Joint Task Force Somalia, A Case Study

by

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A paper submitted to the faculty of the Naval War College in partial satisfaction of the requirements of the Department of Operations.

The contents of this paper reflect my own personal views and are not necessarily endorsed by the Naval War College or the Department of the Navy.

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14 March 1995

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Abstract:

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Abstract of
JOINT TASK FORCE SOMALIA, A CASE STUDY

Since 1983, the United States Armed Forces have been involved in 33 Joint Task Forces (JTF). The scope of these JTF's have varied from Noncombatant Evacuation and Relief (disaster and humanitarian) operations to Environmental Cleanup operations. Joint Task Force Somalia provides a unique opportunity to review one of the key components of a JTF: command and control. "The fundamental challenge facing JTF command elements is achieving unity of effort among diverse service forces in a relatively short period of time." The presence of an effective command and control structure established for Joint Task Force Somalia appeared to be clear and straight forward. However, the command relationships were not as clear as the authors may have thought. In the end, it was professionalism and dedication to duty that got the mission accomplished. While these are time honored traits of U.S. military personnel, these traits should not be continually relied upon as "work arounds" for problems where solutions do exist. A solution is the designation of a service organization as the nucleus of a JTF.
Preface

With the exception of Chapter I, this paper is written from the viewpoint of a primary staff member who was assigned to Joint Task Force Somalia. U.S. forces have only recently completed their withdrawal from Somalia, therefore, printed reference material is not readily available. The observations contained in this paper are first hand accounts. The reader should also be aware that the use of the term "campaign plan" (Chapter III) is that of the Commander, Joint Task Force Somalia and not this author's. Finally, the primary source of information for LTC Olson's unpublished article "Doctrine and Practice: Standing up Joint Task Force Somalia" was an After Action Review (AAR) conducted in Somalia in early December 1993.
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CHAPTER I

INTRODUCTION

The Stage is Set. Fighting, violence, and civil war have not been uncommon to the country of Somalia. However, Somalia did not begin receiving international attention until 1991. In January of that year, General Siad Barre was deposed as the ruler of Somalia by an alliance consisting of the Somali National Movement (SNM), the Somali Patriotic Movement (SPM), and the United Somali Congress (USC). General Barre had led the country since 1969. As the country's ruler he:

... had maintained a centralized and authoritarian regime that had literally ruined the country. The economy was in a shambles, political institutions had collapsed, corruption was rampant, morale in the civil and armed services was low and clanism was at its height. Amnesty International reported gross human rights abuses by government forces perpetrated against opposition clans, culminating in the massacre of tens of thousands of Issaq clan members in 1988.1

In a rapid move, the USC announced that Ali Mahdi would be the interim president of Somalia. While Mahdi and Aideed are from the same major clan, the announcement brought about an immediate split along sub-clan lines. A vicious struggle for power ensued between the Abgals, led by Mahdi, and the Habar Gedirs, led by Aideed. While there are 13 additional clans in Somalia, the clans led by Mahdi and Aideed are the most powerful. "These clan groups are not fighting over ideology, religion, values or any other fundamentally substantive bones of contention. They are primarily fighting over power."2

The fighting between the two clan factions intensified in November 1991 and
continued at a relatively high level through February 1992. This escalation is reported to have killed at least 30,000 and forced more than one million Somali refugees to flee to neighboring countries. Concurrent with the escalation in fighting, the international community became more attentive to the situation. The U.N.:

... monitored the Somali conflict, and issued a series of progressively more strongly worded statements condemning the brutality and calling for an end to the bloodshed. Intervention appeared problematic, however, for the U.N. mandate only authorizes action with regard to international conflict. Somalia by this time is essentially a non-state, and clearly in the midst of what can be only described as a treacherous civil war.³

In March 1992, a cease-fire agreement was worked out between Aideed and Mahdi. While the cease-fire did reduce the numbers killed by the intra-clan fighting, the looting of international aid shipments was increasing. A delayed move by the U.N. to counter the looting trend occurred in August 1992 when it authorized the deployment of the first group of peacekeepers, a unit (battalion) of Pakistani soldiers. However, these "U.N. peace-keeping troops were essentially powerless due to notoriously restrictive missions and rules of engagement."⁴ Little progress in reducing famine, disease, and fighting was to be made in Somalia over the next four months.

**Unified Task Force (UNITAF)**

By the fall of 1992, the combination of civil war, total government collapse, famine and disease in Somalia had taken the lives of between 300,000 and 500,000 people, and more than twice that number were in urgent need of food and medicine to avoid additional deaths; and there were 800,000 Somalia refugees in Kenya and Ethiopia. ... Attempts by the United Nations at political reconciliation, delivering aid, and traditional peacekeeping failed. Public opinion and conviction led President George Bush to call for a more active U.S. role.⁵
On 8 December 1992, the first of approximately 16,000 U.S. troops came ashore in Somalia at the capital city of Mogadishu. The Americans were part of what was eventually to become a 32,000 strong U.N. peacekeeping force. U.N. Security Council Resolution 794, passed on 3 December 1992, had authorized the deployment of the U.S.-led Unified Task Force (UNITAF) to Somalia. It is important to note that the resolution stated that the force was not a U.N. force but, rather, a force recognized by the Security Council. Though technically not a U.N. force, the U.N. did provide UNITAF with a mandate authorizing "...the use of all necessary means to establish as soon as possible a secure environment for humanitarian relief operations." U.S. forces deployed with a clearly defined mission: end clan fighting and protect humanitarian relief operations. The mission was envisioned to be of short duration for as soon as order was restored, U.S. forces were to be replaced by multi-national forces.

In the early stages of the deployment process, signs of unity of effort were evident in U.S. political and military leaders. Robert B. Oakley, President Bush's special envoy to Somalia and LTG Robert Johnston, Commander, UNITAF, met with both Mahdi and Aideed on 7 and 8 December 1992 to obtain their cooperation in assuring the safe arrival of UNITAF forces. In subsequent meetings, Mr. Oakley and LTG Johnston were equally successful in gaining the warring factions' cooperation with UNITAF. Both factions agreed to allow humanitarian activities to proceed unencumbered, and agreed to a ceasefire. While dialogue was the preferred method to achieve a benign security environment,
neither Mr. Oakley or LTG Johnston ruled out the use of force.

By the middle of February 1993, Mahdi had relinquished control of all his heavy weapons to UNITAF. The weapons belonging to Aideed had not been surrendered to UNITAF, but instead moved out of Mogadishu to Galacio. "Given the limited UNITAF mandate, which deliberately excluded general disarmament, there was no perceived need to confront Aideed over the disappearance of weapons as long as they posed no threat to UNITAF forces or humanitarian operations."7

As time progressed, the situation in Somalia was improving. Throughout the countryside, and in Mogadishu, commercial activity was resuming. Schools that had been closed as a result of the fighting were reopening. "Except for a minor uprising by Aideed's supporters in late February the Oakley/Johnston strategy of seeking cooperation, avoiding direct confrontation if possible, and gradually increasing pressure on all factions was working."8

United Nations Operation Somalia II (UNOSOM II). By 4 May 1993, large scale famine and disease had been overcome in southern Somalia, there was virtually no clan warfare, and relief agencies were scaling back many of their activities as normalcy was returning. Though there were reports of sporadic fighting in Kismayu, peace had been generally secured throughout Somalia. Operations were ready for transfer to UNOSOM II. With the exception of a 1,200 soldier Quick Reaction Force (QRF) and logistical personnel in support of UNOSOM II, all U.S. personnel were redeployed to the United States.
While UNOSOM II was technically able to assume the mission from UNITAF in early May 1993, they lacked sufficient forces on the ground in Somalia to conduct all of its assigned missions. Particularly noteworthy was their inability to conduct frequent patrols in Mogadishu. This shortfall allowed Aideed to return many of his men and weapons to the city. Aideed had recognized:

... that international peacekeeping - whether U.S.- or U.N.- led - would not dovetail with his interests. Aideed was obsessed with what he fully believed to be his destiny to become Somalia's leader, ... . His protestations about adhering to a political process were coupled with repeated attempts to subvert it whenever his Somalia National Alliance (SNA) faction seemed to be losing out.9

The event that was to successfully challenge and neutralize U.N. authority occurred on 5 June 1993. While searching Mogadishu for weapons that belonged to Aideed, Pakistani troops were ambushed by Aideed supporters. In this surprise attack, 24 Pakistanis were killed. Almost immediately, the U.N. Security Council called for the punishment of those responsible for the incident. The Security Council's decision also sought Aideed's arrest and the destruction of his command center. Mr. Oakley would later state "... focusing on Aideed seems to have caused a temporary memory loss about what UNITAF, the United Nations, and international relief agencies accomplished in Somalia since last December."10 What was the U.N. focus? Under Security Council Resolution 814, passed on 26 March 1993, the U.N. was "... to begin the work of rebuilding the government, reestablishing the essential elements of a national economy and developing an adequate system of justice and police to maintain order."11
In an effort to carry out the Security Council's desires to capture and punish those responsible for the 5 June 1993 slaying of the Pakistanis, U.S. forces, on 4 October 1993, swept into the suspected command and control center of Aideed. Fifteen hours later, 18 soldiers had been killed; more than 84 injured; and at least one was listed as missing. Somalis estimated their losses at 312 killed and 814 wounded. However, Aideed had not been found. Shortly after the raid, a presidential decision was made to reinforce those forces already in Somalia and have total withdrawal of U.S. forces completed by 31 March 1994. U.S. forces completed their withdrawal on 25 March 1994.
CHAPTER II

THE ESTABLISHMENT OF JOINT TASK FORCE SOMALIA

Guidance and Mission. The presidential decision to deploy additional forces to Somalia was made on 7 October 1993. The mission given to those forces was very clear. The deployed forces were: to protect U.S. troops and bases and keep open, and secure where necessary, essential U.S. and U.N. lines of communications. The president went on to say that these additional troops would remain under U.S. command and control.

The National Command Authority (NCA), having given broad, but clear guidance, passed the mission to Commander in Chief, U.S. Central Command (CINCCENT) for execution. As a result of the commander's estimate process at CINCCENT level, one task was added to the restated mission. That additional task instructed the newly deployed forces to plan, and be prepared to support, the withdrawal of U.S. forces from Somalia. The presidential imposed deadline of 31 March 1994 necessitated this task being added to the mission. Objectives, in the sense of warfare, were not established. The restated mission provided all of the information that the commander of the forces would require.

Command Relationships and Organization. CINCCENT had an in-theater menu of command structures that he could select from to provide the command and control of the deploying forces. Those options included the use of the 10th Mountain Division's Aviation Brigade, the Navy force commander off-shore of Somalia, or the Commander, U.S. Forces Somalia (COMUSFORSOM), who already had tactical control (TACON) of
the U.S. provided QRF. CINCCENT chose not to use any of the in-theater options. Instead, the decision was made to form Joint Task Force Somalia (JTF Somalia). His decision, promulgated by USCINCCENT FRAGO #001:

... provided for a headquarters that could plan for unilateral action to protect joint forces of the U.S. as well as for action in concert with coalition forces. JTF Somalia would provide command and control of U.S. forces augmenting the forces already in theater under Commander, U.S. Forces Somalia (COMUSFORSOM). JTF Somalia would assume the force protection and Quick Reaction Force (QRF) mission from COMUSFORSOM, provide an off-shore QRF capability, and provide armed aerial reconnaissance capability.

The established command relationships, shown in Figure 1, placed Commander, Joint Task Force Somalia (CJTF) under the operational control (OPCON) of CINCCENT. COMUSFORSOM had TACON of JTF Somalia. CINCCENT had command, less OPCON, of USFORSOM. Figure 1 also illustrates that there were no service component commands in JTF Somalia. On order, JTF Somalia was to exercise TACON over the Marine Expeditionary Units (MEU) and Naval task force that were off-shore.

An Army major general was designated to be CJTF with the deputy commander being a Marine Corps brigadier general. The staff was organized as a conventional primary and special staff as shown in Figure 2. Service component composition of the staff was 80% Army, 10% Marine, and 10% Navy/Air Force. The initial design and nucleus of the staff was provided by the Army's 10th Mountain Division (Light). The division had been deployed as part of UNITAF and had gained more than 18 months experience in Somalia.
The physical activation of JTF Somalia was done on short notice and a compressed time line:

- 8 October 1993: CJTF reports to CENTCOM
- 10 October 1993: Advance Party departs Ft. Drum, NY
- 14 October 1993: CINCCENT Activation Order
- 20 October 1993: CJTF departs for Somalia
- 20 October 1993: JTF Somalia operational

Portions of the staff had deployed to Somalia even before the entire staff had been identified. However, by the end of October more than 95% of the positions had been filled and personnel deployed to Somalia.

**In-country Coordination and Support.** As the JTF completed its closure into Somalia, it faced the task of establishing the necessary relationships with other commands and agencies already in Somalia. The two most important headquarters were UNOSOM II and U.N. Logistics Support Command (UNLSC), which had been previously known as Logistics Support Command Somalia. UNOSOM II was critical from the standpoint that COMUSFOROSOM was also the deputy commander of UNOSOM II. Good relations with UNLSC were a must; it was the only logistical support base in Somalia. The introduction of mechanized and armor forces presented a challenge to UNLSC as they had been oriented to supporting light forces, as shown in Figure 3. Establishing relations with UNLSC would prove to be difficult as it appeared that many of the member nations in Somalia harbored ill feelings towards the impending withdrawal of U.S. troops.

Two items of supply, bottled water and construction materials, were critical to the JTF Somalia deploying forces and UNLSC had complete control over each. Bottled
water was important to get troops acclimatized to the Somalian environment.

Construction materials were almost of equal importance because the newly deployed force would have to build their own base camps for life support. Existing facilities were under U.N. control and already at maximum capacity. While these two items received foremost attention, there were other logistical concerns because the lines of communication extended back to the United States.
Planning Organization. Planning began as soon as CJTF and the advance party arrived in Somalia. The focal point for planning within JTF Somalia was the J3. That position had been designated to be filled by a Marine Corps colonel. Within the J3, an Operational Planning Group (OPG) was organized. The OPG officially consisted of members of the JTF primary and special staff along with representation from assigned forces. The command relationship with the naval task force and MEU remained on order TACON. However, full cooperation from both organizations ensured that the mission would be accomplished.

Planning Process.

In a crisis, the situation is dynamic with the body of knowledge growing hour by hour from the latest intelligence reports. An adequate and feasible military response in a crisis demands flexible procedures keyed to the time available, to communications that are rapid and effective, and to the use of previous planning, whenever possible. The principle players need to know what others are doing and they need to know what is expected of them.¹

The deaths of U.S. soldiers on 4 and 5 October 1993 had placed the U.S. in a crisis situation. The decision had been made to deploy additional combat forces to Somalia to protect forces already in country and to prepare for the withdrawal of all U.S. forces by 31 March 1994. JTF Somalia did not have the 18-24 months allocated to the deliberate planning process. It had been thrust into crisis action planning. JTF Somalia was an
excellent example of how to conduct crisis action planning. The staff, even though it had very little joint experience, was able to execute the first five phases of crisis action planning (situation development, crisis assessment, course of action development, course of action selection, and execution planning) without problem. Problems did occur in the execution phase. Recalling that JTF Somalia was TACON to COMUSFORSOM and OPCON to CINCCENT, plans that were developed had to passed through each organization. COMUSFORSOM had a very small staff of less than 50 personnel. They, too, did not have in-depth joint experience. In addition, the COMUSFORSOM "pocket staff" had to contend with other issues concerning the UNOSOM II mission. From COMUSFORSOM, the developed plans were passed to CINCCENT and then on to the NCA. Plans generally took a minimum of 21 days to be acted upon. Given the uncertainty that prevailed in Somalia, this was an excessive amount of time.

**Plans**. CJTF immediately put his staff to work developing a campaign plan for JTF Somalia. Phase I of the campaign plan began with the reception and onward movement of the mechanized and armor task force being deployed. Recognizing that the task force would be most vulnerable as it was off-loading at the port and transiting around the city of Mogadishu to its logger location, the off-shore MEU was tasked to provide security for the task force. Again, the MEU was on order TACON to CJTF and by the time the plan had been acted on in the U.S., the task force had been moved to its logger location. The move was necessitated by the fact that the port had become overcrowded with continuous U.N. operations. The task force presented a lucrative target in the
confined port which was a risk that CJTF was unwilling to accept. The plan, as written, maximized both mass and economy of force. Risk to the task force would have been negligible had the plan been carried out.

Phase II planning dealt with maintaining freedom of movement on the supply routes in and around Mogadishu. Limited planning was conducted for the security of similar routes outside of Mogadishu as these were in sectors belonging to other nations. Several branches to the base plan were developed. Two of the branches developed were Medical/Dental Civil Assistance Programs (MEDCAP/DENCAP). These operations were designed to exhibit to the local population that the U.S. remained committed to the humanitarian effort being conducted in Somalia. Each was a joint operation as OPCON of the off-shore forces had been granted to CJTF. Both were very successful with the local citizenry and also exhibited to the Somali clan leaders that U.S. forces had the ability to move unrestricted and keep supply routes open should the need arise.

Phase III of the campaign was the withdrawal of U.S. troops and Noncombatant Evacuation Operations (NEO). While not included in the mission of JTF Somalia, the headquarters assumed the lead in planning for a potential NEO from Somalia. The withdrawal of U.S. forces was a very emotional issue both in the U.S. and Somalia. The media images of the failed Ranger raid remained fresh in the minds of the American population. U.N. forces were concerned that renewed fighting between the clans would breakout as the U.S. forces were withdrawing, or shortly thereafter. Fortunately, this did not, nor has not occurred.
Withdrawal planning guidance was very clear: the plan would assume that the withdrawal would be conducted under hostile conditions. The planning of the withdrawal was the most complicated effort that the headquarters conducted. Coordination was necessary with the U.S. forces off-shore and the U.N. forces on the ground. While command relationships with off-shore forces remained unchanged, there was no formal relationship with the U.N. forces other than COMUSFORSOM being dual-hatted as Deputy Commander, UNOSOM II. Further complicating the planning effort were three other facts. First, UNOSOM II was conducting a change of commanders in the February time frame. Second, the UNLSC was being redesignated as the U.S. Logistics Support Command (USLSC). This occurred as a result of U.N. logistical functions being transferred to a U.S. contractor. Third, the U.S. Deputy Commander of UNOSOM II was being replaced by a general officer from another member nation. This move allowed for the combining of two U.S. headquarters: COMUSFORSOM and JTF Somalia. The Commander, U.S. Forces Somalia, an Army major general, remained in Somalia to command COMUSFORSOM/JTF Somalia.

The withdrawal was successfully executed without incident and ahead of schedule. That is not to say, however, that the planning was without problems. Many organizations and agencies in the continental United States (CONUS) had a difficult time accepting the fact that the withdrawal was planned with the assumption that it would be conducted in a hostile environment. It took many hours of coordination to work the issues surrounding this type of operation, and the result was not always in the favor of the JTF.
NEO planning faced many of the same challenges as did withdrawal planning. In addition to having a newly appointed Chief of Mission in Somalia, the U.S. logistics contractor to the U.N. was increasing the presence of U.S. civilian personnel on a weekly basis. Determining the exact number and location of American citizens was a variable difficult to define. Successful planning for withdrawal and NEO was accomplished within the framework of the established command relationships and changes previously noted. The effectiveness the NEO planning cannot be determined at the present time.

Force protection, a recognized specified task in each of the mission statements, did not require a separate plan. Protection of U.S. military personnel was thoroughly integrated into every planned operation. In addition, more stringent force protection measures were integrated into U.S. forces' daily routines. For example, U.S. logistical convoys departing Mogadishu in support of U.N. operations were required to remain in constant radio contact with its parent unit and JTF Somalia. This was accomplished through the use of tactical satellite communication equipment that had been provided to the JTF on short notice from CONUS. Other CONUS agencies provided additional developmental items that enhanced the force protection posture of the JTF. The planning, integration of more stringent measures, and introduction of new equipment all attributed to the fact that not one life was lost in non-training activities.

Joint Training and Rehearsals. If the planning process of JTF Somalia was a marked success, then its joint training and rehearsals were resounding successes. CJTF recognized the extreme importance of joint training early on and made it one of his
priorities. Service components did not allow established command relationships to stand in the way of this important aspect of mission accomplishment.

To ensure that there would be no shortfall of aerial medical evacuation assets and locations where casualties could be evacuated, CJTF directed that Army medical evacuation pilots become deck landing qualified on naval platforms. Without doubt, this training was a unique opportunity for army helicopter pilots, but more importantly the training netted an expansion of force protection capability. This benefit was proven during numerous live rehearsals.

The operational fires of JTF Somalia also had tremendous lethality capability. Understanding this capability along with the fact that the components of JTF Somalia had not previously trained together, led to the decision to conduct numerous planning sessions and exercises to ensure that these fires could be properly controlled. It was a challenge to conceive a structure that could control Naval air assets, Marine air assets, Joint Special Operations Task Force (JSOTF) air assets, and Army air and ground assets. Extraordinary proficiency was achieved, but continual training was required because of the rotation of naval and marine units. In a period of four months, JTF Somalia worked with two different MEU's and two different Naval task forces. Before withdrawal would be complete, training would be conducted with two additional MEU's.

There are many more examples of joint training and rehearsal successes, but to list all of them is beyond the scope of this paper. If one significant training deficiency were to be identified, it would be the fact that little training was conducted with U.N. forces. It
could be argued that JTF Somalia took advantage of the fact that no formal command relationship existed between its forces and those of the U.N. A more likely answer, however, is the fact that U.N. forces were changing more rapidly than our own. Any training benefit realized would have been lost with the departure of the unit or nation.

**Plans Execution.** Of the seven plans formulated by JTF Somalia, only two branches of one plan and the withdrawal plan were executed. The NEO plan, while fully developed, has not been carried out as of this date. The question asked by JTF Somalia and anyone else reviewing the numbers of plans formulated versus executed is why the disparity. It was not the result of the plans being flawed.

JTF Somalia had done an exceptional job of integrating operational art into its plans. CJTF had correctly identified the city of Mogadishu as the center of gravity in Somalia. Any outbreak of fighting that could seriously jeopardize U.S. force protection would have to break out in Mogadishu. Whoever controlled Mogadishu would control Somalia. The clans of Aideed and Mahdi were only elements of the center of gravity. CJTF had also recognized that he would be operating almost exclusively on exterior lines, especially when dealing with sustainment. Realizing that if operations had to be conducted outside of Mogadishu, he would quickly reach a culminating point. Operations beyond Mogadishu could not be logistically sustained. The results of the 4 and 5 October 1993 Ranger raid had been studied and the capabilities of the potential adversary embedded in the planning process. Though those capabilities could be classified as primitive in comparison to U.S. capabilities, they were not to be
underestimated. The principles of mass and economy of force were also correctly applied in each plan.

In all likelihood, the plans were not executed because the NCA and CINCCENT realized that the potential adversaries had correctly identified the U.S. center of gravity: the will of the American public. Time was an essential element of this center of gravity. The Somalis had correctly assumed that Americans did not want any more U.S. blood shed in Somalia. All that the Somalis would have to do would be to wait until 31 March 1994. By that date the Americans, with their superior firepower, would be gone. Time proved the Somalis to be correct.
CHAPTER IV

CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS

Overview. JTF Somalia was successful in the accomplishment of its mission. It ably protected the force that it had responsibility for from 20 October 1993 to 25 March 1994. The JTF also maintained freedom of movement for U.S. and U.N. forces on all lines of communication. Finally, all U.S. forces were successfully withdrawn from Somalia prior to the 31 March 1994 presidential deadline. However, it is quite possible that the success by JTF Somalia may instead be a false sense of success. The reason for success was the selfless sacrifice made by the soldiers, sailors, marines, and airmen assigned to JTF Somalia.

Conclusions. The on order TACON of off-shore units to the JTF meant that CJTF could not, with absolute certainty, incorporate those forces into his plan. Ultimate approval for their use rested with USCENTCOM. Once approval for their use was granted, CJTF could only use them in the configuration in which they arrived. "The TACON relation does not carry with it the authority to organize the forces. Neither does the relationship allow CJTF - Somalia to incorporate these forces into a joint training plan prior to an operation." The TACON relationship also precluded the formation of some important standing functional organizations, such as the Joint Targeting Coordination Board and a Joint Combat Search and Rescue Board. JTF Somalia had established informal coordination to accomplish the mission of these boards. Also, off-shore assets
such as the unmanned aerial vehicle (UAV) could not routinely be tasked by CJTF. However, requests for their use were passed by CJTF to the off-shore commander and the missions were flown. In practice, off-shore forces cooperated with the JTF. They were active participants in the planning process and the conduct of joint training.

As stated earlier, COMUSFORSCOM maintained tactical control of JTF Somalia.

... TACON usually entails only detailed, local direction. The controlling headquarters controls the movements or maneuvers necessary to accomplish assigned tasks or missions. The TACON relation carries with it no authoritative direction over operations, nor does it allow the controlling headquarters to organize, employ, assign tasks or designate objectives for the controlled headquarters. All of these are attributes of Operational Control.\textsuperscript{2}

In reality, the relationship between the two headquarters resembled OPCON more than TACON. The TACON relationship also made logistical support of JTF Somalia more difficult than for other units assigned to COMUSFORSCOM. UNLSC, while a predominantly U.S.-manned organization, supported COMUSFORSCOM as previously shown in Figure 3. The TACON relationship implied no specific requirement for UNLSC to support the JTF.

A final fundamental conclusion is that an Army division headquarters does not have the equipment, staff structure, or joint service staff experience necessary to serve as the nucleus of a JTF headquarters. The methodology used with JTF Somalia worked only because the organization was composed of talented people whose ability to improvise resulted in success.

\textbf{Recommendations.} Joint Task Forces are time sensitive organizations; they must
achieve unity of effort among their components in very short periods. LTC Linn states:

...while no precise formula exists for organizing JTFs... the merits of forming around service organizations such as an Army corps, numbered fleet, Marine Expeditionary Force, or numbered Air Force lies in unity of effort and in the efficiency of an existing staff with established operating procedures, previous training, and common doctrine. ³

This approach becomes a building block for the solution. Following the designation of a service organization as the nucleus of a JTF, staff augmentation will follow-on and provide a joint staff planning ability normally not available to a service component. Finally, the CINC should delegate OPCON of the forces to the commander of the Joint Task Force. TACON may be appropriate when authority is required to direct and control movements or maneuvers necessary to mission accomplishment.
APPENDIX I

TERMS OF REFERENCE FOR U.S. FORCES SOMALIA,
UNITED NATIONS OPERATION IN SOMALIA FORCE COMMAND
TERMS OF REFERENCE
FOR
US FORCES SOMALIA,
UNITED NATIONS OPERATION IN SOMALIA FORCE COMMAND

1. Purpose. These terms of reference (TOR) constitute an agreement between the Commander in Chief, US Central Command (USCENTCOM) and the Commander, United Nations Operations in Somalia (UNOSOM II) Force Command for the staffing, organization, and operation of US Forces Somalia (USFORSOM).

2. Authority. The United Nations Security Council (UNSC) has established UNOSOM II in accordance with UNSC Resolution 814 (1993). The National Command Authorities have approved the participation of US Armed Forces as part of, and in support of, UNOSOM II Force Command.


4. Timing. UNOSOM II was established on 26 March 1993 by UNSC Resolution 814 (1993). Administratively, UNOSOM II Force Command Headquarters will be operational in early May 1993. Commander, UNOSOM II Force Command will assume full responsibility for enforcement of UNSC Resolution 814 (1993) on or about 4 May 1993 or at a date mutually acceptable to him and the Commander, Unified Task Force (UNITAF) in Somalia.

Command Relationships:

a. USCENTCOM retains command of USFORCOS and delegates operational, tactical, and/or administrative control of USFORCOS as required to support the Commander, UNOSOM II Force Command.

b. USCENTCOM exercises command of USFORCOS through the Commander, USFORCOS, who is dual-hatted as Deputy Commander, UNOSOM II Force Command.

c. USCENTCOM retains operational control of the Quick Reaction Force and Intelligence Support Element, as described in paragraphs 5.b. and 6.c. below.

d. Commander USFORCOS has administrative control of USFORCOS.

e. "Specific command relationships not outlined in the TCR will be coordinated between Commander, UNOSOM II Force Command, Deputy Commander, UNOSOM II Force Command, and USCENTCOM. USCENTCOM retains final approval authority for all command relationships involving US forces."
Organization. The USFORSOM consists of the Support Force including US personnel assigned to the UNOSOM II Force Command staff, the Quick Reaction Force (QRF) when directed, the Intelligence Support Element (ISE) when directed, and other augmentation forces, as required and when approved by USCINCENT, to support the Commander, UNOSOM II Force Command.

a. The Support Force will consist of those US military combat service/combat service support personnel and headquarters staff assigned directly to UNOSOM II Force Command.

1. Personnel assigned to the Support Force will be under the operational control of the Commander, UNOSOM II Force Command, through the Commander, USFORSOM dual-hatted as Deputy Commander, UNOSOM II Force Command.

2. The primary element of the Support Force will consist of the Logistics Support Command Somalia (LSCS) whose mission is:

(a) During transition to UNOSOM II, to provide UNOSOM II Force Command the same level of combat service support being provided by US forces to UNITAF, until relieved by other UNOSOM II Force Command donors or UN contract services, or as directed by USCINCENT. Transition of logistics support functions to the UN field operations division (FOO) logistics support structure will be event not schedule driven.

(b) After completion of the transition to UNOSOM II, be prepared to provide command, control and management of common item, theater level logistics support for UNOSOM II Force Command to include all units of USFOROSOM deployed in support of UNSC Resolution 814. Provide selected common item support, common use, services support and inland distribution of quick pol as required to support the Commander, UNOSOM II Force Command. Further logistics functions are outlined in paragraph 7 below.

The Quick Reaction Force provides US combat capability for rapid response in support of the Commander, UNOSOM II Force Command to counter specific threats that exceed the capability of UNOSOM II Force Command units. It will not be used to spearhead routine operations, escort convoys, or perform long-term security actions. The QRF will initially
be ashore in Somalia and will transition to off-shore/over-the-horizon presence where conditions warrant and when directed by the US National Command Authorities.

(1) Tactical control of the QRF is delegated from USCINCCENT to Commander, USFORSON in the following situations:

(a) Deployment for normal unit training exercises within Somalia;

(b) Situations within Somalia that exceed the capability of UNOSOM II Force Command forces and require emergency employment of immediate combat power for a limited period or for show of force operations.

(2) QRF taskings outside of the above guidelines require explicit USCINCCENT approval. However, when a situation arises requiring immediate action, and prior approval is impossible or impracticable, the Commander, USFORSON is authorized to make the execution decision.

(3) The QRF will comply with the rules of engagement for US forces supporting UNOSOM II Force Command as established in Operation RESTORE HOPE II CPORD 001.

c. Intelligence Support Element (ISE) will be deployed by USCENTCOM to provide intelligence support to UNOSOM II Force Command and USFORSON. All US intelligence information will be derived from and pass through the ISE. The ISE will consist of a US-only intelligence cell, US representatives to UNOSOM II Force Command headquarters, intelligence-related systems and communications personnel, and other US intelligence support activities, as required.

(1) ISE assets will remain under the supervision and control of the US at all times. Consistent with US releasability requirements, the ISE will directly support UNOSOM II Force Command operations.

(2) The Director of Intelligence, USCENTCOM has overall responsibility for developing and implementing the concept of operations for intelligence, coordinating intelligence requirements, developing the organization of the US-only ISE, and facilitating the acquisition of intelligence support systems.

(3) There will be no bilateral intelligence exchanges with coalition forces in Somalia.
Organization of the UNOSOM II Force Command is based on the following assumptions:

1. UNOSOM II Force Command will operate from five Area Support Centers, one in each of the five brigade sectors, with a General Support Base in Mogadishu, initially staffed largely by the Logistics Support Command Somalia.

2. The predominant UNOSOM II Force Command contributor within each sector will accept responsibility for the Area Support Center and provide logistics support for the entire sector.

3. The items below are the responsibility of UNOSOM II Force Command:
   (a) Perishable and nonperishable subsistence;
   (b) Petroleum (fuel);
   (c) Construction materials and barrier material;
   (d) Water production/purification, storage, and issue;
   (e) Ammunition: standard calibers;
   (f) Intra-theater airlift; and logistics support.
   (g) Ground line haul transportation.

4. The following items are a national responsibility:
   (a) Personal demand items (Class VI) for theater level;
   (b) Clothing, individual equipment, tools, administrative supplies; for contracting and acquisition support to UNOSOM II Force Command;
   (c) Ammunition: non-standard calibers; and by UNOSOM II Force Command;
   (d) Major end items: tracks, pylons, tracked vehicles, etc., and program management of theater transportation;
   (e) Repair parts (tactical vehicle maintenance, aviation support/maintenance) operated.

Best Available C-40
(f) Medical support:

i. Level-I and -II medical care are national responsibilities. Level-III care for UNOSOM forces is to be provided by a UNOSOM designated area support facility. The US will provide LEVEL-I, -II, and -III care specifically for US Forces.

ii. Class VIII (medical supplies) remains a national responsibility.

iii. Casualty evacuation is a national responsibility unless specifically designated by UNOSOM II Force Command to be provided by an area support unit.

(g) Postal support.

(h) Legal Support.

b. Consistent with the above assumptions, initially the LSCS will provide most of the personnel and resources to stand up UNOSOM II Force Command Support Command. The LSCS will furnish support at approximately the same level presently being provided by UNITAF Force Command Support Command.

c. Once UNOSOM II Force Command Support Command is operational, the LSCS will do the following:

1. Provide command and control of logistics support to UNOSOM II.
2. Furnish theater-level logistics management expertise and oversight to other units
3. Assist commander, UNOSOM II Force Command in establishing procedures for the receipt, storage, and issue of material at the theater level.
4. Coordinate with the UN FOD for contracting and acquisition support to UNOSOM II Force Command.
5. All contracting functions will be assumed by UN FOD.
6. Support and over sight contracts.
7. Coordinate and provide management of theater transportation.
8. Coordinate with UN/UNOSOM II on evaluation and liaison.
(2) Manage the Movement Control Center.

(a) Provide oversight management for the movement of personnel and material within the theater.

(b) Provide or arrange for land/theater air transportation of personnel and material.

(c) Provide command and control of attached/assigned units engaged in theater movement control.

(d) Provide highway regulation services.

(3) Conduct Material Management Control and be responsible for the management functions attendant to US common item support for combat rations, water, and bulk petroleum to UNOSOM II Force Command.

(4) Provide common item support (CIS), defined as combat rations, water, and bulk petroleum, to UNOSOM II Force Command, to include:

(a) Receipt, storage and issue/distribution of combat rations to the Area Support Centers.

(b) Production/purification, storage, and issue/distribution of water to the Area Support Centers.

(c) Receipt, storage, and issue/distribution of bulk petroleum (limited to JP5 and MOGAS) to the Area Support Centers.

d. Once UNOSOM II Force Command Support Command is established and functioning, the LSCS will begin drawing down by shifting functions to other donors and UN contractors. This transition will be event-driven, not schedule-driven.

3. Funding. US support of UNOSOM II Force Command will be handled in accordance with applicable US law regarding agreements between the UN and the US government.

3. Other Services. Administrative and technical support and services specifically not outlined in this TOR must be coordinated and negotiated between UN, US, and participating countries.

10. Coordination and Liaison. Coordination and liaison between the US and UN/other countries will be conducted as appropriate.
Responsibilities of US Military Personnel

US Armed Forces personnel assigned to UNOSOM II Force Command will perform their duties in accordance with the rules and regulations established for UNOSOM II Force Command and as stated by USCINCENT. The QRF, JSRT, and other units operating under US control will maintain current US command relationships.

No classified US military information of any nature, that is not releasable based on appropriate directives, will be released to foreign nationals or the UN unless specifically cleared by an appropriate US official.

Press Guidance. There will be no press release for this specific request for press activities with UNOSOM II Force Command. It will be forwarded to the UN for appropriate action. The State Department will remain the lead US agency for public affairs activities regarding all aspects of US participation in UNOSOM II. USCINCENT Public Affairs Office may conduct routine public affairs activities consistent with the UN and coordinating government agreements.

Modification and Termination. Modifications of the TOR will be issued by USCINCENT in consultation with the Joint Staff, Office of the Secretary of Defense, Department of State, and United Nations. The TOR will be reviewed one year from the date of issuance. The TOR may be terminated by mutual agreement of the parties or by direction of USCINCENT.
NOTES

Abstract


Chapter I


2. Ibid., p. 57.

3. Ibid., p. 62.

4. Ibid., p. 62.


8. Ibid., p. 51.

9. Ibid., p. 53.

10. Ibid., p. 54.

Chapter II


Chapter III


Chapter IV


2. Ibid., pp. 3-4.

BIBLIOGRAPHY


