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**COULD THE UNITED STATES ARMY HAVE A POSITIVE IMPACT ON THE
INSURGENCY AND COUNTERDRUG PROBLEMS IN PERU?**

A thesis presented to the Faculty of the U.S. Army
Command and General Staff College in partial
fulfillment of the requirements for the
degree

MASTER OF MILITARY ART AND SCIENCE

by

MICHAEL J. BURNS, MAJ, USA
B.S. , Norwich University, Vermont, 1980

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Fort Leavenworth, Kansas

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Master's Thesis, 2 Aug 93-3 Jun 94

Could the United States Army Have a Positive
Impact on Insurgency and Counterdrug Problems in Peru?

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This study analyzes the Peruvian Maoist Shining Path insurgency and its association with illegal drug traffickers to determine if United States Army elements deployed to the region, could have a positive impact on the Peruvian Government's fight against these terrorists. The Shining Path insurgency is the most serious insurgency now active in Peru. The actions of the Shining Path threaten the United States' interests and our goals on two fronts. First, the ongoing insurgency threatens the regional security of a democratic country, and secondly, the drug trade in Peru is threatening the very foundation that has made the United States a world power. Peru's internal security problems are particularly complex in that both the drug and insurgency problems have become inseparable. This study focuses on branches of the Army to determine what contributions that branch brings to the conflict, and if that contribution assists in defeating the Shining Path.

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
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
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
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
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The opinions and conclusions expressed herein are those of the student author and do not necessarily represent the views of the U.S. Army Command and General Staff College or any other governmental agency. (References to this study should include the foregoing statement.)

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ABSTRACT

**COULD THE UNITED STATES ARMY HAVE A POSITIVE IMPACT ON
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Burns, USA, 104 pages.

This study analyzes the Peruvian Maoist Shining Path insurgency and its association with illegal drug traffickers to determine if United States Army elements deployed to the region, could have a positive impact on the Peruvian Government's fight against these terrorists. The Shining Path insurgency is the most serious insurgency now active in Peru. The actions of the Shining Path threaten the United States' interests and our goals on two fronts. First, the ongoing insurgency threatens the regional security of a democratic country, and secondly, the drug trade in Peru is threatening the very foundation that has made the United States a world power. Peru's internal security problems are particularly complex in that both the drug and insurgency problems have become inseparable. This study focuses on branches of the Army to determine what contributions that branch brings to the conflict, and if that contribution assists in defeating the Shining Path.

ACKNOWLEDGMENTS

This project would not have been possible if not for the hard work of many individuals. I would like to thank all of the people who work at the Combined Arms Research Library at Fort Leavenworth. They proved to be an invaluable source of knowledge and patience and were able to maintain a pleasant attitude at all times. You deserve the new library!

The professionals who work in the Graduate Degree Programs office were also of great help and their efforts are very much appreciated.

A good friend, Maj. Bill Pope, was also a key player in the completion of this project. Without his expertise in computers, his patience, and friendship, I never would have gotten out of the starting gate.

I would be remiss if I failed to mention my wife Kathy and son John. Their support through the entire project was unwavering and without them I would have been at the golf course a long time ago. Their support went beyond the normal range of encouragement and included gathering information from newspaper and magazine articles, proof reading, and my 4 year old son's insistence that he help me type.

A great deal of thanks also goes to my committee, whose efforts made this paper a reality. They are: Dr. Graham Turbiville, LTC Dennis Skelly, and LTC Marcus Hines. Their dedication to their profession is a superb example for others in the field to emulate. They were a constant source of support and knowledge and I'm convinced I was blessed with the finest committee in the program.

Although much of the credit for this project belongs to those I have mentioned, and many more that I haven't, any errors are entirely my own responsibility.

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CHAPTER 1

PERU : AN OVERVIEW OF ITS PROBLEMS, AND THE IMPACT ON ITS RELATIONSHIP WITH THE U.S.

Peru has been faced with a number of severe problems that have had a significant impact on government institutions and Peruvian society. A number of these have been in existence since the birth of the nation, and before, while some have surfaced in recent years. This chapter will briefly address the most critical of these problems and discuss the impact they have had on the country to date. One problem, illegal narcotics and the impact on Peruvian and U.S. society and the U.S. Peruvian political relationship, must be addressed in greater depth than the other listed problem areas. For the purpose of this thesis paper the geography, population, the drug trafficking problem, active insurgencies, political turmoil, human rights violations and the impact on Peruvian-U.S. relations, and the economy will be considered in establishing the research framework.

Geography

Peru is the fourth largest Latin American country with an area slightly over 1,285,200 square kilometers. The country has three distinctly different geographic regions: the Costa (or coast), the Sierra (for mountain), and the Selva (or jungle). The Costa, the narrow, arid coastal region, comprises the coastline and the foothills of the Andes that are below the 2,000 meter level. This area consists of dry plains and sand dunes and includes about 11 percent of the national territory. Although this region is arid, it possesses the richest agricultural lands in the country. Along Peru's 2,414 kilometers

of coastline there are approximately twenty-five ports, but few of these have good harbors. The majority of large cities are located in this region, and the largest and most important is the capital, Lima.¹

The Sierra consists of a high plateau which gradually rises as it extends southward; upon it are imposed three mountain chains interconnected by a large number of random ridges that rise from 1,000 to 2,000 meters above the plateau level. The Sierra region includes about 26 percent of the national territory. The pattern of the mountain system is highly mixed with tremendous canyons cutting below the high surfaces.

The Selva is made up of two zones, the Low Selva and the High Selva. Below heights of about 1,000 meters is found the tropical rainforest of the Amazon that makes up the Low Selva. Above these levels the mountain slopes and the valleys are referred to as the High Selva.²

The Low Selva is very humid, and most of it supports dense vegetation consisting predominantly of rain forest. There are patches of open land, but movement is generally restricted to the river network.

The High Selva is composed of a pattern of alternating hills and valleys which link the Andean landscape and the rain forest of the Low Selva. Ranging from eighty to one hundred and sixty kilometers in width, it is a zone of great variation in vegetation, depending on rainfall, relief, and soils. Rains and intensive river erosion have cut deeply into the steep slopes and created greater obstacles to ground communication between the Costa and the Amazon than does the Andes.³

The geography of Peru has had a significant effect on the lines of communication between the people of Peru and the government. The harshness of the terrain has limited the government's ability to build roads and install electricity and telephone lines. This problem has served to isolate a rather large portion of the population.

Population

The population of Peru is estimated to have reached 22.5 million in mid-1992 and to be growing by about 2.1% a year. The urban population is estimated to have risen from 46% of the total population in 1960 to 71% in 1992. The population of Lima was estimated at 7.4 million in 1992 as compared to 4.7 million in 1980.⁴ The population is racially diverse, with a mixed population of white, Mestizo, Indian, Japanese, and Chinese. The whites, which are primarily of European descent, constitute 15 percent of a total of 22.5 million people. Mestizos, persons with Indian blood who are more Western in culture, represent approximately 38 percent of the population. Peruvian Indians, which comprise various groups, form the bulk of the population with 46 percent of the population. Blacks, Japanese, and Chinese groups together constitute only one percent of the population.

Peru is not a linguistically homogeneous country. Although Spanish is the dominant language, with seventy percent of the population speaking Spanish as a first language, twenty-five percent speak the Indian language, Quechua, and the remaining five percent speak Aymara, also an Indian language.

The various ethnic groups, combined with occupation and geography, serve to divide the population into three, rather complex, classes, the elite, the middle class, and the lower class. Each of these classes are further divided, but for this study it is important to recognize that the Peruvian society recognizes different classes, a fact that serves to further divide the country.⁵

Illegal Drugs and the Impact On Peru and the U.S.
and Their Affect On Our Political Relationship

The eastern Andean region of Peru provides excellent climate and soil conditions for coca growing. It also proves very difficult to traverse, which hinders government authorities in their search of illegal coca crops. Once planted, the coca shrub requires minimal care and takes a year to mature. After maturing, it can be harvested year round, producing crops four to six times annually. The shrub will yield harvests for about six years before the soil has to lie fallow for seven to eleven years. Each year, a single hectare of land, about the average plot cultivated by a family, can produce 1.2 to 2.3 metric tons of coca leaves.⁶

Social conditions in Peru make coca leaves an acceptable crop to be grown as well. Andean peasants have chewed coca leaves for centuries, and Peru's Andean culture long has ascribed religious and magical properties to coca. Widespread poverty in Peru creates an economic condition which favors farming coca. Payment by traffickers for coca is far more than can be earned by farming legal crops or by signing on to government crop-substitution programs. Additionally, coca is a legitimate crop for the world's pharmaceutical industry when grown in accord with legal limitations.

Peru is the leading producer of coca in the world, with estimates ranging from 110,000 to 330,000 hectares of coca (the official U.S. position as of April 1992 being 120,800). A recent report states the majority of coca produced in Peru is grown in the La Convencion and Lares Valleys. Almost one-half of this production is perfectly legal and is for the pharmaceutical industry. Most of the other one-half is illegal, but not for the production of cocaine base. Rather, it is used in a thriving black market which is reported to exist in the pharmaceutical industry. The majority of illegal coca production for narco-trafficking is in the Upper and Central Huallaga regions in the Selva area of Peru. The cultivation of illegal coca has become very important to the economic well-being of many Peruvian peasants. Since peasants can earn nearly three times more for coca than by

cultivating legal crops, it is difficult to introduce an alternative crop program as a solution to the coca problem.⁷

This drug production has particular interest for the United States. That is, the impact on the drug epidemic in the U.S. is enormous. Presently, drug use in the United States is one of the most serious problems facing our government. Its repercussions are felt throughout our society. Globally, the drug trade absorbs over \$500 billion annually, more than twice the value of all U.S. currency in circulation. The \$210 to \$230 billion total loss each year to the U.S. economy is almost four times the amount of money that American consumers spend on oil. This amount of money is over triple the profits earned in 1988 by all the *Fortune 500* companies combined.⁸

The adverse effects of drug abuse are also felt in our industrialized workforce. The effects of drug use by our workforce, both at work and away from work, has reduced profits through lost efficiency, diminished productivity, accidents, medical expense, absenteeism, and theft by employees to support their habits. In 1984 a Drug Enforcement Agency (DEA) endorsed Cocaine Hotline organization reported that :

1. Drug users are three-and-a-half times as likely to be involved in a plant accident.
2. Drug users are five times as likely to file a worker's compensation claim.
3. Drug users receive three times the average sick benefits.
4. Drug users function at 67 percent of their work potential.⁹

This type of employee behavior results in the indirect losses of \$60 to \$80 billion per year. When combined with the estimated \$150 billion that went into criminal hands during 1989, the \$9.48 billion federal dollars allocated for counterdrug activities in FY90, and the considerable funds spent by state and local governments on criminal justice, medical, and social counterdrug programs, the loss to the U.S. economy is enormous.¹⁰

This country's drug epidemic has an astounding effect on each and every one of U.S. The biggest impact is felt in our educational system. This impact is felt daily by millions of school-aged children. Drugs have become part of everyday life in the classroom. Children

of all ages are being exposed to drugs, and each year the number of young addicts continues to rise while their age continues to drop. Gangs who sell drugs as a source of income thrive at our nation's schools, and the mere presence of these gangs at the schools threatens the safety of the students because many of these gang members carry weapons ranging from knives to automatic firearms. Students or teachers being shot or stabbed in school has become almost a daily occurrence. A recent survey conducted by a major TV network showed that over 50% of the students in New York City now carry weapons to school. Children who succumb to the pressures of drug use are turning more and more to crime to support their habits. Eventually, most of the hard core users are arrested or drop out of school signaling an end to their formal education and making it very difficult to live a productive life within the parameters of our society. Studies have shown that math and English scores of students who faced the challenge and stayed in school showed a steady and consistent decline over the years. We also have a very high drop-out rate which burdens our economy with more unemployment and welfare recipients while providing fewer skilled workers for our businesses and industries. As a result, we have fewer people working and paying taxes for the increasing number of unemployed. The children who remain in school have pressures on them that their parents never had. Accompanying the drug problem in our schools is also a very high crime rate. Children who are addicts need some source of income to support their habits and crime is the easy out for them. The crimes range from stealing someone's lunch money to murder. Children who need protection or who just want to belong to some sort of group are turning to gangs. These gangs also have a violent reputation and perpetuate the drug problem by forcing members to use and sell drugs.

This leads into another area of major concern and that is our judicial system. With more and more people turning to crime to support their habits the more overburdened our courts have become. Most of the cases our courts see are related, one way or another, to

drugs. Due to the vast amount of court cases involving drugs combined with the overpopulation of our jail systems, our judges are forced to sentence only the major offenders to jail terms. People with charges of selling or possessing small amounts of drugs are usually placed on probation.¹¹ A residual effect of this kind of policy is that children repeatedly see dealers and other criminals violate the law with what appears to be impunity while gaining huge financial profits. Many children see this as a way out of their present problems and pursue a criminal way of life. This obviously is associated with the problems we face in our educational systems noted above.

Our medical system also suffers from this horrible epidemic. The medical profession has to care for the daily injuries and deaths of thousands of patients whose injuries can be traced to the use or sale of illegal drugs. Gang related drive-by shootings have become a daily occurrence as have the births of babies addicted to drugs due to their mothers addiction. This in its many dimensions affects not only the family but also the hospitals and the insurance companies who will ultimately have to pay the medical bills because the addict mother does not have the money to pay her bills due to her addiction. Drug abuse also contributes to the alarming rise in HIV cases. One of the ways the HIV virus is transmitted is through needles shared by HIV positive to addicts. A popular drug on the streets today is a by-product of cocaine called crack. Injection is the method used most often by addicts because it intensifies the high. It is no wonder that the HIV virus is running rampant through crack addicts. HIV positive addicts further strain the medical system because they then have to be treated for the virus as well. Our nation's credibility with other nations is also tarnished because we have not successfully dealt with this problem. It is seen by many as a problem that is threatening the very foundation of our nation.

Over the last thirty years drug use in the United States has risen steadily and is now at epidemic proportions. It is projected that the U.S. will spend \$2.4 billion for drug treatment and related research in 1993 for an estimated 1.9 million people with drug

related problems.¹² Most of the drugs used by Americans are grown and processed outside of the United States. A very large percentage of these drugs are from Central and South America. Peru, as noted, is the worlds leading producer of coca, whose leaves produce cocaine and is the source of the majority of the processed cocaine shipped to the United States. Clearly, this drug epidemic is one of the biggest problems facing our country today. It affects virtually everyone, either through personal experience or indirectly through our taxes and insurance premiums. It backlogs the judicial system so much that convicted criminals are set free because there is not enough room in our prisons. Our medical community is stretched to the limit trying to care for patients from drug related injuries or illness. This epidemic is a serious threat to our national security and must be dealt with quickly and effectively. If it continues to grow the long term effects could be devastating for U.S. national security.

In the fight against drug traffickers there is potential for establishing a productive and effective working relationship between the U.S. and the Peruvians. Unfortunately, other problems have served to strain the relationship between the two countries, specifically, recent political activities by the Peruvian President and reported human rights violations by the Peruvian police force, and military, both of which will be addressed later. Both countries understand the importance of joint action cooperation and once the other issues are dealt with to the satisfaction of the U.S., both countries can direct their focus on improving the security of both countries.

Insurgencies

Peru has several different insurgent groups which are active, but they operate mostly in the capital city of Lima. For the purpose of this paper the focus will be on the group that presents the biggest threat to the government of Peru, the Sendero Luminoso (Shining Path).

The Shining Path was formed in the late 1960s by university professor Abimael Guzman Reynoso as an Indian-based rural rebel organization. The group's name was taken from a statement made by an early 20th century Peruvian radical that Marxism was the "shining path to the future." The declared aim of the group is to destroy existing Peruvian institutions and replace them with a peasant revolutionary regime. The xenophobic Shining Path criticizes the former Soviet Union and China as well as the United States.¹³

The Shining Path initially operated in the rural areas of Peru as a guerrilla force where it intimidated the local populace by executing civilians with ties to the government. Although it still operates in the rural areas, the group, beginning in 1986, turned increasingly to urban terrorism, particularly in Lima, where it has built a terrorist apparatus. In 1988 the group's activities were hampered when the government was able to arrest several of the group's key leaders. The group typically targets the embassies, consulates, and foreign businesses, in addition to Peruvian Government and private-sector targets. Their strength is estimated to be between 4,000 to 5,000 combatants who limit their operations to Peru. The group has no known foreign state sponsors but they do raise money from leftist sympathizers abroad and collect money from drug trafficking, including Colombian narcotics traffickers.¹⁴ In the course of the Shining Path's 13 year struggle more than 25,000 Peruvians have been killed. Trade union leaders, politicians, local mayors and other elected officials, civil servants, members of organized peasant communities, journalists, and foreign tourists are among the organization's victims.

Early in 1992 the situation seemed desperate, but then the government of Alberto Fujimori, the President of Peru, scored one of two important victories. In September of that year Abimael Guzman, the supreme leader of the Shining Path, was captured in Lima, along with many other members of the group's leadership.¹⁵ Since his capture there have been continuing, if reduced, acts of terrorism linked to the organization. Among the most noteworthy was the bombing of the congressional building on the

eve of a referendum on a new constitution, and the bombing of the U.S. Embassy, both taking place in 1993. Although Guzman has been captured, it clearly does not mean an end to the Shining Path.

Politics

The political history of Peru can be traced back to the beginning of the Inca empire and it is as complicated as it is long. As noted, for the purpose of this paper, only a brief overview of the political history and system is needed. Peru's political history has been one of great turmoil compared to what Americans are accustomed. Going back only as far as the turn of the century, Peru has gone from aristocracy to civil dictatorship to military dictatorship, and back to the democratic form of government Peru has today. An example of the turmoil in Peru's political history is the number of constitutions which have been written since 1860. Almost one hundred years after our constitution was written, Peru has written four constitutions, with the fourth one having just recently been voted on, and approved by their congress.¹⁶ Unfortunately, President Fujimori's democratic credentials have become tarnished due to his assumption of presidential rule in April 1992--the Fujimori autogolpe-- and campaign to silence political opponents in the wake of an aborted coup attempt in November 1992. International human rights organizations have filed complaints on the legal procedures practiced by the government.¹⁷ What is important to remember is that, in the present state of turmoil, the government of Peru is working very hard to rid itself of these insurgents who are trying to overthrow their government--which is a democracy, even if a somewhat flawed one. The government also understands the importance of the financial aid that the U.S. could send to their country to further their cause.

The Economy

The country is also facing severe economic problems. We in the U.S. would have a very difficult job truly understanding the challenges facing the people of Peru. The citizens of the U.S. would demand some kind of immediate action if the inflation rate went up as much as one-half percent. This would become an issue of national importance and would require some kind of action on the part of our politicians to ensure we could get inflation under control and stop the damage already done. To put the economic problems of Peru in perspective, in the month of August 1990 the people of Peru had to face a monthly inflation rate of 397 percent with an annual inflation rate for that year of 12,377 percent. The government of Peru addressed the issue of inflation and has made remarkable progress in getting it under control. Since that record setting year the inflation has dropped to 2.8 percent, but the country is still in a recession.¹⁸

Human Rights Violations

Human rights violations by members of governmental organizations, chiefly the army, have cost the government of Peru dearly. Incidents, such as the massacre of 124 prisoners, many of them members of the Shining Path, in the suppression of a riot at the Lurigancho prison in 1986, and the allegation that over 3,000 detainees of the armed forces have remained missing in various emergency areas since December 1982, have gotten the attention of several human rights groups. Because of these much publicized violations, international relations with the United States has become more difficult. Unlike the former president, George Bush, for whom the drug war was a number one issue, President Clinton's administration has made Peru's human rights record its number one criterion.¹⁹ As a result, a large percentage of the money earmarked for Peru has been canceled or postponed until Peru has a better handle on the human rights issue.

Conclusion

Peru has been faced with serious national challenges for quite some time but is slowly starting to control these problems, and their own destiny. They will always be faced with the challenges presented by their geography and heterogeneous population and cultures, but the other problems, such as their insurgencies, drug traffickers, human rights violations, and economic uncertainties are slowly showing signs of success. For Peru to succeed the United States must play the part of good neighbor, and world superpower, and assist Peru in successfully dealing with these other problems that threaten their national security. For the U.S., the greatest threat remains drug traffickers, while for Peru, the principle security threat to government survival is the insurgents who use the illegal narcotics trade to bankroll their organizations. In either case the two groups present severe challenges for the country of Peru as well as our own country. Drug abuse in the U.S., as was stated earlier, is at epidemic proportions and is having a negative effect on almost every aspect of our society. Assisting Peru in this area not only assists that country, but is also self-serving to the U.S. in that it protects our own national security.

Chapter two will begin with an assessment of Peru and its history of coca cultivation and then address the Shining Path and their relationship with coca. Chapter two will conclude by addressing the impact the Shining Path and coca have had on the two governments.

Endnotes

¹The American University, Foreign Area Studies, Peru. A Country Study, (Washington : Government Printing Office, (hereafter cited as GPO), 1981), 62.

²Ibid., 63

³Ibid., 65.

⁴The Economist Intelligence Unit, Country Report, Peru, Bolivia (London : The Economist Intelligence Unit, 1993), 8.

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⁶Arnaldo Claudio and Steven K. Stewman, "Peru, Sendero Luminoso and the Narcotrafficking Alliance" Low Intensity Conflict and Law Enforcement, Vol. 1, No.3 (Winter 1992) (London : Frank Cass, 1992), 281.

⁷Ibid., 282.

⁸Murl D. Munger and William W. Mendel, Campaign Planning and the Drug War (Carlisle, PA : U.S. Army War College, 1991), 4.

⁹Ibid.

¹⁰Ibid.

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¹²National Drug Control Strategy, Progress in the War on Drugs, 1989-1992, (GPO,1993), 15.

¹³U.S. Dsepartment of State, Patterns Of Global Terrorism, 1990, (GPO, 1991), 73-74.

¹⁴Ibid.

¹⁵The Economist Intelligence Unit, Country Profile: Peru 1993/94 (London: The Economist Intelligence Unit, 1993), 6.

¹⁶The Economist Intelligence Unit, Peru, Bolivia, 8.

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¹⁹Ibid., 7.

CHAPTER 2

DRUGS AND THE SENDERO LUMINOSO

The purpose of this chapter is to provide a detailed discussion of the drug and insurgency problems facing Peru. This chapter will initially look at these problems separately and will conclude with an assessment of how and why these two separate issues merged and the impact on both the United States and Peru.

Peru and Coca

In the fifteenth century several European explorers had returned to their homeland telling of the use of coca leaves by the inhabitants of the New World. It is with the sixteenth century Spanish conquest of the Inca civilization, centered in what is now Peru, in the sixteenth century, however, that the European infatuation with cocaine begins. The local Indians held the plant in high esteem and told marvelous stories of its origins. Some of these stories linked the plant to sexual prowess and fertility. Other legends revealed that the plant showed there was a special relationship between these people and their god. The legends claimed it had initially been a gift to them by a benevolent god who viewed them with special favor. The plant was regularly used for rituals and ceremonies that testified to this special relationship with their gods.¹

Legend has it that the use of the coca plant in preconquest times had been restricted much more than when the conquistadores arrived from Spain. It seems that earlier in history the plant could be used only by the Incan emperor and his royal family. The emperor was a godlike figure to his people, and he enjoyed a privileged relationship to the

coca plant that was in keeping with this special relationship with the gods. He usually exerted strict control over its use by his subjects. So strict was his control, and so sought after was the coca plant, that the emperor was able to use its distribution as a form of social control. On occasion the emperor would distribute some of the coca to his people as a reward for valuable service.

By the time of the Spanish conquest, however, restrictions on the use of coca had been considerably relaxed, and its use among the common people was much more widespread. Even though the connection with the emperor and the gods had been weakened, coca continued to enjoy a favored status.

The Indians used the coca plant in a number of situations. They used it as a stimulant, chewing the leaves to banish fatigue. In the harsh environment of the higher altitudes, this stimulant enabled the Indians to work harder and longer without complaining, and without tiring. The plant was also used by the people to measure time and distance. That is, it was common practice for the Indians to describe a journey in terms of the number of mouthfuls of leaves that normally would be chewed in making the trip.²

The Spanish conquest of the Inca Empire and the subsequent discovery of coca and its uses was the key to introducing the drug to the rest of the world. Physicians and scientists alike were eager to examine this drug to determine if it could contribute to their fields of interest. The names associated with the early study of this drug are well known professionals, in both the medical and scientific fields, who quickly categorized it as a wonder drug capable of curing a vast number of the medical problems of the day. Coca-based medicines soon appeared and were promoted for use in treating a range of illness and diseases, including venereal disease, dysentery, narcotic addiction and alcoholism. Some of the better known people of that time who believed in the medical uses of coca include Sigmund Freud and William Halstead. William Halstead was one of the founders of Johns Hopkins Medical School. It's ironic that both of these individuals almost suffer-

ed extreme personal loss due to this drug. Freud tried to help a friend overcome an addiction to morphine and recommended to his friend to substitute cocaine for morphine. His friend, Dr. Fleischl, did exactly that and quickly became addicted to the coca. His use of the drug resulted in insomnia and hallucinations which were well-documented by Freud and became the first well-documented case of cocaine psychosis. Freud also used the drug to relieve his depression and also sent it to his fiancée to make her strong and to give her color in her cheeks! As a result of his personal experiences, Freud became, for a time, a strong promoter of cocaine. Dr. Halstead used the drug on himself to study its possible uses as an anesthetic and quickly became so strongly addicted that the drug almost ruined his life. Still, in the end, he was a strong advocate of the use of the drug. The great interest that the medical and scientific fields had in this drug soon spilled over into the general population and its use became widespread. It was even used in the making of a popular soft drink, Coca-Cola, until 1907. It was about this same time that the government realized the harmful side effects that people were suffering after using the drug. It was also about this time that the U.S. Government passed laws limiting the use of the drug and making it available only by physician's prescription.³

The exposure of cocaine to the world soon developed into a supply and demand situation for the farmers of Peru. The world demanded it and they supplied it. Since its introduction into our society, cocaine has never left. Even after it became a controlled substance it was still widely used in all the circles of our society. The very large consumption and usage levels of cocaine in the U.S. play a major role in the current problems now facing the government of Peru in its current fight against the drug traffickers and the insurgents now terrorizing its country. There is a direct link to the usage level in the United States, the amount of coca being grown in Peru and elsewhere, the drug traffickers, and the insurgents.

The Makings of the Shining Path

Only one insurgent organization, the Sendero Luminoso, poses any real threat to the democratic government of Peru. As this is written the Shining Path is responsible for over 25,000 deaths and 22 billion dollars worth of property destroyed during the last 13 years.⁴ Therefore, this chapter will only discuss the Sendero Luminoso, its beginnings, relationship with drug traffickers, and the impact the Shining Path has had on both the Peruvian and American Governments.

The beginning of the movement, and its fundamental beliefs can be traced to the development of Peru's Communist Party. During the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, opposition to colonialism, traditionalism, and clericalism became the formative basis for the ideology of the liberal publicist Manuel Gonzalez Prada (1840-1918). He proclaimed that feudalism must be destroyed, thereby allowing the Indians to rise up against their masters. Two of Prada's students played a major role in the modernization and reformation of Peruvian society. One, Victor Raul Haya de la Torre, created the American Popular Revolutionary Party (APRA) while the other, Juan Carlos Mariategui chose the path of Marxism. Mariategui did not initially condone bloody revolution as an immediate solution, but rather taught a gradual rebuilding of the old system of cooperative labor. He believed this type of program was the best program to enhance the status of the Indian. In Mariategui's plan, government assistance was an integral part, allowing the peasants to farm their land using modern farming methods not previously used. In 1928, Mariategui founded the Socialist Party of Peru, whose ideology had shifted from peaceful change to the use of violence to attain their goals. This change in ideology was a result of the lack of response by the government to his earlier goals. He espoused a peasant and Indian revolution as a means of ensuring national development.⁵

After Mariategui's death in 1930, the Communist Party of Peru (PCP) emerged

from the Socialist Party. In 1964, the Communist Party split into two major factions aligned with the Sino-Soviet split of 1963. The pro-Chinese Maoist PCP-Red Flag and the pro-Moscow majority's ideological differences were over the emphasis assigned to "armed struggle." The pro-Moscow faction sought a peaceful solution to Peru's problems while the pro-Chinese faction followed the doctrine of Mao's protracted popular war. The PCP-Red Flag declared that the revolution would originate in the countryside through the mobilization of the peasantry, be committed to armed struggle, and move victoriously in the final encirclement of Lima, causing the eventual collapse of the country.⁶

The Red Flag was led by Saternino Paredes and the leader of the Red Flag faction in the Department of Ayacucho in the southern highlands was an intellectual by the name of Abimael Guzman. Guzman was a charismatic university professor with a strong following among the mestizo university students. He brought dramatic changes to what was a lackluster faction of the Red Flag, located far from the center of Peruvian society. His initial focus was to organize in the poor neighborhoods. To help his recruitment program, Guzman convinced the university to create a high school which he staffed with communists and communist sympathizers. The high school students became Guzman's new cadre. Those that returned to their villages established the foundation of the rural infrastructure on which Guzman would continue to build. Those students who were able to enroll in the university went on to be his most loyal followers.⁷

In 1965 Guzman was attempting to create a military wing for the Red Flag but was sent to China by the Party to avoid arrest because the Peruvian military began to crack down on all subversive organizations within the country. Guzman's arrest at this time seemed imminent. Upon his return to Peru, after spending a little over a year in China, Guzman found the Red Flag in disarray and quickly moved to secure control of the Ayacucho faction of the Red Flag.⁸

In 1969 the government of Peru placed significant limitations on the education program that provided for a free high school education to Peruvian citizens. Guzman was dependent upon the free education program because the high school program fed the university large numbers of mestizos from the Sierra who were frustrated with rigid class structure and the social injustices of Peruvian society. They became the strength of the Shining Path. Guzman was responsible for the protests and the wave of violence that followed the government's announcement that it had limited the education program. This violence resulted in the arrest of Guzman, and also served as the catalyst for his break with Saturnino Peredes, the leader of the Red Flag.

Conflict between Guzman and Paredes continued until 1971, when they mutually expelled each other from the Red Flag. This left Guzman with his own Party, which consisted of the relatively small Ayacucho faction. The major difference between the two men was that Guzman did not believe that Paredes's faction was serious about the revolution and didn't believe they would fight for their cause. Each of these men published their own newspaper and subsequently took the name of their newspaper as the name of their new organizations. Guzman's was the Shining Path and Paredes' the Red Flag.⁹

The goal of Guzman's Shining Path is the total destruction of the current structure of Peruvian society so he can create a new government, The People's Republic of the New Democracy. This government will be a dictatorship of the peasants, the workers, while being led by the current leadership of the Shining Path.¹⁰ The focus of the Shining Path has been restricted to the poor peasants, the poor shantytown residents of the larger cities, students, and the young, frustrated mestizos of the Sierras that form its leadership. It has for the most part, attacked the richer section of society. This continued until 1987 when Guzman created the urban front organizations in Lima.

It was at this time that Guzman turned to strengthening and expanding his organization in the southern highlands with the priority of building a loyal and discipline

cadre, at this same time, the pro-Soviet communist factions collaborated with the military government. In 1976 Guzman decided that the Party was organized sufficiently to begin its preparation for the struggle with the government. Guzman began moving large numbers of cadre out into the countryside to expand the size and support of his Party.¹¹

The Shining Path adopted four primary forms of warfare to fight its insurgency. They are (1) guerrilla warfare with its two forms of attack and ambush; (2) sabotage; (3) selective annihilation; and (4) armed propaganda and agitation. Selective annihilation is best understood as selective terrorism. Armed propaganda is propaganda by deed. They are demonstrations of potency, such as the night the Shining Path plunged Lima into darkness by destroying power pylons and then displaying a large burning hammer and sickle on the mountainside to the city below. Armed strikes are a popular tactic of the insurgents. The Shining Path schedules an armed strike and expects all businesses and schools to remain closed, mass transportation to remain parked, and all public activities canceled. They enforce their demands through the use of violence.

Sabotage is also used extensively. The Shining Path usually focuses its acts of sabotage against two primary targets, governmental services and the economic system. This is done to demonstrate to the people the inability of the government to provide for the needs of the people and to worsen the conditions under which the people must live.

Guerrilla warfare is used primarily in the Sierra area. The guerilla force goes through a training phase that includes a lengthy indoctrination process where the prospective candidate must establish himself at the lower tiers of the organization. The process involves hands-on experience under the leadership of the more senior members, reinforces ideology, and promotes a sense of belonging. The system serves to strengthen the ideological foundation and generate future leaders of the organization.¹² The military training the guerillas receive focuses on small unit tactics, usually involving some type of terrorist act, such as assassinations and bombings. They do have the capability to mass

their forces, and have done so on a few occasions, but generally they prefer to operate in small teams. On the few occasions that they have massed their forces it was against a very weak target and the overall purpose was one of propaganda.¹³

The Shining Path is most known for its extensive use of terrorism. This is also one of the most controversial aspects of the insurgency. It is argued by many observers in the United States and elsewhere, that the Shining Path's use of terrorism will deny it popular support and is the greatest weakness to the insurgency.

The Shining Path first employed violence as a tool to achieve their goal on May 17, 1980. On the eve of Peru's return to democratic elections the Shining Path launched attacks against polling places in the town of Ayacucho and destroyed the ballot boxes. Since that time the Shining Path has continued their acts of violence against government run agencies such as the military, police stations, government offices, power lines, bridges, and government officials. They have also included foreign officials, tourists, businesses, and embassies on their lists of targets.¹⁴

The exact size of the organization is not known, and estimates of strength range anywhere from 3,000 to 6,000, with 50,000 to 60,000 sympathizers. The Quechua-speaking Indians make up the majority of both the active guerilla force and the sympathizers.¹⁵ These Indians are the "second class" in the Peruvian society and many are eager to belong to an organization that promises to change their status in the society to one of greater importance.

As late as 1989 the Shining Path had the support of the peasants, more in protest of the government than in approval of the Shining Paths ideology, but still they had the peasants support. It was at this time, approximately two years into the Shining Paths establishment of the urban front organizations, that it attempted to cut the food supply routes to the cities, thus preventing the peasants from selling their surpluses at the local fairs. The peasants do not produce all the food they need and depended on these

local fairs to sell their surplus in order to buy the other items that they required. As a result the peasants rejected the Shining Paths prohibition. The Shining Paths response was to kill the peasants who they caught violating their policy in order to force the obedience of their policy. Instead of obeying, the peasants revolted against the Shining Path, who in turn began to exterminate whole communities. With government support, the peasants formed defensive organizations, called *rondas campesinas* to repel the attacks of the Shining Path.¹⁶

In 1990, national elections were held for only the third time since the end of the military government and an outsider, Alberto Fujimori, was elected President. The results of this election were a reflection of the disdain the people held for the traditional politicians who had ruled Peru for the last thirty years. The election also marked the turning-point in the governments counterinsurgency efforts. President Fujimori developed a plan to arm the peasants so they could defend themselves from the Shining Path.

This program has been very successful and by the end of 1992 there were 526 peasant communities with arms, and some 790 which had created their own organizations against the Shining Path, and 1,117 communities that were asking the government for arms.¹⁷

The peasants were very successful in eliminating the Shining Path from many areas and forced Guzman to realize he was beginning to lose the war in the countryside and compelled him to concentrate his efforts in the nations capital, Lima. Lima has always been the decisive point for the Shining Path because it holds almost one-third of the country's population and nearly 90 percent of the country's industry and trade.

When the Shining Path began to concentrate on the capital city of Lima their operations were countered by the DINCOTE (Direccion Nacional Contra el Terrorismo), a special antiterrorist branch of the national police. They proved to be a very dangerous opponent who had already proven themselves as an effective antsubversive force. In two

years, from 1990-1992, DINCOTE had destroyed the Metropolitan Committee of the Shining Path in Lima four times. In the early part of Fujimori's presidency DINCOTE decided to concentrate its scarce resources on finding the high ranking members of the Shining Path, with the overall goal of finding Guzman. This meant that many of the smaller cells of the Shining Path, as well as members of other subversive groups would be able to operate in Lima with almost total impunity.

Internal political problems surfaced at this time and played a significant role in the way the government conducted its operations. I will discuss this issue in more detail later in the paper but suffice it to say that President Fujimori was having severe internal strife within his government that affected the way his forces, and the forces of the Shining Path conducted their war. This internal strife led the leadership of the Shining Path to believe that the government would conduct an all out offensive against the Shining Path.

The Shining Path, with the belief the government was to conduct this all out offensive, seized the initiative and began conducting car bombings in Lima in April and May of 1992. With DINCOTE focusing its efforts on finding Guzman, smaller terrorist cells were able to enter Lima to detonate these bombs. The Shining Path also realized that their assumption about the government all out offensive was incorrect. Instead of a well organized military operation they found an army, and its government in turmoil.

During the last car bombings in May the Shining Path used ANFO, a mixture of ammonium nitrate and fuel that increases the effectiveness of the dynamite by a power of ten. These doctored car bombs had the equivalent of 600 kilos of dynamite.¹⁸ These bombings stopped in June only to begin again in July. The bombings in July were almost indiscriminate, targeting police stations, shopping areas, government buildings, and schools. A total of 38 car bombs were detonated killing and injuring hundreds of people, including many women and children. These bombings extended the Shining Paths spectrum of war from the upper class of Peruvian society to the middle and lower class

neighborhoods. The Shining Path, having felt they had lost the support of the peasants now moved against the entire Peruvian society to try to attain a swift and final victory. They hoped that these attacks, which they threatened to conduct again in October, would force the larger businesses and their employees out of the country thereby causing the economy to collapse.

When the political problems facing President Fujimori, combined with the additional pressure put on the government by these car bombings, the government needed to score a big victory against the Shining Path. To do this they turned to the DINCOTE, who had almost captured Guzman in 1991, only to have him escape. On September 12, 1992, twenty months later, the DINCOTE tracked him down again and captured him.¹⁹

The capture of Guzman had elements of high drama and adventure. The DINCOTE traced Guzman to a house in a middle-class suburb in Lima. To conduct their surveillance they impersonated street sweepers, telephone repairmen, street vendors, and even participants in a barbecue. They were able to capture the most dangerous man in Peru, and very possibly the most dangerous man in the world, without a fight. Guzman's capture also netted eleven other members of the Shining Path, including Elena Iparraquirre, one of two other leaders of the Shining Path's politburo. All twelve of the people captured that day received life sentences. Guzman's sentence included life without the possibility of parole.²⁰

After Guzman's arrest and conviction he was sent to a specially built, windowless, underground cell on Peru's Pacific coast. It is here that Guzman is to spend the rest of his life, totally isolated from the outside world and almost all human contact.²¹

This operation clearly was a major victory for President Fujimori and the people of Peru, while causing a major set back for the Shining Path. However, it would be a mistake to think the Peruvian government has destroyed the threat the Shining Path presents to the country's democratic form of government. Throughout the period of the

trial and up to the present day, the Shining Path has continued acts of terrorism against the people of Peru. They carried out attacks in four different regions of Peru and have continued their assassinations against police, local officials, military and neighborhood leaders. It is unclear at this time if the Shining Path will try to continue to operate as it had under Guzman, as a coordinated insurgency, or if will adopt a mode of operations similar to the actions immediately following Guzmans arrest, a continuing series of violent, seemingly uncoordinated attacks.²² What is clear is that the Shining Path remains a force that must be dealt with.

Drug Traffickers

In 1988 the Shining Path reportedly turned to the drug trade to help finance their insurgency. Early in that year the Shining Path went into the Ene River Valley area and forced the local Indians, the Ashaninkas, to grow coca for them as well as forcing them to fight as soldiers in support of the insurgency. The Shining Path would force the Indians to fight for the insurgency away from their homes with the threat that if they did not fight then the families of the Indians would be killed. The families also were forced into service by the Shining Path to forage and cook for the Shining Path members. In reality the Shining Path--in the view of some analysts-- was forming a "cartel" of their own. With the Indians and their land under control the Shining Path became the predominant power in the region and thus controlled the coca market. It was at this time that the Shining Path became the primary interface with the Colombian narco-traffickers for the transfer of coca to Columbia so it could be made into coca paste.²³

In the mid-1980s the Colombian drug barons controlled the Peruvian peasants who grew coca in the Upper Huallaga Valley. This relationship was very profitable for the Colombians but very costly for the Peruvians. The Colombians ruled these peasants through fear and terror. The peasants were forced to grow the coca for very little money

and were forced to live under very harsh conditions. These living conditions under the Colombian drug barons rule make the peasants very susceptible to the promises of protection made by the Shining Path. The Shining Path, according to some reports, came into the area and organized and united the peasant coca-growers and were able to defeat the Colombian drug barons. Then, as a unified group, they demanded more money for the coca crop. With their increase in size and power, the Shining Path was able to destroy any Colombian drug barons who resisted their efforts.²⁴ With the increase in their profits and the much better living conditions, the peasants welcomed the change, and welcomed the Shining Path.

After establishing themselves as the main force in the region, it has also been alleged that the Shining Path then entered into a business agreement with narco-traffickers which allowed the narco-traffickers planes to land at the airstrips controlled by the Shining Path. This was virtually every airstrip in the Upper Huallaga Valley and further served to strengthen the Shining Paths dominance in the region. It was alleged that the Shining Path received \$10,000 for each airplane that landed. They also received an unknown amount of money for other services such as ground security, ground transportation, etc. More recently, a United States Department of State official updated information on the landing rights fee, indicating it was \$15,000. The Shining Path also imposes a tax on all growers, processors, and traffickers who operate in the areas under their control. All who were effected seem to view this tax as just another part of the illegal drug trade. The growers may have actually benefitted from this arrangement. With the Shining Path there to provide protection the growers now were able to negotiate with the foreign drug trafficker and have been able to increase the price of the coca. The peasants are much better off under this arrangement than they were when they were under the control of the Colombian traffickers.²⁵

With what appears to be very little effort on the part of the Shining Path they moved into an area, united the local peasants to fight against, and defeat, the Colombian drug barons, and then went into business with these same drug barons and have reaped huge financial profits which support their insurgency against the government of Peru. Another benefit that the Shining Path reaps from all this is the support from the local peasants. The Shining Path came in and did what the Peruvian Government could not, provide protection for the peasants and better their living conditions. These local peasants also provided a very good base for recruitment at a time when the Shining Path was trying to strengthen their numbers.

All three of these parties, the Colombian drug barons, the Shining Path, and the peasants who grew coca, come out winners in this new arrangement. The peasants are making more money and have better living conditions, the Shining Path has a huge, steady, source of income. It was estimated that in 1990 the Shining Paths income from these drug operations was between \$20 and \$30 million a year. This would make the Shining Path the richest organization body in Peru.²⁶ A second advantage, and one of great importance to the Shining Path, is the fact that these operations provide a very good recruitment base to further the cause of the insurgency, and the Colombian drug barons still have a thriving business in the narcotics trade. The loser in this situation is the Peruvian Government. The main threat to their internal security, the Shining Path, moved into this area and began a program that netted them a source of income to support their insurgency, and also established a fairly large population to recruit from. Another disadvantage, one that effects the core of the current government is the fact that the government has lost its credibility and legitimacy. One of the basic requirements of a government is having the capability to provide for the security of its people. In the Upper Huallaga Valley the government is not the dominant player and has taken a back seat to the Shining

Path. In this situation the Shining Path has taken over this responsibility and in doing so has strengthened its position while simultaneously weakening the governments.

There has been a lot of research done by a large number of people on the subject of the Shining Path's connection to drug traffickers, and there are two opinions, that the Shining Path is, or, is not, involved with the drug traffickers. The evidence points to the fact that the Shining Path is involved with the drug traffickers for several reasons. The fact that the Shining Path has few other large sources of income to finance their insurgency lends a significant amount of credibility to the belief that they are involved with the drug traffickers. They need money to operate and function and it appears that they have all the money they need. On a trip to Peru made by the author several high ranking Peruvian Army Officers all stated that the Shining Path was indeed working with the drug traffickers.²⁷ Additionally, during a recent visit to Fort Leavenworth, a delegation of Peruvian officers and civilians presented a briefing to members of the school student body and staff on the current situation in Peru. After this briefing I interviewed one of the high ranking civilians, who also stated that the Shining Path was involved in narcotrafficking.²⁸ Lastly, there are numerous books and newspaper articles that state that the Shining Path does in fact have ties with the narco-traffickers. Several are listed in this chapter's citations, with still others noted in the bibliography.

The Impact On the Peruvian and U.S. Governments

The impact of the illegal narcotics trade on the U.S. was discussed briefly in chapter one. In this chapter the focus will be on the impact the illegal narcotics trade has had on our policies in dealing with this issue.

In the past, the National Drug Control Strategy has addressed both the treatment and education of drug users, or potential users, as well as the interdiction of the drugs before they cross our borders.²⁹ There seemed to be an almost even split on the emphasis, given to these two aspects, with a little more emphasis given to the interdiction side of the policy. This trend has been fairly consistent since the first National Drug Control Strategy was published in 1989. That has been the case up until this year when Director, Office of National Drug Control Policy, Mr. Lee Brown, published the 1993 Interim National Drug Control Strategy, and later, when the actual National Drug Control Strategy appeared in February, 1994. The Clinton Administration has taken a slightly different approach and seems to be putting the command emphasis on the drug treatment, drug education, side of the policy. In this Strategy, President Clinton lists four focal points for the new national antidrug plan. These focal points are :

1. Chronic hard-core drug use and the violence that accompanies it, which are at the heart of the Nation's current drug crisis.
2. Prevention efforts to educate the young on the dangers of illicit drug use.
3. The need to empower local communities with an integrated plan of education, prevention, treatment, and law enforcement.
4. Changes in how the U.S. carries out international drug control policy to refocus interdiction from the transit zones to the source countries.

Three of the four initiatives deal with problems within the U.S. and only one of these initiatives addresses international support.³⁰ One gets the impression from reading this Strategy that the U.S. is approaching the drug abuse problem in almost complete iso-

lation. There is only one of these issues that addresses the international community and that is mentioned in less detail than the other three issues. Each of the other three issues, or focuses, have specific means of measuring success but the international focus is much more general.³¹

The new National Strategy does call for an increase in the amount of money spent by the department of State and Agency for International Development to support source country efforts to reduce the availability of illicit drugs through activities such as training of law enforcement personnel, judicial reform, crop control, interdiction, and demand reduction efforts.³² This focus reduces the U.S. role to one of a banker. Our plan calls for less U.S. direct action, and more indirect action, by supporting source countries with money to use to finance those programs listed above. On the surface that sounds like a good plan but with little or no assistance from U.S. forces or agencies this source countries are likely to fail in their fight against the drug cartels who have a bigger source of income to draw upon than the source countries. Peru, in its fight with the drug cartels and the Shining Path, is an example of a source country who wants to rid its country of its drug cartels and insurgents, but will likely lose ground to them without some additional interaction with U.S. forces or agencies.

The impact that the illegal drug trade and the Shining Path insurgency has had on the government of Peru has been very significant. For the purpose of this paper the impact of the illegal drug trade and the Shining Path since 1980 will be studied.

The government of Peru has had to deal with many different problems, most of which stem from the illegal drug trade, the Shining Path, or the combination of both. One of these problems, legitimacy, was discussed earlier, but needs to be readdressed here. One of the first, and biggest, mistakes the government of Peru made was that it allowed its' police and military forces to stoop to the level of the drug traffickers and insurgents by permitting human rights violations by these government forces. By accepting these human

rights violations as the cost of doing business the government lost its' credibility with the people because it had failed to legitimize the governments fight against the these forces that threatened the country's survival as a democratic form of government. Even when a military leader stepped in and tried to change the status quo by giving the peasants economic and social assistance he was replaced by the government because his method of dealing with the problem proved to be too expensive, at the time, for the government. This military leader was fired by the civilian government and they replaced him with a new military leader who allowed the old policies of human rights abuses to return.³³ These human rights abuses include 3,000 people reported missing, who were in police custody, and another 3,000 people reported to have been executed by the national security forces.³⁴ The Shining Path's violence, combined with the Peru's inability to administer justice and maintain order resulted in a downward spiral where violence increased on both sides, affecting the government's already weak position.

America's Watch, established in 1981, to monitor human rights in Latin America has revealed that more than one-half of Peru's citizens live under a state of emergency, lacking basic protection against arrest, incarceration, or extrajudicial execution by the armed forces or the police. The United States support of Peru's counterinsurgency efforts cut ten million dollars in aid to the Peruvian army in a call for the Peruvian government to account for human rights abuses in dealing with the Shining Path. The President of Peru , President Fujimori, countered, labeling America's Watch and Amnesty International as organizations interested only in the defense of the human rights of the terrorists.³⁵ These human rights violations also cost the government of Peru \$255 million in aid from the United States. The Clinton Administration has stated that all future aid to Peru will be based on that country's ability to prove that it has made improvements in the human rights arena.

The Shining Path is also guilty of numerous human rights abuses, using terror to establish and maintain control and as their primary tactic to effect the destruction of the Peruvian State. The group was credited in 1990, with over 1500 murders, of which fewer than 200 were police or military personnel.³⁶

Since the beginning of its violence, the Shining Path has cost of Peru billions of dollars, with over \$22 billion in property alone. If we consider the amount of money spent on just the medical costs of fighting this insurgency the number would jump considerably higher. This fight against the Shining Path has caused over 25,000 deaths and an untold number of people injured.³⁷ There are a lot of things we can't put price tags on, but the government of Peru, and its people, will have to pay an unthinkable price for having to fight this war. It has impacted on education, tourism, industry, and the emotional well being of a large percentage of the people. The impact on Peruvian children will have to be studied later, after they have matured and able to express their feelings. One can see that these children will grow up with a sense a fear and anxiety when they conduct the most routine tasks, such as going to the market or boarding a bus.

The illegal narcotics trade has had a negative impact on the economy of Peru. Although the drug trade has brought huge amounts of money into the country almost all of it is done illegally. The high payoff to the peasant farmers has resulted in a large percentage of them opting to grow coca rather than other crops, such as coffee, sugar, rice, and fruits.

The negative effects of the insurgency from the Shining Path, to both the United States and Peru, combined with the illegal narcotics trade, requires both countries to re-address these problems and to increase the scope of the combined operations now being conducted, to reduce the risk to both the people, and their forms of government.

Endnotes

¹John C. Flynn, Cocaine, (New York : Carol Publishing Group, 1991), 19.

²Ibid., 19-20.

³Ibid., 24-30.

⁴Enrique Obando Arbulu, "Subversion and Antisubversion in Peru, 1980-92: A View from Lima" Low Intensity Conflict & Law Enforcement, Volume 2, Autumn 1993, Number 2, 329.

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CHAPTER 3

A STUDY OF PERUVIAN APPROACHES TO INTERNAL PROBLEMS AND U.S. INVOLVEMENT TO DATE

This chapter will address initially the Peruvian government's response to the problems posed by the Shining Path and the narco-traffickers to Peruvian governmental institutions and society. It will look principally at operations and policies that address these two groups specifically, but will not address the day-to-day police work that is done to combat these organizations. The chapter will conclude with a study of the actions taken by the United States in its' attempt to assist Peru in dealing with Shining Path terrorists and narco- traffickers.

Peru's Approach To Their Terrorist Threat

In 1980-1981, when the Shining Path began the active phase of their insurgency, the Peruvian judicial community was caught off guard. With the Shining Path responsible for over 480 terrorist incidents, the number of known or suspected terrorists being detained by the police began to climb at an alarming rate. The real dilemma for the legal community was the lack of laws that pertained to the type of terrorist acts that the Shining Path were committing. The existing laws that applied to terrorists were rather vague and were listed as "disturbance of internal peace", "disruption of public order," and "conspiracy to introduce political terrorism into the country." These did not capture the true violence of the acts being carried out and legally these terrorists could only be punished under the existing laws. Until the government could update the laws to include the acts of violence being committed by the Shining Path this situation posed some ethical issues

for the legal profession as they tried to deal with the vast number of terrorist cases whose crimes were yet to be defined by the current judicial system.¹

The government and its Ministry of Justice recognized the importance of quickly creating new legislation to handle the influx of Shining Path members. The president was authorized by the congress to enact legislative decrees to update legislation passed by the previous military government.² On March 10, 1981, the president of Peru, Fernando Belaunde did just that when he promulgated the first law of terrorism, Legislative Decree 46.³ This decree recognized terrorism as a complex criminal act and defined it in comprehensive and effective terms. This decree was enacted to protect the life, health, and property of the people of Peru as set out in the legislation, anyone who provokes a situation that causes alarm, apprehension, or terror in the population, or creates a risk to the life, health, or property of the people is guilty of terrorism and could be sentenced to jail for not less than 10 years and not more than 20 years.

From the time Legislative Decree 46 was enacted into law there have been four laws that have either eliminated the previous law or has modified it in some way. They appear to shift from a strong government stance with harsher punishments to one that gives terrorists more diminished punishments. As it stands today, Law 24953 has increased the penalties associated with a conviction for terrorist activity, including a 25-year minimum prison jail term.⁴

President Belaunde's reaction to the continued increase of terrorist acts and mounting evidence that the Shining Path posed a more serious threat to the government than was initially believed, was to send a newly formed special police unit, DINCOTE, into the Ayacucho region. This unit specialized in counterterrorism, and their mission was to eliminate the Shining Path threat. This new unit was supported by two existing special force units, similar to our SWAT teams, the Sinchis and the Llapan Aticcs. Both of these units were named after famous Inca warriors.⁵ It is important to remember that these

units were not part of the Army but were part of the National Police. President Belaunde believed that the Shining Path was an Indian peasant movement that would be defeated easily, and prevented the military from participating in these initial efforts to destroy the Shining Path. At the time the military also saw this as a police problem and not a military problem and supported the president's decision to send these units of the National Police. After a relatively short period of time it became obvious that these police units were ineffective and were unprepared to fight an organized terrorist group such as the Shining Path. They were under-equipped and lacked the skills needed to fight such an organization. They lacked a sufficient logistical system, a communication system, and the tactical planning skills needed to conduct these types of operations. In addition to these mounting problems, these units quickly gained a reputation for brutality toward the local civilian population and committed the first human rights violations of this war. Mounting human rights violations, in addition to alienating portions of the population, resulted in a victory for the terrorists in the propaganda war with the government.⁶

The Shining Path continued to grow and to conduct terrorist actions, mostly in Ayacucho. To answer these continued terrorist acts the government began to declare states of emergency in the most active areas. The first area to be declared an emergency area was Ayacucho, a known Shining Path stronghold.⁷ These states of emergency, which only the president could impose, could last up to sixty days and then be renewed. The president would appoint a senior army officer to serve as the administrative, political, and military chief of the zone during the emergency period. Although the court system was supposed to continue to operate during this period, its efforts were severely impaired by this type of government control.⁸ Emergency zones also allowed the government security forces to enter private homes and make arrests without warrants. Other rights, such as public assembly and freedom of movement were also suspended.⁹

On December 21, 1982, President Belaunde approved Supreme Decree 068-82, which directed the deployment of the armed forces to the Ayacucho and Apurimac regions of the country and tasked them to take control of these areas and to restore order. The armed forces included members of the Army, Navy Infantrymen, who are similar to our Marines, and the Air Force. The Army provided the bulk of the manpower, and the Air Force provided the troop transport, air cover, surveillance, and other needed logistical assistance. These two emergency zones were placed under the Political and Military Command of Army General Clemente Noel Moral.¹⁰

Within the emergency zones General Noel Moral sent units from both the army and the police forces into the towns and villages where they believed the Shining Path to be the most active and had them try to reaffirm the government's authority. Joint Army and National Police units would enter the main plaza of each village or town and conduct very solemn ceremonies by raising the Peruvian flag, singing the national anthem, and pledging their allegiance. These were undertaken with the aim of fostering a sense of pride in their country among the village residents and intimidating the forces of the Shining Path, thereby reducing the influence of the Shining Path on the local population. Unfortunately, these actions failed to intimidate the forces of the Shining Path, and actually resulted in an increase in military activity on the part of the Shining Path.

As has been the case in so many insurgencies, the government forces quickly became frustrated by their inability to distinguish between members of the Shining Path and members of the local community. This frustration turned to rage, and this rage was unleashed at the members, and suspected members, of the Shining Path during offensive operations directed at the terrorist organization. This rage and frustration resulted in countless human rights abuses against known or suspected Shining Path members and innocent civilians, which attracted the attention of such organizations as Americas Watch and Amnesty International. They have accused the military of numerous crimes, including

disappearances, torture, rape, aggravated homicide, extrajudicial executions, and even genocide, and brought these human rights violations to the attention of the world. These revelations have a number of nations, to include the United States and Japan, to withdraw aid that was already programmed for Peru.¹¹

Another reason for the inability of the Peruvian military to launch an offensive campaign that would bring about a quick victory, was the government's failure to establish a national objective that addressed all of the resources available to destroy the threat posed by the Shining Path. They failed to integrate such resources as economic development, social reforms, information management, and the mobilization of all the needed government services to the troubled regions. Although the Belaunde Government did plan to integrate some economic assistance to the Ayacucho region, floods in the north and droughts in the Sierras made it financially impossible for the government to carry out those plans. As a result the government had to rely almost solely on a military solution. This military solution led the Shining Path to open new insurgent areas of operations throughout the Sierras. Looking back it can be seen that the states of emergency implemented by the president were not very productive.¹²

President Belaunde decreed a total of twenty-four states of emergency during his presidency. These emergency declarations affected all or part of Ayacucho, fifteen affected all or part of Apurimac, twelve affected all or part of Huancavelica, and seven affected Peru as a whole. As was noted, these declarations did not prove to be very successful, and most likely were counterproductive. Rather than making the areas safer they actually resulted in an increase in the number of deaths and disappearances in these emergency zones between 1982-1984.¹³

International observers and internal Peruvian observers have charged the military with exceeding the limits of power authorized under a state of emergency. In 1983, observers reported that there were 2,223 unnatural civilian deaths in the emergency zones.

This was a huge increase from the 128 that was reported in 1980-1982. Of the 2,223 deaths 1,398 of these were believed to be members of the Shining Path, compared with 48 in 1982.¹⁴ One must remember when studying these numbers that not all of the deaths can be attributed to the military forces. The Shining Path was, and is, one of the most violent terrorist organizations in the world, and clearly it is accurate to assume that many of these deaths can be attributed to their organization. The ratio of civilian to military and police deaths is wildly skewed. For every member of the military or police force that was killed in 1983, an average of 37 civilian deaths occurred. A number that also includes suspected Shining Path members. The high number of deaths in these regions is indicative of the military and police forces' heavy reliance on violent tactics.¹⁵

In August of 1984 the biggest public outcry condemning the government's level of violence took place after three mass graves were discovered in Ayacucho. All three of these graves were attributed to government forces. Fernando Olivera, secretary general of the National Attorney's office, was appointed as a special emissary to investigate these reports of human rights abuses by government forces. After his investigation was completed he reported that the three mass graves contained 50 blindfolded bodies, many with fractured skulls and limbs. The incident took place in Pucayacu, a small town in the province of Huanta, an area under the control of the navy infantrymen. Further investigations revealed that the naval infantrymen were, in fact, responsible for the crime.¹⁶

The number of deaths, disappearances and the level of violence in the first few years of the war affected the way the people felt about their government. A government is expected to protect its people and in those emergency areas where the federal government has replaced local government with a senior army officer, however, level of protection fell drastically as a rule. This negatively affected the level of confidence and credibility the people had in the national government and the military. This left the door open for the Shining Path to come in, point to the faults of the government, and proclaim they could do

a better job running the country. In retrospect, by only approaching this problem with a military solution in mind, the government lent credibility to the Shining Paths claim of providing a better government for the people.

President Belaunda was replaced by President Garcia in 1985. Garcia tried to introduce other government resources into the war with the terrorists. One of the first things he tried to do was negotiate with the insurgents by sending government representatives to the most troubled areas to find solutions to the problems identified by the Shining Path. The Shining Path refused to negotiate with these professionals and chose to kill them instead. President Garcia did initiate several economic programs but all of these were filled with corruption and failed to address the problems of the peasant Indians who lived in the mountains. By not addressing these problems the government strengthened the Shining Path's grip on the Indian population. With each one of these failures President Garcia relied more and more on a military solution. In 1987, preoccupied with a country-wide economic crisis, Garcia's own party, APRA, was suspected of operating death squads against the insurgents.¹⁷

In 1990 President Garcia turned the presidency over to President Fujimori. Fujimori had seen the similarities between the previous two presidents in their methods of fighting the Shining Path, principally with military means, and announced that his methods would be different. Like Garcia, President Fujimori called for negotiations with the Shining Path. Unlike his two predecessors he stated that military actions against the insurgents would be subordinated to economic development initiatives. In fact, he saw military involvement as one of providing security for the economic programs that he was going to initiate. President Fujimori's program also addressed the social injustices that allowed the Shining Path organization to flourish. President Fujimori's first priority was the nation's economy, which was in a state of hyperinflation, with the Shining Path insurgency as his second priority.¹⁸

The first 18 months of Fujimori's presidency produced mixed results. To try to get the economy under control and reduce the inflation rate Fujimori implemented a radical program the Peruvians called Fuji-shock.¹⁹ This tough program eliminated all subsidies and saw the prices of gasoline and public services raised by as much as 3,000 percent. This program had a rough start, with August of 1990 having an extraordinary 397 percent monthly inflation rate, taking the annual inflation rate to 12,377 percent. By the second quarter of 1991 the average monthly inflation rate dropped slightly below 4 percent. However, 1992 proved to be a disappointment when the economy fell back into a recession and the inflation rate was contracted by 2.8 percent with the year's end.²⁰

President Fujimori's number one priority, the economy, had a direct and very negative impact on the peasants of Peru. It devastated the poorest of these peasant regions, the very regions the Shining Path were targeting for recruitment, and only served to strengthen their positions in these areas. As it turned out, his economic plan helped the Shining Path gather new active members and supporters for their cause.²¹ On top of the failing economic program the Shining Path also refused to negotiate with the government. As a consequence, 1992 was characterized by a failed economic program, a stronger insurgency organization that refused to negotiate with the government, and a growing sector of the population dissatisfied with the Fujimori's government. This is exactly what Fujimori was trying to avoid.

President Fujimori was forced to take additional measures to try to cope with the Shining Path while he continued to work his economic programs. Fujimori reorganized the three military services under one command and named an army general to command the National Police in an effort to foster better military-police relations. Fujimori also saw the importance of winning the hearts and minds of the peasants as a way to choke off support for the Shining Path. One way in which he tried to do this was by streamlining the land title program in order to rapidly provide land titles to peasants. This

provided the peasants access to government agricultural programs which required the possession of land title to qualify for the loans. This was also done in order to gain the support of the peasants in these troubled regions. Unfortunately, this program was canceled after less than one year and only provided the Shining Path with leverage in its attempts to make the government look indifferent to the peasant community, and unqualified to run the country. Like so many other programs this one was canceled with the peasant community the principal loser.²²

Another program that was instituted in the fight against the Shining Path was the rotation plan of the military chiefs and all the officers that were fighting against the insurgents. These key people were changed yearly, every December, thereby eliminating any long term experience or continuity for the military leaders. There wasn't any real cross-fertilization between these leaders and mistakes were made that could have been avoided if the rotation plan was different. As a result the Peruvian military leadership in the field, who were novices in this type of warfare, found themselves fighting against experienced guerrillas. The army was not able to control the situation and the Shining Path actually grew under this situation rather than being contained or defeated. Their growth can be attributed to the hatred the peasants had for the military and police forces who were, for the most part, abusive and corrupt.²³

It should be noted that not all the peasants were supporters of the Shining Path. Many peasants were law abiding and wanted to be left alone to farm their land. These were the people that the Shining Path targeted because they wouldn't support their cause, and later because they wouldn't grow coca for them. These people were often killed in very violent ways, often being tortured prior to the actual killing. These killings also served as a lesson to the other sectors of the population who didn't support the Shining Path that a similar fate could await them and their families.

In the past, peasant villagers formed self defense patrols, called *rondas campesinas*, to protect their livestock and property against thieves because the police were notoriously ineffective. Groups of men from the village would patrol the village and the surrounding area at night armed with only flashlights and crude weapons made from farming tools. When these patrols would catch a thief they would either act as judge and jury and informally sentence the thief or would hand them over to the local authorities. This system worked fairly well over the years and the military and police forces in the 1980s hoped that it would continue to work by discouraging the Shining Path from operating in, or around, villages which had organized *rondas campesinas*. When the military and police forces moved into areas where a state of emergency had been declared they tried to organize the same type of peasant patrols if the area didn't already have one established. The military believed that these patrols would inhibit open Sendero Luminoso activities in the area and would also provide a form of self-defense force if the military or police forces were not present when, or if, the Shining Path came to that village.²⁴

Government forces grouped these *rondas campesinas* into larger organizations called Civil Defense Committees. The government forces failed to consider the ethnic or other social differences that routinely surfaced between two or more villages and as a result there was an amount of infighting and a level of nonsupport between these organizations. The forming of these Civil Defense Committees were usually mandatory and a village that refused to form one was considered to be sympathetic toward the Shining Path. Villages who had these organizations were in turn considered to be loyal to the government and open for savage attacks by the Shining Path.²⁵

These patrols did have several severe drawbacks. One was that the villages used these *rondas campesinas* to resolve both individual grievances and long-standing disputes over water rights and land use with neighboring villages. Reports of peasant massacres committed by these self-defense organizations located in the military controlled emergency

zones began to reach both the press and the international human rights organizations. Another problem that surfaced was the fact that the government was putting these peasants on the front lines of the counterinsurgency war. These peasants, who were untrained and poorly armed, were no match for the military arm of the Shining Path. In addition, the government would not provide these organizations with firearms until late in the Garcia presidency and then only with shotguns. This was halted for a time after the military realized that the Shining Path had captured some of these weapons and were using them against government units.²⁶

The peasants went without government supplied weapons until the election of President Fujimori, who agreed to arm the peasants to assist the government in the fight against the Shining Path. By the beginning of 1992 there were 526 peasant communities with arms, and some 790 which had created their own organizations against the Shining Path. In addition to these organizations there were 1,117 communities that were asking the government for arms.²⁷

The *rondas campesinas*, once they were armed, proved to be very successful against the Shining Path. It appears that Guzman realized he was losing the fight in the countryside because of the efforts of the *rondas campesinas* and decided to take his war into the streets of Lima. *Rondas campesinas* continue to operate today and remain an effective force that the Shining Path has difficulty defeating on the battlefield.

The last government program addressed in this thesis is the formation of the new special antiterrorist branch of the national police, the DINCOTE, discussed briefly above. This force was one of the few effective antisubversive forces and proved to be a very dangerous opponent for the Shining Path. DINCOTE learned from the mistakes of the army and did not replace its officers and men every year. This provided the organization with real experts in anti-subversive investigation. As was addressed earlier, the DINCOTE played the key role in the arrest of the leader of the Shining Path, Abimael

Guzman. This organization is a bright spot in Peru's fight against the Shining Path and will in all likelihood continue to play a major role in Peru's terrorist fight.

Although this chapter has discussed, individually, several programs and actions that have been taken by the government of Peru to eliminate the threat posed by the Shining Path, it should be understood that many of these actions were taking place simultaneously and only for clarity were they discussed separately. The key point to be gleaned from this first portion of the chapter should be that Peru had several programs that, early in this struggle, failed miserably, but they have learned from their mistakes and are now actually winning the war against the Shining Path and the other insurgent groups who are operating within Peru.

THE U.S. INVOLVEMENT TO DATE

This portion of chapter three will address only the U.S. involvement in Peru from 1978 to the present day. In the 1960s and 1970s the drugs of choice were heroin and marihuana and neither of these play a significant role in Peru's drug and insurgent problems. As a result, this chapter will only address the policies that the United States Government instituted to deal with the coca and terrorist problems in Peru.

An earlier chapter discussed the impact that the illegal drug trade, chiefly cocaine, has had on our country. What should be reiterated is the fact that the Shining Path threatens a democratic form of government. That in itself is a threat defined by the United States' national security interests and goals as published in the National Security Strategy of the United States.²⁸

The remaining portion of this chapter will discuss how the U.S. government saw its' role in international narcotics control and some of the organizations that were involved in implementing the policies that resulted from this strategy. This portion of the chapter will discuss specific organizations and their role in reducing the amount of cocaine grown

and smuggled out of Peru. All of these agencies worked closely together and with the Peruvian government.

On October 4, 1982, President Reagan released the 1982 Federal Strategy for the Prevention of Drug Abuse and Trafficking. This Strategy established the direction for the U.S. Government's effort to reduce drug abuse in the following years. DEA was heavily involved from the beginning in both national drug law enforcement as well as international aspects of this federal response.

Internationally, the United States was developing and implementing a long range, organized effort to work with drug source nations to eliminate illicit drug production and to interdict these drugs when they were in transit to the U.S. Some of the specific actions taken as a result of this Strategy included:

1. Encouraging and assisting other countries in developing programs to eradicate these illicit drugs grown or produced within their country.
2. Exploring with other countries ways to monitor the cash flow generated by the sale of these illicit drugs.
3. Participating in international drug control and enforcement organizations with other nations where illicit drugs were produced, transited and/or consumed.²⁹

The Drug Enforcement Agency (DEA) played a significant role in the international narcotics control efforts. In 1983 the DEA had Special Agents and support personnel in 62 offices in 41 countries. Sixteen of these were Latin American countries. Their job was to encourage, advise, and assist host countries in the development and implementation of effective ways to control illicit drug crops, reduce illicit cultivation and the manufacture of drugs from raw products, and interdict illicit drugs at staging areas in-country and along the trafficking routes.³⁰

In Peru, the DEA's efforts were far more developed than in most of the foreign countries because of the cooperation efforts by their Peruvian counterparts. Their efforts focused on eradication and crop substitution, which coincided with Peru's priorities.³¹

The DEA also provided technical assistance and training to enforcement officials who were engaged in both drug crop control and interdiction. The DEA agents work closely with the U.S. Embassy narcotics coordinators, assessing the nature and degree of the drug problem and then working with the different Peruvian law enforcement agencies in taking responsive action. The DEA also worked closely with the Bureau of International Narcotics Matters to help slow the flow of cocaine from Peru into America.³²

The DEA is still operating in Peru, working out of a joint U.S.-Peruvian "base camp" at Santa Lucia, located in the Upper Huallaga Valley, together with other bases in the Huallaga in a new mobile basing program. They routinely conduct combined operations with the Peruvian anti-narcotics forces and Peruvian Air Force Personnel.

Another U.S. agency that played a significant role in Peru was the Bureau of International Narcotics Matters (INM). Their primary mission was to reduce the flow of illicit drugs from Peru to the U.S. The INM negotiated bilateral agreements with international organizations on crop control. Their primary goal was to have countries establish bans on cultivation and production, and then enforce the agreement by manually or chemically eradicate the coca crops. Their second goal was to conduct interdiction operations as close as possible to the production source.³³

Typical of the types of operations conducted by the INM was an operation took place in May 1983. This program was one that focused on destroying the coca crops throughout the country. The program was called Reduction and Control of Coca Planting in the Upper Huallaga (CORAH). The program headquarters was located in Tingo Maria and employed three professionals, a clerical staff, and 780 "pullers", who were assigned to pull out forty to fifty hectares of coca a day. The job of a "puller" was not one

of the safest ways to earn a living in Peru. There were occasions when hordes of armed peasants would attack personnel working at the CORAH projects, with the purpose of injuring or killing these "pullers."³⁴

Another key agency in the early 1980s was the Agency for International Development (A.I.D.). Their role was to identify, fund, and implement appropriate development programs in narcotics-producing areas, which provided alternative sources of income for farmers who grew the coca. They played an important role in carrying out activities that supported President Reagan's Federal Drug Abuse Strategy. The agency worked closely with INM, the DEA and other U.S. agencies in a coordinated effort to ensure an appropriate response to the narcotics problem within Peru.³⁵

The agency was involved in a rural development program that began in September of 1981 in the Upper Huallaga Valley, the area that was responsible for producing approximately 50 percent of the illicit coca grown in the country. This program cost the U.S. 18 million dollars, of which 15 million dollars was in loans and 3 million dollars was in grants. The Peruvian government supplied the program with 8.5 million dollars. The program provided a significant amount of farm credit, land registration, and title assistance to the farmers. It also included applied agricultural rearing methods and rural road maintenance and upgrading. This was a five-year program aimed at convincing the farmers of Upper Huallaga Valley to replace their coca crops with crops of rice, cacao, corn, palm trees, and other crops, or cattle. The headquarters for this program was in an area where the level of coca cultivation was very high. It was here that peasants would apply for the short term loans provided by this program. What was unique about these loans was that a person had to sign an affidavit stating that the money would not be used to grow coca. While this would seem to be a fundamental request, a problem surfaced that should have been anticipated by the program leaders. This problem surfaced because of the high inflation rates at that time. That is, short term loans had an annual interest rate of

106 percent. The only way the farmers could continue to provide for their families and pay back this loan was to grow coca, which provided them with four to five well-paying crops a year.³⁶

The U.S. also became involved in the politics of Peru in an attempt to control the drug problem. In 1978, the military government of President Francisco Morales Bermudez became concerned about the quantities of coca being produced illegally and enacted legislation to eliminate illicit coca cultivation - - Decree Law 22095. This action was not taken solely because the Peruvian government was concerned about this problem and the impact it was having on Peru but actually resulted because of pressure from the United States fostered by its' concern about the increasing amount of this illicit drug being smuggled into the United States. This marks the first time that the United States becomes involved in the counter drug effort in Peru.³⁷

The government action that resulted from this Decree was code named "Green Sea" and called for the government forces to destroy all of the large scale coca farms. Due to the government's inability to logistically support such an operation only 60 of the estimated 12,000 hectares of the Upper Huallaga coca fields were eradicated. Frustrated by the increasing size of the areas under coca cultivation the government declared several of the departments that accounted for the majority of the cultivation under a state of emergency. This action called for the government forces to confiscate land, destroy coca crops, and incarcerate resisting farmers and landowners.³⁸

Peru's first efforts to destroy the coca plantations were not very successful. One consequence of this first operation was that the supply side of coca went down, forcing the price of the coca to actually increase. The ripple effect continued and due to the higher prices being paid for the coca more farmers began to grow it.³⁹

Although these programs were well-intentioned they were not very successful. As a matter of fact most of the early programs and efforts by Peruvian and U.S. agencies

were not very successful. This can be attributed to a number of different factors. One factor is an unwillingness of the U.S. government to make a serious effort to stop the flow of drugs. While the U.S. did spend substantial amounts of money for developing and financing these programs, a total commitment was lacking on the part of the senior leaders of both governments. A second reason for this early failure was a lack of understanding by the peasant population of Peru and real incentives for substituting. It appears that the U.S. agencies tried to deal with Peruvian peasants as if they were Americans. The use of coca goes back thousands of years and these agencies failed to consider the impact of their actions. The answer was "to throw money" at the problem and hope it would go away.

More recently the U.S. has employed members of the Special Forces, the Air Force, and the Army, to augment the various other governmental agencies that have been operating in Peru, such as the DEA. These elements have been providing assistance to the Peruvians in the counter drug arena as well as the counterinsurgency arena, and they have had a more positive impact than the efforts of the agencies of the early 1980s. All components involved recognized that they still have a long way to go before this battle is won but the capture of Guzman by the Peruvians is a positive sign that the two governments are on the right track.

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- ²¹Graves, The Shining Path, 188.
- ²²*Ibid.*, 189.
- ²³Enrique Obando Arbulu, Subversion and Antisubversion in Peru, 1980-92 : A View from Lima, Low Intensity Conflict & Law Enforcement (London : Frank Cass and Company Limited, Volume 2, Autumn 1993, Number 2), 321.
- ²⁴Tarazona-Sevillano, Sendero Luminoso, 96.
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- ²⁶Graves, The Shining Path, 192.
- ²⁷Obando, Subversion and Antisubversion in Peru, 325.
- ²⁸National Security Strategy of the United States, (Washington, D.C. : GPO, January 1993), 3.
- ²⁹Congress, House, Committee on the Judiciary, Drug Production and Trafficking in Latin America and the Caribbean, 98th Cong. , 1st sess. , 12 May 1983, 7.
- ³⁰*Ibid.*, 8.
- ³¹*Ibid.*, 11.
- ³²*Ibid.*, 43.
- ³³*Ibid.*, 85-87.

³⁴Edmundo Morales, Cocaine: White Gold Rush in Peru, (Tucson: The University of Arizona Press, 1989), xx and xxi.

³⁵(U.S. Congress, House 1983, 47-48).

³⁶Morales, Cocaine: White Gold Rush in Peru , xx.

³⁷Tarazona-Sevillano, Sendero Luminoso, 109.

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³⁹Ibid.

CHAPTER 4
POTENTIAL COUNTERDRUG AND COUNTERINSURGENCY
ROLES FOR THE U.S. ARMY
IN PERU

The purpose of this chapter is to provide possible employment options for the different branches of the Army. This paper will divide the branches of the Army into Combat, Combat Support, and Combat Service Support. This method was chosen over using the Battlefield Operating Systems (BOS) because there is a more even split of the branches under this method than the BOS.

The purpose is to limit this chapter to only the branches that would have a significant role in addressing the two problems of counterinsurgency and counterdrug operations. It is understood that each branch could assist in some way, but this paper will limit the discussion to only those branches that would play a significant role.

It is understood that the Army, or elements from the Army, would not participate in these types of operations individually. The different Branches of the Army would be part of a Joint/Combined force that would be organized to address these threats and they would fall under a Joint Headquarters. This study is limited to only the Army's possible role in the Peruvian situation and has avoided addressing the Joint/Combined issue. This issue would be a worthwhile study itself and may be of interest for future work.

In order to establish a few reasonable parameters, several assumptions have been made. The first is that the employment of soldiers or units will not last longer than one year. This is a reasonable time constraint for two reasons. First, one year should provide enough data to see if the employment of our forces is having the desired effect in Peru's

counterinsurgency. Secondly, the will of the American people to support an extended effort is limited-- perhaps no longer than one year. The U.S., as a nation, would demand some sort of proof that the operations had been successful. If U.S. forces were successful after a year it can be expected that the American people would want the military to pullout and turn the whole operation over to the Peruvians. If U.S. forces have not yet reached the results that were expected after one year the American people would want the U.S. forces to pullout of Peru to avoid another "Vietnam" type situation.

Another assumption that will govern this study is that substantial mobilization of our armed forces is not required, nor would it be accepted by the people. For the purpose of this study, it is assumed that the president has requested, and the Congress has approved, a partial call-up of selected Combat Support and Combat Service Support units and individuals.

One of the goals of the employment of U.S. Forces will be to maintain a low level of visibility around the major population centers. The Peruvian people are a proud people and a highly visible U.S. presence could weaken the Peruvian governments credibility. We would also have to watch how the influx of U.S. dollars might effect the Peruvian economy. The lower the signature of U.S. troops, the better off the government will be.

The types of operations that the Army conducts in Operations Other Than War that will be addressed in this chapter are : support for counterinsurgencies and combatting terrorism.¹ These will provide further parameters for this study.

To begin this chapter most effectively, it is necessary to come to terms with the definitions for these two types of operations. First; counterinsurgency is the military, paramilitary, political, economic, psychological, and civic actions taken to defeat an insurgency.² Combatting terrorism , includes anti-terrorism (defensive measures taken to reduce vulnerability to terrorist acts) and counterterrorism (offensive measures taken to

prevent, deter, and respond to terrorism) which are activities taken to oppose terrorism throughout the entire threat spectrum.³

Combat Arms

This portion of the chapter will look at light infantry, aviation, and special forces with the aim of determining how they could contribute to these two types of operations.

Light Infantry

The light infantry provides many options to the commander in these types of situations. It is rapidly deployable and is a relatively low profile combat force that can conduct both combat operations and training of host nation soldiers. An asset that would be used to a great extent would be their employment of sniper teams in both types of activities. This is a combat multiplier that would be very effective in this type of terrain against this type of enemy and is mentioned here to prevent redundancy when the two activities are discussed separately.

Counterinsurgency Operations

Light infantry would participate in the counterinsurgency by conducting military operations against the Shining Path. These operations would include ambushes, raids, deliberate attacks, movement to contact, and show of force.

Light infantry forces are ideal for conducting these decentralized operations that make up the counterinsurgency fight. These decentralized operations will require strong unit leaders down to squad level and the light infantry prides itself in its' junior officers and NCOs leadership abilities. They often conduct decentralized training that develops leadership skills and land navigation skills that help build individual and unit confidence, all very important aspects of the counterinsurgency fight.

The proportion of tooth to tail in the light infantry is also an advantage in counterinsurgency operations. There are more combat troops per support troops in a light infantry organization than in a mechanized or armor unit. That means there are more fighters on the ground with a light infantry unit than with any other combat unit. As was discussed earlier, we would have to operate within a constrained level of troop strength and this tooth to tail ratio would become a significant factor. The light infantry may have to rely somewhat on host nation support to maintain the force but that wouldn't provide a serious obstacle to either country or have a negative affect on the soldiers.

The light infantry allocates a large percentage of its training time to conducting the types of operations found in Operations Other Than War. The leaders and soldiers have, for the most part, been put in situations that would be very similar to the situations that would be found in Peru. They are aware of the political considerations when conducting an operation like this and incorporate possible political considerations and Rules of Engagement (ROE) into training exercises. This prior training will greatly enhance their ability to perform when they are put in these very difficult situations.

The light infantry forces could also assist in the training of the Peruvian Army in specific maneuver and command and control aspects of counterinsurgency operations. This could include instruction on patrolling, marksmanship, land navigation, and classes on the different radios and radio procedures. This would not be their primary function because this type of training falls under the special forces charter, as will be discussed later.

The last contribution that will be mentioned concerning light infantry is its ability to be transported by helicopters. Because they are so "light" everything in a rifle battalion can be moved by UH-60s. Another advantage that the light infantry enjoys is the frequency that they train with helicopters. Not only are they "light", and therefore very mobile, they also have a high level of proficiency in airmobile and air assault operations.

This capability will allow the units to conduct operations in the mountains and other numerous hard to reach areas that the Shining Path operate in.

Combatting Terrorism

Light infantry forces could conduct both anti-terrorism and counter-terrorism operations, but their focus will be on counter-terrorism because of their offensive spirit. They will take the fight to the terrorists and force them to fight on their terms. The type of operations that the light infantry will be called upon to execute will be the same type of operations they executed in the counterinsurgency fight. In reality, there wouldn't be any separation in these operations as far as the Infantry units were concerned.

Special Forces

This study is unclassified and therefore will not talk about all of the forces that make up the army special operations forces. Of the five different forces, special forces (SF), rangers, civil affairs (CA), PSYOP, and ARSOA, only SF will be discussed in this portion of the chapter. CA will be discussed with the combat support units

Special forces are ideally suited for these types of operations. They routinely operate in covert or low visibility situations, have the capability to train host nation troops in the host nation language, are highly competent, and have been doing these types of operations since their creation.⁴ They are probably the most experienced element of our Army in conducting these two types of operations.

Counterinsurgency Operations

The primary mission of special forces in this type of operation is to advise, train, and assist Host Nation military and paramilitary forces. They have done several of these types of missions in Central and South America but the specifics of these operations remain classified.⁵ Some of the many missions that the SF will be called upon to execute

will involve instruction on patrolling, marksmanship, Intelligence Preparation of the Battlefield, sustainment operations, and human rights. All of these areas are critical in the fight against the Shining Path, and the Peruvians are having significant problems in each of these areas.

The SF could also be employed in a direct action role, either working in isolation or in conjunction with other U.S. forces or in a combined operation with the Peruvians. In the direct action role they could conduct the same basic missions as the light infantry, but may be better suited for executing raids and ambushes because of their relative lack of heavy fire power and their rather small unit organizations.

Combatting Terrorism

Again, the primary role of the SF is to train the Host Nation military and paramilitary forces to conduct these types of operations. They do have a secondary role in executing direct action missions against a terrorist organization. The type of missions that they would most likely execute would be hostage rescue, recovery of sensitive material from the terrorist organization, and attack of the terrorist infrastructure. Given the situation in Peru, hostage rescue might become the most frequent of these operations because the Shining Path understands that the American public might not be as supportive of our assistance to Peru if U.S. citizens were being taken hostage and possibly killed by the Shining Path.

In any of the roles mentioned above the SF would be a significant combat multiplier for our deployed forces and would play a significant role in all of the operations conducted in support of the Peruvian Government.

Aviation

Army aviation provides the commander with an enormous amount of flexibility. In the Peruvian countryside, with the huge mountain ranges and the poor lines of communica-

tion, it provides the ground commander with a means to move people and equipment around the battlefield quickly. Our aviation assets are currently being used in Peru and this will lead to better coordination and execution between U.S. forces and the Peruvians in future operations. Our pilots are, or will be, familiar with the terrain and the SOPs of the Peruvians and these factors will provide a solid basis for future combined operations.

Counterinsurgency

One of the ways aviation can support counterinsurgency is to assist the Peruvian government in proving, or improving, its' legitimacy among the people of Peru. We could use the inherent lift capability of the helicopters to transport agricultural teams and supplies, along with any other similar needs, to the people in the hard to reach areas, which also supply a large percentage of the illegal coca grown in the country, and assist those farmers in growing alternative crops. The helicopters could also be used to transport civilian casualties that need to be treated at other locations. These casualties could be the result of the insurgents or just a program of the governments to assist those people in the hard to reach villages who need medical attention. This simple act would greatly assist the government's quest to improve its image, or legitimacy, among the people of the country.

In the direct action role aviation could be used to insert or extract combat troops in the most rugged or remote areas of the countryside where deployments are difficult due to lack of roads, their poor condition, and road security concerns. They would be used in such missions as raids, ambushes, and deliberate and hasty attacks. In these same missions they would be used to medivac any combatant, not just government troops. This would help the government in improving its legitimacy problem while demonstrating to the world community that Peru has taken steps to improve in the area of human rights.

The helicopters ability to react, on short notice, and employ forces in regions that would be inaccessible to, other than to foot traffic, make it an ideal platform to use to transport reserves or reaction forces into the battle at the critical moment.⁶ The government forces have not had this capability and has proven to be a major obstacle to their offensive operations. They do possess a limited number of helicopters, mostly old Soviet models that have been used for transport as well as command and control operations. The major limiting factor of these helicopters is the lack of repair parts available.⁷

Another role that falls under direct action would be the use of combat aviation in the fight against the insurgents. The Cobra and the Apache, and for that matter, the old Huey gunships, would be a great asset for the maneuver commander to incorporate into his operations. Their employment would have to be considered carefully though because of the amount of collateral damage that is inherent with the use of helicopter gunships. If not done carefully, this could become another example of a Lima's lack of regard of human rights. Such things as employment in built-up areas should probably be avoided whenever possible, or at a minimum, the risk of their employment must be taken into consideration during the initial course of action development and wargaming.

Aviation assets could also be used as a platform for gathering intelligence. The Shining Path does not have any air defense weapons, other than small arms, that threaten a helicopter. As long as the helicopters stay above the range of those small arms the helicopters could be used to conduct visual recons of specific areas before an operation. Commanders could get an appreciation of the terrain as well as identify key terrain features such as trails, roads, choke points, and air fields/strips.

Another critical area of aviation employment is logistics. When forces are conducting operations in this type of environment logistics takes on even a bigger role and must be carefully planned. The use of the helicopter frees ground forces from having to

conduct, or at a minimum secure, ground lines of communication. This capability offers many more options for the ground commander to take the fight to the insurgents.

The importance of aviation can not be understated and will play a key role in any direct action missions. Of the many branches that could assist the Peruvians in their struggle with the Shining Path, aviation is the most critical.

Combat Support

This portion of the chapter will address engineers (EN), field artillery (FA), military police (MP), military intelligence (MI), and the signal corps (SC) assess what they can contribute to these types of operations.

Engineers

Both construction engineers and combat engineers have important roles in the counterinsurgency and combatting terrorism fight. For simplicity, both will be discussed in this portion of the chapter. Engineers in the United States Army play a significant role in adding legitimacy to Host Nations and are deployed frequently throughout the world. Nowhere is their work more evident than in the countries of our neighbors and allies in Central and South America.

Counterinsurgency

U.S. engineer elements are in Peru on a frequent basis helping to improve the lines of communication throughout the country. By doing so they assist the government in several different ways. First, it shows that the government is aware of the problems in the country and it is taking measures to improve the life of the average person. The work the engineers would do range from improving, or making roads, to facilitating the transportation of crops or people, to the construction of buildings, such as hospitals or warehouses for the storage, or the processing of crops and raw materials. A major requirement for the

conduct of counterinsurgency is the need for airfields. The engineers could greatly assist the Peruvian government's operations, both military and civilian, and assist our government's military operations in the remote regions of the country where we have identified a need for better mobility. In the areas hit the hardest by the Shining Path the engineers would also be called upon to clear roads and trails of mines and booby traps.⁸ Other types of missions that the engineers could conduct in support of these types of operations include the construction of temporary structures for the local populace if they have had their homes destroyed by the Shining Path, or, if military operations in the area require that they be temporarily displaced for their own safety. It is safe to say that engineer construction projects play a major role in counterinsurgency operations by assisting our allied governments to develop a strong infrastructure, which in turn, builds economic growth and stability. This is a key element in the Peruvian government's ongoing attempt to prove its legitimacy to its people.⁹

The deployment of U.S. soldiers to Peru will require large amounts of water for drinking, cooking, and cleaning. Engineers would be essential in meeting this logistical requirement by locating potable water sources and, if required, drill wells to tap into the water sources.¹⁰ These water sources would also help the local population by providing for their domestic water needs as well as providing an additional water source for agricultural needs.

The landscape of Peru makes the need for accurate maps very important. A large portion of Peru is underdeveloped and the country does not have accurate maps of all of the areas. Accurate maps are vital to conducting military operations. Not only does it provide a common understanding for all units involved, something that's needed for operational and logistical support, it also reduces the risk of fratricide. Topographic engineering provides units with maps and other terrain analysis products that can be used to develop plans.¹¹

As a last resort the engineers could be used as infantry during combat operations. They do train in basic infantry skills but if used as infantry they must be augmented with fire support. The decision to use them as infantry usually rests with the division commander.¹²

Combatting Terrorism

The majority of work done by the engineers will be focused on base defense. The engineers would be tasked to construct obstacles to prevent terrorist from entering our areas of operations, such as bases, and deployment areas, the embassy, and other work places. Their goal is to prevent something like the bombing of the Marine barracks in Lebanon from happening in Peru.

Field Artillery

Field artillery support normally provided to a light infantry unit rests largely on the 105mm howitzer. At times, a light infantry unit could be supported by 155mm howitzers from corps, but for this study we will limit the field artillery to just the 105mm howitzers. This is practical when you consider the difficulty in deploying the 155mm howitzer into remote areas with smaller, dirt runways, as well as the need for better road conditions required to move that heavy of a piece of equipment from the airfields to the area of operation. In addition, the 105mm is capable of being sling loaded by a UH-60 while the 155mm is not. This alone provides the maneuver commander with much more flexibility when planning his operations. The use of field artillery must also be controlled very carefully. With its destructive fire power the chances of injuring, killing, or otherwise affecting the civilian populace, (e.g. causing brush fires that could destroy legal crops) is a very real concern. The Rules of Engagement (ROE) will most likely limit its use to remote, or, sparsely populated areas, and only on observed enemy positions. Even with these constraints the maneuver commander will have to carefully consider the possible

benefits of using field artillery against the purpose of the overall mission, and decide if its use, while considering both the positive and negative aspects that could result from its use, contributes to the overall success of the mission.

Counterinsurgency

The field artillery's first and foremost mission will be to support the tactical maneuver units. Some examples of the types of specific operations that they can conduct include supporting security posts, checkpoints, roadblocks, and patrols. In these operations they would perform their usual combat missions by targeting and, when requested, firing, to disrupt or destroy the enemy or possibly firing in support of air insertions and extractions by targeting drop zones (DZs), landing zones (LZs), and flight routes.¹³

Other possible missions include supporting deception plans by placing fires in areas other than those in which an operation is planned, and populace control operations where illumination is fired in support of police-type cordon-and-search operations or raids. As was stated earlier, the commander must consider the possible affects of these fires and decide if the benefits out weighs the risks, such as starting fires as a result of using illumination rounds.

Counterinsurgency operations usually dictate changes in the standard firing units' SOPs that must be considered even before the deployment is completed. These include :

1. Added security requirements for the firing positions as well as planning direct fires for defense and coordination of U.S. or Peruvian military forces to augment the security of the Field Artillery unit.
2. A need to fire in all directions.
3. Close coordination with Peruvian civilian authorities to locate villages, population centers, and religious institutions.

4. Close coordination with Peruvian officials on several different factors such as the suspected threat level in the area, other possible firing positions, and the local road and trail networks.¹⁴

Combatting Terrorism

In antiterrorism operations field artillery personnel and equipment would be used to augment the security of bases, roadblocks and checkpoints, and any other locations that are likely terrorist targets. The personnel, armed with their small arms would add to the security of any of the above mentioned locations. The biggest impact however, would come from the mere presence of their howitzers at these locations deployed in the direct fire mode. This alone would assist our efforts in preventing a terrorist attack.

In counterterrorism operations field artillery personnel and equipment would be used in almost the same manner as in conventional operations. The types of operations they would be supporting, for example, hostage rescue or assault of a terrorist position, are different from the execution perspective, but they would be supported by the field artillery in the same manner as if were an assault on an enemy bunker complex. The only differences are minor, such as the selection of the fuse or type of round. For this reason we will not consider their role in counterterrorism any further.

Military Police

Military police units are a vital component to the "team" that would deploy in this type of situation. Although each branch of service has a role to play, few are as versatile as the military police, or convey our intent, as well as the intent of the Peruvian government. When the military police conduct operations within the limitations of the local laws, and they treat people with respect, they have the potential to greatly assist Peru in it's attempts to establish legitimacy throughout the country. The great amount of

firepower a military police company possesses provides for ample security for their own forces and allows the maneuver commander to exercise flexibility when he assigns tasks.

Counterinsurgency

Military police will play a key role in the counterinsurgency fight. They have a number of missions that fall under their responsibility. The first, and most obvious, is the conduct of regular police-type operations. These will have to be in conjunction with the Peruvian police force, and only if absolutely necessary. The Peruvian government's ability to prove to its people that the government is in control, and not the insurgents, is vital to the government's ability to prove to the people that it is a legitimate government. If our military police are seen, or perceived, as the dominate police force, they will undermine the Peruvian government and lend credence to the Shining Path's claim that the government is not in control of the country.

During cordon-and-search operations MPs would be used to secure persons or property that have been captured or detained, and to evacuate prisoners to the rear. There, MPs would process, secure, and evacuate further, those people detained or captured IAW FM 19-40, Enemy Prisoners of War, Civilian Internees, and Detained Persons, DA directives, and agreements between our government and the Peruvian government.

Other operations that could be assigned to the MPs include conducting checkpoints, roadblocks, establishing traffic control points, convoy escorts, enforcing curfews, and route security. All of these operations will contribute to maneuver commander's intelligence operations due to the amount of exposure the MPs will have with the local population and their ability to develop informants as a result of that exposure.

Combatting Terrorism

Military police will provide U.S. government agencies and Army units, as well as Peruvian governmental agencies, with physical security. This action will deter the Shining Path from attempting to conduct any type of terrorist actions against these agencies or units. It must be stressed that, whenever possible, the Peruvian government itself conducts such security operations. This will assist the Peruvian government in maintaining its legitimacy among its people. This is not to say, however, that our forces surrender all of its security responsibilities over to the Peruvians, just to do it as low key as possible.

One particularly valuable military police asset is the military working dog. These dogs are a great asset when conducting patrolling or base security. They have the ability to alert on movement or smell from people the MP can't see. They are also capable of alerting on drugs and demolitions, a real threat in Peru, and provide the MP with greater security because the MP does not have to expose himself to those dangers as readily as when they do not have working dog support.¹⁵

Signal

The role of the signal corps doesn't change between counterinsurgency and combatting terrorism and for that reason the role of the signal corps will be addressed without considering those two sub-paragraphs.

The environment found in Peru places a great demand on our communications systems. The different types of terrain all pose their own unique problems. The biggest problems that we would have will be the vast, very rugged, mountain ranges, and as a result of those mountains, very poor ground lines of communications. Due to the great demands placed on our systems we must have redundancy on all of our key nets to ensure continuous communications. The challenge comes in when the signal community sit down

and try to maintain communications over this vast area with insufficient radios to do the work. The radios that we have in our inventory are all sufficient to do the job they were made to do, but in this type of environment units will require additional FM (line-of-sight) radios. The signal community must study the situation and develop a communications plan that supports the maneuver commander. We do not have to limit ourselves to just Army equipment. Every plan should consider civilian as well as Peruvian assets.

Although this portion of the chapter does not go into any great detail about missions and challenges that face the signal corps in Peru, the importance of being able to communicate with your subordinates, adjacent units, and superiors can not be emphasized enough. In this situation the maneuver commander will be communicating with not only forces in country, but also with forces, agencies, and units back in CONUS. The maneuver commander must be able to talk to all of his units, and they to each other, so the proper command decisions can be made in a timely manner. Without the ability to communicate to his command on a consistent basis the operation is doomed to fail.

Military Intelligence

Like signal support, military intelligence (MI) missions will not change drastically from counterinsurgency to combatting terrorism so this paper will not divide the MI missions into those two categories.

The mission of the tactical MI element is to collect, process, and disseminate combat information and intelligence. To accomplish this mission the MI element relies on a multi-disciplined intelligence collection effort that includes human intelligence (HUMINT), signal intelligence (SIGINT), imagery intelligence (IMINT), measurement and signature intelligence (MASINT), and counterintelligence (COUNTER- HUMINT).

HUMINT consists of intelligence that is derived from information that is provided by human sources. This information comes from interrogation of enemy prison-

ers of war (EPWs), captured documents, interaction with the local populace, and all of the forces involved with the operation, both U.S. and the Peruvian.

SIGINT will only be slightly effective because only a few of the members, or units of the Shining Path have radios. However, the higher echelon leaders do have communication capabilities and SIGINT may play an important role in capturing, or destroying these leaders. At a minimum we should be able to disrupt a small portion of their operations, typically at the command level.

IMINT is information that is derived from radar, infrared, and photographic sensors. This information will be useful in identifying enemy bases, routes used, and activities.

MASINT is the intelligence gathered from the measurement and signature of threat systems putting out electromagnetic energy. This doesn't play an important role now, but after our deployment to Peru the Shining Path may decide to upgrade their communications capabilities, thereby making them more vulnerable to our collection assets.

In Operations Other Than War, HUMINT usually provides most of the available intelligence. To disrupt or delay the insurgent/terrorist collection process, counter-intelligence is used. By taking advantage of collection and counterintelligence efforts and then synchronizing them, the maneuver commander may be able to deceive the leaders of the Shining Path.¹⁶ The capability to deceive the enemy, and then conduct offensive operations against him, in a place, or at a time, that is unexpected, is a combat multiplier that will save U.S. lives and shorten the amount of time U.S. forces will be required to remain in country.

In both types of operations, counterinsurgency and combatting terrorism, successful intelligence operations require close coordination and interaction between U.S. and Peruvian intelligence agencies. Our intelligence effort must also include interaction

with all of the other branches of the Army taking part in the operation. Each one of them will have some level of interaction with the local populace and will be able provide information that should be useful to the development of the overall intelligence picture.

The challenge for the intelligence community will be to integrate all of this information from these various sources, along with other intelligence from other sources, and develop a picture that allows the commander to see the battlefield and provides him the time and flexibility to react to any contingencies.¹⁷

Civil Affairs

Civil Affairs (CA) include any activity concerned with the relationships between the military and the civil authorities and the people of the area. In addition to helping the commander meet his legal and moral obligations, CA operations provide assistance to civil authorities and help to organize and motivate the local population to support counterinsurgency projects. Activities may range from military civic programs to the exercise of authority that normally is the responsibility of the local government.¹⁸

The objective of CA operations in Peru will be to mobilize and motivate the civilians to assist the government and military forces in defeating the Shining Path.

CA operations are divided into two supporting missions: conduct Civil Military Operations (CMO) and support civil administration.¹⁹ Support to civil administration would be a small role, if conducted at all, and for that reason will not be discussed any further. CMO is conducted to support the commander's assigned mission. Examples of missions that they will be called upon to execute are :

1. Create, restore, and maintain public order, in coordination with the Peruvian authorities.
2. Identify, and use local resources such as labor, supplies, and facilities for both tactical and logistical purposes.

3. Control diseases that might endanger our units.
4. Minimize civilian interference with military operations.²⁰

Combat Service Support

This portion of the chapter will discuss transportation, medical corps, dental corps, veterinary corps, and the judge advocate generals corps. Differentiating between counterinsurgency and combatting terrorism will not be done during this portion of the chapter because the missions of these branches will not change as the operations change.

Transportation

Transportation is the one element that ties together all CSS operations. It includes transportation movement control, mode, airdrop, airlift, and terminal transport operations.²¹ During our deployment to Peru we would utilize both sea and air lines of communication and our early success will depend heavily on how well transportation units execute their missions. Their importance can not be overstated at any time during the operation, from deployment, through employment, and finally our redeployment.

U.S. Army transportation assets will provide movement support for both military, and if needed, Peruvian units and governmental organizations. These assets play a key role in the distribution of supplies to personnel, and for that matter, the distribution of personnel throughout the country. Leasing might also constitute an option for acquiring additional transportation requirements from the Peruvians. This would limit our presence in the country and would also boost the local economy.

A concern that must be addressed is the sequencing of available transportation assets during the deployment. Planners must ensure that there are enough transportation assets on the ground, either U.S. or contract, to move arriving troops and supplies. A failure to do so jeopardizes the security of the men, supplies and the mission. Stockpiled

supplies are also potential targets for terrorists and additional security measures must be taken to protect these supplies.

Medical Corps

In Peru the medical corps will be very active, not only with U.S. troops but also with the Peruvians. Their primary mission would be to plan and perform direct health service support to U.S. and Peruvian military forces. Other missions that they will perform will be the training of Peruvian medical personnel, both military and civilian, in the latest techniques used to fight the most common medical problems found in Peru. The third priority for them will be to set up treatment facilities to care for the civilians who need medical attention. Whenever possible this should be a combined operation with Peruvian medical personnel.

Although the dental corps is a separate branch of service, their missions will mirror those of the medical corps. For simplicity of security requirements and transportation, they would travel together and establish treatment facilities that will care for both medical and dental patients.

Veterinary Corps

One of the missions for the veterinary corps will be to inspect all of the rations that have been obtained locally. This is not limited to processed food like that found in a store, but also locally grown produce, as well as the examination of those animals that we will use for food, such as cattle. They will also be responsible for the control of any diseases that may be transmitted from animals to humans, such as rabies. Their final responsibility will be to treat any of our military animals that we have brought into country or have purchased from the Peruvians. A possible example might be mules purchased to carry supplies for the units operating in the mountainous regions of Peru, and, of course,

military working dogs. This was something our country did in World War II and something the Canadians are doing today in Bosnia.

Whenever possible veterinary corps personnel will travel with the medical and dental personnel and when health reasons don't prevent it, they will set up their operations with, or in close proximity to, their operations.

Judge Advocate Generals Corps

In Operations Other Than War one of the commanders most important staff officers is the staff judge advocate (SJA). The SJA should review every plan to ensure that the plan does not violate any Peruvian laws or treaties that we may have with the Peruvians. All of our personnel should understand that violations of legal constraints may adversely affect the overall accomplishment of U.S. policy objectives, even though the commander accomplishes the immediate military objective.²² The SJA must advise the commander on U.S. and International law, as well as Peruvian law.

All military operations must comply with U.S. law. In the area of U.S. law the SJA will spend most of his time involved with violations of the UCMJ and Federal Acquisition Regulations and various statues that govern the acquisition of supplies and services for U.S. forces.²³

The SJA must also be familiar with international law, which includes the law of land warfare and international agreements. International agreements prescribe the rights, duties, immunities, and privileges of nations in relation to particular undertakings. These international agreements will affect our operations in several different areas. They will provide the framework for the construction and operation of any U.S. bases, either temporary or permanent. They will also contain the aircraft overflight and landing rights with the countries that border Peru. One area that will demand a large percentage of their time will be the agreements for filing claims for damage to persons and property.²⁴

During our operations in Peru, Peruvian law will apply to all of our soldiers. The SJA must review these laws, identify any laws that are unique to Peru, and inform the commander so he can keep his soldiers informed of these laws and the penalty for violating those laws. Other areas that the SJA must look at as far as Peruvian law is if there are any restrictions on the procurement of goods and services and any customs or taxes that would apply. If Peruvian law conflicts with the accomplishment of the mission other agencies such as CA or the U.S. Embassy might be able to work with the local authorities to negotiate an agreement that will exempt U.S. forces.²⁵

As was proven in the past and will no doubt be proven again in the future, the SJA is a key member of the commanders staff and must be kept informed of the upcoming operations to avoid any politically sensitive areas that might jeopardize our operations in Peru.

Now that the possible missions of these selected branches have been discussed *this chapter will conclude with a brief look at how these missions can be accomplished in Peru's unique environment.* This chapter will conclude with a study of two scenarios that take place in the Peruvians fight against the Shining Path.

The first scenario will focus on combatting terrorism in an urban environment, initially conducting a counterterrorist operation after the Shining Path has conducted a terrorist attack on the city of Lima, then shift to an antiterrorism operation to prevent future attacks. The second scenario postulates on a Shining Path attack on an Indian village where the insurgents have murdered and maimed dozens of people.

For the purpose of this study U.S. forces are considered to be deployed in country, with some elements deployed in and around Lima during this terrorist attack. U.S. forces were not a target of this attack but indications are that U.S. forces may be the targets of future attacks. The U.S. also has forces operating throughout the country.

A very important aspect that must be considered when conducting these operations is the requirement to respect Peruvian sovereignty and pride of the Peruvian people. This may not seem to be a major operational planning consideration to some Americans but it must receive close attention. The Peruvian people are a very proud people and great care must be taken to ensure that U.S. forces work closely with their government, their police and their military. U.S. forces must ensure that Peruvian forces are clearly seen as the lead force in conducting operations against the Shining Path. This will serve several purposes. First, it will add to the legitimacy of the government, something that is very important in this situation. Secondly, by conducting operations in this manner U.S. forces will build a stronger relationship with the Peruvian government and their military. Lastly, with Peru playing as active a role as possible U.S. forces build confidence and competency in the conduct of joint operations.

Scenario # 1

In this scenario the Shining Path has just completed a night attack on Lima where they cut off the electricity to large portions of the city and then conducted a series of bombings of Peruvian government buildings. There are dozens of people killed and many injured, with more attacks expected over the next several days.

A number of different actions will have to take place simultaneously, but for the purpose of this study they will be addressed by branch. However, the order in which they are discussed will be different than the order in which they were addressed earlier in the chapter. This is done because of the required sequencing of events during the course of the operation, as, for an example, conducting an Intelligence Preparation of the Battlefield (IPB).

The intelligence effort must be conducted in close consultation with the Peruvians since they have the best intelligence and most experience in dealing with the Shining

Path. The MI element in the city, after consulting with the Peruvians, must immediately review and update its IPB, and disseminate that product to its subordinate units. The MI HUMINT cell must deploy to the various Shining Path objectives and with Peruvian National Police begin interviewing any witnesses to solidify the intelligence picture. This provides a good opportunity to conduct combined operations with the Peruvian intelligence cell and possibly tie in with their collection assets. The commander must also get updates on any SIGINT or IMINT sources available. Some of these assets will be organic to the deployed forces, while other assets will be made available from national sources. In both cases these assets must constantly be focused on the area. Although the Shining Path has a limited amount of radios, any that can be detected will most likely be located at a control point or a headquarters of some type. The information that the MI element processes into intelligence will be instrumental in guiding the deployment of other units and equipment and will begin to shape the future battlefield for the commander.

Because there were not any people taken hostage by the Shining Path the SF will be used to conduct direct action missions against any "soft" targets of the Shining Paths leadership that the MI cell can identify. A "soft" target implies that there are little or no combat troops on the objective. In this case it would most likely be a leadership cell of the Shining Path. Because of the SFs limited firepower, they would not conduct any direct action missions against Shining Path strongholds. However, SF would be used to conduct reconnaissance of hard targets for other forces, such as the light infantry.

Once the enemy has been located the Infantry would then conduct either a hasty or deliberate attack. Additionally, the Infantry could be used to secure the buildings that have been bombed, or other buildings that are likely targets for future attacks. They could also secure American businesses, homes of American citizens, or be used to supplement the security of our embassy. Due to the potential sensitivity caused by our presence these security missions should be a combined mission with the Peruvians as often as possible.

Aviation will play a major role throughout this operation. One of the first missions that will be executed will be casualty evacuation. Helicopters will be able to transport people to hospitals much faster than any form of ground transportation. This translates into more Peruvian lives saved because they were able to receive medical attention that more quickly. Another priority mission will be to confirm or deny the accuracy of the MIs IPB. The MI cell will use a helicopter as a platform to gather this information. The benefits are that it's relatively secure, fast, and very flexible, being able to cover large areas. As was discussed earlier, helicopters will also be used to transport Infantry and SF to the vicinity of the areas where they will be conducting their operations. This provides the units a higher level of security and the ability to react to intelligence more rapidly. In these types of missions the helicopters would also be used to transport supplies forward to the units and to evacuate casualties to the rear. With the higher structures and other things, such as electrical wires, that interfere with the unit's ability to communicate, throughout the city Peru a helicopter will also make an excellent command and control platform. Helicopter gunships will be used in support of the Infantry and SF direct action missions. These helicopters will supplement the fires of the units on the ground and will replace, for the most part, the fires of the Field Artillery, whose use will be limited by the ROE. A reserve force will also be on strip alert to be flown into the battle at the decisive point and time. The constraint on U.S. Aviation operations will be the number of aircraft available within the TOE of a Light Infantry Division. This will require the Light Infantry Division to be augmented with additional aircraft from Corps assets. U.S. forces will still require some assistance and this is a very good opportunity to conduct combined operations with the Peruvian aviation units. These will be high visibility missions that will assist in the building a stronger base of legitimacy for the Peruvian government. With the Peruvians limited aircraft U.S. forces should be prepared to assist the Peruvians with maintenance and repair parts shortages.

Until the exact location of the terrorists is identified, the FA will not fire any ordinance, with the possible exception of illumination, and only then after the commander has weighed the risks of starting fires or the chance of someone being struck from the rounds residue. When the location of the Shining Path is identified the FA units could conduct fire support operations in support of the maneuver units. Again, the risk of collateral damage must be identified and the commander must make the decision to use this asset. Howitzers could also be used in a show of force mission by having them placed around buildings or at key intersections. They could also be used to augment other forces who are conducting security operations within the city, or used separately to establish roadblocks, checkpoints, or to conduct patrolling operations in support of the higher commanders security plan.

The Engineers will conduct several different missions simultaneously. An Engineer element must accompany the Light Infantry on their operations to clear any booby traps that the Infantry discovers. Engineers will also be used to help in the clean-up of the areas where the bombings took place and, within their limitations, begin to repair the buildings. They will also assist in the construction of survivability positions for the security forces.

The MPs, if required, will work closely with the Peruvian police to maintain law and order within selected areas of Lima. They will also be responsible for the security of any people who are detained for questioning. The MPs may also be used to augment the security at U.S. buildings, such as the embassy. Much of their time though will be spent conducting convoy security or escort security for U.S. units and officials, establishing checkpoints on the avenues of approach leading to U.S. units and buildings.

Medical and Dental Corps personnel will assist, when needed, the Peruvian medical care specialists. This will include providing services as well as establishing emergency treatment facilities to care for the wounded if the local hospitals can not treat the

number of casualties. Additionally, the Veterinary Corps will inspect the food at any temporary locations that displaced or injured personnel may be staying.

The Transportation Corps will use their assets, either organic or contract, to assist in most of these missions. They would assist the MP cell by transporting any detainees to interrogation areas. Both the SF and the Infantry will need transportation support to move troops and supplies, while the Medical and Dental Corps will need assistance in moving supplies from storage areas to the locations where the treatment facilities will be set up.

The SJA will act as a liaison between the Peruvian legal authorities and the U.S. commander. The focus for the SJA will be to ensure none of our operations violate Peruvian law.

CA units will assist the Peruvians in restoring public order. They will assist in the coordination between other U.S. forces and the Peruvians in such areas as medical support and security operations

The SC units will support the command by ensuring the commander can talk to all of the units and to higher headquarters. Talking to higher headquarters should not be affected by these attacks, but with the deployment of forces throughout the city and out to the surrounding areas, communications will begin to be taxed. They will have to emplace relay or retrans throughout the city because of the inherent difficulties in trying to talk on a FM radio in a built up area. Additionally, retrans or relay stations will have to be established to ensure constant communications between the units conducting the direct action missions and the units supporting them and their headquarters in Lima.

In the antiterrorism phase of this scenario the roles of the medical, dental, veterinary, SJA, transportation, signal, and civil affairs will not be changed significantly and therefore will not be addressed.

In this phase the MI cell will continue to exercise those collection efforts, and consultations with the Peruvians, that were discussed in the first phase. The IPB must now look at the Shining Path and try to determine if, when, and how they might conduct future terrorist attacks on Lima. This completed product will help paint the future battle for the commander so actions can be taken to prevent future terrorist attacks. Once the IPB is completed the commander will assign missions to his subordinate units. It should be noted that this IPB should actually take place in the counterterrorist phase of the operation to avoid any unwanted operational pauses.

A strong show of force by both U.S. and Peruvian forces will assist in deterring the Shining Path from conducting any more terrorist attacks. It will also show the people of Lima that the government is still in control of the country.

The infantry will be a major element in the show of force operation. They will emphasize combined patrols with the Peruvians when they conduct patrolling in the areas of Lima where the Shining Path is believed to have an influence. They will also patrol the areas around the city where the Shining Path has used to gain access to the city.

Our SF units would instruct the Peruvian SF on different antiterrorist and counterterrorist techniques. They would also be involved in conducting combined reconnaissance operations with the Peruvian SF outside of the city to prevent another terrorist attack.

The engineers will be constructing road barriers which will prevent easy access to government buildings. They will continue to construct and improve survivability positions for the forces conducting security operations. They will also continue to repair or rebuild the buildings from the last terrorist attack. Their visibility around the city will also assist the show of force operation.

Aviation units will assist in the show of force operation as well, and will fly both day and night missions above Lima and the surrounding area in support of this operation.

They will also support the SF in their reconnaissance missions by inserting and extracting them in support of the mission.

The field artillery will be involved in the show of force operation as well, as conducting security operations. In the show of force operation their howitzers will be placed at locations where there is a lot of exposure to the populace. The priority will be on Peruvian government buildings and areas of U.S. official or commercial presence, likely future terrorist targets. This overlaps into the security role as well. Soldiers not involved with the show of force will be incorporated into other security operations, e.g. securing our medical and command and control facilities.

The MPs will take the lead in the security operations. The commander may consider establishing a Task Force, commanded by the senior ranking MP, which would be responsible for all security operations in and around selected locations within Lima. This Task Force would consist of MPs and other soldiers not essential to their parent unit mission, such as was stated with the field artillery. This Task Force will have to work closely with the Peruvian police force to ensure unity of effort.

The operations in this scenario address the need to assist the Peruvian government in its quest to prove to the people that it is the legitimate government of the country, the destruction of the Shining Path, and the security of our forces. Now the principles of Operations Other Than War (OOTW) will be applied to the scenario to determine how well the missions followed the principles. These principles are: Objective, Unity of Effort, Legitimacy, Perseverance, Restraint, and Security

Each phase has a clearly defined objective. In both phases it is supporting the legitimacy of the Peruvian government. Unity of effort was also addressed in each phase. Each branch worked together, supporting the accomplishment of the mission within their means. In several situations branches assist each other in the accomplishment of the mission by providing forces to those other commands for the accomplishment of the

overall mission. An example of this is the field artillery providing forces to the MPs for security operations. Legitimacy has been addressed extensively in this chapter as well as several other chapters. It must be emphasized for everyone involved that this is critical to the success of the mission. Perseverance, was addressed as a potential problem area. The American people will not support a protracted combat operation in Peru. To ensure the will of the people is maintained, and the mission in Peru is accomplished, the designated U.S. mission must be accomplished quickly. If this can be done the combat units can redeploy, leaving behind any other forces that is deemed necessary to assist Peru in recovering from this war. Restraint is exercised by highly disciplined units and soldiers. A clear understanding of the ROE will have to be proven before a soldier can participate in any operation. This was done during operation JUST CAUSE and proved to be very effective. Security is stressed throughout the operation and the actions taken should prevent the Shining Path from acquiring an unexpected advantage.

This operation, with its two phases illustrates the principles of OOTW very well. If this type of operation was executed, the U.S. Army would have a positive impact on Peru's fight with the Shining Path. The Army would assist in the destruction of Shining Path elements, improving the perceived legitimacy of the Peruvian government as well as improving the Army's image among the people of Peru by assisting them in their health care as well as their personal safety.

Scenario # 2

In this scenario, the counterinsurgency scenario, the Shining Path has entered an Indian village in a remote area of the country and has killed and maimed dozens of people. As in the first scenario, combined operations with the Peruvians must be conducted whenever possible. This will assist the Peruvians in their struggle to prove they are the legitimate government.

The MI cell will conduct its IPB to determine routes that the Shining Path used to depart the area, and to identify any areas that look like they could support a military force. They would be looking for food and water sources as well as routes that provide an easy escape and that ease communications with leaders of the Shining Path. They would also focus their collection assets in this region, both organic and national assets made available to the command. Actions taken by these organic collection assets will mirror those actions described in the first scenario. Again, they paint the picture that allows the commander to see the future battlefield.

Of immediate concern will be the condition of any survivors. We would deploy elements the medical and dental units to the area immediately to begin treatment of the more seriously wounded prior to their evacuation to better facilities. Medical elements at these better facilities would begin preparation for the arrival of these seriously wounded people. At the scene we would also treat the people who are less seriously wounded and will not have to be evacuated. The dental units actions will mirror those of the medical units, with more emphasis on treatment at the better facilities. They would deploy and treat people there at the village, but most of their work will be done at these better facilities. The veterinary unit would also deploy to inspect the food stuffs of the village as well as the water supply. This will also be an opportunity to inspect the animals of the village for any diseases.

Infantry units will deploy and conduct offensive operations against the Shining Path in the areas the MI units identified during their IPB as likely locations of the Shining Path. These operations include raids, ambushes, deliberate attacks.

SF units will conduct reconnaissance operations to try to confirm or deny the IPB. This information will be transmitted through command channels back to the Infantry units. The SF could also conduct raids against soft targets, as was discussed in the first scenario.

Aviation will be instrumental in this operation as well. It will insert both SF and infantry units, as well as any other units that must deploy into the area in support of the operations. Helicopters will also evacuate the seriously wounded U.S. and Peruvian military personnel back to established hospital facilities. They would also sling load in some of the howitzers who will be supporting the Infantry and SF. Another important role that aviation will execute will be the transportation of all of the early logistical needs of the units on the ground. Attack helicopters will fire in support of the infantry and SF units as well as destroying any members of the Shining Path that they identify.

The engineers will accompany all of the units deployed into the area to disarm any booby traps. Their priorities will be to the units remaining in the village, the Infantry, then the SF. They will also help the people of the village repair any structures destroyed or damaged by the Shining Path.

The field artillery will sling load a battery of howitzers into the area to support the operation. Any remaining howitzers will be kept at their current locations in support of any other operations that may arise.

MPs will secure the area around the village and assist the Peruvians in their investigation into the attack. They will also accept any POWs or detainees and secure and process them as required. The military police working dogs will also be used in conjunction with the Infantry in their search for the Shining Path.

Transportation assets may have to be used to conduct logistical operations. Depending on the number and type of casualties ground transportation may have to be used to evacuate the less seriously wounded in urban areas. Any soldiers who were not deemed essential and did not fly to the area will also arrive by ground transportation if feasible.

The roles of Civil Affairs, the signal units, and the judge advocate general will not change significantly from the first scenario.

The principles of OOTW apply to this operation and the operation should be compared against those principles. The objective of this operation is to prove that the current government in Peru is the legitimate government. Unity of effort is evident throughout the operation, with both U.S. and Peruvian forces. By destroying the elements of the Shining Path who are responsible for this atrocity and caring for the wounded as quickly as possible, the government of Peru shows its people that it is addressing the needs of the people while at the same time discrediting the Shining Path as nothing more than a terrorist organization interested only in themselves. Legitimacy is the overall objective of the operation and is addressed throughout its planning and conduct. Perseverance in long term operations will present some challenges to the American people. In this type of operation our forces could stay deployed until designated elements were destroyed or the U.S. units were recalled. The ROE must be enforced and all troops must conduct themselves in accordance with these stipulations, Peruvian law, and overall human rights considerations. Violation of ROE only discredit the Peruvian government and U.S. support efforts, and play into the hands of the Shining Path. This will require command attention because of the brutality of the Shining Paths attacks. U.S. forces will be outraged but must not react to their rage, but follow the ROE. Security is always paramount and in this operation there has been a significant force assigned that mission.

These two scenarios compared typical operations that may be conducted in Peru to the principles of U.S. OOTW doctrine in order to ensure that those principles have been followed. The purpose of this chapter was to discuss how various branches of our Army could contribute to a joint and combined operation in Peru to defeat Shining Path elements. In addition to this, the reader may now improve upon the methods mentioned, or develop methods of his own. The goal is to have people thinking about this problem and developing ways to address it.

Endnotes

¹U.S. Army, FM 100-5, Operations (Washington: Department of the Army, 1993), 13-6 and 13-7.

²U.S. Army, TRADOC Pam 525-44 (Washington: Department of the Army, 1985), Glossary-2.

³U.S. Army, FM 100-20, Military Operations in Low Intensity Conflict (Washington: Department of the Army, 1990), Glossary-2.

⁴Slides from USAJFKSWCS presentation, slides marked and dated 2BKA013 09/15/88:FW, Slides two and five.

⁵U. S. Army, FM 100-25, Doctrine for Army Special Operations Forces (Washington : Department of the Army, 1991), 2-8.

⁶U.S. Army, FM 1-111, Aviation Brigades (Washington : Department of the Army, 1990), D-3.

⁷Authors notes from a conversation with a Peruvian helicopter pilot during a briefing in Lima, Peru in June of 1991.

⁸U.S. Army, FM 7-98, Operations in a Low-Intensity Conflict (Washington : Department of the Army, 1992), 7-6.

⁹Center for Army Lessons Learned Bulletin, Introduction to Low-Intensity Conflict, (Leavenworth : Combined Arms Training Activity, 1990), 16.

¹⁰Ibid.

¹¹U.S. Army, FM 5-100, Engineer Combat Operations, (Washington : Department of the Army, 1988), 10.

¹²U.S. Army, FM 7-98, Operations in a Low-Intensity Conflict, (Washington : Department of the Army, 1992), 7-7.

¹³Ibid., 7-3.

¹⁴Ibid., 7-4.

¹⁵Ibid., 7-12 and 7-13.

¹⁶Ibid., 7-8 and

¹⁷Ibid., 7-9.

¹⁸FM 100-20, Military Operations in Low intensity Conflict, (Washington : Department of the Air Force, 1990), E-16.

¹⁹FM 41-10, Civil Affairs Operations, (Washington : Department of the Army, 1993), 1-1 and 1-2.

²⁰Ibid., 10-1.

²¹FM 63-6, Combat Service Support in Low-intensity Conflict, (Washington : Department of the Army, 1992), 2-4.

²²Ibid., B-1.

²³Ibid.

²⁴Ibid., B-2.

²⁵Ibid.

CHAPTER 5

CONCLUSION

The judgment reached in this thesis is that elements of the U.S. Army could deploy to Peru and have a positive impact on the counterinsurgency/counterdrug war that is now being fought between the Shining Path and the democratic government of Peru. Such action would be in support of the U.S. national interests and objectives, specifically, ensuring a stable and secure world, where political and economic freedom, human rights, and democratic institutions flourish. To make such an objective a reality, the U.S. must aid nations in combatting threats to those democratic institutions from aggression, coercion, insurgencies, subversion, terrorism, and illicit drug trafficking.¹ Peru is faced with all of this problems, and all stem from the Shining Path.

The argument against an action like this is that with Abimael Guzman imprisoned for the rest of his life, the Shining Path no longer poses a threat to Peru. This argument is not valid and could be very dangerous to Peru and to U.S. interests there. The Shining Path is still very much in business, according to a recent study of Peruvian political violence. The Shining Path is still active in approximately 90 of the 183 provinces. The new leader of the Shining Path, Alberto Ramirez Durand, and its seven regional directors are all active in the insurgency.² It is also believed that the Shining Path is becoming more involved in the illegal narcotics trade. All of this points to continued political and economic troubles for Peru.

An important point needs to be made again, and that is, if only military solutions are considered and applied then the total effort will fail. The governments of both Peru and the U.S. must consider the problems in the Peruvian society that allowed the Shining

Path insurgency to emerge and enjoy successes, and address those problems with as much determination as would be displayed during military intervention. These underlying causes must be addressed before any real progress is made, and before there is any real hope of defeating the Shining Path.

These troubles for Peru mean problems for the U.S. Chapter one of this paper describes in some detail the affects illegal narcotics has on the American society. All of these problems will be increased if the Shining Path is allowed to continue to operate in the illegal narcotics trade. While Peru continues to conduct operations to counter Shining Paths activities, and at times has won very important battles, they could still lose the war. The current economy in Peru makes the chances of winning this war most difficult for the government. Peasants can make much more money growing coca for the Shining Path then they can growing beans for the government. The huge profits the Shining Path makes in this business enables them to purchase newer, more advanced weapons and aircraft, allowing them to stay just a little ahead of the government troops. The problems of the peasants, who, over the years, have been overlooked by the many different Peruvian administrations needs to be addressed to finally put the Shining Path out of operation.

Pouring money into this problem would help, but would not end the crisis. What is needed from the military aspect of the solution is the discipline and level of training U.S. forces could bring to the war. Our weapons and other support equipment is technologically superior to anything the Peruvians or the Shining Path currently possess. An example of this would be the introduction of U.S. helicopters to the battlefield. The sheer numbers of aircraft, coupled with their capabilities, such as lift and night flying, would seize the initiative away from the Shining Path and put it back into the hands of the government. This type of action is what is needed to end Peru's, and the U.S.'s, problems that stem from the illegal narcotics trade.

It must also be recognized that this type of action is inherently dangerous and will no doubt cost the lives of U.S. military personnel. This would not be a relatively quick operation, like JUST CAUSE or the invasion of Grenada, and could last up to a year before all operations could be handed over to the Peruvians. Within that time period combined operations between U.S. and Peruvian forces should have attrited the Shining Path to a level that the Peruvians would be able to complete operations against the Shining Path. Additionally, in that amount of time the U.S. forces would be able to provide the Peruvians with new equipment through a security assistance program with training on that new equipment complete.

One might ask why the situation in Peru is of importance to the U.S. or why U.S. lives should be lost in Peru fighting the Peruvian's fight. One answer to these questions is provided in chapter one, which discusses the effects that the illegal narcotics trade has had on the U.S. These issues clearly deserve further study. Additionally, this study focuses on only one element of the solution to the problems in Peru, the military solution. Further study of Peru's and the U.S.'s political solutions to this problem would also complement this study for we know that only applying a military solution in that struggle will not result in a final victory for the Peruvian government.

The specific structure of a joint force constitutes another topic deserving further study. As stated, the Army would not deploy to Peru unless it was part of a joint operation. A study addressing the total force required, by service, and branch, could prove to be an interesting and useful exercise-- particularly in regards the command structure of such a joint force.

Endnotes

¹National Military Strategy of the United States, January 1992. (GPO, 1992), 5.

²"Intelligence Report", Parade Magazine, 27 Feb. 1994.

LITERATURE REVIEW

During the course of this study I relied heavily on two sources. Gabriela Tarazona- Sevillano's "Sendero Luminoso and the Threat of Narcoterrorism", and Major William G. Graves' MMAS, "The Shining Path . The Successful Blending of Mao and Mariategui in Peru" completed in 1992. These sources provided a vast amount of knowledge on the Shining Path and Peru in a very succinct manner. They also provided two different perspectives of the challenges that the Shining Path pose for Peru and the U.S. Tarazona is a Peruvian who served as a criminal affairs prosecutor in Peru from 1984 to 1986. She has seen and experienced life under the threat of the Shining Path. Graves, on the other hand, conducted a detailed study of the Shining Path, consulting nearly two hundred sources, to write his MMAS. Both of these works proved to be invaluable to me for this study.

"Low Intensity Conflict & Law Enforcement", published by Frank Case of London, also provided a detailed description of the events leading up to, and the capture of, Abimael Guzman. This journal was a very good source of current information and I recommend it to anyone who is conducting a study in this area.

The various Field Manuals (FM) published by the U.S. Army also proved to be invaluable in the study of each branches specific capabilities and how to incorporate them into an operation in Peru.

The Combined Arms Research Library at Fort Leavenworth, and the very knowledgeable people who work there all deserve a world of credit for their assistance. They were more than willing to assist and they hold the "key" to the information that addresses your specific research project.

In conclusion, I did not have any problems researching this paper. There are hundreds, if not thousands, of articles and books written about Peru, the Shining Path, and illegal narcotics trade.

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Author's personal notes from a visit to the US Army Command and General Staff College
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