CLIC PAPERS

CENTURY TWENTY-ONE:
AN AGE OF TERROR AND VIOLENCE

Army - Air Force Center for Low Intensity Conflict
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Century Twenty-One: An Age of Terror and Violence

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19. ABSTRACT (Continue on reverse if necessary and identify by block number)
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Will there be violence in and between societies in the first decades of the twenty-first century? Based on five thousand years of trackable history, the answer is yes. Will terrorism, as we have come to know it, be one of the prominent forms that violence will take? Suggesting the answer to that question is the purpose of this article.

Discussing terrorism at this point is inevitably redundant and also places the author at risk. It is redundant, because the socio-political phenomenon of terrorism has been studied, dissected, examined, explained, analyzed, defended, and condemned over the last three decades by scores of victims, practitioners, and scholars of every hue. To misuse an aged homily, in the field of terrorism, "There is nothing new beneath the sun." Allowing for technology and perhaps greater finesse, this has been the case for at least the last century.

The author's risk is twofold. One is that of being labeled a bore for a reprise of common knowledge. The other, more serious risk is that of opening the Pandora's box of definitions. The latter event has destroyed more perfectly good papers in the last decade than most office document shredders have over the same period.

Though willing to accept the unflattering appellation, I will slay the definitional Hydra at the beginning. For the purposes of this paper, the Department of Defense's definition of terrorism will apply—"the calculated use of violence or threat of violence to inculcate fear; intended to coerce or to intimidate governments or societies in the pursuit of goals that are generally political, religious, or ideological." More succinctly put, it is the use of violence to generate fear for the purpose of modifying political behavior. Recognizing that the same can be said of all political violence to include interstate war, this paper holds that it is the absence of widely accepted rules (e.g., the law of war) and the terrorists' tendency to target victims who have no discernible relation to the audience they are attempting to influence (i.e., the question of "innocent" victims) which sets terrorism apart. Terrorism is a form of political violence but is not a synonym for it.

A similar logic applies to terrorism when viewed as a political activity (the time worn claim of terrorism as communication). On the one hand, most students of the subject agree that terrorism is a political activity. (The deterioration of terrorist groups into criminal groups is addressed below.) On the other hand, an argument can be made that terrorists have abandoned political processes when they turn to terrorism. The latter interpretation assumes that political interest aggregation and articulation mechanisms exist and that the group choosing to engage in terrorism has access to them.

Legitimacy inevitably enters any discussion of political activity even in the narrow context of terrorism. A state practicing terrorism or any form of violence has an advantage over non-state
actors in that there is an assumption of legitimacy or at least a liberal benefit of the doubt in favor of the state. For purposes of predicting the extent of terrorism in the future, however, legitimacy is irrelevant. Internal violence against the state or social groups within a state cannot be legitimate. Violence by the state against its own members lowers the effectiveness of other social control mechanisms and rather implies acceptance of violence as a political action, that is, an accepted, therefore legitimate, means of interest articulation. Put more simply, the state's use of terrorism legitimizes the practices for non-state actors. While not universal, the terror and counterterror counterpoint is common (for example, Uruguay and Argentina in their "dirty wars" of the 1970s, Israel in the occupied areas during the intifada, Turkey and its Armenians circa 1890-1900, the Algerian insurgency of the 1950s, and, perhaps, the Islamic Republic of Iran and Algeria today).

WHY TERRORISM?

The effort to identify the cardinal reason for engagement in terrorism is nearly as unrewarding as the eternal search for a universally accepted definition. For our purpose, I have arranged the myriad of theories into three broad categories—rational, psychological, and cultural. Although I have attempted here to capture the essence of each in pure form, it is obvious that all are valid, and all play in any group's decision to engage in terrorism. Only the degree of influence on that decision varies.

The rational process (rational for a particular culture), requires an analysis of objective conditions. Will the society accept this form of violence as legitimate in pursuit of the purpose we espouse? Can the target audience protect itself more effectively than we can attack it? Can we sustain the effort? Combined, the answers to these questions indicate whether terrorism is likely (in this case) to be effective and if the group can afford both material and human resources to embark on that course of action.

As with any other group activity, the decision to engage in terrorism cannot be reached in a value-free vacuum. The Society's tradition regarding political violence, the experiences of groups from other societies considered to be in comparable circumstances, the competitive position vis-a-vis other groups in the society, and the personalities of the more influential members all distort the objectivity with which groups perform analysis. These same factors, along with intergroup dynamics, influence strategy and ultimately tactical decisions. Strategic questions include such fundamentals as—do we operate in the political arena as well as use terrorism (common practices in South and Central America), and are we prepared to inflict casualties upon uninvolved (i.e., "innocent") populations? Tactical decisions range from timing to target selection and method of attack.

One final note on choice. Resort to terrorism is rarely, if ever, a group's first choice. While the willingness to resort to
violence is highly situational as well as culturally dependent, typically the group perceives itself deprived of other options (e.g., repressive regimes) or so isolated from society that it must force acceptance of its position on an issue (e.g., anti-abortion radicals) or create conditions for revolution (the case with most ideology-based western European groups).

Psychological determinists hold that individual terrorists are driven to violence by psychological forces rather than through an objective decision process. The argument for psycho-determination is founded primarily on Western experiences over the last three decades. While none claims that members of terrorist groups are generally abnormal (i.e., no clear psychopathology), there are some "true believer" characteristics which are nearly universal among the western, ideologically motivated practitioners. They tend to project their own undesirable motivations onto others and, in so doing, create an all inclusive "they" who represent evil. An "us" versus "them" alignment eases dehumanizing the victims and helps to eliminate any moral ambiguities. Such clarity of purpose also appeals to those who crave violence to give them psychic release from perpetual anger. The other common characteristic is a pronounced need "to belong" to a group. In some cases having a niche in an accepting group provides status and is more compelling than the alleged reasons for the group's existence.

There are significant, if not frightening, behaviors which result from the actualization of these psycho-dynamics. The most apparent is the need to justify continuously the group's existence. A terrorist group must terrorize, or at least commit violent acts in the attempt, to remain worthy (legitimate) of its name and cause. Thus, terrorists sometimes carry out attacks which are objectively nonproductive or even counter productive to their announced goal.

Another result is the intensity of "group think" dynamics within the pressurized environment of a terrorist group. With the enemy clearly identified and unequivocally evil, pressure to escalate violence (in frequency or magnitude) is ever present. Further, the need to belong, along with most groups' unwillingness to accept resignations, tends to stifle dissent from the more cautious. This is why terrorist groups tend to maximalist positions, since having invested their honor in the commission of antisocial acts and frequently shed blood in a cause, they view negotiation often as dishonorable if not treasonous. To some extent this explains the reason that terrorist groups are so prone to fracturing and that the new splinters are frequently more violent than the parent group. The Jewish experience in Palestine is a classic example. In 1931 Haganah B broke from Haganah; in 1936 Irgun Zvai Leumi broke from Haganah B, and in 1940 Lochamei Herut Israel, or the Stern Gang, broke from the Irgun. Each splinter was more intractable and violence prone than the parent organization.

The psycho-dynamics also make achievement of the announced group goal impossible. If the group achieves its stated purpose, there is no longer a need for the group; thus success constitutes a threat to
the psychological well-being of many members. In a success scenario there is a tendency to redefine the goal or to reject the achievement as unreal, inadequate, or the result of insincerity on the part of "them." Nicaragua's Contras, the Basque ETA, and any number of Palestinian radical groups seemingly suffer from this fear of success. One effective defense against success is to be for or against such broad, ill-defined end states that even if the world proclaims success, the group can plausibly deny it and fight on. France's direct action (AD) played a variant of this gambit during the mid-1980s. They would attack various targets for various causes, among them anti-Americanism, anti-imperialism, anti-Catholicism, anti-Semitism, anti-nuclear power and anti-French intervention in Chad. Apparently, the core leadership was determined to struggle and found some cause or other to justify violent action until the cooperative efforts of Western European security forces terminated the organization at least temporarily.

Culture is simultaneously the most important causative factor and the most difficult for the Western observer to understand fully. The difficulty in understanding stems from our reluctance to appreciate the totality of culture and the intensity of its effects on behavior, both conscious and unconscious. Our acceptance of the myth that rationality dictates human behavior makes vendettas, martyrdom, and seemingly self-destructive group action (e.g., the breaking-up of administratively states into ethnically pure but economically anemic mini-nation states) incomprehensible.

Even to attempt a complete listing of cultural characteristics which mold a society's attitude toward violence is too ambitious for this paper. This author will, therefore, list a few of the more important ones and elaborate on those which bear most heavily on contemporary terrorism. Fundamental to a society's view of violence is its treatment of life in general and that of individual humans in particular (the centrality of the group versus the individual).

Other factors include the manner in which aggression is channeled and concepts of social organization, specifically political structure and power transfer mechanisms. It is the latter point--the political culture--which sets the parameters for political violence. Violent societies do not necessarily have traditions of political violence. The United States, for instance, is one of the most violent extant societies (about 529 violent crimes per 100,000 population in 1983), but there is no strong, consistent tradition of political violence, while France (only 106 violent crimes per 100,000 for that same year) and Germany (less than 174), which are far less tolerant of individual violence, have traditions of political violence which need no elaboration.1

Perhaps the most significant cultural characteristics in this context are the perception of outsiders and the reaction to a perception of threat to cultural survival. It is the threat to cultural survival which excites the primordial group instincts and leads to seemingly "irrational" violence. Threat to any or all legs of the cultural triad (language, religion, and some concept of
homeland or native territory) can trigger defensive (even xenophobic) reactions. Some of the better known historical experiences illustrate the depth and tenacity of these premodern *gemeinschaft* motivations. The Russification programs of the nineteenth and twentieth centuries, the final effects of which we still witness (Georgia, Azerbaijan, Moldova to name a few) comprise an example of a multiculture effort. To add universality, consider various areas ruled under French, Portuguese, or Spanish colonial policies of the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries: United States assimilation efforts with Amerindians and, more dramatically, the Sepoy Rebellion against British efforts to change India (1857).

Religion is perhaps the most volatile of the cultural identifiers. A threat to a group's religion is not only a threat to the present but to the past and future as well. One need only note the violence attending the spread of any religion from ancient urban and tribal deities through the great modern religions to include Christianity and, the youngest, Islam, neither of which eschewed conversion by the sword.

In general terms, religion has proven to be capable of controlling violence without being antithetical to it. Further, the control is better exercised internally to the group (proscribing violence among "us" more effectively than against "them"). This builds group cohesion by diverting violence to external targets (e.g., Christian Crusades in Europe and the Middle East, Islamic Jihads, Europe's religious wars of the seventeenth century, Jewish efforts to purify through "Judiasm of the Sword" in the centuries surrounding the birth of Jesus). The traditions and myths of today's great religions offer little hope to those who would look to religion to end violence. Christian "Soldiers of the Cross," the Jewish wars of the old Testament, the battle of the Hindu Ramayana and Mahabharata, along with the Koranic admonition to slay the apostate and infidel, serve to universalize the acceptance of violence to spread or defend religion.

Recognizing that the reasons for terrorism apply equally well to other forms of political violence, we must answer the question of what may make terrorism so appealing in the early twenty-first century? There are several simple and mundane reasons to use terrorism. First is the success record of the late twentieth century. No terrorist group that I know of has attained the goal(s) that it allegedly struggles for, but then announced objectives are not necessarily the actual objectives which may include organizational survival, national or even international attention to their cause, job satisfaction and, more frequently than casual observers like to think, achievement of specific objectives. Among the latter are acquisition of funds (ransom or extortion), forcing business decisions, encouraging governments to leniency in specific criminal cases (usually one involving a group member or family thereof), and influencing governmental decisions. The precipitous withdrawal of the multinational peace-keeping force from Lebanon following spectacular attacks on US and French installations in
October 1983 is the most impressive example of terrorist influence on government policy.

In addition to being more effective than commonly perceived, terrorism is cheap. Leaving aside the popular rhetoric of "weapon of the weak," terrorism, compared to other forms of violence, is cost-effective. Contemporary war is so expensive that few (if any) states can afford to engage in it (recall that the Gulf War was underwritten by all of the World's economic powers and a smattering of lesser states). A single aircraft carrier group costs a billion dollars before it even puts to sea, but a few thousand dollars' worth of used truck and explosives was enough to modify the correlation of power in Lebanon in 1983-84. The world spends tens of millions of dollars on airline security every year, but Pan Am 103 (1989 was destroyed with a couple hundred dollars' worth of explosives and portable audio equipment. The Gulf War held the world's attention for seven months at a cost of some $60 billion, but the occupation of the US Embassy in Teheran was center stage for twice as long at the cost of feeding the hostages.

Even compared to insurgency, terrorism is a bargain. Insurgency carries some of the cost of war (salary and equipment) in addition to those associated with mass organizations over an extended period of years. Mass action requires a high-level of popular support which is difficult to sustain over prolonged periods. It also entails a high risk of casualties which the masses will reject. Internal war also disrupts the economy, sometimes intentionally, but always at a cost to all parties involved.

Terrorism, however, needs only inexpensive technology, a modest support organization, and can sustain itself by contributions from patrons or through business ventures (e.g., groups on both sides in Northern Ireland and Palestinian radicals as well as Latin American and South Asian groups that affiliate with, or enter into, drug trafficking).

Another advantage of terrorism is the terrorists' near monopoly on the quintessential principle of war--the offensive. The terrorist determines who or what is to be attacked, when and where this attack will take place, and how it will be executed. Further, if the attack fails or results in undesirable effects, the terrorist can simply not claim responsibility or, as with the Provisional Irish Republican Army in 1990-91, attempt to maintain some facade of moral rectitude by apologizing for the mistake. In sum, unlike either inter- or intrastate war, with terrorism, the terrorist controls both the pace and magnitude of violence, becoming the envy of generals and admirals everywhere.

Terrorism is obviously not a "perfect" mode of conflict. Today, as in earlier historical periods, the practice of terrorism risks goading its target audience into extraordinary defensive actions. Contemporary practitioners too easily forget the fates of their forbears. The Mongols failed to appreciate the subtleties of the Assassins' approach and slaughtered them in the mid-thirteenth
century. The reaction to Tsar Alexander II's assassination crushed the organized opposition (both violent and nonviolent groups) in the latter decades of the nineteenth century while the Ottoman reaction to Armenian provocation at the turn of the century followed similar patterns. Radical Serbian nationalists brought about their own destruction and, though not their intent, nearly destroyed Europe by triggering World War I early in the twentieth century. More currently, we may have witnessed the beginning of the ebb tide of Tamil militancy with the assassination of Rajiv Gandhi in India (May 1991). Attesting to the shallowness of the terrorist's learning curve are the current activities of third and fourth generation descendants of the Armenian and Serbian extremists in these examples. More recently, the fate of Brazil's urban guerrillas in the 1960s as well as Uruguay's Tupamaros and Argentina's Montoneros/People's Revolutionary Army in the 1970s follows the same pattern. Less sanguine but still effective were the German and Italian legalistic reactions to the depredations of their indigenous terrorists groups during the 1970s and 1980s.

In response to the threat to Cold War tranquillity posed by terrorism in the 1970-1990 period, the world's governments took unprecedented steps in mutual security. Police and eventually intelligence agency cooperation against terrorism reached levels by 1990 undreamed of only 20 years earlier. The fact that Eastern Europe, to include the then Soviet Union and China, had cautiously begun to join the rest of the world can be interpreted as a testimony to the power of fear of terrorism.

In sum, there is evidence to support the view that terrorism is effective and, providing it does not breach the target society's tolerance threshold, sustainable virtually indefinitely. We should note that tolerance tends to rise as the audience becomes jaded by violence (e.g., Columbia today).

CONSIDERATIONS FAVORING TERRORISM CIRCA 2000

Now that the unjustified but widespread euphoria over the cessation of the Cold War is fading, it is appropriate to examine the concept of peace in the post-Cold War era. If one considers peace to be the absence of war, or more precisely the absence of organized armed forces (usually arms of an administrative state) engaged in formal combat for a stated political purpose, then the end of the Cold War certainly has not contributed to world peace. On the formal level there have been armed clashes between Burma and Thailand (1991-92); a West African multinational force has fought in Liberia (1992); Sudan's civil war has flared (1991 to present); the United States intervened in Panama (1989-90), and Afghanistan had a civil war (ongoing). If we stretch the definition a bit as it relates to "formal" combat by organized armed forces, we can include violent conflicts in Chad, Sri Lanka, Burma, Kampuchea, Columbia, Peru, Azerbaijan-Armenia, Turkey and Iraq versus their Kurdish populations, Somalia's civil war cum chaos, Rwanda's insurgency turned slaughter, Angola's insurgency, Mozambique's insurgency, Georgia, and Morocco in the Western Sahara. This list is by no means exhaustive. The
conflicts noted rather belie the folk wisdom about the peace which would follow the end of the "Evil Empire." Had we expanded the concept of peace to include any physical violence engaged in by a group, the examples would have become universal.

With the disappointment of those who expected the biblical millennium at the end of the Cold War as a starting point, I have identified eight factors or considerations which will definitely contribute to increased violence and probably encourage the practice of terrorism over the next few decades. The factors are as follows: The break up of the Soviet block; fear of cultural extinction; the process of learning democracy; cultural acceptance of violent crime; the proliferation of weapons; technological advances in transportation and communication; violence by the emotionally disturbed; and the use of terrorism to attain political power. None of these factors is a product of occult knowledge, and all are evident, and some have been for years. Additionally, they are not particularly frightening individually. Cumulatively, however, they are producing a synergism with chilling potential for civilization at the turn of the century.

First is the most obvious—the political effects of the break up of the socialist block and the subsequent fragmentation of the Soviet Union. Of equal importance was the dizzying pace of that breakup. The world had no chance to adjust, and the results were predictable. In 1990 the author found himself in the incongruous position of arguing with a group of visitors from the former Soviet Union in favor of their (Soviet) continued involvement in selected countries to soften the effects of the demise of one of the world's power centers. Events rendered the discussion academic. As the specter of a nuclear holocaust receded into history (at least temporarily), so also did the stabilizing Cold War practice of other governments' playing off the superpowers against each other. Similarly the fear of escalation into superpower confrontation which served to modulate interstate violence for half a century disappeared. The precipitous move from a bipolar to a multipolar world offers opportunities for area powers to move toward establishing hegemonic spheres (largely still evolving, but India and Iraq are current examples). Potentially more destabilizing than area power aspirations is the opportunity for adventures by any leader aspiring to greatness (Libya's Quaddafi or Serbia's Milosevic might serve as examples).

Closely associated with the opportunities for mini-powers and would-be powers to generate violence is the second consideration—fear of cultural extinction. Examples of this phenomenon are embarrassingly plentiful, ranging from various Amerindian tribes in Canada, the United States, Mexico, and all of Central America as well as the Andean ridge countries; through East Timor and Irian Jaya in Indonesia. Following are a few, mostly western European, areas of ethnic concern. Some have already experienced violence; the others only have the potential.

Spain's Basque, Galician, and Catalanian regions already have active separatist elements as do France's Corsica, Brittany, and
Basque areas. Less well-developed movements can be found in Italy (Tyrole, Sardinia), Greece (Thrace, Macedonia), Czech Republic—

itself a recent creation (Ruthenia), Romania (Moldova), Belgium
(Flanders, Wallonia) and the United Kingdom (Wales, Scotland, and of

course, Northern Ireland).

In areas with recent colonial experiences (Africa, Central and
South Asia) the intentional and unintentional separation of ethnic
communities has produced a more complex mosaic of fractured ethnic
groups, not all of which have yet surfaced as groups consciously
concerned with their identity. Stalin's nationalities policy which
involved mass relocations of ethnic groups has left Central Asia and
the Caucasus ripe for ethnic strife.

A classic example is the Volga Germans. As the German armies
moved to end Bolshevism in 1941, Stalin ended the autonomous republic
status of this culturally distinct but highly suspect group and
dispersed them throughout the Soviet empire. Half a century later,
and some two million strong, they retain their identity as a society
and are developing a fear of cultural extinction in the uncertainties
of the post-Soviet era. There has been no violence to date, but the
decade is young.

Ethnic consciousness beyond the mere awareness of historical
affiliation arises from one or both of two reasons. First is the
memory of past "injustices." The injustice need not be recent so
long as folklore transmits the sense of injury from generation to
generation. Examples of ethnic groups' claiming past offenses as a
basis for current action are worldwide--Burma's Karens and Muslems;
Rwanda's Hutus; Turkey's Kurds and Armenians; Cyprus' Turks; Iraq's
Shiites; India's Sikhs; Mali's Touregs; various Amerindian tribes in
North and South America; Iran's Bahais (if there are any left); and
the expatriate or minority communities in every country of
Southeastern Europe as well as Diaspora Jews nearly everywhere.

The second reason, while less dramatic and less easily
identified, is more common and therefore more likely to result in
elevated ethnic consciousness in the future. In unsettled political
or economic conditions, ethnic self-awareness can be a political
force by creating an instant "us" group. The American experience
with immigrant enclaves and their attendant "ward healers" during the
century beginning about 1850 offers an example worthy of study. More
recently, Africa's pandemic tribal-based political parties have
become a fact of political life even where formal efforts were made
to avoid it. At the risk of over generalizing, one might conclude
that the nationalism of the 1960s and 1970s with its focus on the
administrative state has failed in much of Africa and Asia.

Ethnic-based groups' contending for political power increase the
likelihood of electoral violence and frequently argue for autonomy or
separation in cases where one or a coalition of parties perpetually
outnumbers the others. Fragmentation weakens the administrative
state in many ways, not the least of which is security (i.e., the
capacity to control violence). While only a few groups have resorted
to violence thus far, some of the other considerations discussed here are exciting an ethnic consciousness that will eventually lead to violence.

The third factor is political maturation or simply learning democracy. Democracy does not result from the incantation of such mystic terms as election, multiparty, majority rule, or the will of the people. Even if democracy could be conjured up by priests or alchemists, it has never been identified with the absence of violence. (Athenian aggression fifth century BC; Roman conquest in the republic period during the fourth to first centuries BC; the British experience over any period you choose from 1066 to the late twentieth century; Republican France since 1790; the US from its founding; and of course, the Iberian experience to include the Spanish Civil War and modern Latin America.)

Democracy has become popular in the post-Cold War era. What state today would claim to be anything but a democracy? The popularity has come as a result of the demonstrated failure of communist and authoritarian competitors as well as its identification with the US. The latter comparison, unfortunately, frequently carries with it the assumption that democracy miraculously brings in its wake immediate economic well-being and influence over other peoples. The realities are demonstrably different, and the learning process is rife with conditions fostering violence. A few of the states experiencing such growing pains are: Nicaragua, Georgia, Philippines, Angola, Russia, Germany, Lebanon, Turkey, Egypt, Algeria, Liberia, Somalia, Sudan, Kenya, Surinam, Haiti, and El Salvador. Until the spirit of compromise is inculcated and mechanisms for power distribution and transfer established, violence will continue to serve as the wet nurse to fledgling democracies. Regrettably the maturation process has historically taken several generations even under ideal conditions, and the end of the twentieth century will not be remembered as having ideal conditions.

The fourth factor—cultural acceptance of violence as a means of economic sustenance, i.e., violent crime or banditry—is more narrowly focused than those previously discussed but no less culturally dependent. The evolution of ethnic criminal organizations in the U.S. during the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries is instructive in this regard. Wealth and power acquired by "strong arm" methods were accepted in the immigrant communities, because they succeeded and led to respectability. Today the effects of traditional acceptance of crime can be seen in several areas. Among the more prominent are Pakistan, Italy, Afghanistan, Philippines and Colombia. The pressure of economic malfunction and decline in the states' security capabilities have produced frightening increases in crime throughout Eastern Europe since 1990. Russia, for instance, reported a 23 per cent rise in violent crime and 50 per cent in theft in 1992. It is too early to characterize Eastern Europe in the post-Cold War era, since acceptance in the long term has not been established, or at least not yet. Culturally there are significant differences between Jean Valjean, who acted in desperation, and Al Capone, the career criminal.
There is another facet of the terrorism-crime relation which is evident today in several parts of the world—the shift from a noble cause to banditry. This process can take place as a group, or more frequently, as individuals. Having become habitués of clandestinity and addicted to the thrill of violent action, terrorist group members simply do not want "to retire" when the group loses its cause or is suppressed by police. They move on to new causes or to criminal activity where their skills are marketable and the life-style invigorating. Latin America is riddled with exiled guerrillas from as far back as the Spanish Civil War (1936-39). The recent fundamentalist-sponsored violence in North Africa has provided second careers for Afghan mujahadeen who lost their jobs at home. Of equal currency is the flood of trained specialists from the defunct Eastern European security apparatus now joining various movements and criminal cartels to survive. These rich pools of human resources (the Palestinian refugee camps for instance) are not only sources of immediate terrorist talent but they are also training their own replacements.

Weapons proliferation is the fifth factor. Recognizing that weaponry does not cause violence, the degree to which weapons affect the frequency and magnitude of violence makes it a legitimate matter of interest for this inquiry. An assassin with a knife is dangerous; one with a modern rapid-fire, multiround assault weapon is more dangerous; and one with a vial of deadly chemical or biological material is more dangerous still.

No one knows how many small arms there are in the world. No one knew before the collapse of the communist bloc, and now that collapse has raised the number of weapons in the hands of "unofficial" groups, the number has grown by millions. Similarly, the sad spectacle of successor state governments, factories (with or without government approval), military units, and individual members of armed forces, all selling weapons to whomever has hard currency, has led to the rapid proliferation of crew-served weapons as well. If this flood of weapons were a one-time phenomenon, an aberration, we could take comfort in the thought that ten years from now the more sophisticated systems would be no longer functional. Unfortunately, this is not the case. The industrial states are having difficulty converting weapons industries to production of goods for peacetime. The technologically less-advanced factories of Eastern Europe may well take a decade during which production will continue and products modified to accommodate a wide array of customers to include terrorist groups.

Like other weapons, nuclear, biological, and chemical materials has slipped from the control of disintegrating armed forces and will inevitably contribute to the potential for violence in various parts of the world. While the manufacturing sources of these materials can be more easily converted than those for conventional arms, the knowledge of how to make and use mass casualty weapons has already dispersed, and knowledge does not wear out.
Although terrorist groups have so far refrained from use of mass casualty weapons, there is scant comfort for the future. Reasons offered for this reluctance range from ignorance (during the 1970s several amateurish efforts in the US to poison water were defeated by the normal purification processes) to fear of the material's getting beyond their control, and to concern that such weapons might push the target society beyond its tolerance threshold. There is validity to all of these reasons, but then the fact that terrorist groups have been doing quite nicely with relatively unsophisticated weapons may also be a factor. Considerations favoring use of mass casualty weapons in the early twenty-first century are:

- The need to escalate the action to gain attention in the sensational-rich information environment.

- The subdued outrage following Iraq's use of chemicals against Iran and the Kurds could be interpreted as world acceptance.

- Ease of access to the requisite knowledge.

- Religious zealots and the emotionally disturbed do not always do a cost benefit analysis.

The sixth factor (ease of communication and transportation) is a function of technology much like the weapons issue. Today, the more sophisticated terrorists communicate just as any other affluent organization would--by using portable radios, worldwide telephone service, facsimiles, computers and, of course, postal systems. Over the last few decades explosive devices have constituted approximately 50 percent of the weaponry used in terrorist attacks worldwide. There is no indication that this will change. What changes is the explosives and, as importantly, the initiating devices, which in the 1990s range from atmospheric through photo sensitive, time-delay, motion-sensitive, and radio. (Recall that it was a silicon chip from the explosive device that lead the 1989 Pan American 103 investigation to Libya.)

Improved transportation also benefits the terrorists who can now travel half way around the world, commit the act, and be home or, in some third country, a continent away in a single day. The porosity of state borders increases as security structures weaken (former Soviet Union, Eastern Europe) and as clusters of states move to reduce economic barriers (the European and West African economic communities). The same factors which allow the terrorist to get to his victims more expeditiously also allow potential victims to come to the terrorists (or criminals) through business and tourist travel.

Technical advances in news media operations need little elaboration. An incident in Sri Lanka can be described to an audience in Omaha, NB, within hours and, if newsworthy, accompanied by video coverage the same day. The rapid transmission of news does more than merely increase the terrorist's audience; it contributes to mimicry, hence to the spread of terrorism as a political action. Unfortunately, there is a similar effect on the emotionally unstable
persons who frequently indulge in a flurry of "copy cat" incidents and hoaxes following a publicized incident.

Violence by those who are emotionally disturbed (our seventh factor) is usually dismissed as one of those societal unpleasanties which, like the poor, are with us always. The traditional view, however, fails to consider the effects of "modernity" on emotional stability. He who was eccentric living in a village surrounded by relatives and friends can become unstable and violent in the lonely insecurity of a twenty-first century urban area. With world population at 5.4 billion in 1992, and using the United Nations (medium fertility) projection, it is reasonable to forecast a doubling (to nearly 11 billion) by the middle of the next century. More importantly, by 2000 over half of mankind will be living in urban areas, most of which are ill prepared to support such numbers. If soccer games can spark riots in Europe, and court decisions serve to justify savagery in the United States in the 1990s, it takes little imagination to predict pandemic violence (some in the form of terrorism) in the teeming cities of the near future. The experiences of European and American cities during the industrial revolution offer an instructive analogy for this prediction.

The eighth consideration is the most common—the use of terrorism as an instrument of political power and influence. This harkens back to our earlier discussion of terror as a political action. As political action, terrorism has strengths and weaknesses. Among the weaknesses is its poor record in generating support. It can focus attention on various issues, but arousal of interest does not equate to support. The painful histories of the IRA and others illustrate this weakness. Despite spectacular actions over periods of many years, popular support for any of these organizations is minuscule among the very groups they purport to serve. And poor performance at building support is not restricted to European terror groups. Note the fragmentation of Palestinian groups over the last 30 years, the bloody struggles among Tamil factions in Sri Lanka, and the lukewarm acceptance of the Shanti Bahini by the tribal peoples of the Chittagong Hill tract in Bangladesh.

On the other hand, terrorism is effective for destabilization and intimidation. During the spate of bombings in the Paris subways (Direct Action 1985-86) people avoided intricacy travel. More recently London has suffered transportational mayhem from the same tactic (IRA, 1991-92). Peru's Sendero Luminoso routinely renders parts of Lima electrically powerless. Since modern cities are more sensitive to disruption than their prototypes of a hundred years ago, this type of attack exacts an economic price and exacerbates social unrest.

Intimidation is demonstrated daily and usually successfully. Threatening to kill those who vote (e.g., Philippines, Peru) and assassinating officials who are uncooperative (worldwide but currently most blatant in Turkey, Peru, Colombia, and India) are standard fare for the modern terrorist. Less dramatic but still violent are such action as burning summer homes (Wales and Corsica)
and attempting to stifle the tourist industry (Tunisia, Peru, Egypt, Cambodia, etc.). The impact on tourism is not necessarily intentional. In the summer of 1986 (after a series of terrorist incidents in 1985-86) some 1.4 million American tourists went to UK and Germany but in the summer of 1985 the figure was 20 per cent higher at 1.8 million.  

So called 'single issue' terrorists also rely on the efficacy of intimidation. Animal rights and environmental extremists and anti-abortion groups use terrorist acts to attract attention, but few expect to generate support by this means. The violent acts do, however, convey the message that continuation of the activity of which the terrorist disapproves is more dangerous than one might otherwise assume.

Religious extremists constitute that category of political terrorists who are the most likely to be active at the turn of the century. I have placed religion in the political category because of the historical evidence. Zealots rarely seem to be satisfied to practice their faith. Everyone else must practice it also. Given the short history of the concept of "separation of church and state" as well as its lack of wide acceptance, there is reason to expect that the crusaders and missionaries of the future will rely on secular power just as their forebears did. (Recall that the Inquisition remanded its victims to the secular authorities for execution of sentences. Protestant and Catholic witch-hunting also employed the power of the state. Classic Islam does not even recognize a separation of church and state. Old Testament prophets railed against rulers who failed to do God's bidding, and today ultra orthodox Jewish groups call for Israeli law to enforce their interpretation of correct living.) Applied to religion, terrorism can produce orthopraxy not orthodoxy, but then even zealots usually settle for conforming behavior. (For example, the Salman Rushdie affair has undoubtedly had influence on those authors who may be contemplating work touching any aspect of Islam.) Viewed in this context, religion becomes just another motivation for seeking political power not unlike ideology and simple thirst for power.

In concluding, I had hoped to identify conditions or trends which might militate against the practice of terrorism during the coming decades, but there are precious few to offer. If we omit the miraculous renunciation of violence by all humanity and other millenarian happenings, the only thing left is global cooperation to reduce terrorism. On the one hand, given the trend to political and administrative decentralization and absence of a workable definition, the prospects for international cooperation to improve much beyond current levels are dim.

On the other hand, the factors favoring terrorism are several and obvious. The most significant of these is the melange of "causes" flourishing in the post-Cold War era. Self-determination, recovering from its prolonged post-World War I coma, bestows legitimacy on nearly any group's efforts to assert itself. When one considers that
today there are roughly 180 administrative states and over 1600 ethnic groups, it is a safe assumption that we will not see the end of ethnic violence (including terrorism) for some years.

Another cause of the future stems from the demise and subsequent disavowal of communism. Capitalism and its attendant political form, democracy, may not be workable everywhere. The search for new ways to structure society is already underway in some areas (the Middle East, Africa, Latin America), and in a few terrorism has cropped up (Italy's Third Way, Venezuela's Tercero Camino as well as Peruvian, and Bolivian Groups seeking to re-establish pre-Colombian societies). Recalling the agonies of Europe in the fifteenth and sixteenth centuries as societies struggled to cope with changes in economic conditions, we can say with some confidence that we have neither seen the end of the search for new ideologies nor of the violence which sometimes accompanies it.

Related to the search for the new way, but on a less esoteric level, are the effects of migration and urbanization. The former excites xenophobia (e.g., current attacks on refugees and expatriate communities in Europe; episodic expulsions of immigrant workers in West Africa; the problem of imported workers in the Persian Gulf states; concerns over the U.S. labor force faced with Mexican competition). The latter offers a rich target array for the politically or criminally motivated who desire to employ terrorist tactics in pursuit of their ends. As with ethnicity and ideology, these factors offer little hope for an end to terrorist practices for some years to come.

In summary, the relative efficacy of terrorism, coupled with its low cost compared to other forms of violence, and the surprisingly broad range of motivations for its use, leads to the conclusion that not only will terrorism be practiced in the early years of the twenty first century but also that the practice will be more widespread than anything witnessed in the twenty-first century. Given the potential for mass casualties from NBC weapons, it may well be bloodier also. In a worst case scenario, terrorist acts may become so popular as a means of expression that terrorism, which focuses on a target audience rather than the psychic need of the perpetrator, may lose its identity.