with the exception of a small contingent left to protect their embassy. Italian National Authorities successfully argued for the retention of the brigade commander until his scheduled change of command in early September.

To execute this change of sector, Force Command recalled Nigerian forces from Belet Uen in early September. The North Mogadishu AOR turnover was to be shared by Nigerians and Pakistani forces. Pakistani forces were reinforced by their battalion which was providing security in the area immediately outside Mogadishu. This was accomplished by Moroccan forces assuming control of Marka and by the recently reinforced Zimbabwe contingent assuming control of Afgoye.

The changeover of operations in the city was phased with the Nigerians assuming control of key strong points along the Balad Road (Balad/Belet Uen MSR) followed by Pakistani occupation of strong points in the vicinity of the New Port.

The attempted turnover of Nigerian forces resulted in a violent ambush against this coalition member. The turnover of Strong Points 42 and 19 began at 0500, when Nigerian forces departed their garrison in the old port. All details of the turnover had been coordinated by the Italian forces. They had hosted meetings with the local elders in the areas affected notifying them of the upcoming transition. The early start time was selected because Somalis rarely ever stirred in Mogadishu before 0700. Pakistani forces believed that this early start time would reduce any possibility of disruption or confrontation with local Somalis. However, on this particular morning, Italian forces reported a
large crowd of Somalis concentrating at the Pasta Factory in the vicinity of Strong Point 42 at about 0400.

At 0605, the Nigerian company reached Strong Point 42 to begin the relief of Italian forces there. According to the Nigerian battalion commander's after action report, the company commander was approached by one of the elders from the area, Mr Gullit (media spokesman for the USC/SHA following the Abdi House raid). Mr Gullit told him that the Nigerians needed to have an agreement with the elders before taking over. When the commander said that he would proceed with the changeover, Mr Gullit responded "the Nigerian Troops will see." Five minutes later, Somali militia men opened fire on the Nigerian forces. At 0700, the Nigerian unit commander at Strong Point 42 requested reinforcements from his battalion. Within minutes, the Nigerian unit at Strong Point 19 began moving to assist their comrades. The reinforcing unit split into two columns. One moved up Balad Road, and the other went to the east a few blocks, then north to 21 October Road and on to Strong Point 42. The element moving up Balad Road was ambushed a few hundred meters north of Strong Point 19. Heavy fighting ensued which lasted until 0930. During the fighting one of the Nigerian APCs was cut off from the rest of the element on Balad Road. As they withdrew from the ambush site, the Nigerian element commander requested support from the Italian armored forces at Strong Point 19. The Italian commander stated he had to request permission first. Instead of calling for guidance from his higher headquarters, it was reported that the Italian officer, using a motorola radio, contacted Mr. Gullit and attempted to negotiate permission for Italian relief of the Nigerian column. Permission to intercede was naturally denied by the elder. Nigerian forces received 17 casualties and one Nigerian soldier was captured.

CNN coverage of the ambush demonstrated support for the Nigerian accusations. Somali militia were shown mutilating a dead Nigerian soldier while an Italian tank and supporting forces looked on in the background. The Italian brigade commander would later negotiate with the local elders to allow his forces to enter the area and retrieve the Nigerian dead. However, despite attempts by Italian and UNOSCOM II
negotiators, the captured Nigerian soldier would not be released by the USC/SNA until mid-October. 

This incident again raised serious questions regarding the Italian force's resolve to support UNOSOM II operations. The Nigerian after action report not only indicated the lack of support to their forces in contact but also suggested that the presence of the Somalis at Strong Point 42 at 0400 indicated that the militia had prior knowledge of the operation. Finally, the report indicated that there may have been some arrangement between the Italian force and the local Somali elders regarding UNOSOM II operations in the area (conditions for continuation of a de facto sanctuary) which the Nigerian force would not support. As a result, Force Headquarters recommended that the Security Council direct an independent investigation to ascertain the real facts.

Turnover of the strong points was delayed in order to give the Italian, Pakistani and Nigerian force commanders the opportunity to meet with the local elders to discuss the AOR turnover. Initially, all meetings were set up and run by Italian forces. When it appeared no headway was being made, the Force Command operations section in concert with the civilian political staff established a new series of separate meetings in North Mogadishu to discuss the turnover. The outcome of these meetings was quite different. Instead of elders refusing to accept other UNOSOM II forces into the area, the elders warmly welcomed the peacekeepers. Based on these meetings, peaceful turnovers occurred on 14 and 16 September. Initially Nigerian forces reinforced with Malaysian forces jointly manned Strong Point 19 (along Balad Road), while Pakistani forces assumed control of the other Strong Points near the new port. However, Strong Point 42 at the key intersection of Balad and 21 October roads was left unoccupied and abandoned to hostile control. This area was clearly in an area dominated by hostile militia and no negotiations were held by UNOSOM II with Mr. Gullit, the USC/SNA representative.

This was another possible decisive point exploited by the USC/SNA. The USC/SNA attack on the Nigerians did not neutralize that contingent's operational status, for Nigerian forces would aggressively
patrol their reduced AOR. However, the attack did deny UNOSOM II access to the Balad Road and thus cut off humanitarian and military resupply efforts to Balad and Belet Uen where the German Support group was stationed. To compensate for the loss of this main supply route, Force Command would construct another bypass road from Afgoye to Balad north of Mogadishu. However, the inability of UNOSOM II to establish control at Strong Point 42 was a tactical setback for UNOSOM II. What was thought to be a de facto sanctuary for militia forces under Italian control proved to be just that. Since the 2 July ambush, USC/SNA forces had been firmly in control of the northeastern section of the city. Militia reinforcements and arms resupply most probably had access into the city through that sector. Now with the absence of any force, there was certainly nothing to halt or slow militia reinforcement and resupply into Mogadishu.

21 October Road

The violence on 21 October Road significantly escalated in September. The construction of road blocks by the USC/SNA supporters on 21 October Road became a daily occurrence. Numerous road blocks were constructed over the course of the day to hinder and/or deny resupply to the Pakistani stadium garrison near the Cigarette Factory. As soon as roadblocks were removed, new ones were immediately constructed. Along the five kilometer stretch from the intersection with Lenin Road to the stadium, ten separate roadblocks were built on 5 September and the road had to be temporarily closed on 5 September (See Figure 7).82

The crisis on 21 October Road became violent on 9 and 16 September, when Pakistani and U.S. forces engaged USC/SNA militia in heavy fire fights. The most violent and costly occurred on 9 September. Pakistani and U.S. engineers were clearing road blocks near the Cigarette Factory when they were taken under fire by USC/SNA militia with 106 mm recoilless rifles, RPGs, and small arms. The militia was effectively suppressed by a combination of fires from ground forces and attack helicopters. Between 1530 and 1600, the clearing element was again taken under attack while clearing road blocks near the Cigarette Factory (site of the 5 June ambush). Women and children built the
roadblocks while militia (to include women) covered the obstacles by fire. The intensity of this fight was significantly more than the earlier one. In addition to receiving fire from heavy concentrations of militia forces in firing positions, the Pakistani and U.S. forces on the ground were attacked by over 1000 Somali men and women carrying weapons. As women pressed in close to the U.N. soldiers, armed militia fired upon the peacekeepers from within the crowd and from vantage points overlooking the battle ground. An intense fire fight ensued, lasting until about 1835. At this point the Somalis broke off the engagement, having suffered numerous casualties from both ground forces and Quick Reaction Force attack helicopters. UNOSOM II forces suffered 6 casualties in the engagement.83

A second fire fight broke out on 16 September between Pakistani forces and USC/SNA militia. While clearing road blocks on 21 October Road, Pakistani forces were taken under fire by RPGs. They returned fire with a tank main gun and destroyed the enemy position. However, one tank was destroyed in the ambush. From this date through the end of the month, 21 October Road was not used by U.N. traffic, and road blocks built along it were left in place. An alternate route for resupply of Pakistani Forces at the Stadium was chosen and used.84 Due to their success along 21 October Road, militia ambushes would escalate to other main patrol routes. On 21 September, at approximately 0635, a Pakistani APC was destroyed on Afgoye Road near Benedir Hospital opposite their Strong Point 9. There were nine casualties, including two killed.85

These incidents are possible decisive points. Having occupied the crossroads in northeast Mogadishu, it appeared the USC/SNA was now attempting to drive the Pakistanis from their stadium garrison allowing the militia free access along the entire northern route into the city. It was also significant in that these attacks directly challenged the armored capability of the Pakistanis. Whatever renewed confidence the Pakistanis had gained with the arrival of tanks was once again shattered after these assaults. Further, due to limited repair parts, the Pakistanis would rarely have more than two or three tanks operational at any one time. This would cause the tanks to be withheld as a tactical reserve by the brigade commander, to be used only in emergencies and not
for routine patrolling operations. These violent attacks against the Pakistanis armored forces again placed them in a defensive posture. Though the stadium garrison remained in-place, being resupplied along an alternate route, routine patrols along 21 October Road north of the Afgoye Road cut-off ceased.

Mortar Attacks

With the return to a bunker mentality by Pakistani forces, the USC/SNA militia was able to significantly escalate their mortar attacks on UNOSOM II installations. U.N./U.S. forces suffered 9 casualties from these fires. On 10 September, Force Command permitted its own mortar crews to conduct counter fire into selected, less-populated target areas where mortar positions had been identified. Efforts were taken to ensure that collateral damage was minimized. All engagements were observed fire engagements either by observers from strong points or by Quick Reaction Force aerial observers. Fires were cleared only when no presence in the area of women and children had been verified. This proved effective in reducing the intensity of the attacks, but it did not eliminate them. This measure was taken primarily due to the lack of aggressive patrolling taken by coalition forces.

Other Operations (Searches)

Limited searches and weapons confiscation operations at check points and strong points continued during the month of September to include operations conducted by the Quick Reaction Force in the vicinity of U.S. troop areas. On 13 September, the Quick Reaction Force conducted a search southeast of Benedir Hospital in the Medina Area. UNOSOM II had indications that mortars were possibly located there. The search began at approximately 0525. At approximately 0555, militia forces consolidated for a counterattack against the U.S. ground forces. Fighting initially was localized there. As the Quick Reaction Force was withdrawing, approximately 0650, it came under intense fire. As the search element withdrew toward the Embassy Compound, APCS from the Turkish Company and U.S. attack helicopters provided covering fire. By 0935 the element had closed into the Embassy compound, suffering three casualties from the two hour engagement. This was another decisive
point. Though it did not deter further U.S. ground operations, it marked the first time the USC/SNA had massed forces against a large U.S. ground combat unit.87 Despite suffering greater losses than UNOSOM II, the militia was serving notice that U.S. combat forces were not exempt from their planned attacks on coalition forces.
Endnotes

1UNOSOM II Fax from the Under Secretary General for Peacekeeping Operations to the Special Representative to the Secretary General, Subject: "Draft Resolution on Somalia, S/25889," 6 June 1993, 2 to 4.


3Ibid.


6Tom Farer, an American University professor of law and international relations who would later conduct the initial investigation for the U.N. into the events of 5 June, commented in October of 1993 that there was "clear and convincing evidence" that Aideed alone could have directed the attacks. However, despite the evidence against Aideed, "the 6 June resolution was hurried and ill-advised. 'Anything which could get through all of the relevant bureaucracies in 24 hours is extraordinary expedited. . . . not much thought could have gone into it.'" From Barton Gellman, "U.S. Rhetoric Changed, but Hunt Persisted," The Washington Post, 7 October 1993, A44.

7UNOSOM II Fax from Force Command to the U.N. Military Advisor to the Under Secretary General for Peacekeeping Operations, Subject: Delay in Deployment of UNOSOM II Forces, 3 July 1993, 1.

8UNOSOM II Operations Briefing to the Command Group, 8-9 June 1993, and Fragmentation Order Number 39 to UNOSOM II OPLAN 1, 101400C June 1993, 4.

9Fragmentation Order Number 39 to UNOSOM II OPLAN 1, 101400C June 1993, 8.

10UNOSOM II Memorandum from Force Command to the Special Representative to the Secretary General, Subject: Force Command Concerns for Future Planning, 16 June 1993, 1 to 2.

11UNOSOM II Operations Briefing to the Command Group, 8-9 June 1993; and Fragmentation Order Number 39 to UNOSOM II OPLAN 1, 101400C June 1993, 3 to 6.


UNOSOM II Memorandum from Force Command to the Special Representative to the Secretary General, Subject: Force Command Concerns for Future Planning, 16 June 1993, 1 to 2; and Fragmentation Order Number 39 to UNOSOM II OPLAN 1, 101400C June 1993, 3.

UNOSOM II Fragmentation Order Number 43 to UNOSOM II OPLAN I, 161000C June 1993, 1 to 2.


Fragmentation Order Number 43 to UNOSOM II OPLAN I, 161000C June 1993, 3.


Ibid., 7.

Personal Field Notes, 22 June 1993, 1.

Letter from the Chief of the French Defence Staff to Force Command, 14 June 1993, 1 to 2. The letter stated that

the [national] government, aware of the necessity and the emergency of the restoration of the situation in Mogadishu, which you rightfully considered as your priority, was keen on displaying its solidarity with the United Nations and thus put an intervention party at your disposal for a limited time and a defined mission. However, while almost 4,000 UNOSOM II troops are stationed in Mogadishu and furthermore the American Quick Reaction Force is ready to intervene in the shortest reaction time in case of major problem, it seems that it is not appropriate, generally speaking to call for reinforcement[s] coming from neighboring areas, which jeopardizes their dispositions.

In response to this letter, UNOSOM headquarters sent an 18 June cable from the Special Representative to the Secretary General to the Under Secretary General for Peacekeeping Operations Subject: Need for Armored Units in Mogadishu, in which a request was made for the French force to return to the city in order "to provide a mechanized/armor reserve capability to Mogadishu for the brief additional time... to determine if there will be further attacks by Aiddeed's militia." This cable was the first request made for armored reinforcements in Mogadishu. The cable ended with a request to "expedite provision of two companies of tanks for the Pakistanis to operate."


We took three wounded 27 June; another three were wounded and tow were killed on 28 June. This will continue until equipment is on hand to equip the Pakistani brigade. For that reason, we need your help to expedite shipment of 12 APCs within 10 days, and the shipment of Turkish tanks. Also need to expedite deployment of the Indian forces to arrive earlier this month.

Note: tanks for the Pakistani brigade were coming from NATO stocks, specifically Turkey.

28UNOSOM II Force Command SITREP to U.N. New York, 29 June 1993, 8 ("We are preparing new leaflets to clarify the distinction between Aideed's activities and the Haber Gedir clan so as to ensure UNOSOM does not alienate any clan from the peaceful political process.").


30UNOSOM II Force Command Special SITREP to U.N. New York, 3 July 1993, 1 to 3.

31UNOSOM II Code Cable from the Special Representative to the Secretary General to the Under Secretary General for Peacekeeping Operations, Subject: "Additional Insights re Situation in Mogadishu, 16 July 1993, 2.


40 Ibid., 5.


42 Ibid., 20.


45 In a 14 July 1993 letter to a European Ministry of Foreign Affairs, from North Mogadishu Somali elders, intellectuals, and politicians, the Somalis complained that:

Military authorities have illegally contacted with Aideed several times and his bandits in a cowardly compromising step and accordingly the. . . defense minister. . . has requested the U.N. hold political negotiations with already accused criminal Aideed which is a clear defiance to U.N. Resolution, so that the people have reflected strong concern and anxiety over that silly act which has led to the loss of. . . credibility.

The elders further suggested that the national government should replace "diplomats and commanding personalities in Mogadishu, because they are easily liable to respond to blackmailing and pressure from local bandits."

46 UNOSOM II Code Cable from the Special Representative to the Secretary General to the Under Secretary General for Peacekeeping Operations, Subject: Additional Concerns of Force Commander, 18 July 1993, 1.


Disorganization within the militia caused by the constant routine of fighting both UNOSOM forces and rival clans (Murussade and Abgaal clans) is taking its toll on the Haber Gedir clan. Presently the Haber Gedir as a whole are weak. The militia will continue to conduct harassment operations and encourage its forces to continue with a guerrilla war using hit and run tactics. Attacks on key facilities such as the ports, the Force Command headquarters, the airfield, Hunter and Sword Bases will continue. It is also highly likely that ambush of UNOSOM vehicles will continue and perhaps attempts to hostages may be made. Potential for terrorist activity against UNOSOM personnel in Mogadishu remains high." UNOSOM II Force Command SITREP to UN New York, 18 August 1993, 3, "Once again we are experiencing a lull in the intensity and number of nightly attacks as seen in the past. These attacks, which involve small arms, RPGs, and mortars, are likely to resume. The cause for cessation is believed to be due to Aideed's shortage of ammunition, low morale, and a general dissatisfaction among the Haber Gedir elders."


UNOSOM II Operations Update Briefing, Subject: "Concept for the Integration of Political, Military, and Humanitarian Operations in Mogadishu, 7 August 1993.


Insight on this issue can be obtain from Ambassador Sheldon J. Krys' Report to Admiral Jonathan Howe on the Future of UNOSOM II,
(Mogadishu, 15 April 1993) provided during the transition period with UNITAF.

You cannot change the U.N. system from distant Mogadishu. The agencies will continue to stovepipe to their headquarters and their people here will be more inclined to please their bosses at home. For the success of your mission, agency heads must accept your overall coordination function in the field. A great deal will depend on the personal relations you establish here and with the leadership in N.Y. Your efforts there could ensure needed flexibility both with staffing and with budget. (B-1).

The Humanitarian Assistance Program in Somalia suffers from several institutional weaknesses which affect relief responses in complex emergencies in other countries as well, except that in Somalia chaotic conditions have exacerbated these inadequacies. A humanitarian assistance organizational structure must be designed quickly to plan and implement your RRR (Relief, rehabilitation, and reconstruction) program which is sensitive to the constraints of the existing international humanitarian order. . . Emergency operations by their nature demand hierarchical rather than linear organizational structures which are field driven rather than central office driven in which tactical and logistical decisions can be made and executed instantly at the village level. The central headquarters should design an overall strategy and support field operations. . . The international relief system is designed in precisely the opposite manner: it is a feudal system where the relief barons--are entirely independent of each other and to a great degree, of the Secretary General. Boutros Ghali has little power to reform the U.N. portion of the system. The U.N. agencies are in active competition with each other, and rely primarily for implementation on nongovernment organizations which have pronounced aversion to the U.N. system and which are themselves actors in competition with one another (M-1 to M-2).

60UNOSOM II Fragmentation Order Number 105 to UNOSOM II OPLAN I, 121630C August 1993, 5.

61UNOSOM II Fragmentation Order Number 114 to UNOSOM II OPLAN I, 211630C August 1993, 4.


66Ibid.

68 Ibid, 36.


75 Ibid.


77 UNOSOM II Memorandum from Force Command to the Special Representative of the Secretary General, Subject: After Action Report Nigerian Ambush, 5 September 1993, 1 to 4.

78 Events described during the turnover of forces were taken from After Action Report submitted by the Commander of the Nigerian 24 Recce Battalion, 7 September 1993; and UNOSOM II Memorandum from Force Command to the Special Representative of the Secretary General, Subject: After Action Report Nigerian Ambush, 5 September 1993, 1 to 4.

79 UNOSOM II Memorandum from Force Command to the Special Representative to the Secretary General, Subject: "Inquiry into the Events of the 5 September 1993, Ambush of UNOSOM II Forces, 9 September 1993. In the memorandum Force Command commented that the preliminary investigation into the events leading up to, during, and after the assault on Nigerian forces leave many unanswered questions and allegations of misconduct by one force and denials by another. . . . a formal inquiry should be conducted by independent military and political officers sent from U.N. New York. . . . Such impartiality is a must due to the delicate political implications that are involved. . . . The nature of the
findings could effect the force commitment by nations here in support of our U.N. mission.

80UNOSOM II Fragmentation Order Number 140 to UNOSOM II OPLAN I, 161630C September 1993, 4.

81UNOSOM II Operations Division Memorandum for Record, Subject: "Occupation of Strong Points 19, 42, and 207," 10 September 1993, 2. At a meeting with the elders near Strong Point 42 the Operations officer commented that Gullit

was the leader and did most of the talking. . . . He stated that the SNA would not accept any other contingent other than the one {Italian Brigade} that currently occupied the area and that the they [the SNA] were ready to die before they would cooperate with UNOSOM. . . . We killed the seven Nigerians because they violated the occupation agreement established for the strong point by sending the reinforcing platoon of APCs to Strong Point 42. . . . We are able to kill every one of you.


86UNOSOM II Force Command Special SITREP to U.N. New York, 10 September 1993, 1 to 3.

CHAPTER FOUR

REVIEW AND ANALYSIS OF UNOSOM II OPERATION - PART THREE

Task Force Ranger Operations

The arrival of Task Force Ranger in late August sent a clear signal of the world community's intent to bring those responsible for the 5 June ambush to justice. The unit's mission was to capture Aideed and his top aides. The planning and execution of Task Force Ranger's operations were unilaterally done by the Task Force Commander and

carried out by U.S. forces deployed in support of UNOSOM II. Task Force Ranger was not under United Nations command or authority. Although not under the operational control of the Force Commander or the Deputy Force Commander (Commander, USFORCIN), Commander, Task Force Ranger kept them closely apprised of operations. COMUSFORCSOM was advised of the target area and intent to launch an operation to capture Aideed or one of his aides. He in turn notified the Force Commander who likewise informed the Special Representative to the Secretary General. COMUSFORCSOM, the Force Commander, and the Special Representative to the Secretary General had the ability to veto or stop any Task Force Ranger operation prior to execution.²

The first success was achieved on 21 September. Osman Atto, one of Aideed's top advisers and his principle financier, was captured in a daylight operation. Atto was captured in the Aideed Enclave (an area reclaimed by the militia) with three of his body guards.³ This was a major blow to the militia who relied heavily on Atto to enlist the clan for militia operations. Militia forces were normally recruited just prior to an offensive operation at which time payment was made for their support. With the capture of Atto, it became extremely difficult for Aideed to execute militia offensive operations. With the capture of Atto, Aideed went to ground and it was difficult to acquire information on his location or that of his senior advisers.

On 3 October, the Task Force received information that a number of Aideed's senior advisers were meeting at a building near the Olympic Hotel. Task Force Ranger assaulted the area and quickly captured 24 detainees, including two key Aideed advisers. However, a Task Force Ranger UH-60 helicopter was downed near the raid site. As ranger ground forces moved to the crash site to recover survivors from the helicopter, they came under a barrage of fire from surrounding buildings and streets and took a number of casualties. This force formed a perimeter around the crash site. Two miles south of the crash site a second Blackhawk was hit and downed. The U.S. Quick Reaction Force had a back-up company ready during all task force operations to reinforce the task force should it be required. This light infantry unit mounted in soft skinned vehicles, however, was unable to punch through hostile resistance to
link up with rangers by itself. With the concurrence of the Force Commander, the Deputy Force Commander (COMUSFORSOM) activated the UNOSOM II reserve which was on a two-hour stand-by to support all UNOSOM II operations.

The UNOSOM II mechanized Quick Reaction Force was the Malaysian contingent. After consultation with and approval by the Force Commander, a Pakistani tank platoon and two Malaysian mechanized companies, the only armor forces in Mogadishu were ordered into action. It was ready to launch in less than an hour but Task Force Ranger notified Force headquarters that the rangers had fortified buildings as strong points and that the forces in the engagement area were not in immediate danger of being overrun. Force headquarters therefore slowed the rescue operation in order to complete and fully coordinate a tactical plan with the three contingent forces making up the combined U.S./U.N. rescue (U.S. Quick Reaction Force infantry would ride in the Malaysian APCs). After heavy resistance, the rescue columns reached the two crash sites and evacuated the rangers. In the course of the action, eighteen U.S. soldiers were killed, and seventy-five were wounded; three Malaysian armored personnel carriers were destroyed, one Malaysian soldier was killed, and ten were wounded; and two Pakistani soldiers were wounded. It is estimated that some 300-500 militia were killed and more than 700 wounded in the clash. Intelligence reports following the raid reported, that the militia was badly mauled with most clan families experiencing casualties. Aideed's position within the clan was believed to be deteriorating and Aideed was contemplating fleeing Mogadishu if not Somalia.4

However, this operation was another possible decisive point for the USC/SNA. A major tactical victory was soon transformed into a strategic reversal for UNOSOM II. Public opinion in the United States and elsewhere was deeply affected by the events of 3 October with scenes of dead U.S. servicemen being dragged through the streets of Mogadishu. Even more damaging to UNOSOM II support was the follow-up CNN film clip of a wounded U.S. pilot in the hands of the USC/SNA. After the costly 3 October events, the U.S. chose to reduce its losses and reevaluate its support to multinational intervention. As the news of the ranger raid
on 3 October came in, a White House official said "Clinton put out a basic question: 'How did it happen when we were trying to put emphasis on the diplomatic effort, and a new diplomatic effort was underway, that these offensive raids were going on on the ground?' Another senior official commented, "I think he [Clinton] thought or we thought, that if the president says we are concentrating on the diplomatic effort, the military part, which was tactical, would follow." Secretary of State Warren Christopher would later remark that "the error was the error in not seeing it get out of balance. You know, this is my fault and the fault of the rest of us." The United States would soon ask Ambassador Robert Oakley to return to Somalia to immediately restart negotiations with the USC/SNA (a policy the U.S. and U.N. had criticized the Italian government for just months earlier, differing, though, by the fact that the U.S. openly announced that it was entering into negotiations with the SNA). On 7 October 1993, President Clinton announced the intention of the United States to withdraw from Somalia by 31 March 1994. This U.S. announcement was followed by similar announcements from Germany and Italy to depart the theater. To help with the withdrawal of forces, the United States reinforced its Quick Reaction Force with a Joint Task Force consisting of air, naval and ground forces equipped with Abrams tanks and Bradley Fighting Vehicles, the force protection capabilities COMUSFORSOM had earlier been denied.

Strategic Reset (4 October 1993 - January 1994)

U.S. Forces Augmentation

Shortly after the U.S. Presidential statement of 7 October 1993, which announced the augmentation of U.S. combat forces into theater to enhance the force protection capabilities of U.S./U.N. forces, the first heavy elements arrived aboard U.S. strategic airlift. From mid-October to the end of the month, additional U.S. forces deployed into theater raising the strength level of U.S. forces to over 7000. Two Amphibious Ready Groups with embarked U.S. Marine Expeditionary Units (special operations capable) also arrived in theater in mid-October. The operational utility of these forces gave USFORSO a capability to reach out well beyond Mogadishu with U.S. combat power if required. The United States Central Command also deployed a Joint Task Force
headquarters to assume command and control of the augmented Quick Reaction Force.\textsuperscript{8}


U.N.-U.S. Policy Rift

Aideed himself recognized the U.S. policy change in early November 1993 when he stated that he would not attack U.S. forces unless forced to do so and that he was willing to allow the U.S. time to negotiate and mediate. On 9 October, during the deployment of the Joint Task Force, Aideed declared a unilateral ceasefire and released one Nigerian soldier and one U.S. soldier who had been held captive as a result of combat actions on 5 September and 3-4 October, respectively. With the declaration of a de facto ceasefire, political and military
initiative moved to Aideed. In reality, this unilateral cease fire was required because of the high casualties sustained in his recent campaign especially in the 3-4 October conflict and strong questions over his leadership from within the SNA. However, Aideed had once again managed to demonstrate his ability to seize "a propaganda victory from the wreckage of a military setback."  

Further evidence of the weakening of U.S. commitment to U.N. operations in Somalia was demonstrated by the substance of the Oakley mission to Somalia in October-November 1993. Clinton dispatched the former ambassador to the region to help the political efforts there. Oakley's assignment was to go quickly to Ethiopia and Eritrea and try to energize the African leaders into helping to find a political solution in Somalia. His second objective appeared to be the release of the captured American pilot. One U.S. official was quoted as saying, "the detainee is an American. . . . It is our responsibility to get him back." In interviews with the press in country, Oakley openly criticized the current U.N. policy.  

When one looks at what's happening since June, obviously things have been going in the wrong direction, because the situation is getting worse for Somalia rather than better. . . . The emphasis of the United Nations and the United States and others has become too much on the attack of the fifth of June and all the things that followed, and not enough on helping the people of Somalia pull themselves together.  

In concentrating on the hunt for Aideed, it isolated the leader and his Haber Gedir clan despite the apparent information campaigns to minimize the effects on the clan itself. In so doing the U.N "unintentionally" isolated an important segment of Somali society that has come to see itself as an enemy of both UNOSOM II and the United States.  

Oakley stated that the "change in direction by the Clinton administration does not mean the Security Council resolution calling for the arrest of the June 5 attackers will not be respected." But he went on to state that an independent commission should be established to review the attack. "For the moment, the important thing is political reconciliation. . . . this does not mean Aideed has been found not guilty. It means that the commission has not yet been established and
has not yet made judgment."14 By having an African commission
investigate the killing of U.N. peacekeepers, it would enable the U.N.
and the U.S. to negotiate with Aideed without officially ignoring the
Security Council resolution that required the punishment of those
responsible for the incident on 5 June.15

U.N. New York was not pleased with the announcement of the Oakley
mission. The Under Secretary for Peacekeeping Operations publicly
disagreed with the mission stating, "We do not negotiate, and this sort
of a swap we do not encourage."16 However, a U.S. official was quoted
as saying that Ambassador Albright was instructed to inform the United
Nations that in the period before an American pull out, the United
Nations should use the time to "build up the capability" of its Somalia
force and reinvigorate the political process to establish a working
government in the region and that the United Nations should engage
neighboring African nations in helping in this process.17

The mission of the additional U.S. reinforcements was first and
foremost to protect U.S. troops and U.S. bases. The forces were
provided to keep open and secure the roads, ports, and lines of
communications essential to on-going relief operations. The increased
force presence was further provided in order to maintain pressure on
those who would willingly cut-off the flow of relief supplies or attack
U.N. peacekeepers, thus preventing a return to anarchy. Their presence
would also maintain pressure on Somali leaders to work with each other
in order to reach agreement on a new government.18 This deployment of
additional troops appeared to support UNOSOM II's long term stability
operations by emphasizing the need to open the lines of communication
emanating from the ports in Mogadishu. However, it soon become apparent
that this was to be accomplished only through negotiation. Any use of
force, even overwhelming force, would be interpreted as a renewal of the
urban warfare from which the U.S. had just recently disengaged. The
deployment of the Joint Task Force was in actuality a "show of force" to
sufficiently intimidate Aideed into allowing the safe withdrawal of U.S.
and other coalition forces that were leaving by the end of March. With
a publicly announced deadline for this withdrawal, Aideed and his
militia could afford to maintain the peace while, at the same time,
impede on-going political negotiations with the U.N. that would allow the re-establishment of a peacekeeping presence throughout Mogadishu.19

This shift in policy severely limited the planning considerations for operations in Mogadishu. The narrowly restrictive criteria for employment of the Joint Task Force was not readily apparent to either the UNOSOM II or Joint Task Force planning staffs. However, it soon became so as plans to secure the lines of communication within Mogadishu were forwarded to CENTCOM and permission to execute was denied. U.N. military planners conceded that the political fallout would be potentially devastating should any attempt to reopen the lines of communication result in a new wave of urban warfare.20

This condition was also not readily apparent to the civilian staff of UNOSOM II. Despite the very public announcement of the U.S. intention to withdraw from Somalia, both U.N. New York and local political leadership in Mogadishu did not immediately react to this major change in U.S. direction. While the hunt for Aideed may have been halted, both the Special Representative to the Secretary General and the Under Secretary for Peace Operations continued to press Force Command to initiate some expansion into the Central Region thinking that re-opening the lines of communication remained a valid military mission should negotiations to do so fail. During meetings and briefings to the Special Representative to the Secretary General and in correspondence to U.N. New York, Force Command continued to maintain that expansion was not feasible in the near-term. The arrival of the Indian brigade did not provide additional force capabilities but was to fill the vacuum left by the departing French and Belgian forces, and a force had not yet been identified to fill the void that would be left by the Italians.21

With no combat force for expansion, Germany threatened to pull out its logistic forces. Somalia was a test case for German participation in peace operations. It was the first time German forces of any type had deployed out of country since World War II. Its national government had won parliamentary and public approval to deploy logistic forces under a Chapter VI status in support of an expanded humanitarian effort in Somalia. The approval for deployment of German troops had been tied to the need for additional logistic units to
support expansion into the yet unaided parts of Somalia. Should the mission for expansion be scrubbed, then the German contingent might depart Somalia. This would signify abandonment of the Somalia mission by all major Western participants.

In an attempt to retain the German support forces in theater, the Force Command sent a cable to U.N. New York, on 18 October, proposing the German contingent move from Belet Uen to Baledogle in the Baidoa Area of Responsibility. The cable acknowledged that the original rationale for deploying the element to Belet Uen no longer existed. Citing early successes in disarmament operations in the Central Region, the announced early departures of the French and Belgian contingents and the recent decision by the United States to withdraw from Somalia required a reassessment of the force logistical concept. Force Command believed that relocating the German Composite Force to a more central location in Somalia would better support the U.N. forces after the 31 March withdrawal of the United States logistics structure. The cable acknowledged that some contingent reconfiguration would be required, but the location in theater would not violate the Chapter VI restriction for use of the German force. This plan was not accepted by Bonn and, without the capability for near-term expansion, that government too decided to withdraw from the mission.22

The "shift" of policy leadership in the political arena resulted in a type of military paralysis. No firm direction was forthcoming from U.N. New York or the Special Representative to the Secretary General. The Under Secretary General for Peacekeeping Operations conceded that while the mandate permitting the capture of Aideed remained valid, discussions were going on about how best to implement that mandate.23 He stressed that a shift in direction was required since thirty troop contributing nations had decided the present level of casualties was "unsustainable and unacceptable."24 Force Command was placed in a position of accepting a unilateral ceasefire during a period when Aideed was arguably at his weakest. With no firm political guidance to anchor itself to, Force Command reverted to predominantly garrison activities in Mogadishu. Movement in Mogadishu was restricted to areas where the population had openly supported UNOSOM II in the past, or areas
currently assessed as neutral. Additionally, on several occasions, the U.N. notified the USC/SNA of its plans to move forces so as to avoid any conflict or misunderstanding between the forces.\textsuperscript{25} While this action may have helped to avoid confrontation with Aideed, other clans, perceived that they were being abandoned by UNOSOM II. Ali Mahdi, a rival clan leader in North Mogadishu, told reporters that "to see him [Aideed] will not disappoint only me, but most of Somalis."\textsuperscript{26} This soon resulted in increased clan on clan fighting within the city requiring UNOSOM II to publicly announce that it would be neutral in any inter-clan conflicts. These actions were taken in order to avoid placing U.N. soldiers into positions which unnecessarily put them at risk. Mogadishu was evolving back to the establishment of the "Green Line" area (a no-man's land between warring factions) which had not existed since the early days of UNITAF.

\textbf{Impact of New Mandate Deliberations}

On 29 October 1993, the Security Council advanced a draft resolution (878) which extended the UNOSOM II mandate until mid-November. This extension was given to allow the Secretary General sufficient time to prepare and submit a report on the latest developments in Somalia and the attendant impacts on future decisions of the mandate.

During the first week of November, the Force Commander, accompanied by the Chief of Operations Branch and a logistics representative, returned to U.N. New York to outline options for Force Command as it awaited the decision of the Security Council on a new resolution. In the briefing presented to the Undersecretary for Peace Operations and other senior U.N. officials, the Force Commander recommended that the mission be changed to a traditional Chapter VI operation rather than maintaining its Chapter VII focus. The Force Commander believed that with the departure of the U.S. forces, and the loss of U.S. force multipliers, the remaining coalition force would not be capable of coercive disarmament, and it would be severely constrained logistically.\textsuperscript{27}
While at U.N. New York, Force Command officials were provided three options for their consideration when they returned to Mogadishu. These options represented a full range of possibilities for military employment in Somalia, from the retention of Chapter VII peace enforcement operations to the traditional Chapter VI peacekeeping status of UNOSOM I. The options were as follows:

1. UNOSOM II would be provided a troop strength at 28,000 with retention of coercive disarmament as a viable mission. The U.N. would be required to replace all force multipliers lost with the U.S. pullout as well as new troop contributing nations to offset the loss of forces from the nations already announcing their departure. This option was a status quo position and unrealistic. Force Command considered it a throw away option.28

2. UNOSOM II would be provided a troop strength of 15,000. UNOSOM II would maintain a Chapter VII status, but coercive disarmament would be eliminated as a specified task. Overt military action would be used only in instances of self-defense, along the lines of a traditional Chapter VI mission. Emphasis would be placed on supporting the humanitarian and political efforts of the mission. Success in Mogadishu would depend on the on-going negotiations with the USC/SNA.29

3. UNOSOM II would be provided a troop strength of approximately 5,000 soldiers and the mission would revert to one similar to that of UNOSOM I. It would be charged to maintain key ports of arrival (sea and air) in Mogadishu and other areas. This option presupposed cooperation with local Somali leadership to assist in providing a secure environment for the free flow of humanitarian supplies from these ports. This option was clearly an intentional shift to a traditional Chapter VI mission.30

4. This option required a complete withdrawal of U.N. forces from Somalia to coincide with the withdrawal of U.S. forces (the Secretary General requested Force Command to develop such an option during his October 1993 visit to Somalia). Given the magnitude of the effort, the withdrawal would extend beyond the 31 March 1994 deadline established for U.S. participation.31 This option did not appear to be politically viable since a U.S./U.N. pullout would equate to a U.S.
foreign policy failure, which would be damaging to the Clinton Administration and therefore would probably be vetoed by the United States in the Security Council.

As Force Command reviewed each option as outlined in the Secretary General's report of 12 November 1993 to the Security Council, option 2 was considered to be the one toward which the current political and military dynamic was driving. Force Command felt that the troop levels might realistically stabilize at 15,000 as national contingents committed or withdrew from Somalia as the mandate was renewed. Additionally, adopting a more defensive posture, even though the mandate would still be that of Chapter VII, would be politically appealing to the contingents left behind after 31 March 1994. The option recognized a shift to voluntary disarmament, and supported refugee repatriation and humanitarian development themes.

On 16 November 1993, the Security Council adopted U.N. Security Council Resolution 885. This resolution established a Commission of Inquiry to investigate the armed attacks on UNOSOM II peacekeepers on 5 June. This, in effect, stopped the search for Aideed. Taken in concert with the unilateral ceasefire, the armed conflict between UNOSOM II and the USC/SNA ended. The ceasefire would remain in place through the withdrawal of U.S. forces at the end of March 1994.

The New UNOSOM II Strategy

On 16 November, the Force Commander provided feedback to the Special Representative to the Secretary General and U.N. New York regarding the force options. He stressed that "final deployment/disposition of forces in theater and the degree of disarmament enforced in the country are totally dependent on decisions" that were required immediately. Stated firmly, the Force Commander said that "steps must be taken now to shape the force and security environment prior to U.S. withdrawal." Force Command realized that realistic political and economic goals had to be identified prior to settling on a specific force size and mission. In early December, the Special Representative to the Secretary General issued a draft strategy based on a regional approach to better
coordinate the efforts of all U.N. agencies acting under the umbrella of UNOSOM II. The new regional approach identified five "points of access" through which resources would flow into the country. Those points of access were Mogadishu, Baidoa, Kismayo, Bossasso and a general point of access, the northwest. For Force Command, the regional strategy appeared to be more of the same rhetoric from the civilian division. UNOSOM II was trying to be everywhere at once. Unfortunately, this meant that coalition forces would be required to be everywhere at once as well.

This concept caused some consternation within the Force Command. From April 1993 until December 1993, the military component had pressed the civilian leadership to address a very clear set of regional priorities from which force levels could be applied in a rational, logistically supportable manner. The draft document acknowledged the downsizing of the force through national repatriations. It also had imbedded assumptions such as reconfigured forces, self-sustaining organizations, and infrastructure upgrades to support theater logistics. However, it assumed a greater force burden by proposing what appeared to be a simultaneous fanning out of the force to unoccupied areas (the northeast and central regions) without a reduction of mission requirements in the current area. The draft document stated "UNOSOM II has no intention of leaving Mogadishu or even reducing its presence at this time." On 15 December, Force Command responded to the draft document. While calling it a good initial framework, the Force Headquarters insisted on "more specificity. . . . on the humanitarian and political side before we recommend specific force levels for each region." In short, the military required a vision of the end state on which to develop a concept of operations. The Force Commander further stated:

Without clear definition, military objectives and force levels cannot be properly defined. The current planning process has failed to determine these objectives. Force Command can only provide analysis based on geographic characteristics. This approach leaves us prone to committing the same planning errors of last February as the five brigade strategy in U.N. Security Council Resolution 814 was developed without realistic assessments of supportability, clear military objectives, and a coordinated and agreed upon end state.
The new strategy asked Force Command to do as much, and possibly a great deal more, with less force capability. This was the same situation experienced during transition from UNITAF, where UNOSOM assumed a larger military mission with what could arguably be called a less capable force.

Force Command was not adverse to the concept of a regional approach. The most violent clashes occurred in those areas of Mogadishu, where there was a U.N. presence because "U.N. presence meant jobs, contracts and money." The U.N. hired construction equipment and workers by issuing millions of dollars of contracts and subcontracts to businesses with close relations to the warlords. Without the U.N. and its monies the most contentious areas, except the port facilities, would not be worth fighting for. Even the ports would be less of a prize should regional ports of entry be developed. Therefore, the concept to provide political structure, economic recovery and development, and security in regions friendly to UNOSOM II made enormous sense especially if negotiations with the USC/SNA in Mogadishu failed to make any significant progress (this was the most probable scenario since negotiations were progressing slowly if at all, and time was on Aideed's side).

However, a coordinated political, economic, and military plan had to be produced and implemented immediately if a such a bold, regional strategy were to be executed. A very reduced presence in or a complete withdrawal from Mogadishu would be required in order to have forces available for the other regions. Infrastructure upgrades had to be started by the United Nations Development Program (UNDP) if the seaports and airfields in Kismayo and Bossasso were to be able to support operations prior to the U.S. withdrawal. The Chief Administrative Officer would have to begin contract negotiations for logistics support since the residual forces were not self-sustaining. However, the civilian staff never completely pursued these alternatives. UNOSOM II would remain tied to Mogadishu thereby frustrating any hope for successful implementation of a regional strategy. The Security Council would pass resolution 886 that would tie UNOSOM II to Mogadishu.
Change of Command

On 20 January 1994, Lieutenant General Bir handed over command of UNOSOM II Force Command to Lieutenant General Aboo of Malaysia, marking an end to another phase of UNOSOM II's mission in Somalia. The withdrawal of the U.S., Belgium, France, Germany, and Italy was the final chapter in the participation of combat forces from western industrialized nations and placed the burden of combat multipliers and logistical support squarely on the shoulders of the United Nations.

U.N. Security Council Renewal Of UNOSOM II

On 4 February 1994, the Security Council approved U.N. Security Council Resolution 897, endorsing the Secretary General's recommendation for the continuation of UNOSOM II through 31 May 1994. It basically adopted the U.N. military option 2. Though there was no lower troop limit imposed, new nations did not offer forces to the coalition so UNOSOM's troop size fell below 20,000. The mission remained one of Chapter VII but coercive disarmament was not part of its mandate. It further recognized that the people of Somalia had to bear the ultimate responsibility for establishing viable institutions and reconstructing their country. The mandate approved the concept that international resources should be directed first to those regions where security was being re-established but it did not necessarily withhold resources from Mogadishu. The mandate was an endorsement for a regional strategy if the UNOSOM II staff had the desire or will to truly implement one.41

Summary

Passage of Resolutions 814 in March 1993 and 837 in June 1993 marked a clearly identifiable shift in U.S. foreign policy. This shift was not simply "mission creep" from what had originally been advertised to the American public and Congress as a humanitarian mission but it became a "deliberate experiment in 'assertive multilateralism.'"42 Even as the guerilla war broadened and the Administration began to review the military emphasis of the mission, there was no doubt that the U.S. government was fully engaged with its new policy. In his 27 August address on Somalia, Secretary Aspin stated:
We went there to save people and we succeeded. We are staying there now to help those same people rebuild their nation. . . . President Clinton has given us clear direction to stay the course with other nations to help Somalia.  

While criticizing the United Nations for failing to seek alternate means to end the fighting in Mogadishu, the administration continued in its commitment to "assertive multilateralism" by pushing for the passage of Security Council Resolution 865 on 22 September. In this resolution, the U.S. once again endorsed the expanded mission for nation building, perhaps committing the U.N. to a long-term presence in Somalia. However, just three days after the passage of UNSCR 865, the first U.S. helicopter would be shot down causing Congressional leaders to question the direction of the U.S. mission. The passing of another week would witness the 3 October Raid, and the Clinton Administration would begin its disengagement from its new foreign policy.

By targeting U.S. forces, Aideed had attacked the fabric of coalition unity and steadfastness. Though future U.S. credibility rested on how the situation in Somalia was handled, the U.S. would not demonstrate the required perseverance to see the mission through. In the Gulf War, the United States had stated that it would get the job done and that nations that signed up as members of its coalition would "not find themselves caught holding the bag" if the mission became difficult. In Somalia, the reinforcement by the Joint Task Force, with its heavy armor capability and its stated mission to open and secure the lines of communications, appeared at first glance to be a commitment by the Clinton administration to bolster UNOSOM II coalition forces. In actuality, this force was simply a force protection measure deployed to cover the withdrawal of U.S. forces. It provided USFORSOUM overwhelming military capability that could be used against Aideed and his militia only if Aideed openly violated his self-imposed ceasefire. However, it was not intended to be used as an extension of the political process to coerce Aideed to the negotiating table with the U.N. The Clinton administration had effectively put in place another "two track" policy which worked against itself. It was not feasible to pursue a political reconciliation process and strengthen the U.N. military posture in the country at the same time unless the U.S. was willing to
risk renewal of hostilities. The Clinton administration was not. Without the will to use the increased military capability, the new political initiatives could only succeed if Aideed was willing to make a serious effort at true political reconciliation. He was not. The "two track" policy guaranteed a safe withdrawal of U.S. forces but did nothing to bolster the long-term reconciliation process in Somalia.

This failure to "stay the course" sends an inappropriate signal to future coalition players who may be unwilling to participate in future U.S.-led ventures. More critically, it may cause the American people and Congress to question whether there are any international situations that are considered important enough that U.S. forces should be committed. In his assessment of the Somalia operation, former Under Secretary of Defense Paul Wolfowitz stated:

By too casually committing U.S. Forces in situations that are not critical and where the commitment is thus halfhearted, the administration runs the risk that it will not be able to commit forces later in truly vital situations, and that such a commitment would be presumed half-hearted in any case.

The Clinton Administration would revise its policy on "assertive multilateralism" following its experience in Somalia. It would publish new guidelines in May 1994 that would govern U.S. participation in future multilateral peace operations. It provided reform in several major areas primary including:

1. Making disciplined and coherent choices about which peace operations to support;

2. Clearly defining U.S. policy regarding command and control of forces and;

3. Improving the way the U.S. government manages and funds peace operations.

Just as Somalia was the test case for the administration's first effort in this arena, Haiti appears to be the test for its new reformed policy.

On 25 March 1994, the final U.S. forces departed Somalia. The security situation in Mogadishu, thereafter, failed to improve over time. The streets of Mogadishu were controlled by rival clans and the main military and humanitarian supply routes were not secured. Fighting
erupted between Aideed and his rival in north Mogadishu, Ali Mahdi, and U.N. peacekeepers would once again be found "crouched behind sandbags watching Somalia's factions fight it out. . . . to its credit the U.N. hadn't gotten involved in the clashes." However, this inaction raised serious doubts for extending the U.N. mandate beyond the March 1994 withdrawal of the western powers. If the peacekeepers were not there to keep the peace, then what was their purpose?

In March 1994, just as the U.S. was removing its last troops from the country, the warlords announced they had reached a new accord and had agreed to attend another reconciliation conference. However, this meeting was continually postponed. Clashes between Aideed and Ali Mahdi repeatedly erupted and became increasingly more violent. Several U.N. peacekeepers were killed in the early summer months making the situation even more tenuous for those attempting to mediate a settlement between the warring factions. Without a political breakthrough and barring the chance for a military success, the situation didn't appear to merit the expenditure of further resources. In August 1994, the U.S. declared its intention to move its diplomatic mission, which had remained in country following the March 1994 troop withdrawal, back to Nairobi and urged the U.N. to end the mission. A senior State Department official in theater noted at the time, "We don't see any significant prospect of a breakthrough in the next several months, and the security risk doesn't seem to merit the case to stay any more."

Rather than end the mission, the Security Council approved a motion on 26 August 1994 to reduce UNOSOM's troop presence to 15,000. The Secretary General had blocked a move to end the mission and urged the Security Council to give the warring parties one last chance to make peace and form a government. U.N. Special Representative to the Secretary General, Victor Oboho (who had replaced Admiral Howe earlier that year) carried out this last chance at reconciliation by conducting a shuttle diplomacy effort between North and South Mogadishu. But his efforts failed. On 4 November 1994, the Security Council voted unanimously to end the mission and remove the remaining peacekeepers from Somalia. U.S. Ambassador Daniel Simpson, the Special Envoy to Somalia, remarked at the time: "Why is it that 6 million Somalis deserve
the attention and the gold and the blood of the world forever while they fool around? We've respected their pace. Now it's time to respect ours--we're leaving.  

The last U.N. troops departed Somalia in March 1995, almost two years to the date as outlined in the original mandate, Security Council Resolution 814. However, instead of leaving behind a rebuilt, peaceful nation, the U.N. left behind a country on the verge of a new civil war. Yet, this vacuum created by the departing peacekeepers seemed preferable to a status of continued years of bloody stalemate.  

As the last U.N. troops pulled off the airport beaches in Mogadishu with the assistance of U.S. and Italian marines who had been sent back to cover the withdrawal of these peacekeepers, Somali looters immediately filled in behind the retreat. Scattered shooting erupted, soon to be followed by the appearance of "technicals." These vehicles did not threaten the U.N. peacekeepers but rather signaled an attempt by one of the warlords to seize the port facilities and chase the looters away. The international press witnessed this last failure of the reconciliation process. Somali business leaders and elders had tried to form a multi-factional committee to operate both the air and sea ports after the U.N. pullout, but this was not to be the case. At 3:30 p.m., a convoy of six technicals drove up onto the north ramp of the airport and Aideed stepped out to claim his new prize. Aideed was back, firmly in control of South Mogadishu. He had outlasted the United Nations, and in the final analysis, he had never given up his hold on South Mogadishu.  

The Secretary General stated that international efforts to bring peace and provide humanitarian support to Somalia would continue even though the formal mission had ended. "The United Nations will not abandon Somalia." However, in remarks made after the U.S. assisted pullout of United Nations forces, the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff said:

I cannot imagine the the community of nations going back there again. . . . They're on their own.
Endnotes


4Accounts of the 3 October Raid come from UNOSOM II Force Command SITREP to U.N. New York, 3 October 1993, 6 to 10; and U.S. Quick Reaction Force, Falcon Brigade, 10th Mountain Division Summary of Combat Operations on 3 October 1993.


6Ibid.


12Ibid.

13Ibid.

14Ibid.


17Ibid.

Another problem with the deadline-setting is its effect on the calculations of Mohammed Farah Aideed... One senior U.S. general said that even if Aideed begins to weaken, he will know he needs only 'hang on by his fingernails for a little bit longer' and his principle adversary will depart. A rational strategy for Aideed, defense officials and military planners said, would be to rest his forces and hide his equipment from attack. Once Americans leave, they said, he [Aideed] could return to claim his power base." From Barton Gellman, "Added Punch, but for What Purpose?" The Washington Post, 8 October 1993, A22.


UNOSOM II Cable from the Force Command to the Under Secretary for Peacekeeping Operations Military Advisor, Subject: Deployment of the Indian Brigade, 29 September 1993, 1; and UNOSOM II Cable from the Force Command to the Under Secretary for Peacekeeping Operations Military Advisor, Subject: Additional Strength for Indian Contingent, 30 October 1993, 1.

UNOSOM II Coded Cable from the Force Command to the Under Secretary for Peacekeeping Operations Military Advisor, Subject: German Move Out of Belet Uen, 18 October 1993, 1.


Ibid.


Force Command Operations Briefing to U.N. New York, 8, 9 November 1993; and personal field notes from the Force Command meeting with the Under Secretary for Peacekeeping Operations.


Ibid.

Ibid., 19.

UNOSOM II Coded Cable from Force Command to the Special Representative to the Secretary General, Subject: End State Option, 16
November 1993, 1 and 3. [An internal assessment by the Force Command Joint Movements Control Center estimated that a complete withdrawal initiated in January 1994 could not be completed until June 1994].


33UNOSOM II Coded Cable from Force Command to the Special Representative to the Secretary General, Subject: End State Option, 16 November 1993, 1.


36UNOSOM II Memorandum from Force Command to the Special Representative to the Secretary General, Subject: Regional Strategy Update, 15 December 1993, 1.

37Ibid.


39Ibid. "Areas without a U.N. presence have been relatively peaceful. Take Galcaico, a central Somali town situated between major feuding clans, the Majerteen and the Haber Gedir. During the civil war, it was the site of some of the heaviest fighting in the country. Then in May 1993, meetings among the community leaders, religious figures, businessmen, students, and representatives of the factions produced a peace accord that has held for more than a year. . . . The former fighters had removed the weapons from their trucks and had begun transporting livestock to Bossasso, a port in the north. They return with imported beans, rice, and other goods. The ceasefire has endured because members of both clans need the 465 mile road from Galcaico to Bossasso. And since there is almost no foreign assistance in the region, people depend on the peace."

40The meetings in Addis Abba in early December 1993 between the Group of 12 (the primary Somali political leaders other than Aideed) and the USC/SNA committee headed by Aideed were stalemated. Two primary obstacles existed: First were deep divisions on methodology on implementing political reconciliation (Aideed wanted changes to the March 1993 Addis Abba accords); and secondly the continued rejection by Aideed for any political initiatives put forth by UNOSOM. From the United Nations Reference Paper, "The United Nations and the Situation in Somalia," March 1994, 20 and 21; and UNOSOM II Coded Cable from the Deputy Special Representative to the Secretary General to the Special Representative to the Secretary General, Subject: Situation Report 8, 9 December 1993, 1 and 2.


43 Ibid., 64.

44 Ibid., 65.

45 Paul D. Wolfowitz, "Clinton's First Year," Foreign Affairs, January/February 1994, 34.

46 Ibid., 35.

47 Ibid.


50 Ibid.


52 Ibid.


56 Ibid.


59 Ibid.
CHAPTER FIVE

ANALYSIS

Purpose

This section addresses the significance of each possible decisive point identified in the previous chapters, and links these to possible centers of gravity. The analysis identifies both potential operational and a strategic centers of gravity in order that the effects of hostile militia attacks can be examined against varying levels of the United Nations' structure and organization.

The analysis reveals that Aideed and his militia conducted a series of related military operations designed to attain long-range strategic objectives. In effect, the warlord had orchestrated what U.S. Army Field Manual 100-5 defines as a campaign.¹

William W. Mendel and Floyd T. Banks, early developers of U.S. doctrine on campaign planning, define a campaign as a "phased series of major operations along the intended line (or lines) of operation to bring about decisive results from battles. The synergistic effect of these phased . . . operations creates the operational advantage, or leverage which makes the enemy's position untenable."² The single unifying concept of a campaign is that it synchronizes military actions at each level of war against key capabilities and functions of the enemy in order to exploit a resulting strategic advantage before the enemy can react.³

The campaign necessarily ties strategic aims to the identification and attack of enemy centers of gravity. If these are not assailable then, "enemy vulnerabilities, weaknesses and perhaps even strengths can offer indirect pathways to gain leverage over the center of gravity."⁴ The attack of such decisive points becomes the key or pathway to success. These decisive points can be objective in nature, key geographical locations or important operational functions such as

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sustainment and communications systems, or abstract factors like the morale or will of the force. Whether objective or subjective in nature, the attack of such decisive points is to weaken the opponent's centers of gravity.

Mendel and Lamar Tooke point out in their article on operational logic that:

Strategic aims elicit centers of gravity that, in turn, allow for the establishment of operational goals and the associated centers of gravity. Operational centers of gravity are linked to both strategic and operational objectives. To complete the process, operational goals and centers of gravity establish the foundation for the selection of tactical objectives and the related centers of gravity.

This logic is useful in bringing clarity to Al-Qaeda's campaign plan and his application of military power in Somalia. His managed use of scarce resources against key targets (decisive points) will guide the reader in the identification of UNOSOM II centers of gravity. A premise of Mendel and Tooke logic is that there is strong linkage between the strategic goals and objectives that allow the military planner to seek a logical conclusion concerning their corresponding centers of gravity.

The methodology used is based on two principles:

1. Centers of gravity are derivative of the aims or objective established at the level of war for which you are planning.
2. Aims of objectives established or executed at the tactical or operational level should contribute to one's ability to impose his will over the center of gravity at the next higher level of war.

Therefore, through the examination of tactical and operational targets, one can identify the decisive points engaged and link these back to the operational and strategic centers of gravity. This procedure is not meant to be used as a mathematical formula but rather as a point of departure for identifying centers of gravity.

To assist in the analysis and application of Mendel and Tooke's operational model, the following matrix serves as an organizational aid (See Table 1).

1. The first column lists the key events in chronological order.
2. The second column indicates the effect the event had on either UNOSOM II or the national governments supporting the coalition. It also identifies the level(s) of organization and command affected.

3. Column three verifies the characteristics of the target as being a decisive point.

4. Column four links the decisive point to possible operational centers of gravity.

5. Column five links the decisive point to possible strategic centers of gravity.

Analysis of these last two columns in the matrix orients the reader on a predominant objective or abstract factor. Once the predominant factor is identified, the next step is to test it against the Mendel/Tooke model which asks the following question: Would the imposition of power over this potential center of gravity create a cascading, deteriorating effect on the morale, cohesion and will to fight that prevented UNOSOM II from achieving its aims and allow the achievement of the militia's? If the answer to this question is no, or not completely, another predominant factor will be identified and similarly tested. A cross check of this final step is to judge if the operational and strategic centers of gravity are linked, because aims or objectives executed at the operational level should contribute to one's ability to impose will over the center of gravity at the strategic level.

Tactical/Operational Center of Gravity

Although Aideed's initial attack against UNOSOM II was in Kismayo in May 1993, this assault appeared to be an isolated attempt to seize back territory lost during the UNITAF occupation. The fall of Kismayo in February 1993 to Hersi Morgan, the son-in-law of the dethroned dictator, became a festering wound to the warlord. It was at this time that he began to regard the United States and the United Nations not as neutral humanitarians but as a political adversaries. From the beginning of Operation Restore Hope in December 1992, Aideed had maintained a firm belief that there was no requirement for foreign intervention in Somalia. However, he had not sought a direct
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<td>U.N. Civilian Staffs &amp; Mongoose Organizations Limit Presence In Country; Decrease in Staffs Equated to Decrease in the Effectiveness of Civilian Led Efforts (Political, Humanitarian, Police)</td>
<td>Arbitrary Attacks That Endangered Civilian and Military Alike Affected the Ability of All to Operate Efficiently; Stressed the Force Through Use of Harassing Fires; Increased Casualties Can Weaken National Resolves To Further Support the Mission.</td>
<td>Slowing Down the Humanitarian and Political Efforts of UNOSOM II Allowed Aided to Discredit the UNOSOM II Mission and Delayed Further Loss of Power in the Political Reconciliation Process</td>
<td>Slowing the Humanitarian &amp; Political Methods Was Detrimental to Legitimacy of UNOSOM II Mission By Making it Appear That the Military Effort Was Becoming Its Primary Focus in the Eyes of Somalis as Well As the International Media; Smaller Civilian Staff Hindered Ability to Develop Coordinated Staff Strategy (Unity of Effort)</td>
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<td>7. USC/SNA August 1993</td>
<td>U.N. Constructed</td>
<td>Tactical Attacks Aim Was to Operationally, Logistical</td>
<td>Attack on Leading Member of</td>
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<td>Event</td>
<td>Effect</td>
<td>Potential Decisive Point</td>
<td>Potential Operational Centers of Gravity</td>
<td>Potential Strategic Centers of Gravity</td>
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<td>8. USC/SNA 5 September Ambush of Nigerian Forces in North Mogadishu</td>
<td>Further Hindered UNOSOM II Control of USC/SNA Primary Supply Routes</td>
<td>Failing to Re-establish Strong Point 42 Allowed Retention of Key Crossroads by USC/SNA Militia</td>
<td>Resupply Lines From Central Region Remaining Open into Mogadishu Ensuring Access to Militia Reinforcements and Resupplies; Required UNOSOM II to Build &amp; Secure a By-pass from Afgooye to Balad</td>
<td>Accusations By Nigerians Against Italian Forces Caused Renewed Concerns About the Italian Commitment to Enforce &amp; Assist Other Contingents to Enforce Chapter VII Requirements Outlined in the Mandate (Unity of Effort)</td>
</tr>
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<td>9. USC/SNA 9 &amp; 16 September 21 October Road Ambushes Against Pakistani &amp; U.S. Forces; USC/SNA 21 September Benadir Hospital Ambush of a Pakistani APC</td>
<td>Ensured USC/SNA Control of Primary Supply Routes; With the Defeat of Their Armored Vehicles &amp; Tanks, Pakistani Forces Again Demonstrated Reluctance to Conduct Active Patrolling - Reverted Back to Bunker Mentality</td>
<td>Continued Targeting of Supply Lines Denied Use by UNOSOM II &amp; Ensured Use by the Militia; Attacks Maintained Pressure to Keep UNOSOM II Forces in Garrison</td>
<td>Attacks Ensured Resupply Lines From Central Region Remaining Open into Mogadishu for USC/SNA</td>
<td>Use of Women and Children in Setting Up &amp; Maintaining Roadblocks &amp; Staging Counterattack From Civilian Hospital Provided USC/SNA With Propaganda Against UNOSOM II Damaging UNOSOM II’s Legitimacy</td>
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<tr>
<td>10. Counter-attack by USC/SNA During 3, 4 October Olympic Hotel</td>
<td>Resulted in Massive Militia Casualties; But Also</td>
<td>While Accepting Risk to His Own Forces, Aided Succeeded in Inflicting Heavy</td>
<td>Operationally, Aided Initially Lost Ground Within His Own Clan;</td>
<td>Announcement for Withdrawal of U.S. Forces, Followed by Similar</td>
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confrontation with UNITAF which demonstrated an overwhelming military presence in the form of U.S. and other western nations forces. He knew, though, that he could simply wait these forces out, all the while preparing military actions to be used against UNOSOM II should his political position deteriorate further during the continued U.N. intervention.\textsuperscript{12}

During UNOSOM II's investigation of the Kismayo ceasefire violation, Aideed would suffer yet another major setback. This setback was not caused by U.N. forces but rather by the U.N political division at the Galcayo Conference. Having been opposed by UNOSOM II in his attempt to manipulate the conference, Aideed and the SNA became extremely frustrated over their inability to control the political process in Somalia.\textsuperscript{13} With his political stature threatened and having been defeated by a western military force in Kismayo, Aideed lashed out on 5 June against the Pakistani peacekeepers.

Review of the matrix (See Table 1) at the tactical/operational level reveals a trend indicating the majority of militia attacks were aimed at forces in Mogadishu. More specifically, these attacks appeared designed to secure SNA lines of communication to the Central Region and
deny these same lines of communication to UNOSOM II. It was essential that Aideed secure a capability to reinforce his militia with personnel but more importantly with arms and ammunition in order to sustain the fight against a militarily superior foe. Indirectly, Aideed would gain an added benefit should he be able to hamper UNOSOM II military and humanitarian supplies from reaching outlying regions.

Mogadishu and the ability of one’s forces to control key areas of Mogadishu was important to both UNOSOM II and the militia. There has been a good deal of discussion about the importance of the city to the U.N.’s success in Somalia. Mogadishu, the location for both the country’s national airport and its only major seaport, simply could not be ignored when armed resistance initially developed. There were no alternative seaports or airports sufficiently developed that could support either military or humanitarian operations. As desirable as diversification might have been, the infrastructure elsewhere in the country did not support it.

The importance of Mogadishu to southern Somalia was illustrated by a meeting between the U.S. Liaison Office staff and key leaders from Belet Uen in late July 1993. The Belet Uen leaders requested help in gaining access to roads and facilities in Mogadishu. UNOSOM II and clans not allied with the USC/SNA were denied access to those areas in Mogadishu controlled by the USC/SNA militia. At this time, Belet Uen itself was peaceful and to some extent prosperous. However, it had gone as far as it could toward reconstruction and rehabilitation without access to the markets of Mogadishu for the sale of its agricultural products and access to the port of Mogadishu for the export of its livestock. Without access through North Mogadishu near Check Point 42 (the Pasta Factory), this essential commerce was not possible. The port cities of Bossasso and Berbera could be utilized for the northeast and the northwest respectively, but there was no way for the south-central part of the country to return to any semblance of normalcy without free access to the markets and port of Mogadishu unless infrastructure was improved in either Kismayo or Marka farther to the south.

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Aideed clearly realized the importance of the city. His militia attacks indicate that control of the city was a predominant part of his operational aim. He repeatedly pressed his forces to control 21 October Road. Possession of Strong Point 42 at the crossroads of 21 October and the Balad roads ensured that his vital life line to the Central Region remained open and thus provided him an unimpeded ability to conduct offensive operations against UNOSOM II. UNOSOM II realized the importance of cordonning-off the city but did not have forces willing to execute the mission.

The failure to maintain control of the Aideed Enclave after the 17 June offensive and to effectively control Strong Point 42 in North Mogadishu following the 2 July ambush of the Italians were decisive points that heavily contributed to SNA control of key parts of the city. After the ceasefire in October, an interview with a militia soldier revealed that Atto's garage in the Aideed Enclave remained one of the principle staging areas for the almost nightly attacks against U.N. compounds. It was also from here that increasingly deadly ambushes were launched against Pakistani as well as U.S. peacekeepers.

Failure to control check points into north Mogadishu was also decisive. U.N. officials stated that Aideed was able to funnel large quantities of weapons into the city because the U.N. peacekeepers in North Mogadishu who guarded the approaches into the city after July 1993 allowed vehicles to pass their checkpoints without being thoroughly searched. As a result, Aideed's militia never suffered a serious shortage of arms. Most of his men kept guns buried beneath their houses/huts.

When Aideed escalated the level of violence through the use of command detonated mines, the effect hampered the routine use of city roads to UNOSOM II. Unable to control the primary lines of communication emanating from the city, UNOSOM II would take extraordinary means to ensure logistic and humanitarian supplies continued to reach outlying areas. Construction of a by-pass road was required which extended from the airport around the southern end of the city and linked back to 21 October Road where the 21 October Road fronted several major UNOSOM II logistic bases. The threat of command
detonated mines also diverted UNOSOM II combat forces from cordon and search operations to point protection missions along the by-pass route.

When Strong Point 42 was abandoned in September 1993, lines of communication to Balad and Belet Uen were severed and another by-pass road had to be constructed. This one linked the towns of Afgoye and Balad. This new road solved the requirement to supply UNOSOM II forces in Balad and Belet Uen but it did not deny the infiltration of SNA militia forces and supplies into North Mogadishu.

The fight for control of the city went beyond the control of the supply routes. Aideed was able to deny use of the main roads and frustrate peacekeeper attempts to clear roadblocks along these avenues. In so doing, he hampered UNOSOM II's ability to conduct cordon and search operations that would disarm the city. In fact, in South Mogadishu, it was apparent rearmament was on the rise. In mid-September, an inter-clan skirmish broke out between the Haber Gedir and Hawadle factions. A mortar round landed in the Hawadle area killing several people. The Hawadle blamed the Haber Gedir while the Haber Gedir blamed UNOSOM II forces for firing the mortar. It appeared to be a mortar aimed by Aideed's militia at the airport that fell short of its intended target. But, no matter who was at fault the eyewitness accounts by reporters from the roof of a nearby hotel saw the surrounding streets fill with fighters "bristling with ammunition, RPGs and other weapons. The men had merely rushed to their houses and hiding places a few yards away and picked up their weapons, for them [a] most natural response."¹⁸ A sustained firefight ensued that gave evidence to the lack of arms control in the city.

This inability of UNOSOM II forces to provide security in Mogadishu and secure its lines of communication must be tested against the Mendel/Tooke criteria. Would imposition of power over this potential center of gravity create a cascading, deteriorating effect on the morale, cohesion and will to fight that prevented UNOSOM II from achieving its aims and allows the achievement of the militia's? The answer appears to be that it did. Guaranteed supplies and a safe haven to stage his militia force, Aideed was able to protect what may be considered his operational center of gravity. Had UNOSOM II denied him
this link to reinforcements, the outcome of the conflict may have been different. That leads to the next part of the analysis. What prevented aggressive patrolling, cordon and search operations, and consistent check point procedures?

**Strategic Center of Gravity**

While Mogadishu and especially the lines of communication emanating from and leading into the city appear to have been the operational center of gravity for both UNOSOM II and Al-duced, the strategic center of gravity is more abstract or subjective in nature. The inability of UNOSOM II to protect its operational center of gravity can be linked to a predominant factor listed in the matrix--unity of effort.

Strategically, the cohesion of the U.N. coalition of forces was UNOSOM II's center of gravity. The success of UNOSOM II was dependent upon the strength of the alliance and the ability of the U.N. to find and retain contributing nations who could effectively support the operation. Failure to aggressively and decisively secure Mogadishu and its key terrain was completely dependent on the cohesion of the forces given this mission. In analyzing this center of gravity, several decisive points can be identified:

1. Forces hostile to United Nations efforts in Somalia, predictably directed their energies against members of the coalition while trying desperately to protect their own political leadership and hold their own factional alliance together.

2. The participation of the United States in UNOSOM II with its associated leadership, commitment, manpower and equipment and other resources that only the U.S. could provide was key to UNOSOM II's success or failure.

UNOSOM II's contingent forces were individually and sequentially bloodied by USC/SNA instigated ambushes, snipers, mortars and RPG fires, land mines, and other attacks. The cumulative effect of these attacks weakened UNOSOM II's resolve to fight in an ever expanding urban guerilla war. This was evident in the performance of UNOSOM II contingent forces following attacks by Al-ched's militia. Some refused
to permit their forces to reside and/or operate within the city limits of Mogadishu. Others would not conduct military operations against hostile forces or participate fully as a Chapter VII force. These reactions indicate just how successfully Aideed had been in deteriorating the will of the coalition to act decisively and how unsuccessfully UNOSOM II had been in achieving unity of effort. Throughout most of its first year, UNOSOM II's command and control system was plagued by parallel lines of authority and lack of a clear consensus on the Chapter VII mandate and also on the authority given to the Force Commander. The absence of a consensus building process in New York further compounded these issues.

UNOSOM II's Command and Control Problems

The command and control structure used for UNOSOM II appeared to be straightforward in theory. The Security Council, using the Security Council Resolutions, established the policy and strategic direction for Somalia. The Under Secretary General for Peacekeeping Operations and the Special Representative for the Secretary General directed the implementation of the Security Council Resolution. The operational and tactical decisions for military operations were left to the Force Commander. All national contingent forces were under his operational control. The Force Commander in turn exercised operational and tactical control through brigade level headquarters.19

In actuality, the UNOSOM II command and control system was weak in execution. The first indication of coalition command and control problems came on 6 June. Force Command directed Italian and Pakistani forces to conduct joint patrols in the areas of Mogadishu following the attacks on U.N. peacekeepers the previous day. Force Command intended to place Italian armored forces under tactical control (TACON) of the Pakistani Brigade for operations in the Pakistani area of responsibility in order to bolster that force's capability. However, both the command relationship and the requirement to operate outside of the Italian sector were causes of concern for the Italian Contingent Commander. He felt these issues were beyond the Italian contingent's mission and Force Command's authority. Consequently, national approval was sought.

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Ultimately, Italian forces were permitted by their national authorities to participate in the operation provided they operated separately and under control of the Italian Force Commander. 20

One week later, seeking to reinforce the city with additional armored forces, Force Command directed French and Moroccan forces to deploy a company size force to Mogadishu. Similar to the situation with the Italian forces, both the French and Moroccan governments conditionally approved the deployment of their forces out of sector. In general, the conditions required that the troops remain OPCON to Force Command, and could only be used for a specific mission of limited duration. 21

Both Force Command and UNOSOM II civilian leadership expressed concern with the interference of national command authorities. The Force Commander, in a June 1993 letter to the Special Representative to the Secretary General stated:

Since 5 June some participating national contingents have refused to accept my [Force Commander's] direction until it was agreed by their national command authority of their home government. These impediments arose particularly in cases in which I required elements of one nation to cooperate with elements of another at the tactical level. . . . Being continually forced to delay implementation of my plans for the purpose of receiving national agreement on every mission I order is inappropriate and unacceptable. 22

The Special Representative to the Secretary General relayed these concerns to the Under Secretary General for Peacekeeping Operations in an 18 June cable:

It is unconscionable that a distant national command authority would interfere in ongoing operations by ordering force dispositions which are counter to the restoration of stability in the principle area of confrontation. . . . Such actions could cost lives, and ultimately undermine the viability of future Chapter VII peacekeeping operations. 23

Lack of consensus on command authority and on the new direction of offensive operations clearly demonstrated the debilitating impact that national command authorities were having on operations in Somalia. National interference in operational and tactical decisions hampered Force Command's military initiative and may have put the lives of other contingent soldiers at risk. Further, as casualties and violence rose,
national command authorities, to include the U.S., began to place more restrictions on the employment of their forces in theater. By July, these actions had almost brought security operations in Mogadishu to a standstill. In a 6 July cable to the Under Secretary General for Peacekeeping Operations, Force Command outlined UNOSOM II's command and control dilemma:

National authorities and local commanders feel free to ignore direction and urging for aggressive action. On the one hand [one national contingent] is reluctant to operate until further reinforced with tanks and additional APCs. On the other hand, [another national contingent] is insistent on further negotiations with faction leaders who have no actual influence on the USC/SNA militia.24

The growing command and control crisis in Somalia was a major topic of concern in New York. At an 21 July meeting of the major Somalia troop contributing representatives, the Under Secretary General for Peacekeeping Operations emphasized that the situation in Somalia required unity of effort on the part of UNOSOM II forces. The objective of his clarification was to dispel any confusion or misconception as to the nature of consultations that should be handled in the field and those at Headquarters New York. "Matters relating to the political and strategic issues are handled at the Headquarters by the Security Council and the Secretary General. Operational and tactical issues are handled in the field by the Special Representative to the Secretary General and the Force Commander."25 Contingent commanders should implement operational and tactical plans directed by the Force Headquarters rather than seek permission from their capitals. He requested that the nations instruct their forces to cooperate with Force Command on this issue.26

This appeal was accepted by the representatives, but some felt that a "permanent mechanism should be established in UNOSOM II in which the Special Representative to the Secretary General and the representatives of the main troop contributing countries based in Mogadishu would consult."27 It was further suggested that there should be regular consultations with the troop contributing countries perhaps monthly in order to discuss matters relating to the main objectives of the mandates.28 This latter request was agreed to by the Under Secretary for Peacekeeping Operations. However, he re-emphasized again
that "political representatives of member states present in theater may raise issues with the Force Commanders but any decision of political or strategic nature will be referred to Headquarters [New York]."

The lack of consensus by national authorities can be attributed to the U.N. Security Council Resolution process, especially when there is a significant change in mission as in the case of U.N. Security Council Resolution 837. While the Security Council overwhelming endorsed the resolution, no attempt was made to consult or gain consensus with the contributing nations prior to passage. This issue was brought out at a 27 January 1994 meeting between the Force Commander, the Under Secretary for Peacekeeping Operations and representatives from the force contributing nations. The Under Secretary noted the shortfall and proposed that a "friends to Somalia committee" be established and meet on a regular or emergency basis to address just such issues.

Command and control problems continued through the end of 1993. In September, Force Command intended to use the arriving Indian Brigade (5000 troops) to assist in disarmament operations in Mogadishu. This mission was clearly within the mandate of UNOSOM II. However, the Indian government refused to allow the employment of their forces in Mogadishu objecting to Indian troops working in close proximity to Pakistani troops. The Indian government further emphasized that they had contributed forces for expansion into the Central Region, not for operations in Mogadishu. The Indian government, however, did not oppose diversion of their forces to Baidoa and Kismayo to fill the void left by departing French and Belgian forces. This development raised a similar issue with the Zimbabwe government.

Due to the size of the Indian contingent, their forces could cover the French and Belgian sectors with minimal augmentation from other nations. Force Command directed Zimbabwe forces to redeploy from the French sector into Mogadishu to reinforce troops there. The government of Zimbabwe, however, interceded and refused to allow their forces to be employed in Mogadishu.

Even after the October 1993 ceasefire, command and control issues continued. In November, plans to establish a coalition division
headquarters to command and control tactical operations in Mogadishu were abandoned due to the Egyptian government's refusal to subordinate their forces to a coalition headquarters that would be commanded by a Pakistani major general.34

Aideed's attacks on the various contingents weakened the ability of UNOSOM II to maintain control of Mogadishu, but the cumulative effect was not fully exploited until U.S. forces were drawn more and more into direct conflict with the militia. Then, Aideed concentrated his efforts against American soldiers. His successful engagements of U.S. forces was a significant decisive point in that the U.S. contingent, with the leadership and force multipliers it gave UNOSOM II, was the linchpin that had to be undone in order to defeat the U.N. coalition's will to act decisively.

**U.S. Forces and UNOSOM II Command and Control Problems**

United States support after the transition to UNOSOM II was conditional when it came to committing combat forces to support U.N. operations in Somalia. The Terms of Reference provided strict guidance regarding conditions under which U.S. combat forces could be committed. At no time were these forces permitted to serve under the operational control of any contingent commander other than U.S., and CINCCENT reserved the decision to commit U.S. forces to combat operations in all but emergency conditions.35

Under these limitations, COMUSFORSOC was required to forward a concept of operations (CONOPS) to CINCCENT for approval of any commitment beyond the authority outlined in the Terms of Reference. As casualties and violence increased in Somalia, it became increasingly difficult to gain approval to use the U.S. Quick Reaction Force to support ground operations. Concern regarding the high profile of U.S. forces, particularly attack helicopters, in offensive operations in Mogadishu led to a layered decision making process in the United States. In some instances, decisions were made by U.S. national command authorities in Washington, as was the case in the Abdi House Raid in July 1993. Following the Abdi House Raid and its media criticism, it
was even more difficult to get approval for employment of U.S. ground and aviation forces for anything beyond force protection.

While COMUSFORSON had inherent authority to provide for U.S. force protection using the Quick Reaction Force, he was aware that his decisions would have to stand the Terms of Reference test. However, the only real way to protect the force was to maintain constant pressure on hostile militia forces. Coalition troops were reluctant to do so, and U.S. troops were not allowed to do so beyond their immediate bases. Such limitations on employment of U.S. combat resources had a corresponding effect on the coalition. U.S. forces were the primary source for combat multipliers, particularly attack helicopters. Without the use of these combat multipliers, the coalition often would not act.36

Summary

UNOSOM II's unity of effort was strongly influenced by the politics of individual nation-states. Due to lack of consensus, each of the major contributing nations placed restrictions and conditions on the employment of their forces. These restrictions altered and, at times, paralyzed the operational and tactical operations of UNOSOM II. These factors further compelled Force Command to assume the role of a tactical headquarters at the expense of strategic and operational functions. Unity of effort was clearly lacking in Somalia, and may also have contributed to unnecessary loss of life.

If Mogadishu was the operational center of gravity then every effort to protect its vital areas should have been made by UNOSOM II. However, the lack of unity of effort prevented Force Command from carrying out this critical function. The question must be asked: Would imposition of power over this potential center of gravity create a cascading, deteriorating effect on the morale, cohesion and will to fight that prevented UNOSOM II from achieving its aims and allow the achievement of the militia's? The answer to this is definitely yes. UNOSOM II's lack of a will to fight and inability to carry the fight to Aideed was a direct result of this lack of unity of effort. By national authorities limiting the actions of their forces, Force Command
was unable to sustain pressure in waging its campaign against the militia forces.

Some UNOSOM II contingents saw the failure not as a result of lack of will on their part or interference by their national authorities but rather blamed it on the indecisive behavior by the UNOSOM II civilian leadership. The Pakistani brigade commander reflected:

After each of those major encounters... Aideed was on the verge of defeat but the UN civilian officials called off military action for fear it was becoming internationally unpopular... Self-restraint on the part of the U.N. troops allowed Aideed to regroup his forces, adding recruits from the countryside and strike again [against UNOSOM II] at a place of his choosing.37

The Italian government complained that they had supported UNOSOM II operations initially and that their brigade commander had even requested permission to capture Aideed in the early June, but the request had been denied by UNOSOM II civilian leaders.38 Indeed, the Italian commander had made such a request, but the Special Representative to the Secretary General had delayed any arrest order until an initial review of the 5 June attack could be completed. When this initial investigation was finished and evidence directly linked the USC/SNA and Aideed in particular to the attack, the Special Representative to the Secretary General then urged Force Command to take aggressive military action to apprehend the perpetrators of the attack.

While the UNOSOM II civilian leadership cannot be faulted for supporting the military effort, it can be blamed for not establishing a comprehensive, theater strategy that depended not only upon military action but integrated the other elements of power at its disposal to bring an end to hostilities. No integrated political, military, humanitarian, and informational campaign was ever developed. Several attempts would be made in this direction but not in time to bring success to this nation building endeavor. This failure to develop such a strategy was another factor contributing to the lack of unity of effort within the coalition.

After the 3 October Olympic Hotel Raid, the Clinton administration blamed the the U.N for its lack of a coordinated strategy and its inability to recruit and maintain unity of effort among the
contingent forces. In a press interview following the 3 October Raid, the President remarked that he intended to be as as blunt as he could with U.N. officials in charging that the mission had

"deteriorated" since the United States handed it over to the international agency. . . . "this didn't happen to us when we had 28,000 troops there and we could control the situation" and that the quality of troops of other nations was insufficient. . . . "The people who have come in to replace the United States forces are doing the best they can, I'm sure," but too many are afraid to venture outside "their own areas and don't exactly follow orders."39

This inability to venture out of their own areas led to more use of U.S. forces, and it was the casualties inflicted upon U.S. forces by Aideed which was now compelling the President to readjust his position on Somalia. Public and Congressional pressure was causing the administration to back away from a commitment it had fully endorsed just a few days earlier. On 22 September, it had pushed for passage of Security Council Resolution 865. This resolution had once again approved the expanded mission of nation building for Somalia.40

When the Bush Administration had dispatched 28,000 troops to Somalia in December 1992, Brent Scowcroft, the national security adviser at the time, stated that there was a clear mission, a clear view of what the force was prepared to do and it was not prepared to do; becoming embroiled in an urban guerilla war was not one. However, the lack of political reconciliation among civil war antagonists, the presence of armed and organized militia throughout the city and its surrounding areas, and ubiquitous caches of weapons suggest that the grip of UNOSOM II on Mogadishu had been tenuous at best, when it assumed the mission on 4 May 1993. Some Pentagon planners had always thought that order could not be imposed in Somalia and particularly in Mogadishu, in less than six months. The new U.S. administration handed off the mission to the U.N. while Mogadishu was still dangerous. With fewer than 1400 combat troops remaining, other nations had to make up the bulk of the U.N. force and many of these lacked the muscle and training to be an effective fighting force.41 Therefore it was inappropriate to place the blame for failure on the other coalition participants.
Some may argue that the national will of the American people was the strategic center of gravity for UNOSOM II. As U.S. casualties mounted, the will of the American people to sustain the effort dwindled. The American public and Congress began to question U.S. participation in Somalia, particularly after the events of 3 October 1993. This criticism led to the presidential announcement to withdraw all U.S. forces from Somalia by 31 March 1994. The full effect of this unilateral decision on UNOSOM II by the leading member of the coalition had tremendous impact on the other contributing nations. Withdrawal announcements by the other western industrialized governments soon followed. This absence of forces from the western industrialized nations severely limited what the Force Command could do to realize goals of future U.N. mandates. Although the U.S. was a leader in the coalition, many factors other than continued U.S. force participation led to UNOSOM II’s demise. Aggressive and continuous actions by all the forces would have minimized casualties against any one player. A thorough reassessment of the strategic aims and goals at critical phases in the operation, to include a review of required capabilities, and an attempt to gain consensus from the major contributing nations on the new strategic direction could have precluded the final outcome. Lastly, an integrated U.N. strategy that took advantage of all the elements of power may have brought success. But none of these actions occurred.

Alternative Regional Strategy

Strategic and operational centers of gravity do not exist in isolation from the national and military strategic aims established for the conduct of an operation. While they are dynamic and may change over the course of the campaign, they remain linked to the the political aims of the nation or alliance. Therefore, a change in strategic direction is necessary for the operational center of gravity to be altered. Rapidly changing strategic aims or operational objectives, though, can cause a loss of focus on the center of gravity or require the enemy to reassess your vulnerabilities in light of that new strategy.42

With this in mind, the United Nations and UNOSOM II still had an opportunity to gain success in the midst of the setbacks it was facing
in late October and early November 1993. The U.N. began to articulate a new strategy, one with a regional focus. This strategy would continue to provide military security, humanitarian relief, and economic redevelopment in those areas of Somalia that supported the political reconciliation process. Making little or no headway with Aideed in the December 1993 Addis Abba conferences, UNOSOM II should have vigorously seized this new concept. New attempts at reconciliation being pursued at the December 1993 Addis Abba conference, involving a series of meetings between the political faction leaders, and hoping to end with the formation of a national government were destined to fail. The past summer's events had demonstrated that this approach had not worked. The new Addis Abba talks could not be a substitute for the kind of difficult peace agreements that needed to be worked out between the clans and their associated factions. Nor would they alter the de facto partitioning of the country that already exists under the clan-based factions supported by their militias. Had a national council been formed and had it attempted to impose its will on the various regions, such action would probably have led to a renewed escalation of conflict.\textsuperscript{43}

In December 1993, UNOSOM II had the opportunity to seriously embrace a regional strategy. Viewed as an alternative to Aideed's propaganda of UNOSOM II as being an encroachment by a colonial power, this new approach could have undermined attempts by Aideed and warlords like him that desired to seize power for themselves. Regions had been identified by the political staff that fell under the control of given factions who were sympathetic to UNOSOM II and desired, as a minimum, economic support from the U.N. (the northeast under the SSDF and Somaliland in the northwest). The idea of a loose federal confederation was beginning to gain consideration by diverse groups of Somalis.

During his tenure as the Special Representative to the Secretary General to UNOSOM I in 1992, Ambassador Sahnoun had proposed a similar strategy of national reconciliation for a post-civil war Somalia,\textsuperscript{44} but the idea had been rejected in U.N. New York.\textsuperscript{45} UNOSOM II's leadership could have benefitted giving new life to Sahnoun's earlier concept. Although, UNOSOM II might have initially absorbed a media setback by withdrawing
from Mogadishu, long term benefits would have placed Aideed at an operational disadvantage. Development of improved infrastructure at Kismayo and Bossasso would have forced Aideed to challenge UNOSOM II in areas where other warlords held sway. Not only would he have to threaten U.N. coalition forces, he would also have to challenge other factional militia as well. This would have been most difficult. Tactically, Aideed had almost reached his culminating point during the 3, 4 October 1993 engagement with Task Force Ranger. Militia casualties were high and his ammunition stocks were depleted. In December, he was not in a position to militarily challenge other formidable Somali militias.46

Embracing a regional strategy would have been preferable to being expelled from the city by Aideed as occurred in March 1995. Expulsion of the U.N. gave Aideed control of the airport and seaport in Mogadishu.47 Without the development of infrastructure elsewhere in the country, Mogadishu continues to be the focal point for trade and more importantly for the independent relief operations carried out by NGOs. Had UNOSOM II adopted a regional strategy and developed infrastructure at other ports of entry, the majority of relief work could have been redirected to those outer regions where a secure environment existed. Likewise, new avenues for trade could have been opened. If this had occurred, Aideed's control of Mogadishu would be of much less strategic importance and the operational center of gravity for UNOSOM II would have shifted. However, this regional strategy initiative was never implemented by the United Nations, and the strategic and operational centers of gravity for UNOSOM II never shifted.

**Historical Examples**

The analysis in this thesis demonstrates that the strategic center of gravity of UNOSOM II was a lack of unity of effort. To reinforce this finding it would be beneficial to locate historical examples that indicate similar outcomes. Preferably these examples should be of post-Cold War conflicts or events in recent history categorized as operations other than war. There are several current
historical examples that fit these parameters where unity of effort has played critical role in the outcome of the conflict.

General Robert H. Scales, in his book, *Certain Victory. The U.S. Army in the Gulf War*, describes what the allied staff considered to be their friendly center of gravity in OPERATION, DESERT STORM:

[General] Schwarzkopf considered the Coalition's center of gravity to be the Coalition itself. If the frail bonds of Arab-Islamic commitment to the U.S.-led Coalition could be broken, perhaps by drawing Israel into the war, the Coalition would quite likely be fragmented and torn apart. He knew that forging some unusual instrument at the scene would be necessary to hold the Coalition together.48

General Yeosock, Commander of CENTCOM's Third Army, was directed to form what was later known as the Coalition Coordination and Communications Integration Center (C3IC). This center would provide a framework for information sharing and orders clarification. The C3IC assisted in solidifying a fragile Coalition that did not have the benefit of long term agreements found in standing alliances like NATO. The C3IC would be used as a "directed telescope" that... could focus on specific issues for resolution in an informal, collegial manner.49

In what has been to date the greatest challenge to the U.S. forces in the post-Cold War era, unity of effort was determined as the critical hinge for friendly operations. As FM 100-5 states clearly, "the Army will not operate alone."50 It will find itself in an environment of joint, multilateral and interagency operations. In multilateral operations, consideration of other national interests must be understood and reconciled. Ideally all national efforts would be guided by a single strategic perspective and directed at goals envisioned for a specific end state. Failure to attain such an unity of effort can lead to failure in attaining the conditions of the desired end state, thus causing defeat.

Besides DESERT STORM, unity of effort played an important role in the success or failure of several low intensity conflicts during the Cold War era. While not specified as a center of gravity, the way in which this dimension was handled directly contributed to the outcome of each conflict.
The Guatemalan counterinsurgency campaign of 1982-1985 benefited from a strong identification with a military coup that took control of the besieged government of General Romeo Lucas Garcia. The populace for the most part approved the coup and welcomed the authoritarian but charismatic leadership provided by the Rios Montt military government. Through his dynamic leadership, Rios Montt was able to focus military and political mechanisms against the guerilla forces threatening his regime. He did this in several ways. First, he eliminated the feared Judicial Police detachment from the National police force; then he purged the higher ranks of the Guatemalan Army's officer corps; and lastly he implemented an anticorruption campaign that signified to the people that reforms were being made.51

Besides providing a new sense of legitimacy, General Rios Montt reorganized the government and armed forces to better execute a unified counterinsurgency strategy. A special General Staff was created to develop and implement a counterinsurgency campaign plan. A Committee for National Reconstruction was formed and worked in concert with the Civil Military Affairs branch of the General Staff to conduct an inventory of population needs in the areas of insurgency.52 Following the survey, the committee developed plans to provide needed services to these afflicted areas. In the military insurgency zones, coordinating staffs from all government agencies established working cells. The senior coordinator in each zone was the military zone commander and he was tasked to ensure combined interagency strategies were executed. The strategies had three primary objectives:

1. Coordinated development efforts with military actions and established armed civil defense patrol units in the villages threatened by guerilla attack or where there was suspected presence of guerilla activity.

2. Provided an accountability process for the scarce governmental and international resources expended in the zones.

3. Incorporated the population in the development of local counterinsurgent strategies.53

This new unity of effort demonstrated by the military government proved essential in the successful defeat of insurgent forces.
An example of an unsuccessful counterinsurgency where the
government failed to provide proper unity of effort occurred in Ethiopia
with the Mengistu regime in the 1980s. The Eritrean and Tigrayan
insurgents promoted revolutionary programs against the Mengistu regime
due to the government's ethnic discriminatory policies demonstrated
against these two minorities. To counter the insurgencies, Mengistu had
difficulty in gaining unity of effort within his government. It was
organized in politburo fashion, but Mengistu, like Stalin in the Soviet
Union, ruled in a manner where the politburo members feared him. The
membership would attempt to discover Mengistu's opinion on issues and
model their answers and opinions according to his. This prevented a
free sharing of advice on how to handle the growing insurgencies.54

In addition, his government was not organized to enforce a
coordinated military strategy. It was a triad, consisting of military,
party, and security components, that was layered top down to the field.
Military units had a political officer and a security officer as well as
its tactical commander. Each operated independently and reported back
through a separate chain of command to separate headquarters. It was
only at Mengistu's own level that the separate and divergent reports
came together. Although the military commander was supposedly in charge
of operations, the other two officers did not hesitate to interfere in
development of strategy and in the execution of operations themselves.
This flawed organization was a significant factor in the national
government's inability to gain unity of effort which contributed greatly
to its eventual defeat.55

Implications for the Future

At transition from UNITAF, a center of gravity assessment had
been not conducted by the UNOSOM II military staff. This can be
attributed to the perceived lack of a clearly defined hostile force and
the focus of security tasks on protection of humanitarian efforts from
attacks by local bandits.

During the breathing spell provided by UNITAF's presence, Somalis
began to rebuild their lives, while the warlords, who had promulgated
the civil war and brought on the mass starvation, were being
increasingly marginalized. Eventual confrontation with one or more of the warlords appeared increasingly likely with the departure of UNITAF. However, the accords reached by factional leaders at Addis Ababa in March 1993, where they agreed to reconciliation and disarmament, and UNOSOM II’s belief that the greatest threat against it at the time of transition consisted of large scale riots in Mogadishu, similar to those organized in February of that year, may have lulled UNOSOM II into thinking the security situation in Southern Somalia was relatively stable.  

On 4 June, planners recognized the possibility of resistance and the ceasefire inspection teams were therefore escorted by company-size U.N. forces. When U.N. peacekeepers were ambushed on 5 June, the coalition was caught by surprise. UNOSOM II had underestimated the intentions and military capability of the USC/SNA leadership. The worst case scenario consisting of street riots did not occur, but were replaced by attacks, the ferocity of which were not anticipated.  

It was only after these attacks occurred that an analysis of potential centers of gravity was made and the operational importance of Mogadishu to UNOSOM II’s humanitarian and security missions was identified. Protecting this center of gravity, however, was another matter.

The significant lack of unity of effort was not readily apparent in early June. It was only after several major engagements that the magnitude of the problem began to take shape. Even then it was not until mid-July that coalition force inaction reached such an extreme that permission was sought and granted for the unilateral employment of the U.S. Quick Reaction Force. However, after the Abdi House raid with its accompanying public affairs setback, such unilateral use of U.S. forces was denied.

At this time, that U.N. and U.S. command structures at all levels should have begun a formal reassessment of the mission to include its objectives and means to reach the desired end state as outlined by the objectives. As was discussed earlier, this was accomplished in part, by different agencies and levels of command at different times. COMUSFORSOM saw the dangers to the force in theater and requested armored reinforcement but the request was denied. At almost the same
time, a request for Task Force Ranger was made by the Special
Representative to the Secretary General to U.S. national authorities,
but this time, the request was approved. The most symptomatic of a
failed review process was the "two track" policy put forth by the U.S.,
after interagency coordination, at the end of August 1993. Task Force
Ranger was conducting "hunt and snatch" operations for Aideed at the
same time U.S. administration officials were pressuring the U.N. to seek
a political settlement to the fighting in Mogadishu. The result of this
policy left the President of the United States at a loss to explain how
the 3 October Olympic Hotel Raid had occurred after he'd been briefed
only days before concerning the new political initiatives.\textsuperscript{58} "The error
was the error in not seeing it get out of balance."\textsuperscript{59} Not performing a
complete review at all levels and ensuring the aims and objectives
established at the operational and tactical levels support the goals at
the strategic level. U.S. perseverance to sustain support for the
Somalia mission was strongly questioned following the unilateral
decision to withdraw U.S. forces by March 1994. However, this would
never have occurred if proper reassessments had been performed at
critical stages in the mission and appropriate measures were made to
redefine and link the political and military goals at all levels. The
primary implications for the future is to prudently monitor future peace
operations, periodically reevaluating not only their objectives but also
the centers of gravity of the peacekeeping force should there be a major
shift in direction.

"Mission creep" is not doing more or assuming additional missions
than originally planned. "Mission creep" is taking on these additional
tasks without conducting a thorough reassessment of the strategic and
operational aims of the mission and their derivative centers of gravity.
This reassessment must ensure that all elements of power, military,
political, economic (humanitarian) and informational are considered and
that a review of needed capabilities is made and provided if deemed
necessary for success.

Given national concerns regarding sovereignty and control of
military forces and resources, unity of effort must be achieved in peace
operations. The United Nations faces the arduous task of building
consensus and gaining the complete support of nation-states to provide soldiers to serve under U.N. control in what may amount to combat operations. The U.N. may not be suited for similar peace enforcement missions in the future. The capability of the U.N. to conduct complex, large scale operations requiring fine coordination and quick response is limited. . . . In cases where major U.S. interests are at stake and where unity of effort is essential and large scale resources are required a lead nation approach or one led by an established, competent alliance (NATO) may be a preferred option. Either of these approaches is susceptible to the same inherent shortcomings, the burden for gaining consensus on command relationships is shifted to the lead nation or alliance.

Whether single nation or alliance-led, Chapter VII operations or Chapter VI operations where hostilities are possible, a center of gravity analysis must be completed by the military planner. Chapter VII operations are forcible, armed interventions which are most severely tested in chaotic "failed nation state" situations. Peacekeepers will most often be uninvited by the internal parties. Their presence may be resented, and, in some cases, violently opposed by some of the belligerents. Until the conditions are right for political reconciliation, the peacekeepers may have no choice but to take action against one or more belligerents openly opposed to the U.N. intervention. While minimum offensive action should be employed to achieve the enforcement objective, it may involve reducing the combat capability of one or more of the parties. To do this, military planners going into such operations must conduct a thorough analysis of the main belligerents so their centers of gravity or decisive points can be identified should neutralization of their combat capability be required. At the same time, the strategic and operational centers of gravity of the peacekeeping force must be identified and appropriate security measures designed to protect these centers of gravity and their derivative decisive points from attack. Failure to do so can not only endanger the force but threaten the success of the peace operation.
Endnote


6Ibid.

7Ibid., 5.

8Ibid.

9Ibid.

10Alex Shoumatoff, "The Warlord Speaks," The Nation, 4 April 1994, 444.

11In an interview with Aideed in Ethiopia following the cessation of hostilities, the warlord commented:

We hope foreign intervention will cease and those nations who want to help in the future will come when we have a government that can deal with them effectively. . . The only dangerous thing we are facing is foreign intervention.

He went on to state that UNOSOM had sought to play factions against one another driving the factions apart rather than pursuing political reconciliation. Jennifer Parmelee, "Relaxing in Ethiopia, Unrepentant Aideed Finds Time For Envoys," The Washington Post, 26 December 1993, A41.


16Ibid.

17Ibid.


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