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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

Since 1988, the United States Army and its sister services have experienced a decline in force structure and budget authority. The Army is projected to continue this declining posture into the 21st century. At this juncture, managing the force to agree with resources and balance the shift from a forward presence to a power projection force becomes paramount to prevent the birth of a hollow force. In doing so, the Army has accepted risk in modernization funding to account for failed assumptions in prior years, and increased Operations and Maintenance (O&M) funding. Two areas which have realized growth in O&M, are training and mobilization. With the increased number of contingency operations, an increase in mobilization dollars makes sense. Training on the other hand, should be decreasing as our force declines or remain relatively constant; but is not.

This paper addresses Training and Doctrine Command (TRADOC) institutional Field Training Exercises (FTXs), training support, and Military Occupational Specialty (MOS) training in the Noncommissioned Officer Academy (NCOA). It further addresses their impact on schoolhouse resources, O&M resources, and their ultimate affect on Army buying power. This paper discusses recommendations to review and validate the continued requirement for such academic instruction or elimination thereof. Finally, it addresses the imperative need to re-engineer the process for capturing schoolhouse training support.
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INTRODUCTION

While the Entitlement Program portion of our nation’s budget thrives, our Department of Defense budget strives. Within America’s Army, congressional mandates continue to force a sharp decline in force structure. Conversely, Operation & Maintenance (O&M) costs associated with schoolhouse training continue to grow. Does this make sense? I do not believe so, but here are some facts. When considering the past three fiscal years, the Army experienced an 11% reduction in active force strength, an increase of 6% in institutional training workload, and an overall growth of 2% in Budget Activity 3 (BA 3) training dollars (1:13-14). In a time of fiscal austerity, reshaping roles and missions, and continual decline in force structure, this situation restricts a commanders’ flexibility in balancing mission workload, manpower, and dollars. In addition, it reduces our capacity to fund key acquisition and modernization programs.

Although there is no absolute resolution in rebalancing our infrastructure, operating force, and modernization programs, the drive for American defense decisionmaking has changed and now offers a host of new opportunities for revitalization. Army schoolhouse training is but one of these opportunities.

This paper will discuss sensitive areas within the Training and Doctrine Command (TRADOC) schoolhouse that costs the Army megabucks to execute, Field Training Exercises (FTX), training support, and Noncommissioned Officer Academy (NCOA) MOS training. I will present real time examples, along with, current training strategies, and their taxing of declining resources. Additionally, this paper will address alternative instructional approaches that I believe will not impair the outcome of essential quality training.

DISCUSSION

Since its inception in 1775, the fundamental purpose of the Army is to fight and win the nation’s wars. In order to carry out this mission, training forces remains one of the Army’s highest priorities. However, the buck does not stop here. The Army is also responsible for
equipping and manning the force as well as, maintaining the appropriate balance between the three to effectively carry out its role in supporting the defense of our nation. Broadly speaking, with the collapse of the Soviet Union, growing federal budget, decline in national defense budget and Bottom-Up-Review, a multitude of changes have occurred that impact the way we do business, and the cost of doing business. Like our sister Services, the Army has over the past few years experienced a major decline in force structure and budget authority while operational requirements continue at an unprecedented pace. Despite these external forces, as Army’s Chief of Staff, General Gordon R. Sullivan stated, “America’s Army must be ready to fight and win today and tomorrow.” (3:-) To carry this one step further, as Secretary of the Army, Mr. Togo D. West, Jr. stated “It is no easy task to prepare for the future while remaining trained and ready in the present. Hard decisions and sometimes unenviable trade-offs are demanded to best utilize scarce resources. The Army is striving for a balance between the present and future in the face of a serious affordability crisis. Programs critical to our vision of the 21st century Army could be jeopardized by inadequate resourcing.” (3:-) So where do we go from here? To coin a phrase from Star Trek, “Where no one has gone before!”

First, let’s expand the O&M account issue briefly expressed in the introduction. In FY 94, our O&M obligations represented the second largest portion of Army Total Obligation Authority (TOA), 32%. In FY 95, still representing the second largest portion of our TOA, our O&M obligations increased to 35%, Investments decreased by 2%. Except for BA2 (Mobilization) and BA3 dollars, the remaining budget activities within the O&M appropriation, to include Base Operations, have decreased (1:33-37). This situation doesn’t end with FY 95. These costs continue as we move into the 21st century, leaving fewer dollars to fund other important Army major force programs. This being said, let’s now examine three areas in the TRADOC institutional setting which significantly contribute to rising BA3 costs.

The first issue is schoolhouse FTXs, and associated training support. These two areas go hand in hand. If an FTX is conducted, training support is without a doubt required. Within the TRADOC schoolhouse, each Advanced Individual Training (AIT), Officer Advanced, Officer Basic and NCOA course participate in a 3-5 day FTX or some variation thereof; BASIX, CPX
and STX, etc.. Basically, they provide the soldier an opportunity to tie classroom lessons learned and soldierization skills together in a simulated wartime field environment. FTXs are generally conducted 24 hours around the clock; thus, requiring numerous instructor personnel and training support personnel. On an instructor pool that is funded at approximately 80% and crossutilized to perform other short-funded missions; i.e., training development, FTXs become very difficult for training departments to manage. Equipment requirements are high, ranging from small arms and ammunition to major weapon systems. Let me now share with you a situation that occurred at Fort Huachuca. Although this course has unique problems of its own, on two occasions I'm aware of, 97E10 (Interrogator) classes graduated without having gone through the required FTX. Primary reason, the instructor staff was too thin to make the training event happen. Having three to five 36 man classes in session, numerous interrogation blocks of instruction requiring two instructors for every one student, undermanned staff, and then throw on a 5 day FTX, this course has been very difficult to manage. If the truth was known, I'm sure these were not the only two instances in which this occurred, and not just at Fort Huachuca. Another example, last year a 5 day Integrated FTX (IFTX) was created at Fort Huachuca. Though not specifically funded by TRADOC, this exercise involves Military Intelligence Officer Advanced, NCOA and certain MOS producing courses. The school's plan is to conduct ten iterations with a class size of 200. One iteration requires over 100 full time instructor personnel, additional training support personnel, and major equipment requirements. In addition, the school maintains the integrity of existing FTXs in the respective courses attending the IFTX. To date, ten have been conducted that I'm aware of. In essence, we are paying for the same level of service twice.

Now to address training support. Over the past several years, TRADOC has attempted to capture training support costs without success. The problem is to accurately define, quantify and formally document manpower requirements or dollars associated with this monster. The Training Requirements Analysis System (TRAS), comprised of the Individual Training Plan (ITP), Course Administrative Data (CAD) and Program of Instruction (POI) are the requirements documents which identify the proponent's plan and requirements for developing and
conducting individual training. The TRAS is the long-range planning and management process for timely development of peacetime and mobilization individual training. The TRAS also integrates the Systems Approach to Training (SAT) with the PPBES by documenting training strategies, courses, and related resource requirements. All this to say, the TRAS may work in tying together related acquisition systems for students, instructors, training developers, equipment and devices, ammunition, dollars, and facilities, but does a poor job in quantifying training support. At this point, the ITP, CAD and POI provide no clear means of documenting this form of support.

Let’s consider another problem with training support. It can be provided by instructors, or non-instructor personnel who have other legitimate work loads and missions, or whose requirements are determined by structure but participate in training missions as part of their mission. Some examples are medical, military police, tank crews, and Drill Sergeants, etc. In most cases, when we have an FTX and need training support, what we need and what we get are far apart. Depending on what is available, the units providing this service to the school also have valid mission requirements to tend. Again using Fort Huachuca as an example, the CEWI Company, as it was formerly named, was modeled after a TOE company and created primarily to provide training support to the Intelligence school. Training Support Packages were developed identifying type and number of support requirements needed. However, an FTX did not go by, that CEWI could fully support due to other legitimate mission requirements; primarily Electronic Proving Ground tests, thereby placing the burden back on the school. I can tell you, when I came to work for the Army in 1987, our strength was much greater than it is today. The Intelligence Center at Fort Huachuca had an extremely difficult time executing designed FTXs to include providing the associated training support. As it stands today, each school deals with the training support issue differently, some better than others. The fact remains, supporting FTXs is very costly. No standard way of doing business exists, and no clear way of defining and documenting this support is in place.

I don’t profess the idea that FTXs and training support are worthless; they have been an invaluable method of providing realistic training to our students over the past few years,
especially AIT students, but there has to be means for improvement. I do question whether we
can continue to pay for this level of training, and whether it's necessary to provide this level of
training to our NCOA students or Officer Advanced students. After all, they have been
performing at this level in their MOS or AOC, not to mention, their participation in unit FTXs or
Combat Training Center Program exercises, and finally but most importantly, real life
contingency operations. If these were joint exercises, that would be one thing, but they're not. I
honestly believe that eliminating FTXs from at least the NCOA and OAC courses would benefit
not only the schoolhouse, but the Army as well. The resource management impact of this alone
is far reaching, when you consider training support costs would also be reduced. Our problem
is not solved entirely. If we decide to keep our FTXs intact, the TRAS needs to be modified to
enable training developers and resource managers to capture manpower and dollars
associated with training support.

The next issue I wish to briefly address is skill level 2 through 4 training in our NCO
academies. With the amount of training the soldier receives in the unit, through the Army
Training and Evaluation Program (ARTEP), Mission Training Program (MTP), and Combat
Training Center Program, there seems to be no reason skill level training could not also be
conducted in the unit. The primary objective of the NCO Academy is to train NCOs to be
trainers and leaders of soldiers. Empower them to ensure their subordinates are trained to
standard in the MOS, through completion of correspondence courses and On-The-Job training
programs. This approach has worked well for the Air Force. As an NCO in the Air Force, I had
to ensure my subordinates were properly trained in their specialty. They, in turn, showed
me and the Air Force they were trained. Knowing the flag could go up at any given moment, I
needed to insure my people were well trained since success of the mission, their life, my life,
and in today's environment, the lives of our joint partners depend on them to know what they
were trained to do. Looking at this issue from the other side of the coin, an individual could be
the best trained person in the Army, Navy, Marines or Air Force; but one bullet, one tank
round, or one missile is all it takes. So much for all that wonderful training. Another
argument I've heard, is the adage "Our missions are different." This is no longer valid, as we
are more alike than we are different. I do not mean to sound crass or flippant; I believe the Army should take a serious look at the actual requirement in today's environment for conducting this type training in the schoolhouse. After all, consider the hurdles we've overcome and achievements we've realized over the issue of women in combat. With MOS training removed from the NCOA, we would truly empower the NCO to do what they were trained to do, increase their confidence, strengthen leadership skills, and realize the full potential of our NCOs within today's Army. The resource implications of this alone are monumental; we could have fewer academies. The question that must be asked is whether the Army is ready for such a change, and is this the right or smart thing to do. I think so. Our NCOs are competent, professional, receptive to change, and proud of what they do. Let's entrust them to make the right decision in molding subordinates.

CONCLUSIONS

TRADOC is heavily engaged in preparing for the future while satisfying current training needs. At the same time, TRADOC requirements remain one of the major contributors to an ever increasing O&M budget. With the change in world order, a corresponding change in the way we man, equip and conduct training is in order. The idea that we must conduct FTXs in the schoolhouse, and provide MOS training in our NCO academies may be obsolete. As Major John C. Orndorff, USAF states in a paper titled Advancing On The Future: The Danger Of Paradigms In Military Thinking, "Furthermore, though we may think some options are impossible, it may still be helpful to ask, Have we tried it? The victors of military history were commonly those who tried and did what others thought impossible. Like many who have gone before us, we may not be able to predict the future exactly as it will occur, but we can exploit it." Although comfortable with the old tried and proven ways, we have to ask, can we still afford to train soldiers the same way at the cost of balancing our near and long term readiness. These issues are by far not the only areas which chew up scarce resources, but they do enough on their own. Do we thrive or do we strive?
RECOMMENDATIONS

The Office of the Assistant Secretary of the Army, Manpower and Reserve Affairs, together with the Commander of TRADOC should:

- Review and validate the continued requirement for FTXs in the schoolhouse and MOS training in the NCO Academy, considering the challenge of tomorrow's Army.
- Initiate actions to eliminate this training from the schoolhouse if deemed no longer required.
- If the decision is to maintain training status quo, the Commander of TRADOC should initiate an action to review this training across TRADOC schools, to determine how each school conducts the training, and determine if any efficiencies can be maximized to effect the whole community.

Headquarters TRADOC Deputy Chief of Staff for Training (DCST), should:

- Initiate an action to clearly define training support in all schools.
- Initiate an action to identify all training support costs. Initiate an action to cause a modification to the TRAS which will accommodate the accurate capture of such costs for integration in the PPBES cycle.
BIBLIOGRAPHY


