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Standing Up a Joint Task Force: The Acid Test

by
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A paper submitted to the Faculty of the Naval War College in partial satisfaction of the requirements of the Department of Operations.

The contents of this paper reflect my own personal views and are not necessarily endorsed by the Naval War College or the Department of the Navy.

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15. Abstract: Current joint task force (JTF) formation processes and their resulting command and control structures are inadequate for short notice crisis response. These approaches may fail in a fast rising crisis where forces must be immediately committed to combat. This case is the 'acid test' of the process of standing up a JTF. Crisis warfighting capability at the operational level of war is being jeopardized by the current approaches to JTF formation. Historical evidence from Urgent Fury and the Persian Gulf War supports this argument. Paper describes the five geographic CINC's current approaches to JTF formation and presents some alternatives. Approaches are then compared to an ideal using a subjective scoring method. Subsequent analysis of the results and the characteristics of each approach provides a possible solution. Analysis suggests the CINCs should each form one or more standing, regional JTF headquarters. Standing headquarters would combine with the CINC's subordinate component headquarters and forces to form a JTF. This approach is the only one that meets the acid test. Modifications of the ideal solution may be necessary due to resource constraints but the basic concept is feasible and should be implemented. Additionally, the JCS should review the JTF formation process and provide additional doctrine and procedural guidance in joint publications. Current doctrine and procedures are too diverse and, in some contingencies, would prove inadequate.

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ABSTRACT
The current joint task force (JTF) formation processes and their resulting command and control structures are inadequate for short notice crisis response. These approaches may fail in a fast rising crisis where forces must be immediately committed to combat. This case is the ‘acid test’ of the process of standing up a JTF. Crisis warfighting capability at the operational level of war is being jeopardized by the current approaches to JTF formation. Historical evidence from Urgent Fury and the Persian Gulf War supports this argument. This paper describes the five geographic CINC’s current approaches to JTF formation and presents some alternatives. All of the approaches are then compared to an ideal using a subjective scoring method. Subsequent analysis of the results and the characteristics of each approach is used to provide a possible solution to the problem. The analysis suggests the CINCs should each form one or more standing, regional JTF headquarters. This standing headquarters would combine with the CINC’s subordinate component headquarters and forces to form a JTF. This approach is the only one that meets the acid test. Modifications of the ideal solution may be necessary due to resource constraints but the basic concept is feasible and should be implemented. Additionally, the JCS should review the JTF formation process and provide additional doctrine and procedural guidance in joint publications. Current doctrine and procedures are too diverse and, in some contingencies, would prove inadequate.
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"The Joint Task Force has evolved as the likely force structure of tomorrow. Our recent experiences in peacekeeping, humanitarian assistance, disaster relief and combat missions have, for the most part, involved combined and joint task forces."\(^1\)

**Thesis**

Current joint task force (JTF) formation processes and their resulting command and control (C\(^2\)) structures are inadequate for short notice crisis response. The problem is particularly acute in situations where forces face being immediately committed to combat. Forces are becoming more joint and are increasingly being employed as JTFs. Service interoperability and doctrinal commonality are rapidly improving as the focus shifts to joint warfare. Despite this tactical improvement, crisis warfighting capability at the operational level of war is being jeopardized by the current approaches to JTF formation. Given adequate time, combatant commanders will probably be able to deploy a JTF organization capable of functioning effectively and efficiently. History tells us we will not always have the luxury of time. The short notice, immediate combat crisis is the ‘acid test’ of leadership. To succeed at the operational level of war during such a crisis, the United States needs a common, doctrinally based approach to forming JTFs.

**Introduction**

"After a gestation period of nearly a decade, a fundamental shift in military thinking has finally taken hold: in the post-Cold War world, the JTF has become the hallmark of U.S. military operations"\(^2\)

Unified commands may organize their forces as they see fit but most will rely on the guidance provided in Joint Pub 0-2 and select from one of the options it provides.\(^3\) Of the six options,
the JTF has clearly been the organizational method of choice in recent crises. JTF’s are highly flexible and capable of meeting a wide variety of missions. Many JTFs will not be required to commit forces to combat. Others, like some formed for disaster relief and humanitarian assistance, may not require conventional combat forces at all. Of the JTFs that do involve committing forces to combat, many will be afforded the time to mature as the crisis develops. The last case, and the acid test for JTF formation, is the admittedly rare case where forces must be immediately committed to combat. Forced entry, hostage rescue, and opposed non-combatant evacuation operations are examples of such cases. These cases are different from the others in two important respects. First, the element of time requires a rapid transition from peace to joint combat. Second, the differences between combat and non-combat operations are that vital U.S. interests are more likely to be at stake and the risk of losing American lives may be much greater.

This paper focuses on the process that creates the JTF’s critical C² structure. This process must produce an effective and efficient C² structure that guides and directs a JTF’s actions during deployment, employment and re-deployment. In the time critical, immediate hostilities case, the process meets the acid test. Failure to create an adequate C² structure quickly and efficiently will leave tactical forces without adequate operational guidance during the crucial deployment and initial employment phases of the operation. The failure of the C² structure in such a crisis could have dire consequences and the time has come to apply the same emphasis to JTF formation that is applied to joint force training. Rapid response, joint, tactical capability will mean little if our operational commanders and their staffs are not capable of effective, timely employment. This paper establishes a historical basis for the need to review
the JTF formation process and then attempts to determine the most effective and suitable approach to the task. The current approaches used by the five geographic CINCs and other feasible alternatives are discussed. Then, a subjective merit assessment is accomplished by scoring the various approaches against ideal criteria. Finally, the results are used to form conclusions and recommendations.

**Historical Examples**

Urgent Fury and the Persian Gulf War will be examined to assess the nation’s historical success with effective command and control of joint forces during a fast rising crisis. During Urgent Fury, forces were committed to combat in Grenada with little warning or preparation. In the opening days of the Gulf War, the United States faced the threat of committing forces to combat immediately to defend the Saudi Arabian peninsula. While combat ensued immediately in only one of the cases, the operational C² lessons learned are very similar. Desert Shield is specifically used as an example of what could have happened in hopes of emphasizing the lessons that have become obscured by the subsequent success of Desert Storm.

**Urgent Fury**

The mission as specified by the JCS Execute Order for Operation Urgent Fury was:

"Conduct military operations to protect and evacuate U.S. and designated foreign nationals from Grenada, neutralize Grenadan forces, stabilize the internal situation, and maintain the peace. In conjunction with OECS/friendly government participants, assist in restoration of a democratic government on Grenada." ¹⁴

The lives of American civilians were in immediate danger. Four days after the NCA’s decision to invade, the island was assaulted, and all operational objectives were achieved. Eighteen servicemen were killed and 116 wounded. Despite the apparent success of the operation, it
was a C^2 nightmare. USCINCLANT elected not to use the existing organization for contingency operations in the Caribbean islands and instead established an ad hoc JTF.\textsuperscript{5} JTF-120 was formed around the 2nd Fleet staff of VADM Metcalf who was designated the Joint Task Force Commander (CJTF). VADM Metcalf's staff was augmented as the CINC felt necessary. The JTF experienced severe problems with communications, intelligence and C^2. Joint planning was very uncoordinated and the CJTF was not involved in planning until he was selected a mere thirty-nine hours prior to H-hour. Special forces were on the ground for days before the CJTF was assigned or involved.\textsuperscript{6} Most historians agree Urgent Fury was a success. Most also agree it was a very weak performance at the operational level of war. In terms of lives and resources, few would consider it efficient. The point of emphasis is the CINC's lack of preparedness and inability to rapidly field a C^2 organization capable of controlling the forces that were immediately available. In the words of VADM Metcalf, "It is clear that many decisions just 'happened,' and it is this indeterminate, disoriented decision process that will be difficult to represent in model form."\textsuperscript{7} Urgent Fury is a poor 'model' for any military operation but it did produce some valuable lessons.\textsuperscript{*}

**The Gulf War**

When Iraq invaded Kuwait on 2 August 1990, the King of Saudi Arabia quickly accepted an offer of U.S. forces to help defend his country. USCINCCENT coordinated the initial deployment from his headquarters (HQ) in Tampa through a forward headquarters element (FHE) in Saudi Arabia.\textsuperscript{8} The FHE was focused almost entirely on logistical tasks and establishing a C^4I system in theater. The deploying forces were left without centralized

\textsuperscript{*} The 1986 DOD Reorganization Act received much of its impetus from the failure of the Iran hostage rescue mission, Desert One, and lessons learned employing joint forces in Urgent Fury.
operational direction for their tactical missions. The coordination that was accomplished occurred via informal means among the tactical forces on the ground. Pickup ball was the name of the game for the air and sea-based forces as well. There was no true joint warfighting headquarters during the first few weeks of Desert Shield.\(^9\)

Harvesting lessons learned from the hallowed ground of our Persian Gulf experience can be a difficult and unpopular endeavor. When considering Desert Shield, one must avoid being blinded by 'The Storm.' Most accounts of successful operations have a tendency to highlight positive lessons while giving barely a nod to the shortcomings. Desert Shield is no exception. During the buildup phase of the operation, deploying forces were extremely vulnerable. Had Saddam Hussein not permitted the coalition a leisurely six months to prepare, the end result might have been the same but the course would certainly have been very different. As in Urgent Fury, the CINC was unable to field a rapid response joint force under effective control at the operational level of war.\(^6\)

\(^1\) Desert Shield/Desert Storm were not JTFs but the lessons concerning the initial phases of the conflict still serve as useful examples for the purpose of this discussion.
Current Doctrine (The CINC’s Approaches)
Forming a JTF is difficult and the process is the focus of much current debate in the joint community. Every CINC has to deal with this challenge and most deal with it differently. Each approach has unique characteristics and is better suited to some situations than others. Every CINC has demonstrated their ability to stand up a JTF but few have faced the acid test. The following paragraphs describe the current approaches of the five geographic CINCs.

Pacific Command (PACOM)
PACOM has essentially pre-designated three JTFs. The PACOM approach designates the commanders of one of its three service components (7th Fleet, III MEF, or I Corps) as CJTF. The JTF headquarters (HQ) then forms around the component HQ and is augmented by a unit from the CINC’s HQ called the Deployable Joint Task Force Augmentation Cell (DJTFAC). The commander is chosen based on the primary medium of the operation (land, sea or air) and anticipated preponderance of forces. Once deployed, DJTFAC personnel are utilized at the CJTF’s discretion, no longer reporting directly to the CINC. The DJTFAC deploys with a limited C3I package primarily used to ensure connectivity with the CINC HQ and Joint Intelligence Center. Before Deployment, DJTFAC personnel participate in development of the CINC’s activation or warning order. The DJTFAC is designed and trains to integrate in the CJTF planning, logistics, operations and intelligence cells. PACOM conducts three to four exercises a year focused on the operational staff of a contingency JTF and integration of the DJTFAC. The unique aspects of PACOM’s approach are the designated component based JTFs and CINC provided, CJTF owned, augmentation unit.
**European Command (EUCOM)**

EUCOM also orients its JTF structure towards its service components and the CJTF is chosen from the service component having the anticipated preponderance of forces. There ends the similarity between EUCOM and PACOM. EUCOM JTFs are formed around a cadre of CINC HQ personnel most recently referred to as the Joint Planning Cell (JPC).\(^{11}\) The initial planning takes place at EUCOM HQ using JPC and component personnel and may evolve significantly before the CJTF is selected. Joint doctrine suggests the CJTF and his staff should be involved in planning by at least phase III (Course of Action Development) of crisis action planning.\(^{12}\) In EUCOM, the component personnel are integrated as soon as possible but security concerns make this later than would otherwise be desirable. Once the CJTF is selected, he comes to EUCOM with key elements of his staff, then JPC and personnel from other components are placed in directed positions on his staff. The CJTF assumes responsibility for the operation from EUCOM HQ when the CINC feels he is ready. While both use augmentation personnel, the method used to incorporate them into the JTF staff is a key difference between the EUCOM and PACOM approaches. EUCOM also exercises their JTF formation and planning process on a regular basis. As one might expect, training exercises revolve around the EUCOM HQ and senior component personnel and consist of symposiums, seminar wargames, existing component exercises, simulations, and general staff officer training.\(^{13}\) The unique aspects of EUCOM’s approach are; (1) A CINC HQ cadre detailed to the CJTF’s staff, (2) Close hold planning and face-to-face turnover between the CINC HQ and CJTF, and (3) Contingency dependent selection of CJTF from among one of the subordinate components. EUCOM seems to prefer to initially direct a crisis from the CINC HQ. Then, if the CINC desires, a transition is made to the JTF structure.\(^{14}\)
Central Command (CENTCOM)
The CENTCOM approach also revolves around a concept of assigning the CJTF from a lead component with the preponderance of forces and building the JTF around his HQ. Beyond this similarity with the other CINC’s approaches, CENTCOM’s doctrine is much more ad hoc. CENTCOM’s representative at the 1994 National Defense University Symposium on JTFs voiced the CINC’s philosophy: “Building an effective JTF is an art, it is not a science. It must be looked at as a unique entity and constructed accordingly. A task force must be built to fit the specific mission, not just taken off the shelf.”  

Clearly, CENTCOM does not favor a pre-designated JTF structure and maybe for good reason; they have no permanently assigned forces. CENTCOM must rely on one of the other CINCs for forces. Army and Air Force units generally come from USACOM; Navy and Marine Corps forces from USPACOM. This obviously limits the CINC’s ability to pre-designate JTF commanders or core headquarters. The CENTCOM process for building a JTF is not rapid reaction oriented and is based on the theory that, “It doesn’t work to build a JTF and then build a mission to fit it.”  

CENTCOM first defines the general mission, then selects a CJTF from the service whose forces predominate. The CJTF works with CENTCOM HQ to further develop the JTF mission then force requirements are presented to PACOM or ACOM. The CJTF then forms his staff from among the forces provided with augmentation by available members of the CINC’s staff. Alternatively, he may assume command of forces already deployed and be presented a staff consisting of component and CENTCOM personnel. CENTCOM expects a JTF formed around a component staff will initially use the component’s procedures and then evolve into jointness. The unique aspects of CENTCOM’s approach are the focus on selecting an appropriate CJTF then building a task force and its staff from the forces provided
by other CINCs. This is probably by necessity not choice and limits the CINCs ability to train or develop specific doctrine for contingencies. Conspicuous by its absence is a pre-designated augmentation unit or a cadre though a vague concept of augmentation by the CENTCOM staff is part of the plan.\textsuperscript{17} CENTCOM’s approach to JTFs can be appropriately summarized in two words, ad hoc.\textsuperscript{2}

**Southern Command (SOUTHCOM)**
SOUTHCOM will receive only brief mention here since its situation and JTF approach are very similar to CENTCOM’s. Both are almost totally reliant on external providers for forces. SOUTHCOM is unique in one respect. It has several standing JTFs that more closely fit the definition of sub-unified commands. These JTFs have missions that require “conducting operations on a continuing basis in accordance with the criteria set forth for unified commands.”\textsuperscript{18}

**Atlantic Command (ACOM)**
ACOM is responsible for advanced joint warfighting training of most of the forces based in the continental United States (CONUS).\textsuperscript{8} ACOM also packages and provides forces to the other CINCs. As a trainer and force provider, ACOM has taken an innovative approach to joint force training and packaging, but still takes a fairly conventional approach to JTF formation and employment within its area of responsibility (AOR).\textsuperscript{19} ACOM’s approach most closely

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\textsuperscript{1} Though the term ad hoc has gained a negative connotation in JTF parlance, an examination of the dictionary definition reveals an ad hoc JTF might be suitable for many purposes. Defined: ad hoc (ad hok\textsuperscript{1}, hok\textsuperscript{2}) adverb. For the specific purpose, case, or situation at hand and for no other.” Source: Houghton Mifflin Company, The American Heritage Dictionary of the English Language, Third Edition. 1992, on CD ROM: Microsoft Bookshelf, 1994.

\textsuperscript{2} As of 1 October 1993, ACOM gained combatant command of nearly all forces based in the United States.
resembles that of PACOM in that the CJTF and HQ staff would come from one of the six subordinate service components. Two JTFs are actually designated though only one has any substantial pre-assigned forces. JTF-120 is an ‘open ocean’ JTF built around the 2nd Fleet HQ and primarily concerned with NATO missions. It is almost fully staffed and, if employed, would receive little if any augmentation. The second pre-designated JTF (JTF-140) is a largely paper organization designated as the “small island campaign” JTF. In a contingency, ACOM would use JTF-120, the JTF-140 structure filled with component personnel, or create a new designation and form a JTF around one of the component headquarters. The JTF HQ would be augmented by a Deployable Joint Task Force Cadre (DJTFC) which provides various predetermined levels of basic and mission specific joint operational capability. The DJTFC is very similar to the PACOM DJTFC in both concept and training. The unique aspects of the ACOM approach are the two mission oriented pre-designated JTF structures, the augmentation cell, and expanded training opportunities.**

**Summary of the CINC’s Approaches**

Four of the CINC’s approaches are sufficiently similar that they can be placed into two groups. EUCOM’s approach is unique. Throughout the remainder of this paper, the CINC’s approaches to JTF formation are referred to as:

Component Augment -- PACOM and ACOM
Cadre -- EUCOM
Ad Hoc -- CENTCOM and SOUTHCOM

**USACOM HQ and component staffs should arguably be the best trained of all the CINCs thanks to the numerous CONUS based exercises for which ACOM is specifically tasked and funded.**


Alternative Approaches
Are there other approaches that might be better solutions than those currently in use? The following paragraphs attempt to answer this question by suggesting alternative approaches to current doctrine. First though, an attempt will be made to clear up the often misused term Standing JTF.

Defining the Standing JTF
The term ‘standing JTF’ has come to mean different things to different people. The dictionary gives one use of the adjective form of standing as “Remaining in force or use indefinitely: a standing invitation.” This basic definition of standing is commonly understood but what remains in force receives different interpretations. PACOM and ACOM both use pre-designated JTF structures and designate CINC HQ personnel for augmentation units. These JTFs are occasionally referred to as standing JTFs. There are also some JTFs whose enduring mission and length of existence makes them practically permanent. None of these JTFs meets this paper's definition of standing or shares the characteristics of the alternative standing JTF described in the next paragraph.

The Standing JTF Alternative
A true standing JTF would be a force in being, ready to rapidly deploy in a contingency. Two types of standing JTFs are offered as alternatives. The first, a national standing JTF

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11 For example, JTF 4, 5, and 6 and JTF Bravo are referred to as standing JTFs. They are focused on counter-narcotics and Central American issues. These JTFs meet the letter of the UNAAF JTF definition, but do not conform to the spirit of joint doctrine. They should probably be re-designated as sub-unified commands.

12 One standing JTF of the national type described here does exist; the Joint Special Operations Task Force (JSOTF). The JSOTF is a national asset with a highly specialized mission. The JSOTF is too narrowly focused to meet the broad range of contingencies that would be expected of the standing JTF described in this paper. The JSOTF receives a great deal of criticism because of its cost.
(SJTF(N)) would be based in CONUS and capable of rapidly deploying to any theater. The second, a regional, standing JTF (SJTF(R)) would be assigned to a CINC, and employed within his AOR. These conceptual standing JTFs would have permanently assigned commanders, staffs, forces and dedicated equipment and lift. They would also train intensively and maintain a high state of readiness. Both types of standing JTFs would have highly developed and well-exercised C² structures.

**The Standing JTF Headquarters Alternative**
A standing JTF HQ would have a permanently assigned commander and staff but no forces. A robust C⁴I system capable of operating from land, sea or air would be the extent of the equipment permanently assigned. The focus of a standing JTF HQ would be on joint C² and the unit would deploy to assume control of whatever forces were available to handle the crisis. Like a standing JTF, a standing JTF HQ could also be a national or regional asset. The two designations used here will be standing JTF HQ national (SJTFHQ(N)) and standing JTF HQ regional (SJTFHQ(R)). The JTF HQ would provide a smoothly functioning staff, familiar with each other, their commander, and most importantly, joint warfighting. The national version would deploy from CONUS and assume control of forces in theater. A regional JTF HQ would be focused on the CINC’s AOR and provide national redundancy.

**Analytical Method**
The test of a good process is the quality of the product it produces. The various approaches described above were evaluated by comparing the JTFs they would be expected to produce to an ideal. Each approach then received subjective scores. Higher scores indicate that the approach produced a JTF that incorporated more attributes of the ideal characteristics or that
they were present to a greater degree. A score of 10 is ideal; 1 is unacceptable. While this method is admittedly subjective, it does provide some basis for objective comparison. The following terms and their accompanying definitions describe the characteristics of an ideal JTF. The ideal process would produce an ideal JTF that is:

- **Flexible** - Capable of being tailored to and assuming the wide variety of responsibilities, missions, and tasks any conceivable contingency might require, without significant modification.
- **Responsive** - Capable of rapid, effective and efficient deployment and employment.
- **Self-sufficient** - Largely independent, requiring little outside support (e.g., staff).
- **Interoperable** - Possessing a C^4I system that gives the commander seamless connectivity from the NCA to the lowest tactical level.
- **Doctrinally Common** - A force trained and exercised to the same policies, standards, procedures and tactics.
- **Redundant** - The degree to which employing the force limits the ability of the process to meet multiple contingencies while still using the same approach and retaining its other characteristics (applies more to the process than the JTF).
- **Proficient** - Possessing an advanced degree of competence acquired through training in the form intended for employment.
- **Affordable** - In terms of dedicated resources including: personnel, equipment and training over and above that present in the services and the CINC's conventional staff.
Analysis
The overall results are contained in Table 1 and displayed graphically in Figure 1. The graphs in Appendix 1 depict the approach’s scores in each characteristic category. Reference them during the discussion that follows. The results alone provide no clear solution to the problem, but examining the scores and the logic used to develop them will help determine the best JTF formation approach. Additionally, the results will be used to determine which approach(es) might best pass the acid test. In the paragraphs that follow, the seven identified approaches are discussed in the context of the eight measured characteristics.

Table 1 -- Composite Scores

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Approaches</th>
<th>Flexibility</th>
<th>Response Time</th>
<th>Self-Sufficiency</th>
<th>Interoperability</th>
<th>Doctrinal Commonality</th>
<th>Proficiency</th>
<th>Redundancy</th>
<th>Affordability</th>
<th>Composite Score</th>
<th>Percent of Total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Component Augment</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>53</td>
<td>66%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cadre</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>41</td>
<td>51%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ad Hoc</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>39</td>
<td>49%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SJTF(N)</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>50</td>
<td>63%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SJTF(R)</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>58</td>
<td>58</td>
<td>73%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SJTFHQ(N)</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>50</td>
<td>63%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>STJFHQ(R)</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>59</td>
<td>59</td>
<td>74%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Flexibility
The Ad Hoc approach scored well since it can obviously be completely flexible. Cadre and SJTFHQ(R) are also flexible approaches. Component Augment and SJTFHQ(N) remain reasonably flexible though their pre-determined large scale structures were judged somewhat
constraining. Both SJTF approaches might require significant modification depending on the contingency and received well below average scores.

**Response Time**
A SJTF(R) would have a superior response time due to its standing nature and positioning near potential, regional hot spots. A SJTFHQ(R) would also benefit from location but response time would suffer slightly due to the time required to identify and assemble forces. Response time for SJTFHQ(N) might be reduced further by its remote location and the time required for identification of forces. Component Augment would suffer a similar amount due to the time required to assemble and integrate the staff and C⁴I infrastructure. Cadre would be extremely slow to respond while the staff formed, was brought up to speed on prior planning, and forces were identified. Cadre would also suffer during initial employment since staff members might not be familiar with each other or the commander. Ad Hoc was judged unacceptable for crisis response due to the delay associated with building the JTF from scratch.

**Self-Sufficiency**
Self-Sufficiency is implicit in the standing nature of both SJTF(N) and SJTF(R) and they received perfect scores. The standing HQ approaches SJTFHQ(N) and SJTFHQ(R) were judged only slightly less self-sufficient. They would command external forces and, might require some augmentation by regional or national intelligence or communications equipment and personnel. Prior designation of the augmentation personnel for Component Augment would mitigate their loss, but the CINC HQ staff would still be without their services for the duration of the contingency. Both Cadre and Ad Hoc received low marks since they might
require substantial augmentation from the CINC staff. This might substantially impact the CINC’s ability to conduct his other missions. Cadre was further downgraded because it often violates the principle of centralized control and decentralized execution. This occurs because the CINC’s staff is intimately and continuously involved in the employment of the JTF.

**Interoperability**
A force that trains together continuously, with its own equipment, in the anticipated area of operations, will be the most interoperable. Only SJTF(R) met these criteria and received a perfect score. SJTF(N) was slightly downgraded due to its location; SJTFHQ(R) due to its lack of organic forces. SJTFHQ(N) shared both disadvantages and was further downgraded. Component Augment would be even less interoperable since the augment unit could not train continuously and would be partially reliant on the service component’s C4I architecture. Cadre suffers for the same reason but to a greater degree. Though the exact impact was difficult to quantify and situation dependent, Ad Hoc was severely downgraded due to the inability to predict its interoperability and thus its effectiveness.

**Doctrinal Commonality**
Standing forces again received high marks since by design they are doctrinally common. SJTF(N) and SJTF(R) received perfect scores. SJTFHQ(R) would be expected to suffer slightly when integrated with regional forces, and SJTFHQ(N) would be more subject to doctrine incompatibilities when integrated with global forces. Though the commander would be pre-designated and the staff would be fixed, the SJTFHQs would hopefully be so focused on joint warfighting that they could effectively employ any of the Nation’s forces at the operational level of war. Component Augment would rely heavily on national joint doctrine
but be bolstered by common, CINC specific doctrine and its regular exercise by designated personnel. Cadre shares the Component Augment detractors and received an even lower mark because of its inability to pre-determine the general JTF structure and exercise it. Once again, Ad Hoc was severely downgraded due to the unpredictability and risk that is inherent in this approach.

**Proficiency**
The high scores for standing forces reflect an expectation that they would be inherently proficient. In fact, the proficiency score translates directly to the degree to which the approach pre-designates or identifies the members of the JTF staff and operating forces. As might be expected, except for Cadre and Ad Hoc, all the scores are fairly high. Desert Storm is the perfect example of an Ad Hoc joint force (though not a JTF), requiring months to become proficient.

**Redundancy**
One of the biggest detractors of a standing force approach to JTF formation is its lack of redundancy. Committing the force creates a void the approach is unprepared to fill if another contingency should arise. Ad Hoc, since it forms the JTF exclusively from available forces, provides maximum redundancy and received the highest score in this category. With Ad Hoc, the same approach can be used to form multiple JTFs until no more forces are available. In contrast, a single standing force would have little redundancy so SJTF(N) and SJTFHQ(N) received low marks. They were not scored as unacceptable because it would be feasible (though probably not desirable) to create multiple standing national organizations. Regional standing approaches, SJTF(R) and SJTFHQ(R) would be slightly more redundant since
several of the CINCs would have these organizations if the approach were accepted as joint doctrine. Component Augment could be significantly more redundant than a standing HQ. Because of their size and scope, the CINC could form multiple augment units. Cadre was considered slightly more redundant than a standing HQ but less redundant than Component Augment. This is because the personnel are selected for each crisis (vice pre-designated) from key positions on the CINCs staff, an approach that could significantly impact the CINCs staff during multiple crises.

**Affordability**

Despite their other attractive attributes, standing forces like SJTF(N) or SJTF(R) are probably not affordable in an era of declining budgetary resources. Both approaches received unacceptable affordability scores. The two SJTFHQ approaches also received low to midrange scores. SJTFHQ(R) was scored the higher of the two because of the expectation some of the equipment could be drawn from the CINC’s current contingency items and some training could be accomplished during existing regional exercises. Component Augment, Cadre and Ad Hoc all use increasingly fewer dedicated resources and received increasingly higher scores. Ad Hoc presumably would use little or no dedicated equipment and thus be the most affordable.

**Analytical Summary**

Regionally based standing elements, SJTF(R) and SJTFHQ(R), received the highest composite scores in the comparison. The regionally based Component Augment approach was next, followed closely by the nationally based standing elements, SJTF(N) and SJTFHQ(N). Both Cadre and Ad Hoc received relatively low scores and fail the acid test.
because of their poor to unacceptable response times. The nationally based approaches are undesirable, despite their solid scores in other areas, because of their cost and inadequate redundancy. The two most balanced approaches are Component Augment and SJTFHQ(R). These two approaches received solid scores in almost every area and received no unacceptable marks. Both are acceptable approaches to JTF formation and would be capable of meeting the acid test.

Figure 1 - Graph of Composite Scores

![Graph of Composite Scores]

Conclusions
An examination of history showed the need to improve response to crises at the operational level of war. Excellence at operational art will be imperative in crises involving immediate
commitment of forces to hostilities. JTFs have become and will probably remain the combatant commander’s command option of choice, but joint doctrine provides little specific guidance on the JTF formation process. This paper analyzed the geographic CINC’s current approaches and some possible alternatives to JTF formation. The deficiencies revealed in some current approaches indicate additional joint guidance is appropriate. A regionally based, dedicated contingency staff that combines in a crisis with the CINC’s subordinate component HQ and forces is clearly the best approach. This approach will ensure the JTF’s C² structure is formed quickly and efficiently. It is the only approach that can pass the acid test of warfighting; effective operational leadership of forces immediately committed to combat.

**Recommendations**
The Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS) and CINCs should re-examine JTF doctrine and the approaches to JTF formation using the criteria and results in this paper. The following are specific recommendations.

- Each CINC should form a dedicated contingency staff that exercises regularly (as a JTF) with the CINC’s service component headquarters and forces.
- The contingency staff should be resourced with dedicated personnel, equipment and training to the maximum degree practicable. The degree to which this is accomplished will be a function of resources available, but the goal should be a standing, independent unit like the SJTFHQ(R) described in this paper.
• The CINCs should use care not to make the augmentation unit or standing HQ a critical node of their JTF formation process. Multiple crises may arise simultaneously which would require multiple contingency staffs.

• If tension levels and resources allow, the CINCs should form a minimum of two standing contingency staffs. If this redundancy is not desirable due to resources available, other approaches to JTF formation should be established. A backup approach will be necessary if a second crisis arises and the unit has already been committed. It may also be desirable before the unit is committed if the nature of the crisis and time allows. Alternatively, another CINC should receive the mission.

• The JCS should review the JTF formation process and provide additional doctrine and procedural guidance in joint publications. Current doctrine and procedures are too diverse and, in some contingencies, would prove inadequate.

NOTES


6 Stewart, pp. 24-29


9 Ross, p.23


16 Ibid.

17 Ibid.


Bibliography


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