THE MAYAGUEZ INCIDENT
A Failure in Operational Leadership

by

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A paper submitted to the Faculty of the College of Naval Command and Staff in partial satisfaction of the requirements of the Department of Operations.

The contents of this paper reflect my own personal views and are not necessarily endorsed by the Naval War College or the Department of the Navy.

Signature: ________________

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15. Abstract: On 15 May 1975, the United States successfully conducted a hostage rescue mission off the coast of Cambodia. The tactical forces recaptured the Mayaguez, a U.S. cargo container ship, and rescued the forty-man crew. The success and political euphoria of the Mayaguez crisis resolution championed this relatively small tactical mission encompassing strategic implications. Unfortunately, the euphoria hid a number of failure at the operational level of war. Heroic tactical actions and pure "good luck" overcame these failures in planning, coordination, and execution/supervision to achieve success. Through research and operational analysis, this paper examines these failures. Military rescue missions, more often than not, have strategic implications because of the threat to national or international prestige. The art of command and leadership at the operational level is an essential element to ensure successful strategic/tactical mission accomplishment. The intervening twenty years since Mayaguez have seen a greater emphasis placed on operational art, yet the execution of operational leadership must constantly be studied to ensure proper application. The Mayaguez incident provides an excellent example for the study of operational leadership in strategic/tactical missions.

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On 15 May 1975, the United States successfully conducted a hostage rescue mission off the coast of Cambodia. The tactical forces recaptured the Mayaguez, a U.S. cargo container ship, and rescued the forty-man crew. The success and political euphoria of the Mayaguez crisis resolution championed this relatively small tactical mission encompassing strategic implications. Unfortunately, the euphoria hid a number of failures at the operational level of war. Heroic tactical actions and pure "good luck" overcame these failures in planning, coordination and execution/supervision to achieve success. Through research and operational analysis, this paper examines these failures. Military rescue missions, more often than not, have strategic implications because of the threat to national or international prestige. The art of command and leadership at the operational level is an essential element to ensure successful strategic/tactical mission accomplishment. The intervening twenty years since Mayaguez have seen a greater emphasis placed on operational art, yet the execution of operational leadership must constantly be studied to ensure proper application. The Mayaguez incident provides an excellent example for the study of operational leadership in strategic/tactical missions.
Preface

I began this study intending to show how the U.S. military has improved its ability to conduct strategic/tactical missions in the twenty years since the Mayaguez incident. I knew problems had occurred during the mission in May 1975. I did not realize the magnitude of the failures at the operational level. The scope of my paper quickly changed from a comparison of twenty years of rescue missions to an analysis of operational failures during the Mayaguez crisis. Unexplored in this paper is the question, "Has the military improved and/or corrected the numerous operational failures present at Mayaguez?" I believe the military has improved its ability to conduct operational art. But that improvement was not a result of Mayaguez. It took the Desert One disaster, growing pains in Urgent Fury and Congressional directives to start the military on the road to improvement. I believe a comparison study of these events with the failures at Mayaguez would show that had the military conducted a proper analysis of Mayaguez in 1975, they could have started on the road to improvement five years earlier. That comparison study is beyond the scope of this paper. I have laid the foundation. Someone else can build the bridge.
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INTRODUCTION

At face value, military rescue missions appear to be tactical in nature. Nothing could be further from the truth if the mission affects strategic policy or national prestige. Terrorists and/or third world nationalist/ethnic forces use the seizure of hostages to embarrass, humiliate or affect their target country's prestige or international standing. The resolution of a hostage crisis elevates a tactical military rescue to a strategic/tactical mission. The requirement for operational command and leadership is essential to translate strategic desires into tactical objectives, as well as plan, coordinate and execute/supervise the strategic/tactical mission. If the operational effort fails to meet its requirements, the success of the mission is left to luck or chance. During the Mayaguez incident in 1975, luck saved an operational fiasco. Personnel working at the operational level need to study the many failures in this "lucky" success. In the absence of luck, military leaders must possess carefully honed skills at the operational level to achieve victory.

BACKGROUND SUMMARY

On 12 May 1975, Khmer Rouge forces fired upon, boarded and seized a U.S. commercial cargo ship, the S.S. Mayaguez, as she traversed international waters. Cambodian gunboats escorted the cargo ship to the nearby island of Koh Tang. The Cambodians took the forty-man crew off the ship and later transferred them to a different island. Within hours of notification (via a distress signal) of the seizure of the Mayaguez, President
Gerald Ford convened a meeting of the National Security Council (NSC) to discuss a response to the Cambodian piracy. Over the next 60 hours, the NSC met three additional times. (Appendix A provides a timeline relating actions and events to the time span involved.) At this first meeting, the president directed Secretary of State Henry Kissinger explore diplomatic channels to obtain the release of the ship and her crew. He also directed the NSC develop a military contingency plan.

When diplomatic efforts proved fruitless, President Ford ordered the immediate execution of the contingency plan. At 0615 (local) 15 May, Marines (pre-staged at an airbase in Utapao, Thailand) conducted a heliborne assault of Koh Tang, believing the Mayaguez crew was on the island. A second group of Marines boarded the anchored and surprisingly vacant Mayaguez from a Navy destroyer.

The assault on Koh Tang encountered a regular, well-armed Cambodian force numbering nearly 200 strong (five times the intelligence estimates). The Marines found themselves outnumbered and out-gunned. Air Force aircraft provided close air support fires for the assault forces while carrier-based Navy aircraft bombed NSC-approved targets on the Cambodian mainland to prevent enemy reinforcement. Enroute to Koh Tang to provide naval gunfire support, the U.S.S. Wilson encountered the crew of the Mayaguez, free, unharmed and aboard a Thai fishing boat. With both the cargo ship and her crew safely retrieved, President Ford ordered a halt to offensive actions.
The Marines on Koh Tang could not disengage or attempt a helicopter extract without additional combat forces aboard a scheduled second assault wave. With their arrival, the Marines eventually stabilized their defenses. Enemy fire damaged most of the available helicopters during the two assault waves. By late afternoon, only 4 of 13 available aircraft remained operational. The extraction began at 1520. The last Marines departed Koh Tang (still under intense enemy fire) at 2015. Total casualties amounted to 15 killed in action, 50 wounded and 3 Marines missing. Of the 13 helicopters involved, 2 crashed on Koh Tang and the remaining 9 aircraft were severely damaged by enemy fire.¹

President Ford and his advisors rejoiced at the successful accomplishment of the rescue mission. Newspapers and magazines proclaimed a strong comeback for American prestige in the Far East. Some criticisms and analytical observations of the mission surfaced initially but were quickly subjugated to a file drawer. If military and political leaders identified the numerous failures at the operational level, they soon forgot or left them unanswered.

UNITY OF COMMAND

Even though Mayaguez was a relatively small tactical mission, there existed a definite need for an operational level command structure to provide unity of command. (Appendix B provides the ad hoc command relationships formed for the Mayaguez mission.) The military contingency plan developed by
the NSC tasked Admiral Noel Gaylor, Commander-in-Chief Pacific Forces (CinCPac), to prepare forces for a forceful rescue mission. Admiral Gaylor assigned Lieutenant General John Burns, Chief of the U.S. Support Activities Group and Commander of the 7th Air Force (USSAG/7thAF) in Thailand, as the "on-scene commander" (which roughly equates to Commander Joint Task Force). The selection of LtGen Burns ensured the tactical forces would receive the aviation assets needed to conduct the mission.

Contrary to standard practice, neither the Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS) nor CinCPac assigned responsibility for the mission in message format. This led to problems in planning and coordinating the mission. Lieutenant General Burns believed he had "received command of all inbound ships and planes, with full authority to call on more." In fact, the on-scene commander never received operational control of Navy and Marine forces. Admiral Gaylor directed Navy and Marine commands in the Pacific "to respond to the direction and tasking of USSAG/7thAF and to conduct contingency operations as directed by CinCPac and USSAG/7thAF." Of particular note, the carrier-based aircraft providing operational fires, never came under USSAG\7thAF control. From the beginning, the rescue mission lacked the primary element of operational leadership, unity of command.

LACK OF GROUND REPRESENTATION

Lieutenant General Burns organized an ad hoc, joint force for the rescue mission. He utilized his USSAG/7thAF staff (all
Air Force) for operational planning and execution. He realized
time constraints would eliminate any chance for coordination and
inhibit information flow to the tactical forces. Accordingly,
he asked for a senior Marine to serve as overall commander of
ground forces.

Colonel John Johnson, USMC, assumed the role of ground
forces commander (TG 79.9). Charged with establishing a liaison
between the tactical forces and the operational staff, Col
Johnson chose to remain with the tactical forces at Utapao,
Thailand. He relied on communication assets to execute any
coordination/liaison with USSAG/7thAF in Nakhon Phanom,
Thailand. His presence enhanced the planning for the helicopter
assault but coordination with USSAG/7thAF and execution of the
entire rescue mission suffered. Marine representation was
nonexistent at the operational level and led to a breakdown in
the flow of vital information to the tactical forces. Colonel
Johnson failed to provide required advisory knowledge to the
operational staff to assist in decision making. 4

Colonel Johnson wanted to participate in the assault on Koh
Tang. Lack of helicopters demanded he and his staff remain at
Utapao. Mistakenly believing he could control all ground force
actions from Koh Tang, he elected not to place a Marine
representative on the Airborne Command, Control and
Communication (ABCCC) aircraft which LtGen Burns had designated
the focal point for all rescue mission activities. Colonel
Johnson communicated with USSAG/7thAF in Nakhon Phanom by
telephone. He planned on communicating with the assault forces on Koh Tang via the ABCCC. For unknown reasons, the ABCCC never established the communications link to Utapao. Colonel Johnson’s self-imposed isolation at Utapao effectively turned over operational control of all ground forces to the Air Force’s on-scene coordinator. The senior Marine for the Mayaguez mission became an irrelevant bystander.

INFORMATION FLOW

Several lapses in the flow of information to the tactical forces occurred at the operational level. Lieutenant Colonel Randall Austin, commander of the assault forces on Koh Tang, embarked on the first assault wave with the assumption pre-assault fires would engage and neutralize the island’s defenses. Enemy forces had previously fired on reconnaissance aircraft. Pilots referred to the anti-aircraft defenses as "pretty good" and "a sure thing." An AC-130 Spectra gunship was on station, prepared to deliver accurate, pre-assault fire support. Although CinCPac had authorized such fires and LtCol Austin had requested them, LtGen Burns decided against pre-assault fires, fearing endangerment of the Mayaguez crew. Neither he nor his staff informed the assault forces of his decision. Enemy fire damaged 7 of 8 helicopters in the first assault wave. All but one friendly battle death occurred during the insert of the assault forces.

Lieutenant Colonel Austin also departed for Koh Tang with inadequate intelligence estimates. During operational planning
sessions, several estimates of enemy strength surfaced. Reports of enemy forces on Koh Tang ranged from 20 to 30 people without leadership to 90 or 100 soldiers with a few heavy weapons. A Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA) report estimated 200 regular soldiers with sufficient fire power and anti-aircraft weapons defended the island. During post mission interviews, more than one USSAG/7thAF staff officer indicated "estimates of enemy strength were not of particular concern to them." The designated Mayaguez operational staff failed to reconcile the wide disparages in the estimates of enemy strength. They never passed on the DIA estimate to the tactical planners at Utapao.

OPERATIONAL PLANNING

Lack of a well organized and fully representative operational staff led to failures in operational planning, specifically the employment of naval and air forces and lack of operational reconnaissance. Although the USSAG/7thAF staff lacked Navy representation, they planned the employment of expected naval warships. Their plan called for two destroyers, the U.S.S. Holt and Wilson, to provide gunfire and search and rescue (SAR) support. They also directed the Holt assist in the seizure of the Mayaguez. This task effectively kept the destroyer occupied during the first ten hours of the Koh Tang assault. Although the assault was scheduled for 0615, the second destroyer, Wilson, was not scheduled to arrive until 0730. Upon Wilson’s arrival, CinCPac directed her to intercept a Thai fishing boat spotted by Air Force pilots. The boat had
the Mayaguez crew aboard. Finally, when the commander of Destroyer Squadron 23 (DESRON 23), in charge of Holt and Wilson, contacted the ABCCC for mission assignments and tasking, the ABCCC failed to task DESRON 23 with providing naval gunfire support. The designated on scene operational coordinator never even informed the Navy component command of the Koh Tang assault plans.¹⁰

When Adm Gaylor assigned LtGen Burns the Mayaguez mission, he directed the USSAG/7thAF commander "provide detailed plans for, among other things, employment of TacAir . . . ." The operational staff failed to assume and plan airborne forward air control (FAC) and SAR responsibilities. After action reports showed that during the first 8 hours of the assault, 10 different airborne FACs were used with at least 14 different turnovers. Although OV-10s, the aircraft best suited to perform the airborne FAC and SAR duties, were available, the USSAG/7thAF staff neither requested nor planned their utilization.

Even more inconceivable than poor air support planning was the staff's failure to use all means available to protect the finite number of helicopters available for the mission. Knowing the threat of anti-aircraft fire existed, the operational staff allowed the troop helicopters to conduct the assault without escort gunships.¹¹ The absence of pre-assault fires made escort suppressive fire an imperative.

Finally, in developing the enemy situation and the operational plan, the USSAG/7thAF staff failed to conduct a
detailed pre-assault reconnaissance of Koh Tang. Apparently, the Air Force staff cared little about beach defenses, enemy positions and locations of the captive Mayaguez crewmen. The time and assets existed to conduct a reconnaissance, yet the operational staff never requested the forces. Pilot reconnaissance reports of 13 May indicated a Cambodian gunboat transported 30 to 40 caucasians to the mainland. As with other incongruent reports, the USSAG/7thAF staff seems to have ignored this report since it did not support their plan.

FAILURES IN EXECUTION

Failures in unity of command, information flow and operational planning paved the way for additional problems at the operational level during execution of the rescue mission. The Marines on Koh Tang constantly updated their situation to the ABCCC. Unfortunately, the ABCCC failed to keep the Marines informed as to the status of the entire Mayaguez mission. Four hours after the initial assault found the Marines trying to consolidate and hold their defensive positions, desperately awaiting reinforcements. Known in the ABCCC but not relayed to LtCol Austin, LtGen Burns (possibly at the direction of CinCPac) had cancelled the scheduled second assault wave because the Mayaguez crew had turned up safe and unharmed. Apparently, the ABCCC (the only asset talking to the forces on Koh Tang) was not accurately reporting the status of the assault forces to the operational commander. Eventually, the second wave reinforced LtCol Austin's men. The ABCCC never explained the delay to the
Marines on Koh Tang. Lieutenant Colonel Austin learned of the crew's rescue from the Marines on the second wave.\textsuperscript{13}

The flaws in operational command and leadership that led to the previously discussed failures also allowed actions at the national/strategic level to affect the tactical mission. I want to concentrate on two specific areas: the overabundance of decision making at the strategic level on matters of an operational and tactical nature; and, the failure at the operational level to properly translate the strategic intent or primary objective of this tactical mission encompassing strategic implications.

OVERABUNDANCE OF DECISION MAKING

Citing the Government Accounting Office (GAO) report of the Mayaguez incident, Christopher Lamb stated, "Washington had better communications with the tactical fighting forces than did the local commander. . . . So centrally controlled were the military operations that the president could make on-the-spot decisions" concerning the mission.\textsuperscript{14} The unique communications capabilities of the Command Center in the White House provided the strategic decision makers the ability to bypass the operational commander and affect tactical decisions and actions during the Mayaguez crisis. Unfortunately, the operational command was not strong enough to exert its authority and intercept this strategic interference.

The National Security Council considered five military options proposed by the JCS and chose a coordinated rescue plan.
The mission consisted of a heliborne assault of Koh Tang by one Marine force, the seizure of the Mayaguez by a separate Marine boarding party, and the bombing of mainland targets to prevent enemy reinforcement. The NSC wanted the operational fires (the mainland bombings) to coincide with the seizure and the assault. LtCol Austin wanted to conduct a night assault of Koh Tang to achieve an element of surprise. The NSC denied his request since the boarding party required daylight to search the Mayaguez.

The NSC must have had a strategic or political reason for requiring simultaneous actions. Unfortunately, they failed to communicate their reason to subordinate echelons. A last minute change in the tactical employment of forces, ordered by CinCPac, delayed the seizure of the ship and the mainland bombings. If the USSAG/7thAF commander had understood the NSC’s intent, he could have delayed the assault of Koh Tang.

The ad hoc operational command structure employed by LtGen Burns enabled CinCPac to easily affect tactical actions. On 15 May, Adm Gaylor bypassed both LtGen Burns and Col Johnson by ordering LtCol Austin on Koh Tang to neither "hazard his force" nor "take offensive action without waiting for reinforcements." This led to confusion at the tactical level. As the fighting continued on Koh Tang, Adm Gaylor grew anxious and fearful of the Cambodians overrunning the Marine positions. Without consulting or even informing the Marines, he directed the employment of the 15,000 pound BLU-82, the largest conventional
bomb in the U.S. arsenal, on the enemy defenses at Koh Tang. He wanted to "apply maximum psychological pressure against [the] Cambodian soldiers." The Marines saw the parachute-delivered bomb deploy and believed it was a resupply attempt that missed the drop zone. After recovering from the explosion's concussion, they were glad the "resupply" missed the drop zone.  

Failures in operational leadership also allowed President Ford to affect actions at the tactical level with decisions made hastily at the strategic level. During the execution of the mission, he ordered the carrier, the U.S.S. Coral Sea, to delay the first of four strike packages aimed at operational targets on the mainland after the aircraft had already launched. Although he rescinded his order five minutes later, the strike aircraft were unable to act and react fast enough and failed to hit their targets. 

The capability for instant communications between the strategic decision makers and the "trigger pullers" consistently left the USSAG/7thAF staff and LtGen Burns in the dark. The operational commander failed to divorce the NSC, JCS and CinCPac from the tactical action. Asked whether an overabundance of supervision of the rescue mission existed, a Pentagon general said, "Let's say there was enough." Reading between the lines, I would say "enough" was too much supervision at the strategic level. That interference endangered the tactical mission and the lives of every fighting participant.
TRANSLATING STRATEGIC INTENT

President Ford and the members of the NSC approached the Mayaguez incident as a final test of U.S. foreign policy in Southeast Asia. During the previous month, U.S. forces had conducted the final military evacuations of both Cambodia and South Vietnam. American prestige in the Far East region was at an all time low in May 1975. The abandonment of former allies, plus the diplomatic humiliation the United States had suffered over North Korea's seizure of the U.S.S. Pueblo in 1968, influenced the national leaders' decision making ability.

In the absence of a speedy diplomatic solution, America's response to the seizure of the Mayaguez had to be quick and forceful. President Ford commented later, the United States had to "dispel doubts about U.S. will and its capacity to respond to provocation." The force must be sufficient enough to send a proper message of intent to the Far East. At the first meeting of the NSC on 12 May, the members "quickly agreed on the two foremost U.S. objectives: to recover the ship and its crew; and, to do so in such a way as to demonstrate firmly to the international community that the United States could and would act with firmness to protect its interests . . . ."20

Although the State Department and the White House explored diplomatic channels in an attempt to solve the crisis, the NSC proceeded with the development of a forceful military response. They approved the basic strategy of a simultaneous, two pronged, Marine assault and the bombing of Cambodia at their third
meeting on the night of 13 May. The president and many of his advisors believed the size of the force must be overwhelming. According to Secretary Kissinger, "The excessive use of force [would] demonstrate that there are limits beyond which the U.S. will not be pushed."\(^{21}\)

In his analysis of the crisis, Daniel Bolger determined three strategic objectives existed for the Mayaguez mission: secure the crew of the Mayaguez; secure the Mayaguez; and, prevent Khmer Rouge reinforcement.\(^{22}\) While the objectives listed above are more appropriately operational/tactical objectives, Bolger’s analysis parallels the mission analysis performed by the USSAG/7thAF staff. Like Bolger, LtGen Burns and his staff failed to recognize the primary strategic objective of the Mayaguez crisis. As Christopher Lamb pointed out, the rescue of the ship and its crew was secondary to the need to demonstrate American resolve and forcefulness. Secretary Kissinger all but admitted this fact during the crisis when he remarked, "The lives of crewmen must, unfortunately, be a secondary consideration."\(^{23}\)

National prestige is normally a paramount concern and quite possibly the number one priority governing all diplomatic and military efforts during a crisis. Understanding the priority of strategic goals and translating them into tactical objectives falls within the realm of operational leadership. While the NSC failed to articulate their strategic intent in the Mayaguez crisis, the USSAG/7thAF staff failed to properly analyze their
mission. They were unable to determine the primary strategic goal and translate that goal into operational/tactical objectives. These failures, at the strategic and more importantly at the operational level, led to confusion and near disaster at the tactical level. "If national prestige had been more clearly established as the top priority, avoiding failure even if it meant increasing [the] risk to the hostages would have guided the military planners." 24

CONCLUSION

History shows America's actions during the Mayaguez crisis proved conclusive. "For the first time in several years, the utility of force was demonstrated in a successful U.S. military operation. That success generated a moral uplift for the American people, restored a belief in American credibility and demonstrated a strategic resolve worthy of a great power." 25 Yet, as I have shown, numerous problems existed at the operational level in command and leadership. An ad hoc command organization whose operational staff was purely Air Force led to tremendous problems in unity of command as well as planning, coordination, and execution. The lack of Marine and Navy representation on the USSAG/7thAF operational staff magnified these problems. Advanced communications technology and ineffective operational leadership enabled decision makers at the strategic level (NSC, JCS and CinCPac) to adversely affect the tactical and operational execution of the mission. Possibly the greatest operational failure was the inability at the
operational level to translate strategic intent into operational/tactical planning and execution.

In his article "Raids and National Command," Peter Kelly wrote, once the "decision to use force is made--planning and execution should be the responsibility" of the operational/tactical commander. The president cannot become a tactical commander. The JCS cannot solve operational problems. Neither the NSC nor the JCS should "allow Washington to function as a super tactical operations center, greatly increasing the risk of failure and unnecessary casualties."26

The requirement for well-executed, operational leadership in tactical missions encompassing strategic implications is as strong as the requirement for operational leadership in a major operation or campaign. In the Mayaguez incident, the failures in operational command and leadership could have led to mission failure. To determine whether the military has learned from the operational fiasco at Mayaguez, the reader should study later strategic/tactical mission like the aborted Iranian hostage rescue mission or the Grenada mission. While a study of this kind is beyond the scope of this paper, I believe the reader would find some operational failures corrected and others left unresolved. The lessons of Mayaguez must be studied and not forgotten, if the military is to continue to improve command and leadership at the operational level of war.
APPENDIX A
Mayaguez Incident Timeline

12 MAY 13 MAY 14 MAY 15 MAY

CAMBODIA
1420 0830 1615 0800 0620 0720 0950 1200 1500 2015
MAYAGÜEZ seized
MAYAGÜEZ escorted to Koh Tang
Crew taken from ship
Crew moved to new island
Assault of Koh Tang
Crew released
MAYAGÜEZ boarded
Mainland strikes begin
Extraction begins
Extraction completed
WILSON rescues crew
2nd Wave finally inserted

WASHINGTON
12 MAY 13 MAY 14 MAY 15 MAY
1200 0320 0740 2230 1020 2230 1600 2040 2300 0915
Ford notified
1st NSC meeting
MAYAGÜEZ sighted
2nd NSC meeting
3rd NSC meeting
Mission order issued
Ford delays
Airstrike 5 minutes

* 11 Hours difference between Cambodia and Washington
** Not to Scale; Times approximate to nearest five minutes
APPENDIX B

COMMAND RELATIONSHIPS

NSC

JCS

PACOM

Adm Gaylor USN

LtGen Burns USAF

USSAG/7thAF

ABCCC

Col Johnson TG79.9 USMC

DESRON 23

BLT 2/9 Assault Forces

21st Special Ops Sqd (Helo's)

7thAF Attack A/C

USN Recon Patrol

CVA-43 USS Coral Sea

USS Wilson

USS Holt

Co D1/4 Boarding Party

* Colonel Johnson of TG79.9 became irrelevant when he failed to establish liaison with USSAG/7thAF. Communications problems forced the USMC forces to fall under operational control of the USAF on scene coordinator in the ABCCC.

** Although the Coral Sea established contact with the ABCCC and delivered operational fires in support of the assault on Koh Tang, command and control remained with CinCPac and the NSC.

*** DESRON 23 and its assets participated in the mission at the direction of CinCPac. The ABCCC never provided tasking.
NOTES


3. Patrick, 8.


5. Johnson, 29; and Patrick, 47, 51.

6. Patrick, 92-93, 102; and Rowan, 102.


8. Lamb, 132.


11. Ibid., 74, 89-91, 93.


14. Lamb, 236.

15. Bolger, 43; and Patrick, 9, 101.

16. Lamb, 27-28, 97, 114; and Messegue, 107.
17. Bolger, 73; and Rowan, 219.


20. Head, 110.


22. Bolger, 49.

23. Lamb, 266.

24. Ibid., 182-183, 266.


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