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**Beans, Bullets & Band-Aids:
Attaining Unity of Effort
In Humanitarian Intervention Operations**

**A Monograph
by
Major Thomas G. Pope
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**School of Advanced Military Studies
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
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
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ABSTRACT

BEANS, BULLETS & BAND-AIDS: ATTAINING UNITY OF EFFORT IN HUMANITARIAN INTERVENTION OPERATIONS by Thomas G. Pope, USA, 81 pages.

This monograph examines the difficulty and importance of attaining unity of effort in humanitarian operations. Many post-Cold War humanitarian efforts have required the military to serve as an enabling force for the conduct of relief operations.

This study first defines the environment in which humanitarian intervention may be required. It examines the various actors in these types of operations which negate the possibility of attaining unity of command and instead require unity of effort as a maxim for success. Operations **PROVIDE COMFORT** and **RESTORE HOPE** are examined to identify political, doctrinal and organizational issues which should be considered in the future.

The monograph concludes that the international community will conduct humanitarian interventions in the future. Success will require key participants to agree on overarching objectives and end-states. These actors should fit into an organizational structure which facilitates combined planning, coordination and execution. These factors are essential for attaining unity of effort.

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[During the Cold War] support for intervention was couched in terms of rolling back Communism. Today, the Soviet Union is but a memory and the rallying cry for military action is "humanitarian intervention."

David C. Morrison, National Journal, 1994¹

Two powerful currents, the movement towards democracy and the unleashing of historic animosities and ethnic tensions, are shaping the environment of the post cold war world. We are constantly reminded of the strength of these forces. We have entered a period where international peace and stability are directly linked to healing deep ethnic, political and cultural rifts and achieving justice within countries.

Jan Eliasson, UN Under Secretary General for Humanitarian Affairs, 1993²

INTRODUCTION

The application of military force in support of humanitarian efforts has become common in the post-Cold War era. Overall success of these operations requires unity of effort between a myriad of actors. New world disorder has stirred a revival of Wilsonian idealism and a post-Cold War set of international norms and values in resolving human suffering and promoting global peace and stability. "Increasingly, the United Nations is requested to provide both peace-keeping [sic] and humanitarian assistance programs in conflict situations."³ In cases where the security environment impedes relief efforts, humanitarian intervention may be essential.⁴ These crises have typically required intrusive efforts by the international community in an attempt to stabilize the situation and relieve suffering through the application of political, humanitarian and military resources. The multidimensional nature of these operations necessitates an operational atmosphere of cooperation to achieve a desired end-state.⁵ For this to be effective a multitude of participants' capabilities and energies must be synchronized to attain common objectives.⁶ Attaining unity of effort in these types of operations offers planners a new challenge. During the Cold War the relationship between political organizations, military forces and humanitarian agencies during periods of armed conflict was fairly well-defined. Due to restraints on military and political efforts, humanitarian agencies were relatively free to conduct operations based on donor interests and specific organizational agendas without facing substantial armed resistance. In the post-Cold war era, increasing world disorder has resulted in intra-state conflicts in which armed intervention to support humanitarian efforts is obligatory. During the conflict

resolution stage of World War II and more recent operations in Grenada, Panama and Kuwait, successful humanitarian operations conducted in potentially hostile environments required close cooperation between political, military, and humanitarian organizations. To be effective these operations called for unity of effort. This concept is derived from the principle of war unity of command. According to current military doctrine, the coordination of available means to achieve desired ends is compulsory for effective unity of command.⁷ To attain this goal there must be agreed upon objectives and end-states and an organizational structure which supports coordination, planning and execution.

Since 1988, the number of UN sanctioned peace operations has risen dramatically.⁸ Humanitarian assistance has become an integral part of these operations. Since 1991 the UN Security Council has authorized at least two Chapter VII operations for humanitarian purposes -- Somalia and the former Yugoslavia.⁹ Conditions currently exist in Rwanda, Haiti, Afghanistan and many republics of the former Soviet Union which may also necessitate a mix of UN peacekeeping and humanitarian efforts to defuse threats to security and stability. Peace operations in Northern Iraq, Somalia and the Balkans have met with varying degrees of success. Currently, policies, doctrines and organizations are being developed as a reaction to unfolding events. One of the emerging realities from recent operations in Northern Iraq and Somalia is that "cooperation between civilian organizations and the military is increasing and improving but continued consultation and interaction is important in order to maintain effective civilian/military humanitarian assistance interventions."¹⁰

The focus of this study is unity of effort in peace operations. This monograph examines success and failure in two case studies -- PROVIDE COMFORT and RESTORE HOPE -- with the objective of contributing to greater unity of effort in humanitarian operations. This study will suggest interagency measures which may be considered in conducting similar operations in the future.

The international community is moving toward codification of principles and identification of the appropriate conditions under which humanitarian imperatives will override domestic justification.

Jarat Chopora and Thomas G. Weiss,
Watson Institute for International Studies, 1992¹¹

The term 'humanitarian' is employed in various ways in contemporary parlance ... At times it is used to denote a particular approach to problems, that is to say an approach that emphasizes protection and assistance to the individual as opposed to politically influenced considerations. At other times the term is used in broad, generic sense and gives expression to a widely shared sentiment: anything that can be done to relieve human suffering and to help in the realization of human needs should be done.

Javier Perez de Cuellar, UN Secretary General, 1985¹²

THE ENVIRONMENT

The instability of the new world order in many parts of the world has created an insecure environment and populations in dire need of humanitarian assistance. Intra-state conflicts rising from ethnic, religious, political and historical differences characterize regions in which the international community is attempting to conduct peace operations.¹³ These conflicts require a departure from the traditional Cold War peacekeeping operations during which inter-state conflict shaped the battlefield and humanitarian relief operations were generally deemed neutral by opposing sides. Post-Cold war peace operations represent an evolutionary change in the nature of international efforts to promote peace, stability and humanitarian efforts in times of conflict.¹⁴

This unstable environment has generated a response by the international community to assist in humanitarian relief by applying more forceful diplomatic and military measures to aid situations. When called for, the UN has mandated UN Charter Chapter VII military intervention into regions which needed humanitarian relief but where those efforts were impeded by armed conflict. This assistance has fundamentally changed the nature of humanitarian aid in many parts of the world. It has also generated a new challenge for diplomats, military leaders and humanitarian agencies to adapt to in their attempts to conduct more aggressive peace operations.¹⁵

International efforts to increase global stability are reflected in the increased reliance on the UN to orchestrate and legitimize efforts to bring peace to regions struggling to redefine national boundaries, interests and political beliefs. Witness of this fact

is the dramatic increase in UN sanctioned peace operations since 1988. According to US Ambassador to the UN, Madeline Albright, "the breakup of the Soviet Union eliminated the Soviet veto at the UN," and "permitted more peacekeeping operations in the past five years than in the past 43."¹⁶ These operations have extended beyond traditional peacekeeping operations and have included measures of preventive diplomacy, peacekeeping, peace making and peace enforcement. Except for Operation DESERT SHIELD/STORM most of these operations have focused on intra-state conflicts which have compelled the international community to adapt to a less orderly security challenge. Today's civil conflicts have raised a debate within the global community on the role of the UN and its right to intervene in the name of humanitarian rights. Similar questions were raised after World Wars I and II as international organizations (League of Nations and UN respectfully) and the architecture of international relations adapted to the evolving norms, ethics and morals of the most influential nations.

According to UN Secretary General, Boutros Boutros-Ghali, the post-Cold War era's "fundamental task is the defense and strengthening of a cooperative and healthy international state system while defending the legitimate minority rights within state's borders... There is, therefore, a new reality. It is that a growing number of member states are concluding that some problems can be addressed most effectively by U.N. [sic] efforts."¹⁷ Boutros-Ghali's predecessor, Perez de Cuellar, perhaps more clearly stated the direction towards which many internationalists see the world headed: "We are clearly witnessing what is probably an irresistible shift in public attitudes that the defense of the oppressed in the name of morality should prevail over frontiers and legal documents."¹⁸ This perception is not embraced by all of the world. As witnessed by the recent withdrawal of forces in Somalia and reluctance of developed countries to become effectively involved with ground forces in the Balkans this vision may not be a near-term reality. Not surprisingly, many developing countries question the right of the UN to intervene in national conflicts or perceived humanitarian improprieties based on western ideals. China, for instance, has not always voted favorably for UN resolutions which called for "humanitarian interventions" which could easily be sanctioned against

them at a later date. Perception of Cold War agendas and neo-imperialism by western powers will continue to plague future efforts by the UN to initiate peace operations.¹⁹

Typically, the parts of the world struggling with internal mayhem and governmental legitimacy are the same areas where humanitarian relief efforts have been ongoing for several years. They are generally in the lesser developed regions or areas recently liberated as a result of the Soviet demise. In general these areas lack an overarching national or international vision which provides adequate direction for relief efforts. In regions where illegitimate regimes foster self-serving agendas, misguided relief efforts may exacerbate the internal conflict as a result of coercive government or criminal actions. Countries such as Sudan, Ethiopia and Mozambique have suffered natural disasters and near government collapse fostering a siege mentality and self-interest.²⁰ Political in-fighting and separatist movements (often in concert with natural disasters) have generated humanitarian emergencies in Haiti, Somalia and the Balkans where international relief efforts have been used as instruments of war. Warring factions in "Bosnia-Herzegovina have cooperated with humanitarian activities only to the extent that doing so has suited their tactics. In holding aid hostage, they have taken their cues from combatants in such conflicts as the Sudan and Angola, El Salvador and Guatemala, Cambodia and Afghanistan" as well as Somalia.²¹ The nation of Iraq, a sovereign state, chose to declare war on one of its minority factions. Only through international military intervention in the northern portion of the country were the Kurds able to receive much needed humanitarian relief.

While each region and humanitarian operation is unique, recent operations in Iraq, Somalia, and Yugoslavia illustrate that the environment requiring intrusive international action is generally characterized by several conditions. All or most of these conditions may also be applied to current relief environments in places such as Haiti, Rwanda, Afghanistan, Sudan, and Angola.²² Listed below are conditions which planners may anticipate in their preparation and execution of humanitarian intervention operations.

- conflicting parties which neither respect nor recognize internationally accepted rules of human rights and humanitarian assistance;

- large portions of the population become refugees, dislocated civilians or prisoners of the conflict, with no means of subsistence;
- a weak, illegitimate or non government structure exists;
- humanitarian relief efforts will become instruments of war;
- lawlessness puts humanitarian supplies and operations at risk;
- populations lack the resources and skill to rebuild their society;
- humanitarian organizations have difficulty coordinating or integrating their efforts into an overall plan.

Armed conflict under these conditions only serves to frustrate relief efforts by well meaning organizations. Compounding the problem of security will be the proliferation of weaponry and equipment from the Cold War.

In conducting humanitarian assistance civilian organizations have found an increasing need to depend on some level of military involvement to help shape the environment for relief efforts. This reliance has generated concern among many humanitarian organizations about their ability to maintain neutrality and separate their efforts from political objectives. In cases where the international political objectives provide a durable solution to the conflict, interface between political and humanitarian efforts is preferred. But, not all humanitarian organizations may agree with the political objectives of the international community and as a result may hinder their progress. In the extreme cases these differences may interfere with the military's objective of establishing a secure environment for relief efforts. Prior to the deluge of humanitarian intervention operations, traditional humanitarian assistance applied primarily military logistics, communication and civil affairs capabilities in a benign environment. Military efforts were designed to "supplement or complement the efforts of the host nation, civil authorities, or agencies that may have primary responsibility for providing humanitarian assistance."²³ When relief organizations are able to coordinate with legitimate governments unimpeded by civil war these efforts generally do not require significant security elements from the military. When their efforts are impeded, strong diplomatic and military force may be to achieve peace and stability in the region.

According to Boutros Boutros-Ghali an interdependence exists between diplomatic, military and humanitarian action in the overall peace process which may require armed protection of relief efforts to achieve a desired end.²⁴ Outgunned, outmanned and overextended, peacekeeping forces and humanitarian relief workers have required more capability to employ security forces to create a secure environment for relief efforts. Within these areas, the lines between civilian and military authority have become increasingly blurred as intra-state confrontations cross family, ethnic and religious lines. Compounding the problem is the proliferation of conventional weapons in the Third World, due largely to a surplus of Cold War hardware and technology. Humanitarian efforts under these conditions have become increasingly dangerous, politicized and unpredictable. Casualties among civilian relief workers have increased to the level that ensuring their safety impeded attempts to render assistance in hostile areas. Responding to these "complex humanitarian emergencies" requires political, military and humanitarian measures to be in harmony if the goal is to achieve conflict resolution.²⁵ Humanitarian relief efforts play a large part in creating the conditions for political negotiation. Once the immediate humanitarian concerns are met, factions can refocus their efforts on resolving differences and creating the environment which is conducive to their collective interests. Often the disparity between the haves and the have-nots helped spur or reinforce the original conflict between warring elements in these civil wars. If the humanitarian efforts do not complement political and military endeavors, it is doubtful that any of the intervention's objectives will be achieved.

[A true humanitarian professional is one that understands that] any placement of humanitarian aid is by itself a political act. The only question concerns which kind of politics — whether in support of peace processes or in support of continuing conflict.

Harold Miller, Mennonite Central Committee, 1992²⁶

Far-reaching changes internationally and within the United Nations are essential if the world wishes to minimize the suffering of populations trapped by civil-war induced starvation. Member states need to decide whether, and then how, the United Nations should be equipped to provide humanitarian relief in situations of large-scale violence.

Jan Eliasson, UN Under Secretary General for Humanitarian Affairs, 1993²⁷

THE PARTICIPANTS

The participants in humanitarian intervention operations face a formidable challenge. That is, to be successful in their missions they must cooperate in a very complex environment with players whose diverse purposes undermine the very feature that is essential in these operations: unity of effort. This challenge is made even more daunting by the reality that most of these players are themselves organizations governed foremost by political considerations. Humanitarian intervention requires a myriad of political, humanitarian and military organizations to work together.

Organizations can be placed into three categories based on their influence on the intervention operation. These categories are the donors, implementers and the military.²⁸ The donors provide the financial backing and in most cases the political guidance upon which the implementers and military must act. Major donor organizations include the US Government, UN and the European Community. The implementers are those civilian relief organizations which supply immediate and long-term humanitarian aid to needy areas.²⁹ Most of these organizations are funded by political organizations for the purpose of completing specific tasks. The two major sub-categories of implementers are the non-government organizations (NGO) and UN agencies. In addition to these there are apolitical international relief organizations (IO) which are resourced by private contributions. Theoretically their allegiance is only to the elimination of human suffering. The third category of participant in humanitarian intervention operations is the military. The primary role of the military is to serve as an enabler for relief operations. It accomplishes this by providing a secure environment for humanitarian efforts within the parameters of political objectives and guidance. Together, organizations

from these three categories form an interactive network of resources and capabilities requiring coordination and purpose to be effective.

The difficulty in attaining unity of effort in humanitarian intervention operations is analogous to the difficulties in conducting post-Cold War coalition military operations. "Command arrangements may often be loosely defined, causing commanders to seek an atmosphere of cooperation rather than command authority to achieve objectives by unity of effort" rather than through an explicit chain of command.³⁰ Members of the humanitarian coalition have varying political agendas, chains of command, capabilities and limitations. To be successful, realistic military and humanitarian roles and functions must be guided by achievable and agreed upon objectives aimed at a desired end-state. The players in these types of operation are often connected only by these objectives. Clearly designated and adhered to chains of command are an unrealistic expectation in these operations which if implemented could hinder long-term efforts to relieve human suffering.

Understanding the various types of participants and the coordination required between them is essential to attaining unity of effort. When available, coordination with a governing organization within the area of operations is of extreme importance. In cases where a legitimate government is sensitive to human rights issues, the probability of humanitarian intervention is minimal. By contrast, the intervention operations in Northern Iraq to help the Kurds provide a recent example of a legitimate government which chose to ignore the basic human rights of its Kurdish population. In most cases humanitarian intervention will be initiated in response to armed civil conflict which has prevented the initiation or continuation of humanitarian relief efforts. When no government exists, factions become parties in the overall peace process. In some cases, humanitarian organizations such as the International Committee of the Red Cross provide an acceptable neutral means of delivering humanitarian relief. A brief discussion of the categories of the participants provides the framework for further understanding the difficulty and importance of organizations operating in concert to attain agreed upon objectives.

DONORS

In the broadest sense of the term, a donor is any entity which contributes the material or financial resources to enable implementing organizations to conduct operation. The primary concern of donors is that their resources are wisely spent towards the attainment of political and humanitarian objectives. Donors such as the US Government, the UN and the European Community provide resources to achieve regional and international objectives considered in their best interest. Since they can restrict the operations of organizations which they resource, donors provide a sense of purpose which may override immediate humanitarian relief concerns. While the bulk of donor contributions come from traditional nation-state structures, private interests may also support relief efforts. Religious-ethnic- and business motivated support may sponsor the activities of NGOs and IOs either in concert with the efforts of major political donors or through separate organizations.

IMPLEMENTERS

There are numerous types of organizations responsible for implementing humanitarian relief. The difficulty in coordinating and managing efficient relief operations requires an in-theater structure to facilitate coordination of political, security and humanitarian assistance efforts. As the primary resourcing agents for implementing agencies, the US Government and the UN have taken the lead in providing the organizational structure for these activities.

For the US Government, the task of providing resources for humanitarian operations is handled primarily by the Agency for International Development (AID). Within AID, the Office of Foreign Disaster Assistance (OFDA) provides the operational structure to coordinate resources and funds for relief organizations. OFDA is the humanitarian link at the strategic, operational and tactical level for the military in dealing with humanitarian relief organizations. While the Department of State provides overarching political direction, the actual mission of pulling the operation together in theater rests jointly between OFDA and the military. Experiences in Iraq and Somalia have demonstrated that placing the Disaster Assistance Relief Team (DART) with a

team of Department of Defense civil-military specialists provides a central point to coordinate all assistance efforts by military security and logistics units.³¹

The United Nations is developing a similar system under the auspices of the Department of Humanitarian Assistance (DHA). Formed in 1992 in response to the increasing demand for humanitarian relief efforts in benign and hostile environments, the DHA is the UN Secretary General's focal point and coordinator of UN humanitarian operations.³² As UN operations increase in size, frequency and complexity, the DHA is intended to be analogous to OFDA for the US government. To date, in-fighting between well established UN agencies has impeded the ability of the DHA to effectively control and coordinate relief operations in areas such as Bosnia and Somalia. In addition, some civilian relief organizations remain wary of appearing to align themselves with the UN in crisis situations for fear of losing their neutrality among the warring factions.

Within the UN there are three primary agencies which may operate in theater during an intervention operation. The UN High Commission for Refugees (UNHCR), World Food Program (WFP) and the UN International Children's Fund (UNICEF) are loosely affiliated and have historically operated independently. Lines of command and control between these agencies, the DHA, and the UN Secretary General's Special Representative are often murky at best. In February 1992 the UN Secretary General overruled the UNHCR Commissioner, Ms. Sadako Ogata, when she suspended most relief efforts in Bosnia as a result of the warring factions' failure to permit humanitarian relief organizations access to civilians in need. "The incident demonstrates once again that in the last resort United Nations humanitarian agencies are subject to political direction."³³

As a result of their political limitations during the Cold War, UN agencies today face problems of neutrality similar to those they faced during the Cold War. Organizations which receive support from national governments are subject to the same problems of perception and oversight. It was these types of limitations which spurred the growth of the NGO and IO relief community. Untainted by the UN, they appeared apolitical to governments and factions which required outside assistance to relieve human suffering.

Besides these government organizations, NGOs and IOs provide the bulk of actual humanitarian assistance in these types of intervention operations, leading the relief effort in many war torn areas around the world. During the Cold War these organizations flourished, as the superpower competition in the third world created conditions for their assistance. These organizations have held to a code of neutrality in order to accomplish their primary goal of humanitarian assistance. Their contribution focuses primarily on relief operations intended to eliminate immediate human suffering and to assist political organizations in establishing infrastructure changes which facilitate long-term solutions to improving the quality of life. The contributions of NGOs and IOs are essential in resolving internal conflict intensified by the struggle to provide adequate life support in the affected region.

One of the leading international organizations for these types of operations is the International Committee for the Red Cross (ICRC). Since its founding in 1863, the ICRC has focused on providing assistance to victims of conflict free of political, ethnic, or cultural bias. As the premier neutral it is often the only organization allowed into certain zones of conflict. But, "in many internal conflicts the ICRC has failed to obtain the agreement of all parties to respect its neutrality and mission and so been prevented from undertaking relief operations."³⁴

NGOs have not always taken the strict neutral position taken by the ICRC. Due to their donors' influence and inherent mandate for action, many have provided the only means of providing relief in areas engaged in armed conflict. The diverse capabilities and agendas of the collective NGO community is astounding. At the World Conference on Human Rights in June of 1993 over 2,000 delegates from 1,000 NGOs were represented, overwhelming the government representatives.³⁵ While most of these organizations attempt to become part of the solution during crises situations there is potential for "rogue" organizations to diverge from the objective of the intervention operation thereby undermining unity of effort. Most of these organizations resist the concept of unity of command. Much in the same manner as coalition military forces participating in peace operations, NGOs receive policy guidance directly in "stovepipe" fashion, without concern for unified command channels. While most acknowledge the need for

coordinated planning efforts they also adhere to principles of non-partisanship, impartiality and freedom of action in their quest to provide humanitarian relief under the conditions established by their own organizational mandate. But, most of these NGOs operate their parent organization from within the boundaries of a nation-state which should be expected to have some level of control and responsibility for the NGO's actions.

MILITARY

The role of the military in humanitarian interventions is to create the environment in which humanitarian and peace efforts may be conducted. Although an instrument of policy, the military supports humanitarian efforts through such actions as providing security, facilities and lines of communication. Military forces may also be called upon to provide immediate response humanitarian relief in regions with no established relief organizations, then transition the humanitarian assistance efforts to more qualified civilian relief organizations. Maintaining neutrality in supporting humanitarian relief efforts is important for the military participants. The military can easily lose its impartiality if they are required to resort to armed violence while attempting to protect relief workers. The second order effect on the relief organizations they intend to protect may reduce the ability of IOs and NGOs to appear neutral to warring factions.

Providing humanitarian assistance in hostile environments is not a new task for military forces. Immediately following World War II the military took the lead in establishing the conditions and conducting civil affairs which facilitated the rebuilding of Germany. During this period of humanitarian crisis, the international relief system as we know it today was established. There were very few NGOs and most of the current UN relief organizations were in their infancy. The objective at the time for military involvement was the same as it is today -- "shift from security and management as quickly as possible to security" and hand-off the humanitarian and reconstruction effort to the civilian experts.³⁶ Except when no-notice crisis response military capability is required, the role of the military should be as an enabling force for humanitarian operations.

Military participants are capable of assisting humanitarian efforts with more than security forces. Unique military capabilities such as logistics, airlift, communications, civil affairs, explosive ordnance disposal and engineers may be required on a more frequent basis to assist in humanitarian operations. But, in most cases the civilian relief community is better suited for these missions. The cost of conducting non-security operations by civilian organizations is generally less expensive than military operations. In addition, there is greater potential to integrate local nationals into the process thereby strengthening the potential for a long-term solution which will allow relief organizations to focus their efforts elsewhere in the world.³⁷ In most cases the ICRC and NGOs will already be working in a region prior to the employment of military combat forces. When the military has resolved the security problem they will undoubtedly depart, often leaving the same NGO personnel to continue their in-country mission. The conditions and expectations they generate can be counterproductive if entrance and exit strategies are not developed in conjunction with leading humanitarian organizations.

Regardless of their intentions, it will be difficult for military forces deployed for intervention operations to maintain neutrality. Once the conditions are established for a more neutral peacekeeping (vice peace enforcement) force to provide security the humanitarian intervention force should depart. That military forces, as instruments of policy, are associated with national foreign policy agendas is a planning consideration for structuring the contribution of international actors. While the military is considered most effective in these operations, recent experience demonstrates the role of the military should be to establish a secure environment in which civilian organizations can function. Emphasis should be placed on security and assisting the agencies in transitioning from crises response measures involving extensive military assets to complete reliance on civilian organizations.³⁸ This transition requires unity of effort by all participants and is necessary if the crises is to be eventually resolved. Operations PROVIDE COMFORT and RESTORE HOPE provide recent examples of the coordination required between the military and other members of the intervention community. The importance of this fact was relayed to Congress by Andrew S. Natsios of USAID just

three months before the deployment of troops for Operation RESTORE HOPE: "I cannot emphasize enough the vital links that exist between political reconciliation, improved security and the international community's ability to help Somalia move from emergency relief to long-term rehabilitation of the country."³⁹

Under the provisions of UN Charter Chapter VII, the UN Security Council:

Insists that Iraq allow immediate access by international humanitarian organizations to all those in need ... [and] requests further the Secretary-General to use all the resources at his disposal .

Resolution 688

Authorizes the Secretary-General ... to use all necessary means to establish as soon as possible a secure environment for humanitarian relief operation in Somalia.

Resolution 794

Authorizes UNPROFOR ... to take the necessary measures, including the use of force, in reply to bombardments against the safe areas by any of the parties or to armed incursion into them or in the event of any deliberate obstruction in or around these areas to the freedom of movement of UNPROFOR or of protected humanitarian convoys.

Resolution 836⁴⁰

RECENT OPERATIONS

Within the last three years US combat forces have crossed the northern border of its enemy Iraq, and stormed the beaches of Somalia all for the purpose of supporting humanitarian relief operations sanctioned by the international community. Plagued by a hostile environment, the international community faces pressure to conduct similar operations in the Balkans and in other places where humanitarian efforts have fallen victim to armed opposition. While the general situation and type of hostile forces may vary, solutions to these complex problems require political, humanitarian and military resources and a unified effort. Humanitarian intervention operations in Northern Iraq and Somalia illustrate recent cases in which the principle of unity of effort is required.

OPERATION PROVIDE COMFORT

While the principle of noninterference in the international affairs of a sovereign power has long been a tenet of international law, the television images of these pathetic children swept

it aside, and allied forces eventually were forced by public pressure to go into Iraq to protect the Kurds and feed the hungry.

Walter B. Johnson, former CEO of the Chrysler Corporation, 1992⁴¹

PROVIDE COMFORT is an operation in Northern Iraq which involves political, military and humanitarian resources to assist in relieving the suffering of Iraqi Kurds. The conduct of the exercise illustrates the difficulty in managing humanitarian operations in a hostile environment. In reaction to the crisis, the US government provided immediate humanitarian and military response with the approval of the UN. This response resulted in the US taking charge of an international coalition which would later transition to UN control. Successful response to Kurdish humanitarian and security concerns identified doctrinal and structural weaknesses in the ability of the participants to operate in a humanitarian intervention environment. More importantly it validated the concept that unity of effort is essential for achieving common objectives. A brief examination of the initial stages of the operation provides useful lessons for similar missions.⁴²

Following the cease-fire between Iraqi and Coalition forces on 3 March 1991, Iraqi Kurds rebelled against the Iraqi military forces in Northern Iraq. On 5 March 1991 Kurdish factions committed guerrilla forces against Iraq; by 14 March they had announced their control of much of the northern provinces. In response Saddam Hussein announced on 16 March his intent to destroy the Kurdish rebellion through the application of military force.⁴³ Other than rhetoric there was little response by the Coalition to assist in the overthrow of Saddam's forces in the north: the Kurdish rebels received little support.⁴⁴ As a result nearly 2 million fled from the region to escape the wrath of the Iraqi government. "According to the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR), approximately 1,400,000 Iraqis fled to Iran and 450,000 to Turkey."⁴⁵ International political differences and a capable national disaster relief system in Iran nullified Coalition support for the refugees in Iran. However, refugees on the Iraqi-Turkish border were less fortunate.

In the wake of defeating Iraqi aggression, the international community supported humanitarian intervention measures to assist the Kurdish people in Northern

Iraq. Authorization to conduct these intrusive humanitarian operations was a landmark decision by the UN. For the first time the UN Security Council "linked humanitarian concerns to international peace and security and gave humanitarianism greater weight than nonintervention" in intra-state conflicts.⁴⁶ UN Security Council Resolution 688

condemned the "repression of the Iraqi civilian population, including most recently in Kurdish populated areas, the consequences of which threaten international peace and security."⁴⁷ More importantly, UNSCR 688 authorized the UN Secretary General to use "all the resources at his disposal" to remedy the humanitarian crises in Iraq, insisting that Iraq allow access by humanitarian organizations "in all parts of Iraq."⁴⁸ Under these directives, the US led a coalition effort to respond by providing security cover for the largest and quickest response since World War II.⁴⁹ For humanitarian and military planners the environment they faced was shaped by the following characteristics:

- Hostile Iraqi military forces prevented relief supplies from entering the region and kept the refugees from leaving the security offered by the mountains to return to their homes. Iraqi military capabilities warranted a credible military force with a forced entry and offensive capability.

- There was a need to provide immediate relief. This would require medical, nourishment, housing and physical protection. In addition, a support infrastructure had to be established which could sustain continuous logistics support. Operations would be conducted in an austere environment. Mutual interests with Turkey provided secure basing and air and ground access to the Kurdish refugees. But, based on their own internal differences with the Turkish Kurd population, Turkey was not receptive to allowing large numbers of refugees outside of the border area.

- There were no civilian relief agencies in the region which could respond immediately. The UN's ability to respond with more than a Resolution as minimal.

- The US government had taken the lead. Military forces had already been mobilized for Operation DESERT SHIELD/STORM to include critical elements of the Reserve civil affairs community. In addition, Iraq was an identifiable threat to US and international security interests.⁵⁰

Caught between internal and external political forces, the Kurdish refugees pocketed themselves in 43 separate locations in the mountainous border region with "some one thousand dying each day due to disease, malnutrition, and exposure."⁵¹ On 5 April 1991, President Bush directed the use of US forces to provide humanitarian relief for

the Kurds in southern Turkey and Northern Iraq. Responding to the requirement, Commander in Chief, US European Command established Joint Task Force PROVIDE COMFORT (CJTFFPC) to provide "an organized, sustained effort for protracted humanitarian assistance, until international relief agencies and PVOs [NGOs] could assume overall supervision of the operation."⁵² Fueled by the increasing reports of the international media and the reluctance of the Iraqi government to allow relief efforts in the north, Operation PROVIDE COMFORT expanded to multinational forces and the additional requirement to establish refuge camps in northern Iraq. In response, the JTF formed an ad hoc joint US staff which later transitioned to a combined staff. Because the military was the first to arrive at the crisis, civilian relief organizations were melded into the planning and execution with little benefit of past experience and interagency doctrine. Staff focus was on developing a military staff which would have been better served by the integration of interagency experts in international relief operations in the initial planning stages and throughout the operation as it evolved.⁵³

To accomplish its mission, CJTFFPC established a three phase operation based on the priorities established by CINC EUCOM, General Galvin: "...stopping the dying and misery up in the mountains and then [sic] a workable scheme to relocate the refugees to places (still unknown at that time) where we would be able to sustain them. Then, as rapidly as we could, to transition this operation to the UNHCR... or some other similar organization."⁵⁴ These priorities translated to a three step process of: 1) provide immediate relief; 2) establish secure zones; and 3) transition to the UN. Based on these stages and political objectives established by the UN and President Bush, participants rallied behind a common goal. This unity of purpose facilitated coordination between the participants in an environment in which unity of command was not possible. The professionalism of the organizations drove them to develop adaptive means of coordinating their efforts to achieve their humanitarian objectives.⁵⁵

Prior to the crisis in Northern Iraq, humanitarian intervention doctrine did not exist in sufficient detail to provide participants a point of reference. PROVIDE COMFORT identified a doctrinal vacuum for both military and humanitarian agencies conducting relief operations in a hostile environment.⁵⁶ Unique to the Kurd situation was

the absence of civilian relief organizations already in-place before the military arrived. As a result the ground rules and infrastructure required to initiate and sustain these operations could be mandated by the military. Most military leaders and planners were unfamiliar with the workings of the international relief system. The participants, their capabilities, limitations and disregard for structured command and control mechanism frustrated military personnel. These problems were amplified by the inherent nature of forming and operating a military coalition. From a military perspective, the ground work for clear lines of control for military forces was established during Operation DESERT STORM. As a result there were no significant instances which caused the CJTF Commander, LTG Shalikashvili, to question his authority.⁵⁷

Effective coordination and efficient execution of operations required the participants to adapt their organizational structures to meet mission demands. Recognizing the need for unique capabilities, Commander CJTFPC integrated civil affairs, PSYOP and special forces units into the relief community. The ability of these units to integrate with humanitarian and foreign military organizations was essential to LTG Shalikashvili's ability to build an effective humanitarian coalition. The JTF also formed a military coordination center which provided a focal point for security and humanitarian efforts. As international relief organizations and non-government organizations began arriving into the area these military forces (primarily Civil Affairs units) helped form an effective relationship between relief agencies and the military. To facilitate the effective coordination and application of US civilian relief aid the OFDA provided a Disaster Assistance Relief Team (DART) which worked effectively with the military coordination center to maximize humanitarian resources. This team provided the primary point of coordination for all civilian relief organizations. The DART controlled the funding and resourcing of US sponsored relief organizations arriving to conduct humanitarian assistance. Because of DART members' expertise they were instrumental in dealing with the UNHCR and other UN agencies which they do on a routine basis in benign disaster relief situations. Working with the Civil Affairs Command and the UNHCR, the DART helped develop an interagency plan of transition for hand-off of the humanitarian efforts while maintaining the requirement to provide a secure

environment. To assist in coordination between the DOS, UN, OFDA, and various relief organizations the CA Command formed the Civil Agency Relief Element specifically designed to foster interagency cooperation and to provide military decision makers required information to make security and overarching operational decisions.

The nature of persuasive coordination versus command is inherent to the current international relief system. Efficient integration of relief organization capabilities and the timeliness of appropriate resources is a continuing problem. According to the current OFDA desk officer for Northern Iraq (former DART team member) the refugee crisis in Iraq was the "largest and fastest movement of refugees in this century."⁵⁸ The ability of the military to respond immediately was crucial. The UN took a long time to get organized and allowed the military and DART to set the stage. Although the military arrived first there was no clearly defined chain of command -- but according to DART team members this was not a problem. In fact, attempts to attain unity of command are counterproductive. Civilian relief organizations go into these situations as a matter of choice. Each situation and organization has its unique nuances. Gaining control of these organizations is facilitated by providing a civilian point of coordination. One of the coordination mechanisms created during PROVIDE COMFORT was a data base of most NGO/IOs which OFDA accessed to determine the best organization for the mission. Typical issues in determining the best organization for a specific task include familiarity with the region, political and ethnic acceptability, and language requirements. In addition organizational sustainment, experience and travel time are critical to structuring a relief force. Unlike the military contributions many of the organizations that showed up were unexpected. Controlling this type of situation is doubtful -- "chaos is the nature of the business."⁵⁹ Efforts to steer the energies of humanitarian organizations proved effective.

During PROVIDE COMFORT the success of the humanitarian organizations and the synchronization between potentially competing political-military and humanitarian elements reinforces the importance of the DART concept. An examination of the JTF's structure in relation to the DART and its team leader indicate that there may have been a more efficient way of operating. During the operation there were two primary

military ground task forces: TF Alpha responsible for providing relief to the Kurds in the mountains; and JTF-B which was responsible for securing a safe haven and resettling the refugees in Northern Iraq. The DART and its leader attached itself to JTF-B. In retrospect interviews conducted by John Fishel with military and relief participants indicate that it may have been more productive to assign the DART to the CJTF with the understanding that Mr. Maxwell (DART Team Leader) was an immediate subordinate to LTG Shalikhvili.⁶⁰ Since the DART was responsible for the entire area of operations this would have provided more effective integration. Due to the need for coordination and planning between the CA Command and the DART an overall combined operations center may have enhanced overall operations even more with subordinate centers in various sectors. Regardless of these recommended improvements by participants, the CJTF did accomplish its mission of providing immediate relief, establishing a secure area and then passing off the mission to the UN. Unfortunately, humanitarian relief is still required in Northern Iraq and there have been scattered instances of Iraqi attempts to thwart relief efforts.

While the operational security and humanitarian efforts succeeded in northern Iraq the political element has failed to provide a solution to the problem. The Iraqi government has, according to February 1994 AID situation report, increased its attacks on NGO and UN workers in the area. Access to "at-risk population is good" but in many areas relief workers operate at their own risk. "During the November and December alone, 16 UN reported incidents occurred that violated or did not comply with UNHCR 688."⁶¹ Counter-terrorist operations conducted by the Turkish government against the Kurdish Workers Party complicate the issue of resettlement. To date, Iraq has not lifted its embargo of supplies and services against the north. The role of the US in the region is primarily financial as it provides the bulk of its support to UN and NGO organizations. OFDA's DART is still operational and is collocated with the DOD Combined Task Force PROVIDE COMFORT in Turkey. Together the CJTF and DART have established a Relief Coordination Center to assist in the UN's efforts. Today the UN Military Coordination Center which provides "direct face-to-face communication with coalition forces, Iraqi military forces, humanitarian relief agencies continuing to

work in northern Iraq after the withdrawal of security forces, and Kurdish leaders in the region.⁶² US military forces are committed to this supporting role and assisting in an international effort to enforce a no-fly zone to protect the Kurds from Iraqi attack.⁶³ Resolution of the humanitarian crisis requires resolution of the intra-national conflict between Iraq and its Kurdish population. The ability to develop a long-term strategy of development which will lead to independence from international relief is inconceivable as long as the Kurds are imprisoned in the safe-zone established by coalition forces in 1991. Humanitarian efforts will require planning for protracted operations until the issue of a sovereign Kurdistan or other harmonious relationship with Iraq is resolved. Military intervention is again possible should the Iraqi government sense diminished international support for another intrusive humanitarian operation.

OPERATION RESTORE HOPE

We're supposed to be on a humanitarian mission, and yet we're getting shot at. It's very confusing.

U.S. Marine in Somalia, 1993.⁶⁴

In December of 1992 the US led a multinational military intervention, Operation RESTORE HOPE, into the failed state of Somalia with the intent of establishing a secure environment for humanitarian relief operations. The conditions which these forces faced were similar to those in Northern Iraq only in the sense that relief efforts had been impeded as a result of civil conflict, and there was an immediate need for international military resolve to remedy the situation.

Conditions shaping the field of conflict which these forces faced were different than those of Iraq. During the Cold War, Somalia's geo-strategic position on the Horn of Africa spurred interest by both superpowers to court the country's corrupt government in attempts to gain a political and military advantage. This process resulted in economic and military aid which fostered dependence by the government on external support. Although not ethnically divided, Somalia is a country marked by individual clan interests. These interests were held in check by its President Mohammed Siad Barre whose clan held the power base from which money and military internal control

were generated. Repressive policies and failures to meet the subsistence needs of its population in the 1980s led to increased inter-clan disputes and culminated in organized armed resistance to Barre which toppled the government in 1991. During the period from 1987 to 1991 Barre faced the loss of external support from both superpowers, an extended drought, famine and internal animosity resulting from the Ogaden War with Ethiopia. In January 1991, Barre fled the country signaling the complete collapse of the government. Second order effects of the civil war and fight for survival by the common Somali led to mass migrations of the population into the bordering countries of Ethiopia and Kenya and a mass movement of people from the country to Somali towns and cities. An "estimated 800,000 Somalis [went] into exile in neighboring countries, while more than 1 million displaced persons swarmed into urban areas where non-governmental organizations (NGOs) struggled to provide food and other humanitarian assistance."⁶⁵

Since early 1991 no less than 15 rival clans, armed with sophisticated conventional weapons, have fought for control of the former nation. This multi-factional civil war led to armed anarchy and destruction of the country's infrastructure. It also led to the withdrawal of both the US and Russian ambassadors as well as several other international diplomats in early 1991. The mass starvation, general lawlessness and bitter civil war which coincided with the collapse of the Somalia government prompted the United Nations to launch a limited intervention operation in 1992. The hostile environment kept most humanitarian relief organizations from participating in operations. During the months following Barre's departure, General Aideed, one of the key faction leaders, attacked the Italian embassy in response to their support of the former regime. From December 1991 to January 1992 at least three ICRC relief workers died as a result of wounds sustained from contact with armed bandits and factions.⁶⁶ Relief efforts had become a business opportunity for criminal elements and faction leaders. In response to the cease-fire between the two main warring factions in Mogadishu, the UN Security Council Resolution 751 established an unarmed, non-uniformed fifty person observer force in April 1992. This force was to monitor the cease-fire and protect UN personnel in country as well as humanitarian relief efforts. By August 1992 the UN

had approved an armed 750-person security force to try to protect the efforts of the relief organizations.⁶⁷ UNISOM I proved ineffective in maintaining a cease-fire and protecting relief supplies.

Focused media attention and reports by relief organizations gained increased interest from the international community. While some relief organizations reported success in curbing the problem of mass starvation during UNISOM I the cost of business had become too high for relief agencies. "It cost as much as \$200,000 in 'fees' and 'taxes' to offload a ship of food aid."⁶⁸ The ICRC figured that about 50% of the food supplies reached the people who actually needed it. Protection rackets run like Chicago's Mafia during the 1920s held relief agencies hostage. These agencies, in the perception of many Somalis, then became associated with warring factions. According to a report by Marguerite Michaels, press fellow at the Council on Foreign Relations, the relief agencies had become part of the problem. They did not maintain their neutrality as a direct result of the requirement to pay for protection by rival clan and criminal organizations.⁶⁹ In December 1992 the UN recognized the increasing inability of UNISOM I to establish the conditions for success and authorized intervention by a US-led coalition to remedy the situation.

On 3 December 1992, the UN Security Council adopted Resolution 792 authorizing the use of "all necessary means to establish as soon as possible a secure environment for humanitarian relief operations in Somalia" pursuant to Chapter VII of the UN Charter.⁷⁰ The conditions which framed planning efforts were only marginally similar to those in northern Iraq:

- A UN force was already on the ground with a separate chain of command. They would remain in place to facilitate the transition from UNITAF to UNISOM II. Efforts by the UN to establish a secure environment had failed. Efforts by the US to bolster UN relief efforts through Operation PROVIDE RELIEF in August were not enough. This unilateral US mission involved the airlift of humanitarian relief supplies within Kenya and Somalia.

- Somalia was an immature theater which required the building of an infrastructure to sustain operations.

-- Humanitarian Relief Organizations had been working in-country since 1977. Attempts to provide relief had resulted in the establishment of a criminal protection racket used by warring factions and opportunists for self-interests.

-- Coordination of relief efforts was not well conducted by any central organization. Guidance for relief was often stovepiped to their donor organizations. Duplication of effort, mistargeted relief and distrust of security forces did not lend itself to efficient operations.

-- There was no identified enemy such as the government of Iraq. Attempts to align security or relief efforts were detrimental to the overall resolution of the problem.

-- Warring factions and criminal elements were armed with an abundance of cold war weaponry. "Technicals," crew served weapons mounted on vehicles, had become the security weapon of choice for relief agencies which contracted for local protection. The cost of this "technical assistance" had become too high.

-- There was no legitimate government or judicial system. Somalia had become a "failed" state.

The US defined the end-state for UNITAF as the creation of "an environment in which the UN and NGOs can assume full responsibility for the security and operations of the Somalia humanitarian efforts."⁷¹ Accomplishing this mission led to failures and successes in attaining unity of effort between the political-military and relief organizations in this humanitarian intervention.

The coalition effort for UNITAF involved 22 countries in addition to the United States. Under the direction of the Commander in Chief for Central Command (CINC CENTCOM) they executed a four phase operation: 1) secure a lodgement in Mogadishu, open the airfield in Baiedogle and secure Baidoa; 2) expand operations out to relief distribution sites; 3) expand security operations; and 4) transition mission to the UN and redeploy. The approved CENTCOM mission statement did not specifically include disarmament of hostile factions or expansion of the area of operations beyond that which had been designated already by UNISOM I.⁷² Evolving interpretations by the NCA and the UN challenged the military commander to define the conditions required to achieve success. For example, was UNITAF responsible for stopping the fighting in Central and Southern Somalia? Or did the mission also require the establishment of governmental institutions such as a police force, judicial system and local

governments? These questions were eventually resolved between UNISOM and UNITAF. US led UNITAF forces generally focused on security rather than nation building activities. Enforcement measures in support of humanitarian objectives had worked and relief efforts were flourishing. Unfortunately the inability of UNISOM to resolve political differences between rival clans was not accomplished prior to the transition between UNITAF and UNISOM security responsibilities. As a result the humanitarian environment reverted back to one of insecurity several months after UNITAF departed.

As a part of its security mission and requirement to assist humanitarian relief efforts, UNITAF established an ad hoc system of civil military coordination centers (CMOC). "There were 9 Humanitarian Relief Sectors (HRS) designated" by the UNITAF Commander.⁷³ Within each HRS (and at the seaports) the sector commander established a CMOC to coordinate military support for the relief efforts. This coordination center was initially viewed by many in the military and NGO community as an impediment to their freedom of action. "Coincident with the arrival of UNITAF, UNISOM had established a Humanitarian Operations Center (HOC)" at its headquarters in Mogadishu.⁷⁴ Because most of the major relief organizations were also headquartered in Mogadishu the HOC was a major step in the UN attempting to manage the humanitarian effort effectively. The HOC mission was to plan, coordinate, support and monitor the delivery of humanitarian assistance. To complement the security and humanitarian efforts of UNITAF, the headquarters collocated its command CMOC with the HOC. Representatives from all of the HRS and the seaport provided liaison elements to the CMOC, facilitating synchronization of military and humanitarian efforts at both the operational and tactical levels. The OFDA also established a DART at this location which helped translate relief agency requirements and humanitarian objectives with military and HRO capabilities. Because of the DART's unique relationship with the HRO community and in-country experience, they provided an essential link between UNITAF and the international relief community. Structurally, the CMOC/HOC/DART concept greatly improved the coordination of humanitarian efforts.

UNISOM provided political guidance and direction. However, the issues of the employment of military forces to disarm Somalis and exit criteria were decided by the

NCA and the UN Security Council. UNITAF forces had achieved the objective of providing a secure environment which would permit humanitarian assistance to the most desperate regions. They had, in conjunction with the DART and HOC, established a working system for coordination of military assets in support of humanitarian efforts. In addition, UNITAF forces had performed a multitude of nation building tasks to include basic civil engineering and revitalization of local governments and security forces. The construction of the "Somali Road" which linked Humanitarian Relief Sectors, was essential to relief organizations and security operations.⁷⁵ It was an exit objective for UNITAF forces prior to handing off the mission to the UN.

In March 1993, the UN Secretary General announced that the time had come for the transition from UNITAF to UNISOM II. While the UNITAF forces had "had a positive situation in Somalia... a secure environment had not yet been established."⁷⁶ UNITAF forces had only operated in approximately 40% of the country. UNISOM II was given military tasks which included coercive disarmament, and security of nation building and humanitarian relief efforts. To date, UNISOM II has not been successful. According to an AID situation report dated 4 March 1994, "Security incidents caused most NGOs to suspend project activity in early February... In February, World Concern's compound was hit by mortar fire, reportedly as a result of a labor dispute."⁷⁷

While increases in security violations plague Somalia, relief efforts have been successful in ending the widespread famine in the country. Boutros Boutros-Ghali's initiative to expand efforts throughout the country has been encompassed in a regional approach to rehabilitation. Efforts to eliminate the quality of life crisis include the creation of a Somalia Coordination Body and Standing Coordination Committee in December 1993. These organizations are attempting to orchestrate the reconstruction of the country through a national building process. The underlying problem in Somalia and Northern Iraq is very similar -- no near-term political solution is on the horizon. "Progress in political reconciliation and economic reconstruction is key to the success of sustaining improved humanitarian conditions in Somalia that will outlast the UNISOM military presence."⁷⁸

The role of the US in these types of operations has focused on leading coalitions charged with establishing the conditions for the UN to follow-up. Both humanitarian intervention operations require a new level of cooperation between military and civilian relief agencies. Adapting to this new security and humanitarian relief environment has resulted in doctrinal and structural changes among the participants. This has resulted in an interactive process of professionalization of the humanitarian intervention community. Although there was no overall chain of command between participants in either PROVIDE COMFORT or RESTORE HOPE, a common sense of purpose lead to unity of effort. Similar operations in the Balkans may provide an even more difficult situation. In Bosnia criminal elements and opportunists prey on human misfortunes and vulnerabilities generated by armed conflict. Instead of "technicals" and small arms, humanitarian relief workers face a threat armed with armored vehicles and a vast array of sophisticated conventional weaponry. In lieu of warring clans with minimal support outside the country, ethnic disputes in the Balkans have historically precipitated armed conflict between European powers. Already, the international relief community is performing valiantly in the region but their effects have been minimized by the civil conflict. PROVIDE COMFORT and RESTORE HOPE provide a warm-up for an inevitable humanitarian intervention mission in the former Yugoslavia.

...the use of force should be restricted to occasions where it can do some good and will outweigh the loss of lives and other costs that will surely ensue.

GEN Colin Powell, Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, 1992⁷⁹

Above all, the tragedy of Bosnia has shown that international organizations are not able to deal effectively, and when necessary, forcefully, with violent and single-minded factions in a civil war.

Sir Brian Urquhart, former UN Assistant Secretary General for Peacekeeping, 1993⁸⁰

EVOLVING POLICY AND EMERGING DOCTRINE

As the premier organization representing the concerns of most international states, the UN has forged ahead with policy which has shaped recent humanitarian

efforts. In 1988 the UN General Assembly (UNGA) passed Resolution 43/877 which further defined the rights of civilians in armed conflicts to include civil wars. This measure attempted to codify international legal principles outlined in the Geneva Convention. The General Assembly has since created a position for the Under Secretary General for Humanitarian Affairs in Resolution 46/182. More importantly, in this resolution the UNGA established the conditions for the humanitarian interventions in Bosnia and Somalia by stating that "humanitarian assistance *should* be provided with the consent of the affected country and *in principle* on the basis of an appeal by the affected country. The text leaves room for humanitarian intervention."⁸¹ This measure redefined the potential for military forces to intervene in a sovereign state's affairs.

The measure also increased the vacuum of guidance contained in the UN Charter concerning humanitarian intervention. Neither UN Charter Chapters VI or VII address adequately the use of the military as an enabling force for humanitarian relief. Under Chapter VI, peacekeeping is conducted under the auspices of agreed upon terms by forces in disagreement. Humanitarian agencies in these environments generally neither require nor request more than lightly armed security forces. In enacting Chapter VII peace enforcement measures, humanitarian operations have been impeded by armed aggression. Under these conditions military forces attempt to create an environment which will allow relief operations to flourish. Typically, UN mandates are unable to provide clear objectives or lines of command and control or to delineate responsibilities required to develop a coherent overarching strategy. These mandates are often viewed as a hindrance to their own objectives by civilian relief agencies. For the military they pose problems in structuring and directing their efforts to support an agreed upon and achievable end-state. Overall, attaining unity of effort is difficult without a clear purpose for organizations to plan and act upon.

Since the collapse of the Soviet Union the international community has looked to the US to help shoulder the burden of world leadership.⁸² Both the Bush and Clinton administrations have directed US involvement in humanitarian operations around the globe with diplomatic, military and humanitarian resources. These operations have included participation in UN Chapter VI and VII operations to varying degrees. But as

efforts in Somalia and Bosnia have failed to meet political goals, many have questioned the validity and synchronization of humanitarian and military means in these types of operations. For over a year the Clinton administration has attempted to come to terms with the role it envisions for the US in the emerging world order. Neither the National Security Strategy nor the much needed Presidential Decision Directive on multinational peace operations have appeared. According to a report issued by the Association of the United States Army's Institute for Land Warfare, the Clinton administration has suggested to Congress that criteria for the commitment of US resources in peace operations should be based on seven criteria: 1) the advancement of US interests; 2) acceptable risk; 3) sufficient funding, resources available to ensure success; 4) US involvement is required for the mission to succeed; 5) an end to the operation can be envisioned; 6) public and congressional support; and 7) clearly defined and acceptable command and control relationships. As a part of peace operations, humanitarian intervention operations should be expected to adhere to similar standards.⁸³ The increased potential to conduct humanitarian intervention in the new world disorder may be a part of an emerging US policy coined by Madeline Albright as "assertive multilateralism."⁸⁴ Adapting the political, military, and humanitarian system to achieve unity of effort is especially important.

The direction of US foreign and security policy has not been officially published for scrutiny by the international community or the general US public. Indications by government rhetoric appear to indicate that the US will play an active role in shaping world events. Major General (retired) John Sewall, former Vice Director, Strategic Plans and Policy (J-5), on the Joint Staff has interpreted Madeline Albright's assertive multilateralism as "implying selective participation in more muscular peace operations."⁸⁵ More muscular operations is common terminology for more powerful military forces such as those utilized in Somalia and Bosnia. In September 1993, Anthony Lake, President Clinton's National Security Advisor, described a "Strategy of Enlargement" providing for US participation in international efforts to counter aggression, oppose states hostile to democratization and the protection of human rights.⁸⁶ A recent draft of the National Security Strategy also indicates that the US considers the

promotion of democracy and human rights around the world as one of four security challenges which must be met.⁸⁷ The US's continued support of humanitarian intervention efforts in Iraq, Somalia and the Balkans with a mixture of diplomatic, humanitarian, and military resources demonstrates their interest in shaping international stability. US reluctance to send military ground forces into regions such as Haiti, Rwanda, and Bosnia is an indication of a maturing outlook on the capabilities and limitations of humanitarian relief operations.

Experience in effective policy decisions for humanitarian operations is also reflected in the development of doctrine. The US military and humanitarian community is attempting to develop doctrinal harmonization to facilitate success in humanitarian intervention operations. Among the international community there are no agreed upon definitions for peace operations or humanitarian interventions. Draft Presidential Review Directive 13 provides a common point of reference for US organizations.⁸⁸ Although humanitarian intervention is not one of the terms listed, it is generally understood as the intrusive application of political, military and humanitarian efforts in an environment hostile to relief efforts. Humanitarian intervention may be viewed as a component operation of humanitarian assistance. As a component of durable international peace operation initiatives, humanitarian intervention should be considered in emerging peace operations doctrine. According to DOD's top policy official, "peacekeeping doctrine is in full evolution. The post-Cold War world is fragile... In many countries government as we know it is disappearing in the face of civil war."⁸⁹

Prior to the demise of the Soviet Union, the United States placed little credence in UN peacekeeping or humanitarian operations. "As a result the US defense establishment has had little proactive interaction in its military relations with the United Nations."⁹⁰ This Cold War trend also held true for the relationship between much of DoD and the humanitarian relief community. In the past military support to humanitarian assistance has focused primarily on combat support and service support capabilities. Conducting these operations under hostile conditions poses an unfamiliar task for conventional US forces. They also require a doctrinal review of the postwar mission of the military which "exists to manage violence."⁹¹ The military's role in recent operations in

Iraq, Somalia and the Balkans in humanitarian intervention operations has been to establish a secure environment in support of political, humanitarian efforts to stabilize the situation.

The development of doctrine for humanitarian intervention operations is slowly emerging in the US. During the Cold War little attention was given to the application of military forces for operations other than conventional war. Since the early 1990's military doctrine has emerged for the conduct of peace operations⁹² Most doctrinal manuals focus on the application of military force to monitor or enforce peace sanctions in regions of armed conflict. Except for a cursory mention of the role of humanitarian relief and interagency coordination these manuals do not provide adequate guidance on how to conduct humanitarian intervention operations. But, a concerted interagency effort to draft doctrine is underway. The Department of Defense's Air Land Sea Applications (ALSA) Center is in the process of developing a manual for humanitarian assistance operations which can be adapted for intervention operations. Manual authors include representatives from both the armed services and AID/OFDA. OFDA in turn staffs their efforts with major US relief organizations to build consensus within the humanitarian community. In addition, the Army has included representative NGOs and DART team members in its training program at the US Army Joint Readiness Training Center.⁹³ In addition, the humanitarian relief community is developing a Code of Conduct for International Red Cross and Red Crescent Movement and NGOs in Disaster Relief, which attempts to codify standards of behavior consistent with international humanitarian law.⁹⁴ Together these types of actions are providing a common frame of reference that the newly formed UN Department of Humanitarian Assistance could use to develop policy and doctrine.

For US military and humanitarian organizations, ALSA's manual on humanitarian assistance provides a much needed first step towards easing the problem of attaining unity of effort. The new manual recognizes that civil and military cooperation is essential to success and that clear lines of authority for humanitarian assistance are not required. In addition, it emphatically reinforces the fact that peace operations, such as those conducted in Somalia, require the integration of military and humanitarian

planners to meet contingencies.⁹⁵ Besides the obvious security aspect, "the major contribution that the US military provides to any HA [humanitarian assistance] operation is the organizational structure which allows other agencies to accomplish humanitarian relief."⁹⁶ Practical experience gained by many of the authors who actually participated in humanitarian intervention operations in Northern Iraq and Somalia has led to the incorporation of a Civil Military Operations Centers into emerging doctrine and training.⁹⁷ This type of structure provides a central point of coordination for NGO/IOs conducting humanitarian operations. It also allows the Disaster Assistance Relief Team (DART) from OFDA to more efficiently manage humanitarian resources. In addition military resource managers could support relief efforts which in turn support the overall political guidance. The establishment of this focal point also offers the political, military and OFDA leadership a directed telescope for managing means to attain a desired end. While not perfected, this type of military-civilian interface has proven essential in attempts to orchestrate unity of effort.

In the absence of adequate legal principles or any other mechanism for enforcing their compliance, new approaches should be explored to ensure effective international presence that bring together peace-keeping forces, humanitarian relief agencies and human rights observers.

Sadoka Ogata, UN High Commissioner for Refugees, 1993⁹⁸

IMPLICATIONS FOR FUTURE OPERATIONS

Operations PROVIDE COMFORT and RESTORE HOPE appear to be models for future humanitarian intervention operations. Both operations were atypical of the humanitarian relief efforts which took place during the Cold War. In Northern Iraq international military forces and humanitarian relief organizations intervened on behalf of a repressed minority within the borders of a sovereign state. Humanitarian efforts in Somalia were in response to mass starvation and suffering in the wake of a civil war in a region where there was no legitimate government. Both operations required international diplomatic assistance and legitimate military intervention to achieve humanitarian

relief objectives. Successes and failures in these operations provide implications for similar operations in the future.

With the increased reliance on the UN to intervene in regional and civil strifes, humanitarian intervention has become a component of peace operations which should be integrated to achieve conflict termination and resolution. In establishing the objectives for these operations political leaders need to recognize what is achievable with the resources available to conduct the mission. Decision makers in control of these resources should also be more discriminate in choosing which operations to conduct. Like their political leaders, the military and relief organizations should also gain a better working knowledge of the role each other may play in the operation. These objectives should be incorporated into an interagency campaign plan with a prescribed end-state and measures of success. Such a plan was not developed for PROVIDE COMFORT or RESTORE HOPE. If a campaign plan had been structured, misperceptions about entrance and exit criteria and participants' roles and responsibilities might have been avoided and may have made both operations more efficient and effective. A campaign plan could have also facilitated a more effective transition from the US-led coalition to follow on UN forces. In the case of RESTORE HOPE, an interagency plan which included the specific tasks, conditions and standards between military forces under UNISOM control and those subordinate to UNITAF would have been necessary. As an integral part of the peace process, humanitarian intervention efforts should be incorporated into the planning of peace operations.

Applying the appropriate mix of humanitarian intervention capabilities requires political leaders to be discriminating in the application of available resources. Where and how donor organizations such as the UN choose to act is a political statement. It is prudent for leaders to weigh the long-term benefits against the desire to react with force to achieve short-sighted gains which could lead to greater instability. "As justified as the military contribution in support of the Kurds in PROVIDE COMFORT may have been, how does one weigh the cost of 800 million that was involved, when this amounted to more than the entire global UNHCR budget in support of refugees in the year in question?"⁹⁹ Criteria for initiating humanitarian relief should be developed to

assist political leaders in deciding when and where to act. The process of reviewing established criteria prior to initiating action would also help frame objectives and end-states for the humanitarian and military implementers. Recommended criteria include the following:

- humanitarian relief efforts have been halted or impeded substantially through the use of force by warring or criminal elements; the environment does not exist in which humanitarian efforts can be conducted;
- proactive measures to include all non-force options have failed to remedy the situation;
- attempts by neutral country peacekeepers to demonstrate international resolve have proven ineffective or inadequate to meet the threat;
- a neutral and apolitical source has confirmed that humanitarian efforts can no longer continue effectively;
- the application of military force is required to create the conditions for humanitarian relief efforts to continue as a part of an overall strategy for conflict termination and resolution;
- failure to resolve the conflict could result in the spill-over of refugees into other countries which would spur regional conflict and increase the humanitarian aid requirement;
- resolution of the humanitarian crisis will not promote more detrimental regional stability;
- there is a strong majority consensus by the international community to support humanitarian intervention with adequate funds, resources, military forces and relief organizations.

Development of rigorous criteria for employing a humanitarian coalition has not occurred. Neither the UN nor the international legal community have agreed on when humanitarian intervention is appropriate or just what the term entails. UN Charter Chapters VI and VII do not clearly delineate when such measures are appropriate. The US government has also been slow to adapt to the realities of this type of intrusive action. To date, the USG has failed to establish clear guidelines for the commitment of military and humanitarian resources into potentially hostile areas. This guidance should

be included as part of the Presidential Decision Directive for Peace Operations which has been in draft for over a year. In developing a plan for humanitarian intervention the USG must provide planners with a clearly defined task, purpose and intent for the use of its resources. Because of the coalition nature of these operations the USG should also clearly delineate lines of command control and coordination for US sponsored organizations. In response, the DOD and OFDA must take the lead in developing solutions to the crisis as a team. This team should present a unified US position in theater and be prepared to lead the international effort until such time as the UN or regional organization is prepared to assume the responsibility.

In formulating an effective plan for humanitarian intervention operations, the participants depend not only on clearly defined intent and purpose from political leaders, but also an understanding of the environment in which these missions are to be conducted. Intrusive operations are generally required because hostile actions by one or more factions are impeding humanitarian efforts. During the post-Cold War era these types of environments are shaped by civil war. Perhaps then, the term "peace enforcement in support of humanitarian objectives" more accurately describes the actual missions which may ensue. During PROVIDE COMFORT and RESTORE HOPE participants adapted to operational requirements which necessitated close coordination and cooperation between political, military and civilian relief organizations. Effective coalition members formed ad hoc organizations and relationships. They also provided the foundation for the development of humanitarian intervention doctrine. These actions have helped professionalize the humanitarian community in its efforts to prepare for the future.

The community comprising the political, military and humanitarian organizations is composed of seasoned professionals in their own fields. These experts, serving increasingly in similar operations, ought to draw from their experiences, as well as from their education and training, to recognize the need for a formalization of the humanitarian intervention operation as a concept. The UN is slowly adapting to meet these challenges but, it is struggling with larger conceptual issues of internationalism and reorganization to meet increasing commitments which extend beyond traditional

peacekeeping. Efforts by the US military, OFDA and selected NGOs to develop doctrine and interagency exercises provide the catalyst for improving the system. This trend is leading the US towards the development of a professional humanitarian community in which each element understands the others' abilities and is capable of integrating them into a coherent plan and actual execution. In addition to these efforts fundamental shifts in organizational structures should be considered to form a more effective framework for humanitarian coalition operations.

The development of a common international frame of reference for humanitarian intervention is essential. Internationally accepted doctrine is required. Doctrine "sets the framework for how a coalition will conduct operations to achieve the objectives of a UN mandate... [It] is the capstone from which organization, equipment, training, exercises and rules of engagement are derived."¹⁰⁰ To date there is no internationally accepted doctrine or language for humanitarian intervention or peace operations. Efforts by the US community to develop their own is commendable. Other organizations and nations are also developing a doctrine. For example, the NGO/IO community is developing Codes of Conduct for humanitarian relief organizations in both disaster relief and armed conflict.¹⁰¹ Considering the complexity of these missions and the experience gained during PROVIDE COMFORT and RESTORE HOPE, as well as other operations, it may be time to establish a UN level policy, doctrine and lessons learned organization. To meet immediate training and operational requirements the US should take the lead in developing the policy and doctrine. In order for the community to progress professionally the following measures should be considered:

- development of a common terminology for humanitarian and peace operations; these terms should be appended to the UN Charter and be recognized in an international court of law
- development of USG and UN directives which clearly delineate roles and functions within the humanitarian community;
- development of national and international training programs which lead to the creation and refinement of humanitarian doctrine; this should complement the emergence of UN doctrine and education of peace operations forces;

- development of a humanitarian planning community comprised of political, military and relief agency members capable of developing a strategy and campaign plan for conflict termination and resolution which incorporates humanitarian assistance as an integral part of the durable solution;
- development of mechanisms which hold donor and host countries responsible for the conduct of the NGO/IO which they support;
- development of a code of ethics which does not allow the cloak of neutrality to circumvent the attainment of international objectives;
- development of a code of ethics and diplomatic mechanism which does not allow for the application of humanitarian intervention to serve as a political tool for national self-interests.

While attaining most of these items may be very difficult, the process of developing them will force dialogue within the community. This discussion will assist in the education process and hopefully result in a more professional community. As a part of the education process, the military must be willing to work with organizations which they cannot command and appreciate the depth of knowledge the NGO community has in relief operations. Since most relief organizations will be in-place prior to the military's arrival and remain after their departure they have a vested interest in developing a successful campaign plan. The NGOs likewise must recognize the military's expertise in security, organization and logistics.¹⁰² Humanitarian intervention doctrine can assist in developing more efficient humanitarian coalitions by establishing a common framework for action.

Achieving effective teamwork by the humanitarian coalition will require changes to traditional organizational structures. These changes will focus on better integrating the interagency participants and fixing responsibility on the most appropriate subject matter experts. In instances where the USG chooses to commit ground combat forces and a preponderance of resources to a humanitarian intervention operation they should lead the international effort. This commitment should only be conducted under the sanctions of UN Charter Chapter VII with the intent of transitioning to direct UN control once exit criteria have been met. Overall "command" would rest with a US politico

who would serve as the UN Secretary General's Special Representative. His deputy commander would be a US military flag officer who would also serve as the Commander of the Joint Task Force. Coequal with the deputy would be the DART Team Leader. Depending on the nature of the humanitarian crisis he could also be dual-hatted as the politico in charge. The headquarters staff would be comprised primarily of US military and government personnel. Staff sections would be headed by the most appropriate "officer" based on the position requirements. For example the J-3 may be a military officer but the J-5 would be better served by an DOS or AID representative. In addition to this staff, one of the most critical elements would be the establishment of effective liaison teams between all participating organizations to enhance coordination and minimize misperceptions. This liaison would include a proactive effort to provide a Joint Information Bureau operated by the US Information Agency and subordinate to the DART team leader.

To enhance coordination and planning a CMOC would be established under the staff supervision of the J-3. This coordination center would be jointly run by a Civil Affairs Task Force and DART. The Civil Affairs Task Force would not be subordinate to the military security and support force commander. Instead, he would answer directly to the commander of the military Joint Task Force. The CMOC would be capable of expanding to meet increased operational requirements to include establishing smaller coordination centers in designated humanitarian relief sectors. The CMOC would provide the focal point for all humanitarian efforts in the region. Regardless of their neutral status, NGOs failing to coordinate and comply with security restrictions designed to enhance overall humanitarian efforts would be treated as threats to the operation.

Armed threats and initial logistics requirements would be met by the military's security and support command. This US led command would be comprised of three subordinate units in addition to its headquarters. There would be a security force tailored to the threat. It would be capable of decisive combat power if required. To sustain the operation a logistics unit would be established. The logistics unit would be structured to support US military and government agencies but also complement the efforts of NGOs and IOs. Eventually this function would be contracted to a more cost

effective civilian firm. The third organization would be a transportation unit tailored to meet operational requirements such as ground transportation and airlift.

This type of organizational planning represents a break from traditional military and humanitarian operations. The structure intertwines interagency personnel in an attempt to consider expertise, enhance planning, and maximize effectiveness. More importantly the operational framework reduces the likelihood that the military will be required to solve the problem without commanding the situation. As envisioned, the operational network focuses efforts of the humanitarian community by forming a team with agreed upon goals and objectives. Procedurally the arrangement establishes an organization with a set of ground rules which should enhance "neutrality" and consistency by the participants whose mission is first and foremost humanitarian. Structurally, it enhances the ability to coordinate while respecting the sensitivities of NGOs and IOs who are leery of direct coordination with the military and political apparatus, but still require security and diplomatic immunity to complete their mission. As a US led coalition, the intent would be for the US to provide the structure and environment for the UN to assume the mission.

This concept of teamwork and applying the most appropriate tool for the task should also be reflected in the UN's desires to form a standing UN military force for peace operations. Instead of focusing primarily on a military response, the UN would benefit from creation of a UN Civil Affairs Unit. This unit would be manned by military and civilian experts trained to initiate humanitarian and conflict resolution measures. Equipped primarily with the non-lethal instruments of power, the Civil Affairs unit could assist in conflict negotiation and government building, psychological operations directed at resolving the crisis, and resource assessment teams. These teams would function similar to the DART from the US Office of Foreign Disaster Assistance. Experienced in humanitarian relief, these teams would be responsible for resourcing the appropriate civilian organizations which may be required. Instead of Security Council military forces comprising the security forces, "neutral" countries would provide the UN an adequately trained and equipped international police force which would not pose a political or resource reliability. Actual military enforcement would be provided by the

great powers. These forces could remain in the background and be deployed as required. When deployed, the lead nation would assume command of the UN unit to include UN humanitarian agencies. The lead nation would then structure itself as explained in the preceding paragraph so as to facilitate transition to the UN once a secure environment had been established. Commitment of enforcement troops would require failure on the part of the Civil Affairs unit to succeed with proactive diplomacy and preventive humanitarian measures.

Meeting future challenges of humanitarian intervention depends on having all potential participants in the international community form more effective coalitions. Clearly established rationale for such actions must be established to guide interagency planning efforts. These efforts must be considered as an integral part of peace operations which are intended to promote international peace and stability. Reliance on military force must be abandoned for a solution which includes well coordinated efforts which best utilize the resources available. Control of these efforts should be driven by agreement of a desired end-state and sense of professionalism. Until the international community provides the UN with resources and structures to conduct these operations it ought not blame the Secretary General or the organization for failure. For the near term unity of effort on the ground will require a lead country which can manage the efforts of a multinational coalition of civilian and military organizations then transition the operation to a capable UN organization once the conditions for success have been established.

The savagery of the fighting points to a truth that we lack the stomach to contemplate: a large number of people on this planet, to whom the comfort and stability of middle-class life is utterly unknown, find war and a barracks existence a step up.

Robert D. Kaplan, "The Coming Anarchy," 1994¹⁰³

The involvement of military in humanitarian activities is an ongoing process. The new world alignment has changed the parameters within which NGOs and the military operate, and both must adapt. The NGO and military communities can either resist, or play an active part in the definition of the new military role. The system for communication and cooperation between the military and NGOs as it exists right now is weak and ill-defined. The investment of time and labor must be made now to create a viable framework for future joint operations.

NGO After Action Review comment,

JRTC Peace Enforcement Exercise, November 1993¹⁰⁴

CONCLUSIONS

New world disorder has generated conditions of human suffering which require humanitarian intervention. The need to relieve people's suffering has transcended traditional boundaries of sovereign states and accepted norms of non-involvement in civil conflicts. Intrusive response by the international community involves a myriad of participants. In these operations political, humanitarian and military organizations must complement each other's efforts. To be successful, these operations must respond to immediate human needs and resolve long-term conflicts which perpetuate further suffering. Achieving this objective requires unity of effort among participants.

Recent intervention operations in Northern Iraq and Somalia reveal not only the importance but also the difficulty in attaining unity of effort. These humanitarian actions necessitated participants operate outside of their traditional parameters with little policy or doctrinal guidance. In adapting to the humanitarian intervention environment, Operations PROVIDE COMFORT and RESTORE HOPE demonstrated that achieving unity of effort requires participants to agree on general objectives and end-states they can work towards. This unity also requires an organizational structure which facilitates the efficient use of resources and the attainment of durable solutions.

Increasing demands for humanitarian intervention require the humanitarian community to reevaluate their past efforts and strive for increased proficiency. Interagency efforts to develop policy and doctrine should enhance the community's ability to

operate effectively. Strategic, operational and tactical success in these operations must be developed through a more professional humanitarian community which appreciates the political ambiguity in which they will likely operate. Effective organization can facilitate the attainment of viable political objectives. "It can also mitigate the effects of a less than perfectly clear objective so that there is created the breathing space required to permit the definition of an adequate end state."¹⁰⁵ Potentially more complex humanitarian emergencies in Eastern Europe warrant preparing for future humanitarian intervention. Failure to attain unity of effort in regions like the Balkans could prove a very costly mistake.

Appendix A: Glossary of Common Terms

UNITED NATIONS

Source: Boutros Boutros-Ghali, Improving the Capacity of the United Nations for Peace-keeping (New York: United Nations, 14 March 1994).

Preventive Diplomacy is action to prevent disputes from arising between parties, to prevent existing disputes from escalating into conflicts and to limit the spread of the latter when they occur.

Peacemaking is diplomatic action to prevent disputes from arising between parties, to prevent existing disputes from escalating into conflicts and to limit the spread of the latter when they occur.

Peace-keeping is a United Nations presence in the field (normally including military and civilian personnel), with the consent of parties, to implement or monitor the implementation of arrangements relating to the control of conflicts (cease-fires, separation of forces, etc.) and their resolution (partial or comprehensive settlements), and/or to protect the delivery of humanitarian relief.

Peace-enforcement may be needed when peaceful means fail. It consists of action under Chapter VII of the Charter, including the use of armed force to maintain or restore international peace and security in situations where the Security Council has determined the existence of a threat to the peace, breach of peace or act of aggression.

Peace-building is critical in the aftermath of conflict. It means identifying and supporting measures and structures which will solidify peace and build trust and interaction among former enemies, in order to avoid a relapse into conflict.

THE JOINT STAFF

Source: Memo from Lt Col Charlie Arnold, Joint Staff J-5/UN "Legal Authority, Terms and Definitions" (Washington DC: SEP 93)

Peace Operations: All actions taken by the United Nations or regional organizations under the authority of Chapter VI of the UN Charter, and those Chapter VII operations not involving the use of unrestricted, intense use of combat power to fulfill a mandate. Peace operations include traditional peacekeeping, aggravated peacekeeping, and low intensity peace enforcement operations not involving the use of unrestricted, intense use of combat power to fulfill a mandate.

Preventive Diplomacy: Actions taken to resolve disputes before violence breaks out.

Peacemaking: Action to bring hostile parties to agreement, essentially through such peaceful means as those foreseen in Chapter VI of the Charter of the United Nations. Process of arranging an end to disputes and resolving issues that led to conflict, primarily through diplomacy, mediation, negotiation, or other forms of peaceful settlement.

Peace Building: Action to identify and support structures which would strengthen and solidify peace in order to avoid a relapse into conflict.

Traditional Peacekeeping: Deployment of a United Nations, regional organization, or coalition presence in the field with the consent of all parties concerned, normally involving United Nations regional organization, or coalition military forces, and/or police and civilians. Non-combat military operations (exclusive of self-defense) that are undertaken by outside forces with the consent of all major belligerent parties, designed to monitor and facilitate implementation of an existing truce agreement in support of diplomatic efforts to reach a political settlement in the dispute.

Aggravated Peacekeeping: Military operations undertaken with the nominal consent of all major belligerent parties, but which are complicated by subsequent intransigence of one or more of the belligerent parties, poor command and control of belligerent forces, or conditions of outlawry, banditry, or anarchy. In such conditions, peacekeeping forces are normally authorized to use force in self-defense, and in defense of the missions they are assigned, which may include monitoring and facilitating implementation of an existing truce agreement in support of diplomatic efforts to reach political settlement, or supporting or safeguarding humanitarian relief efforts.

Peace Enforcement: Armed intervention, involving the use of force or the threat of the use of force, pursuant to authorization by the United Nations Security Council for the coercive use of military power to compel compliance with international resolutions, mandates, or sanctions to maintain or restore international peace and security, or address breaches to the peace or acts of aggression.

Source: Joint Pub 3-0, Doctrine for Joint Operations (Washington DC: OCJCS, 9 September 1993), GL-8.

Humanitarian Assistance: Programs conducted to relieve or reduce the results of natural or manmade disasters or other endemic conditions such as human pain, disease, hunger, or privation that might present a serious threat to life or that can result in great damage to or loss of property. Humanitarian assistance provided by US forces is limited in scope and duration. The assistance provided is designed to supplement or complement the efforts of the host civil authorities or agencies that may have the primary responsibility for providing humanitarian assistance.

U.S. ARMY DOCTRINE

Source: FM 100-23 Peace Operations (Draft), (Washington DC: HQDA, 19 January 1994).

Peace Operations - the umbrella term encompassing observers and monitors, traditional peacekeeping, preventive deployment, security assistance to a civil authority, protection and delivery of humanitarian relief, guaranteeing rights of passage, imposing sanctions, peace enforcement, and other military, para-military, or non-military action taken in support of diplomatic peacekeeping operations.

Preventive Diplomacy - diplomatic actions, taken in advance of a predictable crisis, aimed at removing the sources of conflict before violence erupts, or to limit the spread of violence when it occurs.

Peacemaking - process of arranging an end to disputes, and resolving issues that led to conflict, primarily through diplomacy, mediation, negotiation, or other forms of peaceful settlement that may include military peace operations.

Peacekeeping - non-combat military operations (exclusive of self-defense), that are undertaken by outside forces with the consent of all major belligerent parties, designed to monitor and facilitate implementation of an existing truce agreement in support of diplomatic efforts to reach a political settlement to the dispute.

Peace-enforcement - a form of combat, armed intervention, or the physical threat of armed intervention, pursuant to international authorization of the coercive use of military power to compel compliance with international sanctions or resolutions -- the primary purpose of which is the maintenance or restoration of peace under conditions broadly defined by the international community.

Peace-building - post conflict diplomatic and military actions that seek to rebuild the institutions and infrastructure of a nation that is torn by civil war; or build mutually beneficial bonds among nations formerly at war in order to avoid a relapse into conflict.

Humanitarian Assistance - assistance provided by DOD forces, as directed by appropriate authority, in the aftermath of natural or man-made disasters to help reduce conditions that present a serious threat to life and property; assistance provided by US forces is limited in scope and duration and is designed to supplement efforts of civilian authorities who have primary responsibility for providing such assistance.

* These definitions are generally consistent with those in ALSA, HA: Multi-Service Procedures for Humanitarian Assistance Operations (Langley Air Force base, VA: Air

Land Sea Application Center, 24 September 1993). This draft document is a result of an interagency effort to establish guidelines for humanitarian operations.

INTERNATIONAL LAW

Source: David S. Scheffer, "Toward a Modern Doctrine of Humanitarian Intervention," University of Toledo Law Review Winter 1992, 264-265.

Humanitarian Intervention: A classical definition of "humanitarian intervention" is limited to those instances in which a nation unilaterally uses military force to intervene in the territory of another state for the purpose of protecting a sizable group of indigenous people from life-threatening or otherwise unconscionable infractions of their human rights that the national government inflicts or in which it acquiesces... A modern doctrine of humanitarian intervention should establish the legitimacy of certain types of non-forcible and forcible intervention undertaken without the express consent of the target country's government, but with collective authorization or in some limited circumstances, unilaterally or multinationally for the purpose of defending or alleviating the mass suffering of people for whom no other alternative really exists.

Appendix B: UN Charter, Chapters VI & VII¹⁰⁶

CHAPTER VI. PACIFIC SETTLEMENT OF DISPUTES

Article 33

1. The parties to any dispute, the continuance of which is likely to endanger the maintenance of international peace and security, shall, first of all, seek a solution by negotiation, enquiry, mediation, conciliation, arbitration, judicial settlement, resort to regional agencies or arrangements, or other peaceful means of their own choice.
2. The Security Council shall, when it deems necessary, call upon the parties to settle their dispute by such means.

Article 34

The Security Council may investigate any dispute, or any situation which might lead to international friction or give rise to a dispute, in order to determine whether the continuance of the dispute or situation is likely to endanger the maintenance of the international peace and security.

Article 35

1. Any Member of the United Nations may bring any dispute, or any situation of the nature referred to in Article 34, to the attention of the Security Council or of the General Assembly.
2. A state which is not a Member of the United Nations may bring to the attention of the Security Council or of the General Assembly any dispute to which it is a party if it accepts in advance, for the purposes of the dispute, the obligations of pacific settlement provided in the present Charter.
3. The proceedings of the General Assembly in respect of matters brought to its attention under this Article will be subject to the provisions of Articles 11 and 12.

Article 36

1. The Security Council may, at any stage of a dispute of the nature referred to in Article 33 or of a situation of like nature, recommend appropriate procedures or methods of adjustment.
2. The Security Council should take into consideration any procedures for the settlement of the dispute which have already been adopted by the parties.

3. In making recommendations under this Article the Security Council should also take into consideration that legal disputes should as a general rule be referred by the parties to the International Court of Justice in accordance with the provisions of the Statute of the Court.

Article 37

1. Should the parties to a dispute of the nature referred to in Article 33 fail to settle it by means indicated in that Article, they shall refer it to the Security Council.

2. If the Security Council deems that the continuance of the dispute is in fact likely to endanger the maintenance of international peace and security, it shall decide whether to take action under Article 36 or to recommend such items of settlement as it may consider appropriate.

Article 38

Without prejudice to the provisions of Articles 33 to 37, the Security Council may, if all the parties to any dispute so request, make recommendations to the parties with a view to a pacific settlement of the dispute.

CHAPTER VII. ACTION WITH RESPECT TO THREATS TO THE PEACE, BREACHES OF THE PEACE, AND ACTS OF AGGRESSION

Article 39

The Security Council shall determine the existence of any threat to the peace, breach of peace, or act of aggression and shall make recommendations, or decide what measures shall be taken in accordance with Articles 41 and 42, to maintain or restore international peace and security.

Article 40

In order to prevent an aggravation of the situation, the Security Council may, before making the recommendations or deciding upon the measures provided for in Article 39, call upon the parties concerned to comply with such provisional measures as it deems necessary or desirable. Such provisional measures shall be without prejudice to the rights, claims, or position of the parties concerned. The Security Council shall duly take account of failure to comply with such provisional measures.

Article 41

The Security Council may decide what measures not involving the use of armed force are to be employed to give effect to its decisions, and it may call upon the Members of the United Nations to apply such measures. These may include complete or partial interruption of economic relations and of rail, sea, air, postal, telegraphic, radio, and other means of communication, and the severance of diplomatic relations.

Article 42

Should the Security Council consider that measures provided for in Article 41 would be inadequate or have proved to be inadequate, it may take such action by air, sea, or land forces as may be necessary to maintain or restore international peace and security. Such action may include demonstrations, blockade, and other operations by air, sea, or land forces of Members of the United Nations.

Article 43

1. All Members of the United Nations, in order to contribute to the maintenance of international peace and security, undertake to make available to the Security Council, on its call and in accordance with a special agreement or agreements, armed forces, assistance, and facilities, including rights of passage, necessary for the purpose of maintaining international peace and security.
2. Such agreement or agreements shall govern the numbers and types of forces, their degree of readiness and general location, and the nature of the facilities and assistance to be provided.
3. The agreement or agreements shall be negotiated as soon as possible on the initiative of the Security Council. They shall be concluded between the Security Council and Members or between the Security Council and groups of Members and shall be subject to ratification by the signatory states in accordance with their respective constitutional processes.

Article 44

When the Security Council has decided to use force it shall, before calling upon a Member not represented on it to provide armed forces in fulfillment of the obligations assumed under Article 43, invite that Member, if the Member so desires, to participate in the decisions of the Security Council concerning the employment of contingents of that Member's armed forces.

Article 45

In order to enable the United Nations to take urgent military measures, Members shall hold immediately available national air force contingents for combined international enforcement action. The strength and degree of readiness of these contingents and plans for their combined action shall be determined, within the limits laid down in the special agreement or agreements referred to in Article 43, by the Security Council with the assistance of the Military Staff Committee.

Article 46

Plans for the application of armed force shall be made by the Security Council with the assistance of the Military Staff Committee.

Article 47

1. There shall be established a Military Staff Committee to advise and assist the Security Council on all questions relating to the Security Council's military requirements for the maintenance of international peace and security, the employment and command of forces placed at its disposal, the regulation of armaments, and possible disarmament.
2. The Military Staff Committee shall consist of the Chiefs of Staff of the permanent members of the Security Council or their representatives. Any Member of the United Nations not permanently represented on the Committee shall be invited by the Committee to be associated with it when the efficient discharge of the Committee's responsibilities requires the participation of that Member in its work.
3. The Military Staff Committee shall be responsible under the Security Council for the strategic direction of any armed forces placed at the disposal of the Security Council. Questions relating to the command of such forces shall be worked out subsequently.
4. The Military Staff Committee, with the authorization of the Security Council and after consultation with appropriate regional agencies, may establish regional subcommittees.

Article 48

1. The action required to carry out the decisions of the Security Council for the maintenance of international peace and security shall be taken by all Members of the United Nations or by some of them, as the Security Council may determine.
2. Such decisions shall be carried out by the Members of the United Nations directly and through their action in the appropriate international agencies of which they are members.

Article 49

The Members of the United Nations shall join in affording mutual assistance in carrying out the measures decided upon by the Security Council.

Article 50

If preventive or enforcement measures against any state are taken by the Security Council, any other state, whether a Member of the United Nations or not, which finds itself confronted with special economic problems arising from the carrying out of those measures shall have the right to consult the Security Council with regard to a solution of those problems.

Article 51

Nothing in the present Charter shall impair the inherent right of individual or collective self-defense if an armed attack occurs against a Member of the United Nations, until the Security Council has taken the measures necessary to maintain international peace and security. Measures taken by Members in the exercise of this right of self-defense shall be immediately reported to the Security Council and shall not in any way affect the authority and responsibility of the Security Council under the present Charter to take at any time such action as it deems necessary in order to maintain or restore international peace and security.

Appendix C: Descriptions of Selected Humanitarian Organizations¹⁰⁷

UNITED NATIONS ORGANIZATIONS

UN Department of Humanitarian Affairs: The UN Department of Humanitarian Affairs was established in 1992 to provide a mechanism for coordination of international humanitarian assistance. It has the mission to mobilize and coordinate international disaster relief, promote disaster mitigation, promote awareness, information exchange, and the transfer of knowledge on disaster related activities. In country, the UN DHA emergency coordinator provides leadership for the UN country team and serves as point of coordination for Non-Government Organizations (NGO) and International Organizations (IO). The UN coordinator seeks to attain unity of effort through the establishment of the UN Disaster Management Team (DMT).

UN High Commissioner for Refugees (HCR): The HCR is responsible for coordinating the response of the UN system to a refugee emergency. "Upon request of the Secretary-General, the UN HCR provides assistance to internally displaced persons."

World Food Program (WFP): The WFP provides "food rations, feeding programs, and supplemental feeding activities to support rehabilitation, reconstruction, and risk reducing development programs." WFP mobilizes and coordinates the delivery of food aid from other sources.

United Nations Children's Fund (UNICEF): UNICEF is an organization focused on the "well-being of children and pregnant and lactating mothers, especially child health, nutrition and water."

World Health Organization (WHO): WHO is involved primarily in long-range health programs. "It provides advice and assistance in all aspects of preventive and curative health care. This assistance includes the preparedness of health services for the rapid response to disasters."

Food and Agriculture Organization (FAO): FAO is an organization focused on long range programs intended to increase food output in the country. "It provides technical advice in reducing vulnerability and helps in the rehabilitation of agriculture, livestock, and fisheries."

US GOVERNMENT AGENCIES/ORGANIZATIONS

Agency for International Development (AID): This USG organization works indirectly under the control of the Department of State. It "coordinates activities at cabinet and country level."

Office of Foreign Disaster Assistance (OFDA): OFDA and AID have the authority to coordinate USG assistance in response to disasters. Because OFDA has the authority to provide immediate response and commitment of funds their ability to expedite relief efforts is critical. OFDA is also responsible for coordinating the efforts of NGOs and the Department of Defense directly. In addition they coordinate with International Organizations, the UN and other donor countries in an attempt to streamline the humanitarian effort.

NON-GOVERNMENT ORGANIZATIONS

American Council for Voluntary International Action (InterAction): InterAction is "a broadly based coalition of 152 American private and voluntary organizations that work in international development, refugee assistance, public policy and education of Americans about third world nations... A grant from the US Foreign Disaster Assistance (OFDA) has helped this organization establish a professional forum for cooperation, joint planning, and the exchange of information when disaster occurs. However, it is not likely that InterAction will operate within the country in need of assistance. Their work is executed in the US and is geared to maintain an effective liaison with OFDA. It acts as a coordinator at the staff level in meeting within the country in need.

Catholic Relief Services (CRS): "CRS operates relief, welfare, and self-help programs in 74 countries to assist refugees, war victims, and other needy people. CRS emphasizes the distribution of food and clothing, and the provision of primary health care."

Cooperative for American Relief Everywhere, Inc. (CARE): "CARE conducts relief and development programs in 40 countries" throughout the world.... Programs are carried out under three-way partnership contracts among CARE, private or national government agencies, and local communities in the areas of health, nutrition, AIDS, population management, natural resources management, agriculture, small economic activities, and emergency assistance... Their particular strength is in emergency medicine, vaccinations, and basic hygiene services.

Doctors Without Borders/Medicins Sans Frontiers (MSF): "MSF provides medical assistance to victims of disasters, accidents, and war. The US organization is closely associated with their counterparts in Belgium, Holland, Spain, and France.... Their particular area of expertise is emergency medicine, vaccinations, and basic hygiene services."

The International Medical Corps (IMC): The "IMC provides health care and establishes health training programs in developing countries and distressed areas worldwide. They can often be found where other agencies choose not to operate.

International Rescue Committee (IRC): The "IRC assists refugees and internally displaced victims of war and civil strife. Services range from emergency relief and assistance programs to refugee resettlement in the United States. They are capable of

providing "emergency medical support, public health, and small-scale water and sanitation capabilities."

Irish Concern (CONCERN): "Concern is one of the foreign NGOs that receives funding from AID/OFDA. Their primary area of expertise is supplementary and therapeutic feeding and sanitation."

World Vision Relief and Development, Inc. (WVRD): World Vision "provides cash, gifts in-kind, services in-kind, and technical resources for large scale relief/rehabilitation and development projects in over 90 countries throughout the world."

INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATIONS

International Red Cross and Red Crescent Movement: Three Red Cross Organizations make up this organization (International Committee of the Red Cross, National Red Cross and Red Crescent Societies, and International Federation of Red Cross and Red Crescent Societies). The objective of the movement is to coordinate the efforts of its subordinate organizations. Both the Federation and National organizations are focused primarily on disaster assistance and relief efforts within their own borders.

The International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC): "The ICRC works for the faithful application of the provisions of international humanitarian law applicable in armed conflicts and undertakes tasks incumbent upon it under this law. Founded in 1863, this international organization is based in Geneva and derives its mandate from the Geneva Conventions of 1949 and the two additional Protocols of 1977. At times the ICRC may get involved in strictly humanitarian operations, but their mandate is to function only during armed conflict."

International Organization for Migration: This organization has "three primary missions: (1) The processing and movement of refugees to countries offering them resettlement opportunities. (2) The provision of orderly and planned migration to meet emigration and immigration requirements of losing and gaining countries. (3) The transfer of technology through the movement of qualified human resources to promote economic, educational and social advancement of developing countries."

ENDNOTES

- ¹ David. C. Morrison, "Intervention V. Sovereignty" National Journal January 1994, 93.
- ² As quoted from the introduction of a speech by Jan Eliasson to the Foreign Policy Association in New York, 15 December 1993. "The Humanitarian Challenges for the UN: Lessons to be Learned from Bosnia and Somalia?" (New York: United Nations, 1993), 1.
- ³ On 14 March 1994, Secretary General Boutros Boutros Ghali presented a report to the UN General Assembly and the Security Council. The report described the direction of UN peace operations and the changes needed to improve the organization's ability to perform effectively in the future. In his report he recognized the difficulty and importance of linking the political, military and humanitarian efforts as part of the overall solution to international peace and stability. Improving the Capacity of the United Nations for Peace-keeping. (New York: United Nations, 1994), 3. See also Jeffrey Clark, "United Nations Humanitarian Interventions: Somalia and Mozambique Progress Proves Elusive," (Washington DC: Refugee Policy Group, 1993).
- ⁴ Refer to the Appendix A for a legal interpretation of humanitarian intervention.
- ⁵ Multidimensional is a term which describes the complexity of these types of operations. Participants include political, humanitarian and military organizations which are controlled by established nation-states or international organizations such as the UN. They may also include organizations which consider themselves apolitical such as the International Committee of the Red Cross or other relief organizations. In addition, the potential exists for relief organizations to intervene in support of specific faction in the conflict based on ethnic or religious ties. In an ideal environment the efforts of all participants would be synchronized to relieve human suffering in the short-term and as part of a long term strategy for peace and stability in the affected region.
- ⁶ FM 100-5 identifies the difficulties in attaining unity of command in operations other than war. The manual recommends striving for unity of effort in order to accomplish the mission. FM 100-5, Operations. (Washington DC: HQDA, 1993), 13-0 to 13-5.
- ⁷ For a definition of unity of command see FM 100-5, Glossary-9. For examples of how the concept of unity of command may not always apply and how unity of effort does see: John T. Fishel, "Achieving the Elusive Unity of Effort", Gray Area Phenomena: Confronting the New World Disorder. Max G. Manwaring, ed., 109. John Fishel offers an insightful perspective on the difficulties of attaining unity of effort between the US Department of Defense and the Department of State. His case studies

include interagency operations following US armed intervention in Panama (PROMOTE LIBERTY); the drug war in Latin America (Operation BLAST FURNACE) and counterinsurgency efforts in El Salvador.

⁸ See William Durch's study on The Evolution of UN Peacekeeping: Case Studies and Comparative Analysis (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1993) for details on past and current peace operations.

⁹ Appendix B provides extracts of UN Charter Chapters VI and VII for further examination.

¹⁰ Office of U.S. Foreign Disaster Assistance (OFDA), Civilian/Military Involvement in Humanitarian Interventions: Conference Proceedings, May 26-27, 1993, Washington DC: USAID, 1.

¹¹ As quoted in Minear and Weiss, Humanitarian Action in Times of War, 7; from Jarrat Chopra and Thomas G. Weiss, "Sovereignty Is No Longer Sacrosanct," Ethics and International Affairs 6 (1992), 117.

¹² As quoted in Minear and Weiss, Humanitarian Action in Times of War, 9; from Javier de Cuellar, "Report of the Secretary-General on a New International Humanitarian Order" (New York: United Nations: October 1985).

¹³ Much has been written within the academic community on defining the current global disorder and predicting the nature of near-term conflicts. Three sources which provide varying perspectives on the nature of future conflicts include: Paul Kennedy, Preparing for the Twenty-First Century (New York: Random House, 1993); Robert Kaplan "The Coming Anarchy" The Atlantic Monthly, 1 February 1994, 44-76; and Samuel Huntington "The Clash of Civilization?" Foreign Affairs, Summer '93, 22-49.

¹⁴ John Mackinlay and Jarat Chopora's article, "A Draft Concept of Second Generation Multinational Operations 1993" (Providence RI: Brown University, 1993) provides a primer to understanding the evolution of peace operations and the direction they are headed in the future. They refer to recent operations in Somalia and Bosnia as "Second Generation" missions. These peace operations reflect a change from the traditional peacekeeping. Characteristics of second generation missions include: 1) lack of bipolar influence; 2) international concern; 3) requirement to conduct peace enforcement as well as peacekeeping; 4) significant effort placed on humanitarian relief by international private organizations and 5) tendency to be classified as intra-state conflicts. This article coupled with Boutros Boutros Ghali's report entitled An Agenda for Peace (New York: United Nations, 1992) provide a framework for current debates in the study of peace operations.

¹⁵ The terms used to describe peace operations vary. Appendix A indicates the most commonly used terms and sources for these types of operations. Except for the

use of the term humanitarian intervention this monograph will follow the terminology used by the Joint Staff. The term humanitarian intervention is an emerging term which is included in peace enforcement and humanitarian assistance operations. It is commonly used to justify recent operations in Northern Iraq and Somalia during which armed force was required to enable relief efforts to proceed. See also Tim Thomas' work on the multitude of terms applied to these operations. Peace Operations: Terminology Challenge Before the International Community in a Period of Post-Cold War Cooperation. (Fort Leavenworth, Kansas: Foreign Military Studies Office, 1993)

¹⁶ In a speech at the National War College, Madeline Albright explained that not only were the number of UN peacekeeping operations increasing but that the Clinton administration "was ready to do its part," to strengthen the UN's capability to conduct these types of operations in the future. "Know When to Say NO," Army Times, 11 October 1993, 35.

¹⁷ Boutros Boutros Ghali. "Don't Make the U.N.'s Job Harder" The New York Times 20 August 1993, A11.

¹⁸ As quoted in David J. Scheffer, "Toward a Modern Doctrine of Humanitarian Intervention" University of Toledo Law Review Winter 1992, 262.

¹⁹ Robert W. Tucker and David C. Hendrickson's treatise on the perception and temptation of the US embracing a foreign policy of imperialism, is a legitimate fear among many international actors. A similar line of thinking can be expanded to include a fear by non-western powers that the UN is a tool of the economic elite. The Imperial Temptation: The New World Order and America's Purpose. (New York: Council on Foreign Relations Press, 1992.).

²⁰ Thomas Weiss' analysis of humanitarian relief in Africa illustrates the importance of aligning legitimate political and humanitarian efforts for the overall good of a nation. It also provides historical background for the use of military resources to enable relief efforts to be conducted. Humanitarian Emergencies and Military Help in Africa (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1990).

²¹ Larry Minear and Thomas G. Weiss, "The tough-love of humanitarians" The Providence Journal, 8 March 1993. See also Larry Minear, "NGOs on the Front Lines" (Washington DC: Refugee Policy Group, 1993); and Larry Minear, Humanitarian Action in the Former Yugoslavia: The U.N.'s Role 1991-1993 (Providence RI: Brown University, 1994).

²² These characteristics were confirmed by numerous UN, NGO and US government sources in addition to several scholarly works on the subject to include: Kevin Cahill M. ed. A Framework for Survival: Health, Human Rights, and Humanitarian Assistance in Conflicts and Disasters (New York: Basic Books and the

Council on Foreign Relations, 1993); Larry Minear, Humanitarian Action in the Former Yugoslavia: The U.N.'s Role 1991-1993 (Providence RI: Brown University, 1994); and Andrew S. Natsios. "Food Through Force: Humanitarian Interventions and U.S. Policy" Washington Quarterly Winter 1994, 129-144; Leonard Sullivan, Jr. Meeting the Challenges of Regional Security (Carlisle Barracks, PA: SSI, 1994.) and Graham H. Turbiville Jr. "Operations Other Than War: Organized Crime Dimension" Military Review January 1994, 35-57.

²³ Joint Pub 3-0, Doctrine for Joint Operations (Washington DC: Office of the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, September 1993), GL-8. See also Air Land Sea Application Center, HA: Multi-Service Procedures for Humanitarian Assistance Operations (Langley Air Force base, VA: ALSAC, 24 September 1993).

²⁴ Boutros Ghali, Improving the Capacity of the United Nations Peace-keeping, 1-10.

²⁵ In James Ingram's article, "The Politics of Human Suffering" The National Interest Spring 1993, 59-61; the author provides a concise description of the characteristics of recent "complex humanitarian emergencies" which extend beyond the traditional bounds of humanitarian efforts of the past. Referring to these crises as complex emergencies is common terminology amongst the humanitarian relief community.

²⁶ As quoted in Minear and Weiss, Humanitarian Action in Times of War, 88; from Harold Miller correspondence with the Humanitarianism and War Project dated 23 July 1992, 2. See also Leon Gordenmaker and Thomas G. Weiss, Soldiers, Peacekeepers and Disaster. (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1991).

²⁷ As quoted in Minear and Weiss, Humanitarian Action in Times of War, 85; from Jan Eliason, in UN Department of Public Information, "Enlarging the UN's Humanitarian Mandate," December 1992, 1. See also Larry Minear and Thomas G. Weiss, Humanitarian Actions in Times of War (Boulder, CO: Lynne Reinner, 1993).

²⁸ Based on a description of the interactive relief network described in the NGO After Action Review of JRTC Exercise in Peace Enforcement, November 1993, 3. This report was completed after seven civilian workers representing six relief organizations conducted an interagency peace enforcement exercise at the US Army's Joint Readiness Training Center in the fall of 1993.

²⁹ Appendix C provides a description of representative humanitarian organizations which may be found in theater during a humanitarian intervention operation.

³⁰ FM 100-5, Operations, (Washington DC: HQDA), 13-4.

³¹ Joint Unit Lessons learned (JULLS) from PROVIDE COMFORT and RESTORE HOPE indicate that a military coordination center collocated with the primary relief coordinators is essential in these types of operations. Specific details are discussed in JULLS 52961-82034 (06191), 17541-4200 (06293), and 02841-74485 (07828) for PROVIDE COMFORT. RESTORE HOPE JULLS include 33083-11863 (08674), 62932-06391 (08735), 62935-98652 (08736), 62939-03900 (08737), 62948-11286 (08738). Joint Staff, J-7/EAD, Joint Unit Lessons Learned (Washington DC: The Joint Staff, 1994. See also Center for Army Lessons Learned. Operations Other Than War, Volume IV: Peace Operations (Fort Leavenworth, KS: CALL, US Army CAC, 1993).

³² Boutros Ghali, Improving the Capacity of the United Nations Peace-keeping, 9.

³³ James C. Ingram, "The Politics of Human Suffering" The National Interest Spring 1993, 61. A concise discussion of the humanitarian community appears in Overseas Development Institute Briefing Paper, "Recent Changes in the International Relief System," (London, January 1993).

³⁴ ODI, "Current Changes in the International Relief System" ODI Briefing Paper, 1. Both Larry Minear and Robert Gallagher highlight the increasing difficulty humanitarian relief organizations have recently faced in eastern Europe and Africa. Their accounts illustrate the growing politicization of NGO efforts in regions where there is no established government structure to coordinate with. Minear, "NGOs on the Front Lines"; and Gallagher, Remarks at the International Institute of Humanitarian law, (Sam Remo, Italy: 8 September 1993).

³⁵ Minear, "NGOs on the Front Lines", 4. See also Dennis Gallagher's essay, "Beyond the Front Lines" (Washington DC: US Institute for Peace, October 1993).

³⁶ Frederick C. Cuny, "Dilemmas of Military Involvement in Humanitarian Relief" Soldiers, Peacekeepers and Disasters Gordonmaker and Weiss eds., (London: Macmillan, 1992) 53. The work of David Wurmser and Nancy Bearg Dyke in capturing the debate within the academic, policy, humanitarian and military community on how to deal with current international operations provides valuable insight into the problems of attaining unity of effort. The Professionalism of Peacekeeping: A Study Group Report (Washington DC: US Institute for Peace, 1993).

³⁷ The military is not always the most cost-effective means of providing relief except under those war-time type conditions or when immediate crisis repose can only be provided by the military. An example of the cost effectiveness of using military resources is as follows: "When airlifting relief supplies into Somalia prior to Operation Provide Relief, DOD used approximately 400 support personnel and 7 C130 aircraft carrying 10 to 14 tons each. AID determined that a civilian contractor could

accomplish the same task with approximately 7 support personnel and 6 L-100 aircraft carrying 20 tons each." Frank J. Cook, et al. The Defense Department's Role in Humanitarian and Disaster Relief (Boston: Harvard University, 1993), 9.

³⁸ See Cook, The Defense Departments Role in Humanitarian and Disaster, 1-5; and ALSA, HA: Multi-service procedures for Humanitarian Assistance Operations, I-14, Appendix A and B for a discussion of the legal issues which bind the Department of Defense.

³⁹ As quoted from the testimony of Andrew S. Natsios before the House Foreign Affairs Subcommittee on Africa on 16 September 1992. The subject of his presentation was the US Relief Effort in Somalia., 13. After completing his duties as President Bush's special coordinator for Somali relief and assistant administrator of AID, Natsios assumed the role of vice president of World Vision. His seasoned perspective of the potential problems and solutions of US involvement in humanitarian intervention can be found in "Food Through Force: Humanitarian Intervention and U.S. Policy" The Washington Quarterly Winter 1994, 129-144.

⁴⁰ Citations on the authorized use of force for humanitarian purposes are based on UN Charter Chapter VII and specific resolutions passed by the UN Security Council. Resolution 688, adopted 5 April 1991, was intended to legitimize humanitarian efforts to assist the Kurds in Northern Iraq, Associated Press, electronic media, 27 August 1992, 1-2. Resolution 733, dated 23 January 1992, was intended to justify armed intervention to secure humanitarian relief in war torn Somalia, The United Nations and the Situation In Somalia, UN Reference Paper, 30 April 1993, 13. In addition, Resolution 794, 3 December 1992, further emphasized the international resolve for humanitarian intervention action to include the use of force, 22-24 in Somalia. Resolution 836, 4 June 1993, authorizes the use of force to protect humanitarian efforts in Bosnia-Hercegovina, Agence France Presse, electronic media, 18 February 1994, 1.

⁴¹ As quoted in Minear and Weiss, Humanitarian Action in Times of War, 79; from Walter B. Wriston, The Twilight of Sovereignty: How the Information Revolution is Transforming Our World (New York: Charles Scriber's Sons, 1992), 138-139.

⁴² The collection of Joint Unit Lessons Learned collated by the Joint Staff J-7/EAD provides a wealth of information on how the military adapted to the situation in Northern Iraq. Many of the techniques and procedures utilized are reflected in recent operations in Bosnia and Somalia. Concepts of how to attain unity of effort are also reflected in the interagency doctrine effort currently on-going by the Air Land Sea Application Center, HA: Multi-service Procedures for Humanitarian Assistance.

⁴³ Carol D. Clair, Humanitarian Assistance and the Elements of Operational Design (Fort Leavenworth, KS: School of Advanced Military Studies, 1993), 10.

⁴⁴ John Fishel, Liberation, Occupation, and Rescue: War Termination and Desert Storm (Carlisle Barracks, PA: Strategic Studies Institute, 1992), 51.

⁴⁵ Office of Foreign Disaster Assistance. "Situation Report No. 1, Northern Iraq -- Displaced Persons" (Washington DC: USAID, 25 February 1994), 1.

⁴⁶ Thomas G. Weiss. "New Challenges for UN Military Operations: Implementing an Agenda for Peace" The Washington Quarterly Winter 1993, electronic media: Lexus-Nexus, 7.

⁴⁷ "Text of UN Resolution on Iraqi Repression" (AP News electronic media, 27 August 1992), 1.

⁴⁸ Ibid., 1. See also the discussion by James C. Ingram in "The Politics of Human Suffering" The National Interest Spring 1993, 59.

⁴⁹ Weiss, "New Challenges for UN Operations", 7.

⁵⁰ These characteristics are based on several case studies of the operation. See the following for a more in-depth analysis. Stephen C. Pelletiere. THE KURDS AND THEIR AGAS: An Assessment of the Situation in Northern Iraq (Carlisle Barracks, PA: SSI, 1991); John P. Cavanaugh, Operation Provide Comfort: A Model for Future NATO Operations. (Fort Leavenworth, KS: SAMS, 1992); and Center For Army Lessons Learned, Operations Other Than War, Vol I: Humanitarian Assistance (Fort Leavenworth, KS: CALL, CAC, December 1992).

⁵¹ Fishel, Liberation, Occupation and Rescue, 51.

⁵² CALL, Operations Other Than War Vol. 1, iii.

⁵³ Ibid., i. See also Fishel, Liberation, Occupation, and Rescue and Clair, Humanitarian Assistance and the Elements of Operational Design.

⁵⁴ John Fishel personally interviewed LTG Shalikashvili as a part of his in-depth research of Operation PROVIDE COMFORT. Liberation, Occupation, and Rescue, 52.

⁵⁵ See Fishel, Liberation, Occupation and Rescue, 51-58; and Clair, Humanitarian Assistance and the Elements of Operational Design for details of the command, control and coordination relationships.

⁵⁶ The Center for Army Lessons Learned and the Joint Staff's Lessons Learned indicate that adequate doctrine did not exist. According to a report by CALL written shortly after the initial stages of the operation, "Neither Joint Service nor U.S. Army doctrine exists in the required detail and depth for refugee-type operations. Although

PROVIDE COMFORT was a tremendous success, it demonstrated a need for doctrinal publication to provide guidance to commanders and staff, delineating planning factors, responsibilities, and methods." CALL, Operations Other Than War Vol. 1, 18. Based on discussions with experienced relief workers in InterAction, OFDA and the IRC a similar problem existed in the international relief community. While working with the military was not unfamiliar, the complexities of working in a hostile environment added a unique challenge to humanitarian efforts.

⁵⁷ For a discussion of the unique SOF assets and how they were utilized see Fishel, Liberation, Occupation and Rescue, 51-58; and CALL, Operations Other Than War Vol. 1. Fishel provides another case study on similar humanitarian operations following the US intervention in Panama. The use of SOF forces during the post-Conflict phase of the operation is analogous to the type of functions they are capable of performing during humanitarian interventions. Fishel, The Fog of Peace: Planning and Executing the Restoration of Panama. (Carlisle Barracks, PA: SSI, 1992).

⁵⁸ Interview by the author with Shawn Messick, OFDA desk officer responsible for humanitarian relief in Northern Iraq, interview, 2 April 1994. Mr. Messick was involved with the initial stages of PROVIDE COMFORT as a member of the DART team in Iraq.

⁵⁹ Ibid.

⁶⁰ Fishel, Liberation, Occupation and Rescue, 57-58.

⁶¹ Office of Foreign Disaster Assistance. "Situation Report No. 1, Northern Iraq -- Displaced Persons" (Washington DC: AID, 25 February 1994), 2.

JULLS 21049-45804 (06184), (Washington DC: J-7/EAD, 9 March 1994), 9.

⁶³ Ibid., 4.

⁶⁴ As quoted by Larry Minear and Thomas G. Weiss, Humanitarian Action in Times of War. (Boulder CO: Lynne Reinner Publishers, 1993), 81.

⁶⁵ OFDA, Situation Report No. 25, Somalia -- Civil Strife, (Washington DC: AID, 4 March 1994), 1. According to AID/OFDA "the key issue facing the USG and the rest of the international donor community in Somalia is how to deliver food safely to those who need it." The two types of threats relief efforts faced were clans and "gangs of well-armed teenage thugs." The clans attacked and impeded humanitarian efforts as a means of indirectly attacking a rival clan. They also looted relief supplies as a means of obtaining items which could be sold on the black market thereby enhancing their ability to purchase more weapons. OFDA, "Points of Security: A Strategy for Delivering Humanitarian Relief in Somalia," (Washington DC: USAID, 1992).

⁶⁶ Walter S. Clarke. Somalia: Background Information for Operation Restore Hope 1992-93 (Carlisle Barracks PA: SSI, 1992), 34-35. According to Susan Walker, OFDA, "there were two expatriate NGOs killed before UNITAF, [and] three during the first three months of UNITAF."

⁶⁷ United Nations, The United Nations and the Situation in Somalia, UN Reference Paper. (New York: UN, 30 April 1993), 2-3; For a concise overview see William J. Durch. The Evolution of UN Peacekeeping: Case Studies and Comparative Analysis. (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1993), 472-475.

⁶⁸ Marguerite Michaels, "Lemon Aid: How Somalian Relief Went Wrong" Time, 4 April 1993, transmitted electronically from America On Line, 19 April 1994, 1-2. See also articles by Graham Turbiville and Leonard Sullivan for the criminalization aspect of these types of conflicts. Turbiville, "Operations Other Than War: Organized Crime Dimension" Military Review. January 1994, 35-47; Sullivan, Meeting the Challenges of Regional Security. (Carlisle Barracks, PA: SSI, 1994).

⁶⁹ Michaels, "Lemon Aid", 2.

⁷⁰ United Nations, The United Nations and the Situation in Somalia, UN Reference Paper. (New York: United Nations, 30 April 1993), 2-3 and 7.

⁷¹ Center for Army lessons Learned, Revised Final Draft, Operation RESTORE HOPE Lessons Learned. (Fort Leavenworth, KS: CALL, August 1993), I-14.

⁷² Ibid., 3. For the perspective from the military commander see: S. L. Arnold "Somalia: An Operation Other Than War" Military Review December 1993, 26-35. OFDA's view is expressed in their strategy for relief operations -- OFDA, "A Return to Civilian Relief Operations in Somalia" (Washington DC: USAID, 9 October 1992). A divergent view on the need for armed intervention and its negative effect were reported by the human rights organization African Rights -- Rakiya Omaar and Alex de Waal, eds. Somalia Operation Restore Hope: A Preliminary Assessment. (London: African Rights, May 1993).

⁷³ JULLS 40266-19543 (08643), 13-15.

⁷⁴ JULLS 6239-03900 (08737), 27-28.

⁷⁵ S. L. Arnold and David T. Stahl, "A Power Projection Army in Operations Other Than War" Parameters Winter 1993-94, 13.

⁷⁶ United Nations, The United Nations and the Situation in Somalia, UN Reference Paper. (New York: United Nations, 30 April 1993), 8.

⁷⁷ OFDA, Situation Report No. 25, Somalia -- Civil Strife, (Washington DC: AID, 4 March 1994), 2.

⁷⁸ *Ibid.*, 2.

⁷⁹ Colin Powell, "U.S. Forces: Challenges Ahead" Foreign Affairs Winter 1992-1993, 40.

⁸⁰ Gene M. Lyons, "A New Collective Security: The United Nations and International Peace" The Washington Quarterly Spring 1994, 175.

⁸¹ ODI, "Current Changes in the International Relief System", 2 (emphasis added). See also the discussion of the right of intervention in Lyons' article "A New Collective Security", 179-82

⁸² Ernest Evans, "Peacekeeping: Two Views, The U.S. Military and Peacekeeping Operations," World Affairs, Spring 1993, 146. For a perspective of the US Army's role see William Doll and Steve Metz, The Army and Multinational Peace Operations: Problems and Solutions (Carlisle Barracks, PA: Strategic Studies Institute, 1993). See also James R. Graham, ed. Non-Combat Roles for the U.S. Military in the Post-Cold War Era (Washington DC: National Defense University Press, 1993). Samuel P. Huntington offers another perspective in "New Contingencies, OLD ROLES" Joint Forces Quarterly Autumn 1993, 38-43.

⁸³ For a well-informed perspective of how humanitarian intervention could fit into US policy read Andrew Natsios article, "Food Through Force: Humanitarian Intervention and U.S. Policy" The Washington Quarterly Winter 1994, 129-144.

⁸⁴ John O.B. Sewall "Implications for U.N. Peacekeeping" Joint Forces Quarterly Winter 1993-94, 31.

⁸⁵ *Ibid.*, 31.

⁸⁶ "The Four Pillars to Emerging 'Strategy of Enlargement'" The Christian Science Monitor, 29 September 1993, 19. Five days after Anthony Lake gave his speech at Johns Hopkins University, President Clinton addressed the UN reaffirming his commitment to democratization and protection of the world's people against inhumane treatment. "Clinton: UN Must Adapt to Different World," The Christian Science Monitor, 29 September 1993, 19.

⁸⁷ National Security Strategy of the United States (Draft), (Washington DC: The White House, 9 September 1993), 3-5. In this draft strategy the Clinton Administration identifies four security challenges in the post-Cold War period: 1) sustain major power cooperation; 2) contain or resolve regional conflicts; 3) promote global economic cooperation; and 4) promote democracy and human rights abroad. With regards to

peace operations the strategy also states that "establishing an effective multilateral peacemaking, peacekeeping and peace enforcement capability to deal with conflicts that could affect our national security before they do so is essential to continued American strength and flexibility, (p. 9)

⁸⁸ See Appendix A. Glossary of Common Terms.

⁸⁹ Frank Wisner, Undersecretary of Defense for Policy testified before the Senate Armed Services Committee Subcommittee on Coalition defense and reinforcing Forces on 14 July 1993. In his prepared statement, Wisner testified that peacekeeping operations posed one of the most difficult and critical tasks facing DOD. He also explained that peacekeeping in the post-Cold War environment is different than we are accustomed. He referred to the single struggle within the military to develop policy, force structure and doctrine which adapted to the nuances between peacekeeping and peace enforcement. In both of these types of operations support to humanitarian assistance efforts has been an inherent task for the military.

⁹⁰ Edward J. Dennehy, et al. A Blue Helmet Combat Force. Harvard University, Cambridge MA., 1993) 21.

⁹¹ Samuel P. Huntington, The Soldier and The State (Cambridge MA: Harvard University Press, 1957) 11. For a more current interpretation of the military's role see Cook, The Defense Department's Role in Humanitarian and Disaster Relief, 6-11.

⁹² The primary military doctrinal manuals which have been developed for peace operations include: Joint Pub 3-0, Doctrine for Joint Operations. (Washington DC: OCJCS, September 1993); Joint Pub 3-07.3 JTTP for Peacekeeping Operations. (Washington DC: OCJCS, December 1992); FM 100-5, Operations (Washington DC: HQDA, May 1993) and FM 100-23 Peace Operations (Washington DC: HQDA, January 1994).

⁹³ The JRTC conducted a peace enforcement training exercise in the fall of 1993. Besides joint military units participants included members from the OFDA, IRC, InterAction, WVRD, ARC, and CARE. Lauren Landis, NGO After-Action Review of JRTC Exercise in Peace Enforcement" (November, 1993); Joint Readiness Training Center, "Peace Operations" JRTC Rotation 94-2, Peace Enforcement Rotation Scenario Briefing, (Fort Polk, LA: 1993).

⁹⁴ Code of the International Red Cross and Red Crescent Movement and NGOs in Disaster Relief (Steering Committee for Humanitarian Response, Geneva, 1993), 2. The Catholic Relief Services has also developed a code of conduct. "CRS Guidelines on Humanitarian Assistance in Conflict Situations," (Harpers Ferry, VA: April 1992).

⁹⁵ Air Land Sea Application Center, HA: Multi-Service Procedures for Humanitarian Assistance Operations, I-7

⁹⁶ Ibid., I-9

⁹⁷ Ibid., III-1 to VI-20.

⁹⁸ As quoted in Minear and Weiss, Humanitarian Action in Times of War, 82; from Sadakto Ogata, "Refugees and World Peace." Symposium on Strengthening the United Nations — Peace and Environment, Tokyo, January 1993, 15.

⁹⁹ Evans, Cooperating for Peace, 155-56.

¹⁰⁰ John O. B. Sewall's discussion of the harmonization of doctrine for peace operations. He provides a concise analysis of the current problems and potential pitfalls of failing to develop widely accepted doctrine. Sewall, "implications for U.N. Peacekeeping" Joint Forces Quarterly Winter 1993-94, 32-33.

¹⁰¹ Code of the International Red Cross and Red Crescent Movement and NGOs in Disaster Relief (Steering Committee for Humanitarian Response, Geneva, 1993).

¹⁰² Lauren Landis, "NGO After-Action Review of JRTC Exercise on Peace Enforcement," (Washington DC: InterAction, November 1993), VIII.

¹⁰³ Robert D. Kaplan, "The Coming Anarchy" The Atlantic Monthly, February 1994, 70.

¹⁰⁴ Lauren Landis, "NGO After-Action Review of JRTC Exercise on Peace Enforcement," (Washington DC: InterAction, November 1993), VIII.

¹⁰⁵ John T. Fishel, "Attaining the Elusive Unity of Effort" Max Manning, ed. Gray Area Phenomena: Confronting the New World Disorder (Boulder CO: Westview Press, 1993), 124.

¹⁰⁶ This information was transposed from Pacific Armies Management Seminar, "United Nations Peacekeeping Operations," pp. 317-323 and verified in the The Encyclopedia of the United Nations and International Relations (New York: Taylor and Francis, 1990), 946-951.

¹⁰⁷ Descriptions are taken from Appendix C of the HA: Multi-Service Procedures for Humanitarian Assistance Operations, Post Working Group Draft, 24 September 1993. Portions on USG organizations and international organizations is taken from pages III-6 to III-7 and II-10 to II-12 respectfully.

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