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An initial examination of the definition of doctrine and the U.S. Navy's resistance to doctrine is undertaken, followed by a brief review of the three levels of war (strategic, operational, tactical) and their interrelationships. An examination of the status of operational doctrine in current USN publications is made, followed by a discussion of the requirement for a USN doctrinal publication addressing the operational level of war. Comparisons of Navy, land-based, and air-based operations follows.

Based on the above research, recommendations are made for a target audience and contents, and a proposed outline for a Navy operational doctrine publication is provided.
NAVAL WAR COLLEGE
Newport, R.I.

OPERATIONAL DOCTRINE FOR THE UNITED STATES NAVY
A Proposal

by

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Commander, United States Navy

A paper submitted to the Faculty of the Naval War College in partial satisfaction of the requirements of the Department of Operations.

The contents of this paper reflect my own personal views and are not necessarily endorsed by the Naval War College or the Department of the Navy.

Signature: Michael M. Moffatt

17 June 1994

Approved by:

Date

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Doctrinal development within the United States Navy (USN), for a variety of reasons, has traditionally been a slow, tedious process, oriented to the tactical level, and developed by fleet operating units. In the past ten years however, the emergence of the operational level of war within Army, Air Force, Marine Corps and joint doctrine has left the Navy in the unenviable position of being the sole combatant service lacking a published service doctrine addressing the operational level of war. Identifying the antecedents of this situation, assessing the validity of a requirement for a Navy publication addressing the operational level of war and proposing an outline for such a document are the basis for this paper.

An initial examination of the definition of doctrine and the U.S. Navy's resistance to doctrine is undertaken, followed by a brief review of the three levels of war (strategic, operational, tactical) and their interrelationships. An examination of the status of operational doctrine in current USN publications is made, followed by a discussion of the requirement for a USN doctrinal publication addressing the operational level of war. Comparisons of Navy, land-based, and air-based operations follows.

Based on the above research, recommendations are made for a target audience and contents, and a proposed outline for a Navy operational doctrine publication is provided.
PREFACE

While assigned as Head, Tactical Development and Evaluation Branch, Tactical Readiness Division, Chief of Naval Operations Staff (OPNAV Code 731), I was intimately involved in the standup and establishment of the Naval Doctrine Command (NDC). In conjunction with NDC creation, and as OPNAV manager of the Naval Warfare Publication (NWP) and Allied Tactical Publication (ATP) systems for the United States Navy (USN), I regularly researched and reported on the status of naval doctrine and doctrine development. During these efforts, I concluded the USN had little or no doctrine between the outdated strategic concepts elucidated in Naval Warfare Publication I (NWP I) Strategic Concepts of the United States Navy and the tactical procedures level (individual platform manuals, for instance.)

During my term of study at the Naval War College, I have become academically familiar with the operational level of war. Still of the belief that the Navy possesses no doctrinal publication addressing the operational level of war, I have attempted to propose a basic outline for such a publication that, once fully developed and distributed, would guide not only Navy warfighters, but more importantly, joint and combined warfighters in executing the operational level of naval warfare.
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"The object of military doctrine is to furnish a basis for prompt and harmonious conduct by the subordinate commanders of a large military force, in accordance with the intentions of the commander-in-chief, but without the necessity for referring each decision to superior authority before action is taken... to provide a foundation for mutual understanding between the various commanders..."

— Lieutenant Commander Dudley Knox, USN
"The Role of Doctrine in Naval Warfare"

The Problem. In 1915 in his prize-winning essay, "The Role of Doctrine in Naval Warfare," LCDR Knox highlighted the need for a codified naval doctrine. Nearly eighty years and two world wars later, the United States Navy (USN) still has not made great progress in defining and publishing Navy doctrine. For a variety of reasons, the United States Navy has traditionally been slow to codify its doctrine. Numerous naval officers have identified shortcomings in naval doctrine (LCDR Knox—1915, CDR Keener—1966, RADM Wylie—1967); however, none of these individuals identified a deficiency in USN doctrine at the operational level of war. Part of the reason is the concept of an operational level of war has only taken root in the United States military services in the past dozen years. The emergence of an operational level of war within Army, Air Force, Marine Corps, and joint doctrine has left the Navy in the unenviable position of being the sole combatant service without a published service-wide doctrine addressing the operational level of war. In view of the watershed change of policy enumerated in the Navy's White Paper "... From the Sea," the time appears ripe for the identification and satisfaction of doctrinal voids that exist at the operational level of war.
Definition of Doctrine.

“To many officers, doctrines are synonymous with principles; to others, the word suggests methods; and still others confound it with rules.”
—LCDR D. W. Knox, USN
“The Role of Doctrine in Naval Warfare”  

Part of the Navy’s difficulty in satisfying its doctrinal voids was that it had no formal definition of the term “doctrine” in any of its Naval Warfare Publications (NWP). A definition is not even in the Navy’s terminology publication, *NWP 3 Terminology.* Depending on whom was queried as to the definition of “naval doctrine,” answers would range from “NWPs are doctrine” to “the Navy has no doctrine.” In searching for a formal definition, the newly created Naval Doctrine Command has deferred to the Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS) definition, and has codified it in *Naval Doctrine Publication 1 (NDP 1) Naval Warfare.* Per *JCS PUB 1-02 DOD Dictionary of Military and Associated Terms,* “doctrine” is defined as:

Fundamental principles by which the military forces or elements thereof guide their actions in support of national objectives. It is authoritative but requires judgment in application.

While other definitions and proposals exist, for the purposes of this paper the approved JCS definition of doctrine will be used.

USN Resistance to Doctrine.

“In the minds of many, military doctrine savors of the academic and is dangerous. . . . Doctrine misconceived or born of ignorance is, of course, dangerous, . . .”
—CDR C.T. Vogelgesang, USN, 1915
This quote goes far in explaining some of the Navy's resistance to doctrine. The Fleet has traditionally had a degree of mistrust of the Navy shore community, particularly staffs and academia. Operational naval commanders have frequently possessed the view that "they are on-scene" and therefore have the best overall picture from which to make decisions. It is a noxious form of the "if it's not invented here, it's not worthwhile" syndrome. This resulted in a "bottom-up" approach to naval doctrine development; the fleets identified shortfalls, initiated doctrine studies, and developed and approved doctrine.

It has been proposed that Navy doctrine exists in the form of the Maritime Strategy, Fleet Commander fighting instructions and the Naval Warfare Publication Library (NWPL). As proof, defenders point to the fact that the Navy has for decades been successfully operating "under a consistent, defining, widely understood concept of operations—a doctrine." In an interview in early 1992 between Rear Admiral Joseph C. Strasser, President of the Naval War College, and Major Stephen D. Schmidt, USAF, Admiral Strasser pointed out that doctrine exists in the Navy but that "doctrine tends to imply a barrier to flexibility and mobility" and "the Navy just has an aversion to calling it [doctrine] doctrine,".

It is undeniable that the common mindset within the fleet and at the operator level is often a thinly disguised resentment of doctrine. Historically, naval officers have prided themselves that the Navy tells them what they can't do and all else is acceptable, as opposed to the perception that Army and Air Force officers are told what they can do and all else is unacceptable. This independent mindset unconsciously breeds a natural resistance to doctrine. The inherent military predilection for plagiarism (orders, formats, messages, etc.) strangely enough does not extend to doctrine. Commanding officers do not often say "What does someone else tell me to do?" when
handling various situations. The Navy is not accustomed to governing by a committee or staff approach; ergo the difficulties sometimes observed with getting fleet operators to accept a staff tour. LCDR S. A. Hastings, USN, articulated it well when observing:

"No tradition of [naval] doctrine has been handed down."

Levels of War. It is now generally accepted among the military services that there exists three levels of war: strategic, operational, and tactical. The dividing lines between the three levels of war are not distinct and there exists an overlap between levels. Figure 1 depicts graphically the three levels of war. Each level will be briefly discussed below.

![Relationships between levels of war](image)
**Strategic Level of War.**

"The level of war at which a nation or group of nations determines national or alliance security objectives and develops and uses natural resources to accomplish those objectives. Activities at this level establish national and alliance military objectives; sequence initiatives; define limits and assess risks for the use of military and other instruments of power; develop global or theater war plans to achieve those objectives; and provide armed forces and other capabilities in accordance with the strategic plan."

— *JCS Pub 1-02 (1989)*

The strategic level of doctrine flows from the National Security Strategy and the National Military Strategy. It establishes the ultimate objectives for an operational commander and/or a theater commander. At the strategic level of war, a nation normally utilizes all elements of its national power (economic, political, diplomatic, military) to achieve national goals. Additionally, at this level, the military component is often subjugated to the political component; as a result, objectives, concepts, and time-frames involved are often fuzzy or ill-defined by the political leadership.

**Tactical Level of War.**

"The level of war at which battles and engagements are planned and executed to accomplish military objectives assigned to tactical units or task forces. Activities at this level focus on the ordered arrangement and maneuver of combat elements in relation to each other and to the enemy to achieve combat objectives."

— *JCS Pub 1-02 (1989)*

At the tactical level of war, the military component is virtually the sole element of national power utilized; its predominance is principal. Characteristics of this level of war include a
reduced level of uncertainty (objectives and time-frames are normally well defined), a more specific concept of operations, and a shorter range vision (the “big picture” is small). Techniques, rules and procedures are principally in use at the tactical level.

Operational Level of War.

“If military force is committed to achieve a strategic objective, then the military activities which follow are at the operational level.”

The operational level of war is the link between tactical maneuvers and strategic objectives. At the operational level of war, commanders must ensure that operations concentrate on defeating the enemy's center(s) of gravity. Planners and executors of campaigns and major battles at the operational level must never lose sight of the strategic objective; its accomplishment effectively defines the operational level. A theater outlook is required. Similar to the strategic level of war, the operational level of war can use all elements of national power; however, at the operational level of war the military component is more predominant and more evenly balanced with the other elements (political, diplomatic, economic). The operational level of war is based on time, space and resources. Resources can include intelligence, weapons capabilities, numbers of troops, skill levels, morale, command and control capabilities, administration, logistics, etc.

Interactions/Relationships of the Levels of War. Tactical doctrine should flow from

† While it can be argued, for the purposes of this paper the terms operational level of war, operational perspective of war, operational art and operational doctrine will be used interchangeably.
operational doctrine; operational doctrine should flow from strategic doctrine. Operational level commanders exploit tactical events to achieve strategic objectives. ¹⁴

A comparison of some (not all) of the characteristics of the three levels of war are graphically presented in Figure 2. The arrows reflect the relative level of listed characteristics for each level, for example, the impact of the political component at the tactical level of war is relatively minor (if existant at all), increasing at the operational level of war and most prominent at the strategic level of war.

**CHARACTERISTICS OF LEVELS OF WAR**

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**FIGURE 2**
CHAPTER II

UNITED STATES NAVY OPERATIONAL DOCTRINE

Current USN Operational Doctrine. Having defined doctrine, examined the Navy's ingrained resistance to doctrine and briefly discussed the various levels of doctrine, we now turn to the current status of Navy doctrine at the operational level of war.

Published in “... From the Sea” was notice of the development of the Naval Doctrine Command (NDC). Commanded by a two-star admiral, its charter includes the identification, development and promulgation of naval service doctrine and doctrinal changes. With Naval Doctrine Command's establishment ceremony in February 1993, the Navy entered a new era in doctrine development. Formally releasing their first Naval Doctrine Publication, NDP 1 Naval Warfare, in the spring of 1994, NDC has taken the initial step in attempting to confront the Navy's doctrinal shortcomings. NDP 1 briefly mentions the operational level of doctrine in Chapter 3 and portends possible further development with the development and release of NDP 3 Naval Operations.

Excepting a brief mention in NDP 1, the USN does not currently have doctrine that meets the definition and requirements to qualify as operational doctrine nor that completely addresses the operational level of war. JCS Publication 0-2 Unified Action Armed Forces tasks services with developing doctrines, procedures, tactics, and techniques employed by the service. Disputably the Navy can point to the Naval Warfare Publication system and argue that it satisfies the JCS requirement. It possesses a strategic doctrine (outdated as it is) in NWP 1 Strategy of the United States Navy and a tactical doctrine in most of the remaining publications. But what is
missing, and the Navy is only now acknowledging this fact, is doctrine addressing the operational level of war. Even the recently released NDP 1 does not completely clarify this problem.

Several naval documents refer to, or infer, an operational perspective of war but it is piecemeal and incomplete. Some have said that the concept of operational doctrine is embodied in *NWP 1 Strategic Concepts of the United States Navy*; however, one would really need to read between the lines to defend this position. The argument has been put forth that *NWP 10-1(A)* *Combined Warfare Commander’s Manual* is in fact the Navy's operational doctrine. This premise does not hold water either in that *NWP 10-1* does not discuss the generalities of planning and executing campaign and successive operations; rather it describes the structure, organization, and connectivity involved in a battle group's operations (it has a tactical level of war orientation).

As the shift occurs from the open ocean, blue-water, war-at-sea mind-set, what has kept the Navy in good standing in the past likely will not suffice in a littoral, green-water, land-primacy strategy. A foundation of operational doctrine experience in littoral operations, needed to carry the Navy in the future, is in short supply—hence the imperative for a codified doctrine that the complete Navy chain of command can reference in assembling future campaigns and operations.

**The Need for USN Operational Doctrine.**

"The United States Navy needs an official doctrine, now more than ever."

— MAJ S. D. Schmidt, USAF
“A Call for an Official Navy Doctrine” Naval War College Review

In attempting to explain Navy doctrinal shortcomings, Major Schmidt asserts that the Navy preaches the "too hard to do" argument; his counter is that the other services have already
This argument is somewhat soft; the other services have assembled a service operational doctrine, but none have assembled an operational doctrine that addresses such a myriad of forms of land, air, and sea warfare as the US Navy is required to operate in. They have, in fact, only assembled doctrines that address, at most, two of the three environments that the Navy must operate in on a daily basis. It does not necessarily negate the argument, but merely introduces complications.

A surprisingly number of articles calling for a Navy operational doctrine have been written by sister service officers. This is not surprising when considering their need for a Navy doctrine. In today's environment, campaigns, and even large single strike operations, will likely be joint. Navy doctrine that is codified in the Maritime Strategy, Fleet Commander fighting instructions, Naval Warfare Publications, etc., results in the inability of sister service planners to assimilate these various publications to enable them to plan for the maritime component of joint theater and/or campaign operations. To ease the planning of these joint operations, all planners must have an appreciation for the way other services conduct operations. The need therefore exists for a single point publication addressing the Navy's operational level of war.

For the same reasons, combined operations also require a stable doctrinal basis to plan and execute operations with international maritime components. Combined operations inherently are more difficult for a variety of reasons (differing capabilities and aims, political guidance that is often somewhat amorphous, etc.). A published USN operational doctrine will certainly ease these inherent difficulties.

A call has been made by some that a joint doctrine command should be established, tasked with the development of joint doctrine—this argument almost begs that the USN should delay
assembling its own document on the operational level of naval warfare and instead input into the joint document that would address this area. Yet the ponderous pace at which joint doctrine is assembled and approved effectively negates this argument however. Additionally, the Navy needs to determine its own desired entry positions prior to the genesis of a joint publication.

This need for a Navy operational doctrine is especially critical as we move into more and more complex joint planning and operations and begin to explore naval operations in the green-water, littoral environment; for without a clear understanding of the naval services' contributions at the operational level of war, the Navy and the USN/USMC team will not be properly employed nor effectively utilized.

“... problems could be solved by codifying a naval [operational] doctrine that clearly provides official guidelines on how best to employ a force of carriers and their... aircraft in an operational campaign.”

— MAJ S. D. Schmidt, USAF
“A Call for an Official Navy Doctrine”
Naval War College Review
CHAPTER III

COMPARISONS OF SERVICE OPERATIONS

Having established a requirement for a Navy operational doctrine, what form should it take? What should it address? By comparing sister services' operational characteristics that affect doctrinal thinking, a basic conceptual format for a naval operational level doctrine can be gained. But because the Navy must operate and fight on 78% of the world's surface and subsurface while projecting power over the remainder using naval aviation and missiles, there exists certain unique issues that must be addressed in a Navy publication.

Comparisons with Land Operations. Sailors and soldiers approach warfare from opposite ends of the spectrum. Both are inherently bound by the mediums in which they conduct their operations and doctrines could be expected to be noticeably diverse. Surprisingly however, there is a good degree of commonality in basic principles and tenets.

Geography\(^\dagger\) controls both the soldier and sailor, but in markedly different ways. The soldier sees geography as fortress and weapon, force multiplier and hindrance. It can form a basis for his defensive strategy or it can blunt his offensive. It is how the soldier measures progress in conflict—the amount of territory captured, the kilometers given up. Goals—tactical, operational, strategic—are normally based on the possession of territory, implying a neutralization of the enemy. Because a defensive strategy option exists for the soldier at the various levels of war, reserve forces are often kept in the rear to reinforce weak areas across a front.

\(^\dagger\) For simplicity of discussion, the term “geography” will be used here to refer to land and sea, terrain features, elevations and the environment.
Soldiers, being bound to a relatively small maneuvering area by their surrounding terrain, tend to plan and operate on a smaller scale than sailors. One day’s march or ride may only encompass 200 miles; in contrast, the sailor can move 600+ miles in a 24 hour period and get rested while enroute. This expands the sailors view of the world, and shrinks the relative size of his playing field.

The sailor is also governed by geography, but in pointedly distinct ways. The seas and oceans provide no defensive terrain behind which the sailor can hide; opponents normally have the same positional advantages and disadvantages as a result. Therefore this offers no advantage to the defense. Without any advantage provided for in a defensive situation, the offense takes priority and alters the need for a force to be held in reserve. Should an engagement go poorly and naval forces be facing defeat, a reserve force would not likely arrive in time.

Though the sheer size of the sea provides for a level of maneuver that the soldier can only dream of, a sailor in pursuit of an unlocated enemy often finds it a hindrance. A ship or group of ships, despite satellite tracking technologies, can become extremely difficult to locate, track and target in an ocean the size of the Pacific. To this difficulty can be added the problem of civilian shipping on the open oceans; the soldier does not have civilian tanks maneuvering through his battlefield.

This magnitude of size also dictates that no one nation or group of nations can possess the sea; it can temporarily be denied or controlled, but never possessed. This results in a fundamental difference in the objectives of the soldier and sailor—one uses possession as a goal, the other can’t possess and therefore uses control or denial as the goal.
Today's highly trained, high-technology soldiers are relatively low cost and easily replaceable. Within six months a soldier can be trained and equipped to a level so as to be a functional part of a combat unit. His higher level weapons (tanks, artillery) would take longer to replace. This contrasts markedly with the sailor. While a sailor may be able to be trained adequately in six months, it would take years to re-equip him. Construction times for naval vessels run from 3-10+ years and cost millions of dollars. During both world wars, Germany was reluctant to engage the Allied fleets in full scale engagements for fear that they would suffer an unrecoverable defeat.

Logistics are a governing factor at the operational level of war and Major Schmidt's words echo this fact—"... the soldier ... is the only one of the military men who cannot do his part of the war alone." Soldiers cannot cross vast expanses of ocean nor land without the help of the sailor or airman, both of whom possess a near self-sufficiency in logistical support.

Finally, a fundamental difference that impacts doctrinal thinking between the soldier and the sailor, is the rank of the basic "trigger puller." While exceptions exist, it can generally be said that on land the enlisted soldier is the basic fighting unit, the "trigger puller," with the officer corps providing the direction and leadership. By contrast, the enlisted sailor tends to be more of an equipment maintainer, whether ship, submarine or aircraft. The officer corps at sea provides not only direction and leadership, but more importantly, is normally the "trigger puller." This difference in "trigger pullers" will affect the target audience of a publication dealing with operational doctrine at sea.

These differences—geographic dissimilarities, lack of a defensive or fortress capability at sea, high costs and replacement inequities, logistical support systems, rank of the "trigger pullers",

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and a difference in the scope of the view of the operating world—implies that naval operational doctrine should not mirror land-based operational doctrine. While this implication would have likely been true in a blue-water strategy, given the acceptance of the primacy of the land during war, as inferred in “... From the Sea,” strong consideration must be given for littoral operations and land-based operations.

Comparisons with Air Operations. The airman and sailor have a great deal in common. Some of the very reasons that establish differences between the soldier and the sailor result in similarities in the airman and sailor comparison.

Foremost among these, is again, geography. The air and sea possess common characteristics. The sheer magnitude of the sea and air prevent their possession; the airman, like the sailor, can only temporarily control or deny the use of the air. As with the sailor, the airman has no static defensive situation created in the air; no terrain to hide behind. To an even greater degree than the sailor, the airman sees the offensive as his primary operating mode.

The airman, even more so than the sailor, is possessed of great capabilities for mobility and maneuver. Modern aircraft can easily travel 500+ miles in a single hour; consequently, the time-space relationship is even more compressed than with the sailor. Additionally, the ability to work in three dimensions provides the airman a capability of maneuver that is only rivaled by the submarine sailor.

Like sailors, airmen utilize high-technology, high cost equipment that have long lead times to replace. Airmen (aircrew) also take the longest time to train and are therefore the hardest
individuals to replace in a conflict. Given the resulting limited numbers, air planners tend to be cautious in employment in large numbers. As with sailors, the “trigger pullers” in the Air Force are officers; enlisted personnel tend to emulate their sea-going brethren in that they are mainly maintainers. Airmen, like sailors, also have a big picture view of the world due to the “compression” of the world map—anywhere in the world can be reached within 24 hours.

These similarities—the magnitude of their operating mediums, a high degree of mobility and maneuver, costly and long lead-time procurement of equipment, lengthy training times, officer “trigger pullers”, and a relatively large tactical view of the world—indicate that the airman's operational doctrine may be the closest to what naval operational doctrine should be.
CHAPTER IV

PROPOSAL FOR A U.S. NAVY OPERATIONAL DOCTRINE MANUAL

"Military doctrines are beliefs or teachings which have been reasoned from principles; that is, they flow from principles as a source. They are intended to be general guides to the application of mutually accepted principles,..."

— LCDR D.W. Knox, USN
"The Role of Doctrine in Naval Warfare"^20

Having accepted the necessity for a USN naval doctrinal publication addressing the operational level of war and having compared sister service operations, we need to place boundaries on the contents of the publication and develop a rough outline.

The Road Ahead

"Naval [operational] doctrine forms a bridge between the naval component of our nation's military strategy and our tactics, techniques and procedures, such those found in our Naval Warfare Publications and Fleet Marine Force Manuals."

— NDP 1 Naval Warfare^21

The Navy has an opportunity to initiate a terminology standardization by establishing accepted terms for strategic doctrine, operational doctrine, and tactical doctrine so that the playing field is leveled and confusion ceases to exist. As currently expressed in NDP 1, the Navy has elected the term “military strategy” for doctrine at the strategic level of war, “doctrine” for doctrine at the operational level of war, and “tactics” for doctrine at the tactical level of war. In fact, all three are doctrine; they should be referred to as “strategic doctrine”, “operational doctrine” and “tactical doctrine”, respectively.
Audience. In determining the format a Navy operational doctrine should assume, it is constructive to establish the target audience. The Army's *FM 100-5 Operations* and the Marine Corps' *FMFM 1-1 Campaigning* are written for the basic foot soldier and discuss in depth the principles and tenets of war, and how to conduct the operational level of war. The Air Force, by contrast, in *AFM 1-1 Volume I Basic Aerospace Doctrine of the USAF*, has developed a publication oriented to the whole force, and addresses a chapter on operational art in general terms; *Volume II* goes into greater detail, much like the Army and Marine Corps publications.

In deciding the target audience, let's revisit the issue of service “trigger pullers.” As mentioned previously, the Navy is a force in which the officer corps is often the warfighter; in the Army and Marine Corps, the enlisted component is the basic warfighter. This leads to a difference that may appear subtle but is very basic. In a land battle, when the company commander or platoon sergeant is killed or missing, enlisted personnel can step in, and having a clear understanding of the mission and concept of operations, continue the engagement or battle successfully. In the Navy however, if the skipper of the ship is killed, or the lieutenant commander division strike lead is shot down, it is normally an officer that immediately steps in and continues the engagement. Navy enlisted personnel tend to be maintainers (whether an engine system, radar system, or guns system) and only a small portion of the rates tend to be "operators" that could step in and handle an engagement. This specialization, inherent to the Navy, tends to preclude a common operational doctrine that is readable, understandable, usable and pertinent from the Chief of Naval Operations down to the greenest seaman recruit. A document akin to the United States Marine Corps' *FMFM 1 Warfighting*, or the Army's *FM 100-5 Operations*, would be so far above the head of the average E-3 boiler technician or aviation
hydraulics maintenance man that it would likely be a study in futility. They just would not have a need for such principles; their jobs would never utilize them. Therefore, Navy operational doctrine should not be written towards the enlisted sailor.

Who, then, should be the target audience? Taking a hint from those most vocal in their calls for a Navy operational doctrine, the target audience should be the likeliest users of its contents: naval planning staffs, both shore-based and afloat, and those officers involved in joint and combined planning at the operational level. As such, the publication should be written to this audience.

Content? Having established the target audience, to what level of detail should it be designed? It needs to be unclassified, easily readable, readily available, usable, and releasable to allies and coalition partners. It must be detailed enough to guide actions, yet general enough to encompass the myriad of situations that inherently exist in naval operations. It must not go down to the tactics, techniques and procedures level (i.e. message requirements, lower level chain of command diagrams, reporting requirements, etc.).

It should discuss the levels of war and, in detail, the concept of the operational level of war and the interplay between the levels. The prescribing and dividing of the theaters of war and operations must be addressed. The principles, processes, tenets, and the operational instruments of war (time, space, resources) should be delineated; relating these items to the naval capabilities found in “... From the Sea” will help tie the principles to the missions. How the Navy applies the operational level of war to the continuum of naval operations starting from peaceful presence through to global war will aid the planner in determining how to utilize naval forces across the
spectrum of conflict. The practical employment of naval operational forces from the commander's point of view should follow, addressing how to structure operational forces, commander's intent, and how to plan and train forces. Lastly, the utilization of naval forces in a joint and combined arena demands discussion.

Naval Operational Doctrine: A Proposal. What follows is a proposed outline for a publication dealing with the operational level of naval warfare. It is not intended to provide the doctrine, rather identify those items that should be included in the publication; some of the items will not have yet been developed and/or agreed upon. For those areas for which there is known to be current or developing principles, positions or constructs, I have footnoted possible source material.

NAVAL OPERATIONAL DOCTRINE

CHAPTER ONE
LEVELS OF WAR

I. The Three Levels of War
II. Strategic Level
   Elements of national power
III. Operational Level
IV. Tactical Level
V. Strategic-Operational Relationship
VI. Operational-Tactical Relationship

CHAPTER TWO
DEFINING AND SHAPING THE THEATER

I. Areas of Influence
II. Areas of Interest
III. Areas of Responsibility
IV. Theaters of War
V. Theaters of Operations
CHAPTER THREE
NAVAL OPERATIONAL WARFARE

I. Principles of Naval Warfare
II. Processes
III. Tenets
IV. Operational Instruments of War

Time
Space
Resources

CHAPTER THREE
NAVAL OPERATIONAL WARFARE

VI. A. Naval Capabilities
   Command, Control and Surveillance
   Intelligence
B. Battlespace Dominance
   Control of the Sea
   Littoral Operations
   Mining Operations
C. Power Projection
   Battle Group Employment
D. Force Sustainment
   Logistics

CHAPTER FOUR
CONTINUUM OF NAVAL WARFARE

I. Peacetime Operations
   Forward Presence
   Gunboat Diplomacy
   Humanitarian Operations
   Counter-Drug Operations
II. Transition to Conflict
III. Naval Operations in Conflict
   Amphibious Warfare
   Blue Water Operations
   War-At-Sea
IV. Naval Campaigns
V. War Termination
CHAPTER FIVE
IMPLEMENTING OPERATIONAL STRATEGIES

I. Command Structure
   Combined Warfare Commander
II. Commander's Intent
III. Operational Planning
IV. Operational Training
V. Execution

CHAPTER SIX
JOINT AND COMBINED OPERATIONS

I. Joint Operations
II. Combined Operations

Glossary
CHAPTER V

CONCLUSIONS

"The Navy must shed its history of antipathy toward doctrine and develop a naval [operational] doctrine that truly rises from the minds and hearts of its officers and men . . ."

— LCDR S. A. Hastings, USN
"Is There a Doctrine in the House?,” 1994^33

"... doctrine should not be built up, ... the start should be made at the top."

— LCDR D. W. Knox, USN
"The Role of Doctrine in Naval Warfare”^34

The Navy’s approach to doctrine has been given a big boost by the Secretary of the Navy’s establishment of the Naval Doctrine Command. But mere establishment does not doctrine make. A concentrated “top-down” effort to satisfy identified doctrinal voids is now ongoing and a priority task should be the defining, development, codification, publication and promulgation of the levels of naval warfare doctrine.

More specifically, the Navy needs to develop the basics tenets of the operational level of naval warfare and publish them as a naval operational doctrine. A Navy version of the Army’s FM 100-5 Operations, the Air Force’s AFM 1-1 Basic Aerospace Doctrine of the USAF, the Marine’s FMFM 1-1 Campaigning, and the JCS PUB 3-0 Doctrine for Joint Operations will go far in rectifying the Navy’s reputation as the “foot-dragger” in the doctrinal world. Until the Navy joins its sister services in the active pursuit of coordinated operational doctrine thinking, clearly and concisely codifies its doctrine, and widely promulgates the resulting doctrine for all planners to utilize, it will not be able to take its rightful place in future joint operations.
2 Ibid.
8 Ibid.
11 JCS PUB 1-02, p. 349.
12 Ibid., p. 362.
14 AFM 1-1 Vol II, Essay N.
16 Schmidt, p. 45.
17 Ibid., p. 53.
18 Ibid., p. 55.
20 Knox, p. 334.
21 NDP I, p. ii.
23 Ibid.
25 Milan N. Vego, “Fundamentals of Operational Art (Glossary of Terms and Their Definitions),” Unpublished Draft, Joint Military Operations Department, U.S. Naval War College, Newport, RI: February 1994. This document, combined with the above lecture would provide the basis for this chapter. Defining the areas of responsibility and conceiving the concept of the time-space relationships at the operational level of war is critical.
Goodwin/Shuford, p. 12.
FM 100-5 Operations discusses tenets for Army operations; Navy and/or naval tenets would need to be determined.


Hastings, p. 38.
Knox, p. 347.
BIBLIOGRAPHY


