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NATO'S COMBINED JOINT TASK FORCE: SEPARABLE BUT NOT SEPARATE

by

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A paper submitted to the Faculty of the Naval War College in partial satisfaction of
the requirements of the Department of Joint Military Operations.

The contents of this paper reflect my own personal views and are not necessarily
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<tr>
<td>ARFPS</td>
<td>Allied Reaction Force Planning Staff</td>
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<td>CIS</td>
<td>Communications and Intelligence Systems</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CJTF</td>
<td>Combined Joint Task Force</td>
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<tr>
<td>CJTF-HQ</td>
<td>Combined Joint Task Force Headquarters</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CSCE</td>
<td>Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe</td>
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<td></td>
<td>renamed OSCE - Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe</td>
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<td>DRWG</td>
<td>Defense Representatives Working Group</td>
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<td>FAWEU</td>
<td>Forces Answerable to WEU</td>
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<td>HQ</td>
<td>Headquarters</td>
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<td>JTF</td>
<td>Joint Task Force</td>
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<td>MC</td>
<td>Military Committee</td>
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<td>MJLC</td>
<td>Multinational Joint Logistics Command</td>
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<td>MNC</td>
<td>Major NATO Command</td>
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<td>NAC</td>
<td>North Atlantic Council</td>
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<td>NATO</td>
<td>North Atlantic Treaty Organization</td>
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<td>OOA</td>
<td>Out of Area</td>
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<tr>
<td>PC</td>
<td>Planning Cell</td>
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<tr>
<td>PFP</td>
<td>Partnership For Peace</td>
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<td>PPC</td>
<td>Partnership Planning Cell</td>
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<tr>
<td>PSF</td>
<td>Principal Staff Functions</td>
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<tr>
<td>ROE</td>
<td>Rules of Engagement</td>
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<td>WEU</td>
<td>Western European Union</td>
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Abstract of
NATO'S COMBINED JOINT TASK FORCE: SEPARABLE BUT NOT SEPARATE

NATO’s “New Strategic Concept” recognized the need to reorganize forces to respond to “multifaceted... multi-directional” threats and to “permit measured, flexible, and timely responses” to crisis while relying “increasingly on multinational forces”. Accordingly, the 1994 NATO Summit proposed the CJTF-HQ concept by which the collective assets of the Alliance could be made available for European led “out-of-area” operations. This paper investigates lessons learned from combined/joint peace operations involving NATO, WEU and non-Alliance participants, along with CJTF criteria independently developed by NATO and the WEU in order to provide guidance for CJTF-HQ staff functional requirements and organizational relationships. It concludes with a proposal for a CJTF-HQ organizational concept that is “separable but not separate” for NATO or WEU to effectively conduct peace support operations.
INTRODUCTION

NATO’s “New Strategic Concept” approved at the Rome Summit in November 1991, in the wake of the cold war and collapse of the Soviet Union, recognized the need to reorganize its forces to respond to risks which were “multifaceted ... and multi-directional” and to “permit measured, flexible and timely responses” to crisis situations while relying “increasingly on multinational forces”.1 On 4 June 1992, in Oslo, the North Atlantic Council (NAC) agreed to support, on a case-by-case basis, peace-keeping activities under authority of the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe (CSCE), and in Brussels on 17 December 1992 to support United Nations (UN) peace-keeping.2 This required the Alliance to start re-assessing its command structures and crisis management procedures, which had been designed to meet the needs of collective defense within the scope of Article V of the Washington Treaty, in order to address new “Out-of-Area” (OOA) operations.3 The Alliance’s new roles and recent experience in planning and executing peace-support operations in Bosnia-Herzegovina demonstrate the need for a flexible command structure with a readily deployable headquarters to direct peace operations. This requirement has been reinforced through the experience of individual NATO members’ response to OOA actions, where ad-hoc coalitions often lacked the integrative mechanisms for properly organizing a wide array of capabilities, resources, and organizations.

It was the recognition that NATO’s current static headquarters (HQ) structure was not designed to provide the requisite flexible, mobile operational command and control capability for OOA actions, that led the Heads of State and Government at the 10/11 January 1994 Summit to direct the adaptation of the Alliances structures to reflect the full spectrum of its future roles, and endorse the Combined Joint Task Force (CJTF) concept. The primary objectives set forth for the
CJTF were to; 1) Provide a structure that would improve efficiency and operational flexibility in responding to the new Alliance crisis management missions, including peace-operations; 2) Improve cooperation with the Western European Union (WEU), in support of the European desire to develop a European Security and Defense Identity (ESDI) and; 3) Facilitate conduct of operations with nations outside the Alliance. To support these objectives the Heads of State pledged to “stand ready to make collective assets of the Alliance available, on basis of consultations in the NAC, for WEU operations undertaken by the European allies in pursuit of their Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP). They further directed that the NAC, with advice of the NATO military authorities and in coordination with WEU, develop a Combined Joint Task Force Head Quarters (CJTF-HQ) concept as a mechanism to promote “separable but not separate” military capabilities that could be employed by NATO or the WEU. Based upon these objectives the concept was defined as follows:

A CJTF HQ is a deployable, multinational, multi-service HQ of variable size, formed to command and control, as authorized, combined joint forces of NATO Nations, and possibly non-NATO nations for the purpose of conducting peace operations Out-of-Area. A CJTF HQ could also be deployed for WEU led operations.

An important consideration in organizing the CJTF HQ and developing the related command and control concept is the intended limited primary purpose of CJTF employment, which is to conduct OOA peace support operations. These non-Article V peace support operations, are defined in NATO’s MC 327, “NATO Military Planning for Peace Support Operations” and include; conflict prevention, peace-making, peace-keeping, humanitarian aid, peace enforcement, and peace building.

In response to the Summit, and subsequent NAC direction, the Major NATO Commands (MNCs) were tasked to coordinate the development of the CJTF-HQ concept for the Military
Committee (MC) in June 1994. Unfortunately, neither the WEU, nor France as a participant in NATO's political structure, nor any Partnership for Peace (PFP) countries have participated in the concept development.

The WEU's position regarding a CJTF concept has been heavily influenced by the French, and has been evolving for some years via a number of documents including the Petersburg Declaration of 14 June 1992 which identified WEU's roles to include peace operations in support of CSCE or the UN, unrestricted by NATO geographic constraints. The WEU Ministers' Kirchburg Declaration of 9 May 94 directed development of the CJTF concept, citing the benefits of avoiding duplication of capabilities and leading to greater standardization/interoperability. As a result, the WEU has recently presented a "Report on Criteria and Modalities for Effective use by the WEU of CJTFS" to a joint Council of NATO and WEU.

It is these organizational and political criteria and requirements of the US and NATO relative to those of the Europeans / WEU, and the special functional requirements of potential CJTF peace operations that will be primary determinants of the organizational requirements for staffing and effective command and control. This paper will focus on the CJTF HQ organizational concept vs. discussion of component forces that will ultimately be attached to make up the Task Force. It will investigate via lessons learned from recent Combined Joint Task Force peace operations involving NATO and WEU member participants those functional capabilities an relationships that must be brought to a CJTF-HQ organizational concept to effectively conduct peace operations. It will then evaluate criteria set forth in NATO's preliminary CJTF-HQ concept and the WEU's CJTF report to evaluate relationships between the CJTF-HQ staff organization and its superior and subordinate HQs and, attempt to propose an operationally effective CJTF-HQ organizational concept that is "separable but not separate" for either NATO or WEU operations.
CHAPTER II

ORGANIZATIONAL AND FUNCTIONAL REQUIREMENTS OF A CJTF-HQ

Operations Provide Comfort and Provide Promise offer particularly relevant guidance on the required functional capabilities and organization relationships for the CJTF-HQ concept due to their similarities with anticipated future CJTF-HQ missions. They both involved a nationally led Joint Task Force (JTF) which evolved into multinational coalitions involving NATO, WEU, and non-Alliance participants. While both operations were OOA, they were/are conducted on NATO's periphery and represent humanitarian peace operations with strong security requirements.

Provide Comfort coordinated a multinational relief effort for Kurdish refugees in eastern Turkey and Iraq following Desert Storm. U.S. efforts commenced after a 4 April 1991 UN Resolution authorizing use of force to protect relief efforts. As a result of growing multinational commitment of 11 nations, the US led JTF transitioned to a Combined Task Force, and the mission gradually expanded from emergency relief to Kurds in the mountains, to resettling Kurds in Iraq.¹

JTF Provide Promise was established by the US to support UNPROFOR and coordinate humanitarian airlift, initially US and ultimately from six NATO nations, with the UN High Commission on Refugees (UNHCR). Mission creep and multinational involvement resulted in USNAVEUR who is dual hatted NATO CINCSOUTH being designated Commander of the JTF, which then set about planning and preparing to become the nucleus of a NATO headquarters to implement subsequent UN Resolutions.² On 10 April 1993 NATO began Operation Deny Flight enforcing the no-fly zone over the Former Republic of Yugoslavia (FRY) marking the first time NATO conducted OOA operations.³ Also, in response to a series of UN Resolutions requiring firmer sanctions against the FRY, NATO's Standing Force Mediterranean conducted Operation
Maritime Guard, and the WEUs Contingency Maritime Force conducted Operation Sharp Fence. In June 1993 these were combined into Operation Sharp Guard under a single NATO command. 4

These OOA peace operations demonstrate some key characteristics indicating important organizational relationships and Principal Staff Functions (PSFs) required of a CJTF-HQ.

- **Imprecise/Incremental Political Direction** - The complex environments requiring peace operations make it difficult to specify precise objectives. As different nations join a coalition they bring different perceptions of what the operation can achieve, often resulting in incremental direction. 5 This dictates that a CJTF-HQ have a clearly defined chain of command upward to the NAC or the WEU Council to demand clear political direction from the UN or CSCE.

- **Uncertain Nature of Conflict** - requires that potential threats be evaluated and responses planned on a continuous basis. 6 Additionally, peace operations can rapidly escalate from peace-keeping to peace-enforcing, requiring CJTF unity of command and resident crisis action planning capability.

- **Voluntary Nation Participation** - requires a common command concept which can flexibly incorporate pre-designated CJTF-HQ staff elements from existing organizations or national staffs to avoid time consuming ad hoc staff building once it is determined who will participate. 7

- **Greater Requirement for Coordination** - Peace operations require coordination between the CJTF-HQ and a vast array of participants including; UN/CSCE representatives, host governments, non-governmental local leaders, non-alliance military forces, various government agencies, non government aid organizations (NGOs) and the press. Increased coordination requires establishment of special staff elements such as cultural/political advisors, linguists, and liaison officers. 8

- **Requirement for more Flexible Logistics and Support** - OOA peace-operations require the deployment of forces away from established NATO command, control, communications and
logistics infrastructure. It requires that a CJTF-HQ be staffed to provide a full range of logistics, support and sustainment functions to assigned forces, various NGOs and refugees.

Supporting the above, lessons from Provide Comfort and Provide Promise, as documented by JULLS, NTIC and the Center for Naval Analysis, present guidance applicable to required PSFs and organizational relationships for the proposed CJTF-HQ concept and are summarized below:

- **Command and Control** - The CJTF-HQ commander must have OPCON over all subordinate units as in CTF Sharp Guard to provide a high degree of effectiveness. A standard organization should be developed, with core staffs drawn primarily from an existing lead nation or regional command structure, but must allow for staff participation of other major participants. HQ elements must be trained and staffed to utilize the WWMCCs/JOPES or Allied Deployment and Movement System to access force packages, prioritize, and coordinate flow of combined forces. Deny Flight has exposed the deficiencies of NATO’s ageing, static, Air Command and Control System and hence the requirement for deployable equipment and staff for air space management between the CJTF-HQ, subordinate air command elements and AWACs. Similarly, coordination of other fire support assets may require a unit such as an Allied Mobile Force Artillery HQ.

- **Communications** - Deployable Communication and Intelligence Systems (CIS) equipment including: satellite terminals, ADP and secure communications with complete staffing must provide connectivity and support deployed HQ’s C2 in theater and to higher authority.

- **Intelligence/Reconnaissance** - A resourced Intel staff with augmentation from NIST or teams from NATO’s Linked OPINT Center Europe (LOCE) must have capability to access, sanitize, and disseminate intelligence as required by the coalition. SIGINT/IMINT may prove less effective for refugees or small enemy units, putting greater dependency upon collection from HUMINT, news video, tactical reporting and assets such as terrain analysis support teams and local area analysts.
- **Planning capability** - A central planning capability is necessary to produce ready concept plans and force packages to reduce the time required between political direction and execution. A CJTF HQ must be staffed to translate concept plans into op-orders by crisis action planning procedures.  

- **Liaison/coordination** - Assignment of allied officers to the CJTF-HQ staff is critical to unity of purpose. Major organizations also require liaison, such as USAID in Provide Comfort, where a Civil-Military Coordination Center was established to maintain face-to-face communications between coalition forces, Iraqi military and humanitarian relief agencies.  

- **Logistics** - A deployable Combined Support Command concept can facilitate overall coalition logistics coordination when many participants are involved. Additionally, logistics staffing is required to provide support to UN forces and other civilian agencies requiring military support. A staff contracting authority for purchase of local supplies and services facilitates timely supply and reduces requirements for lift. A Theater Contingency Construction Management (TCCM) staff can provide area construction expertise to support CJTF forces and relief efforts.  

- **Public Affairs/Information** - A robust public affairs capability is required to maintain coalition, host nation, and conflicting party support for the peace efforts. Psycho-political operations are linked to this effort and may include deployable radio and TV broadcast capability. A visitors bureau under chief of Protocol can assist in coordinating visits of numerous distinguished visitors.  

- **Comptroller** - Comptroller staffing on CJTF staffs have been found critical to coordinate use and accountability of various funds and ensure proper use of resources.  

- **Legal** - Coalition ROE can be elusive and create ambiguity detrimental to mission accomplishment. Also, Status of Forces Agreements (SOFA) must be established with the host nation. The coalition’s position in Provide Promise was when NATO forces deploy NATO SOFA applies. Such issues require liaison and staff international legal expertise.
CHAPTER III
CURRENT CJTF-HQ ORGANIZATIONAL AND STAFFING CONCEPTS

NATO’s CJTF-HQ’s Concept - The CJTF-HQ concept that has been developed by the MNCs to date was developed in the absence of WEU, French, and PFP participation and hence is preliminary in that it is limited to exclusively a MNC operational perspective.

- Command and Force Relationships - The proposed relationship between a NATO CJTF-HQ and its superior and subordinate HQs is depicted in Figure A. The CJTF concept is expected to fully utilize NATO’s integrated military structure. The MC will nominate a MNC who will be held responsible for all operational matters, including major supporting functions such as logistics coordination; and for interface with the Pol Mil level in HQ NATO. The MNC will select an appropriate subordinate command, normally a Major Subordinate Command (MSC) to satisfy the operational requirements including providing the core/nucleus CJTF-HQ staff, and serve as the deployed CJTF-HQs immediate superior.

- CJTF-HQ Central Planning Staff - A Bi-MNC central planning staff is proposed to perform deliberate CJTF planning functions under the direction of the MNCs, while maintaining close relationship with pre-designated MSC CJTF-HQ nucleus staffs for concept plan development, maintenance of a data base of forces available for CJTF-HQs, and coordination of training and exercises. The Allied Reaction Force Planning Staff (ARFPS), is proposed for this function.

- CJTF-HQ Nucleus Staff - MSC and Principal Subordinate Command (PSC) HQ staffs are proposed to be pre-designated as nucleus staffs for the CJTF-HQs. They will be formed into functional modules which will train, maintain direct links to the ARFPS and be responsible for
detailed operational planning. Since no single MSC has sufficient manning alone, these CJTF-HQ nucleus staffs will likely be augmented from their parent HQs and from other MSC/PSCs.4

It is proposed that the Principal Staff Functions (PSFs) of the CJTF-HQ in peace support operations will be similar to those of a conventional HQ, but that the increased requirement for liaison will require some additional functions including an International Affairs Advisor (INTAF), Civil/Military Operations (CMO) and linguistics. See Figure B.5

- Logistics Support - A CJTF-HQ logistics staff is planned to; coordinate the efforts of component logistics’ organizations, resolve cross-component issues, and coordinate the use of scarce resources such as strategic lift. Depending upon the scale of the operation the MNCs propose that a Multinational Joint Logistics Command (MJLC) may be designated which would perform the actual execution functions of coordinating logistics between components hence reducing the function of the CJTF-HQ Logistics staff to operational coordination and oversight.6

- CIS Support - The MNCs propose a CJTF-HQ CIS Support Group to establish, operate and maintain internal and external CIS for the CJTF-HQ.7

- HQ support - A HQ support group is proposed to provide required logistics, administrative, food services, police and other services for the CJTF-HQ staff.8

- NATO/WEU/PFP Interface - The MNCs believe that the most cost and operationally effective way to satisfy the MC’s directive “to provide options for a CJTF-HQ concept in cooperation with Alliance nations not part of the Integrated Military Structure and with WEU” is for the WEU to capitalize on NATO’s proposed CJTF-HQ structure, procedures, assets and trained personnel.9 In a WEU led operation, it is expected that the WEU commander would be provided OPCON authority over assigned forces including the CJTF-HQ, even if largely manned and equipped by NATO. Non-NATO staff representation on a CJTF-HQ, however, is seen as presenting some
difficulties primarily because of the need for pre-selected staffs to exercise and participate in essential training, and the inability to pre-determine which non-NATO nations will participate in a given CJTF operation. For these reasons, it is expected that key functions is a CJTF-HQ would remain largely in the hands of NATO personnel. To achieve closer cooperation and further address the requirement for involvement of non-NATO nations in the CJTF-HQ concept, the MNCs proposed that the WEU have permanent representation in the ARFPS.¹⁰

WEU’s CJTF-HQ Concept - The WEU presented their “Criteria and Modalities for Effective use by the WEU of CJTF’s” to joint council of the NATO and WEU on 29 June 1994. There was no prior coordination of ideas with NATO with regard to concept development or necessary operational interfaces, hence the report is broad brush and leaves numerous issues unresolved.

- Mission - The scope for a WEU led CJTF is envisioned as smaller than a NATO operation, and more likely to involve greater civilian emphasis as demonstrated by WEU’s customs mission on the Danube and police/civil management effort in Mostar.¹¹

- Command and Force Relationships - The WEU has no permanent command structure, hence will use ad hoc arrangements by which the political authority, the WEU Council, will designate an Operational Commander from a lead nation. The Commander, assisted by the national staff will become directly responsible to the Council for the whole operation including planning, deployment, sustainment and redeployment. Control of a NATO CJTF-HQ operating under WEU command will remain with the WEU Council via the Operational Commander. The Council will keep NATO advised of progress and consult if objectives or conditions of the operation change.¹²

- Planning Cell - WEU’s Planning Cell was established by the Petersburg Declaration and reflects a strong European concern that since the CJTF concept does not automatically make NATO assets available, that WEU must retain an autonomous planning capability.¹³ The Planning cell’s primary
tasks include: 1) Maintaining lists of Forces Answerable to WEU (FAWEU) for various operations, 2) Conducting deliberate planning for WEU operations, and 3) Recommending command, control and communication structures and SOPs for potential HQs. Also, based upon experience in the FRY, the WEU is considering introducing a civilian/military element into the planning process.\textsuperscript{15}

- **Nucleus Staff** - The WEU has not resolved the basis of the CJTF-HQ nucleus staff. They appear to recognize that NATO’s permanent MSC and PSC staffs provide the best source for a well-trained, prepared, fully manned and readily deployable CJTF-HQs staff, however suggest that a Force HQ from FAWEU may also be used.\textsuperscript{16} The WEU expects that any initial NATO CJTF-HQ staff would eventually be heavily augmented or even replaced by their designated lead nation staff, and staff elements from other participating nations. The WEU Council will approve the final composition of the CJTF-HQ as a WEU Force HQ.\textsuperscript{17}

- **Logistics Staff** - The WEU has not specifically addressed logistics staffing, however it has previously developed a Combined Logistics Command concept in the Adriatic.

- **CIS Support** - The WEU recognizes that CJTF-HQ CIS support staffing and assets will be largely dependent upon NATO assets for long haul communications. Certain intelligence capability via its satellite center in Madrid may reduce dependency upon NATO assets and staffing required to disseminate and sanitize NATO intelligence.\textsuperscript{18}

- **HQ Support** - The WEU’s expectation for HQ support coincides with the MNCs concept, that when a CJTF-HQ is chopped to the WEU, NATO’s logistics concepts and infrastructures system will follow.\textsuperscript{19}
CONCLUSION

A CJTF-HQ CONCEPT - SEPARABLE BUT NOT SEPARATE

It can be seen from the differences in the current CJTF-HQ concepts, that "separable but not separate" present certain dilemmas for both the US initiated NATO CJTF-HQ concept as well as for the French influenced WEU position. The US sees the CJTF concept as a means for the Europeans to take on a greater share of regional crisis management, as well as a means of pre-empting the development of a totally independent European Defense Identity. Hence, the question of how autonomous should the WEU be with NATO assets. General Joulwan (SACEUR) asserts that the US is reluctant to "lay out large assets without a say in how they are used", insisting on "sustained political attention"."¹ The French on the other hand want a maximum degree of political and operational autonomy from Washington for the European countries to detach and use parts of NATO's command structure and military assets.²

The following proposal, portrayed in Figure C, attempts to reconcile the proposed CJTF-HQ concepts and the previously investigated peace operations lessons learned to provide a politically acceptable and operationally effective "separable but not separate" CJTF-HQ concept.

- Command and Force Relationships - Lessons learned indicate that effective command and control of operations similar to those envisioned by the CJTF-HQ concept require clear strategic interface between political and military structures (e.g., between the WEU Council and the CJTF commander). Since the WEU has no structure to parallel the NATO MC or the MNCs, and so as to formalize the interface while avoiding duplicative structures, it is proposed that the WEUs Defense Representatives Working Group (DRWG), which is responsible for the military aspects of European security and provides routine support to the Permanent Council, be marginally strengthened during deployment of a CJTF-HQ, potentially via augmentation from the WEU-PC,
to provide the necessary military interface between the Operational Commanders and the WEU Council. While political coordination will occur between the WEU Council and the NAC, military interface could be strengthened by establishing liaison between the DRWG and the MC. The DRWG could also provide WEU led operations with some of the CJTF “supporting” capability envisioned to be provided by the MNCs which are anticipated in most cases to function as “supporting CINCs” to either NATO or WEU led operations, for the provision of NATO or “available” US resources. The DRWG could likewise coordinate provision of WEU member resources as well as influence provision of NATO resources via its liaison with the MC/MNCs.

- Planning Staffs - Both the WEU and NATO development of planning staffs reflect lessons learned from previous combined peace operations which have required rapid force composition for uncertain threat environments. Both NATO and WEU CJTF planning efforts have focused upon generating force availability data bases, development of operational and organizational concept plans and addressing interoperability and sustainability issues of logistics, movement and communications. The European requirement for an autonomous planning capability, preclude integrating the staffs. However, it is expected that by making the WEU PC subordinate to the DRWG vs. the WEU Council, liaison would be facilitated with the BI-MNC planning cell, due to the strengthened liaison recommended between the DRWG and the MC/MNC. It is proposed that the planning cells, including the PPC, create a Planning Cell Coordination Group in Brussels permitting; mutual CJTF concept development, shared force data bases, division of responsibility for deliberate planning, and combined exercise and training planning. These staffs could also provide a trained source of augmentees to the rear Operational HQs (i.e. MSC or national staffs).

- Operational Headquarters and CJTF Nucleus Staffs - The requirement for a rear area Operational HQ responsible for mounting, deploying, sustaining, and recovery of the CJTF-HQ
and forces, while generally recognized, has not been adequately addressed. NATO suggests that these Operational HQ be either the MNC or MSC HQ, while the WEU concept suggests that a lead nation with FAWEU may be responsible for the Operational HQ and the deployed CJTF-HQ.\textsuperscript{5} The problem with most national HQs would be their limited experience in combined/joint operations and in the deployment of NATO CJTF-HQ or other assets. It is therefore proposed that the national staff receive assist augmentation from a NATO MSC/PSC HQ or planning cell.

As for the deployed CJTF-HQ, it is proposed that the core be drawn from a pre-designated MSC/PSC HQ for both NATO and WEU operations. This appears acceptable to WEU at least for initial deployment, after which gradual augmentation or replacement staffing from the lead nation or other FAWEU could allow untrained staff to be incorporated. For smaller scale operations, potentially not involving joint/maritime forces, an existing deployable HQ such as from the NATO ARRC, or the Franco-German Corps in the case of WEU may function as a CJTF HQ.

The Principal Staff Functions proposed for the CJTF-HQ staff by the MNCs generally reflect those identified by our peace operations lessons learned. Those lessons, however, indicate that peace operations put special requirements on some PSFs to ensure the connectivity between key participants in order to achieve the unity of purpose and operational effectiveness. The following changes to the proposed staff organization are therefore recommended: (see Figure D)\textsuperscript{10}

- \textit{Liaisons Officers} are critical to coordination and must function throughout the organization. However, to insure liaison of numerous and diverse players, it is recommended that “liaison” be expanded into a Civil-Military Coordination Center.

- \textit{Operations Staffing} needs to be able to coordinate various fires when provided by more than one component, either via CJTF CJ3 staffing or by designating a component as the Joint Force Air Component Command (JFACC), or in case of artillery as a Fire Support Coordination element.
- Public Information Officer (PIO) staffing must recognize the wide range of customers to serve and products required to favorably; influence public opinion, and hence may be expanded to a Combined Information Office coordinating various official briefings, international press releases, and supporting various psycho-political operations with broadcast capability.

- Protocol - should consider staffing a Combined Visitors Bureau to coordinate VIP visits.

- Logistics - While for larger operations a MJLC may accomplish the routine coordination of component support, the CJTF CJ4 must maintain close contact with the rear area Operational Command and supporting MNC so that logistics plans are fully coordinated with operational plans to ensure mission essential support. Also, local contracting, and Theater Contingency Construction Management staffing have been shown to be required for peace support operations.

- Intelligence - Intelligence staffing should allow for augmentation from the National Intelligence Support Team (NIST) if available, or LOCE, as well as area analysts and terrain analysis teams.

- Surgeon - The humanitarian relief nature of peace operations along with the austere, diseased potent environments require coordination of NGO medical efforts and force protection measures.

The key to an effective “separable but not separate” CJTF-HQ concept to respond to combined peace support operations, involving diverse participants over which the Commander will have varying degree of authority, is the ability to coordinate critical information amongst the numerous and diverse participants. Coordination is achieved via development of required Principle Support Functions and organizational relationships that respond to the interface points through which information must flow. Maximum utilization of NATO’s existing integrated command structure along with development of the CJTF-HQ PSFs and organizational relationships recommended herein will contribute to unity of authority, command and purpose whether in a NATO or WEU led operation.
NATO's CJTF HQ COMMAND AND CONTROL ORGANIZATIONAL CONCEPT

Figure A

NATO's CJTF HQ STAFF ORGANIZATION CONCEPT

Figure B
CJTF HQ COMMAND AND CONTROL ORGANIZATIONAL CONCEPT

NATO Led Operation

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Political</th>
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<tbody>
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<td>NAC</td>
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<td>MC</td>
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<th>Supporting HQs</th>
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<td>MNC</td>
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<th>Operational HQs</th>
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<td>MSC/PSC</td>
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<th>Tactical Components</th>
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<tr>
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<tr>
<td>NATO/WEU/Non-NATO</td>
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<tr>
<td>Nations</td>
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WEU Led Operation

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| PC Coordination Group |
| ARFPS PCC WEUPC |

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<tr>
<th>CJTF HQ</th>
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| Components |
| FA/WEU/Associates/Partners |

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Command
Staff Element Augmentation
Liaison/Coordination

Figure C

17
NOTES

INTRODUCTION


3. “Out-of-Area” is defined as outside the geographic areas of NATO’s collective defense, as defined by Article VI of the North Atlantic Treaty.


10. WEU, *Report on Criteria and Modalities for Effective Use by the WEU of CJTFs* (Brussels: 29 Jun. 94).

CHAPTER II


2. Ibid., 177.


CHAPTER III


2. Ibid.

3. Ibid., 10.

4. Ibid., 11.

5. Ibid., 14.

6. Ibid., 12, G-1.

7. Ibid., 15.

8. Ibid.

9. Ibid., 21.

10. Ibid., 22.


15. Van Mierlo, 9.
CONCLUSION


5. WEU, *Report on Criteria and Modalities for Effective Use by the WEU of CJTFs*, Presented at joint Council meeting of NATO and WEU (Brussels: 29 Jun. 94), 5.
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