Attitudes Toward Peacekeeping and Peacemaking Among U.S. Infantry Soldiers Deployed to the Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia.

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This paper reports survey findings from 171 members of the 6-502d Infantry who had just returned to Berlin from their deployment to the Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia in support of Operation Able Sentry (January 1994). The focus here is on those items related to attitudes about peacekeeping and serving with the United Nations as part of a multinational force. Although we hypothesized that their essentially "constabulary role" in Berlin would lead to attitudes more consistent with peacekeeping duty than those expressed by airborne and light infantry soldiers returning from previous peacekeeping assignments, the data did not show such differences. Like their counterparts in earlier operations, about half of the 6-502d soldiers questioned the appropriateness of the mission for their unit. At the same time, however, more than two-thirds recognized the importance of specialized peacekeeping training prior to taking up their border positions. Furthermore, the vast majority felt the battalion was well-trained for the mission, completed the mission successfully, and had no difficulties serving under a U.N. commander. A "professional ethic" was clearly more prevalent than a "constabulary" one.

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BACKGROUND

Despite the end of the Cold War and subsequent reductions in military budgets and personnel, the U.S. Army has recently been engaged in a historically large number of "operations other than combat." For example, the U.S. Army deployed in Europe (USAREUR) saw its deterrence mission largely dissipate following the fall of the Berlin Wall and its number decline from over 200,000 in 1989 to less than half that today. Yet from the end of the Gulf War in 1991 through 1993, USAREUR has participated in no fewer than 42 contingency missions, nearly all of which can be classified as peacekeeping or humanitarian in nature. (This compared with only 29 such missions in the 44 years of the Cold War.) Increasingly, these latter-day missions are also multinational.

Most multinational operations involving USAREUR forces are conducted under the auspices of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO). Significantly, however, with the deployment of a U.S. Mobile Army Surgical Hospital (MASH) from Germany to Croatia in 1992 to support the United Nations Protection Force (UNPROFOR), USAREUR is part of a growing trend in the 1990's to include U.S. forces in United Nations peacekeeping missions. This development represents an important shift in the Cold War doctrine which held that superpowers be excluded from such missions, a doctrine which was successfully implemented for nearly forty years (Segal, 1993).

The current research focuses on the second major USAREUR contribution to UNPROFOR. In July 1993, an infantry battalion from the Berlin Brigade joined Norwegian, Swedish, and Finnish troops under a Danish commander in the Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia (FYRM) for six months of border patrol duty. The U.S. soldiers were essentially used to free up some of the Scandinavians for redeployment to Bosnia, which was not a politically viable destination for American forces. Like the MASH unit, the Berlin battalion became part of Operation Provide Promise, which is the umbrella referent for all U.S. military activities in the former Yugoslavia. It includes the humanitarian airdrop of supplies over Bosnia, the establishment of a no-flight zone (Operation Deny Flight), and the naval embargo. The peacekeeping mission in FYRM was named Operation Able Sentry.

Previous studies on American peacekeepers in the Sinai who were part of the Multinational Force and Observers (MFO, a non-U.N. mission) have examined the degree to which airborne and light infantry soldiers accept a "constabulary ethic" (Segal, Harris, Rothenberg, & Marlowe, 1984; Segal, Furukawa, & Lindh, 1990; cf. Moskos, 1975). While these researchers generally agree that even "elite" American troops can competently carry out a noncombat mission due to their "professionalism," they do report significant percentages who do not find such a mission appropriate for themselves, who do not think a soldier can be effective in peacekeeping without the right to initiate force, and who do not think additional training is necessary for peacekeeping.
The present study seeks to further this research on attitudes toward peacekeeping with a sample that differs from the MFO samples in three respects: (1) the mission was a bona fide UN mission with American soldiers serving under a UN commander (the first American combat unit to do so); (2) soldiers were deployed from Europe instead of the United States; and (3) the soldiers were members of a "straight leg" infantry unit rather than airborne or light fighter qualified. We expected that the Berlin unit would manifest the constabulary ethic to an even greater degree than its peacekeeping predecessors since the Berlin Brigade's "tripwire role" in the Cold War deterrence mission had ended with the Fall of the Berlin Wall and predeployment activities could in fact be described as constabulary. Furthermore, although an assignment to Berlin was still considered somewhat prestigious, these infantrymen could not be considered "elite" in the same way lightfighters and especially airborne infantry troops are perceived in the Army. Therefore, we hypothesized they would be less likely to believe that a border patrol mission would be inappropriate with respect to their specialized training.

SAMPLE AND METHOD

On 13 January 1994, a research team from the U.S. Army Medical Research Unit-Europe conducted a survey among members of the 6-502d Infantry Battalion who had returned to Berlin one week earlier from their deployment to the Former Yugoslavian Republic of Macedonia in support of Operation Able Sentry (OAS). The purpose of the survey was to measure various aspects of unit climate, morale, and stress factors associated with the deployment, in addition to attitudes about peacekeeping and serving with the United Nations. The survey was administered to all soldiers of the battalion who had served in OAS, were available for duty on the day of administration, and were willing to participate. A total of 171 soldiers completed surveys, out of an estimated 262 battalion members who deployed, for a response rate of 65%. (An additional number of approximately 50 soldiers who were attached to the battalion from units across Europe in support roles were not included in the sample.) Responses to survey questions were both voluntary and anonymous.

The electronically scannable survey form included a section on demographics; perceptions of deployment living conditions, relations among soldiers, and support from the rear detachment, media, and the United Nations (including for families); sources of current stress and stress during the deployment; measures of depression, anxiety, and somatization; satisfaction levels with respect to policies and leaders; estimates of unit cohesion; and attitudes toward peacekeeping, including training with and serving under the auspices of the United Nations.
In addition to being all male, the sample was comprised of 48% never married soldiers; 71% who held the ranks of private to corporal/specialist, 14% the rank of sergeant, 11% the ranks of staff sergeant or sergeant first class, and 4% the ranks of lieutenant or captain; 98% who had completed high school with 39% having completed at least some college; 26% who were under the age of 21, 48% between the ages of 21 and 25, and 26% between the ages of 26 and 45; and 73% who were white, 10% black, and 11% Hispanic. Except for an underrepresentation of blacks and a slight overrepresentation of Hispanics, this unit displays fairly typical demographics for a U.S. infantry unit.

Although no data were collected on the 6-502d prior to its redeployment, cohesion and morale data were available from a sister battalion surveyed in the Berlin Brigade in 1990, which had been the first battalion in the brigade to inactivate and leave Germany. The 6-502d itself inactivated in June 1994 in anticipation of the withdrawal of all U.S. forces from Berlin no later than September 1994.

RESULTS

We begin with those attitudinal items related to peacekeeping where we have MFO postdeployment comparative data—either from airborne infantry soldiers (Segal, Harris, Rothberg, & Marlowe, 1984) or light infantry soldiers (Segal, Furukawa, & Lindh, 1990). For the most part in Table 1, we do not find reason to conclude that soldiers from the Berlin Brigade espouse the constabulary ethic to any greater degree than their airborne or light infantry counterparts. All three groups look similar in their belief that a soldier can be effective in a peacekeeping job if he cannot use force except in self-defense, with about two-thirds of each group saying "yes." Likewise each of the groups is split approximately 50-50 with respect to the perceived appropriateness of peacekeeping for their division or brigade. Finally, infantry soldiers from Berlin are not significantly different from lightfighters in endorsing the notion that additional skills are needed for peacekeeping (71% versus 78%), but both of these groups differ from the paratroopers where only half saw the need for additional skills (a drop from 81% in the paratroopers' predeployment survey).

The largest differences across the infantry groups are with respect to agreement on the statement, "It is a mistake for American troops to be used to help solve other peoples' problems." By the end of their deployment, less than 10% of the airborne troops held that view, compared to a quarter of the light infantry, and more than 40% of the Berlin soldiers. As the number of contingency missions has gone up coincident with military personnel reductions, this kind of statement (although still in the minority) is voiced more frequently both in the barracks and in letters to the editor. The fact that the U.S. had not yet formally recognized FYRM when Operation Able Sentry
began further hurt this kind of deployment's legitimacy. Finally, it must be kept in mind that the airborne data were collected before the airline carrying returning MFO members of the 101st Division crashed at Gander, Newfoundland, and that the Berlin data were collected just three months after significant casualties were suffered among Army Ranger personnel in Somalia (Operation Restore Hope).

Differences in question wording with respect to the appropriateness of the mission produce increases in the Berlin soldiers' acceptance of the idea. For example, when asked, "Do you think the United States should be involved in missions like Operation Able Sentry?" the percent agreeing rises to 52%. Furthermore, 79% endorse the "yes" response when the question is, "Was the Berlin Brigade a good choice for the Able Sentry mission?"

To understand why nearly a third (32%) more of the respondents thought the Berlin Brigade was a good choice for the mission compared to "being the kind of job you think soldiers in the Berlin Brigade should be doing," we looked at their open-ended comments. The reasons for negative answers on both questions were similar: "we are combat infantry," "we are peacemakers not peacekeepers," "we are trained to kill," "we are not policemen," and "we are not gateguards." However, many who thought the Berlin Brigade should ideally be engaged in more combat-related missions also recognized that in reality their situation was not much different in Germany: "Berlin (Brigade) has always been used for guarding," "Berlin Brigade has had similar missions with the Wall," and "Berlin (Brigade) has had to protect the city for 40 years." Others felt that at least OAS gave them something to do, that they had essentially been without a mission since the Fall of the Berlin Wall, and that the brigade was a good choice because they were inactivating.

In addition, there were a substantial number of soldiers who felt that because they are professionals, they will do any job they are sent to do and can adapt to any mission, even those they feel are best left to nations other than the United States. This ethic is fairly widespread among these soldiers and is impressive given the fact that over 70% of them are junior enlisted. It is furthermore reflected in the fact that 75% agree or strongly agree with the statement, "A soldier is a professional and does any job he is given with equal professional skill." This percentage compares with 57% or less within the samples examined by Segal, Furukawa, and Lindh (1990).

With respect to training, although 54% said they were "well-trained and prepared for Able Sentry prior to deployment," 68% agreed that "the training given by the United Nations following (the) deployment to Macedonia (was) necessary." Unlike their airborne and light infantry counterparts who received "peacekeeping training" prior to deployment, the Berlin soldiers (who were deployed with about two weeks notice) were required by
the UN commander in FYRM to undergo one month of training under
the guidance of the Scandinavian forces. In their open-ended
comments, although some did not find the training useful or
including anything they did not already know, most appreciated it
and enjoyed working with their UN counterparts. Very few said
things like:

The NORDBAT (Norwegian battery) is far less combative the U.S.
Army. They are used to being targets with restrictive ROE's
(rules of engagement). We aren't. Once we return, the soldiers
must relearn these aggressive, combat skills. It is most
damaging to new troops.

With respect to serving under a United Nations commander,
most had little to no difficulty with his legitimate authority,
did not feel he threatened the American chain of command, and
furthermore felt he did a good job. Problems with local
Macedonians were few in number.

CONCLUSION

Peacekeepers who served with the Berlin Brigade in FYRM are
about evenly split regarding their belief that the United States
should work with the United Nations in helping other nations with
their problems, to include in peacekeeping roles. Despite, and
in some cases, because of the fact that the U.S. still holds a
"superpower status," about half the Berlin soldiers do not feel
that American soldiers, especially American combat infantry
soldiers are properly utilized in such peacekeeping roles.
Contrary to our expectation, they look much like their MFO
airborne and light infantry counterparts in this regard. The
constabulary ethic aside, they appear to be more likely than
their counterparts to adhere to a professional ethic which states
that a soldier does any job he is given and does it with equal
professional skill.

Admittedly, all three units successfully brought their six
month peacekeeping missions to an end. However, the serious lack
of consensus with respect to mission legitimacy will someday have
to be confronted in a direct manner by Army policy and decision
makers. With Security Council members Britain and France in
major roles in the Balkans, and the United States and Russia
currently in minor ones, such peacekeeping participation will
likely continue for U.S. infantry soldiers. These operations
will look quite different from the kind of U.S. coalitions formed
to fight wars in Korea and Iraq. Many of the problems involved
in such cooperative ventures, such as those seen in Operation
Restore Hope (Somalia), remain to be solved.
TABLE 1
POSTDEPLOYMENT PEACEKEEPING ATTITUDES AMONG THREE SAMPLES
OF U.S. INFANTRY SOLDIERS

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Item</th>
<th>Percent Saying Yes or Agreeing</th>
</tr>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>AIRBORNE</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Does a soldier who is well trained in military skills still require additional skills for peacekeeping service?</td>
<td>50%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Can a soldier be effective in a peacekeeping job if he cannot use force except in self-defense?</td>
<td>72%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Is being a part of a peacekeeping force the kind of job you think soldiers in (your division or brigade) should be doing?</td>
<td>55%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>It is a mistake for American troops to be used to help solve other peoples' problems.</td>
<td>6%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

NR=Not explicitly reported, but "not significantly different" from airborne infantry results.
REFERENCES


SOURCES OF STRESS DURING THE DEPLOYMENT
Percent Reporting Medium-Very High

- Boredom: 71%
- Safety of Family: 50%
- Prob's: Unit Leaders: 49%
- Prob's: Making Calls: 46%
- Isolation: 41%
- Separation from Wife: 39%
- Concern: Infidelity: 27%
- Concern: My Safety: 12%
- News of Trouble Yugo: 11%
- Rear Detachment: 11%

6-502 Soldier Debrief Survey
Berlin, 13 January 1994

U.S. Army Medical Research Unit-Europe
SOURCES OF STRESS
POST - DEPLOYMENT
Percent Reporting Medium-Very High

UNCERTAINTY ABOUT...
MY NEXT ASSIGNMENT
WHERE WE WILL LIVE
INACTIVATION OF BBDE
DRAWDOWN - MY FUTURE
BERLIN COMMUN. CLOSE
MOVING FAMILY - USA
MOVING FAMILY - GERM
CHANGE, UNIT LEADERS
TROUBLE: CHILDREN
FINANCIAL PROBLEMS
CHAIN-OF-COMMAND
NOT GETTING SERVICES
FAMILY MEMBER HEALTH

0% 20% 40% 60% 80% 100%

6-502 Soldier Debrief Survey
Berlin, 13 January 1994

U.S. Army Medical Research Unit-Europe
OPINIONS ABOUT THE PEACEKEEPING MISSION

1. Does a soldier who is well-trained in military skills still require additional skills for peacekeeping service? 71% YES  29% NO

2. Can a soldier be effective in a peacekeeping job if he cannot use force except in self-defense? 66% YES  34% NO

3. Was the Berlin Brigade a good choice for the Able Sentry Mission? 79% YES  21% NO

4. Were you well-trained and prepared for Able Sentry prior to deployment? 54% YES  46% NO

5. Was the training given by the United Nations following your deployment to Macedonia necessary? 68% YES  32% NO
OPINIONS ABOUT THE PEACEKEEPING MISSION
Continued

6. Do you think the United States should be involved in missions like Operation Able Sentry?
52% YES 48% NO

7. Is being part of a peacekeeping force the kind of job you think soldiers in the Berlin Brigade should be doing?
47% YES 53% NO

8. I would like to participate again in this kind of mission.
34% AGREE 34% DISAGREE 25% NO OPINION

9. It's a mistake for American troops to be used to solve other people's problems.
44% AGREE 33% DISAGREE 23% NO OPINION

10. A soldier is a professional and does any job he is given with equal professional skill.
75% AGREE 8% DISAGREE 17% NO OPINION
OPERATION ABLE SENTRY
Soldier Debrief Survey Conclusions

- The most significant stressors during the deployment were related to boredom, isolation, leaders, separation/lack of communication from spouse, and concerns for family safety.

- Current stressors involve uncertainty about next assignment and personal future as a result of the drawdown and Berlin Brigade inactivation.

- There was relatively high satisfaction with training and support provided by the U.N., but low satisfaction with unit training and PT. Other complaints centered on the lack of privacy, the pass/leave policy, and information flow.

- Support from the rear (including for families), whether from the unit, brigade, community, or JTF in Zagreb was viewed positively.
OPERATION ABLE SENTRY
Soldier Debrief Survey Conclusions II

- Relationships with other U.N. troops and local Macedonians were mostly positive, but there was not extensive contact with either group.

- Soldiers preferred being on border rotation at the OP's compared with life in the base camp.

- Unit cohesion and morale were about average for an infantry line unit, but there was a significant minority dissatisfied with unit leaders.

- Psychological distress scores look much like those found in the Berlin Brigade battalion that was first to inactivate (as measured in October 1990).

- Soldiers are split on whether U.S. infantry units should be used to perform U.N. peacekeeping missions. They claim that they can accomplish any mission handed to them, but are worried about maintaining warfighting or "peacemaking" skills.