TRAINING REQUIREMENTS
AND TRAINING AVAILABILITY

FOR UNITED NATIONS PEACEKEEPING FORCES

by CDR Douglas Smith, USN

CENTER FOR NAVAL WARFARE STUDIES

STRATEGIC RESEARCH DEPARTMENT

RESEARCH MEMORANDUM 7-93
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NAVAL WAR COLLEGE
NEWPORT, RI 02841-1207

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**TRAINING REQUIREMENTS AND TRAINING AVAILABILITY FOR UNITED NATIONS PEACEKEEPING FORCES**

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**RESEARCH MEMORANDUM 7-93**

This memorandum provides a brief overview of peacekeeping training opportunities and their availability around the globe.

**PEACEKEEPING OPERATIONS; UNITED NATIONS; PEACEKEEPING TRAINING**

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by

CDR Douglas V. Smith, USN

This paper was prepared for the Strategic Research Department
of the Center for Naval Warfare Studies.

The contents of this paper reflect the views of the author and
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TRAINING REQUIREMENTS AND TRAINING AVAILABILITY FOR UNITED NATIONS PEACEKEEPING FORCES

In the post-Cold War era, due mainly to increased cooperation between formerly hostile blocs and the emergence of ethnically, religiously and nationally motivated conflict previously sublimated to the Cold War rivalry, the United Nations has become much more active in its Peacekeeping role. It has become evident, however, that military forces structured to support the Cold War balance of power are at times ill suited for the type of missions they will be called upon to conduct in support of United Nations military mandates in the future.

It is the purpose of this report to explore the types of training that will be necessary to develop requisite skills for military forces to support Peacekeeping, Peacemaking and Peace-Enforcement missions in the relatively near-term future. Availability of current training by member nations of the United Nations is also assessed. In conclusion, the paper comments on the types of required training that are currently lacking and which should be addressed to ensure the continued viability of the United Nations military instrument. We hope that the paper serves as a catalyst for creation of a comprehensive approach to training by all the nations of the United Nations for support of that organization's Peacekeeping role.

Donald C. Daniel
Dr. Donald C. Daniel
Director, Strategic Research Department
Center for Naval Warfare Studies
ABSTRACT

TRAINING REQUIREMENTS AND TRAINING AVAILABILITY

FOR UNITED NATIONS PEACEKEEPING FORCES

This paper addresses the training requirements associated with the unique military requirements inherent in United Nations Peacekeeping, Peacemaking and Peace-Enforcement operations. It also considers the adequacy of worldwide training available in support of such operations. In conclusion, it recommends creation of training opportunities in areas where they are currently inadequate to support anticipated United Nations military involvements.
TABLE OF CONTENTS

LETTER OF PROMULGATION ........................................... ii

ABSTRACT ............................................................... iii

TABLE OF CONTENTS ..................................................... v

LIST OF TABLES ........................................................... vii

PURPOSE ................................................................. 1

CONFLICT STAGES ..................................................... 1

UNITED NATIONS MILITARY TRAINING REQUIREMENTS ............... 5

AVAILABILITY OF UNITED NATIONS PEACEKEEPING/PEACEMAKING/
PEACE-ENFORCEMENT TRAINING WORLDWIDE .......................... 9

UNITED NATIONS MILITARY OPERATIONS TRAINING ................. 9

UNITED STATES TRAINING IN SUPPORT OF UNITED NATIONS
TASKING ................................................................. 11

NORDIC CONSORTIUM FOR UNITED NATIONS PEACEKEEPING
TRAINING ............................................................... 13

DENMARK .............................................................. 14

FINLAND ............................................................... 14

NORWAY ............................................................... 15

SWEDEN ............................................................... 16

AUSTRIAN PEACEKEEPING TRAINING .................................. 17

CANADIAN PEACEKEEPING TRAINING .................................. 17

AUSTRALIAN PEACEKEEPING TRAINING ................................ 17

OTHER NATIONS' PEACEKEEPING TRAINING ............................ 18

CONCLUSIONS ........................................................... 19

NOTES ................................................................. 23

BIBLIOGRAPHY .......................................................... 25
LIST OF TABLES

TABLE

I. NORDIC Peacekeeping Training.................................13
II. Swedish U.N. Staff Officers' Course...........................16
PURPOSE: It is the purpose of this paper to explore the adequacy of existing training assets, both worldwide and in the United States, for the range of potential peacekeeping-type missions (hereafter Peacekeeping, Peacemaking and Peace-Enforcement missions will be referred to generically as "U.N. military operations or missions") likely to be undertaken by the United Nations in the post-Cold War period. Prior to actually examining existing or proposed training resources, it may be useful to provide a definitional framework and establish the range of skills that may be required when operating under a United Nations mandate.

CONFLICT STAGES: The potential stages of response options for U.N. peace and security missions under United Nations mandate are depicted below:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Conflict Stages</th>
<th>Tools</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Pre-War</td>
<td>Preventive Diplomacy</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Preventive Deployment</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Wartime</td>
<td>Diplomatic Peacemaking</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Peace-Enforcement/Military</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Post-War</td>
<td>Peacemaking</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Peacekeeping</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Peace Building'</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
In that the focus of this paper is U.N. operations where military forces are actually employed, it is necessary at the outset to establish definitions for the potential range of those operations. Stages listed above that apply predominantly to non-military options are considered outside the scope of this paper and will not be addressed. Also, for ease of comparison, stages will be considered in order from most likely to be mandated to least likely rather than as ordered above.

Peacekeeping operations require one fundamental contextual element -- the absence of war. Whether there exists only a cease-fire or a more formal movement toward a lasting state of peace, the implication for Peacekeeping operations is that all belligerents, at least temporarily, have determined that a state of peace is preferable to that of war. In such a situation, Peacekeepers must be viewed as impartial by all contending parties so their role becomes clear and well defined. Peacekeeping forces can thus be relatively small, lightly armed, defensive in orientation, and essentially passively equipped and supported.² This should not imply that Peacekeeping requires little training. On the contrary, the uniqueness of "honest broker" type roles requires a real sensitivity to refraining from traditional military attitudes toward use of force that may tend to undermine the mission objective. Additionally, many negotiating and humanitarian skills may be required that are unlike those associated with traditional military training.
Peacemaking operations, as the name implies, are those conducted when a cease-fire or formal state of peace does not exist. Thus, unlike peacekeeping operations, the objective is to create or restore a condition of peace. The distinction here with Peace-Enforcement operations is that peace is to be restored without engaging directly in the hostilities. Thus a Peacemaking mandate would require a force to conduct defensive military tasks, humanitarian assistance and medical-related tasks, etc., but offensive orientation would be limited to conduct essential for force preservation and to carry out the non-offensive elements of the mandate. Such a mission focus would normally imply that at least one party to the conflict, probably the side that at that time was losing, would support the Peacemaking mandate. Further, for Peacemaking operations to be contemplated by the U.N., at least some expectation of conditions for a lasting peace being acceptable to all parties to the conflict must be present. These type operations, perhaps more than any other type, connote the requirement for skills and training additional to those normally associated with general-purpose military forces. The normal expected evolution is from Peacemaking operations to Peacekeeping operations, and thus the skills associated with both phases would be required. If, unfortunately, involvement should escalate to Peace-Enforcement, at some point it could again be expected to de-escalate back to a Peacekeeping stage along with the peace process necessitating lower-end skills once again.
Peace-Enforcement operations are those where the enforcer imposes himself between combatants who have not eschewed continuing violence. Thus not only will the environment in all likelihood be intensely hostile, but the peace enforcer will be an unwanted addition to the state of war. Forces employed in these conditions will have to be combat troops in that they will require offensive orientation and equipment to protect themselves in combat and to conduct their offensive mission. Such a mandate will require a larger force with enhanced logistical support and sustainment. Prospects of a long-term involvement on the part of the Peace-Enforcement force are high. Additionally, training requirements for the force, i.e., above those associated with general purpose forces, would be unlikely.

A key distinction between Peacemaking and Peace-Enforcement is that Peace-Enforcement operations are distinctly similar to those that would take place in any conventional warfare setting. Therefore, skills that are instilled in Army and Marine personnel in the course of their normal training would serve them most adequately in a Peace-Enforcement setting. Peacemaking, on the other hand, has no offensive thrust and therefore restraint and a deescalatory mindset would certainly lead to non-traditional roles for the military for which they have not been trained. Hence, training for U.N. military operations should of necessity be targeted at those forces which will be engaged in Peacemaking and/or Peacekeeping operations.
UNITED NATIONS MILITARY MISSION TRAINING REQUIREMENTS: While the title of this section implies that training requirements for Peacekeeping operations are the same as those for Peacemaking and Peace-Enforcement, nothing could be farther from the truth. Though some training requirements overlap, the environments in which such operations are conducted and the differences in mandated missions result in distinctly different challenges. Below, training requirements will be outlined along with an indication of their relevance to Peacekeeping (PK), Peacemaking (PM) or Peace-Enforcement (PE) missions, respectfully:

* Staff training of a general nature. This type of training, which is at the present time not available anywhere, would be for the designated United Nations Commander and senior members of his staff or combat Commanders. It would be of short duration (probably one week) and would be focused on comprehension of the U.N. mandate, staff and functional organization and responsibilities, rules of engagement (ROE), history of the mandated area6 and the reasons for the conflict, interoperability, communications and logistics procedures (PE/PM/PK).

* Dealing with displaced personnel and population control (PE/PM/PK). This is an important non-traditional role for the military and should receive high priority.

* Training on requirements associated with running camps (PE/PM).

* Cultural awareness/historical background training (PM/PK).
* Refugee control training (PE/PM/PK).
* Training in negotiating techniques (PM/PK).
* Non-lethal self-defense technique training/methods of controlling groups or individuals (PM/PK).
* Legal training (Who adjudicates the crime? Should the U.N. set up puppets to adjudicate crimes? Whose laws apply? Etc.? ) (PM/PK).
* Training for transfer and warehousing/protection of goods intended for local populations (PM/PK).
* Training on convoy methods and convoy protection (PM).
* Rules of engagement training (PM/PK). ROE would normally have to be understood at much lower levels in the organizational structure than would usually be the case for U.N. mandated operations. As it stands now, United States land force ROE require that a unit or individual take fire before initiating deadly force when peacetime Rules of Engagement are in effect. This requirement would surely be modified of necessity for Peace-Enforcement operations. Since a unit might be dealing with friendly parties to the hostilities as well as hostile parties (Peacemaking), and since combatants might not be readily recognizable (e.g., Somalian "Technicals"), ROE would have to be situational and understood even at the personal level due to the requirement for participants to be engaged in unsupervised individual roles. The absolute requirement to retain impartiality in a Peacekeeping role, even when challenged as to your impartiality by one or more parties to the conflict, would also highlight the need for ROE training at all levels of the
organization -- especially considering the probability of differences in ROE interpretation within a U.N. force composed of units from several nations.

* Training on prisoner of war (POW) handling (PE/PM). Depending on the circumstances, these procedures could vary dramatically from those normally employed in a wartime situation. Normally, prisoners are processed by the army and turned over to the nation in which they are captured or repatriated to own force friendly territory. Assuming that no parties to the hostilities give consent for the U.N. operation, where, for how long and under what circumstances prisoners are incarcerated and/or repatriated could become complicated.

* Civil Affairs training. Since over 95 percent of all Civil Affairs units now reside in the Army Reserve, this type of training -- which would include running basic services such as electricity and water supplies, etc. -- would be essential in virtually all types of U.N. mandated operations (PE/PM/PK). This would especially be the case in the latter stages of Peace-Enforcement missions.

* Training on interoperability, command structure, communications and logistics (PE/PM/PK). This type training would be imperative with multiple nations cooperating in the U.N. sponsored intervention. Since the U.N. is toying with the idea of a combined logistics system (vice nations being responsible for their own logistics as it stands now), and since realistically the U.S. provides the lion's share of supply and logistics capability
for most of the U.N. operations in which it takes part, training for other nations on logistics matters would be advisable.

* Training relating to cessation of hostilities and turnover of responsibilities to other forces (for troop rotation and/or withdrawal) would be advisable (PM/PK). This might include concentration on Police Force type responsibilities that would be required in the transition to civilianization of the operation.

* Language training (PK/PM/PK). This is an area that should take higher priority, but is unlikely to be raised in priority as anticipating areas of U.N. military operational involvement in advance and developing requisite language skills would be to say the least difficult. None-the-less, non-availability of trained linguists will continue to constrain U.N. "Peacekeeping" operations unless this type of training is more widely accomplished.

* Psychological warfare training (PM/PK). This type training would only be required for situations where the force to be deployed did not have Special Forces units attached and psychological warfare tasks would have to be handled by personnel not trained to accomplish them.

* Public Affairs training (PM/PK). As U.N. military operations are conducted in the court of world opinion, and since world opinion is favorably maintained only when the perception of morality in the operation is reinforced, minimal Public Affairs training for all members of the force would be useful in the ideal case.
* Precautionary medical training (PE/PM/PK). Since many of the areas in which U.N. military operations forces have been or are likely to be deployed are disease infested and have significant problems with sanitation and clean water, such training would be beneficial to prevent or decrease the likelihood of illness in the forces that could otherwise have been prevented.

* Observer training (PM/PK).

* Checkpoint training (PM/PK).

The relative ordering of the types of training enumerated above is less important than the realization that their requirement is for the most part scenario dependent and by no means universal.

AVAILABILITY OF UNITED NATIONS PEACEKEEPING/PEACEMAKING/PEACE-ENFORCEMENT TRAINING WORLDWIDE: This section will concentrate on formal and informal "Peacekeeping" training that is conducted or is contemplated by the United Nations and its members. While training for U.N. type military operations is conducted in some form by most nations which provide forces for United Nations sanctioned operations, the training discussed below is generally more formalized and, for the most part, is offered for participation by nations other than that which is actually conducting the training.

UNITED NATIONS MILITARY OPERATIONS TRAINING: The United Nations Institute for Training and Research (UNITAR), located at Manhattanville College in Purchase, New York, conducts periodic international seminars relating to U.N. military operations experience and requirements, and is also involved in research and preparation of training materials related to military operations.
under a U.N. mandate. Training for forces that are expected to be engaged in United Nations military operations will in the near term consist of eight video cassettes which, when provided by the U.N., will serve as the basis for basic individual or unit training. These cassettes, which are tactical and procedural in nature, have not as yet been approved for release. Similarly, a document entitled "A Peace-keeping Training Manual" is in its second draft awaiting approval. As a companion document to the video cassettes, the Manual provides instructional material and accompanying viewgraphs that can serve either as the basis for group lectures or for individual review instruction.⁷

Of perhaps more significance, the United Nations is in the formative stages of contemplating formalized training for Command level echelons of national forces to be deployed and employed under the U.N. flag. This training would of necessity be of short duration (probably a one week course) and concentrate on general staff type instruction and coordination for the United Nations force Commander, his immediate staff and his principal subordinate commanders. As envisioned, the course would concentrate on command organization, history relevant to the conflict and U.N. military force mission, intelligence, rules of engagement and transportation/logistics requirements and arrangements. As the United Nations has been condemned by any number of nations for "ad hocism" in the way it constitutes and organizes its military forces, this proposed training would enable the Commander to address deficiencies in his ability to support the U.N. mandate
under which he will have to operate prior to actually taking the field. Proposed locations for such training include Fort Dix in New Jersey and Governor's Island in New York. The primary driver in selecting a location for the proposed training is proximity to the United Nations headquarters.

UNITED STATES TRAINING IN SUPPORT OF UNITED NATIONS TASKING: At the outset it should be noted that the prevailing sentiment throughout the U.S. military establishment is that there should be no formalized training beyond that provided for general purpose forces for troops or units which will engage in United Nations sanctioned operations. The prevailing notion is that to train specifically for Peacekeeping type roles would lessen the mental and professional readiness of the forces in areas relating to their primary responsibilities as warfighters. Also, it would not be prudent in this era of scarce resources to shoulder the extra burden of costs associated with maintaining a cadre of "U.N. earmarked" forces in addition to those required for true combat missions. Consequently, many advocate not altering training for general purpose forces but rather to let them adapt to Peacekeeping type operations as the situation requires. This may be a short-sighted view and the issue of special training deserves further study.

The above paragraph is not meant to imply that training in support of U.N. military operations is not accomplished. Virtually every unit deployed under the U.N. flag takes advantage of time before deployment, if available, for intensive scenario-specific
training. In-country training is also conducted as required. However, there is no formalized unit training for Peacemaking/Peacekeeping operations anywhere in the United States. There are, though not organized as part of a comprehensive Peacemaking/Peacekeeping training system, three training courses in the United States that are utilized to prepare forces for U.N. tasking. These include:

- A one-week training course at Ft. Bragg, North Carolina. This course provides individual (as opposed to unit) training in areas relating to the threat in the area of U.N. operations; intelligence on the area; how to react if an attempt is made to take you hostage; pistol and shotgun training for self-defense; and basic driving (U-turn) skills to avoid a hostile roadblock. This training is provided for both officers and senior enlisted personnel.

- An Army-sponsored course in anti-terrorist defensive driving given at the Bill Scott Raceway at Summit, West Virginia.

- A short course on cultural aspects of the area in which individuals will be operating provided by the Air Force at Eglin AFB, Florida.

It should also be noted that all these courses are intended and were established primarily for personnel associated with attache assignments and that personnel supporting U.N. military operations may have the opportunity to attend one or all of them, but in most cases will not attend them sequentially or in any reinforcing pattern.
The training outlined above can best be described as non-standardized individual training which has utility primarily for operations related to Chapter 6 of the United Nations Charter. Most military individuals interviewed for this paper (approximately 20 U.S. and foreign military officers and United Nations staff personnel) agree that there is no real requirement for any additional Peacekeeping type training for U.S. land-based forces other than that contemplated by the United Nations for U.N. field commanders and their staffs/principal subordinates.

NORDIC CONSORTIUM FOR UNITED NATIONS PEACEKEEPING TRAINING:
With their long history of abhorrence of war, neutrality and provision of forces and monetary resources far out of proportion to their populations, four Nordic nations -- Norway, Sweden, Denmark and Finland -- have combined their resources to offer training in specific areas relating to Peacekeeping operations. The training they offer is individual in nature and is offered to other nations providing forces in support of United Nations sanctions. Specialized areas of training are as follows:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>DENMARK</th>
<th>FINLAND</th>
<th>NORWAY</th>
<th>SWEDEN</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>U.N. MILITARY</td>
<td>U.N. MILITARY</td>
<td>U.N. LOGISTICS</td>
<td>U.N. STAFF</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>POLICE COURSE</td>
<td>OBSERVER COURSE</td>
<td>OFFICERS' COURSE</td>
<td>OFFICERS' COURSE</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ONCE A YEAR</td>
<td>THREE TIMES A YEAR</td>
<td>ONCE A YEAR</td>
<td>ONCE A YEAR</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**TABLE I : NORDIC Peacekeeping Training**
Additionally, a Nordic U.N. seminar alternates between the countries every third year. The purpose of these courses is to prepare Nordic Officers for service in any U.N. mission -- particularly in today's environment. It should be noted that courses are conducted in English, even when that is not the primary language of the individual undergoing training, as that is the command language of the United Nations. Also, all courses offered by the Nordic Consortium are open to personnel of other nations who will be taking part in U.N. military operations.

DENMARK: The Danish U.N. Military Police training course is held once a year and lasts between two weeks and one month. The course is devoted to individual rather than unit training and is open to both officers and NCOs of at least sergeant rank. It is also open to personnel of other nations supporting U.N. operations, but everyone taking the course, including Nordic Consortium personnel, must be under orders for U.N. operations.

FINLAND: The Finnish U.N. Military Observer training course is held three times a year at the U.N. training facility at Niinisalo. Course length is two months. The course is offered to officers and NCOs of both Nordic and other Peacekeeping states in support of United Nations operations. The purpose of the course is achieved by instruction in:

* U.N. organization, past and present activities,
* Observer duties and communication procedures,
* Political, social, religious and other factors,
* Climatic, topographical and environmental factors,
* Other duties and responsibilities, and
* English language.\textsuperscript{12}

Of note, this course has been offered to personnel from eleven countries including: Denmark; Norway; Sweden; Finland; Estonia; Poland; Portugal; Singapore; Spain; Switzerland; and the United States. Since 1968, thirty-nine such courses have been offered with a total of 1818 graduates.

Before enrolling in the course, Finnish personnel will have received at least 8-11 months of military training. After military service is complete, those having taken the course can elect to remain subject to a voluntary two week recall for "Peacekeeping" operations. Additionally, Finnish forces receive unit training for U.N. operations which is not offered to units of other states.

**NORWAY:** The Norwegian U.N. logistics officers' course and U.N. movement control course take place in alternating years. The duration of the Logistic Course is about two weeks and primary subjects include:

* General information
* Logistics principles/procedures
* Engagement in U.N. operations
* Experience from U.N. operations\textsuperscript{13}

The duration of the Movement Control Course is also about two weeks and main areas of study include:

* U.N. organization and operations
* Movement control activities
* Air transportation activities

15
* Water transportation
* Railway transportation
* Communications

As with the other Nordic courses, these courses are open to personnel from other nations.

SWEDEN: The Swedish U.N. Staff Officers' course is given every year at Strangnas (about 50 miles from Stockholm) and is three weeks in duration.

Subject matter and time distribution of the course is as follows:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>SUBJECTS (with hours)</th>
<th>STAFF OFFICERS</th>
<th>MILITARY OBSERVERS</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>General orientation</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>13</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>U.N. peacekeeping operations</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Staff duties</td>
<td>66</td>
<td>--</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Observer duties</td>
<td>--</td>
<td>43</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Communications</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>15</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Transport</td>
<td>--</td>
<td>15</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>English language</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>14</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Opening/closing sessions</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Reserve/homework/etc.</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>120</td>
<td>120</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

TABLE II: Swedish U.N. Staff Officers' Course

Swedish staff officer training is for officers only. This year the course has included students from Australia; Nigeria; the
United Kingdom; thirty prospective peacekeepers from Japan; as well as observers from Germany and the Russian Federation.¹⁷

For its own forces, Sweden has a one year conscript system with refresher training every four years lasting three weeks. U.N. training for conscripts lasts for two weeks.

AUSTRIAN PEACEKEEPING TRAINING: Austria also has a long history of support for United Nations military operations. Individuals of all ranks are periodically trained at the battalion and company levels in military police and observer duties in support of U.N. operations, and training is open to all nations who support such operations.¹⁸

CANADIAN PEACEKEEPING TRAINING: Canada conducts training as necessary to support United Nations military operations. For instance, the 1st Royal Canadian Regiment underwent urban warfare training before deploying to Bosnia.¹⁹ Most training, however, is completed at the unit level after the United Nations has sanctioned a military operation and is tailored specifically to the requirements of the scenario at hand.²⁰

AUSTRALIAN PEACEKEEPING TRAINING: A United Nations Peacekeeping course for Planners and Commanders to be taught twice each year is contemplated by Australia.²¹ Course topics are likely to include U.N. military operational doctrine and tactics and will cover such areas of interest as skills required for embargo and non-combatant evacuation (NEO) operations in which Australia has recently taken part. As currently envisioned, both an Australian
course and a course intended to attract regional players who have demonstrated interest will be provided.

Recognizing that Australia is a small player in the Peacekeeping game, the Australian course will be limited to about one week in duration. Topics covered will include:

* The United Nations Charter
* Boutros-Ghali's "An Agenda for Peace"
* The U.N. Secretariat
* How the U.N. deals with forces in the field
* How Australia has organized for Peacekeeping operations
* Conflict resolution
* Preventive diplomacy
* The role of the Navy and Air Force in Peacekeeping
* Rules of engagement
* Command and control
* Differences between national and U.N. orders (lack of U.N. consultation)

At the current time, Australia has three individuals dedicated to this project of LT COL/Commander rank. Class sizes should be around 30 and the syllabus for each course should be ready to be vetted later this year.

**OTHER NATIONS' PEACEKEEPING TRAINING:** While most of the nations which take place in Peacekeeping type operations under the auspices of the United Nations (31 nations have made pledges to support a U.N. "Reserve" force\(^{22}\)), almost all training provided in other than the nations mentioned above is reactive to emerging
situations and could be characterized as "ad hoc" in nature. While such training may well be sufficient for forces to perform individual functions adequately, cultural and national economic differences cause U.N. supporting nations to bring a vast assortment of skills and levels of professionalism and commitment in support of U.N. military operations. Training outside of national borders on an scale other than minor, however, is not realistically feasible for most nations that could benefit from it in that own and host nation economic resources would in almost all cases be prohibitive.

CONCLUSIONS: As indicated in the section above on United Nations Military Operations Training requirements, most of the major skills required in United Nations Peace-Enforcement type operations are inherent in the normal warfare training received by general purpose forces of the major nations prone to support U.N. sanctions. Skills associated with Peacemaking and Peacekeeping, however, go beyond those normally imparted in recruit and unit training. While it is recognized that United States military personnel adapt exceptionally well to almost any circumstances, it is the view here that risk associated with their adaptation to circumstances in the field could be greatly reduced by creating at least a corps of individuals who have undergone training of the type outlined in the section above on United Nations Military Operations Training. Of note, while the training opportunities available in other countries are impressive there is good reason to
U.S. servicemen and women whose previous training has reached a considerable level of sophistication. By training a cadre of individuals in CONUS for U.N. type non-traditional military roles, an ability for them to in turn train others at the unit level would be realized.

Two areas in particular stand out as lacking in adequacy of training availability -- staff training of a general nature and dealing with displaced personnel/population control. It is the consensus of those contacted in the course of this study that staff training of a general nature is wholly lacking. This has resulted in "ad hocism" in almost all U.N. military operations of recent memory and is both prescient and dangerous in its application to future U.N. sanctioned operations if not corrected. To be truly effective and give any hope of providing a credible alternative for future collective security arrangements, staff training of a general nature and the forum it will provide for a U.N. Field Commander to ensure he is able to support the U.N. mandate must be made available. Similarly, training for dealing with displaced personnel and population control -- an area not adequately covered in existing training available worldwide -- should be instituted on a priority basis. As the situation in Bosnia has clearly demonstrated, likely scenarios of U.N. involvement in the future will only serve to exacerbate U.N. deficiencies in this area in the decade ahead. Other areas of training mentioned above bear consideration for development of cadre personnel that would become
the basis for pre-deployment and regular training at the unit level.
NOTES

1. Snow, Donald M., Peacekeeping, Peacemaking and Peace-Enforcement: The U.S. Role in the New International Order, Strategic Studies Institute, U.S. Army War College, February 1993. This table and the insights for the entire section under the subheading "Conflict Stages" is based on this report.


6. Of note, there is a school of thought which disagrees with the need for historical overview of the mandated area. For instance, Major General Lewis MacKenzie, the Canadian Commander of U.N. Peacekeeping forces in Bosnia, indicated during the 24-25 February 1993 Army War College Strategy Conference that, in his view, history was useless with respect to enhancing his ability to carry out his U.N. mandate.

7. For more information contact LT COL Christian Harleman, Senior Advisor to the Military Advisor to the Secretary General, Department of Peacekeeping Operations, Room S-3650, U.N. Secretariat, U.N. Plaza, New York, New York, 10017.

8. Phonecon with LT COL Dale Claytor, USMC, of 19 May 1993. This position has been confirmed by numerous senior Army and Marine Officers during conversations prior to and after that conversation referenced above. LT COL Claytor, who has in the field experience as a U.N. Peacekeeper, also noted that most training that is given by any nation of the United Nations for Peacekeeping type operations is "in the weeds" and, as such "any good Marine can adapt excellently after about three days in-country" to perform the missions that are required of them.


10. This and all other information in this section was provided by LT COL Larsen of the Embassy of Denmark, Military Section, Washington, D.C., during PHONECON of 2 July, 1993.

11. This and all other information in this section based on materials provided by Minister Councilor Pauli Jarvenpaa of the Embassy of Finland, Washington, D.C., and on our PHONECON of 9

12. Ibid.


17. This and all subsequent information provided by BGEN Sven Hollmen of the Embassy of Sweden, Washington, D.C., in a PHONECON conducted on 2 July, 1993.

18. This information was provided by CWO Fritz of the Military Section of the Embassy of Austria during our PHONECON of 9 July, 1993.

19. Information here and throughout this section was provided by Master Corporal Machinski of the Military Section of the Embassy of Canada, Washington, D.C., during our PHONECON of 9 January 1993.

20. Ibid.

21. Insights for this section are based on discussions with Commodore Timothy H. Cox, AM RAN, Commandant of the Australian Defense Force War College, held at the U.S. Naval War College, Newport, Rhode Island, 8-9 June 1993.

22. Insight provided by Lt Col Juhani Loikkanen, Military Advisor to the United Nations representing Finland.
BIBLIOGRAPHY


Operations, Thomas J. Watson Jr. Institute for International Studies, Brown University, 1993. This Draft is "Not for Quotation" but provided valuable insights for the research conducted herein.


20. UN Military Observers Course Plan UNMOC 2/92, provided by the Embassy of Finland, 10 pages.