The views expressed in this paper are those of the author and do not necessarily reflect the views of the Department of Defense or any of its agencies. This document may not be released for open publication until it has been cleared by the appropriate military service or government agency.

OPERATION DESERT STORM
G-1, 22D SUPPORT COMMAND
DHAHRAN, SAUDI ARABIA

BY

LIEUTENANT COLONEL FRANK M. HUDGINS
United States Army Reserve-Active Guard Reserve

DISTRIBUTION STATEMENT A:
Approved for public release.
Distribution is unlimited.

USAWC CLASS OF 1992

U.S. ARMY WAR COLLEGE, CARLISLE BARRACKS, PA 17013-5050

19950705 092
OPERATION DESERT STORM
PERSONAL EXPERIENCES MONOGRAPH
AS THE G-1, 22D SUPPORT COMMAND, DHAHRAN, SAUDI ARABIA

BY

LIEUTENANT COLONEL FRANK M. HUDGINS
UNITED STATES ARMY RESERVE—ACTIVE GUARD RESERVE

LIEUTENANT COLONEL DOUGLAS V. JOHNSON
PROJECT ADVISER

20 MAY 1992

U.S. ARMY WAR COLLEGE
CARLISLE BARRACKS, PENNSYLVANIA 17013

The views expressed in this paper are those of the author and do not necessarily reflect the views of the Department of Defense or any of its agencies. This document may not be released for open publication until it has been cleared by the appropriate military service or government agency.

DISTRIBUTION STATEMENT A: Approved for public release. Distribution is unlimited.
PERSONAL EXPERIENCE MONOGRAPH

OPERATIONS DESERT SHIELD/DESERT STORM

PURPOSE: The purpose of this personal experience monograph is to relate to the reader, the author's impressions and experience as it relates to Operations Desert Shield/Desert Storm for the period 22 August 1990 through redeployment on 15 June 1991.

I. INTRODUCTION

On 22 August 1990, the President of the United States signed Executive Order 12727 which implemented, for the first time, the Title 10 US Code 673b authority to order to active duty the Selected Reserve of the United States Armed Forces.

During Operations Desert Shield and Desert Storm I had three assignments in three different organizations. On 1 October 1989 I was a US Army Reserve Active Guard Reserve (AGR) Lieutenant Colonel assigned as Chief, Administrative Support Division, Full Time Support Management Center (FTSMC), St. Louis, MO. (The FTSMC is a field operating activity of the Office of the Chief of
Army Reserve). I remained in that position until 17 February 1991 when I was reassigned to US Army Forces Central Command (ARCENT) Riyadh, Saudi Arabia as Chief, Reserve Component Liaison (Dhahran). On 14 April 1991 I was reassigned to Headquarters, 22d Support Command (TAA) in Dhahran, Saudi Arabia in two positions, the G-1 and as the Deputy, Assistant Chief of Staff, Personnel (D, ACSPER) of the SUPCOM.

This Personal Experiences Monograph is divided into two parts: Introduction and Narrative. The Narrative is divided into four parts. Part 1 is a discussion of my personal experience in FTSMC with regard to Operations Desert Shield and Desert Storm. Part 2 is a discussion of my personal experience in ARCENT. Part 3 is a discussion of my personal experience in 22d SUPCOM. Part 4 are my opinions, recommendations, etc.

II. NARRATIVE

PART 1: FTSMC My responsibilities at FTSMC were to be the strength manager of the AGR program for the Chief, Army Reserve. When the decision was made to activate the selected reserve, there were approximately 450 vacant AGR Full Time Manning positions in USAR units that were to be activated. I immediately initiated measures to ensure that my division filled those vacant positions with the best qualified personnel available. All positions were filled within three months and the various units
deployed with all full time manning personnel either assigned or on orders enroute to the unit.

It was during this time that STOP-LOSS was initiated and with implementation came additional problems. I had approved many soldiers for early release from active duty and had to revoke separations in all cases except those soldiers who were to be separated for cause or for adverse reasons. My office was inundated with letters and telephone calls requesting exceptions to policy. Those requests were based on the STOP-LOSS message which had omitted reference to the AGR program. The message implied that the STOP-LOSS provisions pertained to USAR soldiers not on active duty. After many hectic telephone calls to the Office of the Chief of Army Reserve, I was able to convince OCAR to transmit a corrected STOP-LOSS message that specifically addressed the AGR soldiers.

On 10 August 1990 I submitted a DA Form 4187, Request for Reassignment, to OCAR requesting that I be sent to Saudi Arabia in any capacity and for any assignment where my skills and capabilities could be utilized. That request was acted upon in January 1991 when I was notified that I would be the Chief, Reserve Component Liaison Office, Dhahran, Saudi Arabia.

PART 2: Duty with ARCENT  Upon arrival in Saudi Arabia, I inprocessed in Riyadh with US Army Forces Central Command and was attached to the ARCENT Reserve Components Liaison Office with duty in Dhahran.
The purpose of the RC Liaison effort was to facilitate the personnel action processing for Reserve Component units in the theater. There had been many problems in theater because the Active Component personnel systems were very different from the US Army Reserve and National Guard personnel systems and either the AC had little or no training in those systems or the RC had little or no training in the AC personnel systems. My job was to create Personnel Action Assistance Teams (PAAT) that would go out into the field to visit USAR and NG units and to provide any assistance required to facilitate personnel action processing such as awards, DD Form 214 worksheets, NCOER and OER processing, or anything the unit commander requested.

When I arrived in Dhahran I had a staff of one Major and one Master Sergeant. We had no office, desks, telephone, or vehicle. As bleak as it seemed at the time, we were warmly received by the staff of the 22d Support Command and in no time we were given a "space" in the 22d SUPCOM headquarters building at the Saudi Arabian Air Force Base. Our initial effort was spent on selling the team to the commanders in the area (both AC and RC). We had to establish credibility very quickly and once that was done we could fulfill our mission. The utilization of PAATs was a new concept and not in any established doctrine. We realized this from the start and documented everything that was done.

As redeployment began we realized that the magnitude of work to be done far exceeded the capabilities of our small team and we requested that the RC Liaison offices in Dhahran and at King
Kahlid Military City (KKMC) be expanded to approximately 20 personnel to accommodate the numerous requests that were beginning to pour into our office. The Chief, National Guard Bureau and Chief, Army Reserve both honored our request and in late March the additional teams arrived in Dhahran and KKMC. The teams were a success story and made at least one visit to every unit in the theater that had RC personnel assigned. It did not matter whether it was an AC unit or RC unit.

The PAATs were a conglomerate of different personnel experts from different backgrounds. I personally thought that the USAR teams were more effective because the team members came from USAR units that had not yet been mobilized where the National Guard team members came from the National Guard Bureau in Washington, D.C. The NG team members brought a national level of expertise and the USAR team members brought a unit level expertise. The unit level expertise was what was truly needed therefor the USAR teams appeared to be most effective. An interesting note is that when the teams arrived in theater I was at the airfield to welcome them. Standing in the back of the group was a very quiet young Captain. I immediately recognized him from a previous meeting with him and went over to greet him. He saluted and said "Good evening, sir!" I told him that on our previous meeting that I had kidded him about how difficult it was to say sir to someone much younger than me. At that point, Captain Hipp said that was no longer a problem. Captain Hipp is, in civilian life, the Deputy Assistant Secretary of the Army for Manpower and
Reserve Affairs. He was activated for the PAAT and served extremely well and he was able to effectively transition to the role of a PAAT team leader and leave his civilian job behind in Washington.

PART 3: G-1/DEPUTY ACSPER 22D SUPCOM In late March 1991, the G-1/Deputy ACSPer of the 22d SUPCOM returned to CONUS on emergency leave. LTG Pagonis, CG, 22d SUPCOM requested from LTG Yeosock, CG, ARCENT that I be detailed to the G-1 position until a replacement would arrive. The estimated time was approximately 30 days. LTG Yeosock concurred with a 30 day detailing and I was detailed as the Chief, RC Liaison, Dhahran, the G-1 and the Deputy ACSPer, 22d SUPCOM simultaneously until I was officially reassigned to the 22d SUPCOM on 14 April 1991.

Holy Cow! Where do I begin? I came to Desert Storm fully expecting to utilize my extensive reserve personnel experience to assist commanders. Little did I realize that I would become the G-1 of an AC three star command. Early April 1991 LTG Pagonis decided that I would be his G-1 permanently and told me that I would be allowed to redeploy when he redeployed in January 1992. I told him that I did not mind and I was there until no longer needed. This was the beginning of a very complex period of Desert Storm.

My functions included all awards, orders, officer personnel management, enlisted personnel management, Red Cross, Morale, Welfare and Recreation (MWR), all civilian personnel management,
OERs, NCOERs, retention and anything else you can think of with regard to personnel management. Until ARCENT departed theater in mid-April 1991 my functional area was limited to the SUPCOM and Echelons Above Corps (EAC) units. I was the G-1, the Adjutant General and Deputy ACSPER until ARCENT departed. At that time I received a Finance Major from ARCENT staff whom I quickly trained to become the Adjutant General. Additionally, I received a Military Police Major whom I trained to become the Deputy G-1.

Major Griffin, Major Butler and I quickly reorganized the G-1 staff in order to be more responsive to the command, particularly because, with the departure of ARCENT and CENTCOM, the 22d SUPCOM became the theater command and with that came all personnel activities.

The remaining portion of this paper will discuss some of the various areas of personnel management and will identify problems that began with mobilization and carried over to the theater.

DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY CIVILIAN PERSONNEL: The deployment of Department of the Army Civilians (DAC) was essential to the success of Operations Desert Shield/Desert Storm. There were many success stories such as the conversion of over 960 M1 tanks to M1A1 tanks. Overall, unclear, inadequately applied, nonstandard and inconsistent policies and procedures in the selection, processing and deployment of DACs hampered the ability of the Army to support the operations. The lack of pre-existing plans and policies created a great deal of confusion and delay and hampered mission accomplishment. Although a system exists
for designating civilian positions as "emergency essential", very few of the DACs deployed were in positions so designated. This resulted in no real definition of the skill, physical and mental qualifications required for deployment. Personnel were often not prepared to deploy, and short notices caused family and personal problems and sometimes the deployment of unqualified personnel.

Due to the lack of pre-existing policies and procedures, especially in the early stages of mobilization, there were numerous personnel problems. Pay entitlements were not made clear to the DACs. Health and life insurance benefits and options, customs in-country, living conditions to be faced and expected conduct and responsibilities were not adequately briefed to all personnel. Medical, dental, and eye examinations were sometimes inadequate resulting in deployment of physically unqualified personnel. Personnel records did not contain all of the data elements necessary to ensure proper data was available for casualty assistance and notification. Legal assistance was often not adequate and not equal to that afforded to military personnel. There was no standard for clothing and equipment issued items, and DACs were issued a variety of personal clothing and equipment depending on the mobilization station through which they processed.

Many individuals were not properly trained in Nuclear, Biological and Chemical (NBC) protection, operations in the desert, communication and transportation procedures and their duties in support of temporary duty to a hostile area. Some did
receive follow-on training immediately upon arrival in the theater of operations. Individuals were often not trained in the use of protective gear, antidote administration and other NBC hazards. Personnel were selected who had weight and other health problems which would have precluded the sustained wear of protective clothing.

DAC personnel were often unclear as to the chain of command. There was confusion over who had personnel management authority over the DACs and who was responsible for personnel matters such as discipline, performance ratings and incentive awards. Pay entitlement was not always known and procedures were applied inconsistently. Overtime, overseas differentials and imminent danger pay were problem areas. This resulted in many individuals working many hours for which they were not compensated. Many deployed DACs were not satisfied with the pay procedures and required pay adjustments upon redeployment.

During the operation many DACs were unsure of their status under the Geneva Convention. Most received Geneva Convention cards but questions arose as to their status as they were performing military-type duties (maintenance of vehicles, driving military vehicles, etc.). Some were issued firearms but were unsure of the impact of noncombatants carrying weapons.¹

**MORALE, WELFARE AND RECREATION ACTIVITIES:** Because the U.S. Army only has Morale, Welfare and Recreation (MWR) spaces in garrison Tables of Distribution and Allowances (TDA), supporting MWR programs in Southwest Asia was accomplished in an ad hoc
manner. Commanders do not have the staff expertise to plan recreational support during contingency operations and a MWR structure was needed during the early deployment stages. Over $234,000 worth of recreational items were purchased for the operations.

In addition, numerous items were donated from countries such as Germany and Japan along with numerous donated items from corporate America. These items along with the designation of Half-Moon Bay and the Oasis recreational facilities contributed to the huge success of the MWR program.

The Army and Air Force Exchange System (AAFES) Imprest Fund Activities (AAFIFA) is another area where commanders do not have the necessary expertise for program management. Sales of goods and running of the im prest fund were accomplished using borrowed military manpower. During Operations Desert Shield and Desert Storm, soldiers spent $105.9 million on retail and catalog sales and $8.8 million at food concessions. Because AAFES had three stores operating prior to deployment, AAFES merchandise was available on day 1. Se alift merchandise arrived three weeks ahead of schedule. AAFES operated 16 direct civilian-managed locations.

With regard to rest and recuperation (R&R), the U.S. Army operated a three tier program which, through May 1991, provided R&R to over 58,000 soldiers at Half-Moon Bay and over 36,000 military personnel on a contracted cruise ship (the Cunard Princess) since 24 December 1990. The third tier, out of country
R&R was not implemented. DAC MWR specialists were key to the huge success of the in country R&R programs.

The various musical groups, especially the bands that travelled throughout the theater were a tremendous success. The bands were tasked organized into smaller rock groups to provide the widest amount of coverage. These bands provided commanders with an MWR resource that could be used repetitively.²

SAFETY: Desert Shield/Desert Storm accidental deaths during mobilization, deployment, combat and redeployment exceeded the total deaths from combat. In addition, over 1,150 soldiers were injured by accidents during the operation. The total costs of the deaths, injuries and lost equipment from accidents exceeds $153 million. The basis of a successful safety program should be the same as a successful campaign: strong leadership, clear objectives, a sound plan, adequate resources and support of the plan by all soldiers. The Desert Shield/Desert Storm safety performance was not successful because a safety plan was not part of the overall U.S. Army Forces Central Command (ARCENT) operations plan and a safety program was not resourced or staffed. The safety structure at Army, Corps and Division is staffed, primarily by DACs, and TDA organized. The go-to-war Army is primarily Table of Organization and Equipment (TO&E) organized. Civilian safety specialists were key personnel to deploy with the various units; however, when they did deploy they were without organic equipment such as NBC protective gear, personal combat uniforms and equipment, etc. Basically, there
were no uniformed deployable safety structures to mobilize and deploy with the combat units. The lack of safety personnel as members of the joint staff limited the CINC's capability to reduce or keep to a minimum accidental manpower and equipment losses. Historically, transportation systems, fuel systems, and ammunition supplies are vulnerable to accidents. The problem increased dramatically under the impact of current operational concepts, e.g., Rapid Deployment, Coalition Forces Operations, and the increased complexity and lethality of the modern battlefield. Increased dependency on the employment of high cost, high technology weapons systems that are limited in number, posed a problem that required special consideration to protect soldiers and equipment against accidental loss. A safety staff as part of the joint staff and at echelons above corps would have enhanced the development of an effective operational concept which in turn would have aided the CINC in protecting soldiers and mission critical resources.³

**CONGRESSIONALS:** There were numerous congressional inquiries during Desert Storm. The preponderance of the inquiries were "When is SGT So-and-So redeploying?". The Office of Congressional Legislative Liaison (OCLL) was extremely helpful with the processing of the congressional inquiry. Modern technology such as the FAX machine and satellite telephone communications enabled us to respond immediately. The biggest problem that led to the many congressional inquiries was that there had not been published any list of when units would be
redeploying out of theater. The majority of the combat units redeployed beginning in early March and the real work began. The majority of the combat service support units were RC and hometown America could not understand why the 101st Division had redeployed but their sons had not. I personally feel that the congress could have answered the inquiries without referral to OCLL because the answer was always the same, "Your sons and daughters will redeploy when their units finish their missions." It was not until mid-April 1991 that the list of when each unit would redeploy was published. After that the congressional inquiries reduced drastically to very few.

**DD FORM 1610s:** The DD Form 1610, Request and Authorization for TDY Travel of DOD Personnel, was the main instrument to redeploy individuals from the theater. nits redeployed on unit orders but individuals were redeployed utilizing the DD Form 1610. The magnitude of work required to process individual DD Form 1610s cannot be overstated. The forms were processed in the SUPCOM G-1 office and control numbers were issued there. On an average day we processed over 1,000 DD Form 1610s, seven days a week.

**A LIGHTER MOMENT, GUS THE CAMEL:** In early May 1991, LTG Pagonis tasked me to find a camel that had been presented by Prince Kahlid to the 24th Division. It seemed that the Division was unable to take the camel home and LTG Pagonis wanted it located and placed at the Oasis recreational facility on the Saudi Air Force Base. Additionally, LTG Pagonis stated that he
had named the camel, Gus, which is LTG Pagonis' nickname. After three weeks of searching, we found Gus and began the preparations of transportation to the Oasis. About this time a LTC Kahlif decided that Americans did not know how to move a camel. I had a large truck and padding ordered so that we could move Gus without injury. LTC Kahlif was insistent and would not allow us to move the camel. On the day that Gus was to arrive at the Oasis, I had a SUPCOM photographer present to record the historic moment (?). Gus arrived in the back of a tiny Mitsibushi pick up truck with his hind legs tied up under his body and hid front legs untied. When the truck stopped, Gus attempted to raise himself up on his front legs, raising his rear up and subsequently lost his balance and fell out of the truck. After insuring that the camel was not hurt badly (only a big scrape on his lower backside), I walked over to LTC Kahlif and said that he was right, we Americans did not know how to move a camel like he did. After the great camel hunt, I was often reminded by numerous personnel that my primary function was not G-1 but was Camel Procurement Officer.

PART 4: SUMMARY  All in all the Desert Storm experience was worth every minute. I feel that we had trained for many years for that moment and that training paid off. The RC was taken from their civilian jobs and civilian lives and sent to war. They responded in such a positive manner that the whole country again fell in love with the military.

My experiences were for the most part routine in nature.
The only thing different was that from the day I arrived in theater until the day I departed theater, I never had a day off. I arrived at work at approximately 0600 hours daily and departed for my room at approximately 2100 hours daily. Keeping a schedule like that made the days go by faster and my homecoming even more pleasant.

I have tried to give an overview of my personal experiences during Operation Desert Storm. Included are the three sections on Civilians, MWR and Safety which I extracted from my Military Studies Program (MSP) paper. Therefore, I do not have a bibliography but do credit those extracts in endnotes.
ENDNOTES


2. Ibid. p. 12-14.