Abstracts of Master of Military Art and Science (MMAS) Theses and Special Studies 1983-1984

This volume brings together all abstracts of Master of Military Art and Science (MMAS) theses completed at USACGSC during the academic term of 1983-1984.
U.S. ARMY COMMAND AND GENERAL STAFF COLLEGE
FORT LEAVENWORTH, KANSAS

Abstracts Of Master Of Military Art
And Science (MMAS)
Theses And Special Studies

1983 - 1984
Annual Edition
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THE DEGREE
MASTER OF MILITARY ART AND SCIENCE

On 5 August 1974 legislation was enacted authorizing CGSC to award the degree, Master of Military Art and Science (MMAS), an authority originally requested in 1964. The legislation prescribes that the MMAS program require a thesis; also, that the College must attain affiliate or member status with the North Central Association of Colleges and Schools prior to the award of any degree. Included in the statute was authority for retroactive awards to the 182 officers who had successfully completed the MMAS requirements in previous years. On 31 March 1976 the College was granted full accreditation as a masters' degree-granting institution by the North Central Association of Colleges and Schools.

The establishment of a formal degree-granting program with the full approval of the civilian higher education community represents signal recognition for the quality of military education in general and for CGSC in particular. The degree implicitly testifies that the military profession has its own scholastic discipline, Military Art and Science; and, that insofar as the Army-in-the-field is concerned, CGSC is the source of this discipline. For those receiving degrees, the award constitutes a badge of military scholarship and is a deserving recognition for successful completion of a rigorous program. The College is proud to be the only institution to award this graduate professional degree.

FOR THE COMMANDANT:

STEWART B. KIECH
Colonel, Armor
Secretary

8G-3139
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This edition brings together all abstracts of Master of Military Art and Science (MMAS) theses completed at CGSC from 1983-1984. The subject section is designed to fit the areas of research emphasized by the MMAS student. Because of the primary military thrust of the subject matter, headings such as "U.S. Army," "War," or "Combat" have been omitted in favor of more precise captions.

Some titles have been listed in several places in the subject section, as appropriate. The numbers following the subject heading correspond to the titles in the list of theses, by year of completion. Abstracts and the number of pages in the theses are found in the body of the volume.

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The opinions and conclusions expressed in the enclosed abstracts are those of the authors and do not necessarily represent the views of the U.S. Army Command and General Staff College or any other Government agency.

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This study attempts to answer the following questions on the role of the Iranian armed forces in the fall of the Shah in 1979: (a) Did the armed forces do something that contributed to the causes which led the people of Iran to rise against the Shah? (b) When the demonstrations and riots were staged, did the armed forces manage the situation properly, or did they do something instead that worsened situation? (c) When the period of final confrontation came, why did the armed forces fall to pieces after a mere three days of minor street fighting? (d) Relatedly, what lessons may be learned from what happened in Iran?

Investigation reveals that: (a) the Iranian armed forces contributed to the following causes of the revolution in varying degrees: brutality and other violations of human rights, corruption, economic hardships and excessive military expenditure, and cultural dislocation; (b) during the riots and demonstrations, the armed forces mishandled and exacerbated the situation through the following patterns: use of unnecessary force, resort to "military half-measures," loss of credibility, failure to "feel the pulse" of the people, and breakdown of discipline; (c) when the final three-day confrontation came, the armed forces had already lost their will to fight and the showdown only formalized their defeat; and (d) the lessons that may be learned from what happened in Iran are: it is not a sound policy for a leader to rely heavily on the backing of the armed forces without broadening the base of his support; national development must be balanced; in times of crisis, the leader must be decisive; the armed forces must be equipped and trained not only to fight against external aggression but to counter internal threats as well; the leader must be provided with accurate information as a basis for correct decisions; the people can be "pushed to the wall" up to a certain extent only; loyalty of the armed forces must not be to the leader alone but to the country above all else; and no armed forces personnel can be expected to massacre hundreds of their compatriots in a direct confrontation.


Since 1973, the United States has used marketplace economics to obtain its military manpower. A declining birthrate and the application of Keynesian economic theory indicate that the United States will experience adverse economic, political, and military consequences because of an increasingly constraining military manpower shortfall. This thesis addresses the various processes that collectively determine the Army's quantitative manpower requirements for the accomplishment of wartime tactical missions. It does not address the processes that establish personnel authorizations, allocations, or assignments. The Army's force structure development process, as described in Department of Defense
directives and instructions and Department of the Army regulations, is discussed within the framework of a hierarchy of operating systems. A selection of force development studies, models, and materiel development documents covering the Carter and Reagan presidential administrations is examined to determine the extent to which quantitative manpower impacts have been and are being validly identified and considered during force development activities.


This thesis identifies air base ground defense issues which arose during US Air Force involvement in the Vietnam Conflict from November 1964 until January 1973. After identification of these air base ground defense issues, six active duty US Air Force Security Police officers who served in Vietnam during the time period under consideration were contacted to verify the validity of the issues identified in this thesis.

The validated issues were then used to analyze current US Air Force air base ground defense doctrine to identify the degree to which these issues are recognized in the current doctrine.

The results of the analysis of current US Air Force air base ground defense doctrine in light of the issues which arose during involvement in the Vietnam Conflict were that of the twenty six issues identified, twenty are recognized in current air base ground defense doctrine and six are not recognized. Thus, historical linkages between past US Air Force air base ground defense experiences and current air base ground defense doctrine are established. Seven recommendations for further study are presented to further explore the implications of the results of this thesis.

527. TOWARD A THEORY OF MILITARY INVOLVEMENT IN NATIONAL DEVELOPMENT IN UNDERDEVELOPED COUNTRIES by Lieutenant Colonel Fredelino S. Bautista, Philippine Army, 113 pages.

This study examines the proposition that military institutions in underdeveloped or developing countries offer significant advantages when they are given a role in national development. The investigation focuses mainly on the non-military and non-political role of the military.

Evidence shows that in many underdeveloped countries today, the political role of the military becomes dominant and leads it to assume political power. More than fifty percent of the member states of the United Nations are run by military regimes or civil-military coalitions dominated by officers. However, evidence also shows that military
institutions today have been performing non-political tasks that support civilian institutions and which produce results that enhance human welfare and national development.


This paper determined the public image of the US military as reflected in leading magazines and compared the results with the public image of the military determined in a 1971 study. The 1982 and 1983 issues of twenty-one leading magazines were reviewed for news items on the military. The news items were placed into different military subject areas (Personnel, Vietnam War, Grenada, ROTC, etc.) and judged favorable, unfavorable, balanced, or neutral.

The composite results of this two-year study revealed that the public image of the military was more favorable than unfavorable. Of the items reviewed 35.9% were favorable. While 25.4% of the news items on the military were unfavorable, 30.9% were favorable. The 1971 study favorable to unfavorable ratio was 1.0:1.4.

An analysis of the individual military subject areas revealed two topics that received considerable press attention and that reflected an unfavorable public image of the military in the magazine analyzed. These were Defense Budget/Spending and Leadership.

529. A-10 EFFECTIVENESS AGAINST SOVIET OFFENSIVE OPERATIONS IN CENTRAL EUROPE, by Lieutenant Colonel David K. Burke, USAF, 56 pages.

This study examines the effectiveness of the A-10 in Central Europe against Soviet offensive operations. It establishes sixteen A-10 effectiveness criteria based on the requirements for successful operations. The effectiveness criteria are grouped into primary and secondary categories based on a review of historical air anti-tank operations. Then, the Soviet's offensive operations are studied and the A-10's potential success on the Central European battlefield is analyzed.

The analysis concluded that the A-10 will be most effective in the Allies' rear during a Soviet offensive attack. It also concludes that the A-10 will be very effective against the Soviet's Operational Maneuver Group in the Allies' rear area. The analysis also indicates that the A-10 may be less effective in the close battle area or in the enemies' rear area and that further study is required to determine how the A-10's effectiveness can be improved.
530. COMPUTER-ASSISTED FLIGHT SCHEDULE OPTIMIZATION, by Major Robert D. Drowley, USAF, 87 pages.

This project focuses on integrating flying requirements, duties, and training accomplishments on a microcomputer to produce an optimized weekly flight schedule. The thesis includes research for and examination of earlier attempts to solve this problem as well as detailed explanation of the method used in approaching this work. The main and supporting programs are written in U.C.S.D. Pascal. The programs use a weekly flying schedule, track pilot availability, and integrate training accomplishments to arrive at an optimized flying schedule as prioritized by squadron supervisors.


This study examines the Integrated National Police (INP) as it is presently organized and studies its operational employment in Philippine government efforts against Communist insurgency.

Recent developments in the Philippine local police system have proved the police have a significant role in the overall government counterinsurgency operations. While the traditional role of providing effective and efficient police service is the INP's main contribution to the effort, the police manpower resources and the inherent popular support they enjoy suggest a greater role in counterinsurgency operations. Given the adequate administrative, operational and logistical support, training, and the proper leadership at all levels of command, the local police as a national organization could be a very effective force in operations against Communist insurgency in the Philippines.


This study carefully details the evolution of the Air Force airborne forward air controller. This evolution begins with the first aerial balloon observer and continues through the World War II Horsefly FAC, the Korean War, Mosquito FAC, and the numerous FAC's involved in the Vietnam Conflict. The study is focused on unclassified FAC operations in wartime.

The primary objective of this study is to bring together in one source the history of the airborne FAC. This will allow present-day forward air controllers to become familiar with the past accomplishments, bravery, and ingenuity of earlier airborne forward air controllers. This is especially important because of the pronounced tendency among Air Force FAC's to forget that there had ever been an airborne FAC prior to the Vietnam Conflict. A further objective of the study is to focus attention on mistakes made in the
past concerning the need for an airborne FAC force. Finally, this study highlights the fact that FAC survival above a hostile battlefield in a light, slow, observation aircraft has been a concern voiced in professional papers and research since World War II.

In summary, this study documents the need for an airborne forward air controller force trained and ready for combat. This need is proven by United States Air Force experience in three wars.

533. UNITED STATES INVOLVEMENT IN LOW INTENSITY CONFLICT SINCE WORLD WAR II: THREE CASE STUDIES—GREECE, DOMINICAN REPUBLIC, AND VIETNAM, by Major Ralph W. Hinrichs, Jr., USA, 128 pages.

This study attempts to analyze the causes and results of US involvement in low intensity conflict since World War II in three case studies to determine if there are specific indicators that would suggest the nature of future involvement of the United States in low intensity conflict situations. The investigation is focused on an analysis of historical experience within the context of low intensity conflict as depicted on the conflict spectrum and defined within the study. The case studies include the entire Greek Civil War from 1947 to 1949, the first weeks of the Dominican intervention in 1965, and US involvement in South Vietnam during the advisory effort, 1961 to mid-1965.

Investigation reveals that there are many commonalities as well as disparities among different case studies of low intensity conflict. Further investigation of these case studies with respect to current US doctrine for internal defense and development suggests that the current doctrine is viable and entails more than a simple military solution to a case of low intensity conflict. Several conclusions are reached which may influence US involvement in low intensity conflict. These conclusions are concerned with Communist containment, rules of engagement, country team coordination, internationalization efforts, external support, and US Army doctrine.


This study attempts to trace the development of combined arms concepts, organization, and practices by an examination of five major powers: Great Britain, Germany, France, the United States, and the Soviet Union. The focus is on developments at and below division level, and as such this survey provides valuable background information for the process of force and doctrinal design.

Prior to 1914, the combat arms were integrated within divisions of most armies. Yet each of the arms existed in small units equipped with only one type of weapon and having only limited interaction with the other arms.
Most professional soldiers were aware of developments in the firepower of infantry and artillery weapons, but it required the reality of World War I to establish the absolute necessity for infantry-artillery cooperation in all tactical operations. World War I not only witnessed the growth of modern indirect fire techniques and infantry organizations, but also forced armies to develop elaborate command, control, and communications systems to orchestrate the various arms on a complex battlefield.

Between the two World Wars, major armies evolved in different directions, despite their common recognition of tactical issues such as mechanization and air support. All nations developed new tactics and equipment to some degree, but only Germany synchronized its developments in materiel, doctrine, and training so that it had a temporary advantage in mechanized warfare during the period 1939-41.

World War II produced a number of major trends. For example, most armies adjusted their armored formations from an extremely tank-heavy structure towards a relatively balanced combination of infantry, armor, antitank, and artillery elements. Different nations tried different solutions to the problem of task organizing at the small unit and division level, and all experienced difficulties in coordinating close air support.

Since 1945, both the Soviet Union and the United States have had to adjust to major challenges posed to mechanized combined arms by the rise of nuclear weapons and of low intensity warfare. At the same time, the Israeli armed forces have followed the same pattern of combined arms use and neglect that Germany covered from 1916 to 1945.

In addition to a variety of lesser points about the functions of various arms, this thesis focuses on three major themes: the necessity for combined arms integration at small unit level, the difficulties of achieving such integration by attached non-divisional units on a temporary basis, and the continuing difficulties in reconciling ground and air force priorities in order to ensure effective close air support.

535. CAN THE AGRESSORS CONTINUE TO BE EFFECTIVE IN THE F-5E? by Major Donald M. Krempel, USAF, 86 pages.

The Aggressors were established with the mission to provide realistic, enemy oriented, dissimilar air combat tactics training for United States Air Force fighter units. They accomplished this mission since 1973 with first the Northrop T-38 and now the Northrop F-5E. The F-5E is an acceptable simulant of the Soviet built MIG-21 Fishbed which was originally produced in the early 1960's. This is 1984 and the Russian air combat threat has changed into a more sophisticated fighter force.

This study examined the capability of the F-5E to simulate modern Soviet air combat fighters, specifically, the MIG-23 Flogger, MIG-31 Foxhound,
MIG-29 Fulcrum, and SU-27 Flanker. The investigation revealed that the F-5E is not an acceptable simulator for any of these aircraft. The upgraded F-5E with an improved radar, proved to be able to serve as a part-task simulator for only the MIG-23 Flogger.

536. COMPUTERS FOR COMMAND AND CONTROL: AN AIRLAND BATTLE REQUIREMENT!, by Major Joseph W. McKinney, USA, 149 pages.

AirLand Battle doctrine places extensive requirements on the corps command and control system. In order to adhere to doctrinal tenets (Initiative, Depth, Synchronization, Agility) the corps must be capable of rapidly analyzing a high volume of information inputs, determining optimal courses of action, and transmitting clear and appropriate directives to subordinate units. However, command control procedures at corps level have changed little since World War II. It is questionable whether the current command control system can satisfy doctrinal requirements.

Microcomputer systems are currently used in civilian organizations to improve communications, enhance data management, and support decisionmaking through graphical display techniques and mathematical models. It is logical to assume that microcomputers can be used to perform similar functions in tactical units.

This thesis will examine the current and potential utility of microcomputer systems to support command and control of corps maneuver forces in the near term (1984-1990).


This study traces the organization and tactics of the Imperial Russian Army through two wars and two phases of the industrial revolution. The analysis begins with the soul searching which followed Crimean defeat, describes the principal changes of the reform era, and provides an operational and tactical narrative of the Russo-Turkish War of 1877-78. The treatment goes on to depict the Russians' response to both their own wartime experiences and perceptions of other conflicts, to relate how the Imperial Russian Army adapted itself to smokeless powder weaponry, and to conclude in 1904-05 with Far Eastern defeat.

Although the narrative begins and ends with the agony of defeat, the interpretation underscores what in many respects was a story of successful institutional change and adaptation to new organizational, technological, and intellectual circumstances. Within the space of a half century the Imperial Russian Army managed to surmount many of the tactical and organizational challenges posed by the appearance first of breech loaders, then of smokeless powder weapons. At the same time, the Imperial Army learned both to utilize the railroad and telegraph and to profit in a
limited way from advances to organization and planning which had begun to make possible the effective deployment and employment of modern mass armies.

This thesis describes how the Imperial Army organized, trained, and armed itself to fight. It is a story of tacticians, inventors, teachers, politicians, organizers, and dreamers. Above all it is the story of how a military institution evolved a fighting organization and doctrine as it struggled mightily to accommodate itself to change in a Darwinian world which dealt harshly with failure and the inability to adapt.

This study concludes that the Imperial Russian Army adjusted far better to altered circumstances than many commentators and observers have admitted. The difficulty was one of degree. In organization and tactics the army made incremental adjustments when the nature and pace of change required revolutionary alteration. Thus, despite the considerable impact of material and technological change in the era between the battles of Inkermann and Mukden, Russian tactical theory and application continued to stress the decisive importance of morale and will as expressed in offensive action that culminated in an infantry attack with cold steel. In many ways the theoretician and practitioner whose thought and actions characterized the prevailing attitude was M.I. Dragomirov. It was he who reigned over nearly a half century of Russian tactical development, and it was he who popularized A.V. Suvorov's eighteenth-century maxim, "The bullet's a fool, the bayonet's a fine lad."


This study is a historical analysis of the demonstrated leadership attributes of three World War II commanders in the European Theater, 1944-45: General William H. Simpson, Ninth Army Commander; Major General Troy H. Middleton, VIII Corps Commander; and Major General John S. Wood, 4th Armored Division Commander. Each officer's performance is examined in detail based on available historical records and by focusing on the four components of senior leadership identified in Field Manual 22-999, Senior-Level Leadership. These four facets are personal leadership, technical competence, organizational leadership, and management.

Among the many conclusions which could be drawn from this investigation are: personal leadership was instrumental in each commander's success, although all used diverse styles; all three exhibited an appropriate level of technical competence, regardless of how this expertise was obtained; each used different, but successful, approaches to organizational leadership; and their effective management techniques consistently stressed mission-type orders, regular visits to forward units, and well-defined goals.

The study concludes that the conceptual framework used is appropriate for systematic investigations of senior leadership and organizational
behavior and is useful to the historian as a means of examining and describing the battlefield performance of other historical figures.

539. THE EFFECTS OF INTERDICTION IN WORLD WAR II: THE EUROPEAN THEATER OF OPERATION, by Major Thomas B. Poole, USAF, 80 pages.

This study analyzes the Allied interdiction campaign of World War II in the European Theater of Operation and identifies the target types that were most effective in supporting the land battle. The analysis is divided into strategic and tactical interdiction. The strategic interdiction campaign was aimed at German resources and lines of communication. The tactical interdiction campaign was in more direct support of the land battle; therefore, the analysis is conducted by type ground campaign supported.

Investigation reveals that the strategic interdiction campaign was most effective in supporting the land battle when striking lines of communication. The tactical interdiction campaign was most effective in a battlefield isolation role which included targets within the battlefield area. As a general rule, interdiction was more effective when employed in concert with the ground commanders scheme of maneuver. The high value targets identified were marshalling yards, rail lines, roads, defiles, supply dumps, troop concentrations, enemy columns, bridges, communication centers, signal communications, and anti-aircraft artillery.

540. THE RESERVE COMPONENT DILEMMA: MISSION VS TIME, by Major Donald B. Skipper, USA. 259 pages.

This thesis is a study of the Army National Guard and US Army Reserve (Reserve Components) premobilization training requirements and training time available in which to accomplish them. The original intent of Congress in establishing the post-World War II Reserve Components, the Total Force Policy that places heavy reliance on the Reserve Components, and CAPSTONE related training programs designed to improve Reserve Component readiness are examined to determine if available time resources support training requirements.

Data for this thesis were obtained from a myriad of civilian and government sources published over the last eighty years and from interviews with key policymakers in the Reserve Component training community.

This study concludes that the legislated minimum of thirty-eight (nine) training days per year is no longer enough time to accomplish all required training and briefly examines the various categories and costs of extra-training time now being provided to the Reserve Component to conduct wartime-mission planning and training. Several long-term implications of this approach are also examined. Based on study conclusions, six recommendations are made to address the long-term implications of the use of extra-training time by Reserve Component personnel.

This study evaluates the present-day FM radio frequency management system as it applies to the AirLand Battle doctrine. It centers on the question of friendly mutual interference that will result from shortcomings in the current frequency management system. The history of the tactical radio and mutual interference is investigated during World War I, World War II, the Vietnam Conflict, and recent major field training exercises in West Germany. The procedures for the management of the radio frequency spectrum are established from the international level down to the tactical level.

A model is established as the basis for the evaluation. It includes the procedures and requirements for creating the Communications-Electronics Operating Instructions (CEOI), a tactical scenario based on a representative US Army Corps engaged in combat operations in Europe, and an evaluation of current doctrine for the FM radio net structure. The problems that could result in mutual interference are identified and divided into three areas. These areas are the application of combat power, CEOI procedures, and frequency management doctrine.

The study concludes that there are serious shortcomings in the present-day frequency management system and makes recommendations that concern radio frequency managers, signal officers, and tactical commanders. The recommendations include the requirement for the use of computers, reevaluation of frequency management doctrine, establishing training programs at both the centralized school level and at the unit level, and more detailed planning by tactical unit staff officers.

542. ANALYSIS OF US ARMY TACTICAL OPERATIONS SECURITY PROCEDURES by Major John Tartella, USA, 183 pages.

This study addresses the use of operations security by the US Army maneuver units subordinate to a corps. It examines the evolution of the concept called tactical operations security and the historical occurrences which preceded the development of the concept. In addition, the current US Army tactical operations security doctrine and its implementation are analyzed by this study.

This thesis draws conclusions regarding the current state of tactical operations security procedures and offers recommendations regarding its use and implementation. A model is provided for consideration in the development of future US Army tactical operations security doctrine.
This study attempts to explain the causes and effects of the military coup d'état which took place in Turkey on 12 September 1980. The analysis focuses on the National Security Council government of the period, against the broader historical background of military involvement in Turkish political development.

The research indicates that direct military intervention was necessary in order to avert the real possibility of a calamitous civil war within the republic. Indications are that control is being restored to the elected civilian government under a stronger, more effective constitutional system.

This study examines the first battle of World War II: the defense of the Philippines on the Bataan Peninsula. Only those units properly equipped, adequately trained, and led by officers who were knowledgeable on the current doctrine are examined. A detailed narrative explains what happened.

An analysis is then made to determine if those units used then-current Army doctrine, and whether or not the doctrine proved effective. Each of the battles described in the narrative is then matched against doctrinal guidelines to determine the effectiveness of doctrine.

Doctrine proved effective, especially at the battalion and lower levels. Units performed poorly at division and corps more from a lack of practice than a failure of doctrine. Most tactical failures on Bataan can be blamed on leaders failing to follow doctrine.
ABSTRACTS
OF
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LIST OF CLASSIFIED SUBJECTS

Communications C48

Security C48
C48. Promulgation of National Communications Security Policy
to the Operational and Tactical Levels of the US Army. . . . . 20
C48. PROMULGATION OF NATIONAL COMMUNICATIONS SECURITY POLICY TO THE
OPERATIONAL AND TACTICAL LEVELS OF THE US ARMY, by Dr. C. Dale Nunley, 95
pages.

This study examines the extent to which national level communications
security policy is reflected in the procedures, especially the standing
operating procedures, of units at the operational and tactical levels of the
US Army.

National level documents were obtained from the Department of Defense
and the Joint Chiefs of Staff. The policy and guidance in the
national-level documents were compared with that in various types of
documentation received from twelve field units representing varied command
levels, missions, and geographic areas. These comparisons sought to
discover significant differences in the guidance provided.

It was discovered that while the field unit guidance reflected the
national level guidance to a certain extent, there were deficiencies in some
areas. Physical security was covered more completely than the other COMSEC
areas. Some shortcomings existed relative to cryptographic security but
most units seemed to be aware of the need for this type of protection.
Transmission security was less completely covered with total neglect of
traffic flow security and a greater need for details of transmission
security methods which are not generally covered in the CE0I/CESI. Finally,
TEMPEST problems were almost always neglected.
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