Programming and Accounting for Nondeployable Selected Reserve Personnel

Isidore M. Greenberg
David A. Smith
Programming and Accounting for Nondeployable Selected Reserve Personnel

RA202R1

Isidore M. Greenberg
David A. Smith

Prepared pursuant to Department of Defense Contract MDA903-90-C-0006. The views expressed here are those of the Logistics Management Institute at the time of issue but not necessarily those of the Department of Defense. Permission to quote or reproduce any part except for government purposes must be obtained from the Logistics Management Institute.

Logistics Management Institute
6400 Goldsboro Road
Bethesda, Maryland 20817-5886
Executive Summary

The Congress, as part of the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 1993 legislated a series of reform initiatives for the Army National Guard. Many of these initiatives were prompted by events experienced during the Desert Shield/Desert Storm operation. A portion of this legislation directed the Army National Guard to take the following actions regarding nondeployable members:

- Establish a personnel accounting category for personnel who have not completed the minimum training for deployment, do not meet the physical standards for deployment, or are otherwise unavailable for deployment.

- Carry nondeployable members in the personnel account instead of assigning them to fill positions in units.

- No later than 90 days after the determination is made, transfer to the personnel account those members who have been determined not to meet the minimum physical profile standards required for deployment.

- Design the personnel account to be compatible with the Army National Guard's decentralized personnel system.

- Do not use this account as a factor in establishing force structure levels.

The Secretary of Defense was directed to assess the feasibility of implementing these provisions for all six reserve components and to submit an implementation plan.

The Assistant Secretary of Defense (Reserve Affairs) asked the Logistics Management Institute to consider whether the congressional provisions regarding nondeployable personnel should be applied to the other reserve components, examine other approaches suggested by the reserve components, and compare reserve component practice with personnel accounting procedures in the active forces.

1 Members of the reserve components or active forces are "nondeployable" when they cannot — for any of a variety of reasons — be sent to a location outside of the United States and its territories and possessions.
The active forces' manpower accounting system uses a personnel account called "Individuals" for personnel who are not under the control of force structure units. Personnel in the Individuals account include transients, trainees/students, holdees, and cadets/midshipmen. Personnel in this category do not fill billets in units and are not deployable. When developing the annual manpower program for the active forces, the Services allocate manpower authorizations to force structure units and reserve a portion of the total manpower authorization for the Individuals account. In FY93, the personnel that the active forces programmed for the Individuals account represented 12.6 percent of total active duty strengths.

In contrast, in the reserve components, most Selected Reserve members are assigned to units and to billets within those units. When developing the annual manpower program for their reserve components, the Services allocate all manpower authorizations to force structure units. No authorizations are set aside for a personnel account similar to the active forces' Individuals account. However, the reserve components do use codes to identify and track personnel who are untrained; these untrained personnel constitute a major proportion of total Selected Reserve nondeployables.

We recommend that the following changes be made for all reserve components:

1. **Improve Identification of Nondeployable Personnel.** Existing category codes for the Reserve Components Common Personnel Data System identify about 58,000 nondeployables — primarily enlisted personnel who have not completed initial training. We recommend changes that would increase the identified nondeployables to about 66,000 (6.3 percent of end strength), mostly by including long-term physically disabled, those in advanced medical education, and members unable to deploy because of judicial restraints.

2. **Establish a Personnel Account in Each Reserve Component for the Assignment of Nondeployables, Instead of Assigning Them to Billets in Force Structure Units.** Personnel accounts for nondeployable enlisted trainees have been used successfully for many years in the Naval Reserve, the Marine Corps Reserve, and the Air National Guard. These accounts can be broadened to include other nondeployable personnel, and the Congress has directed the Army National Guard to establish such an account. Implementing this recommendation would require the Army Reserve and the Air Force Reserve to follow suit and would make Selected Reserve accounting more comparable to that of the active forces.

3. **Provide Additional Manpower and Funds, or Else Reduce the Force Structure of the Selected Reserve.** The billets in force structure units vacated by the transfer of nondeployables to the personnel account will remain vacant unless additional resources are provided or the force structure is reduced. Although the Congress has stated that the establishment of a personnel account for nondeployables should not be a factor in establishing reserve force structure levels,

---

2 Patients, prisoners, and personnel being separated.
# Programming and Accounting for Nondeployable Reserve Personnel

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>1. AGENCY USE ONLY (Leave Blank)</th>
<th>2. REPORT DATE</th>
<th>3. REPORT TYPE AND DATES COVERED</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>March 1994</td>
<td>Final</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>4. TITLE AND SUBTITLE</th>
<th>5. FUNDING NUMBERS</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Programming and Accounting for Nondeployable Reserve Personnel</td>
<td>C MDA903-90-C-0006</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>PE 0902198D</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>6. AUTHOR(S)</th>
<th>6. PERFORMING ORGANIZATION REPORT NUMBER</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Isidore M. Greenberg</td>
<td>LMI- RA202R1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>David A. Smith</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>7. PERFORMING ORGANIZATION NAME(S) AND ADDRESS(ES)</th>
<th>7. SPONSORING/MONITORING AGENCY NAME(S) AND ADDRESS(ES)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Logistics Management Institute</td>
<td>Office of Secretary of Defense (OSD/RA)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6400 Goldsboro Road</td>
<td>Mr. Wayne Spruell</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bethesda, MD 20817-5886</td>
<td>Room 2D517, The Pentagon</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(703) 695-7429</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>9. SPONSORING/MONITORING AGENCY NAME(S) AND ADDRESS(ES)</th>
<th>10. SPONSORING/MONITORING AGENCY REPORT NUMBER</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Office of Secretary of Defense (OSD/RA)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mr. Wayne Spruell</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Room 2D517, The Pentagon</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(703) 695-7429</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>11. SUPPLEMENTARY NOTES</th>
</tr>
</thead>
</table>

12a. DISTRIBUTION/AVAILABILITY STATEMENT

A: Approved for public release; distribution unlimited

12b. DISTRIBUTION CODE

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>13. ABSTRACT (Maximum 200 words)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>The Congress, as part of the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 1993 legislated a series of reform initiatives for the Army national Guard, many of which were prompted by the Desert Shield/Desert Storm operations.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The National Guard was directed to establish a personnel account for nondeployable personnel who have not completed the minimum training for deployment, do not meet the physical standards for deployment, or are otherwise unavailable for deployment. The Congress also directed the Secretary of Defense to assess the feasibility of implementing these provisions for all six reserve components.

LMI was asked by the Assistant Secretary of Defense (Reserve Affairs) to consider whether the congressional provisions regarding nondeployable personnel should be applied to the other reserve components, and compare reserve component practices with personnel accounting procedures in the active forces.

Recommendations were made to: improve identification of nondeployable personnel; establish a personnel account in each reserve component for the assignment of nondeployables; and provide additional manpower or funds, else reduce the force structure of the Selected Reserve to compensate for establishing the personnel accounts.

14. SUBJECT TERMS

15. NUMBER OF PAGES

16. PRICE CODE

17. SECURITY CLASSIFICATION OF REPORT

Unclassified

18. SECURITY CLASSIFICATION OF THIS PAGE

Unclassified

19. SECURITY CLASSIFICATION OF ABSTRACT

Unclassified

20. LIMITATION OF ABSTRACT

UL
improving the readiness of reserve units is not a free good. The choice is either to provide additional resources or to have a somewhat smaller but readier force structure.

4. Take Action to Reduce the Number of Nondeployables. The categories of nondeployables that we recommend be identified in the personnel accounting system and transferred to personnel accounts are not all-inclusive. For example, we omitted those who are temporarily physically disqualified and those who are unable to deploy because of family hardships. We recommend actions to reduce the number of such nondeployables who will not be tracked in the personnel systems.
Contents

Executive Summary ................................................................. iii

Chapter 1. Introduction ......................................................... 1-1

Chapter 2. Description of the Problem .................................... 2-1
  Deployment of Reserve Components to the Persian Gulf .......... 2-1
  General Accounting Office Report ..................................... 2-3
  Army National Guard Combat Readiness Reform Act of 1992 ..... 2-4
  Differences Between Active Force and Reserve Component
  Personnel Accounting Procedures .................................... 2-5
    Active Forces “Individuals” Account ............................... 2-5
    Reserve Components “Pipeline” Accounting ..................... 2-6
  Previous Attempts to Change the Selected Reserve Personnel
  Accounting System ..................................................... 2-9
  Analytical Approach to the Study .................................... 2-11

Chapter 3. Identifying Nondeployables ................................... 3-1
  Reserve Personnel Who Should Be Identified as
  Nondeployables ....................................................... 3-1
    Untrained Personnel ................................................ 3-1
    Personnel Who Do Not Meet the Minimum Physical
    Profile Standards Required for Deployment .................. 3-9
    Personnel Who Are Otherwise Not Available for
    Deployment .......................................................... 3-11
  Reserve Personnel Who Should Not Be Identified as
  Nondeployables ..................................................... 3-12
    Members Absent From Units to Attend Lengthy
    Advanced Training ................................................. 3-12
    Members Who Transfer from Unit to Unit ....................... 3-13
    Full-Time Support (FTS) Personnel Transferring from
    Unit to Unit on a Permanent Change of Station (PCS) .... 3-14
Contents (Continued)

Members Who Become Unsatisfactory Participants .............. 3-14
USNR Members in “In-Assignment Processing” (IAP) Status ..................................................... 3-15
Accounting and Data Base Changes Required to Identify Nondeployables .................................. 3-15
Nondeployable Codes Summarized ................................. 3-16
Comparison of Individuals Account and Reserve Components Nondeployables .......... 3-17
Nondeployables Recommended To Be Identified .............. 3-18

Chapter 4. Organization and Administration of the Nondeployable Personnel Account .............................................. 4-1
Introduction ......................................................................... 4-1
Should the Reserve Components Other than the ARNG Also Establish a Personnel Account for Nondeployables? ........... 4-1
Advantages of Personnel Accounts for Nondeployables ...... 4-3
Consideration of Objections to Establishing a Personnel Account for Nondeployables ................................. 4-3
How to Organize and Administer Nondeployable Personnel Accounts .................................................. 4-4
Current Organization Models .................................................. 4-4
Possible Models for Nondeployable Personnel Accounts ...... 4-4

Chapter 5. Allocating Manpower Authorizations .................... 5-1

Chapter 6. Alternatives and Recommendations .................... 6-1
Alternative #1 — Improve Identification of Nondeployable Personnel (Chapter 3) .............................................. 6-1
Alternative #2 — Assign Identified Nondeployables to a Personnel Account (Chapter 4) ........................................... 6-2
Alternative #3 — Adjust Force Structure Authorizations to the Planned Supply of Trained and Deployable Personnel (Chapter 5) ......................................................... 6-3
Contents (Continued)

Alternative 3A — Increase Authorized End Strength and Funds ........................................ 6-3
Alternative 3B — Reduce Unit Force Structure ......................................................... 6-3
LMI Recommendations ......................................................................................... 6-4

Appendix A. Title XI — Army Guard Combat Reform Initiative:

Appendix B. Correspondence Regarding Previous Attempts to Change the Selected Reserve Personnel Accounting System
CHAPTER 1

Introduction

The military manpower programming and accounting systems for the reserve components\(^1\) differ from those for the active forces. The active military manpower system distinguishes between personnel whose availability for duty is controllable by a unit installation or senior local commander and those not under the control of unit commanders. Those not under the control of unit commanders do not fill billets in units and are treated in a separate accounting category, called "Individuals"\(^2\) to identify the nonunit manpower. This account is subdivided into four major subaccounts: Transients, Trainees/Students, Holdees,\(^3\) and Cadets/Midshipmen.

When developing the annual manpower program for the active forces, the Services allocate manpower authorizations to the force structure (units) and make a separate Individuals account allocation based on an estimate of the number of personnel who will be transients, trainees/students, holdees, and cadets/midshipmen.

In the reserve components, no such distinction is made. With few exceptions, their personnel are assigned to reserve units and to billets within those units. A centralized manpower account for personnel in situations similar to those in the active force Individuals account does not exist.

In other words, when developing the annual manpower program for the reserve components, the Services allocate all manpower authorizations to the force structure (units)—no authorizations are set aside for any Individuals account. Personnel who would be in the separate Individuals account if they were in the active forces are assigned to billets in force units in the reserve components. This difference distorts comparisons between active force and reserve component units with regard to their effective personnel strengths.

\(^1\)The term "reserve components" applies to the six DoD guard and reserve organizations: Army National Guard (ARNG), U.S. Army Reserve (USAR), U.S. Naval Reserve (USNR), U.S. Marine Corps Reserve (USMCR), Air National Guard (ANG), and U.S. Air Force Reserve (USAFR).

\(^2\)The term "Individuals" applies to an active force personnel accounting category and should not be confused with the title "Individual Ready Reserve," which refers to a category of reserve manpower.

\(^3\)Patients, prisoners, and personnel being separated.
The reserve component personnel accounting procedure is administratively simple — unit commanders control all personnel assigned to the unit, including those not available for deployment. While attractive for its simplicity, this system causes problems, which were highlighted by the unit mobilizations required for Desert Shield/Desert Storm operations in 1990 and 1991. Mobilized units required replacements for untrained and physically disqualified personnel who were filling unit billets. While trainees — those who had not completed basic and initial skill training — were readily identified for replacement, a large number of physically disqualified personnel were not so identified and ended up reporting to mobilization stations. Replacements for trainees and for physically disqualified personnel were provided by cannibalization from other reserve units, from portions of the same unit that were not mobilized, and from the Individual Ready Reserve (IRR).

As a result of the problems experienced during Desert Shield/Desert Storm, the Congress directed the ARNG to establish a personnel account similar to the active forces’ Individuals account to categorize members who have not completed the minimum training required, who are not physically qualified, or who are otherwise not available for deployment. These members would not be permitted to fill billets in National Guard units. The Congress additionally directed the Secretary of Defense to assess the feasibility of implementing the same provisions for all reserve components.

In response to the congressional direction, and as part of a continuing OSD effort to improve military manpower management, the Assistant Secretary of Defense (Reserve Affairs) [ASD(RA)] asked the Logistics Management Institute (LMI) to study reserve component nondeployable manpower to determine whether programming and accounting for Selected Reserve nondeployable manpower should be revised to be more comparable to that for the active forces, and to standardize procedures among the reserve components. The specific tasks include the following:

- Evaluate the costs, benefits, and feasibility of the changes to the reserve component manpower programming and accounting procedures to meet the direction of the Congress.
- Evaluate other approaches suggested by the reserve components.

Chapter 2 discusses the problems concerning nondeployables identified during the Desert Shield/Desert Storm operation, legislation passed to correct those problems, differences between active force and reserve component personnel accounting practices, and previous attempts to change the Selected Reserve personnel accounting system.

---

4 There are exceptions. In the USNR and USMCR, trainees are not assigned to units or unit billets until completing initial active duty training (IADT). In the ANG, trainees are assigned to separate “student flights” associated with units to which they will be assigned after they complete training.
Chapter 3 discusses which nondeployable personnel should be identified in personnel reports and the necessary coding and data base changes.

Chapter 4 considers whether a nondeployable personnel account should be established in the ARNG only or in all reserve components and discusses alternative ways to organize and administer such an account.

Chapter 5 discusses alternative ways to adjust manpower authorizations and force structure to reap the benefits of establishing a personnel account for nondeployables.

Chapter 6 presents our recommendations.

We have prepared two appendices:

CHAPTER 2

Description of the Problem

DEPLOYMENT OF RESERVE COMPONENTS TO THE PERSIAN GULF

A significant number of personnel assigned to Selected Reserve units mobilized for the 1990 – 1991 Persian Gulf war were unable to deploy overseas. The reasons for nondeployability included initial training not completed, temporary or permanent physical disabilities, and a variety of personal reasons such as family hardship. While the nondeployability problem can be ameliorated to some extent by better peacetime screening, much of it is caused by the personnel accounting system. This report focuses on ways to improve that system.

Operation Desert Shield/Desert Storm represented the largest U.S. military action since the Vietnam war and the largest mobilization of reserve members and forces since the Korean war. During Desert Shield/Desert Storm, the United States deployed about 540,000 active and reserve personnel to the Persian Gulf. As shown in Table 2-1, approximately 106,000 of these personnel, or about 20 percent, were activated reserves, and a total of 228,561 reservists had been mobilized as of mid-March 1991 (this being the highest number of reservists on active duty during the operation). These numbers are shown by reserve component.

As reflected in the table, 17.6 percent of DoD’s Selected Reserve was mobilized for the operation. The Marine Corps mobilized the greatest percentage of its Selected Reserve, 54.6 percent, while the Navy mobilized the smallest percentage, 12.5 percent. Overall, a number equal to some 9 percent of the Selected Reserve was actually deployed (this number includes an unknown number of mobilized IRR members). The Army reserve components deployed the highest number, 73,373, and the Navy the smallest number, 6,796, both numbers including an unknown number of mobilized IRR members.
Table 2-1. Reserve and National Guard Members Mobilized and Deployed for Desert Shield/Desert Storm — August 1990 Through March 1991

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Reserve component</th>
<th>Guard and Reserve actual end strength 30 September 1990</th>
<th>Number mobilized for Desert Shield/Desert Storm</th>
<th>Total number deployed*</th>
<th>Percent of strength mobilized</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>SelRes</td>
<td>IRR/ING</td>
<td>SelRes</td>
<td>IRR/ING</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Army National Guard and Reserve (ARNG &amp; USAR)</td>
<td>754,295</td>
<td>295,284</td>
<td>126,031</td>
<td>17,180</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Naval Reserve (USNR)</td>
<td>152,789</td>
<td>87,439</td>
<td>19,104</td>
<td>15</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Marine Corps Reserve (USMCR)</td>
<td>44,530</td>
<td>36,825</td>
<td>24,309</td>
<td>6,239</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Air National Guard and Air Force Reserve (ANG &amp; USAFR)</td>
<td>201,599</td>
<td>68,714</td>
<td>33,851</td>
<td>842</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Subtotal (DoD)</strong></td>
<td>1,153,213</td>
<td>488,262</td>
<td>203,295</td>
<td>24,276</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Coast Guard Reserve</td>
<td>12,123</td>
<td>5,109</td>
<td>990</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total</strong></td>
<td>1,165,336</td>
<td>493,371</td>
<td>204,285</td>
<td>24,276</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


**Notes:** SelRes = Selected Reserve; IRR = Individual Ready Reserve; ING = Inactive National Guard.

*The Services did not track or report the numbers of SelRes as opposed to IRR members deployed.

*Less than 1.0 percent.

*Highest number of reservists on active duty during Operation Desert Shield/Desert Storm.

The mobilization and deployment of reserve forces were accomplished successfully. Two factors contributed to this success:

1. Only 17.5 percent of the total Selected Reserve was mobilized, and only about 9 percent was deployed. Although there were minor shortages of some types of units and of some skills, sufficient personnel assets were available from units or parts of units that were not mobilized or deployed to compensate for nondeployable personnel. Cross-leveling was used extensively, especially in the Army reserve components, to fill personnel shortages. This process degraded the capability of the units that provided fillers, but fortunately those units were not needed.

2. Although some units were mobilized and deployed rapidly, within the first few weeks, overall the mobilization and deployment took place over several months. Sufficient time was available to correct for the personnel shortages caused by the assignment of nondeployables to units.

These favorable conditions may not exist in a future war requiring the mobilization and deployment of a much larger proportion of the Selected Reserve in much less time.
In 1992, the GAO, responding to a House Armed Services Committee request, reported on the nondeployable problem in the active forces and reserve components during Operation Desert Shield/Desert Storm. The summary stated in part that:

A number of active and reserve personnel were unable to deploy for Operations Desert Shield and Storm. However, the lack of complete and comparable data makes it impossible to develop a reliable estimate of the total number of nondeployable personnel. Moreover, any numbers cited would not reflect the potential for additional nondeployables that were minimized or masked by varying degrees of prescreening to avoid such problems, and the special packaging of forces by the services for Operations Desert Shield and Storm.

Indications of nondeployable problems came from various reports and records of observation by military personnel directly involved with the packaging and deployment of forces. The causes of nondeployability ranged from incomplete training to varying medical conditions or personal problems. Some nondeployable situations were temporary while others were long-term or permanent. It is reasonable to expect that the services would have some nondeployable personnel at any one time, and the Department of Defense (DoD) said nondeployables were not considered a serious problem because the services were able to replace them with other personnel. Nevertheless, available data indicates the number of nondeployables was sizable.

Data available suggests that nondeployability problems were exacerbated by systemic weaknesses in the peacetime screening of active and reserve personnel and inadequate reporting of nondeployables as part of normal readiness reporting. Action is needed to minimize future recurrences, particularly when there will be fewer active and reserve forces from which to tailor and substitute personnel to meet force requirements.¹

Two of the findings of the report are especially pertinent to this study:

Three National Guard combat brigades were not deployed pending further training after activation. About 33 percent of the brigades’ personnel were also found to have deployability problems because of dental conditions or incomplete dental records when they reported to their mobilization stations.

Nearly 23 percent of the assigned strength of units of an Army Reserve Command were nondeployable for a variety of reasons—a lack of training being the major reason.

The GAO report focused on the need to improve the prescreening of nondeployables. The Army National Guard Combat Readiness Reform Act of 1992² requires ARNG members to undergo medical and dental screening on an annual basis and to receive a full physical examination not less often than every 2 years for those over the age of 40. The Secretary of the Army is also required to develop a plan to ensure that units of the ARNG scheduled for early deployment in


the event of mobilization are dentally ready for deployment. The Department of Defense will report to the Congress whether or not these provisions should apply to other reserve components.

In contrast to the GAO report, this LMI report deals primarily with the personnel accounting provisions of the ARNG Combat Readiness Reform Act.

ARMY NATIONAL GUARD COMBAT READINESS
REFORM ACT OF 1992

The Congress, as part of the FY93 DoD Authorization Act, legislated a series of reform initiatives for the ARNG. Much of this act was prompted by the experience of the National Guard during the Desert Shield/Desert Storm operation. A portion of the act is pertinent to LMI’s study of nondeployable personnel in the Selected Reserve (see Appendix A for complete text). In summary, material in Sections 1115, 1116, 1117, and 1137 does the following:

- Requires the ARNG to establish a personnel accounting category for personnel who

  - have not completed the minimum training required for deployment,
  - do not meet the minimum physical profile standards for deployment, or
  - are otherwise not available for deployment.

- Directs the ARNG to

  - design the personnel account to be compatible with the Guard’s decentralized personnel system;
  - not assign nondeployable members to fill positions in a unit but instead carry them in this personnel account;
  - discharge those members who have not completed, within 24 months, the minimum training required for deployment;
  - within 90 days of the determination, transfer to the personnel account those members who have been determined not to meet the minimum physical profile standards required for deployment; and
  - not use the implementation of this account as a factor in establishing the level of Army Guard and Reserve force structure.

---

3Title XI of the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 1993. Sections 1115 and 1116. See Appendix A for complete text.
Calls for the Secretary of Defense to

- assess the concept of implementing a nondeployable account for all reserve components, and
- submit a report not later than 31 December 1993 containing a plan for such implementation.

To permit a better appreciation of the implications of these provisions, we next compare active and reserve accounting procedures.

**Differences Between Active Force and Reserve Component Personnel Accounting Procedures**

**Active Forces “Individuals” Account**

DoD Instruction (DoDI) 1120.11\(^4\) establishes uniform policies, procedures, and definitions for active force military manpower accounting and programming. That instruction was the culmination of several years' work in the 1970s to improve and standardize Service practices for programming and reporting active force military manpower. It established the active force Individuals accounts and provided the rules for managing personnel in those accounts. A parallel instruction covering reserve component military manpower in similar categories has never been prepared.

The programming and accounting system for the active forces that is set out in the instruction distinguishes between personnel whose availability for duty is controllable by a unit installation or senior local commander and those not under the control of unit commanders. People in this latter category are treated in a separate accounting category and do not fill billets in units. This account, called “Individuals” to identify the nonunit manpower, is divided into four major subaccounts — Transients, Trainees/Students, Holdees, and Cadets/Midshipmen — described as follows:\(^5\)

- **Transients:** Military members not available for duty while executing permanent change of station (PCS) orders. Transients comprise all personnel in a travel, proceed, leave enroute, or temporary duty enroute status while on PCS orders to execute an accession, separation, training, operation, or rotational move.

- **Trainees/Students:** Military members not available for duty while attending formal courses of instruction in a PCS status or in a temporary duty status

\(^4\)DoDI 1120.11. *Programming and Accounting for Active Military Manpower*. 9 April 1981.

while executing a PCS move. Trainees generally are those who have not completed initial entry training, while students are those taking courses after initial entry training. Initial entry training consists of basic training and initial skill training.

- **Hodels:** Military members dropped from the assigned strength of a force structure unit and attached to a "holding" activity because of nonavailability as a result of medical, disciplinary, or preseparation status. These personnel are patients, prisoners, and separatees. Patients are members who have medical problems for 90 days or more serious enough to preclude their deployment (Navy personnel scheduled for sea duty are classified as patients if their medical problems are expected to last 30 days or more).

- **Cadets/Midshipmen:** Student members of the three Military Service academies.

When developing the annual manpower program for the active forces, the Services allocate manpower authorizations to the force structure (units) and make a separate allocation for the Individuals account. The allocation for the Individuals account is based on an estimate of the number of personnel who will be transients, trainees/students, hodels, and cadets/midshipmen.

In FY93, the numbers of personnel that the active forces programmed for the Individuals accounts amounted to 217,100 out of a planned end strength of 1,728,300, or about 12.6 percent of the total active duty strength.$^6$

Reserve Components "Pipeline" Accounting

The reserve components do not distinguish between personnel who would be in an Individuals account (as in the active forces) and those assigned to force structure units. With few exceptions, reserve personnel are assigned to reserve units and to billets within those units.$^7$ A manpower account for personnel in situations similar to those in the active force Individuals account does not exist.

When developing the annual manpower program for the reserve components, the Services allocate all manpower authorizations to the force structure (units). No authorizations are set aside for any Individuals account. In other words, personnel who would be in a separate Individuals account if they were in the active forces are assigned to force units in the reserve components.

The reserve components identify and track some of these personnel in their personnel data systems and report them in the Reserve Components Common Personnel Data System (RCCPDS), maintained by the Defense Manpower Data Center (DMDC) in Monterey, California. This reporting to DMDC is, however,

---


$^7$ In the ANG, USMCR, and USNR, personnel who have not completed initial training are not assigned to force structure units.
limited to untrained personnel in the training "pipeline." It consists of reservists in or awaiting training in the following four categories.\(^8\)

\* Personnel awaiting entry in IADT: personnel enlisted and scheduled for IADT on a subsequent date.

\* Personnel currently attending IADT: personnel actually in basic training, subsequent skill training, the second half of split training, and/or Army one-station unit training (OSUT).\(^9\)

\* Personnel awaiting the second part of split training and/or Army OSUT. These courses are often offered in subsequent summers for members who are in high school or college.

\* Personnel in other training programs. These are Selected Reserve untrained officer or enlisted members in other training programs, including chaplains, medical, health professional stipend, and early commission programs.

The law (10 U.S.C. 671) states that "A member of the armed forces may not be assigned to active duty on land outside the United States and its territories and possessions until the member has completed the basic training requirements of the armed force of which he is a member." Additionally, it states that "In time of war or national emergency declared by Congress or the President, the period of required basic training (or its equivalent) may not be less than 12 weeks."\(^10\)

Both the active and reserve components have large numbers of recruits who have not completed initial training. In the active forces, those who have not completed initial training are carried in the Individuals account and are not assigned to operating units. This procedure enables the operating unit to fill all positions with trained personnel. As shown in Table 2-2, on 30 September 1990, just before the Desert Shield mobilizations, there were in the reserve components 77,146 untrained personnel — those who had not completed initial training. On 30 September 1993, this number was 19,727 smaller, mostly because of force reductions, and represented 5.4 percent of the total Selected Reserve strength. (These numbers are based on current definitions and codes for untrained personnel.)

In the ARNG, USAR, and USAFR, untrained personnel are assigned to force structure billets. In the USNR, USMCR, and ANG, they are assigned to training accounts and not to force structure units. In September 1993, 85 percent of the 57,419 untrained personnel were assigned to force structure billets in the ARNG, USAR, and USAFR. Those 48,736 reservists are not deployable. Substitute

---


\(^9\) OSUT courses are integrated recruit and initial skill training courses. In FY93 and FY94 there will be 49 different OSUT courses in six major skill areas. They require less training time than the separate recruit and initial skill training courses they replaced.

\(^10\) The term "basic training" used in the law has been interpreted by the military Services to include both basic training and initial skill training. Both parts of the initial training are required to meet job qualifications at the lowest skill level.
personnel would have to be transferred to their units from other Selective Reserve units or from the IRR pool before the unit could be deployed.

In addition to untrained personnel, at any given time there are other categories of reservists assigned to units who cannot be deployed. These include

- personnel with physical problems (sickness or injury) of either a temporary or long-term nature;
- women members who are pregnant;
- members found to be HIV-positive;
- those who are in jail, awaiting trial, or under other judicial restraint that prevents their deployment; and
- personnel with serious personal problems.

Data on the number of nondeployables in the categories discussed above are not available. The GAO study discussed previously was also unable to provide these counts.

Personnel procedures that prohibit the assignment of nondeployable personnel to force structure units will not in themselves ensure that 100 percent of assigned personnel will be available for deployment. Units will still have to cope
with cases of unanticipated illness, personal hardships, and skill mismatches that require personnel substitutions. Some units will need additional personnel as they move from peacetime authorized strength to full wartime strength. In addition, a unit may have vacancies that require personnel from other units prior to deployment. However, the personnel system can and should be designed to minimize the adverse impact on unit capability and unit cohesion caused by personnel transfers during mobilization and deployment.

PREVIOUS ATTEMPTS TO CHANGE THE SELECTED RESERVE PERSONNEL ACCOUNTING SYSTEM

The need to establish a nondeployable personnel account for the reserve components was recognized in the 1980s and an initiative to solve the problem was initially endorsed by all components. Below, we summarize the correspondence regarding proposed changes to the reserve component personnel accounting system.

In 1984, the Secretary of the Army directed the establishment of a reserve component Individuals account for nondeployable trainees. He stated in a memorandum that "the inclusion in unit operating strength of personnel in the training pipeline distorts the personnel REDCON [readiness condition] for most units...." The memo limited the magnitude of the Individuals allowance to 10 percent of the peacetime authorized strength of units in the Reserve Component force structure. The memo also stated that "personnel classified as individuals will continue to be assigned to Reserve Component units." But the Army reserve components did not establish an Individuals account.

In May 1986, the ASD(RA) requested comments from the Military Departments on a sweeping proposal to establish Individuals accounts for all nondeployable personnel, including transients, patients, prisoners, holdees, trainees, and students. The student category would include personnel who have completed IADT but are scheduled to be absent from their units for more than 140 days while attending skill training, cross-training, or professional military education. The ASD(RA)'s memo pointed out that "in FY86, the reserve components will have more than 82,000 nondeployable, untrained unit members in training status...." (This figure excluded students and nondeployable full-time members.)


12 Memorandum for Assistant Secretaries of the Military Departments. Subject: Reserve Component Non-Deployable Accounts, 7 May 1986. See Appendix B for a copy of the memorandum and responses.
All reserve components endorsed the initiative. However, the Air Force pointed out that in the ANG, trainees were already assigned to student flights. The Navy advised that Training and Administration of Reserve (TAR) personnel (full-time members) were included in the active force Individuals account.

After receiving general support for the proposal, the ASD(RA) established an inter-Service working group in August of 1986 to review current and proposed directives.

In January 1987, the ASD(RA) sent a memo to the Military Departments and the Coast Guard, subject: Implementation of Reserve Component Nondeployable Accounts. The working group agreed to establish a "nondeployable account" for untrained officers and enlisted personnel. The reserve components were requested to "implement such nondeployable accounts and manage them in such a way that personnel will not be precluded from assignment to a trained billet in their unit of enlistment upon completion of training." The reserve components were also required to differentiate between trained and nondeployable strength in program and budget documentation in support of the FY88 – FY89 President's Budget and subsequent budgets.

The working group agreement limited the nondeployable account to personnel who have not completed initial training instead of using the broader definition of nondeployables outlined in the May 1986 memo issued by the ASD(RA). The agreement also did not specifically state that untrained nondeployables would not be assigned to force structure units.

The agreement to change the personnel accounting system was not implemented. A nondeployable account for untrained personnel was not established. The reserve components continued to identify untrained personnel and report them in the RCCPDS to OSD. The ARNG, USAR, and USAFR continued to assign untrained personnel to force structure units. The USNR, USMCR, and ANG continued their previous system of not assigning untrained enlistees to force structure units. The identification of nondeployables was restricted to untrained personnel.

The working group's agreement did lead to one change. The reserve component portion of the Manpower Requirements Report to Congress, which supports the requested manpower authorizations in support of the President's budget, was revised. The tables in it show an Individuals account for each Selected Reserve component. The data represent the actual number of trainees for the past year and estimates for future years. Unfortunately, the displays give the erroneous impression that the active and reserve components have similar personnel accounting systems.

---

13 Memorandum to Assistant Secretaries of the Military Departments. Subject: Implementation of Reserve Component Nondeployable Accounts, 8 January 1987. See Appendix B for a copy of the memorandum.
The Army National Guard Combat Readiness Reform Act of 1992 provides a new opportunity to solve the personnel accounting problems that were recognized and not resolved in the 1980s.

**Analytical Approach to the Study**

The Logistics Management Institute approached the study of nondeployable personnel in Selected Reserve units through four phases:

**Phase I:** The first step was to identify the personnel categories that should be counted as nondeployable and to determine what changes are needed in the personnel accounting systems of the reserve components and the RCCPDS to support the changes. The LMI study team visited a cross-section of reserve component units in different parts of the country. During these visits, discussions were held with unit commanders, personnel managers, personnel clerks, and individual reservists. Readiness reports and drilling records were examined.

**Phase II:** Second, we examined alternative methods for establishing a personnel account for nondeployable personnel. Discussions were held with representatives of the reserve components as we explored alternative administrative arrangements for personnel accounts, including (1) centralization at the reserve component headquarters, (2) state or regional level accounts, and (3) local accounts at the unit or installation managed by unit commanders. We also examined the current personnel account procedures of the USNR, USMCR, and ANG.

**Phase III:** Third, we examined changes needed in allocating manpower authorizations in support of the proposed new accounting system.

**Phase IV:** Finally, an issue paper was prepared for OSD, the Services, and the reserve components. This issue paper was prepared to obtain the views of the addressees. The three categories of issues were

- issues involving the definition of the types of personnel who should be identified as nondeployable (11 issues),
- issues concerned with the organization and administration of a nondeployable account (4 issues), and
- the issue of how to allocate manpower authorizations if a nondeployable account is established (1 issue).

Each issue paper set forth a background discussion, the decision alternatives, and an LMI recommendation. The recommendations did not necessarily represent the views of the ASD(RA). Comments were received from the Services and reserve components. These comments have been considered and, as a result, some of the preliminary LMI recommendations have been modified.
CHAPTER 3

Identifying Nondeployables

This chapter addresses the three categories of personnel that the Congress called for identifying in personnel data systems as nondeployables — those who are untrained, not physically qualified, or otherwise not available for deployment. We first describe the personnel in each category we believe should be identified as nondeployable and explain why. Next, we describe the personnel we do not believe should be identified as nondeployable and explain why. Finally, we specify the accounting changes in the RCCPDS required to implement the recommended identification.

Determining which categories of nondeployable personnel should be so identified and which should not is a judgment call. None of the Services complained about the additional workload generated by coding and tracking additional categories of nondeployables. However, some did complain about the workload involved in preparing orders transferring identified nondeployables between units and the personnel account. In determining which categories of nondeployables should be identified and coded, we assumed that a personnel account will be established. Therefore, our identification recommendations do not include all possible categories of nondeployables. The disadvantage of this approach is that some units may still be carrying on their rolls in peacetime some members who are nondeployable in the event of mobilization. In the future, the categories of identified nondeployables can be revised on the basis of experience without making fundamental changes to the personnel accounting structure.

RESERVE PERSONNEL WHO SHOULD BE IDENTIFIED AS NONDEPLOYABLES

Untrained Personnel

The law (10 U.S.C. 671) requires that members of the armed forces receive basic training before being assigned to active duty on land outside the United States, its territories, and its possessions.

Most new accessions to the Selected Reserve already meet this requirement because of training received as members of the active forces. However, as shown in Table 3-1, in FY93 about 5 percent of officer accessions and 36 percent of enlisted accessions had no prior military service. The proportion of non-prior-service enlisted accessions varied considerably by reserve component, from a high of 61 percent in the USMCR to a low of 11 percent in the USAFR. New non-
Table 3-1.
Non-Prior-Service Accessions as a Percentage of Total Accessions — FY93

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Category</th>
<th>ARNG</th>
<th>USAR</th>
<th>USNR</th>
<th>USMCR</th>
<th>ANG</th>
<th>USAFR</th>
<th>Total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Officer</td>
<td>8.7</td>
<td>6.3</td>
<td>2.7</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>5.2</td>
<td>4.1</td>
<td>5.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Enlisted</td>
<td>38.6</td>
<td>42.2</td>
<td>19.1</td>
<td>60.7</td>
<td>31.2</td>
<td>10.5</td>
<td>35.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>36.8</td>
<td>37.8</td>
<td>16.4</td>
<td>60.7</td>
<td>28.6</td>
<td>9.3</td>
<td>32.6</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


Prior-service enlistees normally attend basic or recruit training, followed by initial skill training.

Recruit training is the basic indoctrination given to enlisted personnel. It provides a transition from civilian to military life, motivation to become a productive member of the Service, and basic instruction in the skills required by the Service involved. This training varies from 6 to 12 weeks, depending on the Service (Air Force, 6 weeks; Army and Navy, 8 weeks; Marine Corps, 12 weeks).

Skill training follows recruit training and provides the initial skills and knowledge needed to perform specific jobs. It leads toward the award of a military occupational specialty or rating at the lowest skill level and qualifies the member to take a position in the job structure of the Service and to progress through additional training and experience to a journeyman level in that specialty. Only a small number of enlistees enter the Service already having a civilian-acquired skill useful in the Military. Therefore, almost all military members must attend formal training to obtain an initial skill in a military occupational specialty. The length of these formal courses varies depending on the skill area, but most are in the range of 6 to 8 weeks (some are shorter; few are longer).

Members of the reserve components attend the same training programs as the active force members and are integrated with the active members in the same courses. However, because of the nature of reserve component duty, as part-time participants in the Military, reservists often cannot complete both recruit and initial skill training in one continuous training period. Many reserve members enlist while still in high school, and many go on to college. Therefore, a split-training option is provided in the ARNG, USAR, USNR, and USMCR. New members can attend a portion of their training during one summer between school terms and then complete it during a subsequent summer (law now requires this training to be completed within 2 years of enlistment for ARNG members).¹

¹Title XI of the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 1993, Section 1115(c). See Appendix A for complete text.
Officers usually come into the military through a commissioning training program such as the Reserve Officer Training Corps (ROTC), Service academies, or officer commissioning schools. They often receive additional skill training after commissioning. In the Army and Marine Corps, all officers immediately go to a basic training school after reporting for active duty and prior to any initial skill training: Army officers attend an Officer Basic Course (OBC) in their branch, while Marine Corps officers attend The Basic School (TBS) at Quantico, Virginia. These courses vary in length but average about 13 weeks.

Most of the reserve enlisted and officer personnel described above are included in the training pipeline portion of the RCCPDS and identified with the codes shown in Table 3-2. Those so coded would be included in any identification of nondeployable personnel, in accordance with congressional intent.

Table 3-2.
Reserve Training Codes and Trainees in the RCCPDS — 30 September 1993

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Training category</th>
<th>RCCPDS code</th>
<th>Number</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Personnel currently attending initial active duty training (IADT)</td>
<td>F</td>
<td>21,576</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Personnel awaiting entry on IADT</td>
<td>P</td>
<td>19,534</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Navy enlisted Training and Administration of Reserve (TARs)</td>
<td>S</td>
<td>944</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Personnel awaiting the second part of IADT</td>
<td>Q</td>
<td>10,525</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Personnel in other training programs</td>
<td>X</td>
<td>2,126</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Individuals in the Simultaneous Membership Program (SMP)</td>
<td>T</td>
<td>2,714</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td></td>
<td>57,419</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


All the Military Services agree that personnel in three of the six training categories shown in Table 3-2 should be identified as nondeployable. These categories are coded “F” (untrained reserve personnel currently attending IADT), “P” (awaiting entry on IADT), and “S” (Navy enlisted TARs undergoing recruit and initial skill training). These three categories account for 42,054 (or 73 percent) of the personnel currently identified with a training code in the RCCPDS.

The Logistics Management Institute believes that personnel in the remaining three categories should also be identified as nondeployable, but one or more of the reserve components disagrees. We will now discuss these issues.
The ARNG, USAR, and USMCR had 10,525 enlisted members assigned to split-training programs as of 30 September 1993. The breakout of these members by reserve component is reflected in Table 3-3. The ANG and USAFR do not have split-training programs.

Table 3-3.
Enlisted Reserve Personnel in the Split-Training Option —
30 September 1993

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Reserve component</th>
<th>Number of personnel</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>ARNG</td>
<td>5,143</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>USAR</td>
<td>4,810</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>USNR</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>USMCR</td>
<td>572</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>10,525</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


*Note: These personnel are all reported in the RCCPDS with a reserve category code of "Q." USNR reported 33 in this category for 30 September 1992.*

The USNR and USMCR consider personnel in the split-training program to be nondeployable until the initial skill training portion is completed.

The ARNG and USAR consider their split-training enlisted personnel as deployable because they have finished the basic portion of the recruit training and by law (10 U.S.C. 671) could be legally deployed. However, Army policy requires recruits to receive initial skill training before actual deployment overseas (in the case of ARNG and USAR members, this skill training would be provided after mobilization but before deployment). Therefore, in effect, they are not deployable and should be identified as untrained nondeployable personnel.

ARNG, USAR, and USMCR Officers Who Have Not Completed Officer Basic Course or The Basic School After Commissioning (Code X)

After commissioning, most ARNG, USAR, and USMCR officers are required to attend one of these schools, which provide basic training before they attend skill training. The ARNG and USAR officers attend Army OBC and then return to their guard and reserve units. Nearly all USMCR officers attend TBS and go on to active duty with the active Marine Corps, losing their reserve membership. The USNR, ANG, and USAFR do not require similar training for their officers. The breakout for these officers on 30 September 1993 is reflected in Table 3-4.
Table 3-4.
Reserve Officers Who Have Not Completed Officer Basic Course (Army) or The Basic Course (Marine Corps) — 30 September 1993

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Reserve component</th>
<th>Number of personnel</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>ARNG</td>
<td>2,089</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>USAR</td>
<td>2,100</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>USMCR</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total</strong></td>
<td><strong>4,195</strong></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


*Notes:* The ARNG personnel are reported in the RCCPDS with a reserve category code of "X." The USAR and USMCR personnel are not identified separately or reported in the RCCPDS. Nearly all USMCR officers go on active duty after commissioning, but a few go directly to a unit as drilling reservists.

The Army and Marine Corps consider reserve officers nondeployable until they have completed the appropriate basic course. However, only the ARNG currently identifies officers in this status, using Code “X.” Since the basic course is required for officers before deployment, any officer not yet completing these courses should be identified as nondeployable. In the Marine Corps, nearly all newly commissioned reserve officers spend an initial tour on active duty with the active Marine Corps. Although the Marine Corps prefers that all officers spend a tour on active duty, a few newly commissioned officers do go directly to reserve units and need to be identified as nondeployable until they finish TBS.

**Enlisted Members of the Reserve Components Who Are in the Simultaneous Membership Program (Code T)**

The SMP consists of personnel who are enlisted members of an ARNG, USAR, or USMCR unit and drill with that unit. They also attend college and are members of the Army ROTC or Marine Corps Platoon Leaders Class (PLC). They are commissioned as officers after completing ROTC or PLC. The number of these personnel as of 30 September 1993 is shown in Table 3-5. The USNR, ANG, and USAFR do not have personnel in such a program.
Table 3-5.
Enlisted Reserve Personnel in the Simultaneous Membership Program – 30 September 1993

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Reserve component</th>
<th>Number of personnel</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>ARNG</td>
<td>1,693</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>USAR</td>
<td>1,021</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>USMCR</td>
<td>555</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total</strong></td>
<td><strong>3,279</strong></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


*Note:* While the ARNG and USAR personnel in the SMP are reported in the RCCPDS with a reserve category code of "T," the USMCR personnel are reported as Code "A," which is the category of all fully trained, deployable personnel assigned to reserve units.

The Army components and the Marine Corps treat members of the SMP differently. All Marine personnel in the PLC are required to complete basic and initial skill training before entering the SMP and, under Marine Corps policy, would be mobilized and deployed as enlisted personnel in time of war. Therefore, the Marine Corps does not code any personnel in SMP category "T," but in Code "A" instead, which is the category of all fully trained, deployable personnel assigned to reserve units.

In the ARNG and USAR, personnel are not required to have completed basic or initial skill training when joining the SMP. They are also assigned to officer billets, where they would serve after completing ROTC and being commissioned. Army policy is that these personnel not be deployed until they are commissioned and have completed the appropriate officer basic course. Comments received by LMI from the Army, ARNG, and USAR were as follows: the Army said that SMP members should be carried in their units' nondeployable account while in the SMP. The ARNG stated that they would be mobilized with their units but would not be deployable until completing OBC. The USAR said that SMP members fill officer positions, would be mobilized, and would deploy as officers after completing training.

While in the SMP, ARNG and USAR members are nondeployable as enlisted because they have not completed both basic and initial skill training. They are also nondeployable as officers because they have not been commissioned. After commissioning, they are still nondeployable because they must first attend OBC prior to deployment. In actual practice, during Desert Shield/Desert Storm, the Army let SMP personnel remain in school and continue ROTC. In effect, they were treated as nondeployable.

The other reserve components require their enlisted personnel to leave the Selected Reserve when they progress to senior status in the ROTC (usually juniors and seniors in college). At that time, the components consider the
individuals solely as ROTC members and future assets of the active components, and not as unit members.

Since ARNG and USAR personnel in the SMP would not be deployed if mobilized as enlisted personnel but would be commissioned and sent to OBC, in reality they are not deployable assets. Thus it would be misleading and inconsistent with the treatment of other untrained personnel to code such ARNG and USAR personnel as deployable.

Since all Marine reserve personnel must complete initial skill training in order to become members of the PLC program, and since Marine Corps policy is to deploy them as enlisted members, they are properly coded as deployable.

**ANG and USAFR Flight Students in Undergraduate Pilot Training (UPT) and Undergraduate Navigator Training (UNT)**

Table 3-6 reflects ANG and USAFR personnel who were assigned to flight training (UPT/UNT) as of 30 September 1993.

**Table 3-6.**

*ANG and USAFR Officers Attending UPT/UNT — 30 September 1993*

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Component</th>
<th>Officers</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>ANG</td>
<td>338</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>USAFR</td>
<td>37</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total</strong></td>
<td><strong>375</strong></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


*Note: ANG officers attending UPT/UNT are coded "F," while USAFR officers are coded "X."*

These personnel are sent as officers to long-term training as pilots or navigators. Some of this training can take longer than 1 year before an officer is fully qualified in a particular aircraft. The other reserve components do not send reservists or guardsmen to undergraduate flight or navigator training.

The ANG and USAFR report personnel in this program to the RCCPDS differently. The Guard reports them in code “F” as personnel currently attending IADT, while the Reserve reports them in code “X” as personnel in other training programs.

It is Air Force policy for the Guard and the Reserve to treat such officers as nondeployable. The Air Force does not wish to pull them out of these lengthy and complicated training programs during a mobilization, and there may be a need for qualified pilots and navigators down the line. Identifying them as nondeployable is consistent with the LMI recommendation regarding Army and Marine Corps officers who have not completed OBC and TBS. In addition, flight
training is very expensive, and it would not be cost-effective to interrupt it. However, both ANG and USAFR officers should be coded identically in the RCCPDS, with a new code.

RESERVE MEDICAL PROFESSIONALS UNDERGOING ADVANCED MEDICAL TRAINING OR EDUCATION

Many health professionals who are members of the Selected Reserve are enrolled in various advanced training programs for physicians, dentists, veterinarians, and nurses. For example, large numbers of physicians are enrolled in either internship (first year of graduate medical education) or residency programs that may require up to 6 years to be fully trained in a specialty. Some nurses undergo undergraduate nurse education to earn a baccalaureate, while others are in advanced training to qualify as nurse anesthetists or in other nursing specialties. Dentists may be receiving advanced training to qualify as oral surgeons or prostodontists.

Some of these health professionals are not qualified to treat patients (for example, physicians who have not completed their internship). However, most health professionals undergoing long-term training can be very useful if mobilized. Some are already qualified in a lesser skill (for example, a clinical nurse undergoing training as an operating room nurse, or a general dentist being trained as an oral surgeon). Medical residents being trained as orthopedic surgeons, urologists, etc., normally treat patients in teaching hospitals under the supervision of board-certified physicians. A resident who has completed 5 years of a 6-year residency is more qualified than a second-year resident, but all residents can, if needed, provide some level of health care services.

The Army's current policy is to not mobilize Army Medical Department officers of the guard and reserve participating in graduate medical education programs during situations short of full mobilization. Future reserve call-ups are likely to be under conditions short of full mobilization.

The Navy and Air Force have similar written or unwritten policies. These policies assume that, short of full mobilization, the contribution of partially trained health professionals will not be needed. These policies can, of course, be modified to mobilize and deploy participants in selected training programs if the demand for health professionals exceeds the available supply.

Although most health professionals enrolled in long-term training programs can make valuable medical contributions if mobilized, Service policy is to avoid interrupting such training. The Military Services believe that their long-term

---

2 Not coded or shown in Table 3-2.
3 The Persian Gulf war reserve call-up was executed under conditions short of full mobilization. Initially, the President exercised his authority to call up to 200,000 reservists under Section 673b of 10 U.S.C. Later, the partial mobilization authority was exercised under section 673 of 10 U.S.C. This latter authority was exercised in order to mobilize Individual Ready Reserve members.
needs are best served by producing the greatest number of fully trained health professionals in the shortest time.

We believe that health professionals participating in full-time training programs of 20 weeks or more should be considered nondeployable. On the basis of data reported to OSD on those professionals receiving stipends and those in education programs who have received loans, it is estimated that as many as 2,500 reservists would fall into this category of nondeployables. A new code will be needed to identify this nondeployable group in the RCCPDS.

Personnel Who Do Not Meet the Minimum Physical Profile Standards Required for Deployment

This is the second category that the Congress directed be included as nondeployable. It includes all personnel who are not physically qualified for deployment. For our purposes, personnel with physical problems stemming from injury or illness can be separated into three distinct subcategories:

1. Those who have a physical injury or illness that can be cured within 90 days.

2. Those who have a physical injury or illness that cannot be cured within 90 days but whose condition does not meet the criteria for separation from military service.

3. Those who have permanent physical injuries or illnesses. These members have been determined by a medical evaluation board to be permanently disqualified for military service and would be discharged or retired.

Section 1116 of Title XI of the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 1993 states that, "the Secretary of the Army shall transfer the personnel classification of a member of the Army National Guard from the National Guard unit of the member to the personnel account established pursuant to section 1115 if the member does not meet minimum physical profile standards required for deployment. Any such transfer shall be made not later than 90 days after the date on which the determination that the member does not meet such standards is made."

The wording of the law is very explicit. A member who cannot be deployed because of failure to meet physical standards must be transferred to the nondeployable account within 90 days of the determination. This provision of the law is not unlike the procedures currently followed by the active forces. In the active components, personnel expected to be not physically qualified for duty for 90 days or longer are transferred to the active force Individuals accounts.

4See Appendix A for the complete text of Title XI of the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 1993.

5In the Navy, because of ship deployment demands, this period is reduced to 30 days for personnel assigned to sea duty.
action removes these individuals from force structure units, enabling the units to fill the vacancies with deployable military personnel. Exceptions to this policy exist in the active forces for women during pregnancy and for persons who are HIV-positive. Although nondeployable, by policy these personnel are retained in their units.⁶

The issue is, which of the three subcategories should be identified as nondeployable in the reserve personnel accounting systems? In making this decision, the following factors should be recognized:

1. Although data on the number of reservists who fit into each of the three subcategories are not available, we estimate that most of those found to be physically disqualified during Desert Shield/Desert Storm fit into Category 1 — those with a defect that can be cured within 90 days. For example, in the USAR components, those with dental defects represented a large proportion of the physically disqualified. Identifying as nondeployable only those in Categories 2 and 3 accepts the fact that mobilized units will be burdened with significant numbers of physical nondeployables. However, many in Category 1 can become qualified before the unit deploys.

2. The 90-day criterion for removing physically unqualified personnel from unit billets is used both by the active forces and by the Congress in Section 1116 of Title XI. Adopting this criterion accepts the fact that not all unit personnel will be immediately available for deployment.

3. Assuming that personnel accounts are established for nondeployables, those identified as physical nondeployables will have to be transferred out of units to the personnel account and then back to units after they become qualified for deployment. The 90-day criterion minimizes the administrative burden.

The Logistics Management Institute recommends that the reserve components identify as nondeployable those members who, it is estimated, cannot become qualified for deployment within 90 days (Categories 2 and 3). We estimate that, on the average, about 2,000 members will be in this combined category of nondeployables.

⁶Personnel who are HIV-positive are permitted to remain on active duty until they actually contract the AIDS virus, when they are discharged.
To improve the process of evaluating the physical condition of ARNG members, the Congress enacted the following provisions:7

The Secretary of the Army shall require that

(1) each member of the Army National Guard undergo a medical and dental screening on an annual basis; and

(2) each member of the Army National Guard over the age of 40 undergo a full physical examination not less often than every two years.

As planned by the ARNG, each reserve member would execute an Annual Medical Certificate to update the individual’s medical treatment history. The certificate requires each member to identify any change in any medical or dental condition, whether the member has received medical or dental treatment or hospitalization, whether the member is taking or has been taking medication, and whether the member is receiving any kind of disability payments or workers’ compensation for health or physical reasons. The member must certify, by signature, that the information is true and complete.

On the basis of this screening, and the biennial full physical examination for those over age 40, the unit commander could assess all members’ physical health and identify those who are nondeployable because of long-term or permanent physical problems. Those members (included in Categories 2 and 3 above) would be coded as “nondeployable” in the components’ personnel data bases. This status would then be provided to OSD through the RCCPDS, using new codes in that system.

These examining provisions, if adopted by all reserve components, would help identify those who will be physically disqualified for more than 90 days and help reduce the number who have short-term disqualifications. Unit commanders would have a basis for requiring reservists to seek remedial medical and dental services to correct defects as a prerequisite for maintaining reserve membership.

Those identified as physically nondeployable and transferred from a force structure unit to a personnel account could still be permitted to drill with the unit, at the unit commander’s discretion.

Personnel Who Are Otherwise Not Available for Deployment

This is the third category that the Congress directed be included as nondeployable. We recommend the identification of only one group: members who are in civil or military confinement, on probation, or under other judicial restraint.

---

7Title XI of the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 1993, Section 1117. See Appendix A for complete text.
A number of members (full- and part-time) get into trouble with either military or civilian authorities. Some may be in jail, while others may be under some type of judicial restraint such as awaiting trial or on supervised probation. These members are not deployable and are currently not identified as such in the RCCPDS.

The number of personnel in this situation is not large. However, LMI field visits indicated that the number varies by component and geographic location. During our field visits, USAR personnel said that they would like to be able to move such personnel out of a unit at the earliest date without prejudice to the eventual resolution of the member’s problem.

All reserve components except the USMCR concur with identifying personnel in these types of conditions as nondeployable. The Marine Corps stated that such identification is not necessary, since its procedures allow timely discharge or administrative separation when needed.

On the basis of active force experience, where such members are transferred to the Individuals account, we estimate that as many as 2,000 reservists in this category could be identified at any time as nondeployable. Personnel under judicial restraint that precludes deployment if mobilized should not be counted as deployable assets. A new code will be needed to identify these members.

RESERVE PERSONNEL WHO SHOULD NOT BE IDENTIFIED AS NONDEPLOYABLES

The types of reserve personnel discussed in this section represent those who were examined by LMI as candidates for nondeployable identification but, for reasons stated, are not recommended for inclusion in this identification.

Members Absent from Units to Attend Lengthy Advanced Training

Selected Reserve members who have completed initial training continue to receive training throughout their careers. In many cases, on-the-job training, short courses during active duty training, evening classes through reserve training schools, and correspondence training are used. These types of training require little or no absence from the unit.

However, members sometimes must attend a lengthy training course. Examples include professional military education at noncommissioned officer schools, command and staff courses, or war colleges; cross-training into a new skill to match the billet to which assigned; advanced training in the current skill; and conversion training when a unit is converted from one weapon system to another. Some of these courses last 6 months or longer.
These personnel already have completed basic training and initial training in one skill. They may be recalled from school/training courses to join a unit that is mobilizing. However, the general policy during recent mobilizations has been to let them finish their programs before they rejoin their units. Since these mobilizations have not been "full mobilizations" of entire reserve components, but rather of selected units, sufficient trained personnel were available in the component, and cross-leveling was used to fill vacancies in deploying units.

In the active forces, those attending advanced training with PCS moves are dropped from unit rolls and are carried in the Individuals account as students. Often they do not return to the original unit after they complete training. They are placed in the Individuals account because neither the commander of the unit they left nor the commander of the new unit they may be assigned to controls them while they are undergoing advanced training.

Data do not exist in the RCCPDS or at headquarters to identify the man-years devoted to long-term training in the Selected Reserve.

The Services want to identify personnel in long-term training as deployable. If not needed during a call-up of the unit, they can be permitted to complete their training programs. However, at higher levels of mobilization, these personnel would be called back in order to deploy with their units.

Previously in this chapter we recommended identifying as nondeployable those undergoing undergraduate pilot or navigator training and medical professionals undergoing advanced medical training or education. These are exceptions. We do not recommend identifying as nondeployables other reservists in advanced training.

Members Who Transfer from Unit to Unit

Large numbers of reservists change units each year. Most of those changes result from member relocations. The normal process is for a member to request that a transfer be arranged in advance through a centralized vacancy and assignment system. Sometimes, prompt reassignment is not possible, and a reservist will move to a new location and then start a search for an assignment in a new unit. The ARNG and USAR generally keep a reservist in the old assignment for up to 90 days after departure to allow time for the new assignment search.

Although these reservists are absent from their old units, they theoretically can be recalled to those units for mobilization if good forwarding addresses are available. However, some of these personnel cannot be found.

Neither the RCCPDS nor the reserve component headquarters has data to estimate the man-years associated with such transfers.

The reserve components have systems to transfer members to new billets in their new geographic areas. These systems work quite well and minimize the
number of members who are in transit without a new assignment. These personnel are considered members of their old units until the transfer is completed, and they would be mobilized with the old units if necessary. The number of personnel who are lost is small. Existing procedures, if followed correctly, prevent this from becoming a problem.

Full-Time Support Personnel Transferring from Unit to Unit on a Permanent Change of Station

In the active forces, personnel in a transfer status are called transients and are included in the Individuals accounts, so that operating units are not burdened with the vacancy time caused by PCS moves.

Full-time reservists are transferred in the same manner as other active duty personnel. Transfers of full-time personnel are caused by PCS moves, retirements, and resignations. The USNR and the USMCR move full-time personnel more frequently than do the other reserve components, but all reserve components move some of their personnel each year.

No data exist in the RCCPDS or at headquarters levels to show how many full-time-member PCS moves take place each year. LMI field visits indicate that 25 to 30 percent of the USNR and the USMCR full-time personnel transfer each year. (We believe that most of those transfers are PCS moves.) The other components have much smaller PCS programs. The USAFR does not have full-time military personnel assigned to reserve units and has fewer than 1,000 total full-time reservists assigned to reserve headquarters and other Air Force organizations.

Full-time Support personnel are considered deployable during the time they are actually moving. Actual travel time is small, and these personnel can readily be recalled from leave or training that may be associated with the PCS move.

---

*Full-time reservists are reserve members who voluntarily serve on active duty providing direct support to prepare reserve component units for their wartime missions, in accordance with DoD Directive 1205.8, Full-Time Support to the Reserve Components, 20 September 1988. In the Army and Air Force reserve components, full-time support personnel are called Active Guard/Reserves. In the Navy, they are called Training and Administration of Reserve (TARs), and in the Marine Corps, Full-Time Support (FTS) personnel.*
Members Who Become Unsatisfactory Participants

Reserve members become unsatisfactory participants after missing eight consecutive training periods. At that time they may be processed for reassignment to the IRR or the Standby Reserve, or they may be discharged. Data are not available in the RCCPDS to identify the number of personnel assigned to units who are unsatisfactory participants at any point in time.

Current policy and procedures exist to separate these personnel, and among those procedures is the right to appeal the separation. During our field visits, Army units indicated that some members take advantage of that right and that the appeals take a long time. During the appeal period, these members remain in a unit and encumber a billet.

Service comments point out that, if current procedures and policies are followed, the reserve components could take action to reduce the time between determination of unsatisfactory performance and discharge. An effort should first be made to solve this problem by making administrative improvements.

USNR Members in “In-Assignment Processing” Status

The USNR has significant numbers of trained personnel temporarily assigned to administrative holding groups called “In-Assignment Processing” (IAP). These personnel do not have skills that match existing vacancies in the units in their geographic areas. They include those transferring from unit to unit in different geographic locations. Another factor that contributes to the IAP inventory is billet turbulence — the switching of billets between regular and reserve units. In the past, the USNR has had quite large numbers of members in this status (about 30 percent of the USNR), but it has been able to reduce the number to below 10 percent.

These personnel are all trained and deployable. They can be mobilized and cross-assigned to billets that fit their qualifications.

ACCOUNTING AND DATA BASE CHANGES REQUIRED TO IDENTIFY NONDEPLOYABLES

In this section, we describe the changes to current codes and the new codes needed to identify nondeployable personnel in the OSD-level personnel data system, the RCCPDS.

---

*Two monthly drill periods constitute eight consecutive training periods, four periods each month.
Nondeployable Codes Summarized

Reserve component personnel recommended for identification as nondeployables would be identified in the RCCPDS with the codes shown in Table 3-7.

Table 3-7.
Proposed Nondeployable Codes in the RCCPDS

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Category</th>
<th>RCCPDS Code</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Training pipeline (untrained personnel)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Enlisted personnel</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Currently attending IADT</td>
<td>F</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Awaiting entry on IADT</td>
<td>P</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Navy TARs</td>
<td>S</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Awaiting the second part of IADT</td>
<td>Q</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Enrolled in SMP</td>
<td>T</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Officer personnel</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>In or awaiting OBC/TBS</td>
<td>New code</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>In UPT/UNT</td>
<td>New code</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>In advanced medical education</td>
<td>New code</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Personnel nondeployable for physical reasons</td>
<td>New code</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Personnel nondeployable for other reasons (prisoners, judicial restraint)</td>
<td>New code</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*Note: New codes would be identified by the RCCPDS file manager.*

**Untrained Personnel**

The current RCCPDS codes for the training pipeline, plus new codes, would identify the untrained portion of the nondeployables. Some changes in current coding are required in order to eliminate inconsistencies, as described earlier in this chapter. In addition, new codes are required for identifying additional untrained personnel who are nondeployable. Thus, personnel currently being identified by the components in their training pipelines would automatically be a part of the nondeployable identification. This fact, plus the new codes, would permit complete identification of untrained nondeployable personnel.

*Consistent Use of Current Coding for Training Pipeline*

* ARNG, USAR, USNR, and USMCR enlisted personnel in split-training programs would continue to be coded as "Q" but would be counted as nondeployable.
ARNG and USAR enlisted personnel in SMP would all be coded as "T" and counted as nondeployable. USMCR enlisted personnel in the SMP would continue to be coded as "A" and counted as deployable.

New Codes for Training Pipeline

- ARNG, USNR, and USMCR officers in OBC/TBS would all be coded with a new code and counted as nondeployable.
- ANG and USAFR officers attending UPT/UNT would all be coded with a new code and counted as nondeployable.
- Reserve medical professionals undergoing medical training or education would be coded with a new code and counted as nondeployable.

Other Nondeployable Personnel

In this chapter, we have discussed two other categories of nondeployable personnel: (1) those nondeployable by reason of not being physically qualified, and (2) personnel who are nondeployable for any other reason, such as being in civilian or military legal trouble that would preclude their deployment in time of war or emergency. LMI has been told that the components can identify these categories of personnel in their own personnel data systems. However, the RCCPDS does not have codes that would permit the components to pass such identifications up to the RCCPDS electronically. New codes are required for these categories, as follows:

- Personnel who do not meet minimum physical standards for deployment would be coded with a new code and counted as nondeployable.
- Personnel who are otherwise not available for deployment, including personnel in civil or military confinement, on probation, or under other judicial restraint, would be coded with a new code and counted as nondeployable. This code could also be used for future categories of personnel who are determined not to be available for deployment for other reasons.

Comparison of Individuals Account and Reserve Components Nondeployables

The categories of personnel included in the active forces Individuals account are not completely comparable to the categories considered nondeployable for the reserve components. Deployment is defined as movement on land outside the United States, its territories, and possessions. The Individuals account includes personnel who may be deployable but are not under the control of the unit commander. For example, active force personnel attending advanced
training courses are in the Individuals account, but such personnel are considered, with few exceptions, deployable in the reserve components. Table 3-8 compares the composition of the active force Individuals account with the categories that we recommend be identified as reserve component nondeployables.

Table 3-8.
Reserve Component Nondeployables Compared to Active Force Individuals Account

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Personnel category</th>
<th>Active force Individuals account</th>
<th>Reserve component recommended nondeployables</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Trainees</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Yes</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Students</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>No*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Transients</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>No</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Patients</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Yes</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Prisoners</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Yes</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Separatees</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>No</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Midshipmen and cadets</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Not applicable</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*Exceptions for identifying ANG and USAFR members attending UPT/UNT and reserve medical professionals undergoing advanced medical training.

NONDEPLOYABLES RECOMMENDED TO BE IDENTIFIED

This chapter has discussed the categories and numbers of reserve component personnel that should be identified as nondeployable at any point in time. Table 3-9 summarizes the number of these personnel, their reserve categories by code, and the personnel not currently identified in the RCCPDS. It also identifies the categories requiring new codes in order to permit their identification in the RCCPDS.
Table 3-9.
Estimated Numbers of Nondeployables by Category, Currently Identified and Proposed — Data as of 30 September 1993

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Categories of nondeployable personnel</th>
<th>RCCPDS code</th>
<th>Number of nondeployables currently identified</th>
<th>Proposed number of nondeployables to be identified</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Untrained personnel</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Enlisted</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Attending IADT</td>
<td>F</td>
<td>21,576</td>
<td>21,576</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Awaiting IADT</td>
<td>P</td>
<td>19,534</td>
<td>19,534</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Navy TARs</td>
<td>S</td>
<td>944</td>
<td>944</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Awaiting 2nd part of IADT</td>
<td>Q</td>
<td>10,525</td>
<td>10,525</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SMP</td>
<td>T</td>
<td>2,714</td>
<td>2,714</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Officer</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>In or awaiting OBC/TBS</td>
<td>*</td>
<td>2,089</td>
<td>4,195*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>In UPT/UNT</td>
<td>*</td>
<td>375</td>
<td>375</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>In advanced medical education</td>
<td>*</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>2,500*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Physically not qualified</td>
<td>*</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>2,000*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Not available for other reasons</td>
<td>*</td>
<td>0</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Prisoners, judicial restraint</td>
<td>*</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>2,000*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td></td>
<td>57,757</td>
<td>66,363</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Note:** * = new codes needed.

*Estimated. The USAR does not report these personnel in the RCCPDS.

*Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense (Reserve Affairs) estimate based on stipend and loan recipients.

*Estimated. Based on active force experience with an adjustment for an older reserve force.

*Estimated. Based on active force experience.
CHAPTER 4
Organization and Administration of the Nondeployable Personnel Account

INTRODUCTION

The Army National Guard Combat Readiness Reform Act of 1992 requires the ARNG to establish a personnel account for nondeployable members and to assign them to this account, not to positions in units.

This chapter addresses two specific questions:

♦ Should the other reserve components also establish a personnel account for nondeployables?

♦ How should the nondeployable personnel account be organized and administered within each reserve component?

These two questions will be discussed in turn.

SHOULD THE RESERVE COMPONENTS OTHER THAN THE ARNG ALSO ESTABLISH A PERSONNEL ACCOUNT FOR NONDEPLOYABLES?

In Chapter 3, we described the types of personnel we recommended be identified as nondeployable. Table 3-9 reflected 66,363 Selected Reserve members, as of 30 September 1993, who would be identified as nondeployable in accordance with the recommended criteria. Table 4-1 shows these nondeployables broken out by reserve component. In addition, it shows the percentage of nondeployables in each component currently being reported in the RCCPDS by current reserve category codes.
Table 4-1.
Estimated Numbers of Nondeployables by Reserve Component, Based on Proposed Criteria – 30 September 1993

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Category of nondeployables</th>
<th>ARNG</th>
<th>USAR</th>
<th>USNR</th>
<th>USMCR</th>
<th>ANG</th>
<th>USAFR</th>
<th>Total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Untrained personnel</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Enlisted</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Attending IADT</td>
<td>8,258</td>
<td>7,799</td>
<td>827</td>
<td>3,018</td>
<td>1,203</td>
<td>471</td>
<td>21,576</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Awaiting IADT</td>
<td>10,258</td>
<td>6,974</td>
<td>1,068</td>
<td>47</td>
<td>1,004</td>
<td>183</td>
<td>19,534</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Navy TARs</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>944</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>944</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Awaiting 2nd part of IADT</td>
<td>5,143</td>
<td>4,810</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>572</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>10,525</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SMP</td>
<td>1,693</td>
<td>1,021</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>2,714</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Officers</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>In or awaiting OBC/TBS</td>
<td>2,089</td>
<td>2,100</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>4,195</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>In UPT/UNT</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>338</td>
<td>37</td>
<td>375</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>In advanced medical education</td>
<td>50</td>
<td>1,680</td>
<td>90</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>30</td>
<td>650</td>
<td>2,500</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Physically not qualified</td>
<td>775</td>
<td>520</td>
<td>250</td>
<td>80</td>
<td>225</td>
<td>150</td>
<td>2,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Not available for other reasons</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Prisoners, judicial restraint</td>
<td>775</td>
<td>520</td>
<td>250</td>
<td>80</td>
<td>225</td>
<td>150</td>
<td>2,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>29,041</td>
<td>25,424</td>
<td>3,429</td>
<td>3,803</td>
<td>3,025</td>
<td>1,641</td>
<td>66,363</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Percent of actual strength

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Category of nondeployables</th>
<th>ARNG</th>
<th>USAR</th>
<th>USNR</th>
<th>USMCR</th>
<th>ANG</th>
<th>USAFR</th>
<th>Total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Enlisted</td>
<td>7.4</td>
<td>9.8</td>
<td>3.1</td>
<td>9.9</td>
<td>2.5</td>
<td>1.4</td>
<td>6.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Officers</td>
<td>4.7</td>
<td>6.8</td>
<td>0.5</td>
<td>0.4</td>
<td>2.8</td>
<td>4.5</td>
<td>4.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>7.1</td>
<td>9.2</td>
<td>2.6</td>
<td>9.1</td>
<td>2.6</td>
<td>2.0</td>
<td>6.3</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Percent currently identified

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Category of nondeployables</th>
<th>ARNG</th>
<th>USAR</th>
<th>USNR</th>
<th>USMCR</th>
<th>ANG</th>
<th>USAFR</th>
<th>Total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>94.5</td>
<td>81.0</td>
<td>82.8</td>
<td>95.6</td>
<td>84.1</td>
<td>42.1</td>
<td>87.0</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*Those currently identified in the RCCPDS as a percentage of proposed identification of nondeployables. See Table 3-9.*
Three of the reserve components (the USNR, the USMCR, and the ANG) already have personnel accounts or organizations for assignment of non-prior-service enlisted personnel who have not completed initial training. Full implementation of the personnel accounts for all nondeployables would require relatively small augmentation of these accounts for additional categories of nondeployables. Only the USAR and USAFR would have to establish nondeployable new personnel accounts after the ARNG complies with the law.

Advantages of Personnel Accounts for Nondeployables

Establishing nondeployable personnel accounts has the following advantages:

- Using such accounts provides a more accurate picture of the manning condition of force structure units.
  
  - Many managers and decision-makers rely solely on reports of reserve component units that compare authorized and assigned strengths. Units at full strength are judged to be in good condition even though they may have large numbers of nondeployables assigned to billets.

  - The personnel ratings in the Status of Resources and Training System are based on the number of supposedly qualified personnel assigned to individual units. Assigning nondeployables to a personnel account and not to units would preclude errors caused by reporting nondeployables as qualified personnel.

- Nondeployables encumber positions in force structure units that should be filled with qualified deployable personnel. As discussed in the next chapter, filling the positions vacated by transferring nondeployables to the personnel account will require either additional personnel resources or a reduction in force structure. However, establishing a personnel account is a necessary step, regardless of which means is used to fill vacancies in units caused by transferring nondeployables to the personnel account.

- Establishing a personnel account for nondeployables will make the reserve component accounting system more comparable to the system used in the active forces. The personnel account would be the Selected Reserve version of the active force Individuals account.
Consideration of Objections to Establishing a Personnel Account for Nondeployables

Nearly all the reserve components oppose establishing a counterpart to the active force Individuals account for nondeployable reserve personnel.\(^1\) The reserve component objections to establishing this account are as follows:

- **The reserve components can identify and track nondeployable personnel by unit without establishing personnel accounts.** We agree that the personnel accounting system can be used to track nondeployable personnel, including those in the additional nondeployable categories proposed in Chapter 3. However, establishing a personnel account for the assignment of nondeployables is a necessary step in enabling the filling of unit billets now encumbered by nondeployable personnel. Furthermore, establishing the proposed personnel accounts will solve the strength accounting comparability problem. Currently, three reserve components use personnel accounts and a fourth component, the ARNG, presumably will follow suit. Establishing consistent and complete nondeployable personnel accounts for the two remaining reserve components— the USAR and the USAFR—will avoid confusion in using reserve component manpower reports. Comparability with active force manpower reports will also be enhanced.

- **Establishing a personnel account will weaken unit cohesiveness by separating personnel assigned to that account from their units.** This problem can be overcome by maintaining a unit relationship with those assigned to the personnel account. The use of a personnel account in the ANG (student flights) has not weakened unit cohesiveness. The recruit is bonded to the unit before leaving the unit for the training center and returns to the unit after completing training. Also, some types of nondeployables assigned to the personnel account can be permitted to drill with their units at the unit commander's discretion.

- **Managing the personnel account will add major administrative and procedural changes that will be a burden to each unit.** Computer programs will have to be changed, and additional orders will have to be issued to transfer personnel between units and the personnel account. We believe that the administrative costs will be minor. We estimate that the cost of revising software and establishing procedures will be about $1 million. The recurring costs of transferring personnel between units and the personnel accounts have been minor in the reserve components that have such accounts. The LMI study of alternatives for identifying nondeployables considered the administrative costs of transfers, and accordingly we did not, for example, recommend identifying as nondeployable those who are only temporarily physically disqualified.

\(^{1}\)The USAR concurred with the establishment of accounts for nondeployable personnel but requested a 15 percent increase in end strength above force structure requirements to accommodate the personnel accounts.
Cross-leveling mobilized units with trained personnel from other units is an acceptable method for filling vacancies caused by assigning nondeployable personnel to units. Cross-leveling is a useful method for filling unit vacancies. The establishment of nondeployable personnel accounts can reduce the volume of cross-leveling required during a mobilization. Combat effectiveness is directly related to team training and unit cohesiveness. Excessive cross-leveling reduces unit effectiveness of the receiving unit and weakens the units that provide the personnel. Retaining large numbers of nondeployable personnel in units requires mobilizing units and personnel for the express purpose of providing fillers to deploying units.

How to Organize and Administer Nondeployable Personnel Accounts

Current Organization Models

Three reserve components — the USNR, the USMCR, and the ANG — already have the equivalent of nondeployable accounts. These components currently assign new, untrained enlisted personnel to organizations or holding accounts outside of force units. The number of reservists so treated amounted to over 8,000 individuals as of the end of September 1993. When recruited, the new reservists are managed outside of the units until they complete basic and skill training, at which time they report to their units and go on the unit rolls. This has been accomplished without unusual administrative burden or costs in these three components.

The ANG procedure is to assign these personnel to a student flight, which is an adjunct of the force structure unit. The unit commander still has oversight of these personnel while they are at a training center. During this period, however, the untrained personnel do not encumber a unit billet, and trained personnel can be assigned to all unit billets. If some trainees complete their training before billets are available for their assignment, unit commanders are authorized to assign them to the unit as over-strength until permanent billets are available. These over-strength situations are temporary.

In the USNR, recruits are assigned to a holding account in the USNR personnel data base. This account is called “MAC-G” by the Navy, which has an account located at each training/readiness center. The center commander controls these untrained personnel during their training periods. After they have completed basic and skill training, the personnel report to the training/readiness center for assignment to specific units and billets. Overages in trained personnel are put in an “In Assignment Processing” status until billets are available.

The USMCR assigns recruits to central accounts managed by the training centers. They are under control of the training center, which tags them to specific units in their home geographic areas as they progress through the basic and skill
training pipeline. In advance of the reporting date, the unit commander knows which people are coming and when they are expected. The unit commander may exceed authorized strengths if necessary to accommodate personnel coming from training centers.

Possible Models for Nondeployable Personnel Accounts

We believe that each reserve component should be able to choose the way its nondeployable personnel account is to be organized and administered. The account should fit the unique operational and mission requirements of the individual components.

In the active forces, centralized Individuals accounts are used, administered by each Service’s military personnel center. This model appears to be inappropriate to the reserve components, principally because reserve personnel are generally recruited in geographic areas near where they will train. Reservists cannot easily be transferred to different geographic areas, as active force personnel can.

Three generic models may be appropriate for the reserve components:

1. **State or Regional Personnel Accounts.** The ARNG could organize a personnel account for each state, operated by the Adjutant General’s office in each state. This approach might also be attractive to the USAR, using the State Readiness Centers. The USNR currently uses a regional approach, with a control group called “MAC-G” at each training/readiness center for managing untrained personnel.

2. **Base-Level Personnel Accounts.** The ANG student flights provide an example of base-level personnel accounts. Non-prior-service personnel enlist in a specific force structure unit associated with a specific Air Force base. Each base has a student flight for the personnel undergoing initial training. After the trainees complete their basic and skill training at Air Force training centers and schools, they leave the rolls of the student flight and are assigned to their original force structure units. This model may be appropriate for the USAFR.

3. **Unit-Level Personnel Accounts.** A personnel account could be established for each unit that has a unique unit identification code (UIC). Derivative UICs could be used to tie the personnel accounts to specific units.
Chapter 5

Allocating Manpower Authorizations

At present, the reserve components allocate their total authorized end strength to force structure units, because the units carry on their rolls nondeployable members.

Force structure planners in the active forces routinely allocate a portion of their congressionally authorized end strength (13 percent average for all Services combined) to the Individuals account and use the rest to construct the authorized force structure units. For the Selected Reserve, the nondeployable personnel accounts would be the counterpart of the active force Individuals accounts.

The proportion of total authorized strength that should be set aside for the personnel accounts will vary by component. On the basis of the nondeployables we propose to be transferred to the personnel account (Table 4-1), we estimate that this proportion will average about 6 percent but will vary from 9 percent in the USAR to as low as 2 percent in the USAFR. The determining factor is the proportion of personnel who have not completed initial training. Reserve components that rely heavily on non-prior-service accessions, like the Army components and the USMCR, would need to set aside a higher proportion of their authorized end strength than would the components that rely primarily on prior-service accessions.\(^1\)

Given a fixed end strength personnel ceiling authorized by the Congress, establishing nondeployable accounts without reducing the number of billets in force structure units would result in personnel shortages in units (i.e., on-board strength would fall short of authorized strength). Assigning the nondeployable personnel to the personnel accounts will result in the units having an equivalent number of unfilled billets. The personnel system is distorted when more billets are authorized in units than the personnel system can possibly fill.

In commenting on the LMI issue paper described in Chapter 2, all six reserve components opposed reducing the number of force structure billets. One component, the USAR, stated that it would establish personnel accounts for nondeployables if the Congress increased its end strength authorizations by 15 percent.\(^2\)

Personnel funding would have to be increased to pay for the higher personnel levels. A higher personnel ceiling and funds would enable the USAR to keep its planned force structure intact, fill all force structure billets with trained and deployable personnel, and also fund the nondeployables assigned to the

\(^1\) See Table 3-1.
\(^2\) On the basis of our proposed definitions of nondeployables, the required increase would be 9 percent.
proposed personnel accounts. Taking this step would significantly improve the readiness and capability of the USAR.

Table 5-1 illustrates the change in manning for a unit authorized 100 positions that are currently filled with 90 deployables and 10 nondeployables. An increase in end strength ceiling and funds would enable the unit to assign the nondeployables to a personnel account and fill all authorized positions with deployable personnel. Note that the total number of personnel in the illustration increases from 100 to 110, requiring a higher congressionally authorized end strength and the funds to pay for the increase.

Table 5-1.
*Unit Illustration Assuming Increased Authorizations and Personnel Funds*

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Unit authorization</th>
<th>Assigned to unit</th>
<th>Assigned to nondeployable account</th>
<th>Total personnel</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Deployable</td>
<td>Nondeployable</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Current</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>90</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Proposed</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>10</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Although this solution is highly desirable, congressional approval of the required strength and personnel funding increases is not likely. It is also unlikely that DoD would offer to shift funds from the active forces to the reserve components.

Assuming that planned end strength and personnel funds will not increase, we now examine alternative ways to reduce authorized force structure billets. The Military Services have extensive experience in raising and lowering force structure authorizations. Reductions are accomplished by a combination of the following actions:

1. Deactivating whole units, (e.g., divisions, brigades, companies, wings, squadrons, ships, etc.).

2. Reducing the number of billets authorized in units but retaining the units in the force structure.

Table 5-2 illustrates how the inactivation of one small unit can provide the resources to improve the readiness of four other units. This change is accomplished with no increase in end strength ceiling or personnel funds. The numbers of units inactivated would, of course, depend on their sizes. A reserve component with an average of 10 percent nondeployables would need to inactivate about 10 percent of its average-sized units.
### Table 5-2.
**Unit Illustration Assuming Inactivation of a Unit to Increase Readiness of Other Units**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Unit</th>
<th>Unit授权</th>
<th>Deployable</th>
<th>Nondeployable</th>
<th>Assigned to nondeployable account</th>
<th>Total personnel</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Current</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Unit A</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>90</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>100</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Unit B</td>
<td>200</td>
<td>180</td>
<td>20</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>200</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Unit C</td>
<td>200</td>
<td>180</td>
<td>20</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>200</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Unit D</td>
<td>500</td>
<td>450</td>
<td>50</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>500</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Unit E</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>90</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>100</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>1,100</td>
<td>990</td>
<td>110</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1,100</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Proposed</th>
<th>Unit授权</th>
<th>Inactivated</th>
<th>Assigned to nondeployable account</th>
<th>Total personnel</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Unit A</td>
<td>200</td>
<td>200</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>220</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Unit B</td>
<td>200</td>
<td>200</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>220</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Unit C</td>
<td>500</td>
<td>500</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>550</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Unit D</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>110</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>1,000</td>
<td>1,000</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1,100</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The reserve components are reluctant to deactivate whole units because of opposition in local communities and states that have been loyal supporters of the guard and reserve. Also, deactivation may eliminate units that are needed to support contingency plans. However, deactivation should not be ruled out, because this method can provide the reserves needed to increase the readiness of remaining units. Deactivations for the purpose of rationalizing the personnel accounting system would be occurring at a time when other deactivations are being made as part of the current drawdown of both active forces and reserve components.

The other way to reduce authorized billets is to retain units but make some of them smaller. All Services have used this method in designing active force and reserve component structures. In the Army, unit downsizing is accomplished by reducing the Authorized Level of Organization (ALO). For example, an ALO-3 unit would be authorized at 70 percent to 80 percent of full strength. The reductions could be made proportionately across all units or selectively in some units and not in others.

A logical way to reduce the number of authorized billets in existing units is to give priority to early-deploying units. For example, units scheduled for early deployment (first 30 or 60 days) would be authorized at full strength, while later deploying units would be authorized at a lower strength. The later deploying
units would be the “bill payers” for the early-deploying units. These late-deploying units would have sufficient time to increase their manning levels as trainees complete their initial training and personnel become available from the IRR pool.

Table 5-3 illustrates how reducing the authorized strength of some late-deploying units would improve the readiness of other, early-deploying units without increasing the congressional end strength ceiling or the number of personnel to be paid.

**Table 5-3.**  
*Unit Illustration Assuming the Authorized Strength of Some Units is Reduced to Increase Readiness of Others*

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Unit authorization</th>
<th>Assigned to unit</th>
<th>Assigned to nondeployable account</th>
<th>Total personnel</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Deployable</td>
<td>Nondeployable</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Current</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Unit A – late deploying</td>
<td>200</td>
<td>180</td>
<td>20</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Unit B – late deploying</td>
<td>200</td>
<td>180</td>
<td>20</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Unit C – early deploying</td>
<td>200</td>
<td>180</td>
<td>20</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>600</td>
<td>540</td>
<td>60</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Proposed</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Unit A – late deploying</td>
<td>170</td>
<td>170</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Unit B – late deploying</td>
<td>170</td>
<td>170</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Unit C – early deploying</td>
<td>200</td>
<td>200</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>540</td>
<td>540</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

One apparent obstacle to inactivating units or reducing authorized billets in force structure units is the provision in Section 1115 of Title XI of the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 1993 stating that “…the account (referring to the personnel account) may not be used as a factor in establishing the level of Army Guard and Reserve force structure.”

In our discussions with congressional staff members, we were unable to get a clarification of the purpose and scope of this limitation. The law directs the ARNG to install a personnel account for nondeployables and requires the Secretary of Defense to advise the Congress whether similar accounts should be created in the other reserve components. We believe that DoD should advise the Congress that the proper operation of a personnel account for nondeployables
requires either reductions in force structure authorizations or an increase in reserve component end strength and additional funding for that additional personnel strength.

The allocation of a portion of the congressional end strength ceiling to the personnel account will provide an incentive to minimize the number of nondeployable personnel in the Selective Reserve. In the active forces, there is a trade-off between the size of the Individuals account and the size of the force structure. The same relationship would hold in the Selected Reserve between the personnel account and the force structure. Reducing the number of nondeployable personnel assigned to the personnel account would enable a reserve component to have a larger force structure. The number of nondeployables assigned to the personnel account can be reduced by

- recruiting a larger proportion of prior-service personnel, thereby reducing the number of recruits awaiting or undergoing initial training;

- separating physically disqualified personnel and unsatisfactory performers more rapidly; and

- reducing the number of enlisted personnel who are awaiting entry to the basic training portion of initial training (Code P). The USMCR assigns most recruits awaiting entry to basic training to the IRR.\(^3\) A similar procedure should be considered by the other components, especially the ARNG and the USAR.

---

\(^3\) As shown in Table 4-1, the numbers of enlisted Selected Reserve personnel awaiting entry to basic training are: ARNG – 10,258; USAR – 6,974; USNR – 1,068; USMCR – 47; ANG – 1,004; and USAFR – 183.
CHAPTER 6

Alternatives and Recommendations

This final chapter discusses alternatives for changing the personnel accounting systems for all Selected Reserve components. The goal is to ameliorate the degradation to unit readiness caused by the assignment of nondeployable personnel to unit billets. Three alternatives are presented. Each succeeding alternative includes the changes provided by any preceding alternative(s). Each alternative is applicable to all six DoD Selected Reserve components.

ALTERNATIVE #1 — IMPROVE IDENTIFICATION OF NONDEPLOYABLE PERSONNEL (CHAPTER 3)

The RCCPDS currently has codes to identify enlisted personnel who have not completed initial training. The changes we recommend would standardize the application of existing codes and add codes for the following categories of nondeployables:

- Officers who have not completed initial officer training; undergraduate pilot or navigator training; advanced medical training
- Members who are expected to be physically disqualified for at least 90 days
- Members who are under judicial restraint.

Given 30 September 1993 strengths, the suggested identification changes would increase the nondeployables identified in the RCCPDS from 57,757 to 66,363, expanding the identified group from 5.5 percent of total strength to an estimated 6.3 percent of total strength.

These changes alone will not identify all nondeployables. The largest unidentified category consists of members who are physically disqualified but have defects that can be corrected in less than 90 days. This omitted group accounted for the largest number of nondeployables during the Persian Gulf mobilization, especially in the ARNG and the USAR. The more limited identification of physically disqualified personnel proposed by LMI is consistent with the congressional provision\(^1\) for the ARNG and the rules used by the active forces in transferring physically disqualified personnel to the Individuals account. The new physical examination procedures directed by the Congress for the ARNG

---

\(^1\)Section 1116 of Title XI of the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 1993.
should (if adopted by all six components) result in reducing significantly the number of people deemed nondeployable for physical reasons.

The proposed identification changes are, in the main, supported by all reserve components and are amenable to revision based on experience and on alterations in deployment policy. For example, we do not recommend identifying as nondeployable the bulk of the personnel who are on active duty for advanced training (e.g., advanced radar training or professional military education). They would not be so identified because the reserve components state that they will be recalled to their units and deployed if needed during a mobilization. If this policy changes, additional nondeployable codes can be added to the RCCPDS.

Identification of nondeployables in the RCCPDS provides useful information to commanders and to staff officers responsible for improving readiness and for selecting units to be mobilized. However, identification by itself is insufficient. The most-used manpower reports simply compare authorized and actual strength by unit, by command, or by reserve component. These reports include nondeployables as part of unit strength. Nondeployable personnel are encumbering positions that should be filled with trained, deployable personnel. The Congress directed the establishment of a personnel account for nondeployables in the ARNG because it recognized that mere identification does not solve the problem.

**ALTERNATIVE #2 — ASSIGN IDENTIFIED NONDEPLOYABLES TO A PERSONNEL ACCOUNT (CHAPTER 4)**

Establishing a personnel account for nondeployables would highlight unit personnel shortages that should be filled before deployment.

The personnel account mandated by the Congress for the ARNG is a counterpart to the Individuals account in the active forces. Three of the reserve components — the USNR, the USMCR, and the ANG — already have personnel accounts for untrained enlisted personnel, and those accounts can be broadened to include additional nondeployables. Creating personnel accounts for the two remaining reserve components — the USAR and the USAFR — is necessary to avoid confusion and bad decisions when strength data are displayed for all reserve components and when joint staffs are involved in selecting units for mobilization and deployment.

Establishing a personnel account does not by itself raise the readiness level of units. But identification and assignment of nondeployables to a personnel account does provide better information to help resolve unit readiness problems when units are mobilized.
ALTERNATIVE #3 — ADJUST FORCE STRUCTURE AUTHORIZATIONS TO THE PLANNED SUPPLY OF TRAINED AND DEPLOYABLE PERSONNEL (CHAPTER 5)

Alternative #2 would shift nondeployables to a personnel account, creating unit vacancies. These vacancies cannot now be filled because of congressional limitations on the number of reservists and the funds appropriated to pay and train them. There are two choices:

- Increase the total authorized end strength of each reserve component and provide additional funds.
- Reduce the force structure.

We present two subalternatives.

Alternative 3A — Increase Authorized End Strength and Funds

Adopting this course of action would require an overall DoD reserve component increase in end strength of about 66,000 personnel (based on 30 September 1993 force structure and nondeployable strengths as shown in Table 4-1). This increase would enable the reserve components to maintain their planned unit force structure authorizations and fill all authorized positions with trained and deployable personnel.²

Alternative 3B — Reduce Unit Force Structure

This alternative assumes that DoD and the Congress are not willing to provide the additional authorized strength and funds discussed in Alternative 3A. Unit force reductions can be made by inactivating units, by lowering the authorized strength of units, or by a combination of both. The manpower authorization levels of priority units scheduled to deploy early can be maintained at wartime levels, at the expense of lower priority units.

Adopting either Alternative 3A or Alternative 3B or a combination would enable the reserve components to fill all authorized positions in units while assigning identified nondeployable personnel to personnel accounts. Currently some unit authorized positions are filled with untrained or otherwise nondeployable personnel. The reserve components are overstructured. There is a cost for improving the readiness of units. Alternative 3A assumes that additional resources will be provided to achieve this higher readiness level. In Alternative 3B,

² The required increase will be somewhat smaller in future years as the overall Selected Reserve force structure is reduced.
the bill-payer is the reduction of authorized force structure or manning levels. Figure 6-1 provides a visual description of the alternatives.

![Graph showing percent of units assigned and non-deployable in different alternatives]

- **Alt #1**: Improved identification only.
- **Alt #2**: Alt #1, plus assigning nondeployables to personnel account.
- **Alt #3A**: Alt #2, plus increased total personnel and authorized strength.
- **Alt #3B**: Alt #2, plus force structure reduction or reduced manning levels.

**Notes**: Auth = authorized; Assgn = assigned; Pers Acct = personnel account; Alt = alternative.

**Figure 6-1.**
*Alternative Reserve Component Authorization and Manning Changes*

**LMI Recommendations**

1. **Implement Alternative #3 for all reserve components.** This course of action includes improving the identification of nondeployables, assigning nondeployables to personnel accounts, and reserving a portion of total authorizations for the personnel account. An effort should be made to secure additional resources (end strength and dollars) to maintain the current planned force structure. If this increase is not provided, the force structure should be reduced.
2. *Take actions to reduce the number of nondeployables who are not assigned to personnel accounts.* These actions would include

a. peacetime physical examinations to identify temporarily physically disabled personnel (e.g., dental defects) and remedial actions to correct their defects, and

b. periodic review of child-care plans of members who are single parents to reduce the number who are nondeployable for hardship reasons.
Title XI — Army Guard Combat Reform Initiative


House Report 102-966

October 1, 1992
TITLE XI—ARMY GUARD COMBAT REFORM INITIATIVE

SEC. 1101. SHORT TITLE.
This title may be cited as the “Army National Guard Combat Readiness Reform Act of 1993”.

Subtitle A—Deployability Enhancements

SEC. 1111. MINIMUM PERCENTAGE OF PRIOR ACTIVE-DUTY PERSONNEL.
(a) Establishment of Minimum Percentage.—The Secretary of the Army shall have an objective of increasing the percentage of qualified prior active-duty personnel in the Army National Guard to 65 percent, in the case of officers, and to 50 percent, in the case of enlisted members, by September 30, 1997.
(b) Interim Accession Percentages.—The Secretary shall prescribe regulations establishing for each of fiscal years 1993 through 1997 an accession percentage for officers, and a separate accession percentage for enlisted members, for prior active-duty personnel so as to facilitate compliance with the objectives stated in subsection (a).
(c) Qualified Prior Active-Duty Personnel.—For purposes of this section, qualified prior active-duty personnel are members of the Army National Guard with not less than two years of active duty.
(d) Deadline for Regulations.—The regulations required by subsection (a) shall be prescribed not later than March 15, 1993. The Secretary shall submit those regulations to the Committees on Armed Services of the Senate and House of Representatives not later than April 1, 1993.

SEC. 1112. SERVICE IN SELECTED RESERVE IN LIEU OF ACTIVE-DUTY SERVICE.

(a) Academy Graduates and Distinguished ROTC Graduates To Serve in Selected Reserve for Period of Active-Duty Service Obligation Not Served on Active Duty.—(1) An officer who is a graduate of one of the service academies or who was commissioned as a distinguished Reserve Officers’ Training Corps graduate and who is permitted to be released from active duty before the completion of the active-duty service obligation applicable to that officer shall serve the remaining period of such active-duty service obligation as a member of the Selected Reserve.
(2) The Secretary concerned may waive paragraph (1) in a case in which the Secretary determines that there is no unit position available for the officer.
(b) ROTC Graduates.—The Secretary of the Army shall provide a program under which graduates of the Reserve Officers’ Training Corps program may perform their minimum period of obligated service by a combination of (A) two years of active duty, and (B) such additional period of service as is necessary to complete the remainder of such obligation, to be served in the National Guard.

SEC. 1113. REVIEW OF OFFICER PROMOTIONS BY COMMANDER OF ASSOCIATED ACTIVE DUTY UNIT.

(a) Review.—Whenever an officer in an Army National Guard unit as defined in subsection (b) is recommended for a unit vacancy promotion to a grade above first lieutenant, the recommended pro-
motion shall be reviewed by the commander of the active duty unit associated with the National Guard unit of that officer or another active-duty officer designated by the Secretary of the Army. The commander or other active-duty officer designated by the Secretary of the Army shall provide to the promoting authority, through the promotion board convened by the promotion authority to consider unit vacancy promotion candidates, before the promotion is made, a recommendation of concurrence or nonconcurrence in the promotion. The recommendation shall be provided to the promoting authority within 60 days after receipt of notice of the recommended promotion.

(b) IMPLEMENTATION.—Subsection (a) shall take effect—

1. on April 1, 1993, for officers in Army National Guard units that on that date are designated as round-out/round-up units;

2. on October 1, 1993, for officers in other units of the Army National Guard in the Selected Reserve of the Ready Reserve that are designated as early deploying units; and

3. on April 1, 1994, for officers in all other Army National Guard combat units.

(c) REPORT ON FEASIBILITY.—The Secretary of the Army shall submit to the Committees on Armed Services of the Senate and House of Representatives a report, not later than March 1, 1993, containing a plan for implementation of subsection (a). The Secretary may include with the report such proposals for legislation to clarify, improve, or modify the provisions of subsection (a) in order to better carry out the purposes of those provisions as the Secretary considers appropriate.

SEC. 1114. NONCOMMISSIONED OFFICER EDUCATION REQUIREMENTS.

(a) NONWAIVABILITY.—Any standard prescribed by the Secretary of the Army establishing a military education requirement for noncommissioned officers that must be met as a requirement for promotion to a higher noncommissioned officer grade may be waived only if the Secretary determines that the waiver is necessary in order to preserve unit leadership continuity under combat conditions.

(b) AVAILABILITY OF TRAINING POSITIONS.—The Secretary of the Army shall ensure that there are sufficient training positions available to enable compliance with subsection (a).

SEC. 1115. INITIAL ENTRY TRAINING AND NONDEPLOYABLE PERSONNEL ACCOUNT.

(a) ESTABLISHMENT OF PERSONNEL ACCOUNT.—The Secretary of the Army shall establish a personnel accounting category for members of the Army National Guard to be used for categorizing members of the National Guard who have not completed the minimum training required for deployment or who are otherwise not available for deployment. The account shall be designed so that it is compatible with the decentralized personnel systems of the Army Guard and Reserve. The account shall be used for the reporting of personnel readiness and may not be used as a factor in establishing the level of Army Guard and Reserve force structure.

(b) USE OF ACCOUNT.—Until a member of the Army National Guard has completed the minimum training necessary for deployment, the member may not be assigned to fill a position in a Na-
tional Guard unit but shall be carried in the account established under subsection (a).

(c) Time for Qualification for Deployment.—(1) If at the end of 24 months after a member of the Army National Guard enters the National Guard, the member has not completed the minimum training required for deployment, the member shall be discharged from the Army National Guard.

(2) The Secretary of the Army may waive the requirement in paragraph (1) in the case of health care providers and in other cases determined necessary. The authority to make such a waiver may not be delegated.

SEC. 1116. MINIMUM PHYSICAL DEPLOYABILITY STANDARDS.

The Secretary of the Army shall transfer the personnel classification of a member of the Army National Guard from the National Guard unit of the member to the personnel account established pursuant to section 1115 if the member does not meet minimum physical profile standards required for deployment. Any such transfer shall be made not later than 90 days after the date on which the determination that the member does not meet such standards is made.

SEC. 1117. MEDICAL ASSESSMENTS.

The Secretary of the Army shall require that—

(1) each member of the Army National Guard undergo a medical and dental screening on an annual basis; and

(2) each member of the Army National Guard over the age of 40 undergo a full physical examination not less often than every two years.

SEC. 1118. DENTAL READINESS OF MEMBERS OF EARLY DEPLOYING UNITS.

(a) Development of Plan.—The Secretary of the Army shall develop a plan to ensure that units of the Army National Guard scheduled for early deployment in the event of a mobilization (as determined by the Secretary) are dentally ready (as defined in regulations of the Secretary) for deployment.

(b) Report.—The Secretary shall submit to the Committees on Armed Services of the Senate and House of Representatives a report on such plan not later than February 15, 1993. The Secretary shall include in the report any legislative proposals that the Secretary considers necessary in order to implement the plan.

SEC. 1119. COMBAT UNIT TRAINING.

The Secretary of the Army shall establish a program to minimize the post-mobilization training time required for combat units of the Army National Guard. The program shall require—

(1) that unit premobilization training emphasize—

(A) individual soldier qualification and training;

(B) collective training and qualification at the crew, section, team, and squad level; and

(C) maneuver training at the platoon level as required of all Army units; and

(2) that combat training for command and staff leadership include annual multi-echelon training to develop battalion, brigade, and division level skills, as appropriate.
SEC. 1120. USE OF COMBAT SIMULATORS.

The Secretary of the Army shall expand the use of simulations, simulators, and advanced training devices and technologies in order to increase training opportunities for members and units of the Army National Guard.

Subtitle B—Assessment of National Guard Capability

SEC. 1121. DEPLOYABILITY RATING SYSTEM.

The Secretary of the Army shall modify the readiness rating system for units of the Army Reserve and Army National Guard to ensure that the rating system provides an accurate assessment of the deployability of a unit and those shortfalls of a unit that require the provision of additional resources. In making such modifications, the Secretary shall ensure that the unit readiness rating system is designed so—

(1) that the personnel readiness rating of a unit reflects—
   (A) both the percentage of the overall personnel requirement of the unit that is manned and deployable and the fill and deployability rate for critical occupational specialties necessary for the unit to carry out its basic mission requirements; and
   (B) the number of personnel in the unit who are qualified in their primary military occupational specialty; and
(2) that the equipment readiness assessment of a unit—
   (A) documents all equipment required for deployment;
   (B) reflects only that equipment that is directly possessed by the unit;
   (C) specifies the effect of substitute items; and
   (D) assesses the effect of missing components and sets on the readiness of major equipments items.

SEC. 1122. INSPECTIONS.

Section 105 of title 32, United States Code, is amended—

(1) in subsection (a)—
   (A) by striking out “may” in the matter preceding paragraph (1) and inserting in lieu thereof “shall”;
   (B) by striking out “and” at the end of paragraph (5);
   (C) by striking out the period at the end of paragraph (6) and inserting in lieu thereof “; and”;
   (D) by inserting after paragraph (6) the following:
   “(7) the units of the Army National Guard meet requirements for deployment.”;
and
(2) in subsection (b), by inserting “, and for determining which units of the National Guard meet deployability standards” before the period.

Subtitle C—Compatibility of Guard Units With Active Component Units

SEC. 1131. ACTIVE DUTY ASSOCIATE UNIT RESPONSIBILITY.

(a) ASSOCIATE UNITS.—The Secretary of the Army shall require that each National Guard combat unit of the Army National Guard be associated with an active-duty combat unit.
(b) Responsibilities.—The commander (at a brigade or higher level) of the associated active duty unit for any National Guard combat unit shall be responsible for—

(1) approving the training program of the National Guard unit;

(2) reviewing the readiness report of the National Guard unit;

(3) assessing the manpower, equipment, and training resources requirements of the National Guard unit; and

(4) validating, not less often than annually, the compatibility of the National Guard unit with the active duty forces.

(c) Implementation.—The Secretary of the Army shall begin to implement subsection (a) during fiscal year 1993 and shall achieve full implementation of the plan not later than October 1, 1995.

SEC. 1132. TRAINING COMPATIBILITY.

Section 414(c) of the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Years 1992 and 1993 (106 Stat. 1353) is amended by adding at the end the following new paragraph:

"(4) After September 30, 1994, not less than 3,000 warrant officers and enlisted members in addition to those assigned under paragraph (2) shall be assigned to serve as advisers under the program."

SEC. 1133. SYSTEMS COMPATIBILITY.

(a) Compatibility Program.—The Secretary of the Army shall develop and implement a program to ensure that Army personnel systems, Army supply systems, Army maintenance management systems, and Army finance systems are compatible across all Army components.

(b) Report.—Not later than September 30, 1993, the Secretary shall submit to the Committees on Armed Services of the Senate and House of Representatives a report describing the program under subsection (a) and setting forth a plan for implementation of the program by the end of fiscal year 1997.

SEC. 1134. EQUIPMENT COMPATIBILITY.

Section 115b(b) of title 10, United States Code, is amended by adding at the end the following new paragraph:

"(3) A statement of the current status of the compatibility of equipment between the Army reserve components and active forces of the Army, the effect of that level of incompatibility on combat effectiveness, and a plan to achieve full equipment compatibility."

SEC. 1135. DEPLOYMENT PLANNING REFORM.

(a) Requirement for Priority System.—The Secretary of the Army shall develop a system for identifying the priority for mobilization of Army reserve component units. The priority system shall be based on regional contingency planning requirements and doctrine to be integrated into the Army war planning process.

(b) Unit Deployment Designators.—The system shall include the use of Unit Deployment Designators to specify the post-mobilization training days allocated to a unit before deployment. The Secretary shall specify standard designator categories in order to group units according to the timing of deployment after mobilization.
(c) USE OF DESIGNATORS.—(1) The Secretary shall establish procedures to link the Unit Deployment Designator system to the process by which resources are provided for National Guard units.

(2) The Secretary shall develop a plan that allocates greater funding for training, full-time support, equipment, and manpower in excess of 100 percent of authorized strength to units assigned unit deployment designators that allow fewer post-mobilization training days.

(3) The Secretary shall establish procedures to identify the command level at which combat units would, upon deployment, be integrated with active component forces consistent with the Unit Deployment Designator system.

SEC. 1136. QUALIFICATION FOR PRIOR-SERVICE ENLISTMENT BONUS.

Section 308i(c) of title 37, United States Code, is amended by striking out the period at the end and inserting in lieu thereof "and may not be paid a bonus under this section unless the specialty associated with the position the member is projected to occupy is a specialty in which the member successfully served while on active duty and attained a level of qualification commensurate with the member's grade and years of service."

SEC. 1137. STUDY OF IMPLEMENTATION FOR ALL RESERVE COMPONENTS.

The Secretary of Defense shall conduct an assessment of the feasibility of implementing the provisions of this title for all reserve components. Not later than December 31, 1993, the Secretary shall submit to the Committees on Armed Services of the Senate and House of Representatives a report containing a plan for such implementation.
Correspondence Regarding Previous Attempts to Change the Selected Reserve Personnel Accounting System
Contents

Reserve Component Individuals Policy, Secretary of the Army, dated 30 March 1984 B-5

Reserve Component Non-Deployable Accounts, Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense (Reserve Affairs), dated 7 May 1986 B-7

Reserve Component Non-Deployable Accounts — Information Memorandum, Department of the Air Force (Office of the Assistant Secretary), dated 30 May 1986 B-9

Reserve Component Non-Deployable Accounts, Department of the Army (Office of the Assistant Secretary), dated 9 June 1986 B-11

Reserve Component Non-Deployable Accounts — Information Memorandum, The Assistant Secretary of the Navy, (Manpower and Reserve Affairs), undated B-13

Reserve Component Non-Deployable Accounts, U.S. Department of Transportation (Commandant, United States Coast Guard), undated B-15

Reserve Component Non-Deployable Accounts, Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense (Reserve Affairs), dated 27 August 1986 B-17

Implementation of Reserve Component Nondeployable Accounts, Assistant Secretary of Defense (Reserve Affairs), dated 9 January 1987 B-19
MEMORANDUM FOR HEADS OF ARMY STAFF AGENCIES
COMMANDER, U. S. ARMY FORCES COMMAND

SUBJECT: Reserve Component Individuals Policy

The Army needs a better way to portray the nondeployability of personnel in the Reserve Component training pipeline. The inclusion in unit operating strength of personnel in the training pipeline distorts the assigned personnel REDCON for most units and hinders attainment of Defense Guidance to achieve 90 percent trained-in-unit strength, measured against wartime required strength, by 1989.

Effective October 1, 1984, a Reserve Component individuals account is established. The first phase will implement procedures to administer and report individuals. Other phases will follow as management systems and procedures are developed.

Initially, Reserve Component soldiers in the individuals account will consist of junior enlisted personnel, to include the simultaneous membership program, assigned to Reserve Component units who have not completed initial entry qualification training and are nondeployable. Inclusion of officers and noncommissioned officers in the individuals account will be considered at a later date. Personnel classified as individuals will continue to be assigned to Reserve Component units.

The individuals allowance will not exceed 10 percent above the peacetime authorized strength of units in the Reserve Component force structure. The establishment of the individuals allowance does not constitute authority to increase unit end strengths resulting from any previously established overstrength policy or to exceed congressional constraints placed on any units.

John O. Marsh, Jr.
MEMORANDUM FOR ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF THE ARMY
(MANPOWER AND RESERVE AFFAIRS)
ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF THE NAVY
(MANPOWER AND RESERVE AFFAIRS)
ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF THE AIR FORCE (MANPOWER,
RESERVE AFFAIRS AND INSTALLATIONS)
CHIEF, OFFICE OF READINESS AND RESERVE,
UNITED STATES COAST GUARD

SUBJECT: Reserve Component Non-Deployable Accounts

May 7, 1986

In FY 1986, the reserve components will have more than
82,000 non-deployable, untrained unit members in training status,
and 64,000 full-time active Guard and Reserve members, some of
whom are also non-deployable. With the partial exception of the
Army National Guard and Army Reserve, these individuals are
presently assigned to unit billets even though they are not
deployable.

It is essential that we have personnel accounting systems
for determining the actual numbers of Reservists and Guardsmen
who are deployable - those that constitute our "trained strength
in units". We must know how many soldiers, sailors and airmen
have actually completed the required 12 weeks of initial active
duty training (IADT) or its equivalent, and are assigned to units
as deployable assets. Those who do not meet the criteria for
deployability should not be assigned to positions in units that
will mobilize and deploy.

The Army has already taken initial steps to implement such
a system by establishing a reserve component "training pipeline"
similar to the active component "individual's account"
(attachment). The system is currently limited to ten percent
of peacetime unit strength and to junior enlisted personnel;
however, the Army is considering the inclusion of officer and
noncommissioned officer personnel later.

I believe it is time that each reserve component establish
similar accounts. At a minimum, these accounts should include:

a. All non-deployable personnel, including transients,
   patients, prisoners and holdees, trainees and students.

b. Personnel who have completed IADT, but who are
   scheduled to be absent from their units for more than 140 days
while attending skill training, cross-training or professional military education.

My staff recently instituted a standard computation of "trained strength in units." The computation was included for the first time in the Defense Manpower Requirements Report, dated February 1986, and will be requested in future Service POMs. By establishing an account as described above, your ability to accurately account for trained strength in units and manage non-deployable personnel will be greatly enhanced.

I would appreciate your comments not later than May 30, 1986. My project officer on this issue is Colonel David Smith, extension 40470 or 57307.

[Signature]

James H. Webb, Jr.

Attachment

cc: Deputy Chief of Staff for Reserve Affairs, USMC
MEMORANDUM FOR THE ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

SUBJECT: RESERVE COMPONENT NON-DEPLOYABLE ACCOUNTS - INFORMATION MEMORANDUM

The Air National Guard (ANG) has been equally concerned about properly tracking its resources who are not considered mobility assets. For that reason, they developed the concept of Student Flights. The purpose of these student flights is to segregate those ANG members in the training pipeline from operationally ready members.

The training pipeline basically consists of members awaiting completion of Initial Active Duty for Training, Academy of Military Science, formal training, Air Force speciality qualification training, etc.

Student flights do not include members who are in advanced skill training, PME, or retraining. According to Air Force guidance contained in AFR 2B-4, availability of members in PME for mobility will be determined by HQ USAF. Those in advance training and retraining will be available for worldwide assignment.

The Air Force Reserve, through use of the Personnel Data System, has the capability of monitoring, controlling, and reporting Air Force Reserve Personnel in Student Status, without the use of a training pipeline or individual account.

Karen R. Keesling
Acting Assistant Secretary of the Air Force
(Manpower, Reserve Affairs and Installations)

cc: Secretary of Defense
MEMORANDUM FOR OFFICE OF THE ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF DEFENSE
(RESERVE AFFAIRS)

SUBJECT: Reserve Component Non-Deployable Accounts

The Army applauds the proposal in your memorandum of May 7, 1986 to establish non-deployable accounts among the other Services in which to identify those who are temporarily unavailable for deployment. Also, the Army supports fully the concept of a standard computation format for trained strength in units in the Defense Manpower Requirements Report and in future Service POMs.

Secretary Marsh recognized in 1984 when he established the Individuals Account that as reserve component strength continues to increase, our readiness objectives of 100% trained strength in units can never be reached without making a provision for the training pipeline to be accounted for separately. The Individuals Account in the Army is a valuable accounting tool to measure progress in attaining trained strength in units to meet Defense Guidance objectives.

At the present time the Army has completed the coordination process to expand the Individuals Account to officers and noncommissioned officers who are undeployable and we plan to implement this change as soon as the authority becomes available in the new DoDD 1215.6.

The reserve components depend on various overstrength provisions to maintain strength. This one is essential to meet our readiness objectives.

William D. Clark
Principal Deputy Assistant Secretary
(Manpower and Reserve Affairs)
MEMORANDUM FOR THE ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF DEFENSE
(RESERVE AFFAIRS)

Subj: RESERVE COMPONENT NON-DEPLOYABLE ACCOUNTS - INFORMATION MEMORANDUM

The Department of the Navy concurs with the necessity to have personnel accounting systems for determining the actual number of reservists that are deployable.

With few exceptions, Selected Naval Reservists who are not deployable are already accounted for as individuals. For TARs, the existing "individuals account" in the Department of the Navy Five Year Defense Program and the Defense Manpower Requirements Report parallels that of the active component and includes transients, patients, prisoners, holdees, students, and trainees. Inactive Reservists funded and accounted for as individuals include those undergoing Initial Active Duty for Training (Training/Pay categories F and U). Individual Mobilization Augmentees (IMAs) are also accounted for as "individuals" as they are not included in the "trained strength in units" category although they may be considered fully deployable.

The Marine Corps Reserve considers its manpower accounting procedures adequate with minor modifications to differentiate between deployable and non-deployable manpower assets. However, it is the opinion of the Marine Corps' Deputy Chief of Staff, Reserve Affairs, that complete compliance with the spirit of your memo, at TAB A, will require revisions to DODI 7730.54 and DODI 1215.6 to clarify definitions and reporting instructions.

The Deputy Chief of Staff for Reserve Affairs recommends that DoD form a working group to resolve any issues on this matter; develop recommended changes to DODI 7730.54 and DODI 1215.6; and, has designated Major D. K. Franklin as his officer.

TAB A - ASD(RA) memo of 7 May 86
From: Commandant
To: Assistant Secretary of Defense (Reserve Affairs)

Subj: RESERVE COMPONENT NON-DEPLOYABLE ACCOUNTS

Ref: (a) Your memo of 7 May 1986

1. I have reviewed your proposal to develop separate accounting for non-deployable personnel and agree with the need to be able to identify non-deployable reservists so that they can be treated differently within the mobilization system.

2. I recommend that uniform provisions for establishing and managing such accounts be incorporated in DoD Directive 1215.6 as part of your on-going revision to that important directive. I would appreciate your inclusion of a Coast Guard representative in any joint-service working group established to develop uniform policy for implementation of the non-deployable account concept.

S. D. Bee
Commandant and Chief of Staff
MEMORANDUM FOR ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF DEFENSE (COMPTROLLER)
ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF DEFENSE (FORCE MANAGEMENT
AND PERSONNEL)
DIRECTOR, PROGRAM ANALYSIS AND EVALUATION
ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF THE ARMY (MANPOWER AND
RESERVE AFFAIRS)
ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF THE NAVY (MANPOWER AND
RESERVE AFFAIRS)
ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF THE AIR FORCE (MANPOWER,
RESERVE AFFAIRS AND INSTALLATIONS)
CHIEF, OFFICE OF READINESS AND RESERVE,
UNITED STATES COAST GUARD

SUBJECT: Reserve Component Non-Deployable Accounts

We have received responses from all addressees on our
suggestion to establish reserve component non-deployable
accounts. (Our memo, subject as above, dated May 7, 1986, is
attached). These responses indicate general support for the
proposal. The Marine Corps, however, suggested that a DoD
Working Group be established to review current directives and
proposed changes prior to any implementation.

I support this suggestion, and therefore request that each
addressee name representatives to such a working group. Please
have the names of your representatives transmitted to Col David
A. Smith, OASD(RA)(G/R M&P) by September 15, 1986. I would like
to implement changes by the first of the year so that FY-89 POMS
can be submitted consistent with these changes. Col Smith will
chair the working group and can be reached at extension 57306.

James H. Webb, Jr.

Attachment

cc: Deputy Chief of Staff for Reserve Affairs, USMC

RA Chron
RA Read
M&P Chron
M&P Subject File CRP-3.10
Col SMITH/mhc/8-21-86/5-7306

B-17
ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF DEFENSE
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20301

January 9, 1987

MEMORANDUM FOR ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF THE ARMY (M&RA)
ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF THE NAVY (M&RA)
ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF THE AIR FORCE (MRA&I)
COMMANDANT, U.S. COAST GUARD (G-R)

SUBJECT: Implementation of Reserve Component Nondeployable Accounts

Subsequent to my memoranda of May 7 and August 27, 1986, (attachment 1), my office convened a working group to review our initiative for improving the accountability of nondeployable (untrained) guardsmen and reservists.

The OSD and Military Department representatives on this working group completed their work and agreed to establish a "nondeployable account" to include all nondeployable guardsmen and reservists in Reserve Category U and training/retirement categories F, Q, P, and X, for both officer and enlisted personnel.

To formalize the conclusions of the working group, I request that each reserve component implement such nondeployable accounts and manage them in such a way that personnel will not be precluded from assignment to a trained billet in their unit of enlistment upon completion of training. Additionally, program and budget documentation subsequent to that in support of the FY 88-89 President's Budget will differentiate between trained and nondeployable strengths.

This accounting convention is fully consistent with DoDI 7730.54, "Reserve Components Common Personnel Data System (RCCPDS)," May 7, 1986, and draft DoDD 1215.6, "Uniform Reserve Categories and Training/Retirement Categories Within the Reserve Components."

Your assistance in implementing this important change is appreciated.

James H. Webb, Jr.

Attachments
cc: see attached list
copies to:  Assistant Secretary of Defense (Comptroller)  
Assistant Secretary of Defense (Force Management and Personnel)  
Director, Program Analysis and Evaluation  
Deputy Chief of Staff for Reserve Affairs, USMC

RA Chron  
RA Read  
M&P Chron  
M&P Subject File  
Col Smith/mhc/11-12-86/5-7306  
  retyped 11-21-86  
  retyped 12-2-86  
  retyped 12-10-86  
  retyped 12-29-86  
  Rewritten 1-6-87 nondepl  
(dsmith) NON-DEP
bcc: LtGen Emmett H. Walker, Jr.
     VADM Cecil J. Kempf
     Maj Gen Herbert Temple, Jr.
     Maj Gen John Conaway
     Maj Gen William R. Berkman
     Maj Gen Sloan R. Gill
     Maj Gen Louis H. Buehl